SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, composed of DEBORAH T.

MARCO (Immediate
Past President), ATTY. MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE GUZMAN and PONCIANO R.
ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Officio Director), petitioners, vs. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 173840. April 25, 2012

PERALTA, J:

Facts:
 Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) was organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269
 The individual petitioners are members of SAMELCO II's Board of Directors.
 Seludo was also a member of the SAMELCO II Board of Directors having been elected thereto in 2002 and whose term of office expired in
May 2005.

 As members of the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 of 2005
o The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD until the end of his term as
director.
o The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district elections.
 Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the subject board resolution, Seludo filed an Urgent
Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof in the RTC of Samar
o In his petition, Seludo prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, contending that it was issued without any legal and factual
bases.
o He likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the individual
petitioners from enforcing the assailed board resolution.
 TRO was issued, effective for seventy-two (72) hours which effectivity was later on extended for another seventeen (17) days.
 In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary
jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
 RTC issued an Order which sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their
representatives from enforcing Resolution No. 5
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC
 Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing its assailed Orders.
 CA rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and affirming the assailed Orders of the RTC.
 A motion for reconsideration was filef, but it was denied by the CA
 Hence, the instant petition for review on Certiorari

Issue: WON the RTC correctly issued the Writ of Prohibition? NO, primary jurisdiction is vested before the NEA, petition should be filed before it first

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2006 and
July 12, 2006, respectively, as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, dated May 6, 2005 and September 15, 2005,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Urgent Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action No. C-2005- 1085)
filed by respondent Ananias D. Seludo, Jr.

Held:
 It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent. However, the basic issue in the present case is not
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and
the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II.
 Pursuant to P.D. No. 1645, the NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions, as well as to issue orders,
rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives
o Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed
respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing
election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as
expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.
 SC agrees with petitioners' argument that to sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an
unnecessary intrusion into the NEA's power of supervision and control over electric cooperative
 The necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the
NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject
resolution.
 The availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition
before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Thus,
respondent's failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.

 Furthermore, the Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of
all administrative processes afforded him – principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
o Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial
review can be sought

 The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
 has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in
quo warranto proceedings
 Seludo has failed to show that his case falls under any of the exceptions