TORTS – 3RD – 1
 CA reversed the RTC decision
G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007
SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM,
INC. vs. LULU V. JORGE and CESAR
JORGE
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
 Lulu V. Jorge pawned several pieces of
jewelry with Agenciade R. C. Sicam to
secure a loan in the total amount of
P59,500.00.
 On October 19, 1987, two armed men
entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found
inside the pawnshop vault.
 Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulu a
letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry
due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop.
 Lulu then wrote a letter to petitioner Sicam
expressing disbelief stating that when the
robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were
deposited with Far East Bank near the
pawnshop and then requested petitioner
Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for
withdrawal but petitioner Sicam failed to
return the jewelry.
 Respondent Lulu joined by her husband,
Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against
petitioner Sicam with the RTC of Makati
seeking indemnification for the loss of
pawned jewelry.
 Petitioner Sicam filed his Answer
contending that he is not the real party-in-
interest as the pawnshop was incorporated
on April 20, 1987 and known as Agenciade
R.C. Sicam, Inc; that petitioner corporation
had exercised due care and diligence in the
safekeeping of the articles pledged with it
and could not be made liable for an event
that is fortuitous.
 Respondents subsequently filed an
Amended Complaint to include petitioner
corporation.
 RTC rendered its Decision dismissing
respondents’ complaint as well as
petitioners’ counterclaim.
 The RTC held that petitioner Sicam
could not be made personally liable for
a claim arising out of a corporate
transaction.
 robbery is a fortuitous event which
exempts the victim from liability for the
loss.
comply with obligations must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be
 the CA applied the doctrine of
impossible to foresee the event that
piercing the veil of corporate entity
constitutes the casofortuito or, if it can be
reasoning that respondents were misled
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c)
into thinking that they were dealing
the occurrence must be such as to render it
with the pawnshop owned by petitioner
impossible for the debtor to fulfill
Sicam as all the pawnshop tickets
obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the
issued to them bear the words
obligor must be free from any participation
"Agenciade R.C. Sicam".
in the aggravation of the injury or loss.
 robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable
 The burden of proving that the loss was due
risks in that those engaged in the
to a fortuitous event rests on him who
pawnshop business are expected to
invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous
foresee.
event to exempt one from liability, it is
necessary that one has committed no
ISSUE #1:
negligence or misconduct that may have
WON the doctrine of piercing the veil of occasioned the loss.
thecorporate entity is applicable in this case.
 It has been held that an act of God cannot be
HELD: YES
invoked to protect a person who has failed
 The CA correctly pierced the veil of the to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
corporate fiction and adjudged petitioner consequences of such a loss. One's
Sicam liable together with petitioner negligence may have concurred with an act
corporation. The rule is that the veil of of God in producing damage and injury to
corporate fiction may be pierced when made another; nonetheless, showing that the
as a shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse immediate or proximate cause of the
legitimate issues. The theory of corporate damage or injury was a fortuitous event
entity was not meant to promote unfair would not exempt one from liability. When
objectives or otherwise to shield them. the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation -- whether by active
 The receipts issued after such alleged intervention, neglect or failure to act -- the
incorporation were still in the name of whole occurrence is humanized and
"Agenciade R. C. Sicam," thus inevitably removed from the rules applicable to acts of
misleading, or at the very least, creating the God.
wrong impression to respondents and the
public as well, that the pawnshop was  Petitioners failed to show that they were free
owned solely by petitioner Sicam and not by from any negligence by which the loss of the
a corporation. pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.
ISSUE #2:  Preponderance of evidence shows that
petitioners failed to exercise the diligence
WON robbery is a fortuitous event rendering required of them under the Civil Code.
petitioners not liable for the loss of the pawned
 Petitioners had the means to screen the
articles in their possession.
persons who were allowed entrance to the
HELD: premises and to protect itself from unlawful
 Robbery per seis not a fortuitous event. intrusion. Petitioners had failed to exercise
precautionary measures in ensuring that the
 Fortuitous events by definition are robbers were prevented from entering the
extraordinary events not foreseeable or pawnshop and for keeping the vault open for
avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the the day, which paved the way for the robbers
event should not have been foreseen or to easily cart away the pawned articles.
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same.
 To constitute a fortuitous event, the
following elements must concur: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to
 TORTS – 3RD – 2

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918  The test by which to determine the existence plaintiff was a more remote factor in the
of negligence in a particular case may be case.
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
STREET, J.: the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation?
FACTS:
 The law considers what would be reckless,
 the plaintiff was riding on his pony over
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
ordinary intelligence and prudence and
 Before he had gotten half way across, the determines liability by that.
defendant approached from the opposite  The question as to what would constitute the
direction in an automobile, going at the rate conduct of a prudent man in a given
of about ten or twelve miles per hour.
situation must of course be always
 As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a determined in the light of human experience
horseman on it and blew his horn to give and in view of the facts involved in the
warning of his approach, as it appeared to particular case.
him that the man on horseback before him  Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
was not observing the rule of the road. circumstances which are before them or
 The plaintiff, being perturbed by the novelty known to them. They are not, and are not
of the apparition or the rapidity of the supposed to be, omniscient of the future.
approach, he pulled the pony closely up Hence they can be expected to take care only
against the railing on the right side of the when there is something before them to
bridge instead of going to the left, thinking suggest or warn of danger.
he did not have sufficient time to get over to  Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the other side.
ignoring of the suggestion born of this
 the defendant assumed that the horseman prevision, is always necessary before
would move to the other side. negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for
 the defendant, instead of veering to the right determining the existence of negligence in a
while yet some distance away or slowing given case is this: Conduct is said to be
down, continued to approach directly negligent when a prudent man in the
toward the horse without diminution of position of the tortfeasor would have
speed. When he had gotten quite near, there foreseen that an effect harmful to another
being then no possibility of the horse getting was sufficiently probable to warrant his
across to the other side, the defendant foregoing conduct or guarding against its
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the consequences.
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of
the railing where it as then standing  Applying this test to the conduct of the
defendant in the present case we think that
 the animal that it became frightened and negligence is clearly established.
turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing, struck on the hock  It goes without saying that the plaintiff
of the left hind leg by the flange of the car himself was not free from fault, for he was
and the limb was broken. guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. It will
 The horse fell and its rider was thrown off be noted that the negligent acts of the two
with some violence. parties were not contemporaneous, since the
 As a result of its injuries the horse died. The negligence of the defendant succeeded the
plaintiff received contusions which caused negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
temporary unconsciousness and required interval. Under these circumstances the law
medical attention for several days. is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences,
ISSUE: without reference to the prior negligence of
WON the defendant was guilty of negligence the other party.
which gives rise to a civil obligation to repair  It is enough to say that the negligence of the
the damage done defendant was in this case the immediate
and determining cause of the accident and
HELD: YES that the antecedent negligence of the

G.R. No. 178763 April 21, 2009
LUCAS vs. DR. PROSPERO MA. C.
TUAÑO
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter)
contracted "sore eyes" in his right eye,
which later developed to Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection, to
which Dr. Tuaño prescribed a steroid-based
eye drop called Maxitrol.
Peter was on prolonged use of Maxitrol due
to his recurring EKC.
In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter
underwent two (2) procedures of laser
trabeculoplasty to attempt to control the
high IOP of his right eye.
ISSUE:
WON negligence attended Dr. Tuaño’s
treatment of Peter
HELD: NO
In medical negligence cases, also called
medical malpractice suits, there exist a
physician-patient relationship between the
doctor and the victim. But just like any other
proceeding for damages, four essential (4)
elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury;
and (4) proximate causation, must be
established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4)
elements must co-exist in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, liable for
damages.
In treating his patient, a physician is under a
duty to [the former] to exercise that degree
of care, skill and diligence which physicians
in the same general neighborhood and in the
same general line of practice ordinarily
possess and exercise in like cases. Stated
otherwise, the physician has the duty to use
at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent physician would use
to treat the condition under similar
circumstances.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and
diligence, or the improper performance of
such duty, by the attending physician when
the patient is injured in body or in health
[and this] constitutes the actionable
malpractice. Proof of such breach must
likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert
witness that the treatment accorded to the
patient failed to meet the standard level of
care, skill and diligence which physicians in
the same general neighborhood and in the
TORTS – 3RD – 3
same general line of practice ordinarily
possess and exercise in like cases.
Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part
of the attending physician is insufficient, for
there must be a causal connection between
said breach and the resulting injury
sustained by the patient. Put in another way,
in order that there may be a recovery for an
injury, it must be shown that the "injury for
which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and
the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes"; that is, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred.
Medical negligence cases are best proved by
opinions of expert witnesses belonging in
the same general neighborhood and in the
same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon.
Absent a definitive standard of care or
diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the
circumstances, we have no means to
determine whether he was able to comply
with the same in his diagnosis and treatment
of Peter. This Court has no yardstick upon
which to evaluate or weigh the attendant
facts of this case to be able to state with
confidence that the acts complained of,
indeed, constituted negligence and, thus,
should be the subject of pecuniary
reparation.
As to whether Dr. Tuaño’s actuations
conformed to the standard of care and
diligence required in like circumstances, it is
presumed to have so conformed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
It must be remembered that when the
qualifications of a physician are admitted, as
in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases, he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the
best of his knowledge and skill in attending
to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established.

G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997
CRUZ vs. CA
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS:
Lydia was examined by the petitioner who
found a "myoma" in her uterus, and
underwent a hysterectomy operation.
During and after the operation the family of
Lydia was required to buy blood twice and
get oxygen from San Pablo District
Hospital.
At around 10:00 o'clock P.M. Lydia went
into shock, which necessitated her transfer
to the San Pablo District Hospital, where the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
because there was blood oozing from the
abdominal incision.
While petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died.
Her death certificate states "shock" as the
immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation
(DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Dr. Cruz has committed
inexcusable lack of precaution in the
treatment of Lydia rendering her liable.
HELD:
This court, however finds the foregoing
circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Whether or not a physician has committed
an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science.
In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda "In order that there may be a recovery for an
v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court
stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in 'injury for which recovery is sought must be
effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, he negligence and the injury must be a direct
will employ such training, care and skill in and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
the treatment of his patients. He therefore
has a duty to use at least the same level of the negligence must be the proximate cause
care that any other reasonably competent
TORTS – 3RD – 4
doctor would use to treat a condition under action unless it is the proximate cause of the
the same circumstances. injury complained of.' And 'the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
Expert testimony should have been offered
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
to prove that the circumstances cited by the
by any efficient intervening cause, produces
courts below are constitutive of conduct
the injury, and without which the result
falling below the standard of care employed
would not have occurred.''' (Underscoring
by other physicians in good standing when
supplied.)
performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of This court has no recourse but to rely on the
a physician are admitted, as in the instant expert testimonies rendered by both
case, there is an inevitable presumption that prosecution and defense witnesses that
in proper cases he takes the necessary substantiate rather than contradict
precaution and employs the best of his petitioner's allegation that the cause of
knowledge and skill in attending to his Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to
established. This presumption is rebuttable the petitioner's fault or negligence. The
by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking probability that Lydia's death was caused by
in the case at bench. DIC was unrebutted during trial and has
engendered in the mind of this Court a
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic;
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless
the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct
imprudence resulting in homicide.
pre-operation tests on the patient; and the
subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner
Pablo Hospital and the reoperation civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali,
performed on her by the petitioner do for while a conviction of a crime requires
indicate, even without expert testimony, that proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the preponderance of evidence is required to
exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no establish civil liability.
cogent proof exists that any of these
Certainly, the award of moral and
circumstances caused petitioner's death.
exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the
person or property was a consequence of the
reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving medical negligence,
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a casual connection of
such breach and the resulting death of his
patient.
In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital,
Inc.,where the attending physician was
absolved of liability for the death of the
complainant's wife and newborn baby, this
court held that:
injury, however, it must be shown that the
the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the
intervening efficient causes.' In other words,
of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of

G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs.
AGANA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical
City General Hospital where she was
diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer
of the sigmoid."
Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of
the Medical City Hospital, performed an
anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid
area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating performance of hysterectomy.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the
incision. However, 2 sponges were lacking.
After a couple of days, Natividad
complained of excruciating pain in her anal
region. Her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being
informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to
her house where he managed to extract by
hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches
in width. He then assured her that the pains
would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true.
Instead, the pains intensified, prompting
Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While
confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez
detected the presence of another foreign
ISSUE #2:
object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
WON the CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes
infected her vaginal vault. Natividad
underwent another surgery to remedy the
HELD: NO
damage.
ISSUE #1:
WON Dr. Ampil is liable for Negligence and
Malpractice.
HELD: YES
An operation requiring the placing of
sponges in the incision is not complete until
the sponges are properly removed, and it is
settled that the leaving of sponges or other
foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least prima
facie negligence by the operating surgeon.
To put it simply, such act is considered so
inconsistent with due care as to raise an
inference of negligence. There are even
legions of authorities to the effect that such
act is negligence per se.
Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was
required by the urgent necessities of the case
to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen,
because of the dangers attendant upon delay,
still, it is his legal duty to so inform his
patient within a reasonable time thereafter
by advising her of what he had been 1) the occurrence of an injury;
compelled to do. This is in order that she
might seek relief from the effects of the
foreign object left in her body as her
condition might permit. The ruling in Smith
v. Zeagleris explicit, thus:
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad
about the missing two pieces of gauze.
Worse, he even misled her that the pain she
was experiencing was the ordinary 4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
consequence of her operation. Had he been
more candid, Natividad could have taken the Of the foregoing requisites, the most
immediate and appropriate medical remedy
to remove the gauzes from her body. To our
mind, what was initially an act of negligence
by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate
wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice
or more appropriately, medical negligence.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the
patient must only prove that a health care
provider either failed to do something which
a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he did something
that a reasonably prudent provider would
not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the
elements are duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.
of any Liability
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing
speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact
of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation.
Stated differently, where the thing which
caused the injury, without the fault of the
injured, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such that it
should not have occurred if he, having such
control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care, and the burden of
TORTS – 3RD – 5
proof is shifted to him to establish that he
has observed due care and diligence.
From the foregoing statements of the rule,
the requisites for the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
2) the thing which caused the injury was under
the control and management of the
defendant;
3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management
used proper care; and
instrumental is the "control and
management of the thing which caused the
injury."
We find the element of "control and
management of the thing which caused the
injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
lead surgeon during the operation of
Natividad. Dr. Fuentes performed the
surgery and thereafter reported and showed
his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined
it and finding everything to be in order,
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating
room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on
Natividad. He was about to finish the
procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze were
missing. A "diligent search" was conducted,
but the misplaced gauzes were not found.
Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be
closed. During this entire period, Dr.
Fuentes was no longer in the operating room
and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the
operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation. Their duty is
to obey his orders. To our mind, it was the
act of ordering the closure of the incision
notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze
remained unaccounted for, that caused
injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the
control and management of the thing which
caused the injury was in the hands of Dr.
Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a
rule of substantive law, hence, does not per
se create or constitute an independent or
separate ground of liability, being a mere

evidentiary rule. In other words, mere
invocation and application of the doctrine
does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. Here, the negligence
was proven to have been committed by Dr.
Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
ISSUE #3:
WON PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr.
Ampil
HELD: YES
The case of Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital was then considered an
authority for this view. The "Schloendorff
doctrine" regards a physician, even if
employed by a hospital, as an independent
contractor because of the skill he exercises
and the lack of control exerted over his
work. Under this doctrine, hospitals are
exempt from the application of the
respondeat superior principle for fault or
negligence committed by physicians in the
discharge of their profession.
In Bing v. Thunig, the New York Court of
Appeals deviated from the Schloendorff
doctrine, noting that modern hospitals
actually do far more than provide facilities
for treatment. Rather, they regularly
employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of
physicians, interns, nurses, administrative
and manual workers. They charge patients
for medical care and treatment, even
collecting for such services through legal
action, if necessary. The court then
concluded that there is no reason to exempt
hospitals from the universal rule of
respondeat superior.
In our shores, the nature of the relationship
between the hospital and the physicians is
rendered inconsequential in view of our
categorical pronouncement in Ramos v.
Court of Appeals that for purposes of
apportioning responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting
‘consultant’ staff. While ‘consultants’ are
not, technically employees, x x x, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-
employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages. In assessing whether
such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the
basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. "
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our
only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its
liability is also anchored upon the agency
principle of apparent authority or agency by DOCTRINE
estoppel and the doctrine of corporate
negligence which have gained acceptance in
the determination of a hospital’s liability for
negligent acts of health professionals. The
present case serves as a perfect platform to
test the applicability of these doctrines, thus,
enriching our jurisprudence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
referred to as the "holding out" theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel, has its origin from the law of
agency. It imposes liability, not as the result
of the reality of a contractual relationship,
but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow
misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists. The
concept is essentially one of estoppel and
has been explained in this manner:
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent
with the apparent authority which he
knowingly permits the agent to assume, or
which he holds the agent out to the public as
possessing. The question in every case is
whether the principal has by his voluntary
act placed the agent in such a situation that
a person of ordinary prudence, conversant
with business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in presuming
that such agent has authority to perform the
particular act in question.
The applicability of apparent authority in
the field of hospital liability was upheld long 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly
time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital of
Lake Worth, Inc. There, it was explicitly
stated that "there does not appear to be any
rational basis for excluding the concept of
apparent authority from the field of hospital
liability." Thus, in cases where it can be
shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held
out a particular physician as its agent and/or
employee and that a patient has accepted
treatment from that physician in the
reasonable belief that it is being rendered in
behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will
be liable for the physician’s negligence.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the
lobby of the Medical City Hospital the
TORTS – 3RD – 6
names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it, including
those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and
publicly advertising their qualifications, the
hospital created the impression that they
were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients.
As expected, these patients,
OF CORPORATE
NEGLIGENCE or CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
In the present case, it was duly established
that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital
for the purpose and under the concept of
providing comprehensive medical services
to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect from
harm all patients admitted into its facility for
medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed
to perform such duty.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s
staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses,
and interns. As such, it is reasonable to
conclude that PSI, as the operator of the
hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out,
particularly the report of the attending
nurses that the two pieces of gauze were
missing.
The failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses’ report, to investigate and inform
Natividad regarding the missing gauzes
amounts to callous negligence. Not only did
PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise
all persons who practice medicine within its
walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This
renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for
the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article
liable for its own negligence under Article
2176.
Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for
damages, let it be emphasized that PSI, apart
from a general denial of its responsibility,
failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the accreditation and supervision
of the latter. In neglecting to offer such
proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden
under the last paragraph of Article 2180
cited earlier, and, therefore, must be
adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil.

Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also
directly liable to the Aganas.
February 2, 2010
CORONA, J.:
After gathering its thoughts on the issues, February 11, 2008
this Court holds that PSI is liable to the
Aganas, not under the principle of
respondeat superior for lack of evidence of
an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil
but under the principle of ostensible agency
for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac
vice, under the principle of corporate
negligence for its failure to perform its
duties as a hospital.
There was insufficient evidence that PSI
exercised the power of control or wielded
such power over the means and the details
of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil
applied his skills in the treatment of
Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be The first factor focuses on the hospital’s
held vicariously liable for the negligence of
Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat
superior.
There is, however, ample evidence that the
hospital (PSI) held out to the patient
(Natividad)that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was
its agent. Present are the two factors that
determine apparent authority:
first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the
patient which led the latter to conclude that
the doctor was the hospital's agent; and
second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct
of the hospital and the doctor, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence.
By its own standard of corporate conduct,
PSI's duty to initiate the review was non-
delegable.
While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary
responsibility of notifying Natividad about
the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself
the separate and independent responsibility
of initiating the inquiry into the missing
gauzes. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed to
notify Natividad did not release PSI from its
self-imposed separate responsibility.
By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own
standard of hospital care. It committed
corporate negligence.
It should be borne in mind that the corporate
negligence ascribed to PSI is different from
the medical negligence attributed to Dr.
Ampil. The duties of the hospital are distinct
from those of the doctor-consultant
TORTS – 3RD – 7
practicing within its premises in relation to these cases, the circumstances yield a
the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill positive answer to the question.
its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise
to a direct liability tothe Aganas distinct
from that of Dr. Ampil.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however, an exception
to this principle. The hospital may be liable
if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of
the hospital. This exception is also known as
the "doctrine of apparent authority."
(Sometimes referred to as the apparent or
ostensible agency theory.)
The doctrine of apparent authority
essentially involves two factors to determine
the liability of an independent contractor-
physician.
manifestations and is sometimes described
as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a
manner which would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital. In this
regard, the hospital need not make express
representations to the patient that the
treating physician is an employee of the
hospital; rather a representation may be
general and implied.
The second factor focuses on the patient’s
reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an
inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in
reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the
blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act of
displaying his name and those of the other
physicians in the public directory at the
lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out
to the public that it offers quality medical
service through the listed physicians. This
justifies Atty. Agana’s belief that Dr. Ampil
was a member of the hospital’s staff. It must
be stressed that under the doctrine of
apparent authority, the question in every
case is whether the principal has by his
voluntary act placed the agent in such a
situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the
nature of the particular business, is justified
in presuming that such agent has authority
to perform the particular act in question. In

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
TAYLOR vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC
RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY
CARSON, J.:
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time evidence:
when he received the injuries complained of,
15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy
of his age, and having considerable aptitude
and training in mechanics.
Plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, crossed the footbridge to the Isla
del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one
Murphy. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy
was not in his quarters, the boys wandered
about the company's premises.
They walked across to the place where the from idle curiosity, or for purposes of
company dumped in the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. Here they found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps, used of the company), the principles on which
in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, scattered on the ground.
The boys picked up all they could find,
hung them on stick, of which each took end,
and carried them home. After crossing the
footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, and all three went to the home of the
boy Manuel.
The boys then made a series of
experiments with the caps. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the
boys proposed putting a match to the contents negligence of another he must himself have
of the cap, became frightened and started to
run away, received a slight cut in the neck.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded,
and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to
the necessitate its removal.
ISSUE:
WON defendant-appellant company is liable that the defendant was guilty of negligence in
for the injury received by Taylor, a boy only leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it
15 yrs of age.
HELD: NO
We agree with counsel for appellant that
under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the
plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to
a recovery, must establish by competent
1) Damages to the plaintiff.
2) Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
3) The connection of cause and effect
between the negligence and the damage.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout,
wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises,
amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence
these cases turn are that "while a railroad
company is not bound to the same degree of
care in regard to mere strangers who are
unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt
from responsibility to such strangers for
injuries arising from its negligence or from its
tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an
infant of tender years is not to be judged by
the same rule which governs that of adult.
While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that to entitle him to recover damages
for an injury resulting from the fault or
been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care
and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to
be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
We adhere to the principles announced in
Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the
case now before us, they require us to hold
in the vicinity of its depot building. It could
have forbidden all persons from coming to its
TORTS – 3RD – 8
coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity
and pleasure. But it did not do so
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion
of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case
of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said
that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected
to act upon childlike instincts and impulses;
and others who are chargeable with a duty of
care and caution toward them must calculate
upon this, and take precautions accordingly.
If they leave exposed to the observation of
children anything which would be tempting
to them, and which they in their immature
judgment might naturally suppose they were
at liberty to handle or play with, they should
expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or
torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied
invitation to visit the premises of another,
says:
In the case of young children, and other
persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
might sometimes arise when it would not on
behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting
thing for children to play with exposed,
where they would be likely to gather for that
purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to
them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one
were to throw away upon his premises, near
the common way, things tempting to children,
the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10,
p. 303.)
The owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the child from entering
his premises at a place where he knows or
ought to know that children are accustomed
to roam about of to which their childish
instincts and impulses are likely to attract
them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does
enter under such conditions the owner's
failure to take reasonable precautions to
guard the child against injury from unknown
or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises
by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty,
responsible, if the child is actually injured,
without other fault on its part than that it had
entered on the premises of a stranger without
 TORTS – 3RD – 9

his express invitation or permission. To hold can be said to have been free from fault when be made between the accident and the injury,
otherwise would be expose all the children in he willfully and deliberately cut open the between the event itself, without which there
the community to unknown perils and detonating cap, and placed a match to the could have been no accident, and those acts
unnecessary danger at the whim of the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, of the victim not entering into it, independent
owners or occupants of land upon which they that his action would result in an explosion. of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
might naturally and reasonably be expected to On this point, which must be determined by For instance, the cause of the accident under
enter. "the particular circumstances of this case," review was the displacement of the
the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
But while we hold that the entry of the Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid. produces the event giving occasion for
plaintiff upon defendant's property without damages—that is, the sinking of the track and
defendant's express invitation or permission In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the
would not have relieved defendant from the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of
responsibility for injuries incurred there by more mature both mentally and physically the car did not contribute, although it was an
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if than the average boy of his age; he had been element of the damage which came to
such injury were attributable to the to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place
negligence of the defendant, we are of a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days wholly or partly through his act or omission
opinion that under all the circumstances of after the injury was incurred; and the record of duty, that would have been one of the
this case the negligence of the defendant in discloses throughout that he was determining causes of the event or accident,
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was exceptionally well qualified to take care of for which he would have been responsible.
not the proximate cause of the injury received himself. The evidence of record leaves no Where he contributes to the principal
by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, room for doubt that, despite his denials on the occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
properly speaking, "attributable to the witness stand, he well knew the explosive he can not recover. Where, in conjunction
negligence of the defendant," and, on the character of the cap with which he was with the occurrence, he contributes only to
other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs amusing himself. his own injury, he may recover the amount
action in cutting open the detonating cap and that the defendant responsible for the event
putting match to its contents was the We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed
proximate cause of the explosion and of the case had sufficient capacity and
a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, understanding to be sensible of the danger to
and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly which he exposed himself when he put the We think it is quite clear that under the
responsible for the injuries thus incurred. match to the contents of the cap; that he was doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of
sui juris in the sense that his age and his the explosion, the accident which resulted in
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. experience qualified him to understand and plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting
Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in appreciate the necessity for the exercise of a match to the contents of the cap, and that
regard to an adult that to entitle him to that degree of caution which would have having "contributed to the principal
recover damages for an injury resulting from avoided the injury which resulted from his occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
the fault or negligence of another he must own deliberate act; and that the injury he cannot recover."
himself have been free from fault, such is not incurred by him must be held to have been
the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. the direct and immediate result of his own
The care and caution required of a child is willful and reckless act, so that while it may
according to his maturity and capacity only, be true that these injuries would not have
and this is to be determined in each case by been incurred but for the negligence act of the
the circumstances of the case." defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
As we think we have shown, under the the proximate and principal cause of the
reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the accident which inflicted the injury.
Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which
would relieve defendant of responsibility for The doctrine as laid down in that case is as
injuries resulting from its negligence can be follows:
attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of
15 years of age, because of his entry upon Difficulty seems to be apprehended in
defendant's unenclosed premises without deciding which acts of the injured party shall
express permission or invitation' but it is be considered immediate causes of the
wholly different question whether such youth accident. The test is simple. Distinction must
 TORTS – 3RD – 10

G.R. No. 172200 : July 06, 2010 It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a
greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice
THE HEIRS OF COMPLETO AND ABIAD versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using
vs. ALBAYDA reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a
bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in
NACHURA, J.:
the two vehicles, more care is required from
FACTS: the motorist to fully discharge the duty than
from the bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical
Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a advantages that the motor vehicle has over
Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, the bicycle make it more dangerous to the
alleged that while hewas on his way to the bicyclist than vice versa.
office to report for duty, riding a bicycle
along 11th Street, the taxi driven by ISSUE #2:
Completo bumped and sideswiped him,
WON Abiad can be held liable for the acts of
causing serious physical injuries.
Completo as teh latter’s employer.
Albayda was brought to the Philippine Air
HELD: YES
Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside
VAB. However, he was immediately When an injury is caused by the negligence
transferred to the Armed Forces of the of an employee, a legal presumption instantly
Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) arises that the employer was negligent. This
because there was a fracture in his left knee
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
and there was no orthopedic doctor available
showing on the part of the employer that he
at PAFGH. exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his
ISSUE #1:
employee. If the employer successfully
WON Completo caused the collision between overcomes the legal presumption of
him and Albayda. negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other
words, the burden of proof is on the
HELD: YES employer.

It was proven by a preponderance of In the selection of prospective employees,

evidence that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab
because he was over-speeding at the time he
hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such
negligence was the sole and proximate cause
of the serious physical injuries sustained by
Albayda. It was also proven that Albayda had
the right of way, considering that he reached
the intersection ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that
is at least equal to that of other vehicles
lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by
the fact that usually more will be required of
a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his
duty of care to the other because of the
physical advantages the automobile has over
the bicycle.
employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service
records. On the other hand, with respect to
the supervision of employees, employers
should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. To establish these factors in
a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.
The protestation of Abiad to escape
liability is short of the diligence required
under the law. Abiad's evidence consisted
entirely of testimonial evidence, and the
unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of
Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal
presumption that he was negligent in the
selection and supervision of his driver.
 TORTS – 3RD – 11

G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010
PACIS vs. MORALES
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
The gun, brought in by a customer for
repair, was left by defendant Morales in a
drawer of a table inside the gun store.
Morales was in Manila at the time, together being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary
with his employee Armando Jarnague, the
regular caretaker of the gun store.
Jarnague requested sales agents Matibag
and Herbolario to look after the gun store
while he and defendant Morales were away
and entrusted to them a bunch of keys used in presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms
the gun store which included the key to the
drawer where the fatal gun was kept.
Matibag and Herbolario later brought out
the gun from the drawer and placed it on top guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms
of the table, where the young Alfred Dennis
Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to
return the gun. The latter followed and
handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head,
causing his death.
otherwise his License to Operate Dealership
will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required
of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
affairs of life or business which involve little
or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous
weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is
safety and should have known never to keep a
loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the
should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed
for ready-access defensive use.

ISSUE:

WON Morales, as the gun store owner, be

held liable for negligence which resulted to
the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis.

HELD: YES

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the

employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or
any person for that matter, under Article 2176
of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based
on a person’s own negligence.

Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the

“Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the
business of purchasing and selling of firearms
and ammunition must maintain basic security
and safety requirements of a gun dealer,

G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION
vs.CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the
2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store.
CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip
at the payment and verification counter when
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a
loud thud. She looked behind her. She then
beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor,
her young body pinned by the bulk of the
store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for
help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was
quick to ask the assistance of the people
around in lifting the counter and retrieving
ZHIENETH from the floor.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the
Makati Medical Center where she was
operated on. She died fourteen (14) days after
the accident due to the injuries she sustained.
She was six years old.
ISSUE #1:
WON the death of ZHIENETH was
accidental or attributable to the negligence of counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
the private respondents for maintaining a
defective counter.
HELD: YES
An accident pertains to an unforeseen
event in which no fault or negligence attaches good father of a family.
to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens."
On the other hand, negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would
TORTS – 3RD – 12
not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, contributory negligence. In his book, former
for the protection of the interest of another Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years
demand, whereby such other person suffers of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account,
injury."
exempt from criminal liability. The same
Accident and negligence are intrinsically presumption and a like exemption from
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. criminal liability obtains in a case of a person
Accident occurs when the person concerned over nine and under fifteen years of age,
is exercising ordinary care, which is not unless it is shown that he has acted with
caused by fault of any person and which discernment. Since negligence may be a
could not have been prevented by any means felony and a quasi-delict and required
suggested by common prudence. discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of
The test in determining the existence of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to
negligence is enunciated in the landmark case be incapable of negligence; and that the
of Plicart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in presumption of lack of discernment or
doing the alleged negligent act use that incapacity for negligence in the case of a
reasonable care and caution which an child over nine but under fifteen years of age
ordinarily prudent person would have used in is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of therefore, is that a child under nine years of
negligence. age must be conclusively presumed incapable
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that Even if we attribute contributory
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that
to negligence. she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners'
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and
theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.
another store supervisor were personally
For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old
informed of the danger posed by the unstable
could not have caused the counter to collapse.
The physical analysis of the counter by both
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the
the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
safety of the store's employees and patrons as
scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal
a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
have done. Thus, as confronted by the
situation petitioners miserably failed to CRISELDA too, should be absolved from
discharge the due diligence required of a any contributory negligence. Initially,
ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist,
later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA
ISSUE #2:
momentarily released the child's hand from
WON the proximate cause of death was the her clutch when she signed her credit card
negligence of CRISELDA and ZHIENETH slip. At this precise moment, it was
for failing to exercise due and reasonable care reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go
while inside the store premises of her child.
HELD: NO
Anent the negligence imputed to
ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine
(9) years old in that they are incapable of

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
YLARDE vs. AQUINO
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
The school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the
old school sho. Realizing that the huge stones
were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez
started burying them one by one.
Deciding to help his colleague, private
respondent Edgardo Aquino called four
pupils to continue the digging. Reynaldo
Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga
and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation
was one meter and forty centimeters deep.
When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete, Aquino left the
children to level the loose soil around the
open hole while he went to see Banez who
was about thirty meters away.
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully
jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped
on top of the concrete block causing it to slide
down towards the opening. The concrete
block caught Ylarde before he could get out,
pinning him to the wall in a standing position,
and sustained injuries. Three days later,
Novelito Ylarde died.
ISSUE:
WON both private respondents can be held
liable for damages.
HELD:
As regards the principal, We hold that he
cannot be made responsible for the death of
the child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of arts and
trades. This is in line with Our ruling in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this
Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is
only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable
TORTS – 3RD – 13
for torts committed by their students. This dangerous site has a direct causal connection
Court went on to say that in a school of arts to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by
and trades, it is only the head of the school themselves, it was but natural for the children
who can be held liable. In the same case, We to play around. Tired from the strenuous
explained: digging, they just had to amuse themselves
with whatever they found. Driven by their
After an exhaustive examination of the playful and adventurous instincts and not
problem, the Court has come to the knowing the risk they were facing three of
conclusion that the provision in question them jumped into the hole while the other one
should apply to all schools, academic as well jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so
as non-academic. Where the school is heavy and the soil was loose from the
academic rather than technical or vocational digging, it was also a natural consequence
in nature, responsibility for the tort that the stone would fall into the hole beside
committed by the student will attach to the it, causing injury on the unfortunate child
teacher in charge of such student, following caught by its heavy weight. Everything that
the first part of the provision. This is the occurred was the natural and probable effect
general rule. In the case of establishments of of the negligent acts of private respondent
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to would not have died were it not for the unsafe
the general rule. In other words, teachers in situation created by private respondent
general shall be liable for the acts of their Aquino which exposed the lives of all the
students except where the school is technical pupils concerned to real danger.
in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the In ruling that the child Ylarde was
canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' imprudent, it is evident that the lower court
should apply to the words "pupils and did not consider his age and maturity. This
students' and 'heads of establishments of arts should not be the case. The degree of care
and trades to the word "apprentices." required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered to care for
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this himself. A minor should not be held to the
case, We rule that private respondent Soriano, same degree of care as an adult, but his
as principal, cannot be held liable for the conduct should be judged according to the
reason that the school he heads is an average conduct of persons of his age and
academic school and not a school of arts and experience. 5 The standard of conduct to
trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private which a child must conform for his own
respondent Aquino, private respondent protection is that degree of care ordinarily
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding exercised by children of the same age,
the digging. capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen
circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We
that private respondent Aquino can be held
cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as
imprudence.
the teacher-in-charge of the children for being
negligent in his supervision over them and his The contention that private respondent
failure to take the necessary precautions to Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a
prevent any injury on their persons. However, very cautious person is certainly without
as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person
alleged liability of private respondent Aquino would have foreseen that bringing children to
on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct an excavation site, and more so, leaving them
from that provided for in Article 2180. there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being
The negligent act of private respondent
would not assume that a simple warning "not
Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away
 TORTS – 3RD – 14

all the serious danger that a huge concrete

block adjacent to an excavation would
present to the children. Moreover, a teacher
who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
would have made sure that the children are
protected from all harm in his company.
 TORTS – 3RD – 15

G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO.,
INC. vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS
CORPORATION
STREET, J.:
H.D. Cranston was the registered owner of
the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was
used in the fishing trade in the Philippine
Islands.
Cranston decided, if practicable, to have experience in fixing the engines of
the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a automobiles and tractors, but it does not
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. C.E. appear that he was experienced in the doing
Quest, Philippine Motors Corporation’s
manager, agreed to do the job, with the
understanding that payment should be made
upon completion of the work.
A Zenith carburetor was chosen and
isntalled. After this appliance had been
installed, the engine was tried with gasoline
as a fuel, supplied from the tank already in
use.
In the course of the preliminary work upon
the carburetor and its connections, it was
observed that the carburetor was flooding,
and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was
trickling freely from the lower part to the
carburetor to the floor.
A study of the testimony lead us to the
conclusion that the loss of this boat was
chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill
of Quest.
It must be remembered that when a person
holds himself out as being competent to do
things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample
of similar work on boats.
Quest did not use the skill that would have
been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There
was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest,
a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to
possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline
may be said to have resulted from accident,
but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It would not have
occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of
skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.

After preliminary experiments and

adjustments had been made the boat was
taken out into the bay for a trial run.

As the boat was coming in from this run,

the engine stopped, and connection again had
to be made with the gasoline line to get a new
start. A moment later a back fire occurred in
the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to
shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly
the carburetor and adjacent parts were
covered with a mass of flames, which the
members of the crew were unable to subdue.
The Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk.

ISSUE:

WON Quest can be held liable for the demise

of the motor schooner Gwendoline

HELD: YES
 TORTS – 3RD – 16

G.R. No. L-12858 January 22, 1918 "skill" required of a druggist is denominated
as "high" or "ample." In other words, the care
THE UNITED STATES vs. PINEDA required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must
MALCOLM, J.:
correspond with the superior knowledge of
FACTS: the business which the law demands.

Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a Under one conception, and it should not be
registered pharmacist of long standing and forgotten that the case we consider are civil in
the owner of a drug store. nature, the question of negligence or
ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is
Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, responsible as an absolute guarantor of what
presented a copy of a prescription obtained he sells. In a decision which stands alone, the
from Dr. Richardson, which was prepared Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
under the supervision of Pineda, returned to
Santos. As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or
persons engaged in vending drugs and
Under the belief that he had purchased the medicines by retail, the legal maxim should
potassium chlorate which he had asked for, be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it
gave the preparation to two of his sick horses. should be caveat venditor.
The two horses died shortly afterwards.
Under the other conception, in which the
Santos, thereupon, took the three proof of negligence is considered as material,
remaining packages to the Bureau of Science where a customer calls upon a druggist for a
for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous
the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie
the packages contained not potassium negligence, placing the burden on him to
chlorate but barium chlorate (a poison). show that the mistake was under the
circumstances consistent with the exercise of
ISSUE: due care.

WON the pharmacist is liable for the death of The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to
the horses. the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor
and the vendee do not stand at arms length as
HELD: YES
in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty
The profession of pharmacy, it has been is on the druggist to take precautions to
said again and again, is one demanding care prevent death or serious injury to anyone who
and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar
use care has been variously qualified as leaning. The nature of drugs is such that
"ordinary care," "care of a special high examination would not avail the purchaser
degree," "the highest degree of care known to anything. It would be idle mockery for the
practical men." Even under the first customer to make an examination of a
conservative expression, "ordinary care" with compound of which he can know nothing.
reference to the business of a druggist, the Consequently, it must be that the druggist
Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must warrants that he will deliver the drug called
be held to signify "the highest practicable for.
degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and
In view of the tremendous an imminent
vigilance, and most exact and reliable
danger to the public from the careless sale of
safeguards consistent with the reasonable
poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too
conduct of the business, in order that human
rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any
life may not be constantly be exposed to the
druggist who shall sell one drug for another
danger flowing from the substitution of
whether it be through negligence or mistake.
deadly poisons for harmless medicine." The
 TORTS – 3RD – 17

G.R. No. 165622 October 17, 2008 In the United States case of Tombari v.
Conners, it was ruled that the profession of
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. DE pharmacy demands care and skill, and
LEON druggists must exercise care of a specially
high degree, the highest degree of care known
REYES, R.T., J.:
to practical men. In other words, druggists
FACTS: must exercise the highest practicable degree
of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact
Respondent Raul T. De Leon, presiding and reliable safeguards consistent with the
judge of RTC in Parañaque, noticed that his reasonable conduct of the business, so that
left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty human life may not constantly be exposed to
reading. the danger flowing from the substitution of
deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
On the same evening, he met a friend for
dinner, Dr. Charles Milla, who prescribed the Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon
drugs “Cortisporin Opthalmic” and “Ceftin” have similarly failed to live up to high
to relieve his eye problems. standard of diligence expected of them as
pharmacy professionals. They were grossly
De Leon went to Mercury Drug Store negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of
Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. the prescribed eye drops to De Leon. Worse,
He showed his prescription to petitioner they have once again attempted to shift the
Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. blame to their victim by underscoring his own
Subsequently, he paid for and took the failure to read the label.
medicine handed over by Ganzon.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise
At his chambers, De Leon requested his and experience of Mercury Drug and its
sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. employees in dispensing to him the right
As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on medicine. This Court has ruled that in the
respondent’s left eye. Instead of relieving his purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and
irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He seller do not stand at arms length. There
immediately rinsed the affected eye with exists an imperative duty on the seller or the
water, but the pain did not subside. Only then druggist to take precaution to prevent death
did he discover that he was given the wrong or injury to any person who relies on one’s
medicine, “Cortisporin Otic Solution.” absolute honesty and peculiar learning.

ISSUE:

WON Mercury Drug exercised the degree of

diligence required of them as a pharmacy

HELD: NO

Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to

exercise the highest degree of diligence
expected of them.

Mercury Drug and Ganzon can not

exculpate themselves from any liability. As
active players in the field of dispensing
medicines to the public, the highest degree of
care and diligence is expected of them.
Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and
abroad, have laid salutary rules for the
protection of human life and human health.
 TORTS – 3RD – 18

G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999 trendelenburg position. Immediately reasonable evidence, in the absence of
thereafter, she went out of the operating explanation by the defendant, that the
RAMOS vs. CA room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that accident arose from or was caused by the
something wrong was . . . happening". Dr. defendant's want of care.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Calderon was then able to intubate the
patient. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
FACTS:
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos suffers from At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, the of common knowledge and experience, the
discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by patient was taken to the Intensive Care Unit very nature of certain types of occurrences
the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. (ICU). may justify an inference of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the
Because the discomforts somehow About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. instrumentality causing the injury in the
interfered with her normal ways, she sought Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The absence of some explanation by the defendant
professional advice and was advised by Dr. latter informed the former that something who is charged with negligence. It is
Hosaka that she should undergo a went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to grounded in the superior logic of ordinary
"cholecystectomy" operation. what was told to him, Rogelio reminded the human experience and on the basis of such
doctor that the condition of his wife would experience or common knowledge,
Rogelio E. Ramos (husband), however, not have happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) negligence may be deduced from the mere
asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good looked for a good anaesthesiologist. occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with
Rogelio that he will get a good Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a
the doctrine of common knowledge.
anesthesiologist. month. About four months thereafter, the
patient was released from the hospital in a However, much has been said that res ipsa
Erlinda requested her sister-in-law, comatose condition. She cannot do anything. loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and,
Herminda Cruz, who was a Dean of the She cannot move any part of her body. She as such, does not create or constitute an
College of Nursing to be with her during the cannot see or hear. She is living on independent or separate ground of liability.
operation for moral support. Herminda was mechanical means. She suffered brain Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary
allowed to stay inside the operating room. damage as a result of the absence of oxygen or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is
in her brain for four to five minutes. regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
The operation was delayed because of the
procedural of convenience since it furnishes a
very late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. ISSUE:
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who WON the negligence of the respondents burden of producing specific proof of
was inside the operating room with the caused the unfortunate condition of Erlinda negligence. In other words, mere invocation
patient, heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka Ramos and application of the doctrine does not
is already here." dispense with the requirement of proof of
HELD: YES negligence. It is simply a step in the process
As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to
she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which present along with the proof of the accident,
hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. literally means "the thing or the transaction enough of the attending circumstances to
Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact presumption of negligence, and to thereby
tiyan". Because of the remarks of Dra. of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the place on the defendant the burden of going
Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what surrounding circumstances, may permit an forward with the proof. 20 Still, before resort
Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter inference or raise a presumption of to the doctrine may be allowed, the following
noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as facie case, and present a question of fact for
Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard defendant to meet with an explanation. Where 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily
Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call the thing which caused the injury complained does not occur in the absence of someone's
Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After of is shown to be under the management of negligence;
Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, the defendant or his servants and the accident
is such as in ordinary course of things does 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within
she saw this anesthesiologist trying to
not happen if those who have its management the exclusive control of the defendant or
intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed
defendants; and
became bluish and the patient was placed in a or control use proper care, it affords
 TORTS – 3RD – 19

3. The possibility of contributing conduct loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was which does not normally occur in the process
which would make the plaintiff responsible is under the influence of anesthetic, during or of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind
eliminated. following an operation for appendicitis, of situation does not in the absence of
among others. negligence of someone in the administration
In the above requisites, the fundamental of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal
element is the "control of instrumentality" A distinction must be made between the tube. Normally, a person being put under
which caused the damage. Such element of failure to secure results, and the occurrence of anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a
control must be shown to be within the something more unusual and not ordinarily consequence of administering such anesthesia
dominion of the defendant. In order to have found if the service or treatment rendered if the proper procedure was followed.
the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition followed the usual procedure of those skilled Furthermore, the instruments used in the
to proving injury or damage, must show a in that particular practice. It must be administration of anesthesia, including the
situation where it is applicable, and must conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur endotracheal tube, were all under the
establish that the essential elements of the can have no application in a suit against a exclusive control of private respondents, who
doctrine were present in a particular incident. physician or surgeon which involves the are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise,
merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty
Although generally, expert medical treatment. The physician or surgeon is not of contributory negligence because she was
testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits required at his peril to explain why any under the influence of anesthetics which
to prove that a physician has done a negligent particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
rendered her unconscious.
act or that he has deviated from the standard any particular scientific treatment did not
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa Upon these facts and under these
ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit circumstances the Court would be able to say,
need for expert medical testimony is if the only showing is that the desired result as a matter of common knowledge and
dispensed with because the injury itself of an operation or treatment was not observation, if negligence attended the
provides the proof of negligence. The reason accomplished. The real question, therefore, is management and care of the patient.
is that the general rule on the necessity of whether or not in the process of the operation Moreover, the liability of the physicians and
expert testimony applies only to such matters any extraordinary incident or unusual event the hospital in this case is not predicated upon
clearly within the domain of medical science, outside of the routine performance occurred an alleged failure to secure the desired results
and not to matters that are within the common which is beyond the regular scope of of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill
knowledge of mankind which may be customary professional activity in such in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. operations, which, if unexplained would operation or treatment was ever performed on
themselves reasonably speak to the average Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that
man as the negligent cause or causes of the determination a case is made out for the
the patient must do is prove a nexus between
untoward consequence. If there was such application of the doctrine of res ipsa
the particular act or omission complained of
extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res loquitur.
and the injury sustained while under the
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the
custody and management of the defendant It is the accepted rule that expert testimony
defendant is called upon to explain the
without need to produce expert medical is not necessary for the proof of negligence in
matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
testimony to establish the standard of care. non-technical matters or those of which an
could.
Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because ordinary person may be expected to have
there is no other way, under usual and In the present case, Erlinda submitted knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can herself for cholecystectomy and expected a of care is so obvious as to render expert
obtain redress for injury suffered by him. routine general surgery to be performed on testimony unnecessary. We take judicial
her gall bladder. At the time of submission, notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have
Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except have become so common, that even an
applied the doctrine in the following
for a few minor discomforts, was likewise ordinary person can tell if it was administered
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the
physically fit in mind and body. However, properly. As such, it would not be too
body of the patient after an operation, injuries
during the administration of anesthesia and difficult to tell if the tube was properly
sustained on a healthy part of the body which
prior to the performance of cholecystectomy inserted. This kind of observation, we
was not under, or in the area, of treatment,
she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. believe, does not require a medical degree to
removal of the wrong part of the body when
Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went be acceptable.
another part was intended, knocking out a
out of the operating room already decerebrate
tooth while a patient's jaw was under Generally, to qualify as an expert witness,
and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and one must have acquired special knowledge of
damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury
 TORTS – 3RD – 20

the subject matter about which he or she is to hours late for the latter's operation. Because Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez’ claim of lack
testify, either by the study of recognized of this, he had little or no time to confer with of negligence on her part is belied by the
authorities on the subject or by practical his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia records of the case. It has been sufficiently
experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in established that she failed to exercise the
qualify as an expert witness based on the his professional duties towards his patient. standards of care in the administration of
above standard since he lacks the necessary Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the anesthesia on a patient.
knowledge, skill, and training in the field of events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a
testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, We now discuss the responsibility of the thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda.
private respondents' intentionally avoided hospital in this particular incident.. Her act of seeing her patient for the first time
providing testimony by competent and only an hour before the scheduled operative
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real procedure was, therefore, an act of
independent experts in the proper areas.
control over their attending and visiting exceptional negligence and professional
Proximate cause has been defined as that "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
which, in natural and continuous sequence, not, technically employees, a point which prudence and vigilance in dealing with
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, respondent hospital asserts in denying all human lives lie at the core of the physician’s
produces injury, and without which the result responsibility for the patient's condition, the centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to
would not have occurred. An injury or control exercised, the hiring, and the right to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a
damage is proximately caused by an act or a terminate consultants all fulfill the important clear indicia of her negligence.
failure to act, whenever it appears from the hallmarks of an employer-employee
evidence in the case, that the act or omission relationship, with the exception of the The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda
played a substantial part in bringing about or payment of wages. In assessing whether such does not normally happen absent any
actually causing the injury or damage; and a relationship in fact exists, the control test is negligence in the administration of anesthesia
that the injury or damage was either a direct determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As
result or a reasonably probable consequence foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of was noted in our Decision, the instruments
of the act or omission. It is the dominant, allocating responsibility in medical used in the administration of anesthesia,
moving or producing cause. negligence cases, an employer-employee including the endotracheal tube, were all
relationship in effect exists between hospitals under the exclusive control of private
Applying the above definition in relation to and their attending and visiting physicians. respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.
the evidence at hand, faulty intubation is This being the case, the question now arises
undeniably the proximate cause which as to whether or not respondent hospital is While the professional services of Dr.
triggered the chain of events leading to solidarily liable with respondent doctors for Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured
Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her petitioner's condition. primarily for their performance of acts within
comatose condition. their respective fields of expertise for the
In the instant case, respondent hospital, treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and that one
As to the responsibility of respondent Dr. apart from a general denial of its does not exercise control over the other, they
Orlino Hosaka as the head of the surgical responsibility over respondent physicians, were certainly not completely independent of
team, under the so-called "captain of the failed to adduce evidence showing that it each other so as to absolve one from the
ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see exercised the diligence of a good father of a negligent acts of the other physician.
to it that those under him perform their task in family in the hiring and supervision of the
the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of
negligence can be found in his failure to to the degree of supervision which it arriving very late for the scheduled operation
exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of
of the operative team) in not determining if offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, his duty as a physician “to serve the interest
his anesthesiologist observed proper respondent hospital thereby failed to of his patients with the greatest solicitude,
anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on discharge its burden under the last paragraph giving them always his best talent and skill,”
record exists to show that respondent Dr. of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez respondent hospital is consequently solidarily requires a person, in the performance of his
properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's duties, to act with justice and give everyone
does not escape us that respondent Dr. condition. his due.
Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a
After a careful consideration of the
different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three
April 11, 2002 finds that respondent hospital’s position on
 TORTS – 3RD – 21

this issue is meritorious. There is no

employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka
which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable
for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

As explained by respondent hospital, that

the admission of a physician to membership
in DLSMC’s medical staff as active or
visiting consultant is first decided upon by the
Credentials Committee thereof, which is
composed of the heads of the various
specialty departments such as the Department
of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics,
Surgery with the department head of the
particular specialty applied for as chairman.
The Credentials Committee then recommends
to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital
Administrator the acceptance or rejection of
the applicant physician, and said director or
administrator validates the committee's
recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a
disciplinary action is lodged against a
consultant, the same is initiated by the
department to whom the consultant concerned
belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee
consisting of the department specialty heads.
The medical director/hospital administrator
merely acts as ex-officio member of said
committee.

Neither is there any showing that it is

DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for
medical services rendered by the latter to
their respective patients. Moreover, the
contract between the consultant in respondent
hospital and his patient is separate and
distinct from the contract between respondent
hospital and said patient. The first has for its
object the rendition of medical services by the
consultant to the patient, while the second
concerns the provision by the hospital of
facilities and services by its staff such as
nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for
the proper treatment of the patient.

Further, no evidence was adduced to show

that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda
was due to a failure on the part of respondent
DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and
staff necessary for her treatment.