PUBLIC CORPORATION CASE constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact
DIGEST
I. Introduction and General Principles
d. Municipal Corporations; Elements; Dual Nature
and Functions [Sec. 15]
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality
of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the
President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified
by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should
be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in
the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province —
Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more
than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain
from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is
to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here
is the second directive. The subject of the statute
must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
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Public Corporation
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire
text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where
the bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is
misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act, is bad.
4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" —
projects the impression that only the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities
in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated
in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For,
the known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from
twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and
(2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato,
a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of
Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill.
e. De Jure and De Facto Municipal Corporations
distinguished
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (G.R. No. L23825)
FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964
the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after
the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and
void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective
January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except under the provisions of
this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan
ISSUE:
W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even
create a barrio, can create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units
of municipalities
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is
untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory —
from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to
another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing
at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious,
however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities — the
authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of
other courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or
“solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power”
Compiled by M.H. Villas
Public Corporation
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also
— and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy
to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
If the President could create a municipality, he could, in
effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which
the official concerned resides, for his office would
thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely
brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if
he had it), without actually creating it, he could
compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.
Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law
ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted.
Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses
 the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal
corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are
hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
It is so ordered.
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez,
Sr.
December 6, 1994 | J. Vitug
Petitioner: Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon, et.
al.
Respondent: Hon. Antonio V. Mendez, Sr., et. al.
Doctrine: Curative laws are in essence retrospective
and aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing
laws have been complied with.”
FACTS
 August 20, 1959: President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Executive Order No. 353 which
created the municipal district of San Andres,
Quezon.
 Years later, by virtue of Executive Order No.
174 that was issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal dated October 5, 1965, San
Andres was recognized as a fifth-class
municipality. This conversion from municipal
district to municipality was approved by the
House of Representatives.
 June 5, 1989: Municipality of San Narciso
filed a petition of quo warranto with Regional
Trial Court, Branch No. 62 against the
Municipality of San Andres. Said petition was
for the declaration of nullity of Executive
Order No. 353 and for the latter to be
permanently ordered to refrain from
performing the duties and responsibilities of
their respective offices.
 July 18, 1991: The trial court resolved to
defer the action on the motion to dismiss and
to deny a judgment on the pleadings
 November 27, 1991: Municipality of San
Andres filed a motion to dismiss the case for
it had become moot and academic with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991), which took
effect on January 1, 1991. The provision in
Compiled by M.H. Villas
Public Corporation
particular is of Section 442(d) which states
that:
(d) Municipalities existing as of the
date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular
municipalities.
Said motion was opposed by the petitioner
on the grounds that said law referred to
legally existing municipalities, not those who
were void from the beginning.
 December 2, 1991: Lower court dismissed
the petition on the basis that there was a
lack of cause of action. However, petitioners
argue that this court acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction. Thus, the petitioners filed quo
warranto proceedings to reconcile the
validity of San Andres as a fifth-class
municipality of Quezon province.
ISSUES + HELD
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Andres is a
de facto municipality.
NO. The Municipality of San Andres is not a de facto
municipality, rather it is a de jure municipality.
Petitioners argued that they had acquired the vested
right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No.
353 since the petition for quo warranto had been filed
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160.
However, such argument does not hold because the
Municipality of San Narciso filed said petition to
challenge the legality of the Municipality of San
Andres only after almost thirty (30) years of the
existence of Executive Order No. 353.
In those thirty (30) years, the Municipality of San
Andres had already begun, and continued to exercise
the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. With that, and by virtue of the
aforementioned law, the State recognizes the
existence of the Municipality of San Andres.
 RULING: The petition for certiorari was dismissed
with the costs against the petitioners.
f. Local Government Units (LGUs) and Unions or
Federations of LGUs in the Philippines
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No.
135962)
limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is
no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power
the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic MMDA is illegal.
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter Wherefore, the petition is denied.
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against

petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court
ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St.

because it is an agent of the Government endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it
follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be
enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to
public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police
powers?

Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to
the President and administrative boards, LGU or other
lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a

legislative body empowered to enact ordinances,
approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,

"development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature. The powers of the MMDA are

Compiled by M.H. Villas

Public Corporation