COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

President Rodrigo Duterte salutes officers of the Philippine Navy at the Port
Area in Manila on January 14, 2020. File photo from Malacañang

MANILA, Philippines – Downplaying the likelihood of the Philippines asserting its rights
in the West Philippine Sea during this administration, President Rodrigo Duterte said he
would instead leave it up to time and economic cooperation when dealing with China's
expansive claims in the maritime area.

"We might as well just be friendly, improve our commerce, and let time heal. Tomorrow
will take care of itself, (that's) one thing for sure and like any other historical claim, the
world is always changing and we did not really do it at the expense of the lives of
Filipinos," Duterte said in an interview with Russian news outlet RT News that aired on
Friday, January 24.

Before making the statement, Duterte again refused to take an aggressive stand similar
to other Southeast Asian countires such as Vietnam when asserting the country's rights
in the West Philippine Sea.

Like the Philippines, Vietnam is a claimant state in the South China Sea and actively
defends its waters against China's aggressive tactics to claim the entire maritime area.
(READ: [ANALYSIS] Will Vietnam take China to court?)

In declining to take a similar approach to Vietnam, Duterte stuck to the line that
asserting the Philippines' rights in the West Philippine Sea would only make China
declare war. It's a false option that experts such as retired Supreme Court
justice Antonio Carpio – a staunch defender of the West Philippine Sea – have refuted,
saying Duterte's insistence on such is a "hollow attempt to scare our people into
submission to China."

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Carpio, who played a pivotal role in securing the Philippines' victory against China at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, earlier said Duterte's projection of war "shows a dismal
lack of understanding of international law and international relations."

The Philippines and China have engaged in talks on the sea dispute since May 2017,
though critics and maritime experts have pointed out that these have not stopped
China's militarization in the South China Sea; the buildup of artificial islands in Philippine
waters; and aggressive tactics against fishermen, among others.

Duterte has likewise been criticized for downplaying the Philippines' decades-long sea
dispute in exchange for loans and grants from Beijing.

Seeking new friends. Duterte was also asked why he sought for a change in the
Philippines' foreign policy characterized by turning away from traditional allies such as
the United States to countries like Russia and China instead.

Duterte said there was nothing to it except that Russia and China "respected" other
countries' sovereignty. He placed the two countries against the US, whom he believed
still viewed the Philippines as a vassal state.

"If I cannot get a credible posture from the Americans, I can get it from the Russians
and the Chinese government. It's because they respect the sovereignty of a country
which America is totally, totally lacking," he said.

Duterte has frequently expressed his dislike for the United States, particularly under the
administration of former president Barack Obama, who was critical of his war on drugs.
Even with the assumption of US President Donald Trump, who he described as a "very
nice person," Duterte repeatedly lashed out at America for "interfering" in the
Philippines' affairs.
The latest escalation of his tirades against the US saw Duterte renew threats to scrap
the Philippines-US long-standing visiting forces agreement, which outlined guidelines
for the conduct of American troops visiting the Philippines.

He also threatened to deny entry to more US senators who approved a measure

seeking sanctions against Philippine officials involved in extrajudicial killings and the
detention of Senator Leila de Lima. – Rappler.com

http://www.fsi.gov.ph/deliberate-not-desperate-the-philippines-national-security-strategy-on-the-west-
philippine-sea/

Deliberate, Not Desperate: The Philippines’ National Security Strategy On The

West Philippine Sea
by Julio S. Amador III and Edcel John A. Ibarra

There were arguments that the Philippine government should not have solely relied on
international courts to manage the country’s most pressing national security concern:
the maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea. Some commentators pointed out that
the Philippines depended heavily on other countries (particularly the United States), that
the government seemed complacent and lax in handling the disputes, that Filipinos
could never retrieve the West Philippine Sea, and that the country was lacking external
security and losing in its strategy. However, what these commentators missed was that
filing an arbitration case against China formed only one part of a broader strategic
framework. Indeed, the legal approach was not out of desperation but a deliberate
component of the Philippine strategy on the West Philippine Sea.

The Philippine strategy

The Philippines did not simply bring China to court. Even before filing the case, the
government had already wisely chosen to settle the dispute with an Arbitral Tribunal
under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
with a registry at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), rather than with the other
international courts listed by the Convention. Unlike in those other courts, states
influence the ad hoc selection of the judges in the Arbitral Tribunal: disputants each
choose one tribunal member and agree on the remaining three from a closed list of
potential members, for a total of five tribunal members. The Philippines naturally
appointed a judge who espoused an aligned jurisprudence. Meanwhile, China refused
to participate in the entire process, thereby also relinquishing its privilege to appoint a
judge. The President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
appointed the other four tribunal members instead, as per UNCLOS.

As it awaited the decision, the government also enlisted the help of the international
community to make China abide by the eventual ruling. Since the submission of the
case to the arbitral tribunal in 2013, Philippine diplomats had been engaging their
counterparts in their countries of assignment to support the country’s position. By asking
support, the Philippines created an international pro-compliance constituency that China
cannot ignore now that the tribunal had released its decision. The strategy had been
historically tested: rallying the international community can tame intransigent states.
In Nicaragua v. United States, Nicaragua successfully lobbied the UN General
Assembly to adopt a resolution that the United States comply with the ruling of the
International Court of Justice. Similarly, in Netherlands v. Russia, Greenpeace, in
whose behalf the Netherlands filed a case at ITLOS, generated enough international
attention on the case, which pressured Russia to eventually release the detainees.

Arbitration fell under the legal track of the government’s three-track approach to the
disputes. Alongside it, the Philippines maintained multilateral cooperation with regional
stakeholders through ASEAN—the political track—and continued bilateral discussions
with China—the diplomatic track. Apparent failures in the political track (the failure of
ASEAN to issue a joint communiqué on the South China Sea disputes) and the
diplomatic track (a stalemate in the bilateral consultations with China on the disputes
after the standoff at Scarborough Shoal) in 2012 had ultimately prompted the
Philippines to file the arbitration case in 2013, but this did not preclude it to continue
engaging ASEAN and China.

Indeed, there had also been improvements on these two tracks. On the political track,
ASEAN had been identifying developments in the South China Sea as a cause of
regional concern in its joint communiqués since 2013. On the diplomatic track, the
Philippines maintained bilateral discussions with China on other, non-contentious
issues. In fact, in terms of economic relations, the Philippines’ total trade with, foreign
direct investment from, and official development assistance from China since 2013 had
indicated no clear sign of deterioration.

“The Philippine strategy on the West Philippine Sea is therefore a comprehensive

package of legal, political, diplomatic, and defense approaches.”

The government’s overall diplomatic strategy went with a defense plan as well. The
Philippines embarked on strengthening its defense relations with allies while improving
its own military capabilities. On defense relations, the Philippines, among others,
adopted the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States, agreed
in principle on the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Japan, and signed
a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam. On defense-capability improvement,
spending for the security sector had generally been increasing since 2010 when
President Benigno S. Aquino III assumed office. In fact, in 2013, real defense spending
exceeded three billion USD at 2014 prices for the first time in history. This growing
appropriation, in turn, allowed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to continue
modernizing its assets.

Filling in the gap in public diplomacy

The Philippine strategy on the West Philippine Sea was therefore a comprehensive
package of legal, political, diplomatic, and defense approaches, but, as noted above,
Filipinos might not have necessarily viewed it as such. The salience of negative
perceptions pointed to a gap in the efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to
communicate the Philippine strategy on the disputes, a gap that could have been
remedied through more public diplomacy. For its part, the DFA had been keen to
explain the legal approach to the domestic public. For instance, the department’s
spokesperson had been going around the country to discuss the arbitration case with
local stakeholders. But, in addition, there should have been efforts to support local
government units—especially those that administer the contested areas—and
educational institutions to conduct information campaigns on their own. There should
have been a wider presence in social media, too. In terms of content, the government’s
legal efforts could have been contextualized in the bigger picture of the Philippine
strategy, because the connection might not necessarily have been automatically
construed. Ultimately, there should have been extra effort to convince the domestic
public that going to arbitration was the country’s best option, as the alternatives—
multilateral balancing through ASEAN, bilateral negotiations with China, and, most
especially, military confrontation—indicated slim success at that time. Past efforts
moreover indicate that there are improvements on the political, diplomatic, and defense
aspects. After all, the flexibility of the Philippine strategy made it possible to pursue
different strategies simultaneously.

Download PDF

CIRSS Commentaries is a regular short publication of the Center for International

Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) focusing
on the latest regional and global developments and issues.

The views expressed in this publication are of the authors alone and do not reflect the
official position of the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
the Government of the Philippines.

Julio S. Amador III is the Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr.
Amador can be reached at jsamador@fsi.gov.ph.

Edcel John A. Ibarra is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for
International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Ibarra
can be reached at edcel.ibarra@gmail.com.

http://www.fsi.gov.ph/deliberate-not-desperate-the-philippines-national-security-strategy-on-the-west-
philippine-sea/
SWS survey shows 80 percent of Filipinos
not OK with gov’t’s nonchalance towards
China’s intrusion
1078
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Published July 15, 2018, 12:07 PM

By Ellalyn De Vera-Ruiz

About eight in 10 Filipinos think it is not right that the government is doing nothing about China’s intrusion in
claimed territories, the latest Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey showed.

Chinese structures are pictured at the disputed Spratlys in South China Sea April 21, 2017. (REUTERS/Erik De
Castro/File Photo / MANILA BULLETIN)

In the nationwide survey conducted from June 27 to 30, 1,200 respondents were particularly asked, “Is
(activity) right or not right for the Philippine government to do in resolving the conflict between the
Philippines and China about the West Philippine Sea?” Five specific activities were presented.

Eighty-one percent of Filipinos repudiate the government’s policy of doing nothing about China’s intrusion in
the West Philippine Sea.
Eighty percent said it is right for the government to strengthen the military capability of the Philippines,
especially the Navy.

Meanwhile, 74 percent said it is right for the government to bring the issue to international organizations, like
the United Nations or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for a diplomatic and peaceful
negotiation with China about the claimed territories.

Seventy-three percent said it is alright to have direct, bilateral negotiations between the Philippines and China
to discuss the resolution of the issue of the claimed territories.

About 68 percent said the government should ask other countries to mediate the issue of the claimed territories.

In the same survey period, SWS also found 81 percent of Filipinos aware of the West Philippine Sea conflict
even before the survey, while the remaining 19 percent learned about the issue only during the survey.

Among those who were aware about the West Philippine Sea conflict before the interview, 12 percent had
extensive knowledge, 40 percent had adequate knowledge, 43 percent had only a little knowledge, and 5
percent had very little knowledge about the matter.

The survey also found that 18 percent of Filipinos have much trust, 27 percent undecided, and 53 percent have
little trust in China.

This translates to -35 China’s net trust rating (percent much trust minus percent little trust), classified by SWS
as “bad.”

It is a 42-point decline, and one grade down, from the neutral +7 in March 2018. This is the lowest net rating
since the bad -37 in April 2016.

SWS terminology for net satisfaction ratings are translated as follows: +70 and above as “excellent”: +50 to
+69 “very good”: +30 to +49 “good”: +10 to +29 “moderate”: +9 to –9 “neutral”: -10 to –29 “poor”: -30 to –
49 “bad”: -50 to –69″:very bad”: and -70 and below “execrable.”

SWS noted that there is higher distrust in China among those who know more about the West Philippine Sea
conflict.

China’s net trust rating was a bad -38 among those who were aware of the West Philippine Sea conflict before
the survey, compared to the poor -22 among those who learned about it only during the survey.

Likewise, distrust in China tended to be higher among those with more knowledge about the West Philippine
Sea conflict. Net trust in China was at -41 among those with extensive knowledge, and -42 among those with
adequate knowledge, compared to -33 among those with only a little knowledge, and -35 among those with
very little knowledge.

The net trust rating of China was at bad levels regardless of people’s satisfaction with President Duterte, SWS
said.

It was highest among those who were dissatisfied with the President, at -42, followed by those who were
undecided, at -39, and among those who were satisfied with him, at -32.

Tags: 80 percent, China's intrusion, Duterte, Philippine government, survey, SWS, West Philippine Sea
ASIA & PACIFIC

Morales: West Philippine Sea

belongs to Filipinos, not to
Duterte, China
By: Darryl John Esguerra - Reporter / @DJEsguerraINQ
INQUIRER.net / 12:28 PM July 12, 2019

MANILA, Philippines—”The West Philippine Sea belongs to Filipinos, not to Duterte,

not to China.”
ADVERTISEMENT

Former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales declared this on Friday as she demanded

accountability on China’s destruction of the marine resources in the disputed territories.

Speaking at the West Philippine Sea forum, Morales pointed out that Manila’s 2016
arbitral victory against China’s expansive claim in the West Philippine Sea showed that
the Chinese government violated its obligation to protect the marine environment
through “tolerance of Chinese illegal fishing, massive land reclamation and the
construction of artificial islands.”

China, however, openly rejected the arbitral award and continues to push with its
militarization in the area. The Duterte administration, meanwhile, decided to set aside
the award and engage Asia’s largest economy in bilateral talks.

This, according to Morales, has prompted Filipinos to “find creative and viable ways to
enforce the award because our [leaders] refuse to do so.”

Morales, together with former foreign affairs Albert Del Rosario, earlier filed a
complaint before the International Criminal Court (ICC) on behalf of Filipino fishermen
who were “persecuted and injured” by China’s aggressive island-building and
occupation in the West Philippine Sea.

READ: Ex-DFA chief Del Rosario, Morales sue China’s Xi at ICC

“In implementing China’s systematic plan to take over the South China Sea, President
Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court which involve massive, near-permanent and devastating environmental
damage across nations,’’ the two former officials said in a communication filed with the
ICC before the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute on March 17.

Morales said that their complaint is a “means of enforcing the award because it seeks to
impose individual responsibility to China’s acts already found unlawful by the award.”

“The inhumane acts of Chinese officials in the South China Sea constitute crimes
against the ICC’s jurisdiction,” she stressed. /muf/ac

Read more: https://globalnation.inquirer.net/177821/morales-west-philippine-sea-

belongs-to-filipinos-not-to-duterte-china#ixzz6CJGydRqM
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
DND supports Duterte’s efforts to settle
WPS issue with China through diplomatic
means
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Published July 24, 2018, 11:51 AM

By the Philippine News Agency

The Department of National Defense (DND) expressed support for President Rodrigo Duterte’s efforts to settle
the West Philippine Sea (WPS) issue with China through diplomatic means.

DND public affairs office chief Arsenio Andolong (AP / MANILA BULLETIN)
“The WPS issue represents just a portion of the sum total of our relations with China, thus, the DND supports
the President’s efforts to manage it through diplomatic means,” DND spokesperson Arsenio Andolong said in
message to the PNA Monday.

“Having said that, however, the DND and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) will defend our country’s
sovereignty with all the means and resources available to us, if and when the need arises,” he added.

Meanwhile, AFP spokesperson Col. Edgard Arevalo said the military has been consistently conducting regular
maritime and aerial patrols in the WPS in line with its constitutional mandate.

“We pursue our mandate of protecting the people and securing our sovereignty – in relation to the country’s
foreign policy,” he added.

In his third State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Duterte said Manila stands firm on its commitment
to protect its interest in the WPS while improving relations with Beijing.

“Our improved relationship with China does not mean that we will waver in our commitment to defend our
interest in the West Philippine Sea,” Duterte said, adding this is reflected in Manila’s continued engagement
with Beijing through multilateral and bilateral channels.

In 2017, the government launched the first bilateral consultative mechanism in South China Sea (BCM) with
China, where all issues concerning the contested area were discussed in a “frank, in-depth, and friendly
manner.”

The Philippines, together with several Southeast Asian countries, also engaged China toward

the drafting of the framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) during its chairmanship
to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2017.

These efforts paved the way for an opportunity to manage the dispute without further escalating tensions in the
strategic waters, Duterte said.

“Opening lines of communication and amicably managing differences have led to positive developments that
include renewed access of Filipino fishermen in the areas of dispute in the Philippines’ West Philippine Sea.”

https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/07/24/dnd-supports-dutertes-efforts-to-settle-wps-issue-with-china-
through-diplomatic-means/