Date and Time: 16 December 2019 14:30:00 IST

Job Number: 105393237

Documents (3)

1. 16.1 Offences against the State

Client/Matter: -None-
2. 16.2 Sedition
Client/Matter: -None-
3. 16.3 Offences Relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force
Client/Matter: -None-

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 16.1 Offences against the State
KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed
K D Gaur

KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed > KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and
Materials, 9th ed > Part II Specific Offences > 16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE
ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

Part II Specific Offences

16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

16.1 Offences against the State

All crimes are treated as offences against the State, or government, insofar as these acts/actions disturb the public
tranquility, national integration and public order. But there are some criminal activities that are directed against the
existence of the State itself viz. treason, sedition and rebellion. The cases reported under sections 121, 121A, 122,
123, 124A, 153A and 153B of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

A total of 571 cases of offences against the State (under sections 121, 121A, 122, 123, 124A, 153A and 153B of
IPC, 1860) were registered during 2015, showing an increase of 11.5% over previous year 2014 (512 cases) [Table
21.1] given below.1

The offences against the State discussed in Chapter VI of IPC, 1860 comprises of twelve sections commencing
from sections 121, 121A, 122 to 124 and 124A to 130. These offences can broadly be classified into five categories:

(i) Waging or attempting or conspiring to wage or collecting men or ammunition to wage war against the
Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123, IPC).
(ii) Assaulting the President of India or governor of any State with intent to compel or restrain the exercise of
any lawful authority (section 124, IPC).
(iii) Waging war against a State [power] at peace with the Government of India (section 125, IPC) or
committing depredations on territories of such State (sections 125, 126, IPC).
(iv) Permitting or aiding the escape of a State prisoner or a prisoner of war (sections 128, 129, 130, IPC).
(v) Sedition (section 124A, IPC).
(vi) Promoting enmity between different groups.

121. Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India.—
Whoever, wages war against the *[Government of India], or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such
war, shall be punished with death, or **[imprisonment for life] ***[and shall also be liable to fine].

Comments

1. Principle.—Every State has the right of self-preservation similar to that of subjects. Accordingly, laws have
been enacted to safeguard and preserve states since time immemorial. In monarchial forms of
government, the right of preservation of the State was exalted into a sacred right, and so the violence
against the States was considered lese majestic-lese majestic human, an offence against the dignity and
majesty of invisible God.

The Penal Code has incorporated the common law concept of preservation of State and has provided
for the most severe punishment of the death sentence, life imprisonment and fine in case of offence
 Page 2 of 5
16.1 Offences against the State

against the State under section 121 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. Ingredients of section 121.—To constitute the offence under section 121 the Indian Penal Code, 1860
the following ingredients must exist:

• (i) accused must wage War, or

• (ii) attempt to wage such war, or
• (iii) abet the waging of such war,
• (iv) against the Government of India.

3. Whoever - This section applies to everyone, whether an Indian citizen or foreigner. Everyone who wages a
war against the Government of India is subject to prosecution and punishment under this section.
Foreigners are liable on the principle of de jure gentium (allegiance and protection are reciprocally due
from subject and sovereign) which admits the right of foreigners to enter the country only upon the tacit
condition that as they rely upon its protection, they are also subject to its laws.
4. Waging war - In view of the gravity of the offence contemplated under this section, the act of waging war,
attempting to wage war and abetting the waging of war against the Government of India is treated on equal
footing and the same punishment of death or imprisonment for life is prescribed in all the cases. In other
words, the section deals with three stages of complicity in waging war against the Government of India,
viz., abetment, attempt and actual war.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with sections 120B, 109, 121 A and 34 and sections 307, 397,
324, 341, 342, and 364 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Case of 20 November 2008 was the offence of waging war
against the Government of India that left Mumbai scarred and traumatised and the entire country shocked
killing 166 people, injuring 238 and resulting in loss of property worth Rs 150 crore is a crime of
unprecedented enormity on all scales since the birth of the Republic that attracts death penalty to the sole
surviving terrorist captured alive out of the ten (nine others were killed in encounter with the police) -
Supreme Court, 2012

Mohd Ajmal Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra,

AIR 2012 SC 3565 : (2012) 9 SCC 1 : 2012 Cr LJ 4770 : 2012 (7) Scale 553 : 2012 (8) JT 4

Per Aftab Alam and Chandramauli Prasad, JJ:

Justice Altamas Kabir said the trial court has awarded death sentence on five counts to TA-1 (terrorist accused) for
the offences punishable under (1) section 120B, 1860 IPC for waging war against conspiracy to commit murder; (2)
section 121 IPC for waging war against India; (3) section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967; (4) section
302 IPC for committing murder of 7 persons; (5) section 302 read with section 34 read with section 109 and 120B
IPC.

The High Court confirmed the death sentence on five counts given to TA-1 by the trial court in a comprehensive
judgment running into 361 pages with lll Schedules in the course of hearing of the case spread over 13 weeks
examined in great details, every aspects of the complicated case of its own type in independent India confirmed the
convictions and sentences of the appellant passed by the trial court. The Apex Court while concluding the judgment
said, “We are left with no option but to hold that in the facts of the case the death penalty is the only sentence that
can be given to the appellant accused”.

The case of the prosecution is based on the confession of the accused, which may be divided into two parts (i) one
relating to conspiracy, preparation and planning for the attack; and (ii) the other relating to actual attack on Mumbai
in execution of the conspiracy of which the appellant along with his buddhia (accomplice), the accomplice Abu
Ismail was a part. A sinister conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan and in furtherance of that conspiracy a savage
attack was unleashed on Mumbai by a team of ten terrorists, including Kasab, who landed on the city’s shore via
the Arabian Sea. The attack began on 26 November 2008 at about 9.15 pm and it ended when the last of attackers,
who was held up in Hotel Taj Mahal Palace, was killed by Indian Security Forces at about 9.00 am on 29 November
2008. Brutal assault left Mumbai scarred and traumatized and the entire country shocked. The terrorists killed one
hundred and sixty-six (166) people and injured, often grievously, two hundred and thirty-eight (238) people. The
 Page 3 of 5
16.1 Offences against the State

loss of property resulting from the terrorist attack was assessed at over Rupees one hundred and fifty crores (Rs
150 crore). The dead included eighteen policemen and other security personnel and twenty-six foreign nationals.
The injured included thirty seven policemen and other security personnel and twenty one foreign nationals. Of those
dead, at least seven were killed by the appellant personally, seventy-two were killed by him in furtherance of the
common intention he shared with one Abu Ismail (deceased accused No 1) and the rest were victims of the
conspiracy to which he was a party along with the nine dead accused and 35 other accused who remain to be
apprehended and brought before the court.

The appellant was convicted and sentence to death vide judgment and order dated 3 June 2010 passed by the Add
Session Judge, Greater Mumbai which was confirmed by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 21
February 2011.

The appellant, tried as accused 1, TA-1 along with nine deceased associates having been trained and indoctrinated
by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan, illegally transgressed into Indian territories from the sea at Mumbai by
hijacking an Indian fishing boat and killing its navigator. These 10 terrorists entered Mumbai at a strategic location
(i.e. Badhwar Park, a fishing village in the heart of city) where they would not be suspected and from where they
could easily move to their target locations for mass killing of Indians and foreigners on Indian soil. The map on the
basis of which their operation was planned and executed had allegedly been prepared by TA-2 and TA-3 (who has
been caught by Indian Police much prior to the alleged attack). The 10 terrorists equipped with sophisticated
gadgets and armed with highly lethal weapons and ammunition divided themselves into five pairs. In their whole
operation, the ten terrorists killed a total of 166 persons, injured 238 others and destroyed property estimated at Rs
150 crore. TA-1 (who has paired with DA-1) was caught alive but the rest of his nine associates who had come to
India died in the encounter. The inflatable rubber dinghy in which the A10 terrorists [the appellant, Kasab (TA-1 or
tried accused 1) and DA-1 to DA-9 (deceased - accused 1 to 9)] came to Mumbai landed at a place called Badhwar
Park (the fishermen’s colony). Out of the total of 166 persons killed and 238 injured by the terrorists, TA-1,
personally and jointly with DA-1 was directly responsible for killing at least 72 people and causing injuries of various
kinds to 130 people.

TA-1 confessed that he committed the first murder on the hijacked Indian fishing boat, Kuber where TA-1 himself
slit the throat of the navigator by asking the others to hold the legs of the deceased. As per the prosecution story
TA-1 and DA-1 killed a total number of 72 persons starting with the said navigator and ending at Vinoli Chowpaty, in
Mumbai (where they were finally caught). As per prosecution evidence, others i.e., DA-2 to DA-9 killed 94 persons
and injured 108 others at various places like Leopold Cafe, Mazegaon Blast, Hotel Taj, Nariman House and Hotel
Oberoi by taking positions there.

The case presents the element of previous planning and preparation as no other case. For execution of the
conspiracy, TA-1 and 9 other dead accused, his accomplices, where given rigorous and extensive training in
Pakistan as combatants. The planning for the attack was meticulous and greatly detailed. The route from Karachi to
Mumbai, the landing site at Mumbai, the different targets at Mumbai were all predetermined. The nature of the
attack by the different teams of terrorist was planned and everyone was given even clear instructions as to what
they were supposed to do at their respective targets. All the terrorists, including TA-1, actually acted according to
the previous planning. A channel of communication between the attacking terrorists and their handlers and
collaborators from across the border in Pakistan, based on advanced computer technology and procured through
deception, was already arranged and put in place before the attack was launched. This case has the element of
waging war against the Government of India and the magnitude of the war is of a degree as in no other case. And
TA-1 is convicted on the charge, among 4 other, of waging war against the Government of India.

The appellant, as also the other nine terrorists, his co-conspirators, used highly lethal weapons such as AK 47
rifles, 9 mm pistols, and Grenades and RDX bombs.

As to the personality of the victims, all the persons killed/ injured at CST, Badruddin Tayabji Marg and Cama
Hospital were harmless, defenseless persons. What is more, they did not even know the appellant and the
appellant too had no personal animus them. He killed/ injured them simply because they happened to be Indians.

Against all this, the only mitigating factor is TA-1’s young age, but that is completely offset by the absence of any
remorse on his part, and the resultant finding that in his case there is no possibility of any reformation or
rehabilitation.

While dismissing the appeal and confirming the death sentence awarded to the accused by the courts below,
Justice Aftab Alam speaking on behalf of the Apex Court said:
 Page 4 of 5
16.1 Offences against the State

If we examine the present case in light of the Machhi Singh,2 decision, it would not only satisfy all the conditions laid
down in that decision for imposition of death sentence but also present several other features that could not have
been conceived of by the court in Machhi Singh. We can even say that every single reason that this court might
have assigned for confirming a death sentence in the past is to be found in this case in a more magnified way.

This case has element of conspiracy as no other case. The appellant was part of a conspiracy hatched across the
border to wage war against the Government of India and lethal arms and explosives were collected with the
intention of waging war against the Government of India. The conspiracy was to launch a murderous attack on
Mumbai regarding it as the financial centre of the country; to kill as many Indians and foreign nationals as possible;
to take Indians and foreign nationals as hostages for using them as bargaining chips in regard to the terrorists’
demands; and to try to incite communal strife and insurgency; all with the intent to weaken the country from within.

The number of policemen and members of security forces killed and injured in course of their duty by the appellant
and his accomplice Abu Ismail and the eight other co-conspirator would hardly find a match in any other cases.
Tukaram Ombale killed by the appellant personally at Vinoli Chowapty. Durgude, Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte,
Vijay Salaskar and the other policemen in the police van were jointly killed by the appellant and Abu Ismail. The
policemen at Cama Hospital were injured, several of them grievously, jointly by the appellant and Abu Ismail. The
rest of the policemen and law enforcement officers, including the NSG Commando Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan,
were killed as part of the larger conspiracy to which the appellant was a party.

It is already seen above that the appellant never showed any repentance or remorse, which is the first sign of any
possibility of reforms and rehabilitation.

In terms of loss of life and property, and more importantly in its traumatising effects, the case stands alone, or
atleast the very rarest of rare case to come before the Apex Court, since the birth of the republic. Therefore, it
attracts the rarest of rare punishment. Kasab was finally executed in 2012 December in Pune jail under tight
security.

Terrorism - Disseminating terrorist publications by uploading videos showing attacks by insurgents on

coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan - And attacks by those engaged in armed struggle against
government on internet is an act of terrorism.

Regina v Gul (Mohammed),

(2012) EWCA Crim 280

The defendant, a British citizen was burnt on 24 February 1998 in Libya and it was uploaded onto the internet
videos, glorifying and encouraging attacks on forces of Her Majesty then serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, which
showed attacks on soldiers by insurgents on coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was charged with six
counts of disseminating terrorist publications. In 2008 and 2009, contrary to section 2 of Terrorism Act 2006, with
the intent to encourage the commission of terrorist acts. The defendant’s case was that he believed that the
insurgents were rightly resisting the invasion of their countries and that he was encouraging self-defence, not
terrorism. After retiring to consider their verdicts, the jury asked the judge whether the attacks seen on the videos
came within the definition of terrorism under section 1 of Terrorism Act 2000. The judge told the jury that the attacks
did come within that definition. The defendant was convicted on five of the six counts.

The defendant applied for leave to appeal against conviction on the ground that the definition of terrorism in
international law excluded those engaged in an armed struggle against a government who attacked the armed
forces of that government. It was a common ground on the appeal that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had
been non-international armed conflicts at the relevant time and that the criminal liability of the insurgents was a
matter of domestic law.

Dismissing the appeal, that on the face of section 1 of Terrorism Act 2000, acts by insurgents against the armed
forces of a State anywhere in the world which sought to influence a government and were made for political
purposes fell within the definition of “terrorism”, and there was no exemption for those engaged in an armed
struggle against a government.
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16.1 Offences against the State

1 Crime in India, 2015, p 182.

2 Machhi Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 957 : (1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 Cr LJ 1457.

End of Document
 16.2 Sedition
KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed
K D Gaur

KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed > KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and
Materials, 9th ed > Part II Specific Offences > 16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE
ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

Part II Specific Offences

16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

16.2 Sedition
The law of sedition has assumed controversial importance nowadays in view of the various changes that have
taken place during the last five decades. Sedition in common language means a stirring up of rebellion against the
government.

The word “sedition” under section 124A, IPC, 1860 is used to designate those activities which, either by words,
deeds or writings, are calculated to disturb the tranquility of the State, and lead people to subvert the government
established by law.3 The provisions of section 124A and section 5054 (Offences against public mischief) apply only
to speeches and writing having intention or tendency to incite others to create public disorder or to violence.
Criticism of government, however strongly worded, does not fall within the ambit of these sections. So long as there
is no intention or tendency to incite others to public disorder, the provisions of these sections are within the ambit of
clause 2 of Article 19 of Constitution of India and are not void as being in violation of the right to freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed in Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution.

124A. Sedition.—Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or

otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards
the government established by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be
added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

Explanation 1.—The expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.

Explanation 2.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain
their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not
constitute an offence under this section.

Explanation 3.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the government
without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this
section.

505. Statements conducing to public mischief.—(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement,
rumour or report,—

(a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the Army, Navy or Air
Force of India to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or
(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public
whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public
tranquility; or
(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence
against any other class or community;
 Page 2 of 11
16.2 Sedition

shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both.

(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes.—Whoever makes, publishes or
circulates any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is
likely to create or promote on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or
any other ground whatsoever, feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or
with fine, or with both.

(3) Offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship, etc.—Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or
religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable
to fine.

Exception.—It does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this section, when the person making,
publishing or circulating any such statement, rumour or report, has reasonable grounds for believing that such
statement, rumour or report is true and makes, publishes or circulates it in good faith and without any such intent as
aforesaid.

770 Criminal Law: Cases and Materials

Sedition: Sections 124A and 505 IPC, 1860 are not void in view of the proviso to Article 19 (1)(a) of the
Constitution of India, Criticism of the Government howsoever strongly worded is not punishable Supreme
Court — 1962

Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar,

AIR 1962 SC 955 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769

State of UP v Ishaq Ilimi5

Per Sinha CJ:

In these appeals, the main question in controversy is whether sections 124A and 505 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
have become void in view of the provision of Article 19 (1)(a) of the constitution. The constitutionality of the
provisions of section 124A is common to all the appeals, the facts of which may shortly be stated separately.

In Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957, the appellant is one Kedar Nath Singh, who was prosecuted before a
magistrate...under sections 124A and 505 (b). His appeal to Patna High Court was dismissed.

In Criminal Appeals 124-126 of 1958, the State of Uttar Pradesh is the appellant though the respondents are
different while the respondent Paras Nath (Cr App No 126 of 1958) was placed on trial he filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the Allahabad High Court challenging his detention on the ground that it was illegal in as much as the
provisions of section 124A IPC, 1860 were void as being in contravention of his freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution which was allowed by the High Court.

The Apex Court gave a detailed account of the various decisions of the federal court and the Privy Council relating
of section 124A IPC starting from 1892 in Bangobasi’s case (Queen Empress v Jogendra Chunder Bose), (1892)
ILR 19 Cal 35; celebrated case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1898) ILR 22 Bom 112; Queen Empress v Amba Prasad,
ILR 20 All (FB) 55; Niharendu Dutt, AIR 1942 FRC 22 and Emperor v Sadashiv Narain case, (1947) till the
enactment of the Constitution of India on 26 January 1950.6

The question for decision in these cases is:7 how far is the offence, as defined in section 124A IPC, consistent with
the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) of Constitution of India which states:

19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

(b) This guaranteed right is subject to the right of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions, the ambit of
which is indicated by clause (2), which, in its amended form, reads as follows:
 Page 3 of 11
16.2 Sedition

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing laws/, or prevent the State from making
any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause
in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

...The right is subject to such reasonable restrictions as would come within the purview of clause (2) which comprises:

(a) security of the State

(b) friendly relations with foreign States
(c) public order and
(d) decency or morality, etc.

Hence, any acts within the meaning of section 124A which have the effect of subverting the government by bringing
that government into contempt or hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute
because the feeling of disloyalty to the government established by law or enmity to it imports the idea or tendency
to public disorder by the use of actual violence or incitement to violence. In other words, any written or spoken
words, etc., which have implicit in them the idea of subverting the government by violent means, which are
compendiously included in the term “revolution”, have been made penal by the section in question.

... [T] the section has taken care to indicate clearly that strong words used to express disapprobation of the
measures of the government with a view to their improvement or alteration by lawful means would not come within
the section. Similarly, comments, however strongly worded, expressing disapprobation of actions of the
government, without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by acts of
violence, would not be penal.

In other words, disloyalty to the government established by law is not the same thing as commenting in strong
terms upon the measures or acts of the government, or its agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people
or to secure the cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to say, without exciting
those feelings of enmity and disloyalty which imply incitement to public disorder or the use of violence.

The expression “in the interest of... public order” of clause 2 to Article 19 are words of great amplitude and are
much more comprehensive than the expression for the maintenance of as observed by this court in the case of
Virendra v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896 : [1958] 1 SCR 308. Any law which is enacted in the interest of public
order may be saved from the vice of constitutional invalidity.

Penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public
peace by resort to violence.

The explanations to the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comments on government action,
however; strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of
freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. have the pernicious tendency
or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order, that the law steps in to prevent such
activities in the interest of public order. The section strikes the correct balance between the individual fundamental
rights and the interest of public order.

...With reference to each of the three clauses of section 505, (see text, statements conducing to public mischief) it
will be found that the gravamen of the offence is making, publishing or circulating any statement, rumour or report:

(a) with intent to cause or which is likely to cause any member of the army, navy or air force to mutiny or
otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or
(b) to cause fear or alarm to the public or a section of the public which may induce the commission of an
offence against the State or against public tranquility; or
(c) to incite or which is likely to incite one class or community of persons to commit an offence against any
other class or community.
 Page 4 of 11
16.2 Sedition

It is manifest that each one of the constituent elements of the offence under section 505 has reference to, and a
direct effect on, the security of the State or public order. Hence, these provisions would not exceed the bounds of
reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It is therefore clear that clause (2) of
Article 19 clearly saves the section from the vice of unconstitutionality.

The Criminal Appeal No 169 of 1957 is dismissed. Criminal Appeal Nos 24-126 of 1958 are remanded to the High
Court for order in the light of the interpretation given by us.

Ordered accordingly.

Section 124A, IPC, 1860—“Disaffection” defined in section 124A, IPC, 1860 includes disloyalty and all
feelings of enmity and is equivalent to excite political hatred

Emperor v Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi8

Section 124A, IPC—Sedition: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, being the editor of the paper “Young India” and
Shri Shankarlal Ghelabhai Sanker printer and publisher were charged on 11 March 1922 by LN Brown, Additional
District Magistrate, Ahmedabad under section 124A, IPC, for bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt
or exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards, His Majesty’s Government established by law in British
India, by means of the written words contained in the articles “Tampering with Loyalty”9, “The Puzzle and its
Solution”10, and “Shaking the Manes”11 published at Ahmedabad as contained in the appendix.

The words “hatred” or “contempt” are words the meaning of which is sufficiently obvious. The word “disaffection” as
defined in section 124A, IPC, 1860 includes disloyalty and all feeling of enmity and the word as used in the section
means political alienation or discontent — a spirit of disloyalty to the Government is equivalent to an attempt to
excite political hatred towards the Government as established by Law, to excite Political discontent and alienate the
people from their allegiance.

Guilty Pleaded: Gandhiji instead of contesting the charge pleaded guilty. In his written statement Gandhiji
explained the reason that compelled him to promote “disaffection” towards the Government established by law in
British India.

Written Statement: The written statement submitted by Gandhiji in the court which gives in brief, an account of the
State of affairs prevailing in India during the British rule that prompted Gandhiji to undertake such steps of
disobedience and disaffection, is printed below:

I owe it perhaps to the Indian public and to the public in England, to explain why from a staunch loyalist and co-operator, I
have become an uncompromising disaffectionist and non-cooperator. To the court too I should say why I plead guilty to the
charge of promoting disaffection towards the Government established by law in India.

My public life began in 1893 in South Africa in troubled weather. My first contact with British authority in that country was
not of a happy character. I discovered that as a man and an Indian, I had no rights. More correctly, I discovered that I had
no right as a man because I was an Indian.

But I was not baffled (confused). I thought that this treatment of Indians was an excrescence (abnormal) upon a system that
was intrinsically and mainly good. I gave the Government my voluntary and hearty co-operation, criticizing it freely where I
felt it was faulty but never wishing its destruction.

Consequently, when the existence of the Empire was threatened in 1899 by the Boer challenge, I offered my services to it,
raised a volunteer ambulance corps and served at several actions that took place for the relief of Ladysmith. Similarly in
1906, at the time of the Zulu ‘revolt’, I raised a stretcher bearer party and served till the end of the ‘rebellion.’ On both the
occasions I received medals and was even mentioned in dispatches. For my work in South Africa I was given by Lord
Hardinge, a Kaisar-i-Hind gold medal. When the war broke out in 1914 between England and Germany, I raised a volunteer
ambulance corps in London, consisting of the then-resident Indians in London, chiefly students. Its work was acknowledged
by the authorities to be valuable. Lastly, in India when a special appeal was made at the war Conference in Delhi in 1918
by Lord Chelmsford for recruits, I struggled at the cost of my health to raise a corps in Kheda, and the response was being
made when the hostilities ceased and orders were received that no more recruits were wanted. In all these efforts at
 Page 5 of 11
16.2 Sedition

service, I was actuated by the belief that it was possible by such services to gain a status of full equality in the Empire for
my countrymen.

The first shock came in the shape of the Rowlatt Act—a law designed to rob the people of all real freedom. I felt called upon
to lead an intensive agitation against it. Then followed the Punjab horrors beginning with the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh
and culminating in crawling orders, public floggings and other indescribable humiliations. I discovered too that the plighted
word of the Prime Minister to the Musalmans of India regarding the integrity of Turkey and the holy places of Islam was not
likely to be fulfilled. But in spite of the forebodings and the grave warnings of friends, at the Amritsar Congress in 1919, I
fought for co-operation and working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, hoping that the Prime Minister would redeem his
promise to the Indian Musalmans, that the Punjab wound would be healed, and that the reforms, inadequate and
unsatisfactory though they were, marked a new era of hope in the life of India.

But all that hope was shattered. The Khilafat promise was not to be redeemed. The Punjab crime was whitewashed and
most culprits went not only unpunished but remained in service, and some continued to draw pensions from the Indian
revenue and in some cases were even rewarded. I saw too that not only did the reforms not mark a change of heart, but
they were only a method of further robbing India of her wealth and of prolonging her servitude,

I came reluctantly to the conclusion that the British connection had made India more helpless than she ever was
before, politically and economically. A disarmed India has no power of resistance against any aggressor if she
wanted to engage in an armed conflict with him. So much is this the case that some of our best men consider that
India must take generations before she can achieve Dominion Status. She has become so poor that she has little
power of resisting famines. Before the British advent, India spun and wove in her millions of cottages, just the
supplement she needed for adding to her meagre agricultural resources. This cottage industry, so vital for India’s
existence, has been ruined by incredibly heartless and inhuman processes as described by English witnesses. Little
do town-dwellers know how the semi-starved masses of India are slowly sinking to lifelessness. Little do they know
that their miserable comfort represents the brokerage they get for their work they do for the foreign exploiter, that
the profits and the brokerage are sucked from the masses. Little do they realize that the Government established by
law in British India is carried on for this exploitation of the masses. No sophistry, no jugglery in figures, can explain
away the evidence that the skeletons in many villages present to the naked eye. I have no doubt whatsoever that
both England and the town-dweller of India will have to answer, if there is a God above, for this crime against
humanity, which is perhaps unequalled in history. The law itself in this country has been used to serve the foreign
exploiter. My unbiased examination of the Punjab Martial Law cases has led me to believe that at least ninety-five
per cent of convictions were wholly bad. My experience of political cases in India leads me to the conclusion, in nine
out of every ten, the condemned men were totally innocent. Their crime consisted in the love of their country. In
ninety-nine cases out of hundred, justice has been denied to Indians as against Europeans in the courts of India.
This is not an exaggerated picture. It is the experience of almost every Indian who has had anything to do with such
cases. In my opinion, the administration of the law is thus prostituted, consciously or unconsciously, for the benefit
of the exploiter.

The greatest misfortune is that the Englishmen and their Indian associates in the administration of the country do not know
that they are engaged in the crime I have attempted to describe. I am satisfied that many Englishmen and Indian officials
honestly believe that they are administering one of the best systems devised in the world and that India is making steady
though slow progress. They do not know that a subtle but effective system of terrorism and an organized display of force on
the one hand, and the deprivation of all powers of retaliation or self-defence on the other, has emasculated the people and
induced in them the habit of simulation. This awful habit has added to the ignorance and the self-deception of the
administrators.

Section 124A, under which I am happily charged, is perhaps the prince among the political sections of Indian Penal Code,
1860 designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen. Affection cannot be manufactured or regulated by law. If one has no
affection for a person or system, one should be free to give the fullest expression to his disaffection, so long as he does not
contemplate, promote, or incite to violence. But the section under which mere promotion of disaffection is a crime: I have
studied some of the cases tried under it; I know that some of the most loved of India’s patriots have been convicted under it.
I consider it a privilege, therefore, to be charged under that section. I have endeavoured to give in their briefest outline the
reasons for my disaffection. I have no personal ill-will against any single administrator, much less can I have any
 Page 6 of 11
16.2 Sedition

disaffection towards the King’s person.

But I hold it to be a virtue to be disaffected towards a Government which in its totality has done more harm to India than any
previous system. India is less manly under the British rule than she ever was before. Holding such a belief, I consider it to
be a sin to have affection for the system. And it has been a precious privilege for me to be able to write what I have in the
various articles tendered in evidence against me.

In fact, I believe that I have rendered a service to India and England by showing in non-co-operation the way out of the
unnatural state in which both are living. In my opinion, non-co-operation with evil is as much a duty as is co-operation with
good. But in the past, non-co-operation has been deliberately expressed in violence to the evil-doer. I am endeavoring to
show to my countrymen that violent non-co-operation only multiplies evil, and that as evil can only be sustained by violence,
withdrawal of support of evil requires complete abstention from violence. Non-violence implies voluntary submission to the
penalty for non-co-operation with evil.

I am here, therefore, to invite and submit cheerfully to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is
deliberate crime, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen. The only course open to you, the Judge and
the assessors, is either to resign your posts and thus dissociate yourselves from evil, if you feel that the law you are called
upon to administer is an evil, and that in reality I am innocent, or to inflict on me the severest penalty, if you believe that the
system and the law you are assisting to administer are good for the people of this country, and that my activity is, therefore,
injurious to the common weal (well being).

Judgment by the Sessions Judge in the case of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

SESSIONS COURT AHMEDABAD—1922

Where trial of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was conducted in 1922 And the judgment was delivered on
18 March 1922

The full text of the judgment delivered by the Session Judge Ahmedabad, against Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
is given below:

Mr. Gandhi, you have made my task easy in one way by pleading guilty to the charge. Nevertheless what remains, namely,
the determination of a just sentence, is perhaps as difficult a proposition as a judge in this country could have to face. The
law is no respecter of persons. Nevertheless, it will be impossible to ignore the fact that, in the eyes of millions of your
countrymen, you are a great patriot and a great leader. Even those who differ from you in politics look upon you as a man
of ideals and of noble and of even saintly life. I have to deal with you in one character only. It is not my duty and I do not
 Page 7 of 11
16.2 Sedition

presume to judge or criticize you in any other character.”

It is my duty to judge you as a man subject to the law, who has by his own admission broken the law and committed what to
an ordinary man must appear to be grave offences against the State. I do not forget that you have constantly preached
against violence and that you have on many occasions, as I am willing to believe, done much to prevent violence, but
having regard to the nature of your political teaching and the nature of many of those to whom it is addressed, how you
could have continued to believe that violence would not be the inevitable consequence it passes my capacity to
understand.

There are probably few people in India who do not sincerely regret that you should have made it impossible for any
government to leave you at liberty. But it is so. I am trying to balance what is due to you against what appears to me to be
necessary in the interests of the public, and I propose, in passing sentence, to follow the precedent of a case, in many
respects similar to this case, that was decided some 12 years ago against Mr Bal Gangadhar Tilak under section 124A,
IPC. The sentence that was passed upon him as it finally stood was a sentence of simple imprisonment for six years. You
will not consider it unreasonable, I think, that you should be classed with Mr Tilak, and that is the sentence, two years
simple imprisonment on each count of the three charges, i.e., six years in all, which I feel it my duty to pass upon you and I
should like to say in doing so that, if the course of events in India should make it possible for the Government to reduce the
period and release you, no one will be better pleased than I.

Gandhiji was sentenced to six years of simple imprisonment for sedition under section 124A IPC, 1860 and was
kept in Poona Jail.

Remission of sentence:

After almost a year of Gandhiji serving in Poona jail the Governor of the Bombay residency on 4 February 1924 in
exercise of the powers conferred by section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 remitted the unexpired portion
of the six years of simple imprisonment passed upon him by the Session Court of Ahmedabad.

16.2.1 Appendix-I (Letters published by Gandhiji in “Young India”)

Text of three letters written by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi published in “Young India” was subject of
charge under section 124A, IPC, 1860 for sedition are reproduced below:

PUZZLE AND ITS SOLUTION,12

Letter 1:

Lord Reading is puzzled and perplexed. Speaking in reply to the addresses from the British Indian Association and
the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta, His Excellency said:

I confess that when I contemplate the activities of a section of the community, I find myself still, notwithstanding persistent
study ever since I have been in India, puzzled and perplexed. I ask myself what purpose is served by flagrant breaches of
the law for the purpose of challenging the Government and in order to compel arrest.

The answer was partly given by Pandit Motilal Nehru when he said on being arrested that he was being taken to the
house of freedom. We seek arrest because the so-called freedom is slavery. We are challenging the might of this
Government because we consider its activity to be wholly evil. We want to overthrow the Government. We want to
compel its submission to the people’s will. We desire to show that the Government exists to serve the people, not
the people the Government. Free life under the Government has become intolerable, for the price exacted for the
retention of freedom is unconscionably great. Whether we are one or many, we must refuse to purchase freedom at
the cost of our self-respect or our cherished convictions. I have known even little children become unbending when
an attempt has been made to cross their declared purpose, be it ever so flimsy in the estimation of their parents.

Lord Reading must clearly understand that the non-co-operators are at war with the Government. They have
declared rebellion against it inasmuch as it has committed a breach of faith with the Musalmans, it has humiliated
 Page 8 of 11
16.2 Sedition

the Punjab and it insists upon imposing its will upon the people and refuses to repair the breach and repent of the
wrong done in the Punjab.

There were two ways open to the people, the way of armed rebellion and the way of peaceful revolt. Non-co-
operators have chosen, some out of weakness, some out of strength, the way of peace, i.e. voluntary suffering.

If the people are behind the sufferers, the Government must yield or be overthrown. If the people are not with them
they have at least the satisfaction of not having sold their freedom. In an armed conflict, the more violent is
generally the victor. The way of peace and suffering is the quickest method of cultivating public opinion, and,
therefore, when victory is attained, it is for what the world regards as Truth. Bred in the atmosphere of law-courts,
Lord Reading finds it difficult to appreciate the peaceful resistance to authority. His Excellency will learn by the time
the conflict is over that there is a higher court than courts of justice, and that is the court of conscience. It
supersedes all other courts.

Lord Reading is welcome to treat all the sufferers as lunatics, who do not know their own interest. He is entitled,
therefore, to put them out of harm’s way. It is an arrangement that entirely suits the lunatics and it is an ideal
situation if it also suits the Government. He will have cause to complain if, having courted imprisonment, non-co-
operators fret and fume or “whine for favours” as Lalaji puts it. The strength of a non-co-operator lies in his going to
jail uncomplainingly. He loses his case if, having courted imprisonment, he begins to grumble, immediately his
courtship is rewarded. The threats used by His Excellency are unbecoming. This is a fight to the finish. It is a
conflict between the reign of violence and of public opinion. Those who are fighting for the latter are determined to
submit to any violence rather than surrender their opinion.

Letter-II

TAMPERING WITH LOYALTY,13

His Excellency the Governor of Bombay had warned the public some time ago, that he “meant businesses”, that he
was no longer going to tolerate the speeches that were being made. In his note on the Ali Brothers and others he
has made clear his meaning. The Ali Brothers are to be charged with having tampered with the loyalty of the sepoy
and with having uttered sedition. I must confess that I was not prepared for the revelation of such hopeless
ignorance on the part of Governor of Bombay. It is evident that he has not followed the course of Indian history
during the past twelve months. He evidently does not know, that the National Congress began to tamper with the
loyalty of the sepoy in September last year, that the Central Khilafat Committee began it earlier and that I began it
earlier still, for I must be permitted to take the credit or the odium of suggesting, that India had a right openly to tell
the sepoy and everyone who served the Government in any capacity whatsoever, that he participated in the wrongs
done by the Government. The Conference at Karachi merely repeated the Congress declaration in terms of Islam.
Only a Musalman divine can speak for Islam, but speaking for Hinduism and speaking for nationalism, I have no
hesitation in saying, that it is sinful for anyone, either as soldier or civilian, to serve this Government which has
proved treacherous to the Musalmans of India and which has been guilty of the inhumanities of the Punjab. I have
said this from many a platform in the presence of sepoys. And if I have not asked individual sepoys to come out, it
has not been due to want of will but of ability to support them. I have not hesitated to tell the sepoy, that if he could
leave the service and support himself without the Congress or the Khilafat aid, he should leave at once. And I
promise, that as soon as the spinning-wheel finds an abiding place in every home and Indians begin to feel that
weaving gives anybody any day an honourable livelihood, I shall not hesitate, at the peril of being shot, to ask the
Indian sepoy individually to leave his service and become a weaver. For, has not the sepoy been used to hold India
under subjection, has he not been used to murder innocent people at Jallianwala Bagh, has he not been used to
drive away innocent men, women and children during that dreadful night at Chandpur, has he not been used to
subjugate the proud Arab of Mesopotamia, has he not been utilized to crush the Egyptian? How can any Indian
having a spark of humanity in him and any Mussulman having any pride in his religion feel otherwise than as the Ali
Brothers have done? The sepoy has been used more often as a hired assassin than as a soldier defending the
liberty or the honour of the week and the helpless. The Governor has pandered to the basest in us by telling us
what would happened in Malabar but for the British soldier or sepoy. I venture to inform His Excellency, that
Malabar Hindus would have fared better without the British bayonets, that Hindus and Musalmans would have
jointly appeased the Moplahs, that possibly there being no Khilafat question there would have been no Moplah riot
at all, that at the worst supposing that Musalmans had made common cause with the Moplahs, Hinduism would
have relied upon its creed of non-violence and turned every Musalman into a friend, or Hindu valour would have
been tested and tried. The Governor of Bombay has done a disservice to himself and his cause (whatever it might
be), by fomenting Hindu-Muslim disunion, and has insulted the Hindus, by letting them infer from his note, that
Hindus are helpless creatures unable to die for or defend their earth, home or religion. If however the Governor is
 Page 9 of 11
16.2 Sedition

right in his assumptions, the sooner the Hindus die out, the better for humanity. But let me remind His Excellency,
that he has pronounced the greatest condemnation upon British rule, in that it finds Indians today devoid of enough
manliness to defend themselves against looters, whether they are Moplah Musalmans or infuriated Hindus of Arrah.

His Excellency’s reference to the sedition of the Ali Brothers is only less pardonable than his reference to the
tampering. For he must know, that sedition has become the creed of the Congress. Every non-co-operator is
pledged to preach disaffection towards the Government established by law. Non-co-operation, though a religious
and strictly moral movement, deliberately aims at the overthrow of the Government, and is therefore legally
seditious in terms of the Indian Penal Code. But this is no new discovery. Lord Chelmsford knew it. Lord Reading
knows it. It is unthinkable that the Governor of Bombay does not know it. It was common cause that so long as the
movement remained non-violent nothing would be done to interfere with it.

But it may be urged, that the Government has a right to change its policy when it finds, that the movement is really
threatening its very existence as a system. I do not deny its right. I object to the Governor’s note, because it is so
worded as to let the unknowing public think, that tampering with the loyalty of the sepoy and sedition were fresh
crimes committed by the Ali Brothers and brought for the first time to His Excellency’s notice.

However the duty of the Congress and Khilafat workers is clear. We ask for no quarter; we expect none from the
Government. We did not solicit the promise of immunity from prison so long as we remained non-violent. We may
not now complain, if we are imprisoned for sedition. Therefore our self-respect and our pledge require us to remain
calm, unperturbed and non-violent. We have our appointed course to follow. We must reiterate from a thousand
platforms the formula of the Ali Brothers regarding the sepoys, and we must spread disaffection openly and
systematically till it please the Government to arrest us. And this we do, not by way of angry retaliation, but because
it is our dharma. We must wear khadi even as the Brothers have worn it, and spread the gospel of swadeshi. The
Musalmans must collect for Smyrna relief and the Angora Government. We must spread like the Ali Brothers the
gospel of Hindu-Muslim unity and of non-violence for the purpose of attaining swaraj and the redress of the Khilafat
and the Punjab wrongs.

We have almost reached the crisis. It is well with a patient who survives a crisis. If on the one hand we remain firm
as a rock in the presence of danger, and on the other observe the greatest self-restraint, we shall certainly attain
our end this very year.

Letter-III

SHAKING THE MANES,14

How can there be any compromise whilst the British Lion continues to shake his gory (bloody) claws in our faces?
Lord Birkenhead reminds us that Britain has lost none of her hard fibre. Mr Montagu tells us in the plainest
language that the British are the most determined nation in the world, who will brook no interference with their
purpose. Let me quote the exact words telegraphed by Reuter:

If the existence of our Empire were challenged, the discharge of responsibilities of the British Government to India
prevented and demands were made in the very mistaken belief that we contemplated retreat from India—then India would
not challenge with success the most determined people in the world who would once again answer the challenge with all
the vigour and determination at its command.

Both Lord Birkenhead and Mr Montagu little know that India is prepared for all “the hard fibre” that can be
transported across the seas and that her challenge was issued in the September of 1920 at Calcutta that India
would be satisfied with nothing less than swaraj and full redress of the Khilafat and the Punjab wrongs. This does
involve the existence of the “Empire”, and if the present custodians of the British Empire are not satisfied with its
quiet transformation into a true Commonwealth of free nations, each with equal rights and each having the power to
secede at will from an honourable and friendly partnership, all the determination and vigour of “the most determined
people in the world” and the “hard fibre” will have to be spent in India in a vain effort to crush the spirit that has risen
and that will neither bend nor break. It is true that we have no “hard fibre”. The rice-eating, puny (weak) millions of
India seem to have resolved upon achieving their own destiny without any further tutelage (protection) and without
arms. In the Lokamanya’s language it is their “birthright”, and they will have it in spite of the “hard fibre” and in spite
of the vigour and determination with which it may be administered. India cannot and will not answer this insolence
(disrespect) with insolence, but if she remains true to her pledge, her prayer to God to be delivered from such a
scourge (suffering) will certainly not go in vain. No empire intoxicated with the red wine of power and plunder of
 Page 10 of 11
16.2 Sedition

weaker races has yet lived long in this world, and this “British Empire”, which is based upon organized exploitation
of physically weaker races of the earth and upon a continuous exhibition of brute force, cannot live if there is a just
God ruling the universe. Little do these so-called representatives of the British nation realize that India has already
given many of her best men to be dealt with by the British “hard fibre”. Had Chauri Chaura not interrupted the even
course of the national sacrifice, there would have been still greater and more delectable offerings placed before the
Lion, but God had willed it otherwise. There is nothing, however, to prevent all those representatives in Downing
Street and Whitehall from doing their worst. I am aware that I have written strongly about the insolent threat that has
come from across the seas, but it is high time that the British people were made to realize that the fight that was
commenced in 1920 is a fight to the finish, whether it lasts one month or one year or many months or many years
and whether the representatives of Britain reenact all the indescribable orgies of the Mutiny days with redoubled
force or whether they do not. I shall only hope and pray that God will give India sufficient humility and sufficient
strength to remain non-violent to the end. Submission to the insolent challenges that are cabled out on due
occasions is now an utter impossibility.

Terrorism : Possession of articles giving rise to reasonable suspicion that possession being for purposes
connected with commission, preparation or investigation of act of terrorism falls within the purview of
terrorist offences— Act of 2000 sections 57 and 58

R v Rowe,

[2007] QB 975 : [2007] 3 WLR 177 : (2007) 3 All ER 36

Per Lord Phillips, CJ and Loham LJ, Cresswell, Holland and Burton, JJ

Dismissing the appeal against conviction of the appellant on two counts under section 57 of Terrorism Act 2000 for
possessing articles which gave rise to a reasonable suspicious that his possession was for a purpose connected
with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism, the court held there is no ground for allowing
appeal that would entitled acquittal of the defendant. One count under section 57 related to a note book which
contained notes in the accused’s handwriting including instructions on how to assemble and operate a motor (gun).
The second count under section 57 related to a code in the defendants, handwriting which encoded components of
explosive, the type of venues susceptible to terrorist bombing and a list of countries.

In brief section 57 dealt with possessing article for the purpose of terrorists, and section 58 dealt with collecting or
holding information that was of a kind likely to be useful to those involved in the act of terrorism. In other words
section 57 included a specific intention while section 58 did not. The object of both sections combined together
included prohibition of different types of support for, and involvement, both direct and indirect, in terrorism.

Section 1 of 2000 Act defines terrorism as follows:

1. In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where – (a) the action falls within sub-section (2);
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the
public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause.
2. Action falls within this subsections if it (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious
damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d)
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
3. The use or threat of actions falling within sub-section (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is
terrorism whether or not sub-section (1)(b) is satisfied.
4. In this section – (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom.

3 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Crimes, 24th Edn 1997, pp 491-520. See also Essays on the Indian Penal Code,
Indian Law Institute, 1962, pp 135-143.
4 Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 505, punishes persons making statements conducive to public mischief. See also
section 153A (promoting enmity between different classes) and section 295A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (deliberate
and malicious acts intended to outrage religious beliefs) which are related to sedition.
 Page 11 of 11
16.2 Sedition

5 (i) Cr App No 124 of 1958 Mohd Ishaq was prosecuted under section 124A IPC for having delivered a speech at Aligarh
as Chairman of Reception committee on 30 October 1953 which was considered to be seditious;
(ii) Cr App No 125 of 1958. Respondent Ramanad was convicted under section 124A IPC for delivering an
objectionable speech on 29 May 1954 in a meeting of Bolshevik party in a village in Hanumantganj, district Basti
inciting the audience to an open armed rebellion against the government established by law;
(iii) Cr.App. No. 126 of 1958 Respondent Paras Nath is said to have exhorted the audience in a meeting in a village in
Faizabad, on 26 September 1955 to organize a volunteer army and resist the government and its servants by
violent means. While he was on trial he filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Allahabad High Court challenging the
provisions of section 124A IPC void being in contravention of the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19
(1)(a) of the Constitution which was allowed by the High Court. Section 168 IPC Public servant unlawfully
engaging in trade: Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant not to engage
in trade, engages in trade, shall be punished. . .”
6 See KD Gaur, Criminal Law; Cases and Materials, 5th Edn, pp 735 to 737 and KD Gaur, Text Book on Indian Penal
Code, 4th Edn (2009), pp 266 to 235 for detail discussion on section 124A IPC.
7 “The sovereignty and integrity of India” was inserted by the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act 1963, section 2.
8 Emperor v Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Shankarlal Ghelabhai Sankar, Session case No 45/1922 Ahmedabad;
Author expresses deep sense of gratitude to Mr DC Verma, former Vice-Chairman Central Administrative Tribunal,
Ahmedabad for making available the text of the judgment from the original court records kept in the Ahmedabad
archives.
9 Young India, dated 29 September 1921.
10 Young India, dated 15 December 1921.
11 Young India, dated 22 February 1922.
12 Young India, Ahmedabad, dated 15 December 1921.
13 Young India, Ahmedabad, dated 29 September 1921.
14 Young India, Ahmedabad, dated 23 February 1922.

End of Document
 16.3 Offences Relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force
KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed
K D Gaur

KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed > KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and
Materials, 9th ed > Part II Specific Offences > 16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE
ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

Part II Specific Offences

16 OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

16.3 Offences Relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force

The Indian Penal Code in sections 131-140 (Chapter VII) deals with the offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air
Force. The Code excludes under section 139, those persons who are subject to Army Act, Naval Discipline Act and
Air Force Act for any of the offences defined in the chapter. It is only with respect to those persons who are not
subject to the above exceptions that the provisions of Chapter VII could be made applicable.15 It is obvious that a
person who, not being himself subject to military law, exhorts or assists those who are subject to military law to
commit gross breach of discipline, is a proper subject of punishment under the chapter.

15 See Draft Penal Code note D, p 120.

End of Document