[ B. M. No.

1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT.

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A
bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass
oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate
in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However,
it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1921 September 30, 2005

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1973-RTJ)

MA. TERESA H. DE JESUS, Complainant,

vs.

vs.
JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 73,
OLONGAPO CITY, Respondent.

Facts:

A complaint was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by Maria Teresa H. De Jesus
charging respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag of the RTCOlongapo City, with gross ignorance of
the law, rendering unjust orders, abuse of authority and misuse of court processes.

Complainant alleged inter alia that her husband Wolfgang Heinrich Konrad Harlinghausen filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City

Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be

Collated. On the same day, respondent judge issued an Order setting the hearing of the motion

Complainant received summons. Forthwith, she filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. This was denied by respondent judge.

Then, respondent judge considered the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be
Collated submitted for resolution after hearing the testimonies of Harlinghausens attorney-in-
fact, Harry E. Joost, and his counsel of record, Atty. Edmundo S. Carian.

Respondent judge issued an Order granting the urgent ex-parte motion and placing under legal
custody the properties enumerated therein. The Register of Deeds of Tarlac was directed to
annotate the Order on the 62 land titles allegedly purchased by Harlinghausens wife using his
money without his consent.

Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed another Ex-Parte Motion praying for the issuance of an
Order directing the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to allow him to enter this
country in order to prosecute his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Respondent judge issued an Order granting Harlinghausens Ex-Parte Motion.

Eventually, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing
respondent judge’s Order granting Harlinghausens Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve
Properties to be Collated; Order granting his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to enter this country; and
Order denying her (complainants) motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue.
Complainant averred that in issuing the challenged Orders, respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 74167.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Dilag committed abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. Yes.

Ruling:
Yes. Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are:

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after
the filing of the motion.

SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of service thereof.

Respondent judge blatantly disregarded the provisions. Instead of denying the motion outright for
being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for hearing, still the
three-day notice was not observed, thus complainant failed to attend the hearing. Clearly, she
was deprived of her right to due process.
When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge
of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position, or is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is in order.

Likewise, respondents failure to afford complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due
process of law deserves administrative sanction.

Relative to the challenged Order, respondent judge shows his ignorance of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID, to the
exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its provisions, specifically the
admission of foreigners to this country.

We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Order of respondent judge directing
the BID to allow the entry of Harlinghausen to this country would effectively countermand the
order of detention issued by the BID and constitutes an intrusion into its prerogatives as regards
the entry, admission, exclusion, registration, repatriation, monitoring and deportation of foreigners
within our national territory.

In his desperate attempt to evade administrative sanction, respondent judge maintains that since
complainant has already resorted to a proper remedy, i.e., by filing a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals questioning his twin Orders, she is barred from filing the instant administrative
complaint involving the same Orders. He cited our ruling in Hilario vs. Ocampo III, 371 SCRA 260
(2001) that where some judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for an act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.

While it is true that the Court of Appeals has set aside the questioned twin Orders, the fact remains
that respondent judge has shown his ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws which
warrants an administrative sanction.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts
so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, as in this case, to still err thereon
amounts to ignorance of the law.

In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic
principles governing motions, specifically, the three-day notice rule and the requisite proof of
service. Also, he showed his utter lack of knowledge and understanding of our immigration laws.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Facts:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisement here in complained of.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
defined:Black defines "practice of law" as : " The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.

Facts:
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with opposition
to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be
a notarized document executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

On December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying,
“Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, angabogadonarito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito” at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet
before the start of a hearing.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical
act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP
Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal
cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer.
The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s
violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to
Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite
the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon
was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the
threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing. On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.

Issue:
Did the IBP board of Governors and the IBP investigating Commissioner err in
finding respondent guilty of the charges against him and if the penalty imposed was
justified

Ruling:
The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree
with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.

Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of an affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed
been falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. The Court has
constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial
nature of our legal system.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several
disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly
before the start of a court hearing and Atty. Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence denying
the said charge against him.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the
court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
Consequently, the penalty of suspension of one from the practice of law is deemed just and
proper.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY.

Facts:
An irate Atty. Almacen, Legal Counsel of the Defendant in a legal Case entitled Antonio
H. Calero, Vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, filed a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
in protest against what he asserted as "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." In the said case, Atty. Almacen filed an appeal at the Court of Appeals (CA)
after the lower court rendered judgment against his client. The CA denied repeatedly Atty.
Almacen’s motions and dismissed the case. He later filed a Petition for certiorari at the Supreme
Court (SC) which refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. His
further appeals for reconsideration were also denied. At this, Atty. Almacen got disappointed and
filed the "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," (with reservation that at any time in
the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume
the practice of the noblest profession). He also caused the publication in the Manila Times an
article assailing the SC as “composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.”
Through the Petition and the publication, Atty. Almacen expressed the hope that by
divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions”.
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, the SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him." Atty. Almacen replied, but neither showed remorse nor any sign of
apology.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. ALMACEN DESERVES TO BE DISCIPLINED BY THE
SUPREME COURT ON THE GROUND OF GROSS MISCONDUCT FOR ASSAILING
THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT IN A DISRESPECTFUL MANNER; AND SHOWING
NO REMORSE FOR HIS ACTS.

Ruling:
Atty. Almacen deserves to be disciplined. As such, the court suspended him.
“A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. “
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Pena V. Atty. Aparicio

Facts:

Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the
NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given
separation pay. Pena rejected the claim. Thereafter, Pena sent notices to Hufana to return to
work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained
threats against the company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file
multiple charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for
the cancellation of the company’s business license. Pena filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the
defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Pena had allegedly
failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP transmitted
the records of the case to the SC. Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for
damages against Pena in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent
suit against him. Pena likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted his position
paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process.

Issue:

Whether of not Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

Ruling:

Yes. First of all, the SC found that Pena actually submitted his position paper. In addition,
disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum
shopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any rate, Pena actually submitted a
certification against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the
supposed defect in the original complaint. Now to the merit. Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a lawyer’s duty to his client is
subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice. Rule 19.01, “a lawyer shall employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate
in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file baseless
criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries
to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail – extortion of
money by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would
not only entail disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio
actually admitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed
against Pena. He also stated that the writing of demand letters is standard practice. SC ruled that
Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he used such threats
to gain leverage against Pena and force the latter to accede to his client’s claims. The letter even
implied a promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if the claim is met. While it is true that
writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such letters must not contain
threats such as those found in this case. Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a
penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his
client’s interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.

Talisic vs Atty. Riñen

AC No. 8761, February 12, 2014
First Division, J. Reyes

FACTS:
Petitioner Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, and it was only after his
father’s death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the
parcel of land originally owned Aurora. While Wilberto believed that his father’s signature on the
deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were merely forged.
Atty. Riñen denied the charge against him and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he
came to know of the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they
approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Real,
Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court prepared the deed
and upon its completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration of oath.

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita)
issued the Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty.
Riñen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Riñen should be removed from being a notary public.

Ruling:
Yes. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. It must then be stressed that, “a notary public’s function
should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.”

Atty. Riñen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly
signed the subject document. There was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due
diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex–officio. Thus, Atty. Riñen’s notarial
commission was revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public
for one year.