CASE # 1

Mañosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412 (1997)

Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of
about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued
its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied.

Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes “public use.”

Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent
power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right
to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even
in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public
use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed,
that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

CASE # 2

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila GR14355, 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely,
the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which
had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for
public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only
function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into
the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without
question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

CASE # 3
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. GR L-18841, 27 January 1969

FACTS:
 Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby
telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and
vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines being
rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract
with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain
the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD:

“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.”

CASE # 4

Comm. Of Public Highways vs Burgos 96 SCRA 831

Facts:

On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way purpose. Then Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance
a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled
Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines). Amigable's complaint was
dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover
the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the government was invoked. In the
hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a
newspaper showing that the price was P6.775. The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay
Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.

Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private
respondent Amigable for the property taken.

Held: No, it is not applicable. Article 1250 of the New Civil Code seems to be the only provision in our statutes which provides for payment of an obligation
in an amount different from what has been agreed upon by the parties because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation. Thus, the Article
provides:

ART. 1250. In case extra-ordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.

It is clear that the foregoing provision applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the obligation to pay arises
from law, independent of contract. The taking of private property by the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to
a contractual obligation. Moreover, the law as quoted, clearly provides that the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall
be the basis of payment which, in cases of expropriation, would be the value of the peso at the time of the taking of the property when the obligation of the
Government to pay arises. It is only when there is an "agreement to the contrary" that the extraordinary inflation will make the value of the currency at the
time of payment, not at the time of the establishment of the obligation, the basis for payment. In other words, an agreement is needed for the effects of an
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which, as a rule, is always
the determinative element, to be varied by agreement that would find reason only in the supervention of extraordinary inflation or deflation. Under the law,
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, even assuming that there has been an extraordinary inflation within the meaning of Article 1250 of the
New Civil Code, a fact We decline to declare categorically, the value of the peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation, which in the instant
case is when the property was taken possession of by the Government, must be considered for the purpose of determining just compensation. Obviously,
there can be no "agreement to the contrary" to speak of because the obligation of the Government sought to be enforced in the present action does not
originate from contract, but from law which, generally is not subject to the will of the parties. And there being no other legal provision cited which would
justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in expropriation
by the Government, the value of the property as it is when the Government took possession of the land in question, not the increased value resulting from
the passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation for the
property taken.

CASE # 5

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta GR L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type
Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was
not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required
6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon
City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of
the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of
private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod
may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues
to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision
lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.

CASE # 6

Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay GR L-59603, 29 April 1987

Facts: The President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-
Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the
reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters
owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the
corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement
regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66. The judge issued
an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby
terminated and the hearing. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the
court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the
amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether
the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation.

Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the
basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever
is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the
basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when private property is
acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly, Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining
just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared
by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code,
whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." The provisions of the
Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitute impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play
in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land
is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated
for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than
correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

CASE # 7

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON vs.VDA. DE VILLAROYA G.R. No. L-64037 August 27, 1987

Facts: The subject matter of Civil Case No. 50 was a 16,500 square meter lot occupied by the Gubat High School and developed as its athletic ground.
The lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors. The decision became final and
executory. Shortly afterwards, the petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated
in the court's decisionhe lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with the requirements set up
by the COA. The lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim or
caprice designed to cause a protracted delay in the actual payment. Moreover, the lower court stated that the requirements were not beyond compliance
considering that some of the required documents were available in the records of the case. When the petitioner tried to disturb the respondents' possession
of the land they had re-entered, the latter, filed a "MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS"
before the lower court. In their Comment to the Motion, the private respondents-intervenors manifested that the status quo in this case should be observed,
namely, that the parcel of land remains in the possession of the petitioner but conditioned on the payment by the petitioner of the value of the land; provided
however, that in the event that the petitioner fails to pay, the definite shares in the property of each heir should first be determined before the possession
is delivered to the plaintiffs and intervenors.

Issue: Whether or not the additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to have the corresponding title issued in the name of the
municipality free from all liens and encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the value of the land is reasonable

Held: No. The dispositive portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors payment of the value of the land, the private respondents
are ordered to execute a conveyance in favor of the petitioner. The respondents have complied with all the requirements originally imposed by COA. The
petitioner cannot, therefore, deny payment to the private respondents.

This case is a classic example of a common problem besetting hapless citizens in varying degrees. Because of insistent but distorted application of
administrative rules and regulations, persons dealing with government are often placed in unfair predicaments which require needless expenditure of their
time, money, and patience. The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high
school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all
required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting
payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners
of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. In cases where land is taken for public use, public interest however, must, be considered. The children of
Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the disputed land as their high school athletic grounds for thirty years. In the execution of this decision, the Provincial
Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delays be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any of
the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this decision.

CASE # 8

COSCULLUELA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77765 August 15, 1988

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of
Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation
Project. In this instant petition, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court as being violative of his right to just compensation and due process
of law. He maintains that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence for as between these said
laws and the constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. As admitted by the respondent Republic, the NIA took possession of the
expropriated property in 1975 and for around ten (10) years already, it has been servicing the farmers on both sides of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project
in Iloilo Province and has been collecting fees therefor by way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner, who is already
more than eighty years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent hospitalization, and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of
just compensation based on a final and executory judgment. The respondent Republic, on the other hand, argues that while it has no intention of keeping
the land and dishonoring the judgment, the manner by which the same will have to be satisfied must not be inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, and
that is, that public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed without the proper appropriation.

Issue: Whether or not the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking is a correct determination for just compensation

Held: Yes. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss. This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The
petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the National
Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct
irrigation systems and sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominwq.,y for the agencies to start earning from those properties
while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of just compensation to the former owners.
CASE # 9

MERALCO v. Pineda
206 SCRA 196

FACTS: MERALCO filed a complaint for expropriation of the lots of the private respondents. While the case was going on and before the appointment of
the Board of Commissioners to value the land, the private respondents filed a motion to withdraw a portion of the deposit of MERALCO. This was granted
by Judge Pineda; MERALCO objected, contending that this cannot be done since the Board of Commissioners was not yet constituted, and allowing such
is a deprivation of its property without due process of law. Judge Pineda maintained that he can dispense with the Board and adopt the testimony of a
credible real estate broker, or he could exercise himself the right to decide the just compensation to be paid to the owners of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court can disperse, with the assistance of Board of Commissioners, in an expropriation proceeding and determine for
itself the just compensation

HELD: : In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to
allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain
just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners
may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Thus, trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of
the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record.
Hence, the judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant
violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

CASE # 10
Province of Camarines Sur vs CA
May 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Resolution No. 129 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase/expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government
employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No 129 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain

HELD: Yes, the expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would ensure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the province. Once operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fisherman and craftsman would
be enhanced. The housing project, on the other hand, satisfies the requirement of public purpose of the constitution.

CASE # 11
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
244 SCRA 272 (1995)

FACTS: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page
for the common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates
to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space shall also be used
by the Commissionfor dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that
the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether or not compelling the petitioner to donate “COMELEC space” amount to “taking” of private property for public use

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “COMELEC space” amounts
to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for
the taking has not been established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking
of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

CASE # 12

Landbank vs CA
249 SCRA 149 (1995)

FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose holdings were acquired by DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under
RA 6657. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses by DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents
filed a petition questioning the validity of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively,
“carmarked”, “reserved” and “deposited in trust accounts” for private respondents and allow them to withdraw the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9

HELD: Yes, DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowners as compensation for his property because Sec 16 (c) of RA 6657 is specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. In the
same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular No 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the
law. The respondent court there, did not commit ay error in striking down AO No. 9 for being null and void.

CASE # 13

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty

G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

FACTS: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept. The trial
court issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15
percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed
that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES: Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action

HELD: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies
with the requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority on the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities
and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s
control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms
“resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

CASE # 14
ESLABAN VS. ONORIO
G.R. NO. 146062, 28 JUN 2001

FACTS: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of
an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the
construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties
in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay
P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent
is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of
P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the value of the just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision

HELD: The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public highway, way,
private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have
been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner
may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the
irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered
on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be
taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the
market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner
of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action
of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
"whichever came first."

CASE # 15
Republic vs Ker & Co
GR NO 136.171, July 2, 2002

FACTS: the petitioner filed before RTC a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by the respondent for road widening. The
provisional value of the properties was fixed at 1,000 per sq meter but the private respondent claimed that it was more than 4,000 per sq m. When estimate
for just compensation was given, the petitioner argued that it is unreasonable as the tax declaration of the property indicated that its assessed value is
only at P425 per sq m., while the market value was only P849 per sq m.

ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation can be measured by the assessment value of the property as stated in its tax declaration and schedule of
market values

HELD: As declared in Manotok v NHA, the statements made in tax documents made by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered
but they cannot exclude or prevail over the court determination after expert commissioners have examined the property an all the pertinent circumstances
are taken into account and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully leas their case before a competent and unbiased tribunal.

CASE # 16

CIR vs Central Luzon Drug Corp

456 SCRA 414 (2005)

FACTS: Respondent Central Luzon Drug Corp (“Central”) is a retailer of medicines and pharmaceutical products. It’s operates franchises under the name
Mercury Drug.
In 1995, Central granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens, in conformity with RA No. 7432. The discount amounted to
P219,779. CIR issued a revenue regulation which implemented RA 7432. It states that the discount given to the senior citizens shall be deducted by the
establishment from its gross sales. So, Central deducted the amount P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995.
Central reported a NET LOSS in its income tax return so as a consequence, Central did not pay income tax for 1995. Thereafter, respondent filed a claim
for tax refund in te amount of P904, 769.00 allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by the respondent to qualified senior citizens in
compliance with RA 7432.

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent’s claim will prosper

Whether or not respondent is entitled to just compensation

HELD: The plain wording of the law discounts given under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income. Thus, the 20%
discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. Sec. 229
of the Tax Code does not apply to the case because such section governs only those kinds of refund and credit of taxes that were erroneously or illegally
imposed and collected. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or
illegally assessed and collected.
As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken
by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments
concerned. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.

CASE # 17
De La Paz Masikip vs. The City of Pasig, et. al.,

GR. No. 136349, Jan. 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner, Masikip, is the registered owner of a parcel of land Pasig City. In January 1994, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

In March 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."

In May 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.

In December 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational
facilities to its poor residents."

In February 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the trial court issue an order for the
condemnation of the property.

In April 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent failed to show a genuine necessity for the taking
of the property. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of eminent domain was properly exercised.

RULING:
 No. The respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The right to take
private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, it was held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character.

Further, upon scrutiny of the records, it showed that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private,
non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown,
especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park,
available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

CASE # 18
Heirs of Pidacan, et. al. vs. ATO

GR No 162779 June 15, 2007

FACTS:

Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo had acquired parcel of land about 22 hectares in San Jose Mindoro Occidental with original title certificate and issuance
of land TCT No. 2204, patent No. 3383.

The ATO (Air Transportation Office) used a portion of land and constructed an air base new terminal building property upon the death of the Pidacan
spouses.

The heirs of the late Pidacan spouses as represented by Pacita Pidacan de Zubiri filed a petition for issuance of owners duplicate because the old copy
(original) was lost and later executed a judicial settlement for them, unfortunately it was cancelled and TCT was issued in favor of heirs.

The heirs presented the death certificate of their parents to the ATO but the latter still refuses to pay; the former allege that the respondents must pay the
rentals plus the value of property to them. However, ATO insisted that the title was still under their parents name and it was formerly sold to its predecessor,
although they failed to claim the property because it was just for taxation purposes.

The heirs filed a subsequent complaint for payment of rentals and property to the respondent on the other hand respondents filed a complaint for
expropriation.

The trial court dismissed the respondents petition and promulgated a decision that respondents should pay the amount of 6, 249, 645.40 php per month
with 12 % interest per annum until same is fully paid, and 10 % amount must need for expenses of attorney’s fees and litigation.

The heirs moved for reconsideration and were denied; afterwards the former filed an instant petition alleging the honorable Court of Appeals grave error
and abuse of discretion, disregarding the law in reversing the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs shall successfully claim the said payment of rentals and property value from the assailed respondents ATO.

RULING:

The CA set aside or reversed the trial court’s decision knowing that there was no contract of lease to allege competent evidence among both parties.

Director of Department of transportation and Communication had a letter that endorse a person named Parales for immediate payment rentals but it was
a considered a hearsay and still doesn’t have any proof of lease of contract between each parties negotiation.

The petition was GRANTED, the assailed decision was set aside. However, the RTC’s decision was AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with regards to
the actual area of occupation by the respondent to the heir petitioner that reckons 304.39 php per square meter of area expropriated plus the appropriate
interest rate of 6% per annum from this total of 65, 668, 183. 43 until fully paid.

The court decision was deemed pursuant to Article VIII of Sec. 13 of the constitution.

CASE # 19
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Trinidad S. vda. De Arieta

GR No. 161834 Aug. 11, 2010

FACTS:

Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an approximate area of 37.1010 hectares 14.999 hectares of which was
covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the land covered by
CARP.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP as just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The
offer was rejected by private respondent.
In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as
provisional compensation for the acquisition of the property.

Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative
proceedings to fix the just compensation.

On June 26, 2002, the DARAB rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on September 4, 2002.

Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), Regional
Trial Court, which is the subject of this petition.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer
and moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB determined amount of
P10,294,721.00

Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the deposit should only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the amount of
P1,145,806.06 and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.

On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release to the private respondent the
DARAB determined just compensation of P10,294,721.00.

On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order to deposit.

On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite, for contempt for failure to comply with the order to deposit.

Public respondent rendered the assailed resolution dated February 17, 2003, denying petitioner LBP’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SAC order to deposit had no legal basis, considering that the requirement for the prompt payment of just compensation was satisfied
buy the deposit of the provisional compensation of P1, 145,806.06 required under Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657.

RULING:

Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be
paid for their taking.[12] Once an expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable
role of LBP begins. EO No. 405, provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the LBP
as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disagree with the decision of the
DAR in the determination of just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as SAC for final determination of just compensation.

The objective of the procedures on land valuation provided by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as amplified by the issuances of the
DAR/DARAB is to enforce the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking of private agricultural lands placed under the CARP. It must be
stressed that the DAR’s authority to determine just compensation is merely preliminary. On the other hand, under Section 1 of EO No. 405, the LBP is
charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking.

In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and
conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special
agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP’s valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination,
which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into
consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations.

As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the
discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees
with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to
challenge the same, by appeal to the CA or to this Court, if appropriate.

CASE # 20
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. PARC, et. Al., GR no. 171101, (2011)

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS
the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which
the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual
land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to
them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their
choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

RULING:

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue
has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5,
2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation
of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

CASE # 21

MORFE vs. MUTUC

22 SCRA 424 (1968)

FACTS:

The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn
statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.

CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

ISSUE:

Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is an oppressive exercise of police power.

FACTS:

NO. Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense
is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.

“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed
the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.”
CASE # 22

Vda. De Genuino vs. Court of Agrarian Relations

22 SCRA 792 (1968)

FACTS:

Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino is the judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Jacinto Genuino, Jr., part of which were lands in Mandili and
Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga, all devoted to rice production. On May 25, 1964, the share tenants of said lands filed the following complaints against
Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Angeles City, Pampanga:

The purpose of these complaints was the conversion of the tenancy relationship from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to Section 4 of
Republic Act 3844, 1 in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, 2as amended. The nominal average produce for the past three agricultural years, less
expenses, was alleged in the complaints.

Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino, in separate answers, on September 22, 1964, denied the alleged normal average produce and as an affirmative
defense, questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of Republic Act 3844.

On January 23, 1965, after the parties had filed their memoranda, the Court of Agrarian Relations denied defendant's prayer for dismissal on the
ground that the issue of constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) will not directly affect the tenants'
rights in the case because even if said sections were declared unconstitutional, Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, providing also for change from sharehold
to leasehold tenancy, which was already held constitutional by the Supreme Court, would still apply. As to the limitation in Section 34 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code of the maximum rental, it ruled that the limitation was not really burdensome, for the decrease of 5% of the owner's share, 4 is offset
by the advantages he gets under the law.

A reconsideration was denied the defendant and the Court of Agrarian Relations subsequently, on August 31, 1965, promulgated its decision
granting and authorizing the leasehold system starting from agricultural year 1965-1966 on the ground that the issue had become moot since the Supreme
Court had upheld the legality of the change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy at the tenant's option pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, as
amended. And hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of POLICE POWER was valid.

RULING:

YES. The abolition of the share tenancy and the compulsion on the landowner and/or tenant to enter into the leasehold system is questioned as
unconstitutional on the ground that the freedom of contract is violated and that it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. Said legislation is
justified by the right of the state to exercise its police powers. Here, individual rights to contract and to property, had to give way to police power exercised
for public welfare.

In the case at bar, the exercise of such a power was the result of the intention of Congress to do away with the share tenancy completely.

And besides, as the Court of Agrarian Relations correctly held then that even if the challenged provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code be
declared unconstitutional, the effect would be the same for the Code provides that while the National Land Reform Council has not declared the Code
operative in the region, the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended, would apply. Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, which grants this option to choose
the leasehold relationship to the tenant and binding to the landowner, is as earlier pointed out, constitutional. Consequently, regardless of the Land Reform
Code, petitioner Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino must give in to the desired change of system.

CASE # 23

Alalayan vs. National Power Corp.,

24 SCRA 172 (1968)

FACTS:

This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise
holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any
contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that
such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses."
Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that
the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional
provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as the
due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3 of the subject act, which further amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 infringes the right to due process and impairs contracts.

HELD:

This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a figure as against the contention that it
was rather too generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any
evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known
presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor. In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of
petitioner that the legislation assailed contravenes the due process clause. Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise
by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already,
existence established and in operation.

CASE # 24

Agustin vs. Edu,

88 SCRA 195 (1979)

FACTS:

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional,
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers
and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said is Letter of Instruction is valid exercise of POLICE POWER.

RULING:

YES. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the
respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna
Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle
of international morality.

In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be considered unless the point is specially
pleaded, insisted upon and adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully
expect success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

CASE # 25
CASE # 25
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

FACTS
The petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila which prohibits any
operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in
any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging
is conducted is the same person. The petitioners argued that said ordinance violates their right to property and due process of law. The lower court
dismissed their petition, hence this appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, violating the petitioner’s right to property in their means of livelihood without
due process of law

HELD
There is no showing of the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila. The enactment of said ordinance is a valid exercise of the
municipality’s police power mainly for the purpose of imposing payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance
No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, and in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers.
The delegation of police power in municipality has been given wide application by municipal authorities and the Court has been liberal in sustaining
ordinances based on the general welfare clause.
CASE # 26
Melchor, Jr. vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1 (1983)

FACTS
Respondent, retired Judge Jose Moya declared Republic Act 6359, the Rent Control Law as unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid
police power measure, that there was lack of substantive due process and a violation of equal protection safeguard. Pres. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 20 as part of the law of the land based on the Article on the Transitory Provisions of the present Constitution which states that : Presidential
Decrees promulgated or issued, or acts done by President Ferdinand E. Marcos "shall be part of the law of the land [to] remain valid, legal, binding, and
effective" except when "modified, revoked, or suspended" by him as "incumbent President or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
[now Batasang Pambansa]. PD 20 amended RA No. 6359.
The petitioner, Alejandro Melchor, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary filed a petition for certiorari and pleaded for the reversal of the
decision of the Respondent Judge.

ISSUE
Whether or not Republic Act 6359 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure, there was lack of substantive due process
and a violation of the equal protection safeguard

HELD
No, Republic Act 6359 is constitutional. RA 6359 was enacted to promote public interest and general welfare. RA 6359 cannot be considered as oppressive
and arbitrary because it was specifically designed to ease economic distress due to housing shortage, as shelter is one of the basic social and economic
rights. Enacted by Congress, there was a clear manifestation that RA 6359 have been thoroughly discussed with all aspects of the question accorded
due consideration. All questions relating to the determination of the matters of the facts are for the legislature and are not subject for judicial review.
Presidential Decree No. 20 have the force and effect of the law of the land as stated in the Article on Transitory Provisions of the present Constitution and
as ruled in Aquino, Jr. vs Commission on Elections. Therefore, Presidential Decree 20 as an amendment of RA 6359, it is extremely illogical if an
amendatory act is given full force and effect and yet the statute it sought to amend would be declared as being tainted by an unconstitutional infirmity. That
clearly is an affront to reason. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision declaring unconstitutional Republic Act No. 6359 is reversed

CASE # 27
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496 (1985)

FACTS

Prior to the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in the country's various domestic ports was in
great disarray. The "cabo system" of exploiting labor and the lack of rationality in the handling of cargoes prevailed in the port. The Bureau of Customs
issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, in two stages, first into ten corporations, then to one. Only eleven corporations
were authorized to do business in the port of Cebu City. Neither respondent Pernito Arrastre Services nor any of the other respondents in this case were
issued permits by the Bureau of Customs to operate arrastre services.
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created thru PD 857 amending PD 505 to carry out all duties and functions of the Bureau of Customs. PPA adopted
Bureau of Custom’s integration policy. The eleven port service contractors formed the United South Dockhandlers Inc (USDI) and was authorized to handle
exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract. Private
respondents Pernito, et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory
injunction and damages against petitioner PPA and USDI. The respondents alleged that the interest of the small contractors were not protected in the
integration policy where the big contractors refuse to assimilate them. Respondents further alleged that the controlling interests in USDI reneged on their
commitments to the small stockholders; that as a result, respondent Pernito, et al., left USDI and applied with PPA for separate permits to operate their
services, but their (Pernito, et al.) applications were denied. Respondent judge issued an injunction order enjoining PPA from enforcing its policy of
integration in the port of Cebu City and directing it to allow respondent Pernito, et al., to operate individually and independently as arrastre and stevedoring
contractors. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE
Whether or not PPA’s policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and void for being violative of legal provisions on monopolies

HELD
No, PPA’s policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provisions on monopolies.The operations of arrastre and stevedoring affected
the maritime transportation in the port of Cebu which is the principal port in the South. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will
prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to
regulation and control for the public good and welfare. The discretion in choosing the stevedoring contractor for the South Harbor, Port of Manila belongs
by law to PPA. As long as standards are set in determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related for the purpose for which they
are used, the courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA's choice. The policy of integration does not promote monopoly because USDI is comprised
of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted. Whether the monopoly has
been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest, therefore PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional
and legal provision on monopolies.

CASE # 28
Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

FACTS

A petition to quash the charges against the petitioners for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) was filed before the Court on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense because BP 22 is unconstitutional. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check
in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."
The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the
case, hence this petition for relief.
ISSUE
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State

HELD
Yes, BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. The effects of
the issuance of a worthless check , creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

CASE # 29

Pernito Arratre Services, Inc. vs. Mendoza, 146 SCRA 431 (1986)

FACTS

The Bureau of Customs due to the proliferation of the oppressive "cabo system" and the increase in the incidence of violence and thefts in the ports,
issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, requiring the merger of the thirty-six (36) existing labor contractors into four
corporations, and then to just one. Presidential Decree No. 857 transferred and vested the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs with
regard to arrastre and stevedoring operations to the respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Pursuant to said decree, respondent PPA imposed a ten
percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and stevedoring services.PPA adopted the existing integration policy to
the port of Tacloban where the four authorized arrastre/stevedoring operators, agreed to merge and form one of the petitioners herein, the Leyte Integrated
Port Services, Inc. (LIPSI).
PPA issued Special Order No. 114-79 creating the Philippine Ports Authority-Tacloban Arrastre Ports Services (PPA-TAPS) within its worn Tacloban port
unit and ordering a take-over by PPA-TAPS of the entire arrastre and stevedoring services in the Port of Tacloban. Petitioner LIPSI, as well all port users
were duly informed of the take-over by PPA-TAPS PPA-TAPS took over the actual management and operations of arrastre and stevedoring services in
the port of Tacloban. According to PPA, the take-over protected the rights of the dockworkers. Several petitions from the various operators were filed, so
the Court consolidated these petitions which seek to permanently restrain the Philippine Ports Authority from taking over the arrastre and stevedoring
operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte. The petitioners invoke the constitutional right to due process of law and to non-impairment of contract.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent PPA's take-over through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power
and does not violate the constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts

HELD
Yes, PPA’s take-over is a valid exercise of police power. The State in the exercise of its police power through its agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke
the temporary permits of petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary permits, and take over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever
the need to promote the public interest and welfare of both stevedoring industry and the workers therein justifies such take over. Rights of the petitioners
from the temporary permits as well as their right to non-impairment of contract must yield to the valid exercise of police power of the State. The take-over
of PPA-TAPS absorbed the entire labor force that existed at the time of the cancellation of LIPSI's permit, composed of all the labor contractors and the
workers under them which have been integrated to develop and improve the planning, growth, financing, construction, maintenance and operation of ports
throughout the country and make them responsive to the needs of their individual localities.

CASE # 30
Philippine Asssociation of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drillon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

FACTS

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a recruitment firm for Filipino Workers for overseas placement filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". The petitioner contends that the Department Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes
the police power of the State for the validity of Department Order No. 1, s.1998.

ISSUE
Whether or not Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution

HELD
Yes, Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution. It is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, which imposes restraint on liberty
and property to foster the common good. Official acts such as Department Order No.1, is presumed to be valid and there is no clear showing why it
should be nullified. Applying only to female workers, it does not discriminate sexes" and equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a
perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class,
where the classification in this case rests on substantial distinctions. The said DO is part of the Government’s efforts to protect victims of exploitation which
is more rampant in female workers than male workers. The Court agrees that due to the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a
ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The deployment ban does not impair the right to travel as this right is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law. Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, of its basic policy to "afford protection to labor”. "Protection to labor"
does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. The Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority, in fact , it removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries
as manifested by the Solicitor General. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in
this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed
for.

CASE # 31
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157 (1992)

FACTS

Residents of Sta. Elena, Virac , Catanduanes filed a complaint regarding the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine in the
warehouse of the petitioner Celestino Tatel. The appointed committee of the municipal council in its investigation found that the inflammable materials
stored in the warehouse pose a danger to the crowded neighborhood. Thus, the committee passed Resolution No. 29 declaring said warehouse as a
public nuisance under Article 694 of the New Civil Code and directed the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place
within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Municipal Council of Virac,
hence he instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on the co.
Respondents contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, which requires warehouses to
maintain a distance of 200 meters from block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance
with law.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
HELD

1. No, Ordinance No. 13 is within the scope of the Constitution as an exercise of the Municipal Council’s police power to provide for health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein. Said ordinance was also validly enacted and is in consonance with the basic principles of a substantive
nature which requires that municipal ordinance : (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6)
must not be unreasonable.

CASE # 32
People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 727 (1992)

FACTS

Private respondent Lim issued a check payable to Sasaki which was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds and still failed to make
arrangements for the payment of the full amount in the check after receipt of the notice of dishonor, thus was charged of violation of BP 22 or “Bouncing
Check Law”. Respondent moved to quash the information alleging that BP 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum
check in the nature of a promissory note. Supreme Court in previous cases ruled that BP 22 is constitutional. Hence, the respondent’s remaining
contention is that the memorandum check that he issued is not covered by BP 22, being only a memorandum of indebtedness and should be sued upon
only in civil action.

ISSUE
Whether or not a memorandum check is within the coverage of BP 22

HELD
Yes, a memorandum check is within the coverage of BP 22. A memorandum check signifies the intent to absolutely pay the debt and has the same effect
as an ordinary check, which upon presentment by a third person is generally accepted by the bank. Sec 185 of the Negotiable Instruments include
memorandum check in its definition which includes any bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Therefore a memorandum check is still
covered by BP 22 which does not distinguish but only states that any person who issues any check knowing at the time that he does not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank.. which check is subsequently dishonored .. shall be punished by imprisonment. BP 22 does not look into the nature of the
check but merely punishes the act of circulating worthless checks.

CASE # 33
JMM Promotion and Management Inc. vs Court of Appeals
260 SCRA 314 (1996)

Facts:
In 1994, the Secretary of Labor issued a Department Order (no.3) containing there in various procedures, requirements for screening performing artists u
nder a system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former performing artists who will pass such test were to be issued an Artist Reco
rd Book (ARB), a necessary pre-requisite in processing any contract of employment. Petitioner contended that such was a property right and vigorously av
er that deprivation thereof violates the due process clause and constitute an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue:
Whether or not Police power was validly exercise in the P.D.?

Ruling:
Yes. Clearly, the welfare of the Filipino performing artists, particularly the women, was paramount in its issuance short of a total and absolute ban agains
t the development of deployment of performing artists to high risk destination, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the ne
w scheme at the very least rationalize the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and certificate skills from the
m and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared from the unpredictable demands of employment of artists abroad. Such facts an
d circumstances leading to the issuance of assailed order compels the court to rule that the ARB requirement and PD no.3 were issued pursuant to vali
d police power.

CASE # 34
National Development Company vs Philippine Veterans Bank
192 SCRA 257 (1990)

Facts:
Petitioner with New Agrix Corporation executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land.Agrix then went bankrupt.Pres
ident Marcos issued PD 1717 in order to rehabilitate the company, which mandated among others the extinguishing of all the mortgages and liens a
ttaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process claims against the company to be administered mainly by N
DC. Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC invoking the provi
sion of the law which cancels all mortgage, liens against it. Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose, which the petitioners opposed by
filing another case on the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality o
f the decree, mainly violation of separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause. Hence the
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not PD (1717) is valid?

Ruling:
No.PD 1717 was held Unconstitutional on the grounds that it was an invalid exercise of police power, it had no lawful subject and no lawful method, it vio
lated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection cl
ause by lumping together all secured and unsecured creditors; it also impaired the obligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely privat
e interests.

CASE # 35
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs Board of Transportation
119 SCRA 592

Facts:
A Memorandum Order no.77-42 was issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) which phases out old and dilapidated taxis and refusing registratio
n to taxi units within the NCR having models over 6 years old.Pursuant to such order the Director of Bureau of Land Transportation issued implementing
Circular 52 for the purpose of information and implementation of M.O 77-42.

Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Circular is a valid administrative issuance?

Ruling:
Yes. The State, in the exercise of its police power can prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. It can prohibit all things harmful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. Here in, PD 101 grants the BOT the power to fix just and rea
sonable standards, classification and regulation to be followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration is the iss
uance of M.C 77-42 for the safety and comfort of the riding public from the danger passed by old and dilapidated taxis.

CASE # 36
Bautista vs Jumio
125 SCRA 239

Facts:
In 1979, an LOI 869 was issued to in response to the continued oil crisis dating back 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with "H and EH" p
lates on weekends and holidays from 12:00 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday but with certain exceptions. Pursuant thereto, Jumio and Edu issued Me
morandum Cicular 39 which imposes the penalty of fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration on owners found violating such LO
I. The Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding for the third offense.

Issue:
Whether or not the LOI (869) and MC (39) valid?
Ruling:
A Regulatory measure enjoys the presumption of Constitutionality. Herein, as to LOI (869) the determination of the mode and manner through which the
objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation are left to the discretion of the br
anches. The question before the court is limited to Memorandum Circular (39) while the imposition of the fine and suspension of registration is valid und
er the Land transportation and traffic code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 ultravires, it must lik
ewise be imposed in accordance with the procedures required by law.

CASE # 37
DECS vs San Diego
180 SCRA 533

Facts:
Private respondent was a graduate of University of the East with BS Zoology as a degree. He took the National Medical Examination Test (NMAT) a
nd flunk for three times. When he applied to take it again, Petitioner rejected his application on the contention that under its rule, the student sh
all be allowed only three chances in taking the NMAT, after three consecutive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth tim
e.

Issue:
Whether or not the regulation is valid?

Ruling:
Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to e
nsure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwearing entrust their lives and health. The Court uphel
d the Constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their com
petence and preparation for a medical education.

CASE # 38
Tablarin vs Gutierrez
152 SCRA 730

Facts:
Petitioner Tablarin and other persons sought admission into Colleges of Medicine for the school year 1987-1988.However, they either did not make it o
r did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and Administration by the Center
for Educational Measurement (CEM). In 1987 Tablarin and others filed a petition questioning the NMAT.

Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT requirement is valid?

Ruling:
Yes, it is valid. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health an
d safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate the admission to the ranks of those
qualified/authorized to practice medicine to take and pass Medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as a valid exercise of governmen
tal requirement for admission for the medical profession has also long been sustained as a legitimate exercise of regulatory authority of the State.

CASE # 39
Philippine National Bank vs Office of the President
252 SCRA 106

Facts:
The Private respondents were buyer on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreement it exec
uted over such lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lot in favor of the petitioner PNB. Unaware of the mortgage, private respondents duly com
plied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their house on the lots in question.Subsequently, the developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed t
he mortgaged. PNB account the owner of the lots acting on suits brought about by private respondents to the HLURB. Authority ruled that PNB may
collect from respondents only the remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreement with the Marikina Village , Inc. and cannot c
ompel respondent to pay all over again. The Office of the Preside concurred with the HLURB, invoking PD 957.

Issue:
Whether or not PD (957) be applied in the case?

Ruling:
Normally pursuant to Art.4 of the Civil code, law shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. However it is obvious and indubtible that P
D 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like in the present case, executed prior to its enactment and such intent must be given ef
fect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial instituti
ons which the developer deals with, it is obvious that the law was an instrument of social justice-must favor the weak.

Case # 40

Republic Planters Bank vs. Ogano

269 SCRA 1 (1997)

NO DIGEST

Case # 41

Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil. Vs. COMELEC

189 SCRA 337 (1998)

NO DIGEST

Case # 42

James Mirasol, et. al. vs. DPWH, et. al.

GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycle at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and
unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways
were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

Issue:

Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional

Held:

No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring
its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable
restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

Case # 43

United BF Homeowners’ Asso., Inc., et. al. (UBFHAI) vs. The City Mayor of Paranaque

GR No. 141010, Feb. 7, 2007

Facts:

The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan &
Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." UBFHAI, several homeowners’
associations, and residents of BF Homes Parañaque filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. They questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15, 17, and 19.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08. They
alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts to
impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer. However, EL ACTO, intervened as respondent claiming that their members will
be affected if the ordinance will be declared unconstitutional. It also asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. It further alleged that
the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Issue:

Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power

Held:

The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause.28 The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

Case # 44

The MMDA, et. al. vs. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. et. al.

GR Nos. 170656-170652, Aug. 15, 2007

Facts:

PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council
of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who
had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory
rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals

Issue:

Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

Held:

Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals. Police power rests primarily
with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised
by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an express delegation
by the LGC of 1991. Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular
traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. On Constitutional Law, “The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.”
Case # 45

Social Justice Society vs. Atienza

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts:
Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in
essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil
companies are located in this area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan
terminals are given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are disallowed.
Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option and not
total removal of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance 8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and
agreed that the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. The
said MOU was adopted by a resolution of the Sanggunian Panglunsod of Manila.

Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate removal
of the terminals of the oil companies.

Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027.
Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance 8027.

Ruling:
Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. The Court ratiocinated, "these officers
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."

As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

Case # 46

CIR vs. YMCA

Facts:

YMCA – a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives – leases out a portion of premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, deriving substantial income for such. Seeing
this, the commissioner of the internal revenue (CIR) issues an assessment to private respondent for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding
taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA opposed arguing that its rental income is not subject to tax, mainly
because of the provisions of Section 27 of NICR which provides that civic league or organizations not organized for profit but operate exclusively for
promotion of social welfare and those organized exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable businesses shall not be taxed.

Issue:

Is the contention of YMCA tenable?

Held:

No, because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions.
Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus,
the claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.”

Case # 47

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

14 SCRA 292 (1965)

Fact:
In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated 10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality as intended. In 1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an
assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal therof.

Issue:

Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt

Held:

The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguised from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the
exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise tax.

CASE # 48

Republic vs Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211 (1965)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 49

Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 50

Sison, Jr. vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 (1984)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 51

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 52

Tan vs. Del Rosario, 237 SCRa 324 (1994)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 53

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667

NO DIGEST

CASE # 54

CIR vs. CA, GR No. 124043, Oct 14,1998

NO DIGEST

CASE # 55
NPC vs City of Cabanatuan, GR No. 149110, Apr. 9, 2003

NO DIGEST

CASE # 56

British American Tabacco vs. Camacho, et. al., GR No. 163583, Apr. 15, 2009

NO DIGEST

CASE # 57

City of manila vs. laguio, jr. GR no: 118127, April 12,2005

Facts: there was City Ordinance No. 7738, entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. That was enacted by the petitioner city of manila. The petitioner argued that
the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. While the
Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) argued that the said ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power on the grounds that
the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them. The respondent prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Issue: whether or not the City Ordinance no. 7738 is unconstitutional for it violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws

Rulling: Yes, the City Ordinance no. 7738 is unconstitutional for it violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws. The
Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its
sanctions. The enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council,
cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws.

CASE # 58

Salazar vs. people G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the
private complainant a check, Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked
up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (“Account Closed”). The
petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the check and drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with
the word “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). The petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be
guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph
2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired
with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner
replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her
personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for “DAUD,” which in banking parlance means “drawn against uncollected deposit.”
According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been
cleared.The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of
the check as payment for her purchase.

Issue: whether or not the right to due process was denied to the petitioner

Rulling: Yes, the right to due process was denied to the petitioner, because the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the
petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon

CASE # 59

People vs. bodoso

G.R. Nos. 149382-149383 March 5, 2003

Facts: There was a complaint-affidavit filed by Jenny Rose Bausa Bodoso accusing her father Ricardo Bodoso of qualified rape committed on July 1999
and repeated sometime the following September. Accused was arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Malilipot and Bacacay, Albay. He was subjected by the same court to preliminary investigation where he failed to submit counter affidavit/rebuttal
evidence against his daughter’s complaint-affidavit. The trial court called the parties to a pre-trial conference. The prosecution and the defense stipulated
that Jenny Rose was the daughter of accused-appellant and that she was fourteen (14) years old during the alleged incidents of rape. The admitted facts
were stated in the pre-trial order that was signed by accused-appellant and his counsel de oficio from the Public Attorney’s Office and by the public
prosecutor. The prosecution presented only two (2) witnesses, the defense counsel cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Incidentally, Jenny Rose
did not substantiate the allegation that she was only fourteen (14) years old when the crimes of rape were supposedly perpetrated, after offering its
documentary evidence and the admission thereof by the trial court for whatever it may be worth, the prosecution rested its case against accused-appellant.
However, upon the manifestation of the counsel de oficio, reception of the evidence for the defense was deferred to 2. the defense was summoned to
present its evidence. Lamentably, unlike in the previous settings of the trial court, the consolidated records of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286 do not
indicate whether accused-appellant was present on the scheduled trial date. There were also no transcript of stenographic notes nor minutes of the
proceedings on that date that would have elucidated on the cryptic order of the trial judge of even date tersely. The accused-appellant was convicted of
two (2) counts of qualified rape against his fourteen (14)-year old daughter; hence, this automatic review.

Issued: Whether or not the accused was denied of due process since no valid waiver of rights has been made

Rulling: the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is preserved and the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty except
that of the guilty. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration that such a different or extraordinary approach
has been undertaken voluntarily and intelligently. To protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any
confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client’s right to
present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe,

CASE # 60

Saya-Ang vs. comelec, GR no. 155087, November 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioners herein, were candidates for the Office of Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan, Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate
of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on
June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec which stated that
petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
submitted its study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners. On the
day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of
candidacy of petitioners herein. Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and were never given the chance
to present their evidence

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was been denied of due process when they were not given the chance to present evidence

Ruling: Yes, the petitioner was been denied of due process when they were not given the chance to present evidence, because the right to due process
is a cardinal and primary right which must be respected in all proceedings. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play, the cornerstone of every
democratic society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a
proceeding had already been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf. Petitioners certainly cannot read the
minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already been instituted
against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf.

CASE # 61

Casimiro vs. CA

G.R. No. 136911 February 11, 2003

Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in Pamplona, Las Piñas City. Adjoining their property on
the northern side was petitioners’ land. During a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the instance of respondents, it was
discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners, encroached by 3,110 square meters into respondents’ land. Respondents notified
petitioners and demanded that they desist from making further development in the area. Subsequently, respondents demanded that petitioners remove all
constructions in the area. Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City an action for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners and the latter’s lot buyers. Respondents alleged that 3,110 square meters of
their property, which has a market value of P640,000.00, computed at the then prevailing price of P200.00 per square meter, have been encroached upon
and fenced in by petitioners as part of the Casimiro Village Subdivision, and subdivided and sold to lot buyers. In support of their contention, respondents
presented the geodetic engineer who conducted the actual ground relocation survey. In their defense, petitioners denied that there was an encroachment
in respondents’ land. They presented Geodetic Engineers Lino C. Reyes and Felipe Venezuela from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile, defendant-lot buyers
interposed a cross-claim against petitioners spouses Casimiro, averring that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective
lots. The Court of First Instance of Pasay City, rendered a decision in favor of respondents,

Issue: Whether or not there were violations of right of due process, when the petitioner and the respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participate
in the survey

Ruling: Yes, there were violations of right of due process, when the petitioner and the respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participate in the
survey, because failure of Engr. Cortez, as chairman of the resurvey team, to notify Engr. Bernardo of the actual field work to enable him to participate
therein constituted as serious violation of petitioners’ right to due process, especially considering that it resulted in a deprivation of their property to the
extent of 3,235 square meters. The actual survey proceedings must, therefore, be conducted anew, ensuring this time that the interests of both parties
are adequately protected. Hence, this case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals for the retaking of the survey of the boundaries on the parties’
respective properties.

CASE # 62

Miranda vs. Carreon G.R. No. 143540 April 11, 2003

Facts: Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed
the respondents to various positions in the city government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the
City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the
appointments. When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his position after his suspension, he considered the composition of the PSPB irregular since the
majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance audit team, to conduct a personnel
evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted
to him a report stating that the respondents were found "wanting in (their) performance." three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued
an order terminating respondents’ services because they "performed poorly" during the probationary period. Respondents appealed to the CSC,
contending that being employees on probation,5 they can be dismissed from the service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary
period of six months, not after three (3) months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the
service violated their right to due process.

Issue: whether or not the dismissal of the respondent by the petitioner, violated their right to due process

Ruling: Yes, the dismissal of the respondent by the petitioner, violated their right to due process, Respondents vehemently assert that they were never
notified in writing regarding the status of their performance, neither were they warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail to improve
their performance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents’ assertion. The records show that what respondents received was only the termination
order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents’ right to due process was violated.

CASE # 63

Gov’t. of the U.S.A. vs. Purganan, GR no. 148571, September 21, 2002

Facts: There was an existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary
of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Initially, the Court
-- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
SOJ, the Court issued it’s a Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. The Resolution
has become final and executory.

Issue: whether or not the detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings violates of his right to due process

Ruling: No, the detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings violates of his right to due process, the court reiterate the familiar doctrine
that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there
is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

CASE # 64

Soriano vs. Angeles, GR no. 109920, august 31, 2000

Facts: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight, they barged into the
barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner
fist blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza"
("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four barangay tanods in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner because they were
held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in
the hospital. Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in the evening, because his younger brother
had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain
Ocampo. They were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded.
Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw petitioner near the door of
the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying
to intervene in the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis dito" ("Your being a policeman doesn’t
pull strings here"). When private respondent insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private
respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun
tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home. In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge
Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none
of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more
serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge also excluded from
the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in
evidence
Issue: Whether or not the respondent decide with bias which encroached the due process

Ruling: No, It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge Bias
and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any
person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an
opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case

CASE # 65

G.R. 144464 November 27, 2001

CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CSC

FACTS:

During the examinations for non-professional in the career civil service, given by the Civil Service Commission, on July 30, 1989 in Quezon City,
the CSC found the petitioner Zenaida C. Paitim, a Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, guilty of falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz,
a co-employee in the said office, who took the examinations for the latter. The CSC recommends the dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties of respondents Zenaida Paitim and Gilda Cruz for the offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that the petitioners’ constitutional right to due process was not violated in the administrative case no. D3-
95-052 where respondent Commission acted as the investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all at the same time, against the
petitioners.

RULING:

No, they were not denied the due process. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is
mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies
attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It can not be denied that
the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the
charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial
of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. We do not find reversible error with the decision
of the Court of Appeals in upholding the CSC Resolution.

CASE # 66

People v. De Leon

FACTS:

This is an appeal of the 2000 Decision of the RTC of Malabon convicting Conrado de Leon of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Appellant was arrested but his co-accused, Andring de Leon and one John Doe, remained
at large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty after the Information had been read and interpreted to him in a language that he fully
understood. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued against him alone. Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed Decision. The Public
Attorney’s Office, counsel for appellant, filed directly with this Court, the Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it directly participated in the active cross-examination of defense witness Armando Roque

RULING:

No. They are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary. In fact, this Court has repeatedly ruled that judges "must be accorded
a reasonable leeway in asking [witnesses] questions x x x as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth.”

This means that “questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter,
may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time.”

In the exercise of sound discretion, they may cross-examine these witnesses or ask them such questions as will enable the former to formulate
sound opinions on the ability of the latter to tell the truth, and to draw out relevant and material testimonies that may support or rebut the position taken by
one or the other party. Even if the clarificatory questions they propound happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one of the parties,
bias is not necessarily implied.

In the present case, the only purpose of the trial judge was to arrive at the truth and do justice to both parties. An accusation of unfairness cannot
be supported when his intention was merely to elicit the truth. As this Court has already ruled, judges may ask questions that would elicit the facts of the
issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that may have been overlooked by counsel.
CASE # 67

Camacho v. Gloria 409 SCRA 174 (2003) or [G.R. No. 138862. August 15, 2003]

DR. MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA, DR. EDMUNDO PRANTILLA, DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, As members of the
Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines; HON. RENO CAPINPIN, CESAR LIMBAGA, LEOVIGILDOARELLANO, As
members of the Special Investigation Committee; DR. THELMA LEDESMA, and HON. WENCESLAO IBABAO, in hiscapacity as Presiding Judge
of Davao City, respondents.

FACTS:

Dr. Thelma S. Ledesma, Secretary of the BOR of USP, filed a complaint against Camacho before the Office of the USP President for grave
misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a dean and falsification of public documents for having rigged the results of the performance evaluation test taken by
her students such that she was not given any teaching assignment by Camacho. Camacho moved for the inhibition of the committee members on the
ground that the ones who formed the committee, namely DECS Secretary Gloria and the committee chairman, Atty. Capinpin, were both respondents in
the Ombudsman case he filed (gross incompetence and insubordination).

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated by the Special Investigation Committee of the university.

RULING:

No. Petitioner’s allegations that Secretary Gloria and the Special Investigation Committee members were biased and partial are merely
speculative. There is no showing that the Education Secretary and the Committee members had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of
the case against petitioner. Absent persuasive proof of bias and partiality, Secretary Gloria and the committee could not be presumed to be incapable of
acting regularly in the performance of official functions. They must be accorded the benefit of the presumption that they would act in a manner befitting
their sworn duties, particularly, with “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” implicit in the guarantee of due process.

CASE # 68

Lozada vs. Arranz A.M. RTJ-O2-1741 November 27, 2003

SPO4 NORBERTO LOZADA & SPO1 CHARLIE CO SAM, complainants, vs. LUIS J. ARRANZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 11, respondent.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint against the Honorable Luis J. Arranz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11, for gross
partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

SPO4 Norberto Lozada and SPO1 Charlie Co Sam of the PNP were among the arresting officers of accused Ruben Dy in a Criminal Case for
violation of Section 15, Republic Act No. 6425, charged with illegally selling and delivering shabu to SPO1 Charlie Co Sam in a buy-bust operation. During
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, SPO4 Lozada was asked to identify the original unmarked envelope containing the marked money handed
by the poseur buyer to the accused.

Judge Arranz himself proceeded to interrogate the witness. He confused the witness by ordering his clerk to get another unmarked legal-size
envelope in substitution of the original unmarked legal-size envelope containing the buy-bust money thus, the witness could no longer identify which of
the two envelopes was the original. During that same hearing, complainants allege that the counsel for the accused shouted derogatory remarks against
Prosecutor Apolo, degrading her stature as officer of the court. The remarks were ignored by respondent judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge Arranz is guilty of gross partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING: Yes, he is found GUILTY of gross misconduct. The over-intrusive questioning of the prosecution witnesses by the respondent judge was
improper. Judges should avoid abruptly interrupting the direct examination of witnesses. In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses have not even
completed their direct testimony when the respondent judge abruptly butted in, bombarded them with tricky questions and in the process threw their
testimonies in haywire. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up
some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent
the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth”.

It ought to be self evident that the questions that may be propounded by a judge to witnesses are limited, in scope and in shape for they should have
no other purpose but to clarify, to promote justice, or prevent waste of time.
CASE # 69

People vs. Tee 395 SCRA 419 (2003)

[G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003]

FACTS:

A raid conducted by operatives of the NBI and PNP - Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by Tee and at his
residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Tee contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally obtained, being the products of
an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. He insisted that the search warrant was too general and the process by which said warrant was acquired did not
satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover, the prosecution witness’ testimony, which was heavily relied
upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was hearsay. The trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93 kilograms of marijuana was the
result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial
court found that the prosecution’s evidence was more than ample to prove appellant’s guilt and duly convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana and
sentenced him to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted at the appellant’s residence was valid

RULING: Yes. A search warrant is issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes
the place contains a specific amount of it. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.

What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize
police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However,
it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. The description “an undetermined amount of
marijuana” must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording,
“undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp,” in our view, has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description. The
description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact – not of law – by which the peace officers
may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents
exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.

CASE # 70

DOH v. Camposano

G.R. 157684 April 27, 2005

FACTS:

Some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda
U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May
13, 1996. The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge
of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge for Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. Then, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an
ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC).

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the
Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service.

RULING: No, due process was not observed because of non-compliance of the 6th requisite in the Secretary’s order in dismissing the respondents. Noting
that the Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. As a matter of administrative
procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case,
the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. Failure to comply with
this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s recommendation, but must
personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the
person administratively charged.

CASE # 71
Velasquez v. Hernandez G.R. 150732 August 31, 2004

FACTS:

The CSC found Hernandez guilty of the charges against her such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer
or promotion of complainant teachers, and ordered her dismissal from the service.

CA reversed the resolutions of the CSC because it is not enough that the twin requisites of notice and hearing be present, there must also be a
fair, independent, and impartial tribunal. It also ruled that Velasquez failed to discharge the burden of proving by substantial evidence the averments of
the complaint because it appears that some affiants who executed sworn statements to support the charges against respondent later retracted their
statements and executed new statements, alleging that they were merely induced to testify against respondent. It also noted that some of the complaining
teachers even failed to appear in the investigation to confirm their respective sworn statements. CA therefore, annulled and set aside the Resolutions of
the CSC and ordered the payment of backwages to respondent.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.

RULING:

No, due process was not violated because Hernandez was given the chance to answer the charges, to submit countervailing evidence, and to
cross-examine the witnesses against her. The mere fact that respondent questioned the impartiality of the fact finding committee will not automatically
result in a denial of due process because what matters is that respondent had actively participated in the proceedings against her. One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably than oral argument, through pleadings. Technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not even strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot be fully equated to
due process in its strict judicial sense. Further, a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him – he is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against
him during the hearing of the investigation committee. It is the administrative resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any
further remedies that the losing party in an administrative case might wish to pursue.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained
for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined,
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum
of proof required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Case # 72

People v. Morato G.R. Nos. 95358-59 July 5, 1993

FACTS:

Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were charged with the crime of murder in an Information dated February 8,1989. In a separate Information also
dated February 8, 1989, Ernesto Morato was charged for illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 1866 is vague and therefore, violative of accused-appellant’s due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:

No. The supposed vagueness arises from the fact that the law does not allegedly specifically define what constitutes the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Upon a perusal of Presidential Decree No. 1866, we find no vagueness in the wording of said law.

The first two paragraphs of Section 1 of the decree are specific enough.

It is plain from a reading of said decree and general orders that the crime of illegal possession of firearms is committed by a person who has in his
possession a firearm without a license or permit to do so from the proper authorities, or by a person, although authorized to possess such firearm,
nevertheless carries it outside of his residence without permit to do so from the proper authorities. The pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms are
clear and unambiguous. Said laws, not being contrary to any provision of the Constitution, are constitutional.

CASE # 73
PEOPLE vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO

FACTS:
The case is all about due process of implementing the Municipal ordinances covering tax payments The prosecution would want to show to the
court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for three
consecutive years as per Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by ordinance no. 15, series of 1965, and as further amended by Ordinance No.
12, Series of 1966, of the municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon. The accuse by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected
have already lapsed and there is no low empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to
show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused
should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under
construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. The defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside
of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and
uncertain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax ordinance is a valid adherence to due process?

RULING:
Yes, the privilege taxes on the business of fishpond Maintenance are not charged against sales but rather on occupation, which is allowed
under Republic Act No. 2264. They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.

CASE #74
Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)

FACTS:
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On July 8, 1974, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one
Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On Nov 8, 1974, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar
nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for Nov. 18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied.
The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on Dec 5, 1974, submitted its report recommending the separation of
petitioner from the University. On Dec 12, 1974, the University applied with the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner’s employment. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for reinstatement and back wages. Judgment was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of
Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified.

ISSUE:
Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal from AUF.

HELD:
No, the guarantee of security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for postponement of
the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at
the Dept. of Labor during which petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case.

CASE #75
CHR vs CSC 227 SCRA 42 (1993)

FACTS:
Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee to the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in, filed an application for optional retirement
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1616 because of failing eyesight. On July 17, 1989 he was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram of the
acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective July 31, 1989 and the appointment of Atty. Rodrigo Roy as his successor
effective August 1, 1989.On August 25, 1989 (GSIS) informed private respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably considered
due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep. Act No. 1616 requiring three (3) years of continuous service preceding
retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the service to complete the said requirement. Accordingly, Pacete
requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty.
Roy. On October 18, 1989, the CHR through a resolution, denied his request and instead formally charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in
the performance of official duty and failure to account for public funds. On May 27, 1990, Pacete, after being informed of the action taken by the CHR
elevated his case to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On August 31, 1990, the MSPB ordered the immediate reinstatement of private
respondent his former position with payment of back wages and other benefits, allowed by law without prejudice to the outcome of the formal charges
against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Pacete was illegal due to the fact that the resolution denying reinstatement was issued without conforming to
the requirements of due notice and hearing.

HELD:
Yes, it constituted a blatant violation of Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 807 which provides
that “No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process,”. If petitioner
wishes to dismiss private respondent for cause, the latter must be allowed to return to his previous position so that he may avail himself of the opportunity
to refute the charges imputed to him. Moreover, if petitioner were sincere in its denial of reinstatement to private respondent, it should have filed the
administrative charges beforehand, not after it had allowed private respondent to undergo the process leading to his retirement from the service. Granted
that an employee is guilty of incompetence and inefficiency, an employer should seasonably file administrative charges against him and marshal the
needed evidence instead of springing these, on him as he is about to retire. Such a treatment is, to put it mildly, unfair and certainly, totally unexpected
and uncalled for from a government agency whose avowed mission is to protect and promote human rights.

CASE # 76
U.P. vs Ligot – Telan (227 SCRA 342)

FACTS:
U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, etc. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, they
state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University
may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. Ramon P. Nadal, applied for STFAP benefits, a
student of the College of Law. A team composed of Dona and Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Urbino, Scholarship
Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Villanueva wrote
Nadal informing him that the investigation showed discrepancies. Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest
based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance
and transcript of records. U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. In executive
session, the BOR found Nad al "guilty" and imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of
any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with
12%interest per annum from March 30, 199 3 and no n-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him"
during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

HELD:

NO, University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is
not exclusive of students wh ose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no tim e did
respon dent com plain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for
delibe ratio n. He would m ake an e x c e p t i o n o f t h e M a r c h 2 9 , 1 9 9 3 m e e t i n g f o r i t w a s supposed
reconside r the decision made on Ma rch 28,1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him.
Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, onl y
substantial evi dence re quired, that which m eans m ore than a m ere scintilla or rel evant evi dence a s a reasonabl e
m ind m ight accept as a d e q u a t e t o s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o n , e v e n i f o t h e r m i n d s equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due process.

CASE # 77
OPLE vs. TORRES

FACTS:
On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoptionof a National Computerized Identification
Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a
Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the implementation of
Administrative Order 308.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AO 308 is a law and not a mere administrative order, the enactment of the former being beyond the President’s power.

HELD:

1. Yes, administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies:
the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative
order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order
is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business
with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. The authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the
President to issue.

CASE # 78
TUNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85)

FACTS:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the
carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that
he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted
to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No.
1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision under Act No. 1147 a valid exercise of Police Power.
HELD:
Yes, beyond the power of Police Power, , the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary"
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted
either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
CASE #79
Smith Kline & French Laboratories vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
In August 1989, Danlex Research Laboratories petitioned before Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) that it may
be granted a compulsory license for the use and manufacture of the pharmaceutical product Cimetidine. Cimetidine is useful as an antihistamine and in
the treatment of ulcers. Cimetidine is originally patented to Smith Kline and French Laboratories in 1978, and the said patent is still in force at the time of
application by Danlex Research. The BPTTT granted the application of Danlex Research together with a provision that Danlex Research should be paying
2.5% of the net wholesale price as royalty payment to Smith Kline. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Smith Kline assailed the grant as it argued,
among others, that the same is an invalid exercise of police power because there is no overwhelming public necessity for such grant considering that
Smith Kline is able to provide an adequate supply of it to satisfy the needs of the Philippine market; that a provision in the Philippine Patent Laws is violative
of the Paris Convention to which the Philippines is a signatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
Yes, the granting is a valid exercise of police power. Cimetidine is medicinal in nature, and therefore necessary for the promotion of public health
and safety.
Section A(2) of Article 5 [of the Paris Convention] unequivocally and explicitly respects the right of member countries to adopt legislative measures to
provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An
example provided of possible abuses is “failure to work;” however, as such, is merely supplied by way of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not
preclude the inclusion of other forms of categories of abuses. The legislative intent in the grant of a compulsory license was not only to afford others an
opportunity to provide the public with the quantity of the patented product, but also to prevent the growth of monopolies. Certainly, the growth of monopolies
was among the abuses which Section A, Article 5 of the Convention foresaw, and which our Congress likewise wished to prevent in enacting.

CASE # 80
Pilipinas Kao v. CA [GR 105014, 18 December 2001]

FACTS:
Pilipinas Kao, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in multiple areas of registered activity, or
has a number of projects registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). Batas Pambansa 391 (Investment Policy Act of 1983) was enacted in 1983,
providing, among others, for tax incentives for new and expanding export producer. To avail itself of these tax incentives, the company applied with BOI
for registration of its expanded production capacity, which BOI approved on 8 January 1987. These tax incentives apply only to the company’s Certificate
of Registration 87-1476 (Project 4) as new export producer, and Certificate of Registration 87- 1247 (Project 3) as an expanding export producer (an
expansion of the company's existing projects registered under RA +6135). The initial application by company for tax credit incentives for the year 1987
was approved by BOI substantially as applied for. But those applied for in 1988 and onwards were drastically reduced by BOI with the adoption and
application of a deductible "base figure" provided in its Tax Credit on Net Local Content (NLC) and Net Value Earned (NVE) Manual of Operations. On 31
March 1989, company filed applications for its 1988 tax credits on the NVE for P8,583,328.00 and on the NLC for P25,928,673.00 for a grand total of
P34,512,000.00. On 10 May 1990, the BOI Issued Board Resolution 188, series of 1990, granting company's application for tax credit but only in the
reduced amounts of P1,512,758 for NVE and P2,631,018 for NLC for a grand total of P4,223,776. Notified of the BOI s decision, company requested for
a reconsideration. But before the BOI could act thereon, company again filed on 3 July 1990 its applications for 1989 tax credits on the NVE in the amount
of P9,649,459 and on the NLC, P25,648,401, for a grand total of P35,297,860. On 27 July 1990, the BOI denied company's request for reconsideration
anent its 1988 tax credit, the denial being communicated to company in a letter dated 1 August 1990 and received by the latter on 15 August 1990.On 17
December 1990, company again moved for reconsideration of the BOI s letter dated 1 August 1990, but the same was denied by the BOI in a letter dated
11 March 1991. On 11 March 1991, the BOI also advised company of the approval of its application for the year 1989 tax credit but only in the reduced
amounts of P3,441,473 (NVE) and P649,471 (NLC) for a grand total of P4,090,944.

ISSUE:
Whether the Board of Investment’s Manual of Operation, especially as to the NLC and NVE, binds Pilipinas Kao, or the public as a whole.

HELD:
The Manual of Operations is not exempted from publication as it is not merely internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, nor is it a letter of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. The Manual of Operations affected the public in a substantial way. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The Manual of Operations was meant
to enforce or implement B.P. Blg. 391, a law of general application. The absence of publication is a fatal omission that renders the Manual of Operations
void and of no effect. Further, Section 17 of PD 1789, as amended by BP 391, explicitly provides that the rules and regulations implementing the
Investments Code take effect only after due publication. Thus, the ''Tax Credit on NLC and NVE Manual of Operations" (Manual of Operations) of BOI has
no legal effect insofar as it adopts as a "base figure" for net value earned (NVE) the "highest attained production volume" in the period preceding the
registration of petitioner's additional or expanded capacity; and (2) only the expanded or additional capacity of petitioner registered under BP 1789, as
amended by BP 391, is entitled to the tax credit provided therein, and not the pre-existing registered capacity.

CASES 81 – 88 : NO DIGEST RECEIVED

81. Montesclaros vs. COMELEC, GR No. 152295, July 7, 2002

82. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, GR No, 46496, February 27, 1940

83. Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et. Al., vs. Albayda Jr., GR No. 172724, August 23, 2010

84. Puse vs. Puse, GR No. 183678, March 15, 2010

85. Atienza, Jr. et. al. vs. COMELEC, et. al., GR No 188920, February 16, 2010

86. Flores vs. Pacasio, AM No. P-06-2130, June 13, 2011

87. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

88. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

CASE # 89

CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 88979
FEBRUARY 7, 1992

FACTS:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers
those who are qualified:

Sec.2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the
petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s status as a co-terminous employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:

No. Petitioner is not excluded. The Early Retirement Law would violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to
be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.

CASE # 90

Tiu vs CA
G.R. No. 127410
January 20, 1999

FACTS:

Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section
12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97,
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-
free privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection of the laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the
exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no
substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the
lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'"

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD:

No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby
justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification,
to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class. The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of
some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its
status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use
as operational bases for their businesses and industries.

CASE # 91

DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 129118
July 19, 2000
FACTS:

The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding
office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election
officials were covered by the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD:

No. The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of
election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

CASE # 92

CRUZ vs COA
GR NO. 134740
October 23, 2001

FACTS:

The Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) is a government-owned corporation granting the payment of social amelioration benefits (SAB) to its
employees. In July 1, 1989, RA 6758 was enacted and pursuant to Sec. 23 thereof, the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 as
the IRR of the law.

In May 1994, the resident auditor of COA in the SRA examined the corporation's accounts and questioned the legality of the payment of the SAB to all
employees of the SRA. DBM further ruled that the grant of SAB had no legal basis and was in violation of RA 6758. Accordingly, the resident auditor
suspended the payment of SAB to SRA employees. The SRA administrator requested the lifting of such suspension and the SRA employees appealed to
the Office of the President for the continued grant of SAB.

In 1996, COA denied the request and claimed that upon the effectivity of RA 6758, the grant of SAB was no longer allowed unless there was a prior
authority from the DBM or Office of the President or a legislative issuance. However, on May 1996, the Office of the President, thru an indorsement,
granted the post facto approval/ratification of the SAB to SRA employees. Pursuant to such indorsement, COA allowed the payment of SAB to SRA
employees BUT ONLY TO THOSE HIRED BEFORE October 31, 1989. All the other employees remained untitled to said benefits and were informed that
the SAB granted to them in 1994 shall be deducted thru monthly payroll.

SRA then filed a motion for partial reconsideration claiming that the authority granted by the office of the President covered ALL employees of the SRA
regardless of the date of hiring. COA denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the classification of the COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and as to who were excluded is valid

HELD:

No. The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and excluding therefrom those employees hired after October 31, 1989, has no legal
basis.

The date of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction. The employees, based on the title or position they were holding,
were exposed to the same type of work, regardless of the date they were hired. The date of hiring is not among the factors that shall be taken into
consideration in fixing compensation or granting of benefits. R. A. No. 6758, Section 2 provides, thus:

“Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences
in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. xxx”

Evidently, any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of difficulty and amount of
work. To discriminate against some employees on the basis solely of date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social policy of the law.

CASE # 93

LOPEZ VS CA
GR NO. 144573
SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Liggayu, Resident Ombudsman of PCSO, was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest Of The Service for issuing
a subpoena in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 entitled, "FACT- FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU versus Manuel Morato, et al.," in excess of his
authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon him the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
suspension without pay. Liggayu's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for review before the CA and prayed for the issuance of
a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.

On March 8, 2000, the petitioners implemented the suspension of Liggayu in compliance with the directive of the Office of Ombudsman. The CA issued a
TRO enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against private respondent. However, on May 2000, a resolution
was issued granting Liggayu's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the execution. Petitioners claimed that the stay of execution
pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government
employees charged under the Civil Service Law, where the decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stay of execution pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection
clause

HELD:

No. The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the
Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary. Courts may not,
in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the
time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied notwithstanding that later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.

The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the execution of private
respondent’s suspension pending appeal. The penalty imposed on private respondent for Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest of The Service was
six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Considering that private respondent appealed from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman,
the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension should therefore issue as a matter of right.

CASE # 94

PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION INC. (PHILRECA), ET. AL. VS. SECRETARY OF DILG
GR 143076
10 JUNE 2003

FACTS:

Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it is the declared policy of the State to provide
“the total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis” the same “being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.”
Pursuant to this policy, PD 269 aims to “promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in supplying electric service, particularly electric
cooperatives” by “giving every tenable support and assistance” to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law. From 1971 to 1978, in
order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council
(now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA (National Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with the government
of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries.
The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are existing until today. The loan agreements
contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. On 23 May
2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own
behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the Secretary of the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending that pursuant to the provisions of PD
269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the
passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their
tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the obligation of contracts between the Philippine
Government and the United States Government.

ISSUE:
Whether the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, in violation of the equal
protection clause, by providing a different tax treatment between the former and cooperatives created under RA 6938.

HELD:

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a law based on reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD
269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines). First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require
cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration
must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least
25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share
capital be less than P2,000.00. Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this principle,
the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not possess the capability nor the resources to do so and only upon
the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD 269, as amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the happening of
certain events, the power to control and take over the management and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent of government control
over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric
cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives.
Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted
to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations
with minimal government intervention or regulation. Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the
fundamental distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and cooperatives under the new Cooperative Code. Article
128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall be deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of
certain requirements within one year. However, cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three years within which to qualify and register
with the CDA, after which, provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives, would no longer apply.
CASE # 95

FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 147387
December 10, 2003

Facts:

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section
67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Issue:

Whether or not the repeal of Section 67 is violative of the equal protection clause

Held:

No. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between
an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

CASE # 96

CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC

VS.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:

Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act). Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition
for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-
and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification
is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which
is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levelsin the BSP. Petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653", violates the equal protection clause as protected by the Constitution.

Held:

Yes. It violates the equal protection clause. The challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of
the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages
to entice them to stay. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution
to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for
discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save
them from reasonless discrimination.

CASE # 97

Quinto & Tolentino, Jr. vs. COMELEC

Gr No. 189698, February 22, 2010
Facts: The Commission on Elections questioned an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, which declared the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, unconstitutional. Both provide that any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Whether or not the given provisions violate the equal protection clause.
Held: No. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, which
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed decision deemed that the above provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. However, there was doubt that the
different treatment of appointive officials in comparison with elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law. Such distinction is justified, or
germane to the purposes of the law, by considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, while there is no such
expectation for appointed official. Thus, elected officials can be said to be excluded from the deemed-resigned provisions out of respect for the sovereign
will of the electorate.

CASE # 98
NPC vs. Pinatubo Commercial
GR No. 176006, March 26, 2010

Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3
and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being
violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.
Issue: Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Held: No. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right
of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim
similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.

CASE # 99
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Facts: COMELEC refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), as a party-list based on moral grounds. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list under RA No. 7941.
Held: Yes. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors in RA No. 7941 is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA No. 7941. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs
and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. The principle of non-
discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

CASE # 100
Louis “Barok” Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010/ Lagman vs. Ochoa, et. al.
GR Nos. 192935/193036, December 7, 2010

Facts: E. O. No. 1 was signed by Pres. Aquino, establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). It is an ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration (Arroyo Administration), and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
Held: Yes. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. However, the equal protection clause permits
classification, if it passes the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Executive Order No.
1 violates the equal protection clause, since the Truth Commission’s clear mandate is to investigate the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not including past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.

CASE # 101
Savage vs. Taypin
G.R. No. 134217. May 11, 2000

Facts: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu
City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. The issuance
was based upon the allegations by the private respondent, that Savage’s products are the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Issue: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents are punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, justifying the issuance of
the search and seizure of the properties.
Held: No. The issue of the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has
been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article, by the Intellectual Property Code on January 1, 1998. In the issuance of search warrants,
the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since
there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant is therefore defective on its face.

CASE # 102
Gov’t of the USA vs. Puruganan
GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002

Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held by the
respondent judge to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. During which, the lower court issued its questioned Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for Jimenez’s arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
Issue: Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued.
Held: No. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which was invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination, under oath or affirmation,
of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with
the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings
and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous.

CASE # 103
People vs. Libnao
G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003

Facts: Appellant Agpanga Libnao was convicted of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659. She and her co-accused
were apprehended at a checkpoint, while they were riding in a tricycle with a bag of marijuana. This occurred after the PNP had conducted surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area, and acted on a tip that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night.
Issue: Whether or not the search and consequent arrest of the appellant was lawful in the absence of the proper warrants.
Held: Yes. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee operates only against “unreasonable” searches and
seizures. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The warrantless search in this case is
not without a probable cause, based on the surveillance and information gathered by the PNP. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she
was committing a criminal offense, delivery or transporting prohibited drugs. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to
carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
CASE # 104

Chu vs. Tamin, 410 SCRA 53 (2003)

FACTS:

Complainant alleged CENRO Dela Cruz of the DENR Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed
that complainant was in possession of “forest products of dubious origin” in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended. On the
same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainant’s fishpond in Bulawan,
Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove
specie) with an estimated value of P183, 790. Complainant obtained a copy of the complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364.
Complainant again obtained, for the second time, a copy of the complete records of the case; these certified copies did not contain any transcript of
respondent judge’s examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint.

Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for
violation of PD 705. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses.
Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted
such examination but the record of the “deposition” was “misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence. In response to the directive of the OCA,
respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement denied complainant’s allegations. Respondent judge asserted that he personally examined a certain
Reynaldo Cuaresma, allegedly a witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question.

In his Report, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch
23. He found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He
attached in his report the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas.

In his explanation, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo
Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the
examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to
complainant failed, through “pure inadvertence,” to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the
pages of the records were not yet “physically paged.” He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to
Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to
accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later
returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law
HELD/RULING:

Yes. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. A Judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and conversant with
basic legal principles. He owes it to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who depends on him, to know
the law which he is called upon to apply. Not only that, there would be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of
justice if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

CASE # 105

Kho vs. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70 (1999)

FACTS:

NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner. On the
same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner. The search
warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of
confidential information they received. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against
petitioner Kho. The respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrants.

Armed with Search Warrant, agents searched subject premises and they recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of
ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said
second search yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The NBI agents found out that
no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Petitioners question the issuance of subject search
warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefore. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents
within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicant’s personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probable cause was fully determined before the issuance of Search Warrant

HELD/RULING:

Yes. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked
searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their
witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing
that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis
for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

CASE # 106

Uy vs. BIR, GR No. 129651, October 20, 2000

FACTS:

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling
thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR
requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which
contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec
253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents
of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and
documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied
by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD/RULING:
Yes. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements,
in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been an inconsistency in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the
thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched.
One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the
issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
CASE # 107

People vs. Francisco, GR No. 129035, April 22, 2002

FACTS:

Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed under surveillance after the police confirmed,
through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling shabu. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan applied for a search warrant before
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the second floor master’s bedroom of their two-
storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight
policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they refused
to answer. It was only at the police station where she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with
Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City and enforced the warrant.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the search conducted was illegal and violative of accused’ constitutional rights.

HELD/RULING:

No. For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality
that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.

Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally
by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must
be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is
none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.

CASE # 108

People vs. Lim, Gr No. 141699, August 7, 2002

FACTS:

On or about March 27, 1999, in Caloocan City, Wilson D. Lim, Danilo S. Sy, Jackilyn O. Santos and Antonio U. Sio without having been
authorized by law, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and
deliver to a buyer(1,994.60) grams of Shabu . Upon their arraignment, accused-appellants Wilson Lim, Jackilyn Santos and Antonio Sio, duly assisted by
their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty. Appellant Danilo Sy, represented by counsel, refused to enter a plea, thus, pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule
116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. Trial thereafter ensued. Appellant Jackilyn Santos testified
that she and Danilo Sy were lovers and they had checked in at the Apollo motel, that while they were taking their nap, somebody knocked at the door and
when she slightly opened the door, about 5 to 6 men in civilian clothes entered the room and a raid was announced she was only wrapped in a blanket
and she was ordered to dress up while accused Danilo argued with the men on why they were being arrested; that she and Danilo were brought downstairs
and then to PAOCTF at Camp Crame.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of the appellants is lawful and valid

HELD/RULING:

No. the raid conducted on the premises by the police without any search warrant or warrant of arrest was illegal. Since the warrantless arrests
were invalid, the search conducted on the premises was not one which is incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. Thus, the search in the motel, without
the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and the shabu allegedly seized thereat are inadmissible in evidence against appellants.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To justify the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must adduce the quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall
on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the accused. Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused-appellants have
not been proven with moral certainty, as in this case against appellants, it is our policy of long standing that their presumption of innocence must be
favoured and their exoneration be granted as a matter of right.
CASE # 109

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)

FACTS:

Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda
R. Marcos” In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In
addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

Respondents filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by
the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent
Marcos children filed a motion dated for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial
implementation of said agreements. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that the motion to approve the compromise agreement took precedence over the motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation claiming
she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to
the Marcos estate.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting
a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, which opposition
was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.

On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment.

HELD/RULING:

No. Respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment
should take place as a matter of right. Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory
of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or
admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for
petitioner Republic.

CASE # 110

People vs. Tuan, GR No. 176066, Aug. 11, 2010

FACTS:

ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA, was charged with two criminal cases namely: Illegal Possession of Marijuana and Illegal Possession of
Firearms Upon her arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to both charges. Pre-trial and trial proper
then ensued. During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses. At around nine o’clock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male
informants namely, Jerry Tudlong and Frank Lad-in reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain
“Estela Tuan” had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City.

SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. He gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then
accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellant’s house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant’s house, while SPO2 Fernandez
waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellant’s house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the
marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought
from accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search
Warrant for accused-appellant’s house.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge
Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV. Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing,
after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause.

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, the immediately implemented the it. Before going to the accused-appellant’s house, SPO2 Fernandez
invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual
(Pascual), accused-appellant’s neighbor, to come along.

The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellant’s house. Even though accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was
allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellant’s father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez
and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.
 They continued the search and found on the appellant’s room a brick of marijuana and a firearm. They issued a receipt for the items confiscated
and recovered from the house of Tuan. The bricks of Marijuana were brought to the NBI for investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering as void the search warrant issued against Tuan.

HELD/RULING:
No. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination
of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by
Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
description of the place to be searched and things to be seized. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of
the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in
this case. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s residence after said judge’s personal
examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.

CASE # 111
People vs. Abriol, GR No. 123137, Oct. 7, 2001
FACTS:

P O 2 A l b e r t A b r i o l o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e N a t i o n a l P o l i c e ( P N P ) , M a c a r i o Astellero, Januari o Dosdos, and PNP

P/Chief Inspector Ga udioso Navales we re cha rge d with and convicted, of m urder for havi ng shot one Alejandro Flores, and of
Illegal Possession of Firearms for the handgu ns that they were arm ed with. On appeal, one of thei r contenti ons against their
conviction for murder is that the PNP cannot be presumed to have done their work regularl y due to the errors and blunders they comm itted in
transferring th e possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They further
contend, as agai nst their co nviction fo r Ille gal Possession of Fi rearm s, that the handguns and amm unition taken from them by
the police officers we re illeg ally seized in the absence of a warrant.

ISSUE:

W hether or not the hand gun s and amm unitions used in the killing were illegally seized from appellants in the absence of a
warrant.

HELD/RULING:

No. There are eight (8 ) instances wh ere a warra ntless search and seizure is valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as
an incident to a la wf ul arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving
vehicles;(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and
premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the
subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reaso ns. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was m ade after a fatal
shooting, and p ursuit of a fast -m oving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part
of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in crim inal activity. The urgent need of the police
to take imm ediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of
Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating
P.D. No.1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules.

CASE # 112
G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY TING UY

FACTS:

Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags
of shabu were confiscated found underneath the driver’s seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he contended that he
was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible.

HELD: No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that “a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.” Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante
delictoas a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.

The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made
without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the
search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]). A buy-bust operation is vastly different
from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the
effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621
[1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.

CASE # 113

G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA

FACTS: Appellant was sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut when police officers showed the search warrant and
explained the contents to him. The team searched the hut and found a plastic container under the kitchen dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver.
The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions and arrested the appellant. He was held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug
found therein. Appellant contended that the hut was not his, hence the search and seizure was illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

HELD: No. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly
recovered – it is held that the search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso factoinadmissible. “SEC.
5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 Rule 112.”

CASE # 114

PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT

G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001

FACTS: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness
SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place
in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted,
and a search warrant was later issued. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the
house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants
of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped
in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign
it. After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had
seized.

ISSUES: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may
be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”

HELD: Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable
cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search W arrant 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to
allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid.

CASE # 115
G.R. No. 132371 April 9, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO SIMBAHON y QUIATZON

FACTS: Police operatives, together with the chairman of the barangay which had jurisdiction over the place, and a member of media, served Search
Warrant No. 95-100 upon appellant Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito Mangulabnan at their residence. Thereafter, the team began conducting
a search of all the rooms in accordance with the search warrant, and found under the bed a brick of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana
wrapped in a newspaper, a black bullet pouch containing six (6) live ammunitions, and sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. After
the search, an inventory receipt of the items seized from the house of the suspects was prepared and, together with an affidavit of orderly search was
signed by Danilo Simbahon. Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon was charged for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession of firearms. The Court found him guilty
of the crime charged against him in Criminal Case No. 95-142514 thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and to pay the cost. However, appellant contended that the court erred in convicting him because the search
warrant served was invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was invalid.

HELD: Yes. The record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which render the same null and void. The caption as well as the body of Search
Warrant No. 95-100 show that it was issued for more than one offense — for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866. In Tambasen v. People, et
al., it was held: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant
for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a “scatter-shot warrant”
and totally null and void.

Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The constitutional requirement is a description
which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all others. In the case at bar, only the application for search warrant contained
the address of the place to be searched. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s residence as “premises”, without specifying
its address. The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. The absence of a particular
description in the search warrant renders the same void.

Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant issued for the search of appellant’s house. The seizure by the police officers
conducting the search of articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not
be committed.20 Neither can the admissibility of such seized items be justified under the plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were
found not inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous search under the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a plastic
bag.

CASE # 116
G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO

Facts: The police officers conducted a test buy operation at the residence of the accused where they bought P1,500.00 worth of shabu but they did not
arrest the accused at that time. Instead, they applied for a search warrant based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his
house. When they arrived at the residence of the accused, they “sideswept a car of the accused parked outside his house. When the son opened their
gate and went out, the police officers introduced themselves, informed him that they had a search warrant entered the house and handcuffed the son of
the accused to a chair. They summoned two (2) barangay kagawads to witness the search. They were able to seize the following: (a) “one plastic bag
containing yellowish substance”, (b) a weighing scale, (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check
writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine Currency and and appellant’s (l) Toyota Corolla car. An inventory was made
signed by the police officers the kagawads and the son of the accused. There was likewise an affidavit of orderly search but not under oath. Accused was
charged with illegal possession of shabu. One of the kagawads testified that shabu was not even one of the items seized and inventoried. What originally
appeared was merely “Chinese Medicine”, but replaced with shabu. After trial, accused was convicted. He questioned the validity of the search.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in implementing the search warrant by the police officers.

HELD: No. The raiding team’s departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, taken together with the numerous
other irregularities attending the search of appellant’s residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply
the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Court’s solemn duty to be ever
watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will that wrong be repressed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from
a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith
is demanded because:

x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities in the manner by which the search of
appellant’s residence was conducted.
Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that
they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate
sideswiping of appellant’s car was unreasonable and unjustified.

There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen entered appellant’s residence. Considering the degree of
intimidation, alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified
as was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.

Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed
receipt of the things seized.

After the inventory had been prepared, it was presented to appellant for his signature without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to
sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. In People v. Policarpio,
this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of
the constitutional right to remain silent.

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellant’s custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium
of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence.

The “Affidavit of Orderly Search” is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not having been executed under oath, it is not actually an
affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then
instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, KagawadManalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.

More importantly, since the “Affidavit of Orderly Search” purports to have been executed by appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity
of the search of his residence for he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was “almost through.”

In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged “Affidavit of Orderly Search,” prepared without the aid of counsel and by
the very police officers who searched his residence and eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question.

On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellant’s residence failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8
(formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery
of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or
his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from
actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law:

As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam
around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search
conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.

That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and
explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126
provides that the search should be witnessed by “two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality” only in the absence of either
the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellant’s residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son
Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.

CASE # 117

NO DIGEST

CASE # 118

People vs. Chua

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their
confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief
formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group
acted as their back up.
 Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After
accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his
right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left
back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-
appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful. (2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel
and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and
frisk”. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. In the case at bar, accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-
and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should
also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case
at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither
the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant. The accused was acquitted.

CASE # 119
NO DIGEST

CASE # 120

People vs. Canton, GR No. 148825, Dec. 27, 2002

Facts:

Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught in possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
without prescription or license. Susan was bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal detector and beeped. A civilian
inspector of the airport searched her and upon frisking, she felt something that is bulging in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover packets
that were wrapped with packing tape.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights

Ruling:

No, warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her constitutional rights. What
was done to Susan was a stop and frisk search. “stop and frisk” situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. The
search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 which states that “Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances xxx”. This is another exemption in
warrantless arrest and seizure. After the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
CASE # 121

People vs. Valdez, GR No. 129296, Sep. 25, 2000

Facts:

De La Cruz unlawfully cultivated seven fully grown marijuana plants from which dangerous drugs may be manufactured. The police officers
received a tip that the said marijuana plants were grown by De La Cruz. They then went to De La Cruz’s place and saw 7 5 ft tall marijuana plants. The
police uprooted the plants and were then confiscated and escheated in favor of the government. A laboratory test was made and confirmed that the plants
were marijuana. A case was brought against dela cruz and the marijuana plants were used as an evidence against him.

Issues:

Whether or not the seizure of marijuana plants is lawful

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the 7 marijuana plants despite their inadmissibility being products of an illegal search

Ruling:

No, the seizure of marijuana plants is unlawful. The OSG may have contended that the seizure is lawful since it can be treated as part of the
plain view doctrine, however, the police have declared that they have one day to obtain a warrant to search the appellant’s farm. They could have convinced
the judge that there is probable cause to justify the issuance of warrant. The doctrine of plain view cannot be applied in this case. The following are required
for the plain view doctrine to be applied:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]

In the instant case, PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there
was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Their discovery of Cannabis plant was
not inadvertent.

II.

Yes, the trial court the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the 7 marijuana plants despite their inadmissibility being products of an illegal
search. The 7 marijuana plants were obtained being products of an illegal search.

CASE # 122
Sr. Inspector Valeroso vs. CA and People
GR No. 164815, Sep. 3, 2009

FACTS:

Senior Inspector Jerry C. Valeroso was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. He was arrested at the
boarding house of his children, where the arresting officers also found the subject firearm and ammunition after ransacking the locked cabinet. With that
discovery, petitioner was charged with Illegal Possession of firearm and ammunition. The RTC found Valeroso guilty. A petition for review has been filed
by Valeroso stating that his constitutional rights have been breached

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition infringes the Constitutional rights of Valeroso

RULING:

Yes, the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition infringes the constitutional rights of Valeroso. The search made was
illegal in violation of Valeroso's right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of the said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him. A warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right; peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity
in the performance of official functions.
CASE # 123

Ronires vs. People ,Gr No. 182010, Aug. 25, 2010

Facts:
Romines was caught possessing 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Romines admitted to the genuiness of the said
item. Through a tip, police enforcers conducted surveillance on activities of a notorious snatcher. As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that
brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the direction of Romines who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what
the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as
a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case. PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can question the warrantless arrest before the appellate court for the first time

Ruling:
No, the petitioner cannot question the warrantless arrest before the appellate court for the first time. The petitioner should have
questioned her warrantless arrent early, at least before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such
ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof– for the
first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her
arrest.

CASE # 124

Fajardo vs People

GR no. 190889

10 January 2011

Facts:

Fajardo and Valerio were charged of violation of PD 1866 for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of
law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of
caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of
M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation. Petitioner insists
on an acquittal and avers that the adiscovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid
intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive
showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when
the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.

Issue:

Whether or not the receivers are admissible as evidence in court

Ruling:

Yes, the receivers are admissible as evidence in court. The receivers were seized in plain view which is an exception to the rule that an evidence that has
been obtained through warrantless arrest and seizure is inadmissible. Prior to the seizure, the law enforcement officer lawfully made an intrusion and was
in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of lawful intrusion, he inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating to the
accused. The evidence was also open to the eye and hand and its discovery was inadvertent.

CASE # 125
Amarga v. Abbas
98 Phil. 739 (1956)

Facts:
Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua,
alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the
case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest
(WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did
not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that
the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima
facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged.

Ruling:
THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING
JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground
to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the
complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place
the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge
to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment
or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

CASE # 126

Burgos vs Chief of Staff

133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against Burgos for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure
of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.Petitioners questioned
the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject
to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

No, the two warrants were not valid to justify seizure of items. The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by
the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The
purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrants. As to the issue that the items seized were real
properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable
cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

CASE # 127

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pane G.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18, 1985 Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

FACTS:

Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely
in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because
his house was used as a contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the
likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Salonga’s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.

HELD:
Yes. The petition is dismissed. The petitioner’s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The
constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the government. In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence
of membership in subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in
furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government
through illegal means. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directed against a particular family. Such a
statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.

OBITER DICTUM: To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it would be to transgress constitutional due process. However, it is not enough that
the preliminary investigation is conducted to satisfy the due process clause. There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused

CASE # 128

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLERAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30,
1991.Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28,1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the
DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain
about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity
that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and
homicide

2. Whether or not respondent Judges deLeon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminaryinvestigation4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as anaccused.

HELD:

1. NO.

2. NO.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.

4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of information, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent Judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely led the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9of Rule 119 for legal basis).With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the
Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. With
regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.

CASE # 129

ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001]

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of
a Warrant of Arrest dated 12April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of the RTC-Br.20, Cauayan, Isabela for the
supposed crime of libel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had not been previously charged, complainant filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Preliminary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking
that the Warrant of Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary
investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was not specified therein in violation
of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that
he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and information already filed in court.
Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

HELD:

YES, Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to
be seized." Interpreting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require this would be to unduly laden those with preliminary examinations and
investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare certification as to the
existence of probable cause. Much more is required byte constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of
stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow
the required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not even a prosecutor’s certification to rely upon since no
information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim.Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed
byte private complainant Leonia Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arrest against complainant and the latter's
client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial
function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket
Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "duty" of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that information had already been filed in
court before preparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of the investigating officer as to the
existence of probable cause making him administratively liable.

CASE # 130

Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 (1968)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 131

Samulde vs. Salvani, Jr., 165 SCRA 734 (1988)

Facts:

Municipal Judge Gelacio Samulde of Patnoñgon, Antique, conducted a preliminary investigation of Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed on
October 29, 1985 by Maria Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale's land (Crim. Case
No. 2046-B, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Pelayo Arangale").

After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his
witnesses, as provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial
Fiscal Ramon Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint".

The fiscal returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records to his office was "premature" because Judge Samulde
failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Section 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Section 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied
"that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
" implying thereby that, although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be immediately placed under custody so
as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest.
On October 9, 1986, a special civil action of mandamus was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Antique by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde
to compel the latter to issue a warrant for the arrest of Arangale.

Issue:

Whether or not there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

Held:

To determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue against the accused, the investigating judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses "in
writing and under oath ... in the form of searching questions and answers." When he is "satisfied that a probable cause exists, and that there is a necessity
of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice," he may issue the warrant as provided in Section 6, par. b,
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

SEC. 6 When warrant of arrest may issue. —

(a) By the Regional Court.....

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. -If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity
of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

As correctly argued by the petitioner Judge Samulde, three (3) conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge
must:

(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers;

(b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediatecustody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

It is an entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, for the
determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to
his sound judgment or discretion.

In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners, the investigating judge did not
believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place
him under immediate custody.

CASE # 132
Uy vs. Mercado, 154 SCRA 567 (1987)

NO DIGEST

CASE # 133
Lim vs Felix 194 SCRA 292 ( 1991)

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of named accused..

On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused
with a recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC
of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued
requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination
of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself
been personally convinced of such probable cause.

Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including
the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a
probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.
The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

CASE # 134

People vs Chua-Uy

The evidence on record shows that at around 5:00 o ‘clock in the afternoon of September 11, 1995, a female confidential informant personally informed
the members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which was then holding office at Barangay Concepcion, Malabon, Metro-Manila,
that accused Ramon Chua Uy "alias Chekwa" had asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram. Acting on the given information,
the members of the unit subsequently planned a buy-bust operation against the accused.

SPO4 Eddie Regalado instructed the confidential informant to consum[m]ate a deal with the accused by telling him that a prospective buyer is willing to
purchase five (5) grams of the illicit drug to be delivered in front of the Justice Hall of Malabon located along Sanciangco Street, Barangay Catmon. At
6:30 p.m., the confidential informant called up and informed the police officers that accused Chua Uy already agreed on the transaction as well as to the
place of delivery. P/Insp. Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Narcotics Unit, at once formed the buy-bust team composed of SPO4 Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel
Borda. After securing five (5) P1,000.00-peso bills to be used in the operation from P/Inp. Aquino, SPO4 Regalado have (sic) them photocopied, after
which, [he] affixed his signatures (sic) on each of the xerox copies although the serial number of the bills were previously recorded.

The group then proceeded to Barangay Catmon at about 7:00 p.m., with SPO1 Nepomuceno designated to act as the poseur buyer. When they reached
the place, SPO1 Nepomuceno first went to a store near the tennis court while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic locations. At 8:20 of
the same evening, SPO1 Nepomuceno saw a white Toyota car came to a stop. Their confidential informant immediately stepped out of the car and
approached SPO1 Nepomuceno and ordered him to board the vehicle. Once inside, SPO1 Nepomuceno caught sight of the driver and the other male
companion of accused Chua Uy through the back seat where he and the accused together with the confidential informant were seated. After a few minutes
conversation, accused Chua Uy opened up his brown attaché case and ensuingly handed over to SPO1 Nepomuceno five (5) grams of ‘shabu’ placed in
a transparent plastic packet. In exchange for the substance, SPO1 Nepomuceno delivered the five (5) P1,000-peso bills which accused Chua Uy put in
his right front pocket. SPO1 Nepomuceno then simply opened the rear right door of the car and lighted a cigarette as pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Regalado
and PO3 Ortiz consequently closed in on the vehicle. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the accused of his constitutional
rights before placing him under arrest. He later turned over to SPO1 Regalado the five (5) grams of ‘shabu’ Thereafter, SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz
seized the brown attaché case from accused Chua Uy which yielded five (5) more plastic packets of "shabu," along with several drug paraphernalia. SPO4
Regalado likewise recovered the buy-bust money from the accused after the consumated (sic) transactionThe one packet of suspected "shabu" which
was the subject of the sale including the five (5) packets of the same substance, taken from the brown attaché case, bearing the respective initials of SPO4
Regalado and SPO1 Nepomuceno were brought to the NBI Forensic Division. Laboratory examination of the pieces of evidence shows positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was
learned that there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused at No. 402 Gen. Vicente St., San Rafael Village, Navotas,
Metro Manila. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court to lawfully search the said premises of the
accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride. During the search and in the presence of Bgy. Kagawad George So and Rodolfo Salvador including Maritess
Puno, the alleged owner of the house and live-in partner of accused Chua Uy, the team was able to confiscate assorted articles intended for the repacking
of the regulated drug ,SPO1 Nepomuceno identified them as follows: one (1) white plastic scoop; one (1) blue plastic scoop; one (1) tangerine plastic
scoop; one (1) Selecta ice cream cup; and one (1) white plastic container All the items were marked by SPO1 Nepomuceno with his initials "AGN." Along
with the aforesaid articles were three (3) pieces of plastic scoops and two (2) plastic glasses (sic) with traces of "shabu." Laboratory examination made on
them gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (These antecedent facts which lead to the filing of the
present cases against accused Chua Uy are embodied in the sworn affidavit of SPO1 Nepomuceno marked and offered in evidence as Exh. "J."

SPO4 Eddie Regalado corroborated the testimony of SPO Nepomuceno, claiming that he was positioned fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away when he
saw SPO1 Nepomuceno entered the white Toyota car at the time of the operation. He further went to say that a caliber 9mm pistol was also recovered
from accused Chua Uy but considering that up to now they have not received any certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit, showing whether
accused is authorized to carry firearm, no case has yet been filed against the latter. Further, SPO4 Regalado said that accused Chua Uy has admitted to
him that he is just a neophyte in the illegal trade.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid buy-bust operation.

Held:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution
of their criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending
drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit.[18] As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given
to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against
appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall
prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.

We, of course, are aware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass
civilians.[20] But the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement
agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[21] Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court
with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
CASES # 135

PP VS BERIARMENTE GR NO. 137612

FACTS: This is a case of -buybust operation wherein the judgment rendered that the accused is found guilty on the basis of the weight of the dried
marijuana which is 1500 grams. Based from the given facts, SPO2 Caballero was informed by a police informant that he identified the accused who was
looking for buyers of a sack of marijuana plants. And this informant's story was overheard by SPO2 Sinarlo, so they pretended to be as buyer so they
could arrest the prospective seller . As soon as they saw the sack change hands, they arrested the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the buy - bust operation conducted in this case is valid warrantless arrest

HELD: Yes, it is well - established that in the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs, what is important is the fact that the poseur - buyer received that
gooda from the accused - appellant and the same was presented as evidence in court neither is there a rule of law which requires that there must be so
simultaneous exchange of the marked - money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the same of the illegal drugs is
adequately established and the substance itself is presented before the court. It is provided in the rules of court which provides that a peace officer or
private person may make an arrest, without a warrant, when a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense, in his presence. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy - bust operation conducted by the police on the basis of
information received from a police asset that the accused - appellant was looking for a buyer. His arrest, therefore was lawful and the sack of marijuana
plants confiscated from him were admissible un evidences, being the fruits of the crime.

CASE # 136– 137

NO DIGEST

CASE # 138

G.R. No. 113218 November 22, 2001

ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

FACTS

The petitioner was charged with illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollars. Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, had a buy bust operation in
a restaurant where the three members of the Investigation staff of the Central Bank stayed outside the restaurant and only Labita, a confidential assistant
of the Central Bank of the Philippines and Marqueta, a representative of the US Secret Service went inside. The informer introduced Labita and Marqueta
to the petitioner as buyers of the US dollar notes. The petitioner drew ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet, where at that moment,
upon a pre-arranged signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended the petitioner
Alejandro Tecson . The petitioner affixed his initial on the dorsal portion of each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes and signed the corresponding
receipt for the said US dollar notes seized from him. He also executed a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the proper conduct of the investigation by the Central
Bank operatives on the petitioner.

Petitioner claimed that no buy-bust operation took place, inasmuch as there was no haggling as to the price between him and the poseur buyers, and that
no money changed hands. Tecson averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta had no personal knowledge as to petitioner's alleged
possession of counterfeit US dollar notes as they merely relied on the predetermined signal of the civilian informer before making the arrest. Hence, the
ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly confiscated from him incidental to his arrest are inadmissible in evidence.. The trial court found the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner filed an appeal but the trial court’s decision was reaffirmed and the petition for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner’s warrantless arrest and seizure of evidences was valid

HELD

Yes, this is a case of a legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the crime. The civilian informer did not have to convince the petitioner
to sell fake US dollar notes during the buy-bust operation because he arranged with the informer a meeting with possible buyers. What the informer did
was merely to convince him that prosecution witnesses were actually buyers. The absence of haggling as to the price of the subject fake US dollar notes
between the petitioner and the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of the buy-bust operation.The petitioner cannot validly impugn the admissibility of the
subject ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him in his arrest. It is clear from the testimony of Labita, that he saw the petitioner drew
several pieces of fake US dollar notes from his wallet and did not have to rely on the prearranged signal of the informer inasmuch as he had unhindered
view and appreciation of what was happening before him. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes are admissible in evidence for the reason
that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by the prosecution witnesses during the said buy-bust operation. There is a legal presumption that public
officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. That legal presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to the
contrary. In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of Appeals.
CASE # 139

People vs Sanus

G.R No.135952 September 17, 2002

Facts:

Case arose from the death of a grandmother and her 6 year-old grandson. Police officers of Canlubang,Laguna received information that appellant was
the principal suspect and that he was seen inside the residence of the Spouses Vallejo.The team composed of peace officers and local barangay
officials,asked permission from the spouses and right there and then arrested the accused after a sudden jump on the roof. The trial court found enough
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was lawful?

Ruling:

No. Jumping from a roof is not a crime that would satisfy the warrantless arrest of the appellant.The appellant was not in flagrante delicto. Considering the
arrest of the appellant was unlawful the apprehending officers alleged that he had voluntary surrendered to them. It was only upon being pressed that
police officers admitted that they have indeed made the arrest.

CASE # 140

People vs. Tudtud

Facts:

Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other
carry a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened
the box, beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages
and contained what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they
pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained.

Held:

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such “search and seizure” becomes reasonable
within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Except with the following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain
view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

CASE # 141

Lopez vs. People GR 184037

Facts O n A p r i l 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , P O 2 A t i e n z a , a m e m b e r o f T a s k F o r c e o f t h e Mandaluyong City Police Station, while conducting a

routinary foot patrol saw petitioner at a distance of seven meters walking in his direction. He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand,
which held a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced him self to petitioner as a mem ber of the
Man dal uyo ng p olice, arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. He then
brou ght petitio ner to th e Ma ndalu yo ng Me dical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet and brought it to the police station.
He prepared a request and then placed the markings “APA” –his initials on the plastic sachet.

Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does the presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule?

Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
m om ent the item was picked up to the tim e it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it
was receive d and the condi tion in which it was deli vered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had b een no cha nge i n t he condition of the it em and no opport unity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testim ony of every witness who handled the evi dence from which a reliable assurance
can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.
2) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule. In case at bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza
and, in the same way, banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only arises in the absence of contradicting details
that would raise doubts on the regularity in the perform ance of official duties. Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply
with the standard procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption of regularity

CASE # 142

NO DIGEST

CASE # 143

People vs. Mariacos, GR No. 188611, Jun. 16, 2010

FACTS:

PO2 Pallayoc was informed by a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney
that was about to leave for the poblacion. Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the
other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one knew. Upon reaching the destination, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers but
he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were
already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but the women got away.

ISSUE: Whether or not PO2 Pallayoc can arrest the women without securing a warrant

RULING: Yes. The IRR of R.A. No. 9165, Section 21, provides for the Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean
that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question
the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant
should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence,
she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.

CASE # 144-146
NO DIGEST

CASE # 147

HARVEY VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 82544
June 28, 1988

FACTS:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan
Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was
found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report”
read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photonegatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown inscandalous poses as well
as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working
with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April
1988.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months.
The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest;
therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a validwarrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.)
Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was
incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.
Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental
rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner ofImmigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the PhilippineImmigration Act of 1940 in relation
to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner
ofImmigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Courtproceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to
be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

CASE # 148
LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs.HON. RAMON J. LIWAG
G.R. No. 78596 July 13, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national turned immigrant in the Philippines. He was later forcibly taken to the CID Intelligence Office
by CID agents assisted by the police, upon the order of the respondent CID Commissioner, which was based on a complaint accusing the petitioner of
being an undesirable alien. A warrant of arrest was then issued by respondent but there is no proof showing that said warrant was served on petitioner
prior to his apprehension. Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to question the validity of his arrest and detention by respondent
Commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner, preparatory to deportation proceedings, was legal.

Held: Yes. In the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, it was held that the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not extend
to deportation proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair
hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Assuming,
however, that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning due to lack of probable cause; certain events have supervened to render his petition
moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement.
Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The
restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal.

CASE # 149
Jackson vs. Macalino, GR No. 139255, Nov. 24, 2003

FACTS:

Ann information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID
which had not yet been resolved. The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in one of the criminal cases. Jackson filed a
petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the respondents. In their return, the respondents
alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and the hold departure order of the Makati RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so,

Whether or not such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of deportation

HELD/RULING:

Yes. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which
he is detained. The term “court” includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents
rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege
and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered
Yes. Prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had
become final and executory. His passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute
sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

CASE # 150

People of the Philippines vs Uy

G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005

Facts:
U y , G a m u s a n d O c h o a a r e p u b l i c o f f i c e r s e m p l o y e d b y N A P O C O R , was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting
funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for
the amount of P183, 805,291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification
of Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-
accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the managers check with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sandigan
Bayan rendered a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said crime and is orderedto pay the equal amount malversed
solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claims t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s b a s e d o n t h e a l l e g e d s w o r n s t a t e m e n t a n d
t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the reportof the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed thesworn statement while confined at the Heart C enter and upon assurance
it would not
beu s e d a g a i n s t h i m . H e w a s n o t a s s i s t e d b y c o u n s e l n o r w a s h e a p p r i s e d o f h i s constitutional rights
when he executed the affidavit.

Issue:

Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated

Held:

No, the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated. Considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of
NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim
that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police
authorities. Therefore, no counsel was required for such Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from
the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter