Gettier_ Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Knowledge = JTB. S knows that p iff (i) p is true,(ii) S believes that p, and(iii) S is justified in
believing that p.

Gettier‘s two assumptions:

• First, Justification is fallibilistic – we can be justified in believing things that are
false.
• Second, a person is justified (at least to the same degree) in believing any
proposition that she competently deduces from the original.
o We can generate Gettier cases (e.g., holograms, robots, red barns) without
this second condition. It just makes it easier to produce cases.

Ford Case: Smith believes that ‘Jones owns a Ford,’ and Smith is justified (fill in whatever you
thing is required for fallibilistic justification) in holding this belief. Smith then goes on to think
‘Jones owns a Ford or my friend Brown is in Barcelona.’ Jones is justified in holding this
disjunction. However, it turns out that Jones does not own a Ford (it is a rental) but Brown
(unbeknownst to Smith) actually is in Barcelona.

All of Smith’s evidence was for the false disjunct and only the truth of the second preserved
the truth of Smith’s belief. Lucky indeed for Smith that he, willy-nilly, velled on a truth. The
destruction of knowledge comes from Smith’s justification hooking on to the wrong disjunct.
‘Luckily true beliefs’ cannot be knowledge. But that means JTB is not sufficient for
knowledge.

The Argument

1. If knowledge is justified true belief, then it is not possible for a person to have a justified
true belief that isn’t knowledge.
2. A person can be justified in believing a false proposition.
3. If a person is justified in believing some proposition, then she is justified (at least to the
same degree) in believing any proposition that she competently deduces from the original.
4. Smith, in our example, is justified in believing the (false) proposition “Jones owns a Ford.”
5. From the proposition in (4) Smith competently deduces “Jones owns a Ford or my friend
Brown is in Barcelona.”
6. Smith is justified in believing the proposition in (5).
7. Smith’s belief in the proposition in (5) is true but only by luck.
8. Luckily true beliefs are not knowledge.
9. It is possible for a person to have a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge
10. It is not the case that justified true belief is knowledge.

Two Possible Solutions:

• Go with Descartes – strengthen justification so that false beliefs are ruled out.
o Downside: Hard to resist skepticism.
• Find a suitable fourth condition – knowledge = JTB+X
This handout is intended as a reliable guide to the text. As it has benefited from the work of many scholars, it is not suitable for citation.
 o Downside: X has proved elusive.

Recipe for constructing Gettier cases for JTB+X

1. Start with an example of a case where a subject has a justified false belief that also meets
condition X.
2. Modify the case so that the belief is true merely by luck.

This handout is intended as a reliable guide to the text. As it has benefited from the work of many scholars, it is not suitable for citation.