'rules of international law of our times'; (II Oppenheim,
[ G.R. No. 409, January 30, 1947 ]
ANASTACIO LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS.
ERIBERTO MISA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
"In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa,
etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic:
"(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a
qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign
of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains
there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government
or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 429;
Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the
United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
"Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance
of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in
the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
(75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons
(75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant
it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs
a body politic or society which constitute the state) must
be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent
thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period
of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy
passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence
of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented
from exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the
6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of
Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the
conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended
and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as
suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the
whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
"Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of
the United States was suspended in Castine, set forth in
the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of
the existence of a government de facto therein and its
power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory
adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907,
that the military occupation of an enemy territory does
not transfer the sovereignty, or on the old theory that
such occupation transfers the sovereignty to the
occupant; that, in the first case, the word 'sovereignty'
used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested
in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the
occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and that
in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or
doctrine, refers to the suspension of the sovereignty
itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be
applied to the present case;
"Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary
allegiance,' repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them,
such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a
foreign country owes to his own government or
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government
or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces
of the enemy may commit treason against his own
legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and
that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience
to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it
would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a
foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso
facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey,
with certain exceptions, the laws of that country which
enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives,
and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship,
because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws
of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;
"Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate
power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political
laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or
in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that
as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes
against national security, such as treason and espionage,
inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,
flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal
possession of firearms, which are of political complexion
because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable
as against the occupant, because they can not be
committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the
invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by
him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory,
yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national
security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by
their allegiance to the latter during" the enemy
occupation;
"Considering that, although the military occupant is
enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce
public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de
facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change
the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies
of the military service demand such action, that is, when
it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of
the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations,
the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940
United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated
within these limitations are obligatory upon the
inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have
not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and
orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended
or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
"Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance
or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand
from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the
latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for
the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel
them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because
it is evident that such action is not demanded by the
exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection
of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically
transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore,
if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or
intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may
lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
"Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and
would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants
of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are
not to aid them in their military operation against the
resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and
conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of
their own independence or sovereignty—such theory
would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the
people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own
freedom and independence and repressing the exercise
by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide;
"(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the
government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended
to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,
exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was
made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of
the Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article
XVI thereof, which provides that 'All laws of the Philippine
Islands * * * shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution * * * and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands,
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the for others to be stated in the said opinion, without
Government and corresponding officials under this prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Constitution;' Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate
"Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines opinion."
was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance
appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by
the Legislative Department or Congress of the United
States in approving the Independence Law above quoted
and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains
the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them'
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among
others, 'As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States
in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations—in
fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law.
ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is 'a purely
political question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all ofher officers,
citizens and subjects of the country.'

"Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended

to the Constitution which provides that pending the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States 'All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance
to the United States', was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United
States, but these limitations do not do away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that
the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to
reason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States
as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of
government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during the Commonwealth, because
it is an offense against the same government and the
same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that 'The government established
by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and
the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines';

"This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a

more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition,
as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and

[ G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904 ]
THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND
APPELLEE, VS. DALMACIO LAGNASON,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
WILLARD, J.:
The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No.
292 with the crime of treason, was convicted and
sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from
the evidence. From the time of the occupation of the
Province of Occidental Negros by the American troops,
there had existed therein a band of men in arms against
the Government of the United States, which band was led
by the defendant and which in October was campaigning
through the northern part of the province. In the
southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio
Papa. These two parties, though in communication with
each other, had formerly operated independently, but in
the month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed
himself and his forces under the orders of said Dionisio
Papa. His band was constantly armed and kept together,
and its object was to establish an independent
government.
On October 29,1902, the defendant with this band made
an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in said province, but
was driven off by the force of Constabulary there
stationed. During that night two inspectors of the
Constabulary arrived with additional fortes and early in
the morning they left the pueblo in search of the
defendant. He was encountered with his party about
three kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked by the
Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a half. The
defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty
of his men were killed. On the side of the Constabulary
were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were acting
as guides. The defendant's band consisted of between
seventy and eighty men. They had for arms five or ten
rifles, bolos, daggers, and one small cannon. The
defendant when captured was armed with a rifle, a
revolver, and a bolo. Most of his men wore black shirts,
white pantaloons, and black caps. They
carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden
crosses which were captured, together with the cannon.
Article 3, section 3, of the Constitution of the United
States provides as follows :
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open
court."
The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat L., 112),
contained the following provision:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the
United States of America, shall levy war against them, or
shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the United States or elsewhere, and shall
be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of
the treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such
person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason
against the United States, and shall suffer death."
The statute law of the United States stood in that form,
so far as we are informed, until the act of July 17, 1862
(12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second
sections of that act were as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That every person who shall hereafter
commit the crime of treason against the United States,
and shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death,
and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free;
or, at the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned
for not less than five years and fined not less than ten
thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be
declared and made free; said fine shall be levied and
collected on any or all of the property, real and personal,
excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted
was the owner at the time of committing the said crime,
any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding.
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall
hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the
United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or
comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and
comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection,
and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished
by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or
by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the
liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of
said punishments, at the discretion of the court."
In the Revised Statutes of the United States these
provisions appear in sections 5331, 5332, and 5334,
which are as follows:
"Sec. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United
States, who levies war against them, or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United
States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.
"Sec. 5332. Every person guilty of treason shall suffer
death; or, at the discretion of the court, shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and
fined not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on
and collected out of any or all of his property, real and
personal, of which he was the owner at the time of
committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the
contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted
of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any
office under the United States.
"Sec. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists,
or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or
gives aid or comfort thereto, shall, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of
not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both of such
punishments; and shall, moreover, be incapable of
holding any office under the United States."
Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission are as follows :
"Section 1. Every person, resident in. the Philippine
Islands, owing allegiance to the United States, or the
Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war
against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is
guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death
or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at
hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less
than ten thousand dollars."
"Sec. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or
engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States, or of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives
aid or comfort to anyone so engaging in such rebellion or
insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not
more than ten years and be fined not more than ten
thousand dollars."
The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes
of treason, rebellion, and sedition. Article 236 of that
code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of Act No.
292, but that act, as to treason and rebellion, is practically
a reproduction of the sections quoted from the Revised
Statutes.
Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of
the country, the question as to what constituted a
"levying of war" within the constitutional definition of
treason had been before the Federal courts on several
different occasions.
In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of
the United States quoted the definitions of the phrase
"levying war" which had been given by different judges of
the United States, and declared through the Chief Justice
what the latter afterwards said in Burr's case (25 Fed.
Cases, 13), to wit:
"That part of his deposition which bears upon this charge
is the plan disclosed by the prisoner for seizing upon New
Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States. That this
plan if consummated by overt acts would amount to
treason no man will controvert."
Whatever differences there may have been among the
early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the
enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5,1)
constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not
treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts
of violence committed by an armed body of men with the
purpose of overthrowing the Government was "levying
war against the United States," and was therefore
treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand.
(See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed.
Cases, 105.)
No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign
enemy and a rebel or insurgent so far as the act of
"levying war" is concerned. All of the cases tried before
the United States courts have grown out of insurrection.
The case of Mitchell grew out of the "whisky rebellion" in
western Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of the North-
ampton Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of Burr's
attempts; the case of Hanway out of resistance to the
fugitive slave law; and the case of Greathouse out of the
civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made
under the second clause of the Constitutional provision,
namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It has been
said that the word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy
and does not include a rebel.
If it were not for the provisions of the second section of
the act of July 17, 1862, now section 5334 of the Revised
Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the Commission,
the case at bar would present no difficulty. The defendant
would be clearly guilty of treason and punishable under
the first section of Act No. 292. He was engaged in an
attempt to overthrow the Government and was captured
after an armed contest. It matters not how vain and futile
his attempt was and how impossible of accomplishment.
The acts performed by him constituted a levying of war.
Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall
be punished by death, or imprisonment for not less than
five years. Section 5334 declares that one engaging in a
rebellion or insurrection against the United States shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years.
As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and
therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by
both sections and in different ways.
This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case
of United States vs. Greathouse (4 Sawy., 457 S. C; 26 Fed.
Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting in the circuit
court The defendants in that case were indicted under the
second section of the act of July 17, 1862 (now Revised
Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No. 292, sec. 3), for fitting out
in the harbor of San Francisco a privateer to aid the then
existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in charging the
jury:
"But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in
the second section which would not constitute treason,
except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of
inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the
Senate, and read the several sections of the act together,
the apparent inconsistency disappears. Looking at the act
alone, we conclude that Congress intended (1) to
preserve the act of 1790, which prescribes the penalty of
death, in force for the prosecution and punishment of
offenses committed previous to July 17,1862, unless the
parties accused are convicted under the act of the latter
date for subsequent offenses; (2) to punish treason
thereafter committed with death, or fine "and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, unless the
treason consist in engaging in or assisting a rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States, or
the laws thereof, in which event the death penalty is to
be abandoned and a less penalty inflicted. By this
construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions
of the different sections is avoided and-effect given to
each clause of the act. The defendants are, therefore, in
fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the
protection and privileges allowed to parties accused of
treason, without being liable, in case of conviction, to the
penalty which all other civilized nations have awarded to
this, the highest of crimes known to the law."
Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said:
"If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the
present rebellion constitutes a levying of war, it follows
that in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress
has denounced the same crime; and that a party
amenable to the second section for having 'engaged in
the rebellion and given it aid and comfort,' must also be
guilty of treason by levying war against the United States.
"As, then, the offenses described are substantially the
same, though a different penalty is attached to their
commission by the sections referred to, it was held by the
court, under the first indictment, which was in terms for
treason, that the smaller penalty could alone be inflicted,
that the prisoners could not be capitally punished, and
could therefore be admitted to bail. On the same grounds
it was considered that under the present indictment,
which pursues the language of the second section, the
offense charged was treason; that both the offense as
described and the overt acts charged amounted to that
crime, and that the accused were entitled to all the
privileges secured by the Constitution or allowed by law
to parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding,
that in consequence of the legislation referred to, the
penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In determining,
therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted
under this indictment, it will be proper to consider
whether their acts constitute in law 'a levying of war,' for
'an engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort'
amounts to a levying of war; while at the same time we
may also inquire whether their acts are such as would, if
done with regard to a public enemy, constitute an
adherence to him, ' giving him aid and comfort.' "
As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, " treason
against the United States is defined by the Constitution
itself. Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain,
construe, or define the offense. Its construction is
entrusted to the court alone."
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the
power to fix the penalty for this crime and the
construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the
case of Greathouse was that under both sections the
offense was treason, but when the treason consisted of
engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it could be
punished only by imprisonment for not more than ten
years, in other cases it could be punished under section 1
by death, or imprisonment for not less than five years.
That the Commission when it used the phrase " levies
war," in the first section of Act No. 292, intended to give
to it the meaning which it then had in the United States,
can not be doubted.
In Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following
language in speaking of the phrase " levying war:".
"But the term is not for the first time applied to treason
by the Constitution of the United States. It is a technical
term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose
language is our language, and whose laws form the
substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the
term was not employed by the framers of our
Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by
those from whom we borrowed it."
In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of
the same phrase, said:
"At the time the Constitution was framed, the language
incorporated into it from the English statute had received
judicial construction and acquired a definite meaning, and
that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts of
the United States."
No one can believe that the Commission intended to
abandon the well-recognized meaning which the phrase
then had and give to it a meaning entirely different. If that
had been their intension they would certainly have used
other language, so that their intent not to adopt the
recognized meaning would have been manifest.
That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a
"levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the
time the act of the Commission was passed, can not be
doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts
constituted a "rebellion or insurrection'y within the
meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two
sections can only be reconciled in the manner employed
in the case against Greathouse, and that decision should
be followed.
However, in respect to the penalty, it
makes no difference whether the offense called rebellion
in section 3 of Act No. 292 is considered an offense
different from that of treason denned in section 1, or
whether the decision in the case of Greathouse be
followed and the acts punished by section 3 considered
as of the same character as those punished by section 1.
In either case the punishment cannot exceed ten years'
imprisonment and a fine.
There would be a difference in respect to evidence to
prove the two crimes. If rebellion and insurrection are
treason, a defendant can not be convicted under section
3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act or by confession in open court. (Act of Congress,
March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not treason he could be
convicted upon the testimony required in ordinary case's.
In United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the
constitutional provision as to two witnesses applied to
prosecutions under the second section of the act of 1862
(our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that
question in this case, as the overt act of the defendant
was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to
decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase "
owing allegiance to the United States," which is found in
section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of the act,
makes a difference between the two sections in respect
to the persons who may be covered by them. In the case
at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore
covered both by section 1 and section 3.

This court has decided two cases in which treason was

charged. In the case of United States vs. Antonio de los
Reyes, February 23, 1904,[1] the defendant was acquitted
because no overt act of treason was proved. In the case
of United States vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 932[1]) the
defendant was acquitted because there were not two
witnesses to the same overt act.

The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty,

however, from death to ten years and a fine of $10,000,
money of the United States, with the costs of this instance
against the defendant.

[ G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. APOLINAR ADRIANO,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused to
life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
"That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout,
during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese
Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the
mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
Apolinar Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino
citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said
allegiance, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces
of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines
and the United States were then at war, giving the said
enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
"That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines in the said
enemy's war efforts and operations against the United
States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm
and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and
the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements
against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas
of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of
San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in
the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between
January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law."
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to
substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization.
What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in
confiscation of personal property. The court below,
however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely
as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer,
"that the accused and other Makapilis had their
headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform;
that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with
other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; * * * that
during the same period, the accused in Makapili military
uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other
Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;"
and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to
the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations
are not borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two
of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of
the various acts of treason imputed by them to the
appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused
took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and
performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to
acts allegedly committed on different dates without any
two witnesses coinciding in any one specific deed. There
is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that
the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in
Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point
it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by
another if corroboration means that two witnesses have
seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, be it
a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili
organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one
against his will, membership in the Makapili organization
imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for
which the organization was created, which, according to
the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the
obligations assumed by the Philippines, in the Pact of
Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and
sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate
Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate
unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the
common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need
not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal
intent and knowledge may be gathered from the
testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act
itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U. S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive
of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose
of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually
went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his
country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight
side by side with him when the opportune time came
even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such
membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and
comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the
country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy
aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented,
and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he
could count on men such as the accused and his kind who
were ready to strike at their own people. The practical
effect of it was no different from that of enlisting in the
invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be
established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the
evidence in the present ease meet this statutory test? Is
the two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of
one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and
so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin
and so we have to look for guidance from American
sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation
has been placed on the two-witness principle by
American courts, and authoritative text writers have
commented on it. We cull from American materials the
following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of
authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p.
2282, says:
"In England the original Statute of Edward, although
requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was
held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt
act and another witness to another overt act of the same
species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated
that the same construction might apply in this country.
But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: 'The
opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by
sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their
variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting
them to speak to different acts.' The rule as adopted in
this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state
and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall
testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in
England."
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the
overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act."
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D. C. S. D.,
N. Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is
necessary to produce two direct witnesses to
the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have
the support of two oaths; * * *." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decided
during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court
lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that
an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that
it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to
sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and
comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two
witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set
aside the judgment of the trial court. To the possible
objection that the reasoning by which we have reached
this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say
that the authors of the constitutional provision of which
our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for
treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This
provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard
to the amount of evidence that where two or more
witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them
is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been
said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any
moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which
we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences,
however strong or conclusive, flowing from the testimony
of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are
unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in
the form of direct testimony of another eye-witness to
the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles
placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that
the founders of the American government fully realized
the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but
because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United
States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the
members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the
few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed
against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante,
section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the
Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice
Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the
celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find
grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in
psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical
calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its
protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the
treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely
restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson
that " 'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a
manner, as to render proof extremely difficult—as in a
traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision
was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in
the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was
not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that
'prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.' "
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of
the American Constitution. By extension, the law-makers
who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute
books must be understood to have intended that the law
should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as
the American forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted
with costs charged de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones,
Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur. Paras, J., concurs in
the result.
 [ G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERFECTO, J.:
Appellant stands accused of treason, committed between
December, 1944, and January, 1945, in the Province of
Laguna, on only one count alleged in the information as
follows:
"That on or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a
member of the Ganap, a subversive pro-Japanese
organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization
supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and designed to
bear arms against the army of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the guerrillas in the
Philippines; that he was equipped with a 1903 Springfield
rifle, caliber 30, and was made to undergo 10 days
training, consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and
target practice; and that from or about January 12, 1945
to March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to
guard duty once a week; that he was armed with a rifle
with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom
he was guarding who might attempt to escape and also
any guerrilla or American soldier who might approach the
Japanese garrison."
The lower court found him guilty and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the
costs.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Tomas C. Serrano, 46, farmer, resident of Siniloan, Second
Lieutenant in the Marking's guerrilla organization,
testified that in December, 1944, he saw the accused in
the Japanese garrison in Siniloan, "he was a member of
the Makapili organization;" "he was doing guard duty,
with a rifle, with a bayonet at his side;" "he was at the
entrance of the garrison and he made all civilians passing
through the entrance bow to him." If they did not bow,
"he dragged them by the arms and brought them to the
captain of the garrison;" he served as guard "since
November, 1944, when the Japanese garrison was
established in Siniloan, up to the time I was arrested on
March 25, 1945;" he saw the accused on guard duty in the
garrison "many times;" "I often saw him confiscating
foodstuffs such as rice, fruits, calabasa, and other
vegetables, for the support of the Japanese soldiers;" " he
was with arms accompanied by Japanese soldiers and
other members of the Makapili;" "I often saw him
accompanied by Japanese soldiers and
other Makapili members, arresting suspected guerrillas
and sometimes they were patrolling or camping in the
hideouts of the guerrilla forces, I cannot tell how many
times, but I often saw him;" the witness was arrested on
March 25, 1945, by Japanese soldiers and Makapilis, with
whom the accused was; "the next morning we, the
thirteen prisoners, were brought to the place where we
were to be executed; but luckily while we were on our
way to the barrio, the American planes came roaring, so
the guards took cover;" "they were pulling the rope that
tied us, and luckily I was able to slip away because I was
the second to the last man in the line, and the rope was
cut;" "I could not run fast because I was lame;" the rest
were executed, naming the following: "Alejandro Serrano,
Custodio Adaro, Emilio Javier, Peter Sardal, Elias Rodolfo,
Ignacio Cavano, Beato Optis, Napoleon
Pagtakhan, Bienvenido Agapangan, and myself;" Miguel
Palma "was in my back to the last, so we two remained,
and Pacifico (Adopina) remained untied" because he was
carrying food, and when the Japanese ran, "he escaped."
Asked to explain how he knew about the lot of those who
were executed, the witness said that he went home when
the town was liberated, and he visited the place "because
I know the place," and when he reached the spot "I
smelled very bad odor, and I recognized the soil which
swelled, so I said to myself that this is the place where our
son was buried;" "I went home and told the other parents
of the victims" about the spot; "the next month, about
thirty days," the witness and the other parents requested
the municipal authorities to be allowed to exhume the
bodies; when his son was being taken to the place of
execution. "I had not seen him that time;" the witness
based his knowledge as to appellant's being a Makapili on
Exhibit A and he saw him armed, guarding the Japanese
garrison, confiscating foodstuffs for the Japanese, and
arresting guerrilla suspects in the town; Bienvenido
Agapangan, one of those who were executed by the
Japanese, "was the son" of appellant; "I cannot tell you
whether he (appellant) was reporting to his officers any
guerrilla;" Angel Javier and Custodio Adaro were arrested
by a party of which the accused was a member, and "I
know because he was with them when they were
arrested;" the witness does not know whether the
accused was present during the execution "because there
was nobody present; only God had witnessed the killing
of those persons."
Mauricio Adaro, 47, farmer, resident of Siniloan, testified
that in December, 1944, he saw the accused in the
Japanese garrison in Siniloan; "he was mounting guard;"
asked from what date to what date he saw him in the
garrison, the witness answered that "I cannot remember
the month in 1944 because we used to go out of Siniloan
every time;" appellant "was getting food supplies from
the civilians and giving them to the Japanese;" "the
accused and the Japanese companions of his arrested my
son (Custodio) in our house;" the witness was not
arrested, "because I was able to hide;" he saw defendant
mounting guard in the Japanese garrison "many times;"
"more than ten times;" the garrison was located "in the
school building."
Delfin Redor, 55, mayor of Siniloan, since 1937, testified
that appellant "has been my barrio lieutenant;" he
belongs to Pampar Makapili and Pampar and Makapili, "I
believe are the same;" from December, 1944, to March,
1945, the witness saw the accused "in
the Makapili garrison, in the Siniloan plaza;" "I believe
that he was a member of the Makapili;" "Sometimes he
was detailed as guard in front of the garrison with arms
and ammunitions—bayonet;" he saw him as such "many
times;" the witness was not a mayor during the Japanese
occupation because "in 1944, March, I escaped because,
you know, I was wanted by the Japanese because I was
also a guerrilla; before that, "I was a mayor of the town;"
"during December, 1944, up to March, because, you
know, I left the office, I was still in the town of Siniloan
collecting some supplies for the guerrillas;" after
abandoning the office of mayor, the witness "remained
living in the poblacion of Siniloan;" he "never stopped
living in the poblacion;" "I had three times seen the
accused accompanied by the Japanese in raiding outside
the poblacion;" the accused commandeered foodstuffs
"and took them to the garrison for food;" "the Japanese
garrison was in the Intermediate Building and
the Makapili garrison is in Baybay Academy, about one
kilometer distant;" the witness saw the accused "in
Makapili garrison;" the witness was a captain of the
guerrillas and was arrested by the Japanese four times,
and in those occasions he did not see the accused in the
garrison; the witness does not know of anybody who had
been pointed out by the accused to the Japanese and was
arrested by the same.
The Constitution provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved." (Article II, section
1 [17].) To overcome this constitutional presumption, the
guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the
prosecution in this case does not offer that degree of
proof. None of the several overt acts alleged in the
information has been proved in accordance with the two-
witness rule provided in article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code.
It is imputed to appellant, in the first place, that he is a
member of the Ganap, "a subversive pro-Japanese
organization," and "joined the Pampar, a military
organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and
designed to bear arms against the Army of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
guerrillas in the Philippines." No witness has testified that
appellant is a member of the Ganap. Only one witness,
Redor, testified that appellant belonged to Pampar, but
he did not testify as to its nature.
The next allegation of the information is that appellant
"was equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber 30,
and was made to undergo ten days training, consisting of
military drill, manual of arms, and target
practice." No evidence has been presented in support of
this allegation.
The third allegation against appellant is that "from or
about January 12, 1945, to March 15, 1945, the said
accused was assigned to guard duty once a week." The
fourth and the last allegation is that "he was armed with
a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners
whom he was guarding who might attempt to escape and
also any guerrilla or American soldier who might
approach the Japanese garrison." In connection with
these two allegation, the only thing that the prosecution
attempted to prove is that appellant did guard duty and
was armed with a rifle. But the attempt does not meet the
test under the two-witness rule.
The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that
they had seen the accused doing guard duty in the
Japanese garrison in Siniloan "many times," more than
"ten times," but neither of them has mentioned any
specific time, day and hour. They were able to mention
only years and months. There is no way of concluding that
the two witnesses testified about the same overt act. The
"many times" or more than "ten times" mentioned by
them may refer either to two different sets of moments,
not one instant of one set coinciding with any one of the
other, or to only one and identical set of instances or,
although referring to two sets, some of the instances are
the same in both. As there is no basis on record upon
which we may determine which, among the two
alternatives, is the correct one, the doubt must be
decided by taking the first alternative, the one compatible
with the presumption of innocence stated in the
fundamental law. The case for the prosecution is further
weakened by the fact that its first two witnesses are
contradicted by the third, who testified that appellant did
guard duty "many times," more than "ten times," in
the Makapili garrison, located in the Baybay Academy,
one kilometer from the Intermediate School building,
where the Japanese garrison was located.
To meet the test under the two-witness rule, it is
necessary that, at least, two witnesses should testify as to
the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and
the sameness must include not only identity of kind and
nature of the act, but as to the precise one which has
actually been perpetrated. The treasonous overt act of
doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison on one specific
date cannot be identified with the doing of guard duty in
the same garrison in a different date. Both overt acts,
although of the same nature and character, are two
distinct and inconfusable acts, independent of each
other, and either one, to serve as a ground for conviction
of an accused for treason, must be proved by two
witnesses. That one witness should testify as to one, and
another as to the other, is not enough. Any number of
witnesses may testify against an accused for treason as to
a long line of successive treasonous overt acts; but
notwithstanding the seriousness of the acts nor their
number, not until two witnesses, at least, shall have
testified as to the perpetration of a single but the same
and precise overt act, can conviction be entertained.
In justice to appellant, we feel it necessary to state that
our decision to acquit him is not only based on the
reasonable doubt we entertain as to his guilt, because the
prosecution has not satisfied the requirements of the
two-witness rule, but because we are rather inclined to
believe his testimony to the effect that a guerrilla
member, Vicente Auxilio, was caught by the Japanese in
appellant's house, tortured and, finally, killed. For said
reason, appellant was called by the Japanese,
investigated, and then told to do some work in the
garrison, otherwise he would have the same fate that
befell Vicente Auxilio. "To save my life, I accepted the
order and worked there," he testified, adding: "The
Japanese, not being contented with my work, they got my
carabao and on March, 1945, they got my son, who was
tortured and killed."

This son is the same Bienvenido Agpangan who, according

to the first witness for the prosecution, was executed by
the Japanese with several other victims. We do not
believe that appellant could have adhered to the
Japanese, the same who tortured and killed his own son.
We do not believe that, in the absence of proof, he can
be such a monster.

The decision of the People's Court is reversed and

appellant is acquitted. He shall be released from the
custody of the agents of the law upon the promulgation
of this decision.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones,

Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-1006, June 28, 1949 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. FILEMON ESCLETO,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former
People's Court with treason on three counts, namely:
"1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation
of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez, Province
of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon
Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the
said Imperial Japanese Forces, going out with them in
patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and
of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance
movement in the Philippines; bearing arms against the
American and guerrilla forces in the furtherance of the
war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces against the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
and mounting guard and performing guard duty for the
Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines.
"2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation
of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez, Province
of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon
Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with
Japanese soldiers in and aro und the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of guerrillas and
guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy
with the resistance movement in the Philippines.
"3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to
give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest and/or cause to be
arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and did turn
him over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities
in their garrison, since which time, that is, since the said
18th day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from
the said Antonio Conducto and is considered by his family
to have been killed by the Japanese military authorities."
The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant's
membership in the U.N. or Makapili organization nor on
what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they
were out of town", and so was "constrained to rule that
the evidence of the prosecution fails to establish, in
connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of
treason." We may add that no two witnesses eoinfefcded
in any specific acts of the defendant. The People's Court
believed, however, "that the same evidence is sufficient
to prove beyond question defendant's adherence to the
enemy."
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People's Court was
that it had been fully substantiated.
The record shows that on or about March 11, 1944,
Japanese patrol composed of seventeen men and one
officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas
in barrio Bibito, Lopez, province of Tayabas, now Quezon.
As a result, some of the inhabitants of Bibito and
neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were
arrested and others were ordered to report at
the poblacion. Among the latter were Antonio Conducto,
a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto's wife, parents
and other relatives.
Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March
18, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, in
obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her
family went to the town from barrio Danlagan. Still in
Danlagan, in fromt of Filemon Escleto's house, Escleto
told them to stop and took down their names. With her
were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio
Conducto, and three grandchildren. After writing their
names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in
the poblacion where they were questioned by someone
whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she
heard gunshots and she said yes but did not know where
it was. The next day they were allowed to go along with
many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released.
Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-
examination she said that when Escleto took down their
names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything
would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I am
going to accompany you in going to town."
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town,
Filemon Escleto stopped her, her mother-in-law, her
husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the
latter's wife and took down their names; that after taking
down their names Escleto and a Philippine Constabulary
soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband
asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family,
and Escleto said "nothing" and assured Conducto that he
and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that
Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the
latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that
afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know
what happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court's
findings. It will readily be seen from a cursory examination
thereof that the only point on which the two witnesses,
Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the
accused took down the names of Conducto and of the
witnesses, among others, and came along with them to
the town. Granting the veracity of this statement, it does
not warrant the inference that the defendant betrayed
Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he
allegedly did was compatible with the hypothesis that,
being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it convenient as
part of his duty to make a list of the people under his
jurisdiction who heeded the Japanese order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write
Conducto's name in order to report on him. The two men
appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew
Conducto intimately, and the latter was on his way to
town to present himself. If the accused had a treasonable
intent against Conducto, he could have furnished his
name and identity to the enemy by word of mouth. This
step would have the added advantage of concealing the
defendant's traitorous action from his townmates and of
not appraising Conducto of what was in store for him,
knowledge of which might impel Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the
prosecution is best demonstrated by the fact that it
included, according to witnesses, Conducto's wife and
parerits and many others who were discharged the next
day. The fact that, according to the evidence for the
prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in the
screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt that the
defendant had a hand in Conducto's misfortune.
In short, Escleto's making note of persons who went to
the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak, vague and
uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be
considered direct and damaging is Patricia Araya's
testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary
soldier, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But
the prosecution did not elaborate on this testimony, nor
was any other witness made to corroborate it although
Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and
relatives who would have heard the statement if the
defendant had uttered it.
Leaving aside the question of Patricia's veracity, the
failure to corroborate her testimony just mentioned
makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt act
of treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony is
inoperative as a corroboration of the defendant's taking
down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa.
It has been seen that the testimony was not shown to
have been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it
necessarily have that implication. This process of
evaluating evidence might sound like a play of words but,
as we have said in People vs. Adriano, (44 Off. Gaz.,
4300[1]) the authors of the two-witness provision in the
American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason
law was taken, purposely made it "severely restrictive"
and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we
adverted to the following authorities, among others:
"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act;
or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each
part of the overt act." (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed.,
Sec. 2038, p. 271.)
"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to
the whole, overt act. It may be passible to piece bits
together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must
have the support of two oaths; * * *." (Opinion of Judge
Learned Hand quoted as footnote in Wigmore on
Evidence, ante.)
"The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient
action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding
that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be
supported by the testimony of two witnesses." (Cramer
vs. U. S. of A., 65 S. Ct. 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.)
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel
with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the framers
placed rather more reliance on direct testimony
than:modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may
be, considered that such a quantitative measure of proof,
such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude
device at best that its protection of innocence is too
fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to
conviction. Certainly, the treason rule, whether wisely or
not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered,
however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned
by James Wilson that Treason may sometimes be
practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely
difficult—as in a traitorous correspondence with an
Enemy. 'The provision was adopted not merely in spite of
the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident,
but because one of the most venerated of that venerated
group considered that 'prosecutions for treason were
generally virulent.' "(Cramer vs. U. S. of A., supra.)
The decision of the People's Court will be and the same is
reversed with costs de oficio.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C. J.:
Mr. Justice Pablo voted to reverse.

[ G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. SUSANO PEREZ (ALIAS KID
PEREZ), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by
the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City
and sentenced, to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the
prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and
6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated.
In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1—
"Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the
other filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their
will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were
used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of
Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were
Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda
Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana
Bonalos.
"It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies
of all the victims of the accused; it is sufficient to
reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta
Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused
came to her house to get her and told her that she was
wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was
brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontañosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon
her hometown; that the accused came again and told her
that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk;
that she did not accept the job; that a week later, the
accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in
taking some other girls to Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontañosas; that Governor Hontañosas told her that
Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was
brought to Colonel Mini the flatter had nothing on but a
"G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a
sword, tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following
night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again
she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and
stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from
the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2—
"Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That
the accused in company with some Japs and Filipinos took
Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their
home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance
organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet
Governor, Agapito Hontañosas in order that said
Japanese Colonel might select those girls who would
latter be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sisters were brought to the headquarters
of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in
Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to live a life
of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were
testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo and her
mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to
recite once more their testimony in support of the
allegations in count No. 2; this Court is fully convinced
that the allegations in said count No. 2 were fully
substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4—
"Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942,
the two girls named Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by
the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer,
and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to
satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused
Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before
delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first
their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduardo S.
Daohog, and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other
girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said:
that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused through
force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited
house; that she resisted with all her force against the
desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving
in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer
named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay
testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his
companion, Bullecer, went to her house! to take her and
her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that
the accused threatened her with a revolver if she refuses
to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog
was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried
Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took
the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the
accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter,
Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and
Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on
arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor
Hontañosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for
these girls"; but the accused replied sayings "These girls
talked bad against the Japs, and that is why we arrested,
them"; that the said Governor Hontañosas then, saids
"Take them to the Japs"; that the accused and Bullecer
brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that
Eduarda Was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain
called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken
to another room by another Japanese, living in that
house; that she was raped by that Jap while in the room;
that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
"In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses,
Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations
in Count No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
"As regards count No. 5—
"Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the
said adcused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her
sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to
be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the
investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik
Eping), and upon arriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the
accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence
of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violences threat and
intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had
sexual intercourse with Flaviana "Bonalos; that the
accused subsequently brought Flaviana Bonalos to a small
house near the headquarters of Colonel Mini and through
violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her against her will; that about two
days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the
unfortunate girls to their horns, the said accused brought
the other girl Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by means of threat
and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her
will.
"Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that
the accused came to get her on the pretext that she was
to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman
before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister
Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; that
they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that her
sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after
remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out
with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told
her immediately that she was raped against her will by
Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the
residence of said Japs officer, was taken by Perez to an
uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation
the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she
returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that
the following day while conducting the two girls back to
their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the
accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
"Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana
Bonalos) testified as follows: That on June 15, 1942, the
accused came and told her that the Japs needed her
daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, her
daughters, under that understanding, started for
Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for
her daughters and she found them in the office of the
Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters
wept and told her that they were turned, over to the Japs
and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the
witness) that after the Japs had raped her the accused
also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that
the accused did not permit her two daughters to return
home on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then
absent and in the mean while they stayed in the house of
the accused Perez; that when her daughters returned to
her house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what
happened; that both daughters told her they would have
referred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran;
that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had
raped her.
"The information given by Feliciana to her mother is
admitted in evidence as a part of the res
gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between
the occurrence and the time of the information. In the
manner these two witnesses testified in Court, there
could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute
truth. It is hard to conceive that these girls would assume
and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they
we're not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the
allegations contained in Count No. 5 have been iproven
by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond
reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6—
"Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his
Filipino companions, apprehended Natividad Barcinas,
Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
Provincial Hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of
Colonel Mini and other Japs High ranking officers, which
was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that
upon being brought before the Puppet Governor, they
were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8,
1942, again said nurses were forced to attend another
banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and
Takibayas might make a selection which girl would suit
best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those
forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of
said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
"Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P. A., testified at
length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and
companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the
hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the
Office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely
reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance
held on June 25, 1942; that the real purpose in compelling
them to attend said dances and receptions was to select
from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy
of Colonel Mini for immoral purposes; that she and her
companions were always afraid of the accused Perez
whenever he came to said Hospital; that on one occasion,
one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the
accused, ran up into her room, laid down on her bed and
simulated to be sick; that said accused not satisfied, went
up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out
the blanket which covered her and telling her that it was
only her pretext that she was sick.
"The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully
corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said
testimony need not be reproduced here."
In a carefully written brief for the appellant, these findings
are not questioned, but it is contended that the deeds
committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The
Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues
that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers
has always been, and will always be, a fundamental
concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of an army
rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly,
on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of
the Chief of Staff, United States Army, for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies
was treason because women's company kept up their
morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at
parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts,
would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt
produces the same general result. Yet by common
agreement those and similar manifestations of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason, does not proscribe
all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create
relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must
depend upon their nature; degree and purpose. To draw
a line between treasonable and unreasonable assistance
is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy
is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate, as was
said in Cramer vs. U. S., 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals, and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of
the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend
or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy
personal necessities is to assist him as an individual and is
not technically traitorious. On the other hand, to lend or
give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition
to use in waging war against the giver's country enhances
his strength and by the same count injures the interest of
the government of the giver. That is treason. (See U. S. vs.
Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C. J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's
first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering"
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men
or to enliven the entertainments held in their honor was
not treason even though the women and the
entertainments helped to make life more pleasant for the
enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more
than the women themselves would have been if they
voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organised the entertainments. Sexual and social relations
with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the
United States. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, calculated to strenghten the Japanese
Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and
resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect
the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might
have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a
vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature
and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta
Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana
Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his
cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes
could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason
finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682, which says:
"Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence
is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged,
the People's Court, may, nevertheless, convict and
sentence the accused for any crime includes in the acts
alleged in the information and established by the
evidence."
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the
information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this provision as
violative of section 1, Paragraph 17, Article III of the
Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right
"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." The contention is not well taken. The
provision in question requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be
averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In
the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of
the hazard that he might be found guilty of rapes if he was
innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to
prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise
or anomaly involved. In fact, under the general law of
criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from
that designated in the complaint or information is allowed
and practised, provided only that such crime "is included
or described in the body of the information, and is
afterwards justified by the proof presented during the
trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of
the offended girls but these assaults are not charged
against him and should be ruled, out. The crime of
coercion alleged and found on count No. 6 need not be
noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other
crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of
rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal,
with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the
offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the
costs; it being understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
Moran, C. J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO MANAYAO ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS. PEDRO MANAYAO, APPELLANT.
DECISION
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and
Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime of
treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The
Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao
was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him
with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of
armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced
to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000
to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third
paragraph of the decision, and the costs. He has appealed
from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas
raided the Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan, municipality
of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese
soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with
the Makapili, among them the instant appellant,
conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of
barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C,
and C-1). Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and
their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets,
gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio
chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or
seventy, the residents thus assembled included men,
women and children—mostly women (Exhibits A, C, and
C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t. s. n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the
men and women—the prosecution star witnesses, Maria
Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp.
3, 40, t. s. n.). Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino
comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48,
70, 71, 103, t. s. n.), and proceeded to butcher all the
persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus
killing, among others, those known by the following
names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta,
Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado,
Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32,
47, 48, 61, 62, 63, t. s. n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom
were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to death in
the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t. s.
n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy,
he being their relative, but he gave the callous answer
that no mercy would be given them because they were
wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t. s. n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children
including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had been
allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones
had been butchered, he proposed to kill them too, but the
Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children
knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t. s.
n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the
children would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew
up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t. s.
n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the
testimony of eye-witnesses—Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez,
and Policarpio Tigas—to the ruthless massacre of
Banaban. There is a complete absence of evidence
tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for
falsely testifying against appellant—such a motive is not
even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's
counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not
dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court."
Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged
ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and
saw them testify, had the following to say:
"The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to
very great weight. They are simple barrio girls, only ten
years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by
feelings of hatred or revenge or by any desire to be
spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward
and frank in their testimony and did not show any
intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They
could nut have been mistaken as to the presence and
identity of the accused for they know him so well that
they referred to him by his pet name of 'Indong Pintor' or
Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the
narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of
January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-
witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the
burning of the houses and the massacre committed by
the accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad
daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting moment
but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to
retain a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event
they could not help but witness."
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria
Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing that it would
be sufficient for conviction without any further
corroboration. Yet, there is ample corroborative proof.
Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the
corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban shortly
after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t. s. n.).
And appellant himself admitted his participation in the
massacre in two sworn statements—one made on August
28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment
Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A;
pp. 75-77, t. s. n.) and another made on September 5,
1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t. s. n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel
contends that appellant was a member of the Armed
Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not
subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and
in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his
Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to
the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either
contention. We are of the considered opinion that
the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to
the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war,
was not a part of said army. It was an organization of
Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine
citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely
untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and
6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
"* * * A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of
the following ways and/or events:
* * * * * * * and time of war, but it is brought more immediately and
"(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constituton or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more;
"(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country;
* * * * * * * that the duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the
"(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time
of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted."
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an
oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A
"he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into the
Makapili association, 'the aim of which was to help Japan
in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And
counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one
of allegiance to support the constitution and Jaws of
Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched deduction.
The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help
Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support
her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who
so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war with
Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the
Chinese constitution and laws, even if they had to
subscribe to an oath, upon entering the organization, to
help China fight Japan. During the first World War the
"National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines,
pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the Allies,
particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that
mission—although the war ended before this could be
done—they surely did not have to take an oath to support
the constitution or laws of the United States or any of its
allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they
illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by
appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air
service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant
had ever been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army,
Navy or Air Corps—nor even that he was a member of
said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the
duties of a citizen toward his country under our
Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said Constitution
ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or
civil service." (Italics supplied.)
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace
peremptorily into play when the country is involved in
war. During such a period of stress, under a constitution
enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered
free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the
Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting
on the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that
in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the
aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare)
above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively
cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the
simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country,
and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a
commission in the military, naval or air service of such
country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry
to say that this appellant, by the very fact of committing
the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of
which under the circumstances of record he does not
deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and
thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason
law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield
that would protect him from punishment.
"But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a
crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character
of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion.
They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal
modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor
render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the
force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to
hia country." (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p.
731.)
"696. No person, even when he has renounced or
incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms
against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a
felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this
duty." (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation
from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third asignment of error, the Solicitor General
agrees with counsel that it is improper to separately take
into account against appellant the aggravating
circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the
employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the
crime. We likewise are of the same opinion, considering
that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code providing that "whenever more than three armed
malefactors shall have acted together in the commission
of an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed
by a band," the employment of more than three armed
men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So
that in appreciating the existence of a band the
employment of more than three armed men is
automatically included, there being only the aggravating
circumstance of band to be considered.
punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and
appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the
third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the
costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the

contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant acted in
obedience to an order issued by a superior and is
therefore exempt from criminal liability, because he
allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his
service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is
obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our
Revised Penal Code cannot be construed as sanctioning
as legal acts done in compliance with duties to or orders
from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an
illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant
could entail in its potentialities even the destruction of
this Republic.

The contention that as a member of

the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters
under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts
should be considered. as committed under the impulse of
an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury, is no less repulsive.

Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full

knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid
to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected—if
the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
subsequently arose, he brought them about himself
freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the
matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the
appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of
Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese themselves as
regards the little children. And his Japanese masters—so
fate willed it—were the very ones who saved the little
girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined
to become the star witnesses against him on the day of
reckoning.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor

General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of treason
with multiple murder committed with the attendance of
one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed band," thus
discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered
by the trial court. A majority of the Court voted to affirm
the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty,
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of
P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of
the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower
court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of
Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death
penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions
we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the
 [ G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO PRIETO (ALIAS
EDDIE VALENCIA), DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for
treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered
a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the
original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special
prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating
with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have
sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was
found guilty of count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and
was sentenced to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their
statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito
Albaño, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the
accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese
soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness
carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao;
that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and
asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane;
that the American was taken to the Kempetai head
quarters, after which he did not know what happened to
the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that
one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an
American whose hands were tied; that the accused struck
the flier with a piece of rope; that with the American and
the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different
occasions. The last witness stated that the American was
walking as well as his captors, And there was no sled, he
said, nor did he see Juanito Albaño, except at night when
he and Albaño had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle.
The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not
only on the whole overt act but on any part of it,
(People vs. Apolinar Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300;
Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the
aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as
crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to the technical designation of the
crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the
appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
"1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the Municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting
as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that
said accused and his companions did apprehend Abraham
Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows;
thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused
and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where
he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his
shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back
to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and
detained for 7 days;
"2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the Municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military
Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, lead,
guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did
in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce
from their house; that said accused and his companions
did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce behind their backs, giving them fist blows on the
face and in other parts of the body and thereafter
detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that
Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his
brother Macario Ponce was detained and thereafter
nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts
known;
"3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in
the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military
forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some
6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an,
Municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said
patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian
Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a
rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th
day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken
about ½ kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;
"7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipino
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of
Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla
activities."
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects
mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical
injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United
States constitution defining treason, after which the
former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One
without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed
to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U. S., ante.) This deed
or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even
so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one
can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, end a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling
in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and
in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred
as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would
not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or
physical injuries as such if the government should elect to
prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead
of relying dn them as an element of treason. It is where
murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason that they can not be regarded separately under
their general denomination.
presumption that the accused was not denied the right to
have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 82.) It is presumed
that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed
unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.
S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney
appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his
defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation
because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not
sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient
to overcome this presumption. The statement of the
counsel in the court below did not necessarily imply that
he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the
accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel
"sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his
best, although it was not the best of a willing worker," We
do not discern in the record any indication that the former
counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his
ability. If Attorney Garin did his best as a sworn member
of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was
enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the
result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the
appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4
and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7.
There being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusiòn
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be
modified in this respect accordingly. In all other
particulars, the same will be affirmed. It is so ordered,
with costs of this instance against the appellant.
Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado,
Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical

injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating
circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less
painful method of execution will be taken into account to
increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in
this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended
parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the

mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. It is true that the
accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count
4 has not been substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were
abandoned.

In his first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of

the judgment because of the trial court's failure to
appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in
spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who
defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be
relieved for obvious reasons".

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable

presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all
the proceedings of the trial court, including the
 [ G. R. No. L-9529, August 30, 1958 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA,
DEFENDANT AND APPELALNT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death by
the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court for the
crime of treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was
elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of the
appeal duly interposed by the accused but also under the
provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
which provides mandatory review by this Tribunal of all
decisions or judgments of the lower courts imposing
death penalties. Meantime, it was discovered that the
transcript of stenographic notes taken down on October
8, 1947, before the People's Court was missing and
unavailable, by reason of which and upon
recommendation of the Solicitor General, we
promulgated a resolution on August 1, 1952, remanding
the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses
who testified before the People's Court, namely, Gregorio
Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and the accused
himself. Thus the case was sent to that court.
On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that he be allowed
to withdraw his appeal so as to avail himself of the
benefits of the Executive clemency granted to all
prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose
cases were pending appeal, on condition that such
appeals be first withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo returned the case to us for whatever
action we may take in view of the withdrawal requested,
for, at all events, the case had to be reviewed by us
regardless of defendant's appeaL The case was included
in the agenda prepared by the Clerk of Court for
September 21, 1953, only on the basis of the motion for
withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without calling the
attention of the Tribunal that defendant had previously
appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which
decision called for an automatic review and judgment by
us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this Tribunal
of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals
where briefs had not been filed, as in the present case,
said petition for withdrawal was granted by resolution of
September 21, 1953. However, at about 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same date, and after the passing of
the resolution, appellant filed directly with this Court a
petition reiterating his request for withdrawal of appeal
previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
attaching thereto two documents said to be copies of the
conditional pardon granted him and of the letter of the
Legal Assistant in the office of the President addressed to
the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering this
second petition when we realized the nature of the case
and that the withdrawal of appeal granted on September
21, 1953, was a mistake and contrary to legal precedents.
So, in a resolution dated October 19, 1953, this Tribunal
reconsidered its resolution of September 21st granting
withdrawal of appeal, and again remanded the case to the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the
testimonies above referred to, with instructions that a
new decision be rendered based on the said testimonies
and on the standing evidence adduced before the
People's Court. The resolution of October 19th read as
follows:
"By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth
Division of the defunct People's Court after trial of
appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on
several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder
and sentenced him thus—
'IN THE VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of
the complex crime of treason and murders as defined in
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with
Article 48 of the same Code, sentences him to suffer
death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of
P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the
amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia
Tambirao in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the
proceedings.'
"Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were
sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also
under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules
of Court which provides for review and judgment by this
Tribunal of all cases in which the death penalty shall have
been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the
defendant shall have appealed or not.
"It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8,
1947, could not be located, and following the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution
was promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding the case
to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of
the testimony of said witnesses.
"Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant
Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating
that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted
executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason,
including those whose cases were pending appeal, on
condition that such appeals be first withdrawn,
supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower
court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his
appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10,
1953, directing the return of the case to this Court for
whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of the
petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant
and because the case had to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the defendant.
"The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953.
The agenda of this Court on that date as regards this was
prepared by the Clerk of Court's Office only on the basis
of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the defendant.
Our attention was not called to the fact that defendant
had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him
to death, which decision called for an automatic review
and judgment by us. So, following the practice of this
Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of
appeals where the briefs have not yet been filed, as in the
present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal was
granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. On the
same date, however, and presumably after the passing of
the resolution, appellant Villanueva filed directly with this
Court a petition reiterating the request for withdrawal of
his appeal previously made with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits 'A' and
'B', said to be copies of the conditional pardon and of the
letter of the Legal Assistant in the Office of the President
addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on
considering said petition that we realized the nature of
the case and the decision appealed to this Court, the
withdrawal of which appeal had been granted by the
resolution of September 21, 1953.
"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to
death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any
other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the
briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not
remove the case from the jurisdiction of this Court which
under the law is authorized and called upon to review the
decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to
render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as
was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case
of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of
review by this Court of a decision imposing the death
penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial
court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been passed
upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a
judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said
decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment
and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is
not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review
by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death
penalty is something which neither the court nor the
accused could waive or evade.
"Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower
court for the purpose of retaking the testimony of those
witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the case was
virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the evidence
and the testimony received during the trial before the
People's Court which is still intact and available shall stand
and the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the
same witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the
stenographic notes or transcript of which cannot now be
found. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the
trial court to render a new decision because the new trial
is being held before a new Judge and there
is no assurance that the witnesses testifying, altho the
very same ones who were on the witness stand on
October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and in
the same manner that they did at the former trial, altho
they are supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de
Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al., 46 O. G. No. 1, p. 390).
Going over the record of the case, we find that it would
not be too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the
said witnesses as far as possible confine themselves to the
same points on which they testified on October 8, 1947,
because the testimonies of said witnesses including the
defendant are referred to and described in the decision
of the People's Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129,
and that there are only four witnesses including the
accused himself.
"Examining Exhibits 'A' and 'B' submitted by appellant in
relation to his petition for the withdrawal of his appeal,
we find that although his name appears in the list of
prisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed
to be pardoned conditionally, the pardon itself refers to
the remission of the 'unexpired portions of the prison
sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed below
who were convicted by the defunct People's Court of
treason and committed! to the new Bilibid Prison to serve
their sentence.' It is highly doubtful that the pardon could
have contemplated and included appellant herein
because his sentence of death does not merely involve a
prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death
sentence is not exactly served but rather executed.
Moreover, Exhibit 'B' says that 'those prisoners whose
cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only
after their appeal has been withdrawn.' The implication is
that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decision
of the People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this to
bring it into harmony with Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the
Constitution which requires conviction as a condition
precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we
have already stated, despite defendant's withdrawal of
his appeal from the decision imposing the death
sentence, there is no definite conviction or sentence until
and after this Tribunal has reviewed the case and
rendered its own decision affirming, modifying or
reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the
new decision of the trial court based on the new trial a
sentence other than death is imposed, in which case
there would be no automatic review by us.
"Let the record of this case be again remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for new trial and
thereafter, for a new decision."
At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the
defense, Ambrosio Tuble and Basilio Taborete, were
introduced. Appellant also presented documentary
evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly
granted him. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found
nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the
decision of the People's Court, and, reproducing said
decision, rendered judgment on October 11, 1955,
sentencing appellant to capital punishment. The case was
again elevated to us for automatic review and judgment
and given the present docket number.
In the amended information filed before the People's
Court, appellant was accused of treason on ten counts,
but the prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of
them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower
court found that Counts 1 and 2 were not proven, and
convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The prosecution established that during the Japanese
occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino citizen, and owing
allegiance to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid
and comfort by rendering service with the Japanese
Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its
Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in the
performance of such service, he participated actively and
directly in the punitive expeditions periodically made by
the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the
province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson and
mass-murders, specifically as follows:
Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information
recites:
"6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of Baroc
and Atabayan, municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to
adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid
and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of
the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in
company with other Filipino spies and several Japanese
soldiers, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan
Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco, Melchor Trieco, Cosme
Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto,
Napoleon Luceno, Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio
Belandrez on the charge that they were guerrilla soldiers
and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and
torture them; that subsequently the persons above-
mentioned were taken away and were not seen or heard
of since then; that on the occasion of the aforementioned
patrol, the above-named accused and his companions,
.with intent of gain and without consent of the owners
thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously loot the house of Jose T. Belandrez, taking
therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the amount of
P300; emergency notes in the amount of P1,200; jewelry
valued at P500; clothing valued at P200; and other
personal effects; and from the house of Toribia Taleon,
jewelry, watches, clothing and other personal effects with
a total value of P160 more or less."
Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and
Maria Mendoza, corroborating one another, testified that
at dawn of June 10, 1943, appellant, accompanied by
some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house
of Jose T. Belandrez situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and took
therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry worth P300, and
clothing valued at P200; that they also arrested Dionisio
Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno,
members of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the
guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said three
members of the Bolo Battalion never returned.
Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this
Count, reads as follows:
"7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August, 1943,
in the municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he
did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give said enemy, aid and comfort, in his
capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective
Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with
other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest and apprehend several persons suspected of
guerrilla activities, among whom were Federico
Tinamisan, Eustaquio Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador
Tedor, Tomas Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta, Andres Tayo,
Victorio Tuante, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirante, Rufo
Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilarion
Toga and several others, who were gathered in the Chapel
at barrio Napnapan, where the persons aforesaid were
investigated, maltreated and tortured, as a consequence
of which Salvador Tedor died of the beating and torture
inflicted upon him by the herein accused and his
companions; that the following morning about thirty-
seven persons were taken to the yard of Valentina
Amandoron's house, where Jesus Astrologo, Carlos
Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the Japanese
killed by beheading Andres Tai, Victorio Tuante, Roque
Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania, Rufo Tulato,
Agapito Trompeta, Tomas Trompeta, Celedonio Tupino,
Simeon Ledesma, Hermenegildo Taleon, Marcelo Turid,
Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid, Jose Tamon, Cornelio
Taghap, Eustaquio Doga, Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU)
Lucio (LNU), Juan (LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo (LNU),
and several others whose names are unknown, while
Alfredo Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and
wounded on their necks but miraculously escaped death."
Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa Gua,
Natividad Duga, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilario Taghap and
Valentina Amandoron who, corroborating one another,
stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was a Monday,
at about six o'clock in the evening, while Eustaquio Duga
and his family were at their home in Tigbauan, Iloilo, he
saw Japanese soldiers and some Filipinos approaching
their house; that Eustaquio Duga notified his wife and
they immediately started to flee; that unfortunately, they
were overtaken by the Japanese soldiers, and Eustaquio
Duga was arrested by herein appellant who was in
company with said Japanese soldiers; that Eustaquio
Duga was taken to the nearby barrio of Napnapan; that
sometime later, Severa Gua found the dead body of
Eustaquio Duga, with his head almost severed, among
other corpses in the yard of the house of Valentina
Amandoron.
On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his
companion Roque Teologo were walking in a barrio road
in Napnapan, Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by
Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that
Trompeta and Teologo were taken to the barrio of Ermita,
of the same municipality, where they were investigated
together with about thirty persons who were suspected
as guerrillas; thence they were brought to the house of
Valentina Amandoron where appellant and his
companions killed in cold blood Trompeta's companions
as well as those persons who were brought there earlier.
Among the twenty-five persons killed on that occasion,
were Andres Tayo, Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato, Roque
Teologo, Jose Taucon and Matias Tiranea.
Count No. 8. The information equally recites:
"8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality
of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T.
Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give
said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent,
informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial
Japanese Army; and in company with other Filipino spies
and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme
Calacasan, Nazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario
Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevega, Jose Canillas, Aurelio
Calacasan, Graciano (LNU), Juan (LNU), and three others,
names unknown, on the charge that the persons
aforesaid were guerrilla soldiers or guerrilla sympathizers;
that thereafter these persons were taken to barrio Taal
municipality of San Miguel, where the accused and his
companions set fire to and burned several houses in the
aforesaid barrio; and later to barrio Baguingin,
municipality of Leon, where the above-named accused
and his conmpanions investigated, maltreated and
tortured them; that the above-named accused further
adhering to the enemy did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, and with evident
premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to death
Cosme Calacasan, while tied to a tree with hands tied
behind his back; while Nazario Calimutan was bayonetted
and killed in the same manner by Jesus Astrologo, Filipino
co-spy of the herein accused; while Graciano (LNU) and
Juan (LNU) and two others (names unknown) were
bayoneted to death by the Filipino and Japanese
companions of the accused; that after the killing of the
aforesaid persons, the above-named accused and his
companions did gather the corpses of their victims in the
house of Juan Caya and thereafter did set fire to and burn
that house with the dead bodies inside."
Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each
other, testified that at about eight o'clock in the morning
of August 12, 1943, while Aurelio Calacasan, Cosme
Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique,
Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevieja and Jose Canillas
and several others were in the barrio of Anonang, Leon,
Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers and taken
to the barrio of Taal, of the same municipality, where they
saw appellant and his companions. After setting afire the
houses in said barrio, appellant and his companions
brought the prisoners to barrio Agboy, of the same
municipality, where they were investigated regarding
their guerilla activities or connections; that during the
investigations, appellant stabbed to death Cosme
Calacasan who was a member of the Bolo Battalion, an
auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that after several prisoners
were killed, their corpses were gathered and placed in a
house which was set on fire.
Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended
information recites:
"9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality
of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T.
Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy and with treasonable intent to give as he did give
said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent,
informer, spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese
Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and
Japanese soldiers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid
against and mass arrest of persons suspected as guerrilla
soldiers and sympathizers, as a consequence of which,
about eighty persons, male and female, both young and
old were arrested and gathered in a schoolhouse and
chapel in the barrio of Buenavista, and thereat
investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein
accused and his companions; that subsequently about
thirty persons including women and children were taken
to the house of Aquilino Sales, where about fourteen
persons were bayonetted and killed by Japanese soldiers,
namely, Julia Cabilitasan, Mercedes Calopez, Andrea
Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel Canag, Rosalia
Calopez, Luz Caldito, Estelita Camorahan, Roman
Cabilinga, Tomas Canag, Luis Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin,
Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio Caldito; while Paulina
Cantara, Alejandro Calsona and Bienvenido Cabankalan
received and sustained bayonet wounds but survived and
were able to escape after the house of aforesaid Aquilino
Sales was set on fire and burned by said patrol of Filipino
spies and Japanese soldiers."
Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro
Calsena and Perpetua Canag, who testified for the
prosecution, corroborating one another, stated that at
about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943,
several residents of barrio Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were
arrested by the appellant, who was armed with revolver
and bayonet, and his companions consisting of Filipinos
and Japanese soldiers; that said barrio residents were
brought to the barrio schoolhouse where they were
investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan
was singled out by the appellant who tied her hands
behind her back and brought her under a "doldol" (kapok)
tree, near a chapel, where she was stripped of all her
clothings until she was naked. Appellant investigated her
regarding the whereabouts of her husband who was a
USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after severely beating Julia
Cabilitasan, brought her to the house of Aquilino Sales
where there were other Filipino prisoners. Shortly
thereafter, appellant and his companions started the
massacre of the prisoners. Appellant stabbed Julia
Cabilitasan three times with a bayonet. In that massacre,
fourteen persons including women and children were
killed. Among those killed were Julia Cabilitasan, Macario
Cabilitasan, Roman Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia
Calpit. Later, said house was set on fire.
Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding
this Count, recites:
"10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the
municipalities of Guimbal and Tubuñgan, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to
adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid
and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of
the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in
company with other Filipino spies, Bureau of
Constabulary and Japanese soldiers, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest
Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina Escorido,
Romero Escorido, Edgardo Escorido, Editha Escorido,
Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor Tabanda, Elena
Gierza, Natividad Gersalino, Jovita Gersalino, Ernesto
Tambirao, Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio
Tortugalete, Paz Tabora, Basilisa Taborete, Gloria
Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with unknown
names on the charge that the persohs aforesaid were
either guerrilla soldiers, sympathizers and supporters;
that the aforesaid persons were then taken to the house
of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein accused, did then
and their investigate, maltreat, or otherwise torture
Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido and Eustaquia
Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess as to their
connection with the guerrilla movement and the
whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that subsequently
the herein accused further adhering to the enemy did
deliver to a Japanese executioner Juan Gelario, Felipe
Tanato, David Garnica, Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez
and Luz Tabiana, who were all executed and killed one
after another; that the killing of Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa
Jimenez and Luz Tabiana took place shortly after they
were abused and raped by the Japanese and BC soldiers
in the house of Jacinto Taborete; that while this was going
on, Jovita Gersalino and Lourdes Tabanda were taken to
another house by the herein accused, Filemon Palacios,
Jr., Vicente Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they
were abused and raped; that subsequently the persons
gathered were asked who of them were relatives of
Tranquilino Geonanga for they would be released and
when an old woman answered that they were all relatives
of Tranquilino Geonanga, the Japanese soldiers at once
started to inflict and deliver bayonet thrusts on the
persons gathered and as a consequence of which about
thirty of them were killed and several were wounded: that
subsequently, the herein accused and his companions
proceeded to barrio Buluangan, where one Saturnino
(LNU) was arrested, investigated, maltreated and
tortured by the herein accused and later killed by the
Japanese."
Gloria Escprido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza,
testifying in support of this Count, and corroborating one
another, stated that at about seven o'clock in the morning
of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and several
Japanese soldiers were on a punitive expedition in the
barrio of Miadan, Guim^al, Iloilo, they arrested the barrio
residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in Tubongan, Iloilo;
that the barrio residents, who were about fifty persons,
were brought to the barrio of Laguna, Tubongan, Iloilo,
where they were investigated and maltreated; that during
the investigation, appellant tied the feet of Gloria
Escorido, hanged her with her head downward and beat
her with the branch of an "aguho" tree; that appellant
likewise brought to the house of Jacinto Batorete three
females, namely, Luz Tabiana, Jesusa Jimenez and Juana
Tabiana where the said girls were abused by the appellant
and his companions; that appellant also bayoneted to
death Sofia Tambirao for the simple reason that she was
the cousin of Tranquilino Geonanga, an officer of the
guerrillas; that appellant and his companions massacred
on that occasion around thirty persons, among whom
were Jovita Gersalino, Carolina Escorido, Romero
Escorido, Sofia Tambierao, and Edgardo Escorido.
We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated
actively in the punitive raids made by the Japanese
soldiers and in arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas, but
personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely 16
years of age at the time (Count 10), and killed in cold
blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three times
(Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her
three times, with the added ignominy of stripping her
stark naked moments before killing her (Count 9), and
Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of
appellant as testified to by eyewitnesses who have
survived the harrowing massacres, speak eloquently that
his adherence to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort,
was accompanied by cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton
disregard of the feelings and decency of his fellow
citizens.
The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence
for appellant, his defense in the lower court merely
consisting of (1) his denial of the overt acts imputed upon
him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective force
of the Japanese Army since January 1st, 1944, it was
because he was made to accept the position under
duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for
the good of the people, He having saved many Filipino
lives from Japanese atrocities.
We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record
because of the seriousness of the charges against
appellant, and we find that the evidence for the
prosecution is overwhelming, such that appelant's counse
de officio instead of m'ng a brief, made a manifestation
dated November 29, 1955, stating that "after a thorough
study of the records of the case, he finds nothing therein
sufficient to disturb the decisions of the People's Court
and of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo imposing capital
punishment on the accused." Said counsel further'stated
that "The accused's only evidence which directly attacked
the government's proofs was his denial of what several
witnesses testified to." This manifestation was considered
by this Tribunal as appellant's brief, in its resolution of
December 6, 1955. Certainly mere denial by appellant
cannot prevail upon the positive assertion of the
witnesses for the government establishing incriminating
facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence that as
between positive and negative testimony, the former
deserves more weight and credit.
Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the
Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the
detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with the
Solicitor-General that "except the lone and self-serving
testimony of the appellant that he was coerced to
cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there is
not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or
coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any evidence
showing that the alleged compulsion or coercion was
grave and imminent."
hereinbefore quoted. As to appellant's contention
respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find
it untenable, for the Astrologo case (88 Phil., 423) was
elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he filed his
brief on October 21, 1949, and we rendered judgment on
March 30, 1951, commuting the sentence to life
imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon
granted him on June 27, 1953, or more than two years
after the final judgment, was therefore in order, and
cannot be invoked by herein appellant as a precedent.

"Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a
defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough." (16 C.
J., 91).
"To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-
founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or
great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It
would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could
shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely
setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third
person." (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
"Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by
the law. No man, from fear or circumstances to himself
has the right to make himself a party to committing
mischief upon mankind" (Lord Denman in Reg. vs. Tyler, 8
Car. and P. (Eng.) 616, vs. Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B. Div.
(Eng.) 273).
As to the payment of Indemnity in the amount of P2,000
to the respective heirs of each of the victims of appellant,
the Solicitor-General recommends that this amount
imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000. We
find this Recommendation to be correct, as it is in
consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal
on the matter; hence the decision of the lower court
should be amended accordingly. Furthermore, although
the facts of the case verily justify the imposition of death
penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty
should be, as it is hereby commuted to reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with law.
Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

When the case was remanded to the Court of First

Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of lost testimonies,
appellant attempted to give the case a new twist by filing
a motion to quash on the ground that the pardon
extended him has already extinguished his criminal
liability and that his conviction by the People's Court had
placed him in jeopardy. This motion was denied, but
during the trial appellant was allowed to present
documentary evidence relative to the clemency extended
him, consisting of Exhibit 1 which is a certified copy of his
conditional pardon; Exhibit 2, a certified copy of the letter
of the Legal Assistant of the President dated June 30,
1953, addressed to the Director of Prisons; Exhibit 3 the
motion to withdraw appeal filed before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo; and Exhibit 4, the Tribunal's resolution
of September 21, 1953, granting said withdrawal. In
addition, appellant presented an Exhibit 5 the decision of
the People's Court in the case of People vs. Jesus
Astrologo, dated December 11, 1947, sentencing him to
death; Exhibit 6 the conditional pardon extended to said
accused dated June 27, 1953; and Exhibit 7 the letter of
the Legal Assistant of the Office of the President to the
Director of Prisons, to show that said Jesus Astrologo who
is now enjoying his freedom by reason of the pardon
extended, has been allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw
his appeal pending review of his death sentence.

Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we

reiterate our ruling in our resolution of October 19, 1953,
 [ G.R. No. L-2189, March 31, 1950 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. CILDO (ALIAS CELDO
CENENTE [CALAGAN]), DIALING (CALAGAN)
AND MUDA (TAGACAOLO), DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANT.
DECISION
OZAETA, J.:
The soul is transfixed in horror by the extreme
wantonness and brutality of the murders involved in this
case. Two helpless women and three innocent children
were attacked while asleep and butchered for a most
trivial motive in their dwelling in the sitio of Sacub, barrio
of Sinayawan, municipality of Sta. Cruz, province of
Davao, on the night of November 10, 1947. The victims
were Cuya Baga Lim, 35; her children Emilia Lim, 9, and Eli
Lim, 8; her maidservant Constancia Bagaan, 30; and the
latter's daughter, Candelaria Bagaan 7.
The nearest neighbor of the victims was the accused
Dialang, a non-Christian belonging to a tribe called
Calagan, whose house was only about 30 meters distant
from theirs, iihen he was investigated by the constabulary
as to what he knew of the horrible occurrence he made a
statement to this effect: That about five o'clock in the
afternoon of November 10, 1947, he went to the river
near his house to fetch water and there saw and heard
Unte Tagacaolo, Cania Galagan, Faustino Tagacaolo,
Muda Tagacaolo, Cildo Galagan, and I-iakinista Calagan
conversing and plotting to kill the Chinese widow named
Cuya who owned a store near his house; that Unte
proposed to kill Cuya because she had much money, she
having just sold some corn; that Faustino seconded the
proposition because she sold her wares at an exorbitant
price; that he (Dialang) tried to dissuade them from their
evil purpose, even telling then that Cuya was the only one
who owned a store near then, and that he left them still
planning to kill her; that during the night of November 10,
prayers were being said in the house of Cuya which ended
about ten o'clock; that not long after that Cania Calagan
and four others came to his house and called for Muda
Tagacaolo, who was already in his (Dialang's) house
vraiting; that Muda joined them and while downstairs
they all agreed to continue their plan but waited for some
time because it was still early; that he (Dialang) was afraid
and tried his best to advise them not to commit the crime,
but Faustino warned him to keep quiet or else they would
also kill him; that about twelve o'clock they left and went
directly to the store; that Cania was armed with a home-
made shotgun; Cildo, with an ax, and the others with
bolos; that while they were walking towards the store of
Cuya he (Dialang) followed them and hid himself among
the bananas in front of the store; that Cildo Calagan called
the Chinese woman on pretext to buy some dried fish;
that when the store was opened Gildo entered first, Unte
next, and then Faustino and Makinista followed; that
Cania Calagan guarded the main door of the store while
Muda guarded the kitchen door; that immediately he
heard a woman cry inside and then heard a shot; that a
crying child was able to escape outside through the
kitchen but was pursued and killed by Muda; that because
he was very much afraid he returned to his house and
waited till norning, when he reported the case to Mr. Pio
Acot, president of the parents-teachers association of
Sacub. (Exhibit B.)
Upon being apprehended Muda, another non-Christian
belonging to a tribe called Tagacaolo, admitted his
participation in the crime, saying that he was called by
Cania and Faustino and that he went with them because
he was afraid they might kill him; that his companions
were Faustino, Cildo, Cania, Unte, and Hakinista; that
during the attack one girl was able to escape through the
kitchen but that he was able to catch and kill her; that
Cania found some money and gave him some amount
near the school-house of Sacub and after that they all
returned to their respective homes; and that the
following morning he escaped to Mandulog where he was
apprehended bj soldiers. (Exhibit C.)
The constabulary filed a complaint for robbery with
multiple homicide against Dialang and all the persons
implicated by him in his statement.
When the case was called before the justice of the peace
of Sta. Cruz for preliminary investigation, the accused
Cildo and Muda pleaded guilty and swore to written
statements before the justice of the peace to the effect
that Dialang was their ringleader and that they (Cildo and
Muda) were induced by him to participate in the
commission of the crime. They made no mention of the
accused Unte, Cania, Faustina, and I'lakinista, and the
constabulary said it had no proof against them. The
complaint was then and there amended by excluding the
said accused and including only Cildo, Muda, and Dialang.
After the preliminary investigation Dialang, who pleaded
not guilty, admitted before Policeman Felicisimo Bolado
of Sta. Cruz in a conversation they had at the municipal
jail that he (Dialang) was there confined because he had
killed Cuya Lim, Eli, and Candelaria. The policeman
reported that conversation later to the chief of police,
Tamoteo Aguilar, who took Dialang's statement by
question-and-answer in writing and later brought Dialang
before the justice of the peace where Dialang swore to
and thumbmarked his said statement Exhibit E after the
justice of the peace had explained to him its contents and
asked him whether they were true.
After the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance
Judge Enrique A. Fernandez found the accused Dialang
and Muda guilty of five separate crimes of murder
(acquitting them of robbery for lack of sufficient
evidence) and sentenced each of them to life
imprisonment for each of the five murders with an
indemnity of P2,000 in each case. The accused Cildo was
found guilty as an accomplice of each of the five murders
and was sentenced in each case to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of
prisi6n correccional as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of
prisi6n mayor as maximum, with the appropriate
indemnity in each case. From that sentence the three
accused have appealed.
The main proofs against the accused are their respective
confessions before the justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz—
Exhibits E (by Dialang), F (by Cildo) and G (by Muda); and
the only question before us is whether said confessions
were made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
facts therein narrated.
The accused Dialang, 58, is married to a sister of the
accused Muda, 40, and is the grandfather of the accused
Cildo, 17.
Timoteo Acot, one of the neighbors of the victims,
testified that about 6:30 in the morning of November 11,
1947, Dialang came to his house and told him that Cuya
had been robbed and that there was plenty of blood and
many died. This witness testified: "I asked him, 'Why is it
that you did not find out what happened before you came
here?' He said he was afraid. I told him to go to the barrio
lieutenant, but he refused on account of the distance. He
insisted that I should go with hin to find out what
happened and because of that I went with him. We went
to the place of the incident, to the house of Cuya Daga
Lira. On our way we met the rural policeman and I told
him to report to the barrio lieutenant."
Juan Armilla, sergeant of the constabulary, testified in
substance as follows: About one o'clock in the afternoon
of November 12, 1947, I was assigned to investigate the
killing at Sacub, Sta. Cruz, Davao. I went to the place
where the dead persons were. The nearest neighbor is
Dialang. I asked him whether he heard any cry or shout of
persons that night inasmuch as he is near the place, lie
said that he did not hear. I asked him whether some
persons happened to sleep in his house and he said Muda
slept there on the 10th of November. I asked him where
Muda was and he said he was no longer there. I took him
around to the neighbors of his house. On November 13
Dialang admitted that Makinista, Cildo, and Cania Calagan
were the ones who killed the Chinese. I got these men and
brought them to Malalag. I delivered them to Captain
Castillo and the latter and another sergeant investigated
them. I arrested Muda in Bocalil on November 18. On the
way to Malalag I investigated him and he admitted that
he was the companion of Dialang in killing those persons.
I brought him to Malalag and turned him over to the
company commander and he was investigated by
Sergeant Fabiania.
David Fabiania, sergeant of the constabulary, testified
that he investigated the accused Dialang and wrote his
statement Exhibit B which he (Dialang) later
thumbmarked before the justice of the peace; that he
also took the statement of Muda (Exhibit C) and that the
latter affixed his thumbmark to it before the justice of the
peace of Sta. Cruz, who asked Muda if the contents were
true after it was translated to Muda in the Oebuano
Visayan dialect. He further testified in substance as
follows: On November 24, 1947, Muda was brought to the
justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz for preliminary trial. After
the trial I had a conversation with him. He told me that
the bolo he used in the commission of the crime was
thrown bj him into the river. Because he was already
delivered to the jailer at ota. Cruz, I requested permission
to bring Muda with me to recover the bolo. lie also said
that there was a khaki pant which he took from the house
of Cuya Daga Lim and which he also threw away. I brought
him to the place where he said he threw the khaki pant
and the bolo. When we arrived at the place I asked him to
look for the bolo and khaki pants. He could not find them
because during those days it was rainy season and the
river had overflowed its banks.
Felicisimo Bolado, patrolman of Sta. Cruz, Davao, testified
in substance as follows: On November 24, I was sergeant
of the guard and I inspected the municipal jail and found
Cania, Cildo, and Dialang there. I asked them what crime
they were charged with and Dialang answered that he
had killed Cuya Lim, Eli, and Candelaria and that his
companion was Muda, who killed Emilia and Constancia.
I asked him why he killed them and he said that at nine
o'clock in the morning Cuya tried to collect from him his
indebtedness of P7 and that he was not able to pay his
indebtedness and Cuya got angry and scolded him, calling
him a shameless Calagan and slapped him on his left
cheek and he showed to me one of his teeth which was
moving due to the slapping. During that conversation
Cildo and Cania were present. At that time Muda was with
the MPC. The chief of pollco was absent. When he arrived
on November 26 I reported to him the confession given
to me by Dialang. He sent for Dialang and asked him
whether he was the one who killed at Sacub and Dialang
answered yes. The chief of police took his affidavit in
Visayan. After the affidavit was finished Biclang was
brought before the justice of the peace with the affidavit
which is Exhibit E. The justice of the peace read the
affidavit and asked Dialang whether the contents are true
and he answered they are true.
Timoteo Aguilar, chief of police of Sta. Cruz, testified in
substance as follows: On the morning of November 24,
1947, I investigated Muda and Cildo. They were brought
out of the jail to my office preparatory to the preliminary
investigation which was set on that day and in my
investigation they admitted before me that they
committed the crime charged. After I was convinced that
what they told me was true I typed their statements. After
typing their statements I took them to the justice of the
peace to have their oaths taken. Exhibit F is the statement
of Cildo and Exhiibit G is the statement of Muda. The
justice of the peace read and explained to the accused the
contents of Exhibits F and G and after reading and
explaining to them they were asked if the contents were
true and the accused Cildo and Muda said yes. After the
preliminary investigation Sergeant Fabiania asked
permission from me to bring with him Muda in order to
show to Sergeant Fabiania the river or place where Muda
had thrown the west point cloth and the bolo. I was
informed later that they "were not able to recover those
things because on the previous days the river overflowed
its banks and probably those things were carried away by
the flood. On November 26, when I reported to the office,
Patrolman Bolado approached me and told me that
Dialang had confessed to him and admitted to have
participated in the killing of Cuya Lim and companions at
Dacub. Immediately I ordered the guard to bring Dialang
to me. When Dialang was before me I confronted him
with the report made by Bolado and Dialang readily
admitted that the conversation lie had with Bolado was
true. On November 27 I took him before the justice of the
peace with his statement Exhibit E. The justice of the
peace ordered patrolman Bolado to read and translate
the affidavit to Dialang.
Artemio Cometa, justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz,
testified for the prosecution and vouched for the
authenticity and voluntariness of the different
confessions made by the accused and thumbmarked and
sworn to by each of them before him, assuring the court
that each of the accused thumbmarked his confession
before him after the contents were translated and
explained to him in the Visayan dialect and after each had
affirmed before him (the J. P.) that they were true.
We shall disregard the first statements made by the
accused Dialang and Muda to the constabulary, Exhibits B
and C, as inaccurate and consider onl;r their statements,
Exhibits E, F, and G, taken subsequently by the chief of
police of Sta. Cruz.
Exhibits E and E-1, translated into English as Exhibits E-2
and E-3, read as follows:
"I, Dialang Calagan, of legal age, married and a resident of
Sacub, Padada, Sta. Cruz, Davao, after having been duly
sworn according to law, depose and say:
"Q. In the evening of November 10, 1947, what happened
in Sacub, Sta. Cruz, Davao?—A. Cuya, Tanciang, two
children of Cuya (Emilia and Eli) and one child of Tanciang,
Candelaria, were killed.
"Q. Who killed them?—A. I killed Cuya, Eli and Candelaria,
and Kuda killed Tanciang and Emilia.
"Q. why did you kill those persons?—A. I killed them
because I was slanderously scolded by Cuya and her
children. I was put to shame and I could no longer endure.
"Q. You said that you were put to shame; what then
happened between you and Cuya?—A. I was indebted to
Cuya in the amount of P7. She tried to collect from me my
debt on Sunday at about 9:00 A.M. I told her to please
wait for a while as I was going to harvest yet my corn. But
she slanderously reprimanded me and put me to shame.
She called me a Calagan without manners. Her children
helped also in defaming me. And I was slapped by Cuya
on my left face.
"Q. When did you think or decide to kill Cuya?—A. Muda
arrived at my house at 12:00 noon, Monday, November.
10, 1947. In the afternoon I decided to kill Cuya because
Muda was already there who could help me.
"Q From the time you decided to kill Cuya please state
what you actually did until you consimmated your plot.—
A. At about 5:00 P.M., Monday, I told Muda of my plan to
kill Cuya. I told him the reasons ana because he is my
brother-in-law he sympathized with me and he acceded.
I tola also Muda that I will call for Cildo to accompany us.
In the evening, after the prayer (novena) in the house of
Cuya, I went to the house where Cildo lived and woke him
up without the knowledge of his housemates. I told Cildo
of my plan while on the way to my house. At the outset
Cildo did not like to consent, but I forced him, he being
my grandson and I promised him that he will just stay
outside. Aaien we arrived at our house I woke up Muda
so that we can leave without the knowledge of my wife
and children. At about 12:00 midnight we left for the
house of Cuya. I then opened the back door of the kitchen
and entered followed by Muda while Oildo stayed
outside, "when we entered we already drew our bolos
from the scabbard. We saw Cuya and companions
sleeping as there was a light from the lamp. I immediately
stabbed and slashed Cuya until she died and then I killed
lili and Candelaria. lluda killed first Tanciang and because
Emilia ran outside I ordered Muda to follow her and he
killed Emilia. When they were dead already I got one khaki
pant. When Muda reentered the house after killing Emilia,
we left passing thru the main door. The short west point
khaki pant was taken by me from a hanger inside the
store. When we went out I gave the pant to Muda and
then we returned to our house while Cildo went to ths
house where he was living. Early the next morning Muda
returned to the mountains.
"Q. Why did you not also kill the two other children of
Cuya?—A. We did not kill them because they could not
yet talk and as such they could not report.
"Q. Why did you kill Tanciang and her daughter when they
are not your enemies?—A. We killed them because they
will report what we have done.
"Q.. In your affidavit which you have sworn to before the
Justice of the Peace, Sta. Cruz, Davao, on November lo,
1947, you stated that Cania, Fnustino, Makinista, Unte,
Cildo and lluda were the ones who killed Cuya and
companions, and now you stated again that the ones who
killed are Muda, Cildo and you, which is now true?—A.
The truth is Void a and myself while Cildo accompanied us
only and he stayed outside of the house.
"Q. why did you report Cania, Makinista, Faustino and
Unte when in fact they are innocent?—A. I reported them
because I was afraid of the MPC and so that it will not be
known that I was the one who killed.
"Q. What else did you get from the store of Cuya?—A.
Nothing else except the west point pant, we were not able
to get the money because we were in a hurry to get out
due to fear of being discovered.
"Q. When you were investigated by the authorities in
Sacub why did you not tell the truth?—A. At the beginning
I did not tell the truth as I was afraid that I will be killed by
the MPC, but later when there were no more MPC I told
the truth to a policeman of Sta. Cruz.
"Q. Do you have anything more to say?—A. No more.
"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing statenient
and that it is your own free and voluntary declaration
without force, threat or intimidation nor any promise of
reward of any kind?—A. Yes, sir.
"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
(marked)
"Dialang Calagan
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of
November, 1947, at Sta. Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio Cometa
"Justice of the
Peace
"Note: The above confession xjonsists of two pages.
The confession was read to the affiant by Patrolman
Felicisirno Bolado before said affiant swore it before
the undersigned.
(Sgd.) "Artemio
Cometa
"Translated by:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police"
Exhibit F, translated into English as Exhibit F-1, reads as
follows:
"I, Cildo Cemente (Calagan), of age, single, farmer and a
resident of Sacub, Padada, Sta. Cruz, Davao, after having
been duly sworn to, depose and say:
"Q. On Monday, the 10th of this month where were
you?—A. I was in our house and in the evening I went to
the house of Cuya to attend the novena.
"Q. After the novena was finished where did you go?—A.
I went home to sleep.
"Q. Did. you see Dialang on the night of Monday?.—A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. Where?—A. When I was already sleeping I was
awakened by Dialang and he told me that we will kill Cuya
so that he could get the money of Cuya to pay his debt to
Muda. I refused when he told me but he forced me and
for fear that he will kill me I went with him.
"Q. From your house where did you go and what did you
do?—A. Dialang brought me to his house and then he
awakened i-iuda. when Muda was awakened Dialang
again said that we will kill Cuya. It was about 12:00
midnight more or less we went to the house of Cuya
bringing with us our respective bolos. When we arrived at
the house of Cuya Dialang opened the back door and he
entered followed by Muda. I stayed outside listening. I
heard that they were hacking and stabbing the people
inside and then a child ran out of the house. Dialang
ordered Muda. to run after the child. Muda ran after the
child and he stabbed and killed also the child. Not long
after Dialang came out bringing with him "West Point
khaki good for one pantalon. This was given to Muda and
Dialang said that he was able to get money in the amount
of P100.00 but he did not give me anything. After that I
went home while Dialang and Muda went together.
"Q. "Why did you not report the matter to the
authorities?—A. Because I was advised by Dialang not to
tell anybody and I was afraid that Dialang might kill me.
"Q. Do you have anything more to say?—A. No more.
"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing without
force, threat or intimidation nor promise of reward of any
kind and that the above is your free and voluntary
statement?—A. Yes, sir.
"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
(marked)
"Cildo Cenente
" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day
of November, 1947, at Sta. Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio
Cometa
"Justice of the
Peace
"Translated from original Visayan confession of Cildo
Cenente by:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
November 26,
1947"
Exhibit G, translated into English as Exhibit G-1, reads as
follows:
"I, Muda Tagacaolo, of age, married, farmer and a
resident of Magdolog, Sta. Cruz, Davao, after having been
duly sworn in accordance to law, depose and say:
"Q. Where were you on Monday, the 10th of this
month?—A. I went to Dialang Galagan at Sacub to collect
his debt of a horse and I arrived at his house at 12 noon.
"Q. On the night of Monday where were you?—A. In the
house of Dialang.
"Q. During the time you were in the house of Dialang what
happened to you?—A. At about 12 midnight I was
awakened by Dialang and when I woke up Cildo was
already there. Dialang said that we will kill Cuya.
"Q. From the time you have agreed (to kill Cuya) what did
you do?—A. We went to the store of Cuya. When we
arrived, Dialang opened the door in the kitchen and he
entered followed by Cildo and me. We saw that
everybody were sleeping in the house. Then Dialang
stabbed Cuya and Cildo stabbed Constancia. When Cuya
died he (Dialang} also hacked the two children. When we
were stabbing one of the children ran out of the house in
the direction of the toilet, When Dialang saw he ordered
me to run after the child so that I also ran out and killed
the child, life used our respective bolos in killing those
people. After I killed the ehild outside I did not enter
anymore inside the store. I only waited for them outside.
"Q. Why did you know whom Dialang and Cildo killed?—
A. I saw them because of the light of the lamp (lamparilla).
did they bring? A. Dialang brought West Point Khaki good
for one pantalon and he gave it to me.
"Q. Where is that West Point given to you?—A. When I
went to Bocalil I threw it into the river together with my
bolo because I was afraid of what we have done.
"Q. How much money were you able to get from the
store?—A. I did not know because they did not give me
anything.
"Q. After you have robbed and killed those people where
did you go?—A. Dialang and myself returned to his house
while Cildo returned to his house also. Early in that
morning Dialang ordered me to return to the mountains.
"Q. You have anything more to say on this
investigation?—A. No more.
"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing statement
freely and voluntarily without any force, threat or
intimidation or any promise of reward of any kind?—A.
Yes, sir.
"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
(marked)
"Muda
Tagacaolo
" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day
of November, 1947, at Sta. Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio
Cometa
"Justice of the
Peace
"Translated from original Visayan confession of
: the one who received Dialang in the provincial jail on
Cildo Cenente by
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
November 26,
1947"
As against the foregoing evidence for the prosecution, the
evidence for the defense consists merely in the denial by
each of the accused of any knowledge of the contents of
their respective confessions.
Dialang testified that the contents of his confessions
Exhibits B and E are not true. He said: "I did not know what
I was signing, whether it was good or not. When they
prepared Exhibits B and B-1 I was sleeping. I did not know
where they prepared it. I learned of this in the following
morning." This witness, however, cannot be believed
because his testimony shows that he had no regard for
the truth. We quote a portion of his testimony on direct
examination as follows:
"Q. Did you, Cildo and Muda ever go to the house of Cuya
on the night of November 10, 1947?—A. No, sir, I was
sick, I was wearing a patadyong. I stated those statements
because they threatened me with the revolver, they
pointed to me the revolver.
"Q. Did they not explain to you the contents of Exhibits E
and E-1?—A. No, sir.
"Q. In exhibits E and E-1 it appears that you appeared
before the justice of the peace; is it true that you
appeared before the justice of the peace in connection
with exhibits 2 and E-1?—A. No, sir.
"Q. Please tell the truth, because I myself I am convinced
that you appeared before the justice of the peace. Did you
really not appear before the justice of the peace in
connection with exhibits E and E-1?—A. No, sir."
Thus Dialang denied under oath having appeared before
the justice of the peace to sign Exhibit E, although his own
attorney believed, and it had been clearly established,
that he did appear. As between his testimony and that of
the justice of the peace, the chief of police, and Patrolman
Bolado, we find that the trial court did not err in rejecting
the former and in accepting the latter.
The testimony of Teopisto Capul, provincial warden of the
City of Davao, as a witness for the defense, to the effect
that on December 2, 1947, the accused Dialang was sent
to the public hospital because he complained that one of
his ribs was dislocated, has no decisive weight because
such complaint of the accused was not verified either by
the warden himself or by a doctor of the hospital. It was
a mere self-serving statement of the accused, and the
accused himself did not testify during the trial that one of
his ribs was damaged due to any maltreatment inflicted
by an officer of the law to extract a confession from him.
Besides, the testimony of the provincial warden that
Dialang could not walk alone and had to be held by other
prisoners was contradicted by the next witness for the
defense, Generoso Evangelico, who testified that he was
November 29 and that Dialang could walk alone, although
with difficulty. Dialang in his testimony repeatedly
asserted that he suffered from a boil.
The accused Cildo, also a Calagan, who pleaded guilty
before the justice of the peace, according to the record
and according to the latter's testimony, denied that he
entered that plea. He said that he was maltreated by the
soldiers in the house of Dialang. On cross-examination he
testified in part as follows:
"Q. And during that preliminary investigation of the case
the justice of the peace asked you whether you were
guilty of the murder of Cuya, and you answered the
justice of the peace that you were guilty?—A. I stated I
was not guilty.
"Q. Just tell the truth, is it not true that you said yes, there
were many people there?—A. I stated I was not guilty.
"Q. And during the time that the justice of the peace was
asking you, your other coaccused were there, hearing
your confession, is that not true?—A. I did not say that I
was guilty.
"Q. And during that investigation or preliminary
investigation of your case the justice of the peace showed
you a paper and asked you to thirnbmark that paper, is
that right?—A. I was made to sign certain caper but I did
not know what it was.
"Q. But it was the justice of the peace who asked you to
thumbmark on that paper, is that right?—A. He said to
sign it because it is for our own good.
"Q. And when you put your thurabmark on said paper, all
your coaccused were present, is that true?—A. They were
there and they saw.
"Q. They also heard your conversation with the justice of
the peace relative to that paper on which you were
placing your thumbmark?—A. Maybe they heard,
because they were there.
"Q. And after you narked that paper, the justice of the
peace called your coaccused Muda and had a talk with
him, is that true?—A. Me was asked.
"Q. And the justice of the peace showed Muda some
paper and asked Muda to thumbmark that paper, is that
true?—A. Muda was forced to sign.
"Q. Who forced him?—A. The justice of the peace.
"Q. What did the justice of the peace say in having Mud a
sign that paper?—A. He said to sign it because it is for his
own good."
The accused Muda, who lived in Bocalil, about two days'
walk from Sacub, admitted that on the night of November
10, 1947, he was in Sacub, to ask his sister, the wife of
Dialang, to help him harvest his palay, but that she could
not go with him because her husband Dialang was sick
with a boil. He testified that he was forced to thumbmark
his concfession, Exhibits G and G-1. From the testimony
of this accused it also appears that he has little
or no regard for the truth. We quote from his testimony
on cross-examination as follows:
"Q. You remember that during the preliminary
investigation the justice of the peace had a talk with you
right in his court, is that right?—A. Yes, sir.
"Q. The justice of the peace spoke to you about the killing
of Cuya and members of her family, is that right?—A. Yes,
sir.
"Q. And during that preliminary investigation the justice
of the peace showed to you some document which you
thurnbmarkeilater on, is that right?—A. Yes, sir.
"Q.. And during your conversation with the justice of the
peace and during the time that you were talking with him
about the killing of Cuya Lira and some members of her
family there were plenty of people who were inside the
Court room, is it not?—A. Many people.
"Q. And during your conversation with the justice of the
peace your coaccused Dialang and Cildo were present and
hearing that conversation, is that right?—A. They were
not.
"Q. They were not there?—A. They were there but they
did not hear our conversation, myself and the justice of
the peace.
"Q. And during that occasion the justice of the peace also
had a talk with Cildo, is it not?—A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And their conversation was about the killing of Cuya
Lim and some members of her family, is it not?—A. No,
sir.
"Q. But you have just told us that they had conversation.
Tell the truth.—A. No, sir.
"Q. What were they talking about?—A. They were not
talking anything.
"Q. Is it not true that during that occasion Cildo also
thumbmarked some paper?—A. No, sir.
"Q. Are you sure of that?—A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I want to call your attention that Cildo has testified
here and stated that he had thumbmarked certain paper
in your presence at the office of the justice of the peace.
Tell the truth now.—A. There was none.
"Q. But Cildo was present during that occasion?—A. Yes,
sir.
"Q. And so also was Dialang?—A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So it is not true then that the two were not present?—
A. They were there."
We do not accept confessions readily and without due
care and caution because we are aware that some officers
of the law resort to the illegal and. reprehensible tactics
of extorting confessions thru violence and intimidation
(People vs. Tipay, G.R. Mo. 49014, March 31, 1944[*]). But
in the present case we believe with the trial judge that the
confessions of the accused were voluntary and true. The
fact that the four individuals who were at first implicated
by Dialang and Kuda and who were also arrested and
included in the original complaint were not forced to sign
any confession or statement, tends to show that the
constabulary and the local police acted properly in
handling this case.
The Solicitor General recommends affirmance and we
find his recommendation in order. The judgment is
affirmed, with costs.
 [ Commonwealth Act No. 616, June 04, 1941 ]
AN ACT TO PUNISH ESPIONAGE AND OTHER
OFFENSES AGAINST THE NATIONAL SECURITY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be
obtained information affecting national defense.— (a)
Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to
believe that the information to be obtained is to be used
to the injury of the Philippines or of the United States, or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters,
flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning
any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval
station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery,
torpedo, station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp,
factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal
station, building, office, or other place connected with the
national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of
construction by the Philippines or by the United States or
under the control of the Philippines or of the United
States, or any of its officers or agents, or within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines or of the United
States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms,
munitions, or other materials or instruments for the use
in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or
stored, under any contract or agreement with the
Philippines or the United States, or with any person on
behalf of the Philippines or the United States, or any
prohibited place within the meaning of section six hereof;
or
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like
intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or
obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy,
take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model,
instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of
anything connected with the national defense; or
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or
obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another
to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source
what ever, any document, writing, code book, signal
book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue
print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note of
anything connected with the national defense, knowing
or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or
obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another
to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained,
taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the
provisions of this Act; or
(d) Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of,
access to, control over, or being intrusted with any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan,
map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to
the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits
or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any
person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or
employee of the Philippines or of the United States
entitled to receive it; or
(e) Whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful
possession or control of any document, writing, code
book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blue print, plan, map. model, note or
information, relating to the national defense, through
gross negligence permits the same to be removed from
its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in
violation of this trust or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or
destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than ten years and may, in addition thereto, be
fined not more than ten thousand pesos.
SEC. 2. Unlawful disclosing information affecting national
defense.— (a) Whoever, with the intent or reason to
believe that it is to be used to the injury of the Philippines
or of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts
to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver,
or transmit to any foreign government, or any faction or
party or military or naval force within a foreign country,
whether recognized or unrecognized by the Philippines or
by the United States, or to any representative, officer,
agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either
directly or indirectly, any document, writing code book,
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blue print, plan, map, model, instrument', appliance, or
information relating to the national defense, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty
years, if the offense is committed in time of peace, or by
death or imprisonment for not more than thirty years, if
it is in time of war.
(b) Whoever, in time of war with intent that the same
shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect,
record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any
information with respect to the movement, number,
description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed
forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the Philippines
or of the United States, or with respect to the plans or
conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any military,
naval, or air operations, or with respect to any works or
measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended
for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other
information relating to the public defense which might be
useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for not more than thirty years.
SEC. 3. Disloyal acts or works in time of peace.— It shall
be unlawful for any person, with intent to interfere with,
impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or discipline of
the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of the
United States: (a) to advise, counsel, urge, or in any
manner cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or
air forces of the Philippines or of the United States; or (b)
to distribute any written or printed matter which advises,
counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or
air forces of the Philippines or of the United States. The
violation of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by fine not
more than ten thousand pesos, or both.
SEC. 4. Disloyal acts or words in time of war. — Whoever,
when the Philippines or the United States is at war, shall
willfully make or convey false reports or false statements
with the intent to interfere with the operation or success
of the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of
the United States or to promote the success of its
enemies shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in
the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or the
United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the Philippines or of the United
States, to the injury of the service of the Philippines or of
the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or by a fine of not more than
twenty thousand pesos, or both.
SEC. 5. Conspiracy to violate preceding sections. — If two
or more persons conspire to violate the provisions of
sections one, two, three, or four of this Act, and one or
more of such persons does not act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy
shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case
of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the
object of such conspiracy.
SEC. 6. Harboring or concealing violators of the law. —
Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows,
or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed, or is about to commit, an offense under
this Act, shall be punished by imprisonment of not more
than ten years and may, in addition thereto, be fined not
more than ten thousand pesos.
SEC. 7. Designation of prohibited places by
proclamation. — The President of the Philippines in time
of war or in case of national emergency may by
proclamation designate any place other than those set
forth in subsection (a) of section one hereof in which
anything for the use of the army, navy, or air forces are
being prepared or constructed or stored as a prohibited
place for the purpose of this Act: Provided, That he shall
determine that information with respect thereto would
be prejudicial to the national defense.
SEC. 8. Photographing, etc., defensive installations
regulated; penalties. — Whenever, in the interests of
national defense, the President of the Philippines shall
define certain vital military, naval, or air installations or
equipment as requiring protection against the general
dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall be
unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture,
drawing, map, or graphical representation of such vital
military, naval, and air installations or equipment without
first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of
the military, naval, or air post, camp, or station
concerned, or higher authority and promptly submitting
the product obtained to such commanding officer or
higher authority for censorship or such other action as he
may deem necessary. Any person found guilty of a
violation of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of
not more than two thousand pesos, or both.
SEC. 9. Photographing, etc., from aircraft. — Any person
who uses or permits or procures the use of an aircraft for
the purpose of making a photograph, sketch, picture,
drawing, map, or graphical representation of vital military
naval or air installations or equipment, in violation of
section eight of this Act, shall be liable to the penalty
therein provided.
SEC. 10. Reproducing, publishing, selling, etc., un-
censored copies. — After the President of the Philippines
shall have defined any vital military, naval, or air
installation or equipment as being within the category
contemplated under section eight of this Act, it shall bs
unlawful for any person to reproduce, publish, sell, or give
away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map or
graphical representation of the vital military, naval, or air
installations or equipment so defined, without first
obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the
military, naval, or air post, camp, or station concerned, or
higher authority, unless such photograph, sketch, picture,
drawing, map, or graphical representation has clearly
indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper
military, naval, or air authority. Any person found guilty of
a violation of this section shall be punished as provided in
section eight of this Act.
SEC. 11. Destroying or injuring or attempting to injure or
destroy war material in time of war. — When the
Philippines or the United States is at war, whoever, with
intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines
or the United States or any associate nation in preparing
for or carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to
believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct
the Philippines or the United States or any associate
nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, shall
willfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt to so injure or
destroy, any war material, war premises, or war utilities,
as herein defined, shall be imprisoned not more than
thirty years or be fined not more than thirty thousand
pesos, or both.
SEC. 12. Making or causing war material to be made in
defective manner. — When the Philippines or the United
States is at war, whoever, with intent to injure, interfere
with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or
any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the
war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act may
injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the
United States or any associate nation in preparing for or
carrying on the war, shall willfully make or cause to be
made in a defective manner,, or attempt to make or cause
to be made in a defective manner, any war material, as
herein defined, or any tool, implement, machine, utensil,
or receptacle used or employed in making, producing,
manufacturing or repairing any such war material as
herein defined, shall be imprisoned not more than thirty
years or be fined not more than thirty thousand pesos, or
both.
SEC. 13. Injuring or destroying national defense material,
premises, or utilities. — Whoever, with intent to injure,
interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the
Philippines or the United States shall willfully injure or
destroy, or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any
national defense material, national defense premises, or
national defense utilities, as herein provided, shall be
imprisoned not more than ten years or be fined not more
than ten thousand pesos, or both.
SEC. 14. Making or causing to be made in a defective
manner, or attempting to make or cause to be made in a
defective manner, national defense material. — Whoever,
with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the
national defense of the Philippines or of the United
States, shall willfully make or cause to be made in a
defective manner, or attempt to make or cause to be
made in a defective manner, any national defense
material, as herein defined, or any tool, implement,
machine, utensil, or receptable used or employed in
making, producing, manufacturing, or repairing any such
national defense material, as herein defined, shall be
imprisoned not more than ten years, or fined not more
than ten thousand pesos, or both.
SEC. 15. Definition of terms. — The term "aircraft" as used
in this Act means any contrivance known or hereafter
invented, used, or designed for navigation or flight in the
air. The expression "post, camp, or station" as used in
this Act shall be interpreted to include naval vessels,
military and naval aircraft, and any separate military,
naval or air command.
The words "war or national defense material" as used
herein shall include arms, armament, ammunition,
livestock, stores of clothing, food, foodstuffs, or fuel; and
shall also include supplies, munitions, and all other
articles of whatever description, and any part or
ingredient thereof intended for, adapted to, or suitable
for the use of the Philippines or the United States, or any
associate nation, in connection with the conduct of war
or national defense.
gas mains, oil or gasoline stations, pipes, structures, and
buildings, whereby or in connection with which water, or
gas, or oil, or gasoline, or other fluid is being- furnished,
or may be furnished, to any war or national defense
premises or to the military, naval, or air forces of the
Philippines or the United States, or any associate nation,
and all electric light and power, steam or pneumatic
power, telephone, and telegraph plants, poles, wires, and
fixtures and wireless stations, and the buildings
connected with the maintenance and operation thereof
used to supply water, light, heat, gas, oil, gasoline, fluid,
power, or facilities of communication to any war or
national defense premises or to the military, naval, or air
forces of the Philippines or of the United States, or any
associate nation.
The words "associate nation," as used in this chapter, shall
be deemed to mean any nation at war with any nation
with which the Philippines or the United States is at war.
The words "foreign government," as used in this Act, shall
be deemed to include any government, faction, or body
of insurgents within a country with which the Philippines
or United States is at peace, which government, faction,
or body of insurgents may or may not have been
recognized by the Philippines or the United States as a
government.
SEC. 16. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 4, 1941.

The words "war or national defense premises," as used

herein, shall include all buildings, grounds, mines, or
other places wherein such war or national defense
material is being produced, manufactured, repaired,
stored, mined, extracted, distributed, loaded, unloaded,
or transported, together with all machinery and
appliances therein contained; and all ports, arsenals, navy
yards, prisons, camps, or other military, naval, or air
stations of the Philippines or the United States or any
associate nation.

The words "war or national defense utilities," as used

herein, shall include all railroads, railways, electric lines,
roads of whatever description, railroad or railway fixture,
canal, lock, dam, wharf, pier, dock, bridge, building,
structure, engine, machine, mechanical contrivance, car,
vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or any other means of
transportation whatsoever, whereon or whereby such
war or national defense material or any troops of the
Philippines or of the United States, or of any associate
nation, are being or may be transported either within the
limits of the Philippines or the United States or upon the
high seas; and all dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, water and

[ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 39,
September 07, 1979 ]
AN ACT REGULATING THE ACTIVITIES AND
REQUIRING THE REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN
AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session
assembled:
SECTION 1. Title.—This Act shall be known as the "Foreign
Agents Act of 1979".
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It shall be the purpose and
policy of this Act for reasons of national security and
interest to regulate the activities of foreign agents and to
require them to register and to disclose their political
activities in the Republic of the Philippines, so that the
government and the people of the Philippines may be
informed of their identity and may appraise their
statements and actions.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act—
1. "Person" refers to an individual, partnership,
association, corporation or any other
combination of individuals.
2. "Foreign principal" refers to the government of a
foreign country or a foreign political party; a
foreigner located within or outside the
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines; or
a partnership, association, corporation,
organization or other entity owned or controlled
by foreigners.
3. "Foreign agent" refers to any person who acts or
agrees to act as political consultant, public
relations counsel, publicity agent, information
representative, or as agent, servant,
representative, or attorney for a foreign principal
or for any domestic organization subsidized
directly or indirectly in whole or in part by a
foreign principal. The term "foreign agent" shall
not include a duly accredited diplomatic or
consular officer of a foreign country or officials of
the United Nations and its agencies and of other
international organizations recognized by the
Republic of the Philippines while engaged in
activities within the scope of their legitimate
functions as such officers or a bona fide member
or employee of a foreign press service or news
organization while engaged in activities within
the scope of his legitimate functions as such.
4. "Political activity" refers to political propaganda
or any other activity which seeks in any
reasonable degree to prevail upon, indoctrinate,
convert, induce, persuade, or in any other way
influence any agency or official of the Philippine
Government, or any section of the public within
the Philippines with respect to the domestic or
foreign policies of the Philippines, or with respect
to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a foreign government or a foreign
political party.
5. "Political propaganda" refers to any oral, visual,
graphic, written, pictorial, or other
communication or expression :
(a) which seeks in any reasonable degree to
prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in
any other way influence a person or any section
of the public within the Philippines with respect
to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a foreign government or a foreign
political party or with respect to the foreign
policies of the. Philippines; or
(b) which advocates, advises, instigates, or
promotes social, political, or religious dissension,
disorder, civil riot, or conflict involving the use of
force, or the overthrow of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
6. "Political consultant" refers to any person who
engages in informing or advising any other
person on the domestic or foreign policies of the
Philippines or on the political or public interests,
policies, or relations of a foreign government or
of a foreign political party.
7. "Public relations counsel" refers to any person
who engages directly or indirectly in informing,
advising, or in any way representing a principal in
any matter affected by the public policies or
interests of a principal.
8. "Publicity agent" refers to any person who
engages directly or indirectly in the dissemination
and/or publication of information for and on
behalf of a principal.
9. "Information representative" refers to any
person who engages in collecting or gathering
data and in disseminating and/or publishing the
same for and on behalf of a principal.
SEC. 4. Registration.— (1) Every person who is now a
foreign agent shall, within thirty days after this Act takes
effect, and every person who shall hereafter become a
foreign agent shall, within ten days thereafter, file with
the Ministry of Justice a true and a complete registration
statement, under oath, which shall set forth—
a. The name, principal business address, and all
other business and residence addresses in the
Philippines or elsewhere, if any, of the registrant.
b. The name of the foreign principal or other
person/s or organization/s for which such person
is acting as agent.
c. A copy of the contract/s of employment, or in the
absence thereof, a full statement of the terms
and conditions, under which such person acts or
agrees to act as agent.
d. The date when such contract or each of such
contracts was made, the date of commencement
of activity thereunder and the period during
which such contract or each of such contracts is
to be in effect.
 e. The compensation to be paid, if any, and the form
and manner of such compensation.
f. The name of every foreign principal or other
person, or organization which contributed or
which has promised to contribute to the
compensation provided for such contract.
g. A detailed statement of every activity which the
registrant is performing or is assuming or
purporting or has agreed to perform for himself
or any other person other than a foreign principal
and which requires his registration.
h. If the registrant be a partnership, association, or
corporation, a true and complete copy of its
charter, articles of incorporation, association,
constitution, and by-laws and any other
instruments relating to its organizations, powers
and purposes.
i. Such other statements, information or
documents as the Ministry of Justice for purposes
of this Act may from time to time require.
(2) The termination of the status of the foreign agent shall
not relieve him from his obligation to file a registration
statement in accordance with this Act for the period
during which he was such an agent.
SEC. 5. Additional Statement.—Every person who has
filed a registration statement required by Section four
shall, within thirty days after the expiration of a period of
six months succeeding the first filing, and every six
months thereafter, file with the Ministry of Justice a
statement, under oath, which shall set forth—
1. Such facts as may be necessary to make the
information required under Section four hereof
accurate and current with respect to such period.
2. The name, business, and residence address, and
if an individual, the nationality, of any person
other than a foreign principal for whom the
registrant is acting, assuming or purporting to act
or has agreed to act under such circumstances as
require his registration hereunder, the extent to
which such person is supervised, directed,
owned, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in
whole or in part, by any foreign government or
foreign political party or by any other foreign
principal, and the nature and amount of
contributions, income, money," or thing of value,
if any, that the registrant has received during the
preceding sixty days from such person in
connection with any of the activities referred to
under this Act, either as compensation or for
disbursement or otherwise, and the form and
time of each such payment and from whom
received.
3. A detailed statement of money and other things
of value spent or disposed of by the registrant
during the preceding sixty days in furtherance of,
or in connection with activities which require his
registration hereunder, and which have been
undertaken by him either as a foreign agent, or
for himself, or any other person, or in connection
with any activity relating to his becoming such an
agent.
SEC. 6. Statement Open to Public Scrutiny.—The Minister
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Minister) shall
retain in permanent form all statements filed under this
Act, and such statements shall be public records and open
to public examination and inspection at all reasonable
hours, under such rules and regulations as the Minister
may prescribe.
The Minister shall, promptly upon receipt, transmit one
copy of every registration statement and other
statements or matters related thereto, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Public Information for
such comment and use as they may determine to be
appropriate from the point of view of the foreign relations
and internal policies of the Philippines.
SEC. 7. Exemptions.—This Act shall not apply to any
person engaging or agreeing to engage only—
1. In private and non-political activities in
furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce
of a foreign principal;
2. In activities in furtherance of bona
fide charitable, religious, scholastic, academic,
artistic or scientific pursuits ;
3. In the legal representation of a foreign principal
before any court or government
agency: Provided, That for purposes of this
subsection, legal representation does not include
attempts to influence or persuade government
personnel or officials other than in the course of
their ordinary official business.
SEC. 8. Amended Registration.—If the Minister
determines that a registration statement does not comply
with the requirements of this Act or the regulations issued
thereunder, he shall so notify the registrant in writing,
specifying in what respects the statement is deficient.
It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a foreign agent
at any time after receipt of such notification without filing
an amended registration statement in full compliance
with the requirements of this Act and the regulations
issued thereunder.
SEC. 9. Filing and Labelling of Political Propaganda.— A
foreign agent who transmits or disseminates in the
Philippines any political propaganda for or in the interest
of his foreign principal among two or more persons shall,
not later than forty-eight hours after the beginning of the
transmittal thereof, file with the Ministry of Justice two
copies thereof, setting forth full information as to
The places, times and extent of such transmittal. Violation
of this provision shall constitute an offense under this Act.
SEC. 10. Injunction.—Whenever in the judgment of the
Minister any person is engaged in or about to engage in
any act which constitutes or will constitute a violation of
any provision of this Act, or regulations issued
thereunder, or whenever any foreign agents fails to
comply with any of the provisions of this Act, or the
regulations issued thereunder, or otherwise is in violation
of this Act, the Minister may secure from the appropriate
court an order requiring compliance with any appropriate
provision of the Act or regulation thereunder. The court
shall have jurisdiction and authority to issue a temporary
or permanent injunction, restraining order or such other
order as it may deem proper. The proceedings shall enjoy
the highest priority and shall be expedited in every way.
SEC. 11. Unlawful Acts.—(1) It shall be unlawful for any
person within the Philippines who is a foreign agent:
a. to transmit, convey, or otherwise furnish to any
agency or official of the government for or in the
interest of a foreign principal any political
propaganda, or to request from any agency or
official for or in the interest of such foreign
principal any information or advice pertaining to
any political or public interests, policies or
relations of a foreign country or of a political
party or pertaining to the foreign or domestic
policies of the Philippines, unless the propaganda
being issued or the request being made is
prefaced or accompanied by a true and accurate
statement to the effect that such person is
registered as a foreign agent under this Act;
b. to be a party to any contract, agreement, or
understanding, either express or implied, with a
foreign principal pursuant to which the amount
or payment of the compensation, fee or other
remuneration of such agent is contingent in
whole or in part upon the success of any political
activity carried out by such agent;
c. To make, directly or indirectly, any contribution
of money or other thing of value, or promise
expressly or impliedly to make any such
contribution, in connection with any convention,
caucus or other process to select candidates for
any political office.
If the offense, is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or any other organization or entity, the
penalty provided herein shall be imposed on the
president, managing director, managing partner, or chief
operating officer, whichever the case may be: Provided,
That if the offender is a foreigner, he shall, after payment
of the fine and/or service of the sentence, be subject to
deportation.
SEC. 13. Rules and Regulations.—The Minister of Justice
shall forthwith promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act;
such rules and regulations shall have the effect of law
fifteen (15) days following their publication in the. Official
Gazette.
SEC. 14. Separability Clause.—It, for any reason, any
provision or part hereof is declared unconstitutional, the
remainder of this Act shall not be affected by such
declaration.
SEC. 15. Revealing Clause.—All provisions of law which
are m conflict with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 16. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved, September 7, 1979.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any person in the Philippines to

solicit, accept, or receive, directly or indirectly, from any
foreign agent or from a foreign principal, any of the
contributions, or promises to make such contributions,
referred to in subsection (c) of this Section.

(3) It shall be unlawful for any public officer or employee

or his spouse to act as a foreign agent. However, the
government may employ any foreign agent: Provided,
That the head of the employing agency certifies that such
employment is required in the national interest. A
certification issued under, this paragraph shall be
forwarded by the head of such agency to the Minister
who shall cause the same to be filed along with the
registration statement and other documents filed by such
agent.

SEC. 12. Penalties.—Any person who violates any

provision of this Act or any regulation thereunder; or who
fails to file any statement required to be filed under this
Act; or in complying with the provision of this Act, makes
a false statement of material fact, or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein shall be liable
on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years or a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 or both.
[ PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532, August 08, 1974 ]
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY
LAW
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal
that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from
one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order
and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic
and social progress of the people;
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either
piracy or highway robbery, brigandage which are among
the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries; and,
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations
by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January
17, 1973 and General Order No. 1, dated September 22,
1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of
the land the following:
SECTION 1. Title. — This Decree shall be known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. — The following terms shall
mean and be understood, as follows:
a. Philippine Waters. — It shall refer to all bodies of
water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays
around, between and connecting each of the
Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective
of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all
other waters belonging to the Philippines by
historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the
sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine
areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. — Any vessel or watercraft used for
transport of passengers and cargo from one place
to another through Philippine Waters. It shall
include all kinds and types of vessels or boats
used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. — It shall refer to any road,
street, passage, highway and bridges or other
parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the
Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the movement or
circulation of persons or transportation of goods,
articles, or property or both.
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or Its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall
be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The seizure of
any person for ransom, extortion or other
unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the
property of another by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things of
other unlawful means, committed by any person
on any Philippine Highway.
SEC. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed.
If physical injuries or other crimes are committed
as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished
by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes
are committed during or on the occasion of the
commission of robbery or brigandage, the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping
for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide,
or rape is committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or
abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. — Any
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any
manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in
accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the
acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
SEC. 5. Repealing clause. — Pertinent portions of Act No.
3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code; and all
laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts thereof,
insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 6. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect upon

approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the

year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
 [ G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO MENDOZA Y REYES AND
JAIME REJALI Y LINA, DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main question answered in this case is whether the
accused should be convicted of highway robbery with
homicide punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532,
or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were
charged on June 17, 1991 before the Regional Trial Court
in Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) of the crime of
"ROBBERY HOLD-UP (sic) with HOMICIDE (P.D. No. 532,
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highwat (sic) Robbery Law of
1974)"[1] in an Information which reads as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of May 1991, in the
municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above- named accused, armed with gun and knives,
conspiring and confederating together with one alias Jack
whose true identity and present whereabouts is still
unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of cash
money amounting to P3 0.00, while the said victim was
aboard a passenger jeep, cruising along Aurora Blvd., San
Juan, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof, in the
aforementioned amount of P30.00; that on the occasion
of said robbery (hold-up) and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, rob and carry away personal belongings of
all passengers in pursuance of their criminal act said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the passengers (sic) of said passenger jeep, one
Ramilyn Zulueta by then and there hitting her head with
a gun and kicked (sic) her out of the passenger jeep which
caused her to fall in (sic) the pavement hitting her head
on the ground, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
injuries which directly caused her death, while Ma. Grace
Zulueta, punching her face and hitting her head with a
gun, as a result of which said Ma. Grace Zulueta sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her
from performing her customary labor for the same period
of time.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The records show that both accused were assisted by
their counsel de oficio, Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), when they pleaded not
guilty to the charge upon arraignment on August 9, 1991.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution thereafter established that on May 29,
1991, at about 9:00 in the evening, 17-year-old Ma. Grace
Zulueta and her elder sister, Ma. Ramilyn, were on their
way home from their grandparents’ house in Altura Ext.,
Sta. Mesa, Manila. They boarded a passenger jeepney
bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd. The jeepney was fully
loaded with the driver, his wife and two children on the
front seat and eight passengers on each of the two
parallel back seats.[2]
The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of
the jeepney[3] with accused Romeo Mendoza seated
beside Grace.[4] It was through Mendoza that Grace
handed over their fare to the driver as the jeepney passed
by the SM complex.[5] Glory Oropeo (or Lory Europeo[6]),
who boarded the same jeepney near the Stop and Shop
Supermarket, was seated behind the driver. Accused
Jaime Rejali was beside Glory while their companion
named Jack, who has remained at large, was seated
across her.[7]
When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora
Blvd. in San Juan, Metro Manila, near St. Paul’s College,
just after the bridge and before Broadway Centrum,
someone announced a hold-up[8] Both Mendoza and
Rejali had guns while Jack was armed with a knife. It was
Rejali who fired his gun.[9] Jack told the Zulueta sisters that
they would "bring" the sisters along. As the accused
appeared drunk, the sisters ignored them. However, a
male passenger jumped off the jeepney and a commotion
ensued. Perplexed ("naguluhan") by this turn of events,
the accused held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to
extricate herself from their grasp. This prompted
Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He boxed
and kicked her, causing Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney
into the street where she rolled. [10]
Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she
struggled, Grace shouted, "bitawan mo ako, bitawan mo
ako," in an attempt to call the attention of the drivers of
the other vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit
Grace on the head with a gun causing her to lose
consciousness.[11] (She finally came to at the St. Luke’s
Hospital; she was confined there up to June 7, 1991. [12])
While all this was happening, Rejali poked his gun at the
other passengers.[13]
From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of
P30.00. She handed it to the holdupper seated in front of
her. When the commotion took place, the driver slowed
down the jeepney but the holduppers told him to keep on
moving. One of them ordered the driver to proceed to J.
Ruiz St. and make several turns until, when they reached
Paterno, the culprits alighted and made their escape.[14]
Ramon Zulueta, the father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned
about the incident from his other daughter, Joralyn, who
was informed that Grace was at the St. Luke’s Hospital.
Grace, who was then a student employed at the Pizza Hut
for P3,000.00 a month, was confined in said hospital from
May 30 to June 7, 1991 for head trauma; she had
contusions and hematomas on the left temporal region
and on the right occipito-parietal and anterior temporal
regions, and abrasions on the supra orbital area as well as
elbow.[15] Ramon Zulueta spent around P 19,000.00 for
Grace’s hospitalization.[16]
Upon learning from Grace that Ramilyn had been with
her, Ramon Zulueta surmised that she might have been
brought to the hospital nearer the place of the incident,
the UERM hospital. When he got there, he learned that
Ramilyn, 21 years old and a computer management
student, had already died of severe, traumatic head
injuries.[17] The Zulueta family spent around P 15,000.00
for her interment.[18]
Two days after the incident, Ramon Zulueta was informed
that the jeepney driver and his wife had "surrendered" to
the police station in San Juan. The following day, he went
there but the driver was not around. He gave a statement
to the police.[19]
By fluke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about
the apprehension of Mendoza. On the morning of June
12, 1991, Grace saw Mendoza selling ice cream along
Altura St. She noticed Mendoza staring at her. When she
stared back, Mendoza lowered his gaze and left
immediately. That same afternoon, she saw him again.
Considering her poor eyesight, she was instructed by her
cousin to buy ice cream from Mendoza so that she could
get near enough to be sure if he was indeed one of the
holduppers. When she approached and asked Mendoza,
"Mama, kilala kita?", he could not look her in the eyes and
seemed confused. Certain now that he was one of the
holduppers, Grace announced to her brother and the
other people present that Mendoza was one of the
holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for it, but the
people gave chase and overtook him.[20]
Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was
identified by Grace in a line-up.[21] Rejali was
apprehended that same night by police operatives.
According to SPO1 Dalmacio Luces, Lucia Salinas, the wife
of jeepney driver Virgilio Salinas, described one of the
suspects to the NBI cartographer who came out with a
sketch of his face.[22] However, Luces failed to get a
statement from Lucia.[23]
Evidence for the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi as defenses. Both
of them admitted knowing each other as they were
working as ice cream vendors at the Ana Maria Ice Cream
Factory in 1045 Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila where they
also lodged in rooms provided by their employer.
Mendoza, 28 years old, swore that on that fateful day, he
sold ice cream from 8:30 a.m. to about 4:00 p.m. From
the factory, he went as far as V. Mapa St., passing under
the bridge near the Stop and Shop Supermarket. By 5:30
in the afternoon, he was back at the factory. He spent the
night of May 29, 1991 in his living quarters at the factory
taking care of his child as his wife was pregnant. [24]
For his part, 27-year-old Rejali testified that he also sold
ice cream on the date in question, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00
p.m., along E. Tuazon St. near Balic-balic. He claimed that
he had not gone to San Juan as he did not even know
where San Juan was, being new in the vicinity. Once back
in the factory, he prepared ice cream for sale the next day.
Then he rested in his room.[25]
Myrna Balderama, who also stayed in the living quarters
within the same ice cream factory, corroborated the
testimonies of the two accused. According to her, she saw
Mendoza enter the compound in the afternoon of May
29, 1991. From outside her room, she could see
Mendoza’s room; on the night in question, she saw him
taking care of his child. As to Rejali, she knew that he did
not leave the premises that evening as she had a
conversation with him up to 10:00 p.m. while he was
preparing ice cream.[26]
On March 10, 1992, the trial court[27] rendered the
Decision subject of this appeal. Its dispositive portion
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both
accused ROMEO MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y
LINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the
heirs of Ramilyn Zulueta in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), to pay the sum of
P23,673.35 by way of reimbursement of the
hospitalization, burial and other related expenses for
Ramilyn Zulueta and the further sum of P30,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages; to pay Glory
Oropeo the sum of P30.00 by way of reparation of the
stolen cash money; to pay Ma. Grace Zulueta the sum of
P6,400.00 by way of reimbursement of her hospitalization
expenses, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be
credited in full with the period of their preventive
imprisonment.
"SO ORDERED."
In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving
credence to the "inconsistent, conflicting and
contradictory testimonies" of prosecution witnesses
Grace Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them
of the crime charged "despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
"[28]
Although not directly raised by the appellants, we find, -
upon a thorough scrutiny of the facts - that there is yet
another question which is of concern to the bar and the
bench: are the facts attendant to this case constitutive of
the crime of highway robbery with homicide under Pres.
Decree No. 532 or of the felony of robbery with homicide
under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?
 The Court’s Ruling
This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of
witnesses. As this Court has ruled in innumerable cases,
the trial court is best equipped to make the assessment
on said issue and therefore, its factual findings are
generally not disturbed on appeal unless the court a
quo is perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood or
misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight,
which, if properly considered, would affect the result of
the case and warrant a reversal of the decision
involved.[29] We do not find in the instant case any such
reason to depart from said general principle.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we
shall confront the issues raised herein by the appellants.
Appellants allege the following "inconsistent" testimonies
of the prosecution eyewitnesses: (a) Grace testified that
it was Rejali who shouted "hold-up," pulled out a gun and
fired, in contradiction to Glory’s testimony that the man
in front of her, referring to Jack, announced the hold-up,
and (b) at the direct examination, Grace pointed out that
she was struck behind her right ear but during cross-
examination, she said that she was hit on the left ear.
The first inconsistency may be attributed to the difference
in the relative positions of Grace and Glory inside the
jeepney. Grace was seated near the rear entrance of the
jeepney while Glory was behind the driver. Because Grace
was far from both Jack and Rejali who were seated near
Glory, this could have affected her perception of who
announced the hold-up. At any rate, such disparity in their
testimonies does not at all derail the sufficiently
established fact that both appellants herein participated
in the hold-up. As regards the injuries sustained by Grace,
the certificate issued by her attending physician, Dr.
Sosepatro Aguila, states that she sustained injuries on
both sides of the head,[30] clearly
showing no "contradictions" in her testimony with
respect to where she was hit.
Be that as it may, these "inconsistencies" or
"contradictions" are minor ones which do not have any
material, bearing on the culpability of the appellants as
they do not in any way refute their positive identification
by the two eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the hold-
up.[31] On the contrary, they reflect the truthfulness of the
testimonies of Grace and Glory. As this Court said
in People vs. Retuta:[32]
"The discrepancy signifies that the two witnesses did not
deliberately pervert the truth in their narrations. The
discordance in their testimonies on minor matters
heightens their credibility and shows that their
testimonies were not coached or rehearsed (People v.
Doria, 55 SCRA 425). As this Honorable Court held in
People v. Agudu, 137 SCRA 516 to wit:
‘However, the variance, if any, is on a minor detail which
would not destroy the effectiveness of their
testimony. We cannot expect absolute uniformity in
every detail because witnesses react differently to what
they see and hear, depending upon their situation and
state of mind. Complete uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness. The light contradictions, on the other
hand, strengthens the sincerity of the testimony of the
witnesses.’
"Thus, far from evidence of falsehood, the minor
inconsistency between the testimonies could justifiably
be regarded as a demonstration of their good faith."
The strongest part of the defense arguments concerns
the identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime considering the lighting condition inside the
jeepney. Appellants believed that they could not have
been recognized because both Grace and Glory admitted
that the place was dark, and so surmised that it would
have been darker inside the jeepney because the
eyewitnesses failed to point out the source of light
therein.[33] However, in trying to prove their allegation,
appellants unwittingly brought out details via Grace’s
testimony which demolish their surmise. Thus:
"Q. Despite the darkness, you were able to identify the
gun?
A. I did not say it was completely dark. I said in the
jeepney it was quite lighted. I said it was dark outside but
in the jeepney, it was quite lighted."[34] (Italics supplied.)
It seems, moreover, that appellants only quoted portions
of the testimonies of Grace and Glory to suit their
purpose. Had the appellants been candid enough, they
would have retained portions of the same testimonies
evidencing that it was the place where the jeepney was
passing through that was dark but, inside the jeepney, it
was "medium light." Grace had testified on cross-
examination as follows:
Will you mention again the exact location of the
"Q.
alleged incident?
I am not familiar with the streets, sir. It was after a
A.
bridge. After UERM, sir.
Q. What was the condition of the place at that time?
A. It was moderately dark. Quite lighted. Medium.
How about inside the passenger jeepney? Was it
Q.
lighted?
Medium, sir. Since it was dark, you cannot have a
A.
complete light there.
Q. It was quite dark?
A. Yes, sir."[35]
For her part, Glory testified on cross-examination in this
wise:
Madam witness, will you mention again the exact
"Q.
location where you said you were allegedly held up?
A. San Juan, H. Lozada and J. Ruiz St., sir.
Q. What was the condition of that place at that time?
A. It was dark because it was already nighttime.
You mean the exact place where you were held-up
Q.
is a dark place?
A Yes, sir."[36] (Italics supplied.)
Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a
criminal offender. However, its relative weight and
significance depends largely on the attending
circumstances and the discretion of the trial
court.[37] Another overriding consideration is the fact that
the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive
to see the appearance of the perpetrator of the crime and
observe the manner in which the crime was being
committed.[38]
In the case before us, Grace’s unrebutted testimony is
that the jeepney was "quite lighted x x x medium." Even
granting that the light was dim as most jeepneys have
colored or low-wattage bulbs for the passenger area, the
added illumination from the headlights of passing vehicles
traveling the busy Aurora Boulevard would have been
sufficient to permit positive identification of the
appellants.[39] Moreover, identification of the appellants
as the hold-uppers was facilitated by their physical
proximity to the said eyewitnesses. Grace was seated
beside appellant Mendoza while Glory was beside Rejali.
That Grace had poor eyesight does not affect her positive
identification of Mendoza because she was wearing her
eyeglasses when the hold-up took place.[40] As stated
above, because they were victims of violence, both Grace
and Glory must have had the appellants’ features indelibly
imprinted in their minds.
In light of the positive identification of the appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime, their alibis are
worthless.[41] Moreover, the defense failed to meet the
requisites for alibi to be considered as a valid defense. It
is not enough that the appellants were somewhere else
when the crime transpired. They must likewise duly
establish that they were so far away that it was not
physically possible for them to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at or about the time of its
commission.[42] Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and
Aurora Boulevard in San Juan, Metro Manila are not very
distant from each other considering the numerous public
transportation facilities plying between said places.
But, while there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay
culpability on the appellants for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn
Zulueta, the physical injuries sustained by her sister Grace
and the asportation of Glory Oropeo’s thirty pesos, we do
not agree with the trial court that the crime committed
by appellants is covered by P.D. No. 532.
In its Decision, the trial court curtly said:
"The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged,
namely, intent to gain, unlawful taking of property of
another, (the P30.00 of Glory Oropeo) violence against or
intimidation of any person, on a Philippine Highway and
death of Ramilyn Zulueta and physical injuries upon Ma.
Grace Zulueta, (Section 2, par. 3 and Section 3, par. b,
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres.
Decree No. 532) have been duly proved in the instant
case."
Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide?
Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the
above elements mentioned by the court a quo. Highway
robbery or brigandage is defined by Section 2 of said
decree as follows:
"e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. - The seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes
or the taking away of the property of another by means
of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any person
on any Philippine highway."
In People vs. Puno,[43] this Court, speaking through the
learned Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, explained the
purpose of brigandage as follows:
"In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia,
indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery
in band if there are at least four armed participants.
(citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422 [1904]) x x x
"x x x Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated
by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons
on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, x x x"
Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for
highway robbery, the prosecution should have proven
that the accused, in the instant case, were organized for
the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately.
There, however, was a total absence of such proof. There
was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar
robberies by the accused - to show the "indiscriminate"
commission thereof.
Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number
of perpetrators is no longer an essential element of the
crime of brigandage as defined by P.D. No. 532. Mr.
Justice Regalado explained this in Puno:
"True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when
committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed
persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption
in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use
unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree.
x x x"[44]
Under the old doctrine, brigandage was committed by a
"cuadrilla"[45] or by "more than three armed persons" per
the definition of brigands in Article 306 of the Revised
Penal Code.[46]
Even before the Puno holding, however, there had been
cases[47] where less than four offenders were held guilty
of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532, which just
strengthens the view that the number of offenders is not
an essential element in the crime of highway robbery.[48]
It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a highway
within the purview of P.D. No 532,[49] the prosecutors
deemed it proper to charge appellants with violation of
said decree. In this regard, the Puno ruling is enlightening.
This Court held:
x x x (i)t would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation
that any unlawful taking of property committed on our
highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of
the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof.
Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the
elementary caveat that he who considers merely the
letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal justice
inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of
doubt.
"If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed
on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not
be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd,
effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law.
While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory
adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of
the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering
nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where
the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large
cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon
by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?"[50]
Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is
important to consider whether or not the very purpose
for which the law was promulgated has been
transgressed. Citing the "whereas clauses" of P. D. No.
532[51] in Puno, the Court said:
"Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of
robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the ‘innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another,’ and which single
act of depredation would be capable of ‘stunting the
economic and social progress of the people’ as to be
considered ‘among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,’ and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle ‘to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people,’ such that said isolated act would constitute
the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous."[52]
Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without
personal violence and death) committed against the
middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery
committed against the economically well-heeled.
Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to
bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic
principle that all doubts are to be resolved liberally in
favor of the accused. As such, appellants may not be held
liable under P.D. No. 532 but only under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.
In the interpretation of an information, what controls is
not the designation but the description of the offense
charged.[53] Considering the allegations of the
aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be
liable for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable
doubt by the asportation of thirty pesos from Glory
Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta’s death was
accidental because it was produced by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.[54] The physical injuries inflicted
upon Grace Zulueta during the commission of the crime
are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.[55]
Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of
the appellants and their companion[56] of depriving Glory
of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and Grace which
resulted in Ramilyn’s accidental death. Since both
appellants took part in the robbery, they shall be liable for
the complex crime of robbery with homicide in the
absence of proof that they endeavored to prevent the
accidental killing of Ramilyn.[57] In view of the prohibition
against the imposition of the death penalty when the
crime was committed, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was then the single and indivisible penalty for
robbery with homicide. It shall be imposed on each of the
appellants regardless of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) in Crim. Case No. 87218
is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Romeo Mendoza y Reyes
and Jaime Rejali y Lina are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide and accordingly, each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The other portions of the trial court’s decision, including
the monetary awards imposed against them,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco,
JJ., concur.
 [ G.R. No. 116734, March 29, 1996 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA,
MELVIN DAGUDOG, AND RICHARD DISIPULO,
ACCUSED. LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a case for our automatic review[1] in view of the
death penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Larry
Laurente (hereinafter Laurente).
In a decision[2] promulgated on 23 August 1994 in
Criminal Case No. 104785, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig, Branch 156, found Laurente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with
Homicide, defined and penalized under P.D. No.
532,[3] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death;
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay them P27,300.00 as funeral
expenses and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.
We declare at the outset that even granting ex gratia that
the established facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Laurente and his two co-accused indeed committed the
acts charged in the information,[4] Laurente cannot be
validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide
under P.D. No. 532. The object of the decree is to deter
and punish lawless elements who commit acts of
depredation upon persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another - which acts constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage - thereby disturbing the peace,
order, and tranquility of the nation and stunting the
economic and social progress of the people.[5] It is
directed against acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person on Philippine
highways, as defined therein, and not those committed
against a predetermined or particular victim. Accordingly,
a robbery committed on a Philippine highway by persons
who are not members of the prescribed lawless elements
or directed only against a specific, intended, or
preconceived victim, is not a violation of P.D. No. 532.
This Court, per Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, so held
in People vs. Puno[6] and a reiteration of the discussion
therein is in order. Thus:
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General
Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant
portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous
ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous.
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage
(bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in
the proper context and perspective, we find that a band
of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is
more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on
the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with
such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was
passed.
The following salient distinctions between brigandage
and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense
consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of Art. 306.
It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under
it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when
the organization and purpose of the band are shown to
be such as are contemplated by Art.
306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a ban
d, whose members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the c
rime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than
three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar."
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter
alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is
only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or
robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
objectives announced therein, could not have been
unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have
adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn
from the time when and the circumstances under which
the decree to be construed
originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as
highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined
therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal
that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredation upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless i
nhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereb
y disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the natio
n and stunting the economic and social progress of the p
eople;
WHEREAS, such acts and depredations constitute x x caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an
x highway robbery/brigandage which are among the high
est forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statut
es of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts and
depredations by imposing [a] heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educ
ational and community progress of the people; (Italics
supplied.)
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of
robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another," and which single
act of depredation could be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be
considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people," such that said isolated act would constitute
the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when
committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed
persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption
in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use
unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree.
But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against
any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway
and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in
Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was
under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for
that matter, under the old Brigandage Law.
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court
below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by
appellants should be covered by the said amendatory
decree just because it was committed on a
highway. Aside from what has already been stressed
regarding the absence of the requisite elements which
thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the
purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it
would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways
would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the spirit of intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as
it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the
fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of
the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed
on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not
be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd,
effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal
law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum
line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated
theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of
the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering
nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where
the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large
cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon
by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the
coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of
things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within
the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its
definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely define[s] "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as
we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery
conceived and committed by appellants in this case does
not constitute highway robbery or brigandage. (citations
omitted)
In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that
Laurente and his co-accused, or their acts, fall within the
purview of P.D. No. 532, as interpreted above. Thus, to
repeat, Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway
robbery with homicide under P.D. No 532.
Assuming further, however, that Laurente and his co-
accused may be convicted under P.D. No. 532, the death
penalty cannot be legally imposed on Laurente. While it is
true that Section 3 of the said decree prescribes the
penalty of death for highway robbery with homicide, the
imposition of capital punishment was suspended[7] by
Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[8]
The reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No.
7659[9] did not ipso jure lift the suspension as far as
P.D. No. 532 is concerned. An examination of the former
reveals that while it specifically imposed the death
penalty or restored it for certain crimes,[10] it failed to do
so for the latter - in fact, R.A. No. 7659 does not mention
P.D. No. 532 at all. Clearly, by failing to squarely deal with
P.D. No. 532, Congress is deemed not to have considered
highway robbery with homicide a "heinous crime"; or if it
did, it found no "compelling reason" to reimpose the
death penalty therefor.
Nevertheless, the amended information hereinafter
quoted[11] indubitably shows, that except for the
emphasis of the place where the robbery was committed,
i.e., a highway, the charge is actually for robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code. This provision now reads, as
amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson x x x.
Simply, the information remains a valid information for
robbery with homicide under the above provision. The
investigating prosecutor’s characterization that it was for
highway robbery with homicide is of no moment. On the
matter of an accused’s right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation,[12] it is elementary that what
determines the offense charged is not the
characterization made by the prosecutor who prepared
the information, but the allegations in the indictment.[13]
Accordingly, on the assumption that the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
robbery and of homicide committed on the occasion
thereof, Laurente can nevertheless be meted the penalty
of death under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since the crime was
committed on 14 February 1994, or one month and
thirteen days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. But
whether the prosecution in fact discharged its burden is
an entirely different matter which goes into the merits of
this appeal.
We shall then turn our attention to the appeal proper.
In an information[14] dated 17 February 1994 and filed
with the trial court on 21 February 1994, Laurente was
charged with the crime of Highway Robbery with
Homicide. The information was later amended to include
his co-accused, Melvin Dagudog and Richard
Disipulo. The indictment in the amended information
read as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994 in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo, who are still
at large, and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent of [sic] gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest from
Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings in and [sic]
undetermined amount along F. Concepcion St., Bgy. San
Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine
Highway; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for
the purpose of enabling them to take, divest and carry
away the said money, in pursuance of their conspiracy
and for the purpose of insuring success of their criminal
act, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously strangle said victim with a leather belt and
hit him with a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain
physical injuries which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[15]
Laurente was taken into custody on 15 February
1994,[16] but his two co-accused have remained at
large. The case then proceeded as against Laurente only.
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, Laurente entered a plea of not guilty.[17] At trial on
the merits, the prosecution presented four witnesses,
namely: (1) SPO1 Crispin Pio, the investigating/arresting
officer; (2) eyewitness Myra Guinto; (3) Felicitas
Matematico, the victim’s daughter; and (4) Dr. Emmanuel
Arañas, the medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, who performed
the autopsy on the victim. The prosecution attempted to
present the other eyewitness, Noel Guinto (Myra’s
brother-in-law), but despite the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and the trial court’s grant of one last chance to
present him, the prosecution was unable to do so.[18]
SPO1 Crispin Pio testified that on 14 February 1994, while
on duty as a homicide investigator at the Pasig Police
Station, he received a case assignment relative to one
Herminio Artana. He proceeded to the place of the
incident, which was just a few meters away from the exit
gate of the Capitol Compound in Pasig. Upon arrival, he
saw a parked taxicab and looked inside it. He saw a dead
man, who, he supposed, was the taxicab driver. Pio
recalled that the taxicab was an "Adet taxi," but he forgot
its plate number.[19]
At such time, Pio asked the Guinto siblings-in-law and
other persons present about the incident, but
gained no meaningful information from them. He
conducted a "cursory investigation" and saw that the
body "sustained strangulation marked [sic] and wounds
on the face and head," thus he sent the body to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. He then conducted a
"crime scene search inside the taxicab and within the
vicinity," which yielded a "colored brown wallet
containing an SSS [Social Security System] ID of x x x Larry
Laurente" and "a leather belt supposedly used in
strangling the dead man."[20]

Pio took the articles, went to the police station to make
an incident report, and "requested the SSS to secure the
complete record" of Laurente. From the SSS records, the
police authorities learned that Laurente lived
"somewhere in Kalawaan Sur, Pasig"; accordingly, a
"follow-up" team was formed to arrest him.[21]
Pio further testified that on 15 February 1994, the
"follow-up" team arrested and brought Laurente to the
police station for investigation, and that during the
investigation, after having been apprised of his
constitutional rights, Laurente:
[V]erbally admitted that he together with his friend[s]
Richard and Melvin boarded the taxicab and they grabbed
the taxicab driver and after which they strangulated [sic]
the driver with the use of [the] belt while Melvin hit the
taxi driver with the used [sic] of a blunt instrument at the
head and face.[22]
Thereafter, Laurente was "put under [sic] police line-up
wherein the 2 witnesses positively identified him as one
of the 3 persons they saw coming from the taxicab." Pio
was present during the conduct of the police line-up and,
under his and his superior’s[23] supervision, he had the
line-up photographed (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").[24]
Pio next took the statements of the witnesses (Exhibits "F"
and "G")[25] and the complainant (Exhibit
[26]
"E"), proceeded to make his report (Exhibit
"I"),[27] executed an affidavit (Exhibit "H")[28] attesting to
the conduct of the investigation and arrest, and secured
the death certificate of the victim from the PNP Crime
Laboratory (Exhibit "J").[29] To close his testimony on
direct examination, Pio identified Laurente and further
disclosed their efforts to locate the other suspects.[30]
On cross-examination, Pio clarified certain details
regarding the findings of the investigation, e.g., the locus
criminis was well lit as a lamp post was
nearby.[31] However, Pio admitted that although he
informed Laurente of his constitutional rights while he
was investigated at the police station, Laurente was not
represented by counsel during such investigation; he was
merely accompanied by a sister and some
cousins. Nevertheless, despite the absence of counsel,
Laurente verbally admitted his complicity in the crime,
although the admission was not reduced in writing.[32]
Myra Guinto testified that on 14 February 1994, at about
9:15 p.m., she was selling cigarettes at Sitio Square, Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig, around a meter away from the
Provincial Capitol.[33] At such time, she saw people
scrambling inside a yellow taxicab which was "at the stop
position" on the other side of the Street. Three men then
left the taxicab, ran towards her, and at the time these
men passed in front of her, they were "about 2 arms
length[s]" away. These men then boarded a jeepney
headed towards Pasig. A fourth man approached the
taxicab, saw the taxicab driver inside already dead and
called the police.[34]
She was questioned by the policemen upon their arrival,
and at a later date, reduced her statements into writing
(Exhibit "F"). After she identified Exhibit "F," Guinto then
identified Larry Laurente as one of the three men who left
the taxicab and passed in front of her.[35]
On cross-examination, Guinto declared that the "taxi was
rather of old vintage" and that it did not have tinted
windows, in fact, one "could see the persons inside the
taxi." She likewise declared that the place where she first
saw the taxicab had "a big white bulb" and was
approximately fifteen meters away from where she was
selling cigarettes.[36]
Felicitas Matematico testified that the victim was her
father and presented the following as evidence of funeral
expenses: (a) several pieces of paper with the tagalog
caption "nagastos noong lamay"[37] (Exhibit "K");[38] (b) a
receipt dated 22 February 1994 for P800.00, for the
construction of a niche cover (Exhibit "L");[39] and (c) a
receipt dated 21 February 1994 from Sta. Marta Funeral
Homes for P 10,000.00 (Exhibit "N");[40] for a total of
P27,300.00. To close her testimony on direct
examination, she stated that she was "still sad" about the
death of her father; and when asked to "quantify her
sadness," she responded that her mother was in a better
position to do so.[41]
Dr. Emmanuel Arañas testified on the autopsy he
conducted on the cadaver of the victim and the medico-
legal report (Exhibit "O") he made on 15 February
1994.[42] He reiterated his finding that the cause of death
of the victim was "traumatic injuries of head," and that he
suffered the following injuries: "(1) Hematoma, right peri-
orbital region, measuring 5 by 3 cm., 4 cm. on the anterior
midline; and (2) Contusion, neck, measuring 15 by 1.8
cm., crossing the anterior midline, 2 cm. to the right and
13 cm. to the left," and that "[t]here are subdural and
subarachnoidal hemorrhages." He opined that the
injuries could have been caused by a "hard blunt
instrument," such as a belt, a piece of wood, or a head
(buckle) of a belt.[43]
On his part, accused Larry Laurente interposed the
defense of alibi. On the witness stand, he related that on
14 February 1994, at around 3:00 to 3:30 p.m., he was in
his house at Consorcia Street, San Joaquin, Pasig, together
with his friends Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo.
Supposedly, they began a drinking session at around 3:30
p.m. which lasted four hours, during which period they
consumed two bottles of "Tanduay 5 years." After that,
he did not leave his house anymore,[44] as he got so drunk,
"lost consciousness," and did not wake up until 4:00 a.m.
the next day. It was only then that he found out his two
friends had left his house.[45]
In the morning of 15 February 1994, he had to look for his
wallet as it got lost "in [his] wooden bed (papag) where
[he slept]." That wallet contained an "I.D., SSS number
and P250.00." He then presumed that Melvin Dagudog
and Richard Disipulo had taken his wallet as they were the
only ones in the house during the drinking
session. Having failed to obtain any information from his
neighbors, Mang Roming and Ate Baby, as to where
Dagudog and Disipulo had gone, he went home to rest;
then he took a shower and got ready to report for
work. He had been a shingle molder at Winning
Enterprises for the past three years, with offices in Taguig,
Rizal.[46] He maintained that on 15 February 1994, he
reported for work at 6:00 a.m. and stayed in the office till
8:00 p.m.[47]
After returning home from work, four policemen were
waiting for him, and in Laurente’s own words, "bigla na
lang po akong sinugod at hinila."[48] He surmised that they
were policemen even if they were not in uniform because
they were "holding guns." Although they had no warrant
of arrest, the policemen brought him to the Pasig police
station where he was investigated for being "a hold-
upper"; and throughout the investigation, he was not
assisted by counsel.[49] On cross-examination of Laurente,
the prosecution obtained an admission that it would take
him "about half an hour" to travel from his house to the
Provincial Capitol.[50]
On 23 August 1994, the trial court promulgated the
challenged decision wherein, as stated earlier, it found
Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of highway
robbery with homicide "punishable by death as a single
indivisible penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532
entitled ‘Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974.’"[51] It gave full faith and credit to the eyewitness
account of Myra Guinto and rejected the defense
of alibi proffered by the Laurente as "he failed miserably
to give any evidence to support this claim."[52] Regarding
Laurente’s presence at the locus criminis, it relied on the
positive identification made by Myra and Laurente’s SSS
ID card which was found inside the taxicab of the victim.
Apparently, finding it difficult to impose a death penalty,
the trial court stated:
[W]hile the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe
in the imposition of the death penalty as a form of
punishment, as he has stated about a month ago in
Criminal Case No. 104781, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Mercado. et al., this
same Court, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which
is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences accused
LARRY LAURENTE y Bejasa to death x x x.[53]
Laurente forthwith filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
noted therein that the review by this Court was
automatic.[54]
In his Brief, Laurente assigns the following errors
committed by the trial court, but being interrelated,
discusses them jointly:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT LARRY LAURENTE WAS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF HIGHWAY ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ELEMENTS OF COMMITTING
SUCH CRIME WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION.[55]
Laurente anchors his prayer for acquittal on the
unreliability of the positive identification made of him by
the lone eyewitness who testified at the trial, Myra
Guinto. He initially attempts to discredit this by deducing
from Myra’s testimony in court that she was neither able
to recognize the three men she allegedly saw coming out
of the taxicab, nor see Laurente stab the victim. Thus:
ATTY.FERNANDEZ:
xxx
Q: By the way, do you know these men who came
out from the taxi and passed by you?
A: No, sir.
xxx(TSN, May 6, 1994)
Q: And also did not have any knowledge that there
was a stabbing incident that happened inside the
taxi?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there were three men who
ran passed [sic] infront of you. Is that correct?
A: Yes. sir.
Q: And because of that speed, you were not able to
identify any of these persons?
A: No, sir. I was able to recognize one of them
because they ran in front of me, sir.
xxx
Q: Will you describe to the Honorable Court how
fast these man passed by in front of you?
A: It was quite fast, sir.
xxx
Q: You identified the accused in this case as the one
who allegedly killed the victim in this case. Is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you personally see the accused stabbed
[sic] the victim or killed [sic] the victim?
A: No, sir. (Ibid, p. 7-8) (Italics Ours)[56]
Hence, Laurente concludes that "[t]he identification [by
Myra Guinto] of the accused-appellant in the police line-
up as one of those who killed the victim. . . is . . . not
entirely reliable."[57]
Laurente then continues his assault on Myra’s positive
identification by surmising:
[T]hat it was only thru the SSS ID Card of the accused-
appellant which was found inside the taxicab that made
the police authorities conclude or suspect [the] accused-
appellant. . .. Thus, in all probability, the identification. . .
in the police line-up was because of the SSS ID Card but
not for the reason that she recognized the accused-
appellant on the night of the incident.[58]
As to his SSS ID card in the wallet found inside the taxicab,
Laurente submits that the said card:
[W]ill not suffice as a ground for conviction, for neither
was it established that accused-appellant had left the I.D.
while committing the felony. It may well be that who ever
took appellant’s wallet with the I.D. in it purposely left the
same to implicate [the appellant] . . ..It was established
by the defense that the wallet of the accused-appellant
which contained his SSS ID Card was stolen from him by
his co-accused [and] this allegation remain[s] unrebutted
by the prosecution.[59]
Finally, Laurente challenges the trial court’s rejection of
the defense of alibi and relates this to the allegedly
improbable positive identification by Myra Guinto and
ultimately, the constitutional presumption of innocence:
While it may be admitted that the defense of alibi. . . is. .
. weak this gains strength when the evidence of the
prosecution is equally weak. As earlier discussed, there
is no positive identification of the [appellant] by. . . Myra
Guinto, thus the defense of alibi of the appellant perforce
prevails. As held, the weakness of alibi of the accused
could not strengthen the prosecution’s case for settled is
[the] rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
(People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349) Further, alibi as a
defense assumes commensurate strength . . . where the
evidence presented by the prosecution [is] unreliable and
uncertain since it is not relieved of the onus probandi just
because alibi is the defense invoked by the accused
(People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).[60]
At bottom, Laurente’s line of reasoning flows as such:
First, the positive identification by Myra Guinto is
unreliable as she did not see the three men who came out
of the taxicab, neither did she see Laurente stab the
victim. Second, in the light of the improbability of Myra
having adequately seen Laurente at the locus criminis, the
positive identification at the police line-up necessarily
cannot be relied upon as well. Third, without the positive
identification of Laurente, only his SSS ID card found
inside the taxicab links him to the crime; however,
Laurente satisfactorily proved that his wallet containing
his SSS ID card had been taken. Hence, he concludes, the
spurious positive identification, either at the scene of the
crime or at the police line-up, coupled with the weak link
provided by his SSS ID card found inside the taxicab,
should not be allowed to overcome the defense of alibi
and the presumption of innocence.
Laurente’s attempts to cast doubt upon the positive
identification made of him by Myra must fail.
Laurente’s contention that Myra did not see the three
men who came out of the taxicab deserves scant
consideration. As the proceedings below clearly
established, the place where Myra saw Laurente was well-
lit due to a lamp post nearby and the latter was only two
arms lengths away from her when he passed in front of
her. Moreover, she identified Laurente at the police line-
up, which was even photographed, and in open
court. Finally, as observed by the trial court:
Nothing in the demeanor of prosecution witness Myra
Guinto would indicate that she harbors ill-feelings
towards accused Larry Laurente that she will falsely testify
against him. Her testimony is thus given much weight by
the Court. . .[61]
This assessment of the credibility of eyewitness Myra
Guinto deserves the highest respect of this Court,
considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity
to observe her deportment and manner of testifying and
availed of the various aids to determine whether she was
telling the truth or concocting lies.[62] This is a settled rule
in this jurisdiction and the exceptions thereto, viz., some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, which if considered might affect the
result of the case,[63] have not been shown to exist in this
case.
Equally settled is the rule that where there is no evidence,
and nothing to indicate that the principal witnesses for
the prosecution - like Myra in this case - were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that they were not
so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.[64]
Laurente’s next contention that Myra did not actually see
him stab the victim must likewise fail. From the
circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be doubted
that Laurente and his companions acted in conspiracy in
committing the crime. They were together in the taxicab
when it stopped and Myra saw them "scrambling inside,"
after which, they ran off and boarded a jeepney to
escape. On the matter of proving the existence of
conspiracy, it is settled that direct proof of the previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[65] There is no doubt in our minds that the victim
was killed by the co-conspirators. That Myra did not
actually see that it was Laurente who stabbed the victim
is of no moment. Once conspiracy is established, the act
of one is the act of all.[66]
Laurente’s story on the alleged loss of his SSS ID card and
its being found in the taxicab is simply unbelievable. As
to his defense, the trial court assessed Laurente’s
testimony in this manner:
Accused Larry Laurente would like the Court to believe
that he was someplace else when the hold-up and killing
. . . occurred . . . During his testimony, he first claimed to
have gone to work on February 14, 1994, and then on the
same breath, he suddenly changed his mind and said that
he was absent. He would also like to convince the Court
that his co-accused in this case, Richard Disipulo and
Melvin Dagudog, came out of the blue, had a drinking
session with him, and just left with nary a word to him.
"Evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the
mouth of a credible witness but the same must be
credible in itself as when it conforms to the common
experience and observation of mankind." (People vs.
Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).
The Court also noted that [the] accused. . . contradicted
himself when he said that he ha[d] been a molder . . in
Tagig, Metro Manila for the past three (3) years and yet,
he has only been in Manila from Negros Oriental last
October! Such inconsistencies destroy his credibility and
further bolster the Court’s findings that his defense of
alibi is merely invoked as a matter of convenience.[67]
We are in full accord with such assessment, and further
reiterate the rule that alibi, being the weakest of all
defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the
positive identification of the accused.[68] But most telling
in this case is that Laurente’s alibi does not meet the
requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time
the same was committed.[69] On cross- examination,
Laurente admitted that it would take "about half an hour"
to traverse the distance from his house to the scene of
the crime.[70] Such distance is so near as not to preclude
his having been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. We are, therefore, left with no option but to
rule that the prosecution has discharged its burden to
prove the commission of homicide by Laurente and to
reject his defense of alibi.
Proof of the commission of robbery, however, must be
examined more closely.
Laurente pleads that the prosecution failed to prove the
element of robbery, thus, his conviction of the crime
charged should not be sustained. On this score, Laurente
calls this Court’s attention to the fact:
[T]hat not a single [shred of] evidence was introduced by
the prosecution to prove robbery or unlawful taking of
property from the victim. Nothing was shown whether
the victim was divested of his money or other personal
belongings. It cannot be presumed that the main purpose
of the killing . . . was to rob [the victim]. There must be
evidence showing the unlawful taking of another by
means of violence or force upon things to make the
accused-appellant liable under Pres. Dec. No. 532. . ..[71]
An examination of the records of this case reveals that the
following constitute the evidence to prove the robbery
aspect of the offense: the statement given by the victim’s
daughter to the investigating! arresting officer,[72] and the
contents of the affidavit executed by the
investigating/arresting officer himself.[73]
The police statement of the victim’s daughter contained
the following exchange:
"05. t: Nalaman mo ha naman kung ano ang
dahilan at pinatay ang iyong tatay?
s: Ang tatay ko po ay hinoldap.
06. t: Ano naman ang trabaho nang iyong tatay,
para siya holdapin?
s: Siya po ay taxi driver.
xxx
08. t: Nalaman mo ha naman kung magkano ang
nakuha O’ naholdap sa iyong tatay?
s: Hindi ko po alam kung magkano pero wala
na po ang kinita niya sa pagpapasada ng
taxi.
09. t: Papaano naman ninyo nalaman na hinoldap
at napatay ang iyong tatay?
s. Nuong pang gabi ng petsa 14 ng Pebrero
1994, mayroon pong pumunta sa aming
bahay at kami po ay inimpormahan na ang
aking tatay ay hinoldap at napatay habang
sakay siya ng kanyang inilalabas na
taxi.[74] (italics supplied)
Clearly, such constituted inadmissible hearsay as any
knowledge as to the robbery aspect of the offense was
not derived from her own perception[75] and did not fall
within any of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule.[76] However, assuming arguendo that the said
statements were admissible for failure of the defense
counsel to raise a timely objection, nevertheless, such
statements carry no probative value.[77]
On the subject of SPO1 Pio’s affidavit concerning the
conduct of the investigation, it becomes the sole piece of
evidence to prove the robbery in the case before us. The
relevant portion is quoted hereunder:
That . . . a crime scene search was conducted by this
investigator, during said search, . . . a leather wallet
colored brown was found on the passenger seat at the
back . . . further the personal belongings of the dead man
known as the taxi driver was [sic] intact, however, his daily
earnings was [sic] missing, showing that the victim was
robbed before being killed. . ..[78] (italics supplied)
This Court holds that the above statements, as the lone
measure by which to judge the commission of robbery,
are insufficient to prove the same, i.e., that the victim
actually earned money and that these earnings were
unlawfully taken by the accused. The prosecution, in this
regard, failed to discharge the burden of proof and satisfy
the quantum of evidence for the robbery aspect in this
case.
A conviction for robbery simply cannot be had in the light
of the total absence of evidence regarding the taxicab
driver’s earnings and the sweeping statement that "the
personal belongings of the dead man . . . [were] intact."
Moreover, the prosecution did not even bother to
introduce evidence as to what time the victim in this case
started plying his route, which may have led to a
reasonable inference that he had earned some money by
the time the crime was committed. In sum, there
is no conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by Laurente and his co-accused.[79]
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative that the
robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other
essential element of a crime. In the absence of such
proof, the killing of the victim would only be simple
homicide or murder, depending on the absence or
presence of qualifying circumstances.[80]
We thus rule that the crime committed by Laurente is
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized therein with reclusion temporal.
Since no modifying circumstances have been established,
it shall be imposed in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In passing, this Court notes with much concern that the
law enforcers in this case failed to respect Laurente’s
rights against unlawful arrest[81] and during custodial
investigation.[82]
In this case, the follow-up team which arrested Laurente
on 15 February 1994 had only the latter’s SSS ID card as
possible basis to link Laurente to the crime. None of the
members of the team were eyewitnesses to the
commission of the crime; they had, therefore, nothing to
support a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Under this section, a peace
officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person only: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has
in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from confinement to another.
fundamental law of the land in ignoring these rights
designed to ensure the very equilibrium of our
democracy.
It must, however, be pointed out that the conviction of
Laurente is not based on his alleged oral admission during
his custodial investigation by SPO1 Crispin Pio.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No.
104785 is hereby modified as to the nature of the offense
committed. As modified, accused-appellant
LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as co-principal by direct participation,
of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused-
appellant LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. In all other respects, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SPO1 Crispin Pio candidly admitted that he investigated

Laurente without the benefit of counsel after Laurente
was arrested, although he informed him of his
constitutional rights. As to what these rights were, he
never disclosed; moreover, neither did Pio demonstrate
that he exerted the requisite effort to ensure that
Laurente understood his rights.[83] Undoubtedly, the
custodial investigation had commenced, as the police
authorities had in fact pinpointed Laurente as the author
or one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him
as a suspect thereof. Finally, there is no evidence that
Laurente waived the rights to remain silent and to
counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides as follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

There was then a total disregard of the duties of an

investigator during custodial investigation, which this
Court laid down in Morales vs. Enrile,[84] reiterated in
several cases.[85]

It cannot be overemphasized that the rights enshrined in

the Bill of Rights[86] are the very mechanisms by which the
delicate balance between governmental power and
individual liberties is maintained. Thus, it does not bode
well for society when our law enforcers defy the
 [ G. R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LOL-LO AND
SARAW, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when
picturesque buccaneers like Captain A very and Captain
Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination,
when grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem
far away in the pages of history and romance.
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of
twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped
of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present
a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of
the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation,
at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods
too horrible to be described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with
the idea that it would submerge/although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with
them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two women were able
to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their
home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court
of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and
that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under
the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had,
and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants
guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which
had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of
924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this
court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of
the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or
forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was
done in the lower court and as is again done in this court,
that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of
the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy
is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike
all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the
crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit
of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes." ( U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat, 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to
this court for decision for the first time is whether or not
the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal
Code read as follows:
"ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against
Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent
subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
"ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in
the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall
suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those
who commit the crimes referred to in the second
paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding
or firing upon the same.
"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in
articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four
hundred and sixteen.
"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses
against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this
book.
"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons
without means of saving themselves.
"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as
well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it
shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of
this code, every person, who, according to the
Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard
shall be considered as such."
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on
by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of
territory from another State to the United States are well-
known. The political law of the former sovereignty is
necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main
rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which
are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by
direct action of the new government they are altered or
repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U. S., 542.)
These principles, of the public law were given specific
application to the Philippines by the Instructions of
President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley
Merritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
Condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property, and provide for the punishment of
crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they
are compatible with the new order of things, until they
are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as
they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion." (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number,
Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt's Proclamation
of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish
Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the
Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy,
would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of
nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he
has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the
Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions
elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This
must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code
finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas,
the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the
Congress shall have the power to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations. ( U. S. Const. Art. I,
sec. 8, ,cl. 10.) The Congress;, in putting on the statute
books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life. (U. S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.
S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution
and the members of Congress were content to let a
definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under
the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in
force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in
the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands
to the United States. A logical construction of articles of
the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of
piracy, would be that wherever " Spain" is mentioned, it
should be substituted by the words " United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United
States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word
"authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning,
which would no longer comprehend all religious, military,
and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the
Penal Code would read as follows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with the United
States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent
subjects of another nation at war with the United States,
it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with
the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be
still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of
the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are
present at least two of the circumstances named in the
last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or
death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an
offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It
is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding
present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,
and compensating the same by the one mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11,
as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to
life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were
employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of
the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by
the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction,
and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it
becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to

the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon
the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the accused who
raped one of the women), but is not unanimous with
regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one
member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of
the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is
affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy
and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such
time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first
instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis,
defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924
rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand,

Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, AND JOHN
DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has
remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was
reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-
SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo
vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600
barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was sailing off
the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including
Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly
boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven
fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother
of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates,
including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-
appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint
over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the
front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC
logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then
painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San
Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported
the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast
Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and
rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another
vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were
thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991
where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to
and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March
30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the
same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi
Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan,
Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10,
1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident
to government authorities for a period of two days or
until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The
first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly
painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought
them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain
Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991
and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by
the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The
crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office
for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements
regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information
that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance,
accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the
NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were
arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as
the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed
to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and
Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in
Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified
piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy
in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P.
TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine
(9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of
P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to
April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning
a motor launch and armed with high powered guns,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO
loaded with petroleum products, together with the
complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the
cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the
Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before
Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola,
notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony
as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the
defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective
sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on
March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach,
a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and
Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached
the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if
they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the
work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they
worked beyond that period. They agreed even though
they had no sea-going experience. On board, they
cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas.
Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991,
they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days
of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor
contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the
charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10,
1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio
Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as
Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney,
Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and
later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of
trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was
seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name
was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile
Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board
the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul
Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the
former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half
of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together
with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on
March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the
vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-
ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was
ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil
and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan,
and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride"
sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told
that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the
port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon
submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong,
Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list
submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of
"M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the
vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of
the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao
met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby"
(who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco
nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the
soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took
samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey
report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name
"Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to
Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the
morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity
and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another
transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee"
to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that
there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by
the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer
took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991.
Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to
Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its
cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a
broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore.
Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new
transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel.
Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at
the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in
under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of
"KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio
Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that
the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested
by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting
accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr.
and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters
defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and
the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said
crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for
the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court
cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r., and Cecilio
Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of
the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article
52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD
532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to
return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer
return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to
remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value
thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00 Philippine
Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid
in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are
hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc.
the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused
can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation,
all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said
cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine
Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his
sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the
City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City
Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation.
With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The
arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as
follows:
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and
Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio
Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them
to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr.
Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of
them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on
February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was
after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven
witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence;
were forced to sign statements without being given the
opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of
their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court
erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were
outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were
not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659
in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the
trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on
him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts
attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the
cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or
robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him
guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court
erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him
for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred
in making factual conclusions without evidence on record
to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in
convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a
principal by direct participation under said decree, thus
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other
accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his
part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He
further argues that he had not in any way participated in
the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the
crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that
the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was
charged under the information with qualified piracy as
principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he
argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed
within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as
follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of
the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects
and implications of the absence of counsel during the
custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the
crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant
Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be
convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such
and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done
or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation
(Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on
February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-
lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a
categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants
were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of
the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the
truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn,
February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused
person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not
versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also
provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person
with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that
"[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without prejudice
to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of
law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-
appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by
the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of
the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver
of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274
SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel
during custodial investigation may not be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S.
436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he gives may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made
in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of
the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make
them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda
rights was not even shown in the case at bar.
Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the
so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a
phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S.
388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against
them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict
accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with
the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio
Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and
confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words
of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the
Court of Appeals -
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of
witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said
Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the
"M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock
in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the
officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of
Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off
the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the
Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was
discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991...
x x x Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial
x x x of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in
x x x fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the
"M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can
be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody
by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and
Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B")
and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of
the pirates.
x x x
x x x
x x x
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their
defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that
they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of
March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel
sailed to its, destination, which turned out to be off the
port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given
to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial
of participation in the commission of the crime (People v.
Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a
patently desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion)
while said accused-appellants were conversing with one
another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T
Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And
readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks
and handymen for an indefinite period of time without
even saying goodbye to their families, without even
knowing their destination or the details of their voyage,
without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at
sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord
with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court,
it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba,
and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30
o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or
handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place
Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
(People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that
it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to
disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10,
1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in
Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this,
he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place
of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect,
for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to
determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of
conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times
when conspirators are assigned separate and different
tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in
fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco,
accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and
others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus,
Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the
vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on
their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present
at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
since he performed his task in view of an objective
common to all other accused- appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-
appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo),
owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his
brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each
other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin,
on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of
the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides, Loyola and
Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils
and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco
(aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while
Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he
can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters
as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because
Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has
impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in
Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile
the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in
Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be
omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only
apply to offenders who are members of the complement
or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members
of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence,
excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas.
-The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon
any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January
1, 1994), reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas
or in Philippine waters. -The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and
be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement
or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person. including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member
of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of
the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence,
passenger or not, a member of the complement or not,
any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended
the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there
is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the
law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as
well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article
122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack
on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition
by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule
on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies
even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with
a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but
under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential
Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here
since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible
crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil.
19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-
appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him on the
ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he
was charged as a principal by direct participation under
Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of
evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo;
(b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c)
and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless,
the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted
Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition
of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or
abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. -Any
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any
manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in
accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the
acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle
jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any
doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of
lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People
v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes
that any person who does any of the acts provided in said
section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that
he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
piracy, received property taken by such pirates and
derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided
the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked
cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified
the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with
Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General
Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal
transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and
other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn,
June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General
Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was
accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong
and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of
their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port
Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not
falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could
have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place
and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution
in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo
from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been
effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial
court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in
the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as
follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy
Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the
Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that
the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-
CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name
of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure)
of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore
(Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that
the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in
the evening), that there were no passengers on board,
and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation"
and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons
of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T
Galilee" with' Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k.
a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the
"Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating
that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406
gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the
Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2
CSH", Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but did not
require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco
also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General
Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29,
1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A
CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the
"Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high
seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the
"M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second
transfer transpired with the same irregularities as
discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco
supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely
following the orders of his superiors and that he
has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the
cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he
should have avoided any participation in the cargo
transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under
which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of
deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any
contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not
even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom
he met for the first time nor did he check the source of
the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66
nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which
a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also
the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a
Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should
also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that
time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-
half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have
been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind
would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation -only to sell at the aforestated
price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition
to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-
appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his
firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant
was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to
an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some
lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy,
is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board
a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used
by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful.
He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified
records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate
said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and
the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent
and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show
that he must have realized the nature and the
implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy.
Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to
conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo
to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason,
he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-
appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 [ G.R. No. 97841-42, November 12, 1997 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR TIMON Y CASAS, JOSE
SAMPITON Y SENTUS, JESUS LAGARAS Y
CORNELIO AND CLARO RAYA Y BERENO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this appeal from a conviction of piracy, the
Court reiterates some well-settled doctrines on
identification of felons, waiver of objections to illegal
arrest, and assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated September
24, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 72,[1] convicting Appellants Victor Timon,
Jose Sampiton, Claro Raya and Jesus Lagaras of piracy
defined under Presidential Decree No. 532 and
sentencing them to “life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua.”
In Criminal Case No. 8492-MN, Asst. Fiscal Hannibal V.
Santillan filed before the court a quo an Information
dated October 5, 1989[2] charging herein appellants with
piracy in the high seas with homicide allegedly committed
as follows:
“That on or about September 20, 1989, at the territorial
water of Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together with four (4)
John Does, whose true names are unknown and all of
North Bay Blvd., Navotas, M.M., and who are still at large,
mutually helping and aiding each other, not being a
member of the complement nor a passenger, all armed
with guns, with intent to gain, and with the use of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, seize the vessel named
“M/B Kali” and board on the said vessel and poked their
guns against the crew of the vessel and forcibly take, rob
and carry away cash money worth P100,00.00,
wristwatch, men’s ring and two (2) telescope, all
belonging to and owned by one PAQUITO RODRIGUEZ II,
owner of the said M/B “Kali”, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Paquito Rodriguez II, that on the
occasion of the aforesaid piracy and for the purpose of
enabling them to rob the said M/B “Kali”, in pursuance of
their conspiracy and for the purpose of ensuring success
of their criminal act, armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the said Paquito Rodriguez II
by then and there shooting the latter on the head,
thereby inflicting upon the said Paquito Rodriguez II gun
shot wounds, which immediately and directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.”
In Criminal Case No. 8493-MN, Appellant Timon was also
charged by Asst. Fiscal Gil Savedia with illegal possession
of firearms allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about October 4, 1989, in the Municipality of
Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, control and direct custody a firearm, to wit:
one (1) Homemade Shot gun with one 12 gauge live
ammunition and one (1) magazine, without first securing
the necessary license and permit from a competent
government authority.
Contrary to law.”[3]
During the arraignment held on November 10, 1989,
Appellants Victor Timon, Jose Tampiton, Jesus Lagaras
and Claro Raya, all assisted by Counsel de Oficio Froilan C.
Zapanta of the Public Attorney’s Office, pleaded not guilty
in Criminal Case No. 8492-MN.[4] Timon, assisted by the
same counsel de oficio, also pleaded not guilty in Criminal
Case No. 8493-MN. Thereafter, joint trial of the two
criminal cases ensued in due course. On September 24,
1990, the trial court promulgated the assailed Joint
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding all the accused in Crim. Case No. 8492-
MN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of the
crime (sic) charged against them. All of them are hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The penalty should have been death, but same has been
abolished.
All the accused are also ordered to pay proportionately
the heirs of their victim in the amount of P30,000.00 for
the loss of the latter’s life, as well as the additional
amount of P100,000.00 representing the cash money
taken from the victim and another P70,000.00 for the
expenses incurred by the family of the victim in
connection with the latter’s death and burial and to pay
the costs.
Accused Victor Timon y Casas is hereby acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence in Crim. Case No. 8493-MN. His
unrebutted testimony that the firearm subject matter of
the said case was merely brought out by a policeman from
a locker in the police station and the failure of the
prosecution to present the “maong” jacket allegedly
wrapping said firearm rendered doubtful the accusation
against Timon in this case.
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this appeal.[5]
 The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts as viewed by the prosecution are narrated in the
Appelle's Brief as follows: [6]
"At about 12:00 o'clock noon on September 20, 1989, the
fishing boat, "M/B Kali" left Navotas, Metro Manila with
its owner Modesto[7] Rodriguez and seven (7) crew
members to buy fresh fish in Palawan (pp. 4-7, tsn,
January 19, 1990; pp 5-9, tsn, February 9, 1990; pp. 13-
15, tsn, March 7, 1990).
The "M/B Kali" had not yet left the territorial waters of
Navotas when it was intercepted by eight (8) armed
pirates, six (6) of them including appellants boarded "M/B
Kali" unnoticed, while the other two stayed behind in
their pump boat (pp. 7-8, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 16-
20, tsn, March 7, 1990; pp. 3-5, tsn, March 9, 1990).
Once on board, the six (6) pirates herded the owner and
crew members of "M/B Kali" and ordered them to lie face
down. Thereafter, three (3) of the pirates, including
appellants Lagaras and Sampiton, accosted Rodriguez at
the "fuente" and ordered him to take our the money
which he had to buy fish worth about P100,000.00, after
he was pointed to by the crew members as their boss (pp.
9-11, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 13-19, tsn, February 9,
1990; pp. 5-8, tsn, March 9, 1990).
After divesting Rodriguez of his P100,000.00 cash and
other personal belongings, the pirates fatally shot him.
Whereupon, the pirates left, after warning the crew
members of "M/B Kali" not to move, accompanied by a
warning shot (pp. 11-12, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 19-21,
tsn, February 9, 1990; pp. 8-9, tsn, March 9, 1990).
As soon as the pirates left, the crew members of "M/B
Kali" stood up, and learned that their boss, Modesto
Rodriguez, was fatally shot at the back of his head. They
also found out that the pirates divested their boss of his
money and personal belongings, and took with them the
two (2) telescopes used by the crew members (pp. 12-14,
tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 21-31, tsn, February 9, 1990;
pp. 9-10, tsn, March 9, 1990).
That same afternoon, the incident was reported to the
Navotas Police Force (p. 14, tsn, January 19, 1990), which
immediately sent a team to conduct a "spot"
investigation. When the policemen arrived at the Navotas
Fish Port where "M/B Kali" was moored, they saw the
lifeless body of the victim Modesto Rodriguez with a
gunshot wound at the back of his head. From the crew
members who did not know the identities of the pirates,
albeit could recognize them if they saw them again, the
policemen took down the description of the suspects (pp.
5-8, tsn, January 5, 1990; pp. 23-27, tsn, February 28,
1990).
On the basis thereof, the Navotas Police Force continued
to "follow-up" the case until they received information
from the Philippine Coast Guard as to the identities
and/or whereabouts of some of the suspects. Fortwith,
the Philippine Coast Guard and the Navotas Police Force
organized a team to the effect the arrest of the four (4)
appellants, and the confiscation from appellant Timon of
a shotgun which he eas allegedly carrying wrapped in a
"maong" jacket at the time of his arrest (pp.9-25, tsn,
January 5, 1990).
At the Navotas Police Headquarter[s] where the four (4)
suspects were brought, they were positively identified by
the crew members of "M/B Kali" as among those who
boarded their boat, and at gun point forced them to lie
face down (pp.38-44, tsn, February 28, 1990).”
Version of the Defense [8]
The defense posits denial and alibi. Appellant Sampiton, a
fisherman, denied participation in the commission of the
offense. In the morning of September 20, 1989, Sampiton
mended fishing nets; in the afternoon, he stayed at his
house in Davila St., Tabing Dagat, Navotas, which was
thirty meters away from that of Appellant Raya. As he did
not have a boat of his own, he usually went fishing with
Timon. On that day, however, Sampiton averred that he
did not go fishing with Timon because of strong waves at
sea.[9]
Victor Timon claimed that on September 20, 1989 he was
mending fishing nets with Sampiton and Raya in Davila St.
Timon’s boat was dry-docked even the day before. It was
only about 6:00 p.m. of September 20, 1989 when they
took down the boat to where it was usually moored in
preparation for the next morning.[10] Timon’s friend and
neighbor, Rogelio Anieves, corroborated his story.
Anieves testified that he worked on the fishing nets
owned by Timon on said day.[11]
For his part, Appellant Jesus Lagaras claimed that from
11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. of September 20, 1989, he was at
Cesar Casoy’s house in Davila St., merely a house away
from his. He was playing a card game called cuajo with a
certain Carding and a certain Deling. After the game,
Appellant Lagaras went outside the house where he
heard people discussing the M/L Kali’s plunder. He joined
the conversation and left about 7:00 p.m.[12]
When Lagaras reached home, his brother, Julito, alias Boy
Muslim, admitted complicity in said crime which he
allegedly committed with a certain Felix Duran, alias Rudy,
and one known only as Toto. Julito informed Jesus that he
was leaving the place to evade arrest and advised the
latter to do the same. According to Jesus Lagaras, he
looked like his brother Julito; thus, he posits that the
authorities mistook him for the real culprit. Believing in
his innocence, Appellant Lagaras did not heed his
brother’s advice to flee.[13]
Cesar Casoy, a fisherman and good friend of Jesus
Lagaras, corroborated the latter’s story. He added that
after the card game, they went to a nearby place called
bukid where they first heard of the crime.[14] Casoy, the
team leader of the area’s barangay tanod, related that
while he was cooking in the morning of September 27,
1989, Navotas policemen, including Patrolman Mabbun,
came to his house. They were looking for “Rudy, Felix, Boy
Muslim and the Chief Engineer” who were the suspects in
a crime. Casoy accompanied the police to the house of
Rudy but the latter was absent. Thereafter, the police left
and he headed for home.[15]
Casoy’s assistance was again sought about 4:00 a.m. of
October 4, 1989 by Yolanda Lagaras, the wife of Appellant
Jesus. She apprised him of her husband’s arrest. They
went at once to the police station and told Policeman
Mabbun that Jesus Lagaras “was not involved” but the
policeman allegedly replied, “Just follow the case in court
because Lagaras was being pointed to (as) Boy
Muslim.”[16]
Yolanda Lagaras, on the other hand, testified that about
4:00 a.m. of October 4, 1989, she was awakened by the
sound of “strong successive knocks” on their door,
accompanied by voices identifying themselves as the
police. She woke her husband and told him to open the
door. As he did, a policeman immediately pointed a gun
at her husband, saying, “Ikaw na nga si Boy Muslim.” Her
husband answered, “hindi po”; while she said, “Hindi iyan
si Boy Muslim, kapatid iyon ng asawa ko.” Another
policeman, carrying a picture, arrived and said, “Pare, ito
na nga ang hinahanap ko si Boy Muslim.” The same
policeman told her, “Misis, dadalhin ko ang asawa mo sa
detensiyon.”[17]
Immediately after her husband’s arrest, she asked the
help of Cesar Casoy who accompanied her to the police
station where her husband was detained. At 11:00 a.m.,
her husband was brought to a small room. She then heard
him shout, “Hindi po ako si Boy Muslim kapatid ko po ang
gumawa.” She tried to report this to two policemen but
they ignored her. It was 4:00 p.m. when her husband was
brought back to the detention cell.[18]
About 7:00 p.m., the policemen asked her “to point [Boy
Muslim] to them” so that they could “set free” her
husband. Acceding to them, she accompanied three
policemen to the house of Julito Lagaras or Boy Muslim at
North Bay Boulevard, but they did not find him. She
returned to the police station two hours thereafter.[19]
Finally, appellants alleged that they were arrested
without a warrant, then maltreated and tortured. They
also accused the police of attempting to extort money
from them.
The Trial Court's Ruling
After “examining the testimony of prosecution witnesses”
who “clearly identified all the accused,” and “clearly
narrated the participation” of Lagaras, Raya, Sampiton
and Timon [20] vis-a-vis appellants’ denial and alibi, the
court a quo rendered its decision finding the four
appellants guilty of the “crime charged” in Criminal
Case No. 8492-MN but acquitting Timon in Criminal
Case No. 8493-MN.
Errors Assigned
All four accused appealed to this Court. In their brief,
Appellants Timon, Sampiton and Raya assigned the
following “errors”:
“I
The court a quo blatantly erred in decreeing that the
accused-appellants were positively identified as the
authors of the crime charged when even a cursory
reading of the evidence adduced by the prosecution will
unveil the unreliability and dubiousness of such
identification.
II
The court a quo grievously erred in not holding that the
accused-appellants’ warrantless arrest effected through
the highly irregular identification made by an unnamed
source was illegal.
III
The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the crime charged in the face of the
prosecution’s failure to establish their guilt by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.”[21]
Appellant Lagaras filed a separate brief, alleging the
following errors:
“The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
the accused-appellant Jesus Lagaras was proved beyond
reasonable doubt despite
I. the obviously flawed and highly irregular investigative
process that brought to naught his constitutionally
protected rights;
II. the fact that the evidence on record is replete with
factual antecedents showing that he was a victim of
mistaken identity.”[22]
This case hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2) the
credibility of the evidence pointing to appellants’
identification, but the Court will also rule on the (3)
objections to the alleged illegal arrest, (4) appellants’ alibi
and (5) the proper penalty.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious
1. Admissibility of Identification
Appellants Timon, Sampiton and Raya argue that their
identification during the police investigation constituted
a violation of their constitutional rights.[23] Claiming that
they were subjected to “malicious pinpointing,” they
argue that the police line-up was improperly used against
them as there were no other “suspects” presented to the
witnesses. Additionally, Appellant Lagaras alleges that the
police “investigative process was fraught with
unprofessionalism and prejudice” which “did violence to
the constitutionally protected rights of the
former.”[24] The Court is not persuaded.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[25] the Court, through Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno, explained the procedure for out-
of-court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identification. It listed the following
ways of identifying the suspects during custodial
investigation: show-ups, mug shots and line-ups. The
Court there ruled:
“x x x. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time: (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.”[26]
Applying this “totality of circumstances” test to the case
at bar, the Court finds the out-of-court identification of
appellants (which is a show-up) admissible and not in any
way violative of their constitutional rights. This is borne
out by the following salient facts. Police Officer Manalo
testified that while the crew was unable to give the names
of the suspects, they nonetheless gave him their
assurance that they would be able to identify the pirates
“if they see them again.”[27] In addition, the crew of the
M/B Kali described the appellants to the police. This
description, coupled with information obtained from the
Philippine Coast Guard and police “assets,” all
contributed to the identification and the arrest of
accused-appellants. Pat. Manalo testified thus:
“ATTY. ZAPANTA
Q I understand Mr. Witness that you are the officer on
case and you were the first person as member of the
Navotas Police Station to arrive at the scene and you also
(sic) the very first member of said station being an officer
of this case to talk to the memvers (sic) of the crew of MB
Kali and I got from you during the direct examination that
not one of the crew members were able to give the
identity of the suspects, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact not one of the members of the crew gave you
the description of the suspects?
A No, sir. They described the suspects.
Q What kind of description did they give you?
A Physical description.
Q What in particular?
A The face, the attire or the wearings (sic) of the
suspects.
Q In the interview conducted by you on the person of
the crew members, do I gather or get right that they also
gave you the description of the weapons used in the
commission of the piracy?
A They gave me the description of the firearms which
they were armed.
Q They did not give you the specific type of the firearm?
A Yes, sir. Because they do not know what kind of
firearms.”[28] (Underscoring supplied.)
Evidently, while the crew members w
ere not able to name the pirates, they were able to
identify them and to give their accurate descriptions. This
is best shown in Eyewitness Virgilio Adreser’s sworn
statement dated October 4, 1989 that he could not forget
one of the suspects who had a scar between the eyes
(“hindi ko makakalimutan iyong pilat niya sa pagitan ng
mata”).[29] Said suspect later turned out to be Appellant
Sampiton.[30] Significant, too, is the prosecution
witnesses’ conscious effort to look at and observe the
pirates. Note that the crime was committed on board the
M/B Kali in broad daylight. The eyewitnesses’ attention
was naturally intense as they were in an extremely tense
situation and their very lives were threatened. Appellant
Raya pulled Adreser’s collar to wake him up.[31] Raya’s
companion, who has remained at large since this incident,
pointed a short gun at Nuña;[32] while Appellant Lagaras
pointed a gun at Rojo[33] and Mabiliran and then kicked
them.[34] Oftentimes, an attacker’s image is indelibly
etched in the victim’s memory, and what the latter has
observed is not easily effaced therefrom.[35] The fact that
the other witnesses -- aside from Prosecution Witness
Rojo who described Lagaras as “mataas” -- had not
described the appellants in their sworn statements is
of no moment. It is clear that they positively and certainly
identified the appellants in the police headquarters barely
two weeks after the commission of the crime when the
incident was still fresh in their minds, and subsequently
during trial. That the sworn statements of the three
witnesses did not contain a description of the pirates’
physique merely shows that the same were incomplete;
this, however, does not in any way detract from the
overall veracity of their testimonies or their identification
of accused-appellants. [36]
Furthermore, appellants’ allegation of suggestiveness in
the identification is unsubstantiated. The identification of
accused-appellants was effected through the zealous
investigation of the police. Because the appellants’
allegations of irregularity, maltreatment and torture have
not been proven adequately, the investigators are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in
good faith. We note that the identities of the accused-
appellants were established after a week of intensive
police investigation.[37] We note further that each of the
eyewitnesses could identify only some, not all, the
accused-appellants; Rojo, for instance, identified only
Appellant Lagaras. If the police had manipulated the
identification process, all the eyewitnesses would have
identified all the appellants. That Rojo failed to identify
the other appellants indicates that the identification
process was done freely, with no suggestion or coercion
from the police.
That appellants were not linedup with other “suspects” is
not a bar to or inconsistent with their proper
identification. We reiterate that “(t)here is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Identification can be made in a room in a
police station even if it were not a police line-up as long
as the required proprieties are observed x x x.”[38] In
fine, no irregularity was shown to have attended the
police work which led to the identification of appellants
at the police station. Hence, applying the totality of
circumstances test, we rule that appellants’ out-of-court
identification is admissible; appellants were not
“misidentified” nor their constitutional rights violated.
Even assuming arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court
identification was defective, their subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the
“inadmissibility of a police line-up identification x x x
should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.”[39] We also stress
that all the accused-appelllants were positively identified
by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.
Appellant Lagaras insists that it was his brother Julito, also
known as “Boy Muslim,” who was involved in the piracy.
He argues that the policemen were looking for “Boy
Muslim” when they arrested him. He was taken into
police custody simply because he had “deceptively similar
facial features” as his brother Julito.[40] At the trial, he
presented as witnesses his friends Casoy and Anieves and
his wife Yolanda to show that he cooperated with the
efforts of the police to apprehend his brother.
Appellant Lagaras’ claim that he was improperly identified
would have acquired persuasive weight had he presented
independent evidence to prove that he and his brother
Julito looked identical and that one could easily be
mistaken for the other in broad daylight. However,
Lagaras failed to present such evidence to bolster his
defense of mistaken identification. Although he
presented the testimonies of his co-accused Sampiton,
friend Cesar Casoy, his neighbor Rogelio Anieves, and his
wife, the Court notes that not one of them talked on the
alleged identical features of the brothers; they merely
concluded that Appellant Lagaras and his brother, who
were not even twins, [41] were “deceptively similar” in
appearance although Appellant Lagaras was taller than
his brother. [42]
Such self-serving conclusion, by itself, cannot be given
greater weight than the prosecution eyewitnesses’
positive identification of Appellant Lagaras as one of the
pirates. Appellant’s stance is equivalent to a denial which,
being unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is inherently weak -- a negative self-serving claim that
cannot be given evidentiary value greater than that
accorded to the affirmative testimony of credible
witnesses.[43] Astutely observed by the trial court is the
fact that Lagaras did not even submit a photograph to
prove the alleged similarity of his facial features with
those of his brother Julito.[44]
The fact that the police looked for Julito Lagaras or “Boy
Muslim” when they went to Appellant Lagaras’ house
does not prove Julito’s complicity in the crime of piracy or
disprove that of appellant. The insinuation of Lagaras that
the police arrested him to force him to produce his
brother Julito or to compel Julito to surrender[45] is merely
an unsubstantiated conjecture that cannot prevail over
appellant’s positive identification. Verily, the accuracy of
Appellant Lagaras’ identification is beyond doubt. The
prosecution eyewitnesses categorically testified that they
saw Appellant Lagaras for the first time during the
incident,[46] thereby precluding the probability that they
mistook or confused said appellant for his brother Julito.
As noted earlier, Nelson Rojo, in his sworn statement of
October 4, 1989, stated he recognized only Appellant
Lagaras:
“10 T: Dito sa apat na ito (referring to Jesus, Claro, Victor
and Jose) at sa kasama nilang apat (4) pa na wala ngayon
dito sa loob ng himpilang ito, si Jesus Laragas lang ba ang
nakikilala mo?
S: Oho, iyong mataas na iyan lang (pointing to Jesus
Laragas) dahil sa hiwa-hiwalay kami ng pwesto (sa) lantsa
ng mga kasama ko ng umakyat sila at nag-kani-kaniya sila
ng pagtutok sa amin.”[47]
That Appellant Lagaras was accurately identified by the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses is evident from his highly
visible and active participation in the commission of the
crime, considering that the crime was committed at 1:00
p.m. in sunlit areas of the M/L Kali, where visibility was
thus very clear.[48] The defense failed to show any ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely
accuse appellants of so serious a crime as piracy with
homicide. Even Appellant Lagaras himself could not think
of any reason for Prosecution Eyewitnesses Mabiliran,
Adreser and Nuña to falsely accuse him.[49] In the absence
of evidence or any indicium that the prosecution’s main
witnesses harbored ill motives against the accused, the
presumption is that they were not so moved and that
their testimonies were untainted with bias.[50]
Appellant Lagaras’ assertion that he could not have
committed the crime because he did not follow his
brother’s advice to leave his residence, by itself, is not
proof of his nonparticipation in the crime charged. “Non-
flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.”[51]
2. Credibility of Witnesses
All told, the issue of whether or not appellants were in
fact identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses is
anchored on credibility. Anent this issue, “(j)urisprudence
teaches us that the findings of the trial court judge who
tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be
disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and
circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if
properly considered, might affect the result of the case.
The trial judge’s evaluation of the witness’ credibility
deserves utmost respect in the absence of
arbitrariness.”[52] “The reason for this is that the trial court
is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.”[53] After a
thorough review of the records in this case, the court
finds no reversible error or arbitrariness in the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses. As aptly stated by the trial court, it “could not
help but note that they clearly identified all the accused
in these cases as among the six (6) armed pirates who
boarded the M/B (sic) Kali and robbed and killed its
owner.”[54]
3. Waiver of Objections to Illegal Arrest
The defense assails the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellants. The circumstances of the present case do not
fall under any of the instances in Section 5, Rule 113[55] of
the Rules of Court, which recognizes warrantless arrest.
We note that the crime was committed on September 20,
1989; appellants were arrested fourteen days later on
October 4, 1989 by police officers who were nowhere
near the crime scene. Clearly, said police officers
had no personal knowledge to effect the warrantless
arrest allowable under paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules. Neither can the police invoke paragraph
(a) thereof as regards the arrest of Appellant Victor Timon
who, when arrested, allegedly hid an unlicensed firearm
in a maong jacket; as found by the trial court such
accusation was doubtful in view of the prosecution’s non-
presentation of the maong jacket and appellant’s
allegation that said firearm was produced from the police
locker.[56] However, appellants’ warrantless arrest cannot
help them in this appeal because they are deemed to
have waived the illegality of such police action. They did
not raise such question before their plea to the offense
charged. Neither did they move to quash the information
on that ground before the trial court.[57] In People v.
Nazareno,[58] where the police, also without a warrant,
arrested the accused fourteen days after the commission
of the crime, this Court ruled:
“x x x. (The accused) waived objections based on the
alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they
pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be
deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this
ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is
not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The
technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void
and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to the culpability of
accused.”[59]
Appellant Timon’s application for bail[60] likewise
constitutes a waiver of his right to question whatever
irregularities and defects attended his arrest.[61]
4. Weakness of Appellants’ Alibi
To sustain alibi, the defense must prove that it was
physically impossible for the accused-appellants to have
been at the crime scene during its commission.[62] This,
the defense miserably failed to do. More significantly, it is
well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by an
eyewitness who had no motive to falsely testify, like the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses in this case. [63] In view of
such positive identification, appellants’ alibi is unavailing
and remains weak and impotent.[64]
5. Proper Penalty
In passing, we should state that the penalty of “life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua” imposed by the trial
court is wrong because the two are not the same. This
Court had occasion to differentiate the two penalties as
early as May 24, 1948 in People vs. Mobe,[65] and recently
in People vs. Layno [66] where we noted the following
distinction:
“The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the
penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized not by the x x x Code but by
special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for
at least (30) years, after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory
penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc.
It is not the same as life imprisonment which, for one
thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and
for another does not have any definite extent or
duration.”
We also have to mention that burial expenses, which are
by nature actual damages, must be proved.
Since no proof of burial expenses was ever presented in
the instant case, its award will not be allowed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision convicting
Appellants Victor Timon, Jose Sampiton, Jesus Lagaras
and Claro Raya of the crime of piracy with homicide,
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering the payment to the victim’s heirs of the sum of
P100,000.00 representing the amount taken from the
deceased is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications: (1) the civil indemnity is hereby increased
to P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, and
(2) the words “life imprisonment or” in the dispositive
portion thereof and (3) the unproved amount of
P70,000.00 awarded for burial expenses are deleted.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010 ]
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH-
SOUTH NETWORK (SSN) FOR NON-STATE
ARMED GROUP ENGAGEMENT, AND ATTY.
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An
Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15,
2007,[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and
lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even
date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-
KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
(CTUHR), represented by their respective officers[3] who
are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding
Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and
Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil
Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition
and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League
of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas
ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for
Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their
respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens
and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido
Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-
Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes,
Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey
Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member
organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga
Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya
(SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace
(EMJP), and Promotion of Church People's Response
(PCPR), which were represented by their respective
officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own
behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty
(CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal,
Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog
(BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations
mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and
individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19,
2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised
in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are
the Anti-Terrorism Council[9] composed of, at the time of
the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as
Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of
Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-
Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and
investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners' resort to
certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents
who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.--When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any
modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the
petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.[10]
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11]
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question on standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute
must have a direct and personal interest. It must show
not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid,
but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it
has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis
of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual
petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental
public importance dispenses with the requirement that
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the
proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus
standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any
charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA,
EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that
they have been subjected to "close security surveillance
by state security forces," their members followed by
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with
military build." They likewise claim that they have been
branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA
9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No.
178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents' alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
People's Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law.[15] The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the
same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged
"tagging" of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take
judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges
far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any
fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for
the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners' apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific
charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed
against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU,
NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp
as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation
of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct
injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially
declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have
both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of
the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the
Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.[19] Such statement notwithstanding, there
is yet to be filed before the courts an application to
declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again,
RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From
July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
have conducted their activities fully and freely without
any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution
initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino
Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and
Luzviminda Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume
peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of
designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as
foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy
statement of the Aquino Administration[21] of resuming
peace talks with the NDF, the government is not
imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription
of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the
Court with direct and specific interests in the questions
being raised.[22] Of recent development is the filing of
the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA
9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan
Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the
least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the
imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding
to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal
of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List
Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador,
Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna.
Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were
petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus
and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front
organizations for the Communist movement were
petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA,
PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save
the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were
filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined
and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by
the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment
thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion,
its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion
charges bear no relation to prospective charges under
RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years
after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has
been charged.

Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their
claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of
law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of
its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights
and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected
under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims
to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also
lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let
alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance,"
the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest
threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking
in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their
being respectively a human rights advocate and an
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has
been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos
Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the
issues they raise are of transcendental importance,
"which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching
implications," without mention of any specific provision
of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may
be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy
has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants
with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or
immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result
of the law's enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is
proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing
must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.[29]
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for
any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the
implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.
Petitioners fail to
present an actual
case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when
there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court
ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.[32]
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC[33] cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable--
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law
converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was
tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34] Similarly, a
petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has been
denied or granted by the authorities does not present a
justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court
to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press
Institute v. Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite
any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It
refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[37] to rule
on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners
based merely on a perceived potential conflict between
the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the
national law, there being no actual controversy between
real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely
hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad
infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of
the occurrence of a perceived threat to any
constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional
challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable
the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-
enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible
threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking relief."[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an
action before a federal court to assail the
constitutionality of the material support statute, 18
U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1),[41] proscribing the provision of
material support to organizations declared by the
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist
organizations. They claimed that they intended to
provide support for the humanitarian and political
activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication
on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly
shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there
would then be a justiciable controversy.[42]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein
petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to
do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much
less a real and existing one.
Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance"
and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts"
in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being
lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of
a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.[44]
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA
9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of
the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused.[45] Allegations
of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the
doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these
doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of
thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to
assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting
toward the idea of limiting the application of the two
doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly
cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.[48]
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether
the word "intervene" in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes."[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged
provision, under which the therein petitioner
was charged, is not vague.[51]
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis,
and concluded that the therein subject election
offense[53] under the Voter's Registration Act of 1996,
with which the therein petitioners were charged, is
couched in precise language.[54]
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate
Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from
ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of
plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates
these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial"
invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He
basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute
is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of
its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring
Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length
in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."
The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that the protected speech of others may
be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled
that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For
this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
[only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder
Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a
departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract
contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing
its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely
if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case
that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes
has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to
be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
generally disfavored. In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking
relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as
grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a
penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process
of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate
rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect
of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.[58]
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.[59]
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-
applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.[60]
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech
cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect"
on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at
all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may
even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.[63]
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations
by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and
"underscored that an `on-its-face' invalidation of penal
statutes x x x may not be allowed."[64]
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes
on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes
be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force
the court to consider third parties who are not before it.
As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a
facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the State's ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the State's power to prosecute
on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the
penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding
that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to
necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if
the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the
law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to
case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise
the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for";
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until
a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very
existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted;
underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech
claims, the Court, in at least two cases,[67] observed that
the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held
that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified
by the "transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."[71]
Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied
to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it
did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on
the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to
review the law "on its face and in its entirety."[72] It
stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."[73]
American jurisprudence[74] instructs that "vagueness
challenges that do not involve the First Amendment
must be examined in light of the specific facts of the
case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has
evaluated defendants' claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as
"among the most important guarantees of liberty under
law."[75]
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
asserted under the due process clause has been utilized
in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In
at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine
into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-
payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article
202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the
claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the
earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following
elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated
special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and
(3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that
the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks
to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners' notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount
of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case[78] illustrated
that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in
hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to
take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly
means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating
speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the
doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of
the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not
speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case
where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct
here were as in most instances brought about through
speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would
make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws
against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many
other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as

unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a
prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved
here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged

in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal
statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as
they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes
challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said
cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed
penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme

Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the
therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution"
and "should not be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have

established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat
of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus
legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical
scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.