Article 22-23
The
3. University of the Philippines vs Philab Industries, Inc.
G.R. No. 152411
September 29, 2004
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system
of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially,
the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the
acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to
contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina,
the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries,
Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for
the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase
order and downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus: 1)
Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and 2)
Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and paying
the downpayment of 50% or P286,687.50
Ten days after, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed
with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive
Assistant Lirio. Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and
FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the
laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt
No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of
P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF.
remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB,
through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and
FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of
money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other
capitalization for the project, not to exceed P29,000,000.00.
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA with Philab on November 25, 1982.
Later, President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution. On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her
help to secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF. In the meantime, the
PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its
perusal.
PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the complaint,
PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following: (1) P702,939.40 plus an additional amount
(as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at
the time of transaction the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and
twenty seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully
paid; (2) P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and (3) Cost of suit.
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against
it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the
BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the
purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay
for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principle of unjust
enrichment when it held that UP and not FEMF, is liable to Philab?
Held:
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the
petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect
only between the parties and their assigns. A contract cannot be binding upon and
cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. Likewise admitted by the parties, is the
fact that there was no written contract executed by the petitioner, the respondent and
FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the
BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-
in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the Philab and FEMF.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise
to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not
itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not
obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based
on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner
legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled
to keep the laboratory furniture.
The petition is granted. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is reinstated
with no costs.
Article 24
1. MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI
and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 115024 [February 7, 1996]
Facts:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was
driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home.
While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right
tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the
car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed
up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the
body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to
have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial
leg.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.
2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.
3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.
Held:
1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing
towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela,
hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where
she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the witness declared that he
observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s
allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of the right lane.
2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule.
Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which
led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making,
and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only
negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.
3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction,
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the
steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained
by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his
functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office
hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee
tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients
were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by
Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to
put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its
clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former
with a convenient mode of travel.
ARTICLE 27
G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997 RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC, Quezon City, respondents
Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr.
against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the
complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. A petition for review of the resolution of
Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice
pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The Department of Justice gave
due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for
deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5
Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992 was filed by
Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial
court granted the motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final
termination of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or approval of the trial
prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated
September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial
Issue : WON the letter is libelous
Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim
must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance
against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair
treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center
Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate
distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the
Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a
private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her
intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the
presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the
absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege
the existence of malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was
filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent.
It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage
against petitioner's administrative action against him
ARTICLE 28
Willaware ProCorp. vs Jesichris ManuCorp. (28)
Caption:
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin
Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing
plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The
respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi
Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing
Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the
Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the
other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items
made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing
Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of
petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the
respondent’s employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed
familiarity with respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design,
same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as
[respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.
Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer
bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s]
manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from
respondent’s idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately
copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused [respondent]
damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the
date of respondent’s complaint.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties
are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
2. Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and
attorney’s fees?
3. Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have
been established?
Held:
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial
or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a
right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may
deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the
law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair
and legitimate.
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had
been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal
damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
ARTICLE 29

ARTICLE 31 – 35
ABERCA v. VER

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-
emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several
houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people
without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use
of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun
granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983.
He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being
filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj.
Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in
the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in
the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a
superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just
followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the
rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official
duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of
these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional
rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an
individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It
cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case
at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered
indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who
directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they
admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.
 Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
on 6:55 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law 0
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
LUMANTAS VS> CALAPIS
FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
“Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654
was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted
merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for
her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case
on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which
a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer
the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public
officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in
bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a
public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may
be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not
so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the
office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special
law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious
act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without
right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial.
The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not
render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
ARTICLE 36
G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962

Merardo L. Zapanta, petitioner

vs. The Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, etc., et al., respondents

DIZON, J.:

Facts:

On May 20, 1958 Olimpia Y. Co filed a bigamy case against Merardo L. Zapanta alleging
that the latter having previously married to Estrella Guarin, and without having the said
marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage with the complainant. On June 16,
1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for the annulment of their marriage on the ground
of duress force and intimidation. Co filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that it stated no cause of action but was denied after a few days. On Sept. 2,
1958, Zapanta filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the civil case
was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as petitioners
motion for reconsideration and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not
guilty, petitioner field the present action.

Issues:

The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court.

Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the ground that
Zapanta’s consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation?

Held:

Zapanta’s act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for bigamy.
Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. The civil action
for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for in the petition was hereby granted. Without any costs.
 PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, [September 13, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case
(Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of
the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already
been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met
since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in
the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed
at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that
“the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.”
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
“[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the
Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”
ARTICLE 40-41
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a
two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of,
nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for
damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn
child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is,
of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40
of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present
case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased child.
ARTICLE 48-49
RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL & MARY GRACE
POE-LLAMANZARES, GR No. 221538, 2016-09-20
Facts:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Rizalito Y.
David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17,
2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.[7] He later turned her over to Mr.
and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.[8] Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968.[9] She
was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses
Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained
solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until
today.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is
DISMISSED.
David moved for reconsideration
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2)
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of
the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as
private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave
reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly
comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Issues:
judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and
conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.
the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal... the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—
through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
Ruling:
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which
provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the
Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The
electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review.
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional
cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court
has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals
not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a
determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
in judgment.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or
which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions,
as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence,
is also considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The arbitrariness consists
in the disregard of the current state of our law.
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make
a reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the
established personal circumstances of private respondent.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be
Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical
times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen
without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so.
Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of
the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues;
there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the
implications of international legal instruments.
the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a
complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on
citizenship.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement
from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to
consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is
qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those
who may count themselves as natural-born.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to
establish bloodline is misplaced.
To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the
actual naturalization process.
Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status.
It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different
premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status
is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to citizenship.
Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the
status of citizens
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino
citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of
what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore,
be ethnically foreign.
The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no
need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and
are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount
to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then
never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and
state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations.
These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all
through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of
which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior
class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their
own.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the
object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and
granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate
them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the
constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting
them from discrimination.
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to
natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit
from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following
her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the
requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1)
that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a
foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when
she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship.
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their Philippine
citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise
the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain
solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights
and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5).
those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may
exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities.
this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never
lost at all.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish
to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following
requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[251]
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the
right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July
7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.[256] Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.[257] This evidences her compliance with
Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the
country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship.
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born
citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for
eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-
born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic
Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of
restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a
Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have
consequences de facto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
Principles:
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least
one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and
substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born.
the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
(particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections[113]) the power to rule
on contests[114] relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives).
There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's
power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body.
The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no other function.
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to members of the National Assembly... the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve such contests in
the legislature itself.
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that
"[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines."
The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from
which this Court determines constitutional intent.
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of
the Philippines:Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and(4) Those
who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:Sec. 2. Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation.
It is the "right to have rights."[151] It is one's personal and . . . permanent
membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity
to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the
right to petition the government for redress of grievance
Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to
the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it
Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were
identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish
territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification,
however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly
mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of
Spain, that there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens,[159] thus:(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,(b) Children of a
Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,(d) Those who, without
such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who citizenship."... hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born naturalization as citizens of a foreign country."
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries.
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary
States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
ninety-eight. Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was upon taking the aforesaid oath.
operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-
Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. born citizenship.
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,... The Jones Law of 1916 status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with
provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to by law.
be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a
subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country."... the
requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against
foreign infiltration in the administration of national government
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and
naturalized.
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63[242] and
Republic Act No. 8171[243] specifically "to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries."
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in
its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine