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SPENSER'S TWELVE MORAL VIRTUES "ACCORDING TO
ARISTOTLE"
An articleby AmbassadorJusserand,entitled"Spenser's 'Twelve
Private Morall Vertuesas Aristotlehath Devised,"' ModernPhilol-
ogy,January,1906,is my apologyforwriting. M. Jusserandunder-
takes to prove that Spenser's solemn statement concerningthe
substanceof the whole Faerie Queene,made to the poet's friendand
patronSir Walter Raleigh, at Raleigh's requestas Jusserandthinks,
is "misleading,everywordofit." Jusserandsays:
Spenser'sstatement [intheletterto Raleigh]thathe intends"to por-
traictin Arthur,beforehe was king,theimageofa braveknight, perfected
in thetwelveprivatemorallvertuesas Aristotlehathdevised"is misleading,
everywordofit. Thereis no suchdefinite numberis not
list; Aristotle's
twelve,and thevirtueshe are
studies farfrom being thesame as thoseform-
ingthebasisoftheFaerieQueene.'
That Jusserand'spaper has not been withoutits influencewas
shownin a recentarticleby ProfessorErskine,of Columbia Univer-
sity. AlthoughProfessorErskinepointsout one falsestep in Jusse-
rand's argument,he accepts his conclusion. In discussing"The
VirtueofFriendshipin the Faerie Queene,"PublicationsoftheModern
Language Association, XXIII (1915), 831-50, Professor Erskine
asks, "Had Spenser read Montaigne, or Plutarch, or Cicero's On
Friendship,or Aristotle'sEthics?" Replyingto his own question,
he says, "He may have read them all, though M. Jusserandhas
taught us to suspect the Aristotle." Again, Erskine speaks of
Jusserand's"having shownthat Spenserdid not get his list ofvirtues
fromAristotle."
It is the purpose of the present paper to show that not only
are Jusserand'sargumentsfaulty,but his conclusionis incorrect.
Jusserandmakes three main arguments: first,that Spenser's and
Aristotle'slists of virtuesare not the same in number; second,that
they are quite unlike in nature; and, third,that Spenser actually
derivedhis virtues,and his ideas concerninga list of twelvevirtues,
1 Modern Philology, III, 376.

23] 23 [MODERN PHILOLOGY, May, 1918

24 W. F. DEMOSS

fromLodowick Bryskett,who in his Discourseof Civil Life includes

a discussionof moral virtues,in which the numbertwelve is men-
tioned.
I shall replyto these threemain argumentsin the orderin which
I have statedthem.
The firstof Jusserand's three main arguments,that Spenser's
and Aristotle'slists of virtuesare not the same in number,fallsinto
threesubdivisionsor arguments:first,that "Aristotledrawsnowhere
any dogmaticlist ofvirtues;" second,that it is difficult to knowhow
to count Aristotle'svirtues; and, third,that "Aristotle'snumberis
not twelve," for,count his virtuesas you will, you cannot get the
numbertwelve. I take up the last subdivisionfirst.
Jusserand finds that nine of Aristotle's virtues are certainly
virtues,but that thereis some doubt concerningthe remainingfour:
Temperance,or Self-control;Shame, or Modesty; Friendship;and
Justice.' Jusserandsays:
If weincludeboth[Temperance and Modesty]wehavea totalofeleven;
ifwe excludeboth,a totalofnine; ifwe admitSelf-control alone,a totalof
ten. Addingarbitrarily Justiceand Friendship, oronlyoneofthem....
we shouldhavea totalvarying fromtento thirteen;2 a totaloftwelvebeing
perhapsthemostarbitrary ofall andthemostdifficult to reach.3
Now, it should be noted at the outset that a total of thirteenis
exactlywhat we want. Spenser'stotal is not twelve. It is thirteen.
In his letterto Raleigh,onlya shortdistancefromthe assertionwhich
Jusserand undertakes to disprove, Spenser makes the following
statement:
In thepersonofPrinceArthure I setteforthmagqiificence4in particular,
whichvertueforthat(according toAristotle andtherest)itis theperfection
of all therest,and conteinethin it themall, therefore,in thewholecourse
I mention thedeedesofArthure applyableto thatvertue,whichI writeof
in thatbooke. But of the xii. other I makexii.otherknights
vertues,4 the
patrones, forthemorevarietyofthehistory.
1 The fact that Spenser wrote a Book on each of these fourvirtues-see Faerie Queene,
Books II, III, IV, and V-might be expected to throw some light on whether Spenser
counted them as virtues or not.
Hereafter references to book, canto, and stanza of the Faerie Queene are given with-
out the title of the epic.
2 Italics mine.

3 Mod. Phil., III, 374-75.

4 Italics mine
24
 SPENSER'S TWELVE MORAL VIRTUES 25

So much for Jusserand's point that "Aristotle's number is not

twelve." Neitheris Spenser's. We may now proceedto findwhat
is the natureof Aristotle'slist of virtues,how Aristotle'svirtuesare
to be counted,and how Spensergot his numberofvirtues.
In Book II, chap. vii, of the NicomacheanEthics,Aristotledis-
cusses a list of moral virtuesor qualities essentialto the good man.
They are exactlytwelvein number: (1) Courage, (2) Temperance,or
Self-control,(3) Liberality, (4) Magnificence,(5) Highmindedness,
(6) the mean concerningAmbition,(7) Gentleness,or Mansuetude,
(8) Truthfulness,(9) Wittiness,or Jocularity,(10) Friendliness,or
Courtesy,(11) Modesty,or Shame, and (12) RighteousIndignation.
Concerningthis discussionAristotlesays: "For the presentwe are
givingonly a roughand summaryaccount [ofthe virtues],and that
is sufficientforour purpose; we will hereafterdeterminetheirchar-
acter more exactly."' We are promised,then, a carefuldiscussion
of the moral virtues "hereafter." In Book III, chaps. ix ff.,Book
IV, and Book V, Aristotlekeeps his word. Moreover,an introduc-
torysentenceand a concludingone markthe limitsofthis discussion
of the moral virtuesas definitelyas two milestones. The firsttwo
sentencesof III, ix, are as follows: "Let us then resumeour con-
siderationofthe severalvirtuesand discusstheirnature,the subjects
with which they deal, and the way in whichthey deal with them.
In so doing we shall ascertaintheirnumber."2 The last sentencein
Book V unmistakablycloses the list of moral virtues: "This then
may be taken as a sufficient descriptionof Justice,and the other
moral virtues." Between these two absolutely definite limits,
Aristotlediscussesexactlytwelve good qualities or desirablemeans.
In this carefulconsiderationof the moral virtues,the same good
qualities,or desirablemeans,are listedas in theless carefuldiscussion
which precedesit, withone exception: in the "rough and summary
account" Righteous Indignationis included. We know fromthe
Rhetoricthat Aristotledecided that his discussionof this quality
was false, as Envy and Malice, whichhe gave as its extremes,are
not opposites, but compatible and coexistent.3 In his second
1 My quotations are from the translation by J. E. C. Welldon.
2 Italics mine.

See Aristotle's Rhetoric,Book II, chap. ix.

25
26 W. F. DEMOSS

discussionofthemoralvirtues,whichis to "determinetheircharacter
more exactly" and "ascertain their number," he omits Righteous
Indignation and adds Justice, leaving the number unchanged.
Surely there is enough here to suggest the numbertwelve if any
such suggestionwere needed.
But Jusserandhas difficulty in totalizingAristotle'svirtues,for
he findsit hard to decide whichones are to be counted. In the first
place, he contendsthat "Some of his virtuesare only a branch or
developmentofanothervirtue. .... Magnificenceis onlythe same
as [Liberality],but practiced by the very rich, instead of by the
moderately rich, man."' Now it is plain that Aristotle's Mag-
nificenceand Liberality are not the same. It would be strange
indeed if they were, since Aristotletreats them as two separate
virtues. They are much the same in principle,as both implybeing
freein givingand spending. But practicallytheyare verydifferent.
Any one who gives to the rightcause, at the righttime,in the right
manner,and to the rightamount,consideringthe means ofthe giver,
and who takes fromrightsources,is liberal.2 He has to avoid the
extremesof illiberalityand prodigality. The magnificentman, on
the other hand, must avoid the extremesof meanness and vulgar
display,or bad taste. He must be a kind of artist. "The magnifi-
cent man," says Aristotle,"is like a connoisseurin art; he has the
facultyof perceivingwhat is suitable,and of spendinglarge sums of
moneywithgood taste. .... .With equal expenditurehe will make
the result more magnificent."3And, as we shall see later, Magni-
ficenceincludesfar more than this. The poor widow who gave the
miteswas liberal; but the problemsshe had to solve in beingso were
very differentfromthose of a personwho is in a positionto practice
the virtueof Magnificenceand wishesto do so.
Again, Jusserandobjects, "Others . . . . are treated of quite
apart, at great length; but it is not clear whether,if one wanted to
do what Aristotleneglected to perform-that is, to tabulate his
moral virtues-these should,or should not, be admittedin the list.
Such is the case with Justice..... Such is the case also with
1 Mod. Phil., III, 374-75.
SNicomachean Ethics, IV, i-iii; II, vii.
3 Ibid., IV, iv-v; II, vii; Magna Moralia, I, 26; and Ethica Eudemia, III, vi.
26
 SPENSER'S TWELVEMORALVIRTUES 27
Friendship..... .Aristotle has treated them apart, and shown
that he did not includethemin his regularcount."'
Jusserand'sassertionthat Aristotletreated Justiceapart from
the other moral virtues is a misinterpretation.Justice is not
separated fromthe precedingdiscussionin Books III and IV; on
the contrary,it is in the closest possible way connected with it.
In Book IV, chap. xiii,whilediscussingTruthfulness, Aristotlesays:
"We are not speakingof one who is truthfulin legal covenants,or
of all such mattersas lie withinthe domain of justice and injustice,
forthese would be mattersbelongingto a different virtue." Again,
the last sentencein Book IV is as follows: "But let us now proceed
to considerJustice." Hence, one can no more draw a line between
Books IV and V than betweenBooks III and IV. Finally, the sen-
tence which so clearly and definitelycloses the discussion of the
moral virtuesis, as we have already seen, the last sentencein Book
V: "This then may be taken as a sufficient descriptionof Justice,
and the othermoralvirtues." One virtue,Friendship,Aristotledoes
treat "apart at great length." Accordingto Jusserandits "admis-
sion into [Aristotle's]treatiseis justified,not to say excused,on the
plea that it is eithera virtueor relatedto virtue,and that it is most
necessaryin life."2 But it could hardlyneed a betterjustification.
Finally Jusserandpoints out: "Some, admitted into the class
at one part ofthe work,are describedelsewhereas doubtfullybelong-
ing to it. .... There is also a chapter on Shame (aL=60s,Lat.
verecundia),though 'it is not correct to call it a virtue.' But
'neitheris Self-control,'adds Aristotlein the same chapter."3 Thus
Jusserandmakes much of showingthat Aristotleis sometimesuncer-
tain whethera given one of his desirablemeans is a virtueor not-
that is, whetheror not it comes undera technicaldefinition ofvirtue.
And then, strangelyenough, he expects Spenser to be severely
technical when his master has not been. But Aristotletells us
plainly in Book I, chap. i, of his NicomacheanEthics,and again in
Book II, chap. ii, that in a discussionon ethics,scientificexactitude
is impossible. He answers Jusserand'sobjections some centuries
1 Mod. Phil., III, 374-75.
2 Ibid., p. 374.

8Ibid., pp. 374-75.

27
28 W. F. DEMoss

beforetheyweremade. He says: "An educated personwill expect

accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject
allows."' Jusserandoverlooksthe importantfactthat both Aristotle
and Spenser are eminentlypractical in their aims. In Book II,
chap. ii, Aristotlesays: "Our presentstildyis not,like otherstudies,
purelyspeculativein its intention; for the object of our inquiryis
not to know the nature of virtuebut to become ourselvesvirtuous,
as that is the sole benefitwhich it conveys." Spenser's statement
to Raleigh of the object he had in writingthe Faerie Queeneshows
the practicalnatureof that work: "The generalend thereforeof all
the book is to fashiona gentlemanor noble personin vertuousand
gentle discipline."2 With such a purpose,is it likely that Spenser
would stop to quibble over whethersuch a quality as Temperance,
for example, does or does not come under a technicaldefinitionof
virtue? What wouldhis gentlemanbe withoutit ? Is it not reason-
able that, in attemptingto followAristotle,Spenser would take all
of Aristotle'sdesirable means or good qualities? Whethercertain
of them come undera technicaldefinitionof virtueor not, they are
virtuesin any practicalsense. And Aristotlehimselfregardedthem
as such, as is shown by the fact that he discussedthem as virtues.
Besides, they are absolutely necessary to a system which is to
"fashion a gentlemanor noble person" not only in "vertuous," but
also in "gentle," discipline.
This bringsus to a very simple explanationof how Spensergot
his numberof virtues. He simplytook all of Aristotle'sdesirable
means, or qualities essential to the good man. Now Aristotledis-
cussed,all told, thirteengood qualities,or desirablemeans,as Jusse-
rand himselfobserves. One of these, as Jusserandalso observes,is
Magnificence. Magnificence,as we saw, Spenser gives to Arthur,
leaving exactlytwelve others. Clearly,if one of Aristotle'svirtues
contains all the others,his virtuesmightproperlybe divided into
"the twelve" and the onewhichincludesthe twelve.
So much for the number of Spenser's and Aristotle'svirtues.
We come now to Jusserand'sargumentthat "the nature of the
virtues considered by Spenser matches the Aristotelianselection
1 N. Eth., I, i.
2 Spenser's Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh, included in all editions of the Faerie
Queene.
28
 SPENSER'STWELVEMORALVIRTUES 29

scarcelybetterthan theirnumber"--a propositionwhichto Jusse-

rand means that the two do not match at all.
Beforediscussingthe natureof Spenser'svirtues,it will be neces-
sary to clear the groundsomewhat,by sayinga word about how the
Faerie Queeneis to be interpreted. There is a notionthat Spenser's
episodes are unimportant. For example,Jusseranddisposes of the
lesson of one of Spenser's great cantos by saying, "It is only inci-
dentallydweltupon,formingthe episode of Guyon'svisitto Medina,
Bk. II, c. 2."2 And in this attitudetoward the episodes Jusserand
is by no means alone. Any notion that whateveris not a part of
Spenser's main plot can have littleto do with his meaningis based
upon a misconceptionof the fundamentalstructureof Spenser's
great poem. An episode fillingone of Spenser's cantos-a great
poem in itself-such as theonein whichGuyonis takenby hisPalmer
(Reason or Prudence) to the house of Medina (the Mean), wherethe
Knight of Temperance learns the fundamentalconceptionof true
Temperance,cannot be consideredunimportant. Such an episode
may be "only incidental" to some of the pointsnamed in Spenser's
letterto Raleigh, in whichthe authorundertakesto state the "gen-
eral intention"and to give somethingof the plot and plan of more
than half a millionwords,and to proposeand name the contentsof
a second poem, whichwould probably3have containedanotherhalf
millionwords,all in a four-pageletter-a summarywhich disposes
ofthewholeoftheBook on Temperancein sixlines. But in Spenser's
developmentof any given virtue,such an episode is of very great
importance.
It is mainly by means of the episodes that Spenser's discussion
of the virtuesis carriedon. This fact will become clear as we pro-
ceed. We may note here,however,Spenser's directtestimonythat
his episodes are organic. In the Book on Courtesy,at the end of a
three-cantoepisode showingCalidore's Courtesyamong the lowly,
Spensermakes it unmistakablyclear that each episode in the Faerie

1 Mod. Phil., III, 375.

2 Ibid., p. 381 and note.
3 It will be observed that Spenser does not say how many Books will be in the second
part; he speaks only of " these firsttwelve bookes" and of " the other part." Nor does
he give the number of the political virtues. Aristotle gives nowhere a list of the political
virtues.
29
30 W. F. DEMOSS

Queenerepresentssome phase of the virtue under discussion; that

the author "never is astray."' Again, in the Book on Justice,in
introducingthe account of the spousal of Florimel,Spenser assures
us that he is admittingto the poem nothingsave what "with this
present treatise doth agree, True vertue to advance."2 And the
episode turnsout to be a studyin just distributionof honors,which
accordingto Aristotleis the essenceof Justice.3
Moreover, Spenser does not intend that his readers shall mis-
understandhim. "By certainesigneshereset in sundryplace,"4he
aims to see to it that the reader"never is astray." And among the
most helpfulof these "signes" are the very illuminatingcomments
of the author,oftenestat the beginning,but sometimesin the middle
of a canto.5 No one will need to be remindedof the importanceof
Spenser's argumentsto the cantos and his proems to the books.
Sometimesa fewlines spoken by one of the charactersthrowgreat
light on the allegory of the poem.6 ProfessorGreene has truly
remarked,"Only a man of abundant leisure can read the [Faerie
Queene]as Spenserwould have it read."' To get the meaning,one
must watch not only the envelopingplot and the episodes,but also
everycomment,everyspeech,everyline,everyword,and, frequently,
in the case of propernames,everysyllable. He mustread the poem
intensively-minutely:
ne lethimthenadmire,
But yieldhissenceto be too bluntand bace,
That no'tewithoutan houndfinefooting trace.4
So much forthe mannerin which Spenser is to be interpreted.
Let us now examine,in the case of each of the six virtuesdeveloped
by Spenser, Jusserand'sargumentthat Spenser's and Aristotle's
virtuesare unlikein nature.

IVI, xii, 1-2. Cf. I, vii, 50; II, xii, 1; III, vi, 52; VI, iii, 25; VI, ix, 1.
2 V, iii, 3.
3 With this canto of Spenser's Book on Justice, cf. N. Eth., V, ii, and V, iv, and
Politics, II, vii. With Braggadocchio cf. Achilles' Coward, Politics, II, vii.
4 Book II, Proem, stanza 4.
5 See I, viii, 1, or I, x, 1. Other examples will be pointed out later.
8 See, forexample, I, viii, 49.
7 H. L. Greene, "Allegory in Spenser, Bunyan, and Swift," Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc.,
IV (1889), 181.
30
 SPENSER'STWELVEMORALVIRTUES 31

Concerningthe subject of Spenser's firstBook, Jusserandsays:

"Holiness is certainlynot borrowedfromAristotle'sseriesof moral
virtues."' This is mereassertion,not argument. Possiblyan argu-
ment is thoughtto lie in a supposed inconsistencybetween "holi-
ness" and "moral virtues;" but if so, it should be rememberedthat
Spensercertainlyclassed holinessas a moralvirtue,as is shownnot
onlyby the letterto Raleigh but also by the "XII. Morall vertues"
of the title page of the Faerie Queene.
Again, Jusserandsays that Spenser's referenceto the twelve
moral virtues of Aristotle was "a mere afterthought,probably,
imaginedafterpart ofthe poem had been written;forSpenserbegins
with the virtue of Holiness, conspicuouslyabsent as we saw from
Aristotle'senumeration,"etc.2 Surelyit is incrediblethat Spenser
should contemplatea great epic for years (see Spenser's letter to
Harvey underdate of 1580) and finallywritethe forty-five thousand
a
wordsof the Book on Holiness withouteven generalnotionof the
plot and purposeof his poem. Besides, the fact that the machinery
of the courtof Gloriana and of the quests is introducedat the very
beginningof Book 13 indicatesthat the plan of the letterto Raleigh
was not an "afterthought." But even if we wereto admit that the
referenceto Aristotlewas an afterthought, conceivedafterthe first
Book was written,it would have to fit, at least approximately.
And Book I, Holiness, was one of the threewhichaccompaniedthe
letterto Raleigh. How could Spenser say that each of the twelve
Books of the Faerie Queenewould contain one of Aristotle'stwelve
moral virtues,"of whichthese threebookes contaynthree,"4when
the firstof the three had nothingwhateverto do with Aristotle?
Could he expect to deceive Raleigh, Sidney,Elizabeth, and the rest
of the brilliantcircleforwhomhe wrote?
ObviouslyJusserandmisunderstands, or has forgotten,
the mean-
ing of Aristotle'svirtue of or
Highmindedness, Magnanimity; for
in
he sees it only "a kind of ornamentapplicable to all the virtues."5
It is well knownthat this virtuerepresentsAristotle'sconceptionof
1 Mod. Phil., III, 376.
2 Ibid., p. 381.
3 I, i. See also canto vii, stanza 46.
4 Letter to Raleigh.
5Mod. Phil., III, 382.
31
32 W. F. DEMOSS

absolute moral perfection. "The highmindedman," says Aristotle,

"seems to be one who thinkshimselfworthyofgreatthings,and who
is worthyofthem. For he who thinkshimselfworthyof greatthings
withoutbeingso is foolish,and novirtuouspersonis foolishorabsurd."
"There will be one particularobject of his interest. ... honor."
"Highmindedness,then, has to do with honor on a great scale."
"The highmindedman, as being worthyof the highestthings,will
be in the highestdegreegood." "It seemsthat the highmindedman
possessessuch greatnessas belongsto everyvirtue." "It seemsthat
Highmindedness is, as it were,the crownofthevirtues,as it enhances
them and cannot exist apart fromthem." Finally, the following
sentence shows Aristotle'sexalted conceptionof Highmindedness:
"He [the highmindedman] will be onlymoderatelypleased at great
honors conferredupon him by virtuouspeople, as feelingthat he
obtainswhatis naturallyhisdue or evenless thanhis due; forit would
be impossibleto devise an honor that should be proportionateto
perfectvirtue."'
But is the Knight of Holiness Aristotle's highmindedman?
Some change in the conceptionof the Red Cross Knight was, of
course,necessaryon accountofthe factthat he was a Christianhero.
So far as possible, however,Spenser has made him conformto
Aristotle'sconceptionof Highmindedness. First,he is characterized
by a highopinionofhimself. For proofofhisamazingself-confidence
we have not only Spenser's letter to Raleigh, but also the Faerie
Queeneitself. "A tall clownisheyoungeman" who has neverworn
armor,2 he entersthe courtof greatGloriana,
Wherenoblestknights wereto be foundon earth,3
and to the great wonderof the Queen and the disappointmentand
mortification ofUna, whomhe proposesto help,demandsthegreatest
of all quests,the establishmentofTruth-true Christianity-andthe
defeatofErrorand the Devil, a quest so difficult that,althoughgreat
knightsfromall over the worldhave tried it, none has been able to
fulfilit.4 Assuredlyhe thinkshimselfworthyof great things. But
he not only thinkshimselfworthy; he is worthy-as is abundantly
proved,not alone by his abilityto wear the Christianarmor,which
I For Aristotle's discussion of Highmindedness see Nicomachean Ethics, IV, vii ff.
2 Letter to Raleigh and F. Q., I, i, 1. 3 I, iii, 28. 4 I, vii, 45.
32
 SPENSER'S TWELVE MORAL VIRTUES 33
is the test,' nor by Una's later testimonyconcerninghis greatwork,2
but also by his finaltriumphover all enemiesincludingthe Dragon
of Evil.3 In the second place, his chiefthoughtis the winningof
great earthlyhonor. His "noble heart" is "with child of glorious
greatintent" and
Can neverrest,untillit forth
havebrought
Th' eternallbroodofglorieexcellent.4
"All for prayse and honourhe did fight."' From firstto last the
Knight of Holiness is in pursuitof honor. He has come to Faerie
Court in the firstplace to seek forfame:
pricktwithcourage,and thyforcespryde,
To Faerycourtthoucam'stto seekeforfame.6
Upon our firstintroductionto him, at the beginningof the Faerie
Queene,we are told:
Upona greatadventure he was bond,
Glorianato himgave,
That greatest
GloriousQueeneofFaerielond,
That greatest
To winnehimworship, and hergraceto have,
Whichofall earthly hemostdidcrave.'
things
And whenhe appears in the thirdBook, afterhe has attainedperfect
Holiness, his characterin this respectis unchanged:
Thenhe forthon hisjourneydidproceede,
To seekeadventures, whichmotehimbefall,
Andwinhimworship through hiswarlikedeed,
Whichalwayesofhispaineshemadethechiefest meed.8
Nor does the Red Cross Knight seek merelygreat honor; he seeks
the greatestof all earthlyhonor. Una tells him that his fightwith
the Dragon of Evil
shallye evermorerenowmed make,
Aboveall knights onearth,
thatbatteill
undertake.9
1 Letter to Raleigh. 4I, v, 1.
2 I, vii, 47-49. 5 I, v, 7.
aI, xi. 8 I, x, 66.
7 I, i, 3. Italics in quotations from Spenser are all mine. I quote from Smith and
de Selincourt's Poetical Works of Spenser, Oxford, 1912, but I have disregarded the
italicization of proper names and followed modern usage in regard to u, v, and j.
8 III, iv, 4.
9 I, xi, 2.
33
34 W. F. DEMOSS

And Heavenly Comtemplationhas already told him what this great

honoris to be. The knightis to be Saint George,famousthroughout
Europe as a militarysaint,and the patronsaint ofEngland:
For thouemongst thoseSaints,whomthoudoestsee,
Shaltbe a Saint,and thineownenationsfrend
AndPatrone:thouSaintGeorgeshaltcalledbee,
SaintGeorgeofmeryEngland,thesigneofvictoree.1
Finally, that the Red Cross Knight's Highmindednessmay be com-
plete and convincingin Spenser's and Aristotle's2view, Heavenly
Contemplationexplainsthat the knightis of highbirth-
thouspringstfromancientrace
OfSaxonkings.3
And we know that it is by deliberateplan, not by accident,that
Spenser makes the Red Cross Knight's one great passion love of
honor. Even Heavenly Contemplationsanctionsthe knight'spur-
suit ofearthlyfame.4 And the poet, in his own person-
That I thismanofGodhisgodlyarmesmayblaze5-
prays aid of
The Nourseoftime,and everlastingfame
That warlikehandsennoblest withimmortall
name.6
The moral perfectionwhich the knightattains is, no doubt, to be
expected:
fromthefirstuntothelast degree,
His mortalllifehe learnedhad to frame
In holyrighteousnesse,without rebukeorblame.'
It is not to be overlookedthat all of Spenser'sgreatknightsare
characterizedby Highmindedness,as they are by all of the other
moral virtues. This is in accordance with Aristotle'stendencyto
make any given virtueinclude all the others,and his teachingthat
"Neither greatnessnor highmindedness is possiblewithoutcomplete
virtue."8 But although,on account of this close relationbetween
the virtues,such greatknightsas Guyon and Artegallare character-
ized by Highmindedness,none of Spenser'sknights,except possibly
1 I, x, 61.
2 This statement is warranted not only by Aristotle's and Spenser's strong feeling
of aristocracy, but also by Aristotle's discussion of Highmindedness in N. Eth., IV, viii.
3 I, x, 65. 6 I, xi, 5.
4 I, x, 59, 60, and 62. 7 I, x, 45.
5 I, xi, 7. 8 N. Eth., IV, viii.

34
 SPENSER'STWELVEMORALVIRTUES 35
the all-perfectArthur,can compare in Highmindednesswith the
Knight of Holiness. That especial emphasis should be laid on
Arthur'sHighmindednesswould naturallyresultnot only fromthe
close relation between the virtues, but also from Arthur'smoral
perfection. But it is in Book I, where Arthurtells his dream of
glory,that we are most impressedwith his Highmindedness. And
accordingto Spenser'splan in the letterto Raleigh,Arthurmust,in
the Book on Holiness, representthe same virtue as the Knight of
Holiness: "In the whole course I mentionthe deedes of Arthure
applyable to that vertue,which I write of in that booke." Con-
sequently, if Arthur representsHighmindednessin Book I, so
must the Knightof the Red Cross. Thus it is clear that the Knight
of Holiness exemplifiesAristotle'svirtue of Highmindedness. Nor
was Spenser doing anythingunusual in thus combiningpagan and
sacred writings. He was only doing what many divines did both
beforeand afterhim. Moreover,he was onlydoingwhat he himself
did again and again in the Faerie Queene,sometimesin a rathersur-
prisingfashion. For example,in II, xii, 52, he comparesAcrasia's
Bower, falselynamed the "Bowre of blis," not only to "Parnasse"
and Mount Ida, but also to the Garden of Eden, the comparison
being unfavorableeven to Eden. Again, the marriageritesof Una
and the Knightof Holiness,describedin I, xii, are pagan, not Chris-
tian.' There is nothing surprising,however, in his combining
Aristotle'sHighmindednesswith Christianity;forthe combination
is simplymoral perfection(representedby the Knight of Holiness)
marriedto Christiantruth(Una).
I have discussed the case of Holiness at considerablelength
because it is the only one whichis in any way doubtful. In Books
II-VI it is certain that Spenser is consciouslyand deliberately
followingAristotle.
The subject of Spenser'ssecondBook is Temperance. Jusserand
has to admitthat "[Spenser'svirtueof]Temperancetrulyand plainly
corresponds to one of Aristotle's [virtues]."2 Aristotle outlines
Temperancebrieflyin the NicomacheanEthics,II, vii, discussesit at
some lengthin III, xiii-xv,and continuesthe discussionthroughout
1 See I, xii, 37.
2 Mod. Phil., III, 376.
35
36 W. F. DEMOSS

mostofBook VII. Spenser,in his Book on Temperance,drawsupon

all threediscussions.
Concerningthe virtue of Spenser's thirdBook, Jusserandsays:
"Chastity may be held to have been [one ofAristotle'svirtues],ifwe
give the wordthe sense of 'shame' (verecundia),and neglectthe fact
that Aristotle,while studyingit, declaresthat this 'shame' is not a
virtue."' That both Spenserand Aristotlewere interestedin prac-
tical morality,not in whethersuch qualities as Temperance and
Chastity are technicallyvirtues,we have already seen. Although
Aristotletends to make this virtue of Shame, or Modesty, all-
inclusive,just as he tendsto make all the others,his discussionof it
in the NicomacheanEthics2and in the Rhetoric3 leaves unquestionable
the factthat he means it particularlyto apply to sex morality. It is
hardlynecessary to state that in his Book on Chastity Spenser is
discussingsex moralityfromthe standpointof Shame, or Modesty,
on the one hand, and Shamelessness,on the other.4 It should be
added that sex moralityis also an importantpart of Aristotle'sdis-
cussion of Temperance,includingLicentiousnessand Incontinence.
AristotelianTemperance,in the strictor particularsense,applies to
"meats" and "drinks" and "what are called the pleasuresoflove."'
AristotelianShame, or Modesty,in the strictsense,applies,ofcourse,
to the last of these. Spenser,in his Book on Chastity,drew not
onlyupon Aristotle'sdiscussionofShame, or Modesty,but also upon
that part of his discussionof Temperanceand Incontinencewhich
deals withsex morality.
Concerningthe subjects of Spenser's fourthand fifthBooks,
Jusserandsays: "The readerknowswhat the case is withFriendship
and Justice."' I believehe does.
Finally,concerningCourtesy,the subjectofSpenser'ssixthBook,
Jusserandsays: "Courtesy may be held to correspond,if to any-
thing, to Aristotle'sfriendliness,but not without a considerable
1 Mod. Phil., III, 376.
2 N. Eth., II, vii; IV, xv.
3 Rhetoric,II, vi, xii, and xiii.
4 See, for example, III, i, 48. See also, III, i, 50; III, ii, 40-41; III, iv, 45; III, v,
55; III, vii, 49; III, viii, 32; and III, xii, 24.
s N. Eth., III, xiii.
6 Mod. Phil., III, 376.
36
 SPENSER'STWELVEMORALVIRTUES 37

extensionand modernizationof the word. .... Aristotle'sdescrip-

tion of friendlinessbest suits,however,withoutmatchingit exactly,
the modern notion of courtesy."' The New English Dictionary
reveals nothinginconsistentin Spenser's discussingunderthe name
of Courtesythe virtuewhichAristotlesays is most likeFriendliness.
But what reallycounts,a comparisonofSpenser'sBook on Courtesy
with this Near-Friendliness,shows that the two really do match.
The sphereof Aristotle'sNear-Friendlinessis "human society,with
its commonlife and association in words and deeds." The virtue
is a mean betweenflattery, obsequiousness,complaisance,on the one
hand, and surliness,disagreeableness,contentiousness, on the other.
Aristotle says: "It most resemblesFriendliness; for the person
in whom it exists answersto our idea of a virtuousfriend,except
that friendlinessincludes affectionas well. ..... .He will so
act alike to strangersand acquaintances," etc.2 Thus Aristotle's
Near-Friendliness is a kindof Golden Rule: In yourassociationwith
others,includingstrangers,speak to themand act towardthemas a
virtuousfriendwould do.
Spenser's virtue of Courtesy matches this Aristotelian ideal
exactly. It allows neitherflattery,on the one hand, nor conten-
tiousness,on the other.3 It consistsin acting toward othersas a
virtuousfriendwould act. It shouldbe remembered, however,that
with both Aristotleand Spenserfriendshipincludeslove; and also
that, in accordancewithAristotle'sand Spenser'stendencyto make
any given virtue include all the others,Courtesyand Discourtesy
will includeothervirtuesand vices.
For seldomeyetdidlivingcreaturesee,
That curtesieand manhoodeverdisagree.4
That the virtueof Spenser'ssixthBook does consistin actingtoward
othersas a truefriendwould act is shownby the charactersand the
episodes. Calidore, Tristram,Calepine, Prince Arthur,and others
representCourtesy,or Friendliness. Maleffort,Crudor,and Briana,
whomaltreatstrangers(c.i.); the "proud discourteousknight" whom
Tristramslays (c. ii); the contemptibleSir Turpine, who will not
1 Ibid.
2 N. Eth., IV, xii.
SSee, for example, Spenser's exposition of Calidore's Courtesy in VI, i, 2-3.
4VI, iii, 40.
37
38 W. F. DEMOSS

give lodgingto Calepine and his woundedlady, or help the wounded

woman over the ford,and who evenoattacksthe defenselessknight
(c. iii, vi, viii); Mirabella, who delightsin the sufferings
ofherlovers
(c. vii); the "salvage nation," which preys upon strangers(c. viii,
stanzas 35 ff.); and the "theeves" who lead Pastorellinto captivity
(c. ix, xi)-these are some of the examplesof Unfriendliness, of not
acting toward othersas a virtuous friend would act. And, finally,
the Blatant Beast is not Slander,as it is sometimesnamed, nor yet
the Puritans,as it is oftenestnamed. It is the Spiritof Unfriendli-
ness;' it is Malice, Malevolence, Envy, Despite, Slander, Conten-
tiousness,and is representedin one place,2no doubt, by the most
contentiouselementamong the Puritans. The Blatant Beast, like
Duessa,
couldd'onso manieshapesin sight,
As evercouldcameleoncoloursnew.3
Besides, Spensermorethan once shows by the speechesof his char-
acters, combinedwith the plot, that he is keepingbeforehim Aris-
totle's ideal of actingtowardothersas a truefriendwould act. For
example,in VI, iii, 15, Aldine is talkingto Sir Calidore,the Knight
of Courtesy. The two are strangers,having seen each other but
once before. We are told:
In th'endhis [Calidore's]
kyndlycourtesie
to prove,
He [Aldine]himbyall thebandsoflovebesought,
Andas it motea faithfull
friendbehove,
To safeconduct hislove,and notforought
To leave,tillto herfathershousehe had herbrought.
W. F. DEMoss
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

[To beconcluded]
1 With V, xii, 28-43 and VI, i, 7-10, in which passages the Blatant Beast is identified
with Envy and Detraction, the latter including Malevolence, and with VI, v, 12-22, in
which the Blatant Beast is identified with Malice, Deceit, and Detraction, compare the
author's comment, or literal exposition of Discourtesy, in VI, vii, 1-2.
2 See
VI, xii, 22-41; but note in VI, xii, 22 and 23, that the Blatant Beast has gone
"through every place" and "through all estates," all ranks of life, before he comes to the
"Clergy."
3IV, i, 18.

38