Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477

- versus –

MODESTA H. VILLAREAL,
Accused-Appellant.
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MANIFESTATION WITH
MOTION TO ADMIT
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT, through the undersigned

counsel, most respectfully submits this Appellant’s Reply Brief
and in support thereof, states that:

1. On October 18, 2019 herein accused-appellant received

the a copy of the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
However, counsel has not yet received any Notice dated
requiring her to submit a Reply Brief.

2. Nevertheless, accused –appellant submits her Reply

Brief in the above instant case and aver the following:

Search Warrant No. 2013-002

is Constitutionally infirm.

3. Section 2, Artice III of the 1987 Constitution expressly

provides that:
Appellant’s Reply Brief
CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477
Page 2
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“The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.” (Underscoring ours.)

4. Corollary, in the case of People vs. Amador Pastrana and

Rufina Abad, G.R. 196045, February 21, 2018, the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that:

“It is elemental that in order to be valid,

a search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of things to be
seized is primarily meant to enable the law
enforcers serving the warrant to: (1)
readily identify the properties to be seized
and thus prevent them from seizing wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with
no discretion regarding the articles to be
seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. It is not, however,
required that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute details
as to leave no room for doubt on the part
of the searching authorities.
(Underscoring ours);
Appellant’s Reply Brief
CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477
Page 3
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5. To amplify such Constitutional provision, Section 4,

Rule 126 of the Rules Court, also provides that:

“Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search

warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to
be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.” (Underscoring ours)

6. Obviously, the purpose of requiring the particularity of

the place to be searched is to avoid the exercise by the
enforcing officers of discretion. A vague search warrant
would certainly concede to the police officers the power
of choosing the place to be searched;

7. In a careful perusal of the assailed search warrant, it

would readily show that it failed to pass the test of
particularity because it merely describe the place to be
searched as Purok 7, Barangay Lag-on, Daet,
Camarines disregarding the fact that said place has
various houses and streets.
Hence, to uphold the validity of the assailed search
warrant would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution which is to place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice
and or passion of peace officers;

8. In Paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief, the

Plantiff-Appellee clearly admitted that the subject of the
Search Warrant No. 2013-002 issued by Judge Roberto
Appellant’s Reply Brief
CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477
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A. Escaro of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines

Norte is a house located at Purok 7, Barangay Lag-on,
Daet, Camarines Norte. However, it does not contain
any identity or distinction from other places that
would lead the officer unerringly locate the target
house;

9. Further, considering that Purok 7, Barangay Lag-on is

composed of many houses and delineated by various
streets, indeed, the search warrant miserably failed to
specifically describe the place to be searched. In the
case of Jaylord Dimal and Allan Castillo vs. People, G.R.
No. 216922, April 18, 20118, the Supreme Court clearly
emphasized that:

“To be sure, a search warrant is not a

sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to
a crime. x-x-x”

10. Such irregularity was amplified by Plaintiff-Appellee’s

statement in the same Paragraph 6 which states that
“x-x-x 101 Rigo was designated to search the target
house located at Purok 7, Barangay Lag-on, Daet,
Camarines Norte”. Indubitably, in view of the
uncertainty of the place, the PDEA operatives had to
exert more efforts in locating the target house and, for
that purpose, they designated 101 Rigo to do the job
prior to the intended raid. To reiterate, it is because of
the failure of the search warrant to specifically
describe the place to be searched in wanton
violation of the Constitutional provision and
relevant principles governing the issuance of the
same;
Appellant’s Reply Brief
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The search warrant was

irregularly executed and
Chain of Custory Rule was
violated.

11. In Paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief,

Plaintiff-Appellee categorically admitted that the PDEA
operatives arrived at the Accused-Appellant’s house at
about 10:30 o’clock in the evening headed by IA1 Erwin
Magpantay;

12. Likewise, in Paragraph 8 of the same Plaintiff-

Appellee’s Brief, confirming the allegations in
Paragraph 7 of Accused Appellant’s Brief, Plaintiff-
Appellee admitted that the PDEA operatives ordered
accused Spouses Villareal to sit in the kitchen and the
latter’s children Rocelle, Regina, Reijan, Rellegin and
Rodel, Jr., together with spouses Zanfranco and his
brother Arnel Villareal to go inside a room;

13. Such incident narrated in the immediately preceding

paragraph took place because when the PDEA
operatives raided the house of accused-appellant at
about 10:30 o’clock in the evening, the representatives
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and any elected public official, as required by Republic
Act No. 9165 and existing jurisprudence, were not
present. Worse, while waiting for the arrival of the
said representatives and while the accused spouses
and their children were already confined or locked
in a particular place inside their house, the PDEA
operatives freely roamed around and commenced
their searching operation under the guise of
securing the area;
Appellant’s Reply Brief
CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477
Page 6
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14. Needless to say, there was irregularity in the

implementation of the search warrant and it violated the
Chain of Custody Rule. Firstly, at the time the PDEA
operatives raided the house of accused-appellant and
commenced their searching operation, at about 10:30
o’clock in the evening of February 20, 2013, they were
not accompanied by the representatives from the media,
the DOJ, and by elected public official. Secondly, the
unreasonable searches and seizure took place in the
absence of accused-appellant considering that they
were locked in a certain place insidethe house. And
thirdly, the PDEA operatives merely followed the said
rule after two (2) hours or at about 12:30 a.m. of
February 21, 2013 just to show that there was
compliance in the Chain of Custody Rule. The Supreme
Court reiterates the strict compliance thereof when it
pronounced that:

“Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165

requires that upon seizure of illegal drug
items, the apprehending team having
initial custody of the drugs shall (a)
conduct a physical inventory of the drugs
and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the
presence of the person from these items
were seized or confiscated and (d) a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and any
elected public official (e) who shall be
required to sign the inventory and be given
copies thereof.” (People vs. Yepes, 788
SCRA 588); (Underlining ours)

Further, the confiscation and seizure of alleged illegal

drugs while the accused-appellant and the members of
her family were locked in a certain place inside their
house simply manifests that the latter were not in
possession and control of the said recovered items. It
cannot even be said that accused-appellant was in
constructive possession of the seized items because
Appellant’s Reply Brief
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she was not exercising dominion and control over

the said items;

15. Worthy of mentioning also is that in view of the hasty

and irregular searching and seizure operations of the
PDEA operatives, the latter miserably failed to
determine and record the weight of all the alleged drugs
seized which is a clear violation of the protocol set-forth
by law, rules and regulations and existing
jurisprudence. In fact, in the case of People vs. Arenas,
798 SCRA 680, the Supreme Court explicitly states that
“The quantity of the dangerous drugs is
determinative of the penalty to be imposed for the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs”;

16. Verily, the violation of the Chain of Custody Rules

greatly affects the integrity and evidentiary value of the
alleged seized illegal drugs which will certainly not
conform to the quantum of evidence required in
criminal case, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Also, in the case People vs. Dimaano, 783 SCRA 449,
the Supreme Court ruled that “in cases involving
dangerous drugs, proof beyond doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude is observed in establishing
the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core
is the confiscated illicit drug”;

The illegal items allegedly seized

from the Accused-Appellant are
deemed Fruits of the Poisonous
Tree.

17. Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution

expressly provides”

“Any evidence obtained in violation of

this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.”
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18. The aforesaid constitutional mandate provides

for an exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Hence,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding;

19. As discussed above, the assailed search warrant is

defective in view of its failure to specifically describe the
place to be searched as required by the Constitution
and existing jurisprudence. Apparently, the search of
the accused-appellant’s house on February 20, 2013
at about 10:30 p.m. which was merely re-enacted
after the lapse of two (2) hours or on February 21,
2013 at about 12:30 a.m. pursuant to the said
search warrant was unlawful and erroneous;

20. Relatively, all the seized items by the PDEA

operatives from the house of accused-appellant, which
were illegally obtained, were inadmissible in evidence in
any proceeding for being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
As ruled by the Supreme Court in a litany of cases, such
tainted, defective and illegally obtained pieces of
evidence cannot be used to sustain the conviction
of the accused-appellant.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Accused-Appellant

reiterates her prayer in the Appellants Brief to MODIFY,
REVERSE and/or SET ASIDE the Decision dated January 9,
2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch
39, Daet, CamarinesNorte, convicting her for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and in lieu thereof
render a new Decision ACQUITTING her for the crime charged.
Appellant’s Reply Brief
CA-G.R. CR HC-NO.09477
Page 9
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Other relief and remedies, which the Honorable Court may

find just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed
for.

Quezon City for Manila, December 9, 2019.

ROSALINDA A. MONTENEGRO
Counsel for the Accused -Appellant
Unit 312, Acre Building
No. 137 Malakas St., Barangay Central, Quezon City
Roll of Attorneys No. 68465
PTR No. 7324350; Issued on 01-04-19; Q.C.
IBP O.R. No. AR 4792020 CY; 1-04-19; Quezon City
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0005347
14 April 2022

Copy furnished:

Office of the Solicitor General

No. 134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village,
1229 City of Makati

Regional Trial Court, Br. 39

Fifth Judicial Region
4600 Daet, Camarines Norte

EXPLANATION

Due to time constraint and lack of messengerial personnel

to effect personal service, a copy of this Appellant’s Reply Brief
was sent to the parties through Registered Mail with Return
Card.

ROSALINDA A. MONTENEGRO