SECOND DIVISION NEZER D. BELEN SR., Respondent, "for Estafa docketed as I.S. No.
G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017 04-312, the pertinent and relevant portions are quoted hereunder, to
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April 12, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 2, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal
Case No. 15332-SP, convicting petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of
the crime of libel.
On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a
former Judge,3 filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle,
Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
San Pablo City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 04-312 and assigned
to then Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman
for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the parties' and
their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for
resolution.
In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his cause,
petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the
request, ACP Suñega-Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a
Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his
complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration &
Disqualify),4 the contents of which later became the subject of this libel
case.
Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the
Office of the Secretary of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus
Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving
Section on August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions filed
with the said office are first received and recorded at the receiving
section, then forwarded to the records section before referral to the
City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating
Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus
Motion from Michael Belen, the son of Nezer who is the respondent in
the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the motion by Joey
Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked
the receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and requested a
photocopy of it for her own reference.
On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner
a criminal complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations in the
Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 04-931 before the OCP of San Pablo City.
Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP
of San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited itself from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its
records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an
Order designating State Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City
Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation of the libel complaint.
On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution
finding probable cause to file a libel case against petitioner. On
December 8, 2004, he filed an Information charging petitioner with the
crime of libel, committed as follows:
That on or about August 31, 2004, in the City of San Pablo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a
member of the Philippine Bar with Attorney Roll No. 32322, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent
of impeaching, defaming and attacking the honesty, competence,
integrity, virtue and reputation of Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman as an
Assistant City Prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City and for the further purpose of dishonoring, injuring,
defaming and exposing said Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman to public
hatred, contempt, insult, calumny and ridicule, wrote, correspond,
published and filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo
City an undated "OMNIBUS MOTION (FOR RECONSIDERATION &
DISQUALIFY) in the case entitled "MEDEL B. BELEN, Complainant vs.
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the instant case, however, the Investigating Fiscal was not
impartial and exhibited manifest bias for 20,000 reasons. The
reasons were not legal or factual. These reasons were based on her
malicious and convoluted perceptions. If she was partial, then
she is stupid. The Investigating Fiscal's stupidity was clearly
manifest in her moronic resolution to dismiss the complaint because
she reasoned out that: (1) the lease started in 1983 as the number 9
was handwritten over the figure "8" in the lease contract; (2) no support
for accounting was made for the first five (5) years; and (3) the
dismissal of IS No. 03-14-12 covered the same subject matter in the
instant case. Thus, the instant complaint should be dismissed.
Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumption were
tarnished with silver ingots. She is also an intellectually infirm or
stupidly blind. Because it was just a matter of a more studious and
logical appraisal and examination of the documents and affidavits
submitted by respondent's witnesses to establish that the lease started
in 1993. All respondent's supporting affidavits of Mrs. Leyna Belen-
Ang; Mr. Demetrio D. Belen and Mr. Silvestre D. Belen (all admitted
that the lease started in 1993). Secondly, had she not always been
absent in the preliminary investigation hearings and conducted a
clarificatory questioning as requested by herein complainant, as her
secretary was the only one always present and accepted the exhibits
and affidavits, there would have been a clear deliverance from her
corrupted imagination. Firstly, complainant was married to his wife on
August 15, 1987. Thus, it would be physically and chronologically
inconceivable that the lease for the subject lanzones be entered by
complainant and his wife, whom he met only in 1987, with respondent
and his siblings in 1983. Secondly, the payments were made in 1993
and 1994, these were admitted by respondent's witnesses in their
affidavits. Thus, it would be a height of stupidity for respondent and his
witnesses to allow complainant to take possession and harvest the
lanzones from 1983 to 2002 without any payment. Lastly, the only
defense raised in the respondents witnesses' affidavits was the lease
period was only from 1993 to 1998. Thus, this is a clear admission that
the lease started in 1993. Despite all these matters and documents,
the moronic resolution insisted that the lease started in 1983. For all
the 20,000 reasons of the Investigating Fiscal, the slip of her skirt
shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind - a manifest
partiality and stupendous stupidity in her resolution.
Furthermore, Investigating Fiscal's 2nd corrupted reason was the failure
of complainant to render an accounting on the 5-year harvest from
1993 to 1998. Sadly, the Investigating Fiscal was manifestly prejudiced
and manifestly selective in her rationale. Firstly, the issue of non-
presentation of accounting for the first 5 years was not raised in any of
the witnesses' affidavits. A careful perusal of all their affidavits clearly
shows that the issue of accounting for the first 5-year (1993-1999)
harvest was never a defense because respondent and his witnesses
knew and were informed that the lanzones harvest from 1993 to 1999
was less than 200,000. Secondly, during the respondent's 2002 visit
from USA in a meeting at the house of Mrs. Leyna Belen Agra,
complainant advised respondent of this matter and respondent
acknowledged the fact that the 5-year harvest from 1993 to 1998 was
abundantly inadequate to pay the principal sum of 300,000. Thirdly, all
the numbers and figures in the Lease Contract indicated 1993 and/or
1994 - a clear indicia that the transaction covered by the instrument
started in 1993. Fourthly, the correction was made by respondent or
one of his siblings, which can easily be shown by the penmanship.
Lastly, the letters of complainant to respondent clearly advised of the
non-payment of the principal and interest for the 1st 5-year. For this
reason, complainant had repeatedly agreed to the request of
respondent's wife, Lourdes B. Belen and younger son, Nezer Belen, Jr.
in 2003 for meetings for resolution of the matter. But respondent's wife
and younger son repeatedly cancelled these meetings. All these
factual circumstances are undeniable but were presented because the
issue of accounting was never raised.
Lastly, the invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was a
nail in the coffin for the idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating
Fiscal. It was her fallacious rationale that because No. 03-14-12
covered the same subject, the instant case should also be dismissed.
Unfortunately, she showed her glaring ignorance of the law. Firstly,
there is no res judicata in a preliminary reinvestigation. Secondly, the
dismissal of a complaint shall not bar filing of another complaint
because upon completion of the necessary documentary exhibits and
affidavits to establish probable cause another case could be filed.
Thirdly, the cause of action in the instant case is totally different vis-a-
vis that in I.S. No. 03-1412. Fourthly, the complainant is filing the
instant case in his own personal capacity as "lessee" over the entire
property from 1993 to 2013. In other words, the Investigating Fiscal's
invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was clearly
imbecilic and idiotic.
All these matters could have been easily established. All the idiotic
and corrupted reason of the Investigating Fiscal manifestly
exposed, had the Investigating Fiscal exercised the cold partiality of a
judge and calendared the instant case for clarificatory questions. In
fact, she deliberately ignored complainant's request for such setting
despite the established doctrine in preliminary investigation that the
"propounding of clarificatory questions is an important component of
preliminary investigation, more so where it is requested in order to
shed light on the affidavits >>>" (Mondia v. Deputy
Ombudsman/Visayas Are, 346 SCRA 365) Unfortunately, the
Investigating Fiscal, despite the letter-request for clarificatory
question to shed lights of all the transaction and facts under
investigation, chose to be guided by her manifest partiality and
stupendous stupidity. As a reminder to the Investigating Fiscal,
Justice Oscar Herrera, Sr., in his treatise, I Remedial Law 2000 ed.,
succinctly explained the underlying principle of fair play and justice in
the just determination of every action and proceedings is that the rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the
Courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of cases
before the court.
In totality, the dismissal of the instant case was based on reasons that
were never raised by the respondent. Reasons dictate and due
process of law mandates that complainant be afforded opportunity to
rebut issues raised. In the instant case, manifestly established is the
corrupted penchant of the Investigating Fiscal to assume matters and
presume issues not raised and decide, without affording complainant
the due process, matters totally extraneous and not raised. Thus,
contrary to the due process requirement of law, the Investigating Fiscal
rendered a resolution on a matter not raised. The question, therefore,
is her reason in adjudicating without affording complainant the
opportunity of rebuttal, a matter not raised. She never ever asked
these questions. She deliberately and fraudulently concealed her
biased reasoning to prevent complainant to rebut this matter. She
sideswiped complainant on matters not raised in the pleading. She was
a partial and interested investigator with clear intent to dismiss the
case. This is an implied lawyering for the respondent. Thus, she
should resign from the prosecutorial arm of the government and
be a defense counsel. Then her infirm ed intellectual prowess and
stupid assumptions be exposed in trial on the merits under which
complainant is afforded the due process requirement of the law.
At that stage of trial, she would be exposed as a fraud and a
quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty.
It is a sad day for a colleague in the practice of law to call for a
disqualification of an Investigating Fiscal. The circumstances of the
instant case, leave no recourse for complainant but the option, in his
quest for justice and fair play and not for corrupted and convoluted
20,000 reasons, to strongly ask for the disqualification of Fiscal
Suñega-Lagman in the resolution of the instant motion.
In the resolution for this motion for reconsideration, the sole issue is
whether based on the affidavits and evidence adduced by the
complainant probable cause exist to file a case against respondent.
The answer is YES because, all law students and lawyers, except
Fiscal Suñega-Lagman, know ">>> the preliminary investigation should
determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
(Webb vs. Visconde, August 23, 1995, 63 SCAD 916, 247 SCRA 652)
And if the evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty
bound to file the corresponding information. (Meralco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115835, July 5, 1996, 71 SCAD 712, 258 SCRA
280). Thus, preliminary investigation is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. A probable
cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner..."
That the article in question had for its object to appear and made it
understood, as was in effect understood and interpreted by the public
or person/s who read it, that Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman is an inept,
ignorant, dishonest, corrupt, undeserving, unjust, unfair and
incompetent prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial
court entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) complainant
ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative
of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores
and Gayne Gamo Enseo, who are part of the administrative staff of the
OCP of San Pablo City. For its part, the defense presented the
accused petitioner as its sole witness.
After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced
him to pay a fine of P3,000.00, with no pronouncement as to damages
on account of ACP Suñega-Lagman's reservation to file an
independent civil action against him.
The trial court stressed that the following allegations and utterances
against ACP Suñega-Lagman in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are far
detached from the controversy in the estafa case, thereby losing its
character as absolutely privileged communication: (1) "manifest bias
for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful
assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt
shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and
convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5) "moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually
infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity";
(8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud
and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty." On
the element of publication, the trial court noted that the Omnibus
Motion was not sent straight to ACP Suñega-Lagman, but passed
through and exposed to be read by third persons, namely: prosecution
witnesses Flores and Enseo who are the staff in the receiving section
of the OCP of San Pablo City, as well as Michael Belen, the son and
representative of Nezer in the estafa case.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision. On the claimed
lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the defamatory matter was
made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores
and Enseo, who are the staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able
to read the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well as Michael, son
and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated
by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion. Anent the
applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged communication, the CA
ruled in the negative because the subject statements were
unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the
estafa case filed by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were
defamatory remarks on the personality, reputation and mental fitness
of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela stated
that petitioner could not be convicted of libel because the statements in
his Omnibus Motion, while couched in intemperate, acrid and uncalled-
for language, are relevant to the dismissal of his estafa case, and thus
falls under the concept of absolutely privileged communication. She
also said that the element of publication is absent, because with
respect to Nezer, Michael is not a "third person," i.e., a person other
than the person to whom the defamatory statement refers, but a
"representative of his father." She added that while Flores and Enseo,
who are staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, had read the Omnibus
Motion, they are not "third persons" since they had a legal duty to
perform with respect to the said motion filed in their office.
In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In seeking his acquittal of the crime charged, petitioner argues that the
CA erred (1) in finding him guilty of libel despite the absence of the
element of publication; (2) in ruling that the privileged communication
rule is inapplicable; and (3) in relying on the opinion of ordinary
witnesses to show the presence of malicious imputations.6
The petition lacks merit.
On the absence of the element of publication, petitioner contends that
in serving and filing the Omnibus Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes,
he did not intend to expose it to third persons, but only complied with
the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done. He
asserts that the perusal of the said motion by Michael, the duly
authorized representative and son of the respondent in the estafa
case, as well as the two staff of the OCP - Flores and Enseo - did not
constitute publication within the meaning of the law on libel because
they cannot be considered as "third persons to whom copies of the
motion were disseminated." With respect to Flores and Enseo,
petitioner insists that they were both legal recipients as personnel in
the OCP where the motion was addressed and had to be filed. Stating
that the absence of publication negates malice, petitioner posits that he
could not have intended to injure the reputation of ACP Suñega-
Lagman with the filing of the Omnibus Motion since it was never
published, but was sent to its legal recipients.
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has
been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has
been written.7 A communication of the defamatory matter to the person
defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his
self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of
himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. 8 In the same vein, a
defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another
constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its
possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the
offended party.9 If a sender of a libelous communication knows or has
good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the
person defamed, there is sufficient publication.10 The publication of a
libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the
immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is
reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by
third persons.11
In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to
third persons, but only complied with the law on how service and filing
of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the defamatory
statements in it were made known to someone other than the person
to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was
contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that
persons other than the one defamed would be able to read the
defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the
OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in
the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in
Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion
is not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record
when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his
act,12 petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and
service of his Omnibus Motion. As aptly noted by the trial
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx The Omnibus Motion although contained in a sealed envelope was
addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, San Pablo City. As
such, the accused fully well knows that the sealed envelope will be
opened at the receiving section, and will be first read by the staff of the
Office before the private complainant gets hold of a copy thereof. In
fine, the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to the private
complainant — the person [to] whom it is written, but passed through
other persons in the Office of the City Prosecutor. At the time the
accused mailed the sealed envelope containing the Omnibus Motion
addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, he knew that there
exists not only a reasonable but strong probability that it will be
exposed to be read or seen by third persons.13
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of
defamatory matters is not satisfied by a communication of such
matters to an agent of the defamed person.14 In this case, however, the
defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus
Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and
representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is
clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and
Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had read the
contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled
rule that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official
duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of
officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter
of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication."15 Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of
the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and
Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the
subject matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the
dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-
Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty
pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions filed
with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
Petitioner also avers that the alleged defamatory statements in his
Omnibus Motion passed the test of relevancy, hence, covered by the
doctrine of absolutely privileged communication. He asserts that the
statements contained in his motion are relevant and pertinent to the
subject of inquiry, as they were used only to highlight and emphasize
the manifestly reversible errors and irregularities that attended the
resolution rendered by ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.
A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable,
even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes
allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings
or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative
proceedings, as well as answers given by the witness in reply to
questions propounded to them in the course of said proceedings,
provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues,
and the answers are responsive to the questions propounded to said
witnesses.16
The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are
considered privileged is not only because said pleadings have become
part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to the
undeniable fact said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations
and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition
of issues ventilated before the courts for proper administration of
justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings
are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they
can be supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of which
would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged
of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.17 In fine,
the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice.18
While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of
absolutely privileged communication extends to statements in
preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to trial, the
Court found as persuasive in this jurisdiction the U.S. case of Borg v.
Boas19 which categorically declared the existence of such
protection:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial
proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned
and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official
nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are
proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for
crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or
the court is not libelous although proved false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person
for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same
cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for
defamation.20
The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and
the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or material
to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry.21 Sarcastic, pungent and
harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the
dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are
absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues.22 As to the degree of
relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory
matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to
which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in
relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.23 In order that a matter
alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need not, in any case, be
material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, it must be
legitimately related thereto or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of
the trial.24 What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered
to favor the writer, and the words are not be scrutinized with
microscopic intensity,25 as it would defeat the protection which the law
throws over privileged communication.26
The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of
San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa complaint
during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. An
examination of the motion shows that the following defamatory words
and phrases used, even if liberally construed, are hardly material or
pertinent to his cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of the
dismissal of his estafa complaint and the disqualification of ACP
Suñega-Lagman from further acting on the case: (1) "manifest bias
for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful
assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her
skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind";
(4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5) "moronic
resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest
partiality and stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of
the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft of
any intellectual ability and mental honesty." These statements are
neither relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid and
justifiable reasons for disqualification. These diatribes pertain to ACP
Suñega-Lagman's honor, reputation, mental and moral character, and
are no longer related to the discharge of her official function as a
prosecutor. They are devoid of any relation to the subject matter of
petitioner's Omnibus Motion that no reasonable man can doubt their
irrelevancy, and may not become the subject of inquiry in the course of
resolving the motion. As fittingly ruled by the trial
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court has no problem with legitimate criticisms of the procedures
taken during the preliminary investigation and accused's comments
pointing out flaws in the ruling of the private complainant. They should
ever be constructive and should pave the way at correcting the
supposed errors in the Resolution and/or convincing the private
complainant to inhibit, as she did, from the case. Unfortunately, the
Omnibus Motion, or the questioned allegations contained therein, are
not of this genre. On the contrary, the accused has crossed the lines
as his statements are baseless, scurrilous attacks on the person of the
private complainant. The attacks did nothing but damage the integrity
and reputation of the private complainant. In fact, the attacks
undermined in no small measure the faith and confidence of the
litigants in the prosecutorial service.27
Petitioner should bear in mind the rule that the pleadings should
contain but the plain and concise statements of material facts and not
the evidence by which they are to be proved. If the pleader goes
beyond the requirements of the statute, and alleges an irrelevant
matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.28 The reason for this is
that without the requirement of relevancy, pleadings could be easily
diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of the
issues in litigation and pervaded into a vehicle for airing charges
motivated by a personal rancor.29 Granted that lawyers are given great
latitude or pertinent comment in furtherance of the causes they uphold,
and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some
infelicities of language,30 petitioner would do well to recall that the
Code of Professional Responsibility31 ordains that a lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper. After all, a lawyer should conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues,32 and use only such temperate but strong language in his
pleadings or arguments befitting an advocate.
There is also no merit in petitioner's theory that the test of relevancy
should be liberally construed in his favor, especially because "in the
information for libel, there was no allegation of irrelevancy or
impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause"33 or the
subject of the inquiry, the estafa complaint in I.S. No. 04-312. It bears
emphasis that while the relevancy of the statement is a requisite of the
defense of absolutely privileged communication, it is not one of the
elements of libel. Thus, the absence of an allegation to the effect that
the questioned statement is irrelevant or impertinent does not violate
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. As the party raising such defense, petitioner
has the burden of proving that his statements are relevant to the
subject of his Omnibus Motion. For its part, the prosecution only has to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all the elements of
libel as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1)
imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition status or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication;
(3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical
person; and (5) tendency to cause the dishonour, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed.34
Meanwhile, petitioner's reliance on People v. Andres35 is misplaced. In
that case, the prosecution argued that the trial court erred in dismissing
the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the judge's
conclusion on the face of the information that the defendant was
prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to be proved, and that
the alleged privileged nature of defendant's publication is a matter of
defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the libel complaint.
The Court sustained the trial court in dismissing the libel case on a
mere motion to quash in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While there is some point in this contention, yet when in the
information itself it appears, as it does in the present case, that the
communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate
pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent
and defendant need to wait until trial and produce evidence before he
can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned
imputations appear, as they seem, in this case, to be really pertinent
and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on
complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which
defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest
as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the
fact thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of
libel.
As has already been said by this Court: "As to the degree of relevancy
or pertinency necessary to make an alleged defamatory matter
privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety." Having this in mind, it can not be said that
the trial court committed reversible error in this case in finding that the
allegations in the information itself present a case of an absolutely
privileged communication justifying the dismissal of the case. Note that
the information does not contain any allegation of irrelevancy and
impertinency to counteract the quotations from the motion for
reconsideration in question.36
In stark contrast to People v. Andres, even on the face of the
allegations in the information, the defamatory statements in petitioner's
Omnibus Motion fail the test of relevancy in order to be considered an
absolutely privileged communication, because they are neither relevant
grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid or justifiable reasons
for disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Finally, petitioner argues that the reliance of the CA on the statements
of ordinary witnesses like Michael, Flores and Enseo is contrary to
Sections 4837 and 5038 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, because they
are incompetent to testify on whether the statements against ACP
Suñega-Lagman in the Omnibus Motion constituted malicious
imputations against her person.
As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge39 and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the facts
testified to. Opinion evidence or testimony refers to evidence of what
the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as
distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves. 40 In
this case, however, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo
barely made a conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statements
in petitioner's Omnibus Motion, but merely testified on their own
understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People41 the Court stated the twin rule for the purpose
of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous:
(1) that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such
a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was uttered; and (2)
the published matter alleged to libelous must be construed as a whole.
"In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court
will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the
publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the
effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not
having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article,
it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there
be from the words used in the publication."42 As the persons who,
aside from ACP Suñega-Lagman, had also read the Omnibus Motion,
prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo are competent to
testify on their own understanding of the questioned statements, and
their testimonies are relevant to the trial court's determination of the
defamatory character of such statements.
At any rate, even if petitioner's objections to the admissibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to their supposed opinions
on his statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman were to be sustained,
the trial court still correctly determined the statements to be defamatory
based on its own reading of the plain and ordinary meanings of the
words and phrases used in the Omnibus Motion,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Based on the above testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on
this Court's own assessment, the statements above-quoted disturb
one's sensibilities. There is evident imputation of the crime of bribery to
the effect that the private complainant may have received money in
exchange for the dismissal of the accused's complaint against his
uncle Nezer Belen. There is likewise an imputation against the private
complainant as an "idiot", "imbecile" and with "stupendous stupidity".
An "idiot" as defined in Meriam-Webster Collegiate Thesaurus, 1988
Edition, p. 380, as a "fool", "moron," "stupid", "nincompoop",
"ignoramus", "simpleton", "dummy", or "imbecile". On the other hand,
an "imbecile" means "retarded", "dull" or "feeble minded". "Stupid"
means lacking in or exhibiting a lack of power to absorb ideas or
impressions, or dumb. "Stupendous" means marvelous, astounding,
monstrous, monumental and tremendous. Thus, "stupendous stupidity"
simply means tremendous or monstrous dumbness. Indeed, accused's
characterization of the private complainant is unkind, to say the least,
which should not be found a pleading written by a lawyer.43
Given the settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate
court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether or not they are made the subject of assignment of
errors,44 the Court finds it proper to modify the penalty of fine of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) imposed upon petitioner.
Apropos is Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in
the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties
in Libel Cases,45 where the Supreme Court cited cases46 of libel,
indicating an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only
rather than imprisonment in such cases under the circumstances
therein specified. The Administrative Circular sets down the rule of
preference on the matter of imposition of penalties for the crime of libel
bearing in mind the following principles:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the
crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code;47
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of
sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing
to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be
unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal
Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.
The penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from P200.00 to P6,000.00, or both,
in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party. The Court finds it appropriate to increase the fine imposed upon
petitioner from Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) to Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00), considering the following peculiar circumstances of
the case: (1) then a practicing lawyer himself, petitioner ignored the
rules that in his professional dealings, a lawyer shall not use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, and should treat
other lawyers with courtesy, fairness and candor; (2) the barrage of
defamatory statements in his Omnibus Motion are utterly irrelevant to
his prayers for a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa case and
for the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting
thereon; (3) the baseless and scurrilous personal attacks in such public
document do nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of ACP
Suñega-Lagman, as well as undermine the faith and confidence of
litigants in the prosecutorial service; and (4) the lack of remorse on his
part, as shown by his unfounded claim that he filed the Omnibus
Motion in self-defense to ACP Suñega-Lagman's supposed imputation
of falsification against him without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED, and the Decision dated April 12, 2013 and the
Resolution dated January 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32905, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the
penalty imposed upon petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen to Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-58681. May 31, 1982.]
ALFREDO P. MALIT, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Caloocan
City, Branch IV, Respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for Petitioner.
SYNOPSIS
During the trial of an administrative case filed by Dr. Macaspac against
Ruth Fernandez, Dr. Macaspac on cross-examination by petitioner,
counsel for the respondent, was asked if she knew the person who
"made" a certain exhibit. Evading the question, Dr. Macaspac stated
that she did not understand the word "made." After explaining that the
word means "prepared," Dr. Macaspac, instead of answering, asked
for clarification, prompting the petitioner to utter the words "I doubt how
did you become a doctor." Based on this utterance, an information for
Unjust Vexation was filed in respondent’s court. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash the information but this, and a subsequent motion for
reconsideration were denied. Petitioner filed the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition which respondent Judge claims is not the
proper remedy to assail an mierlocutory order.
The Supreme Court held that the utterance made in the course of a
judicial or administrative proceedings belongs to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged; and that although
interlocutory orders ordinarily are reviewable only on appeal, it maybe
the subject of certiorari where grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed or the lower court acted capriciously.
Order assailed, reversed and set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS;
PARTIES AND COUNSEL EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN LIBEL OR
SLANDER CASES. — Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted
from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory,
uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the
statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS DEEMED
PRIVILEGED. — As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency
necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts
are inclined to be liberal. The master to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and
impropriety (People v. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046). It is thus clear that
utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings
belong to a class of communications that are absolutely privileged.
Stated otherwise. the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage
of the administration of justice.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS, NOT PROPER SUBJECT THEREOF; EXCEPTION.
— Certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of an interlocutory
order of the trial court. Interlocutory orders ordinarily should be
reviewed when an appeal is taken from the trial court’s judgment. Not
every procedural error or erroneous legal or factual conclusion
amounts to grave abuse of discretion. However, as the Court ruled in
Sanchez, Et. Al. v. . Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, Et Al., (L-27043, November
28, 1975) ‘when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed,
or the lower court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves
 upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.’’
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of respondent
Judge, dated February 20, 1981, denying petitioner’s motion to quash
in Criminal Case No. 126521, entitled: "People of the Philippines v.
Atty. Alfredo Malit", as well as the order of same respondent, dated
May 5, 1981, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth
Fernandez in an administrative case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac.
At the hearing of the case on January 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac
identified certain exhibits on the witness stand. On cross-examination
by herein petitioner, Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a
certain exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did
not understand the word "made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying
that it means "prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr. Macaspac would not
answer and, instead, asked petitioner for clarification. This prompted
Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how did you become a Doctor." As a
consequence, Dr. Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander against
herein petitioner with the Fiscal’s Office of Caloocan
City.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 28, 1980, an information for unjust vexation docketed as
Criminal Case No. 126521 was filed by Special Counsel Apolinario A.
Exevea which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan City,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously vex and annoy one Corazon I.
Macaspac, by then and there uttering the following remarks directly
addressed to the latter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I DOUBT HOW DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR’.
to her great annoyance, vexation and disgust."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged
do not constitute an offense."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion
for reconsideration raising the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
because the facts charged in the information are privileged
communication.
It is the position of petitioner that the statement "I doubt how did you
become a doctor" does not constitute an offense as it was uttered at
the time he was conducting the cross-examination of Dr. Macaspac;
that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all
kinds of pleadings and motions belong to the class of communication
that are absolutely privileged.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that an order denying a
motion to quash cannot be the subject of certiorari which is a remedy
to keep an inferior court within the limits of its jurisdiction; that the
delimitation of the correctness, if at all, should be brought on appeal,
after the trial of the case and not in certiorari; that petitioner’s
contention that the act complained of does not constitute an offense
because it is protected by the mantle of privilege is strictly a matter of
defense.
Petitioner’s contention should be sustained. Well settled is the rule that
parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or
slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in
the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are
pertinent or relevant to the case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of
judicial proceedings are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or
material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry, the same may be
considered privileged communication and the counsel, parties, or
witnesses therein are exempt from liability. (See 53 C.J.S. 170-171;
Tupas v. Parreño, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and
authorities cited therein). (Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010)"
And, as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be
liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy
that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety.
(People v. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046).
In the case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you
become a doctor" when Dr. Macaspac would not answer the question
as to who prepared the document presented to her, and when the
witness repeatedly evaded the question by saying that she did not
understand the word "made."cralaw virtua1aw library
Newel, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the
following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Absolute Privilege. — In this class of cases it is considered in the
interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express
their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all
questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are
absolutely forbidden, even if it be alleged and proved that the words
were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice." (Section 350,
pp. 387-388).
It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or
administrative proceedings belong to the class of communications that
are absolutely privileged. Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in
aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice. As this Court
observed in Sison v. David (Supra):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration
of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being
that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124)"
Generally, certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial court. Interlocutory orders ordinarily
should be reviewed when an appeal is taken from the trial court’s
judgment. Not every procedural error or erroneous legal or factual
conclusion amounts to grave abuse of discretion. However, as this
Court ruled in Sanchez, et al v. Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, Et Al., (L-27043,
November 28, 1975), "when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower court acted capriciously and whimsically, then
it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such
a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s orders of February 20, 1981 and May 5,
1981 are reversed and set aside. Respondent is hereby ordered to
desist and refrain from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
126521.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11268 January 28, 1961
CARLOS M. SISON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO D. DAVID, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
In his amended complaint, herein plaintiff, Carlos Moran Sison, seeks
to recover P50,000 by way of damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, in addition to costs. Defendant Gonzalo D. David answered
admitting some allegations of the amended complaint, denying other
allegations thereof, alleging some special and affirmative defenses,
and setting up a counter-claim. In due course, on December 10, 1954,
the Court of First Instance of Manila gave judgment for the plaintiff in
the sums of P5,000, as moral damages, and P1,000 as attorney's fees,
besides the costs. Subsequently, the court motu proprio rendered an
amended decision, dated December 29, 1954, finding no merit in
defendant's counterclaim and increasing the award in plaintiff's favor to
P15,000 as moral damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees, aside from
costs. Defendant appealed from this amended decision to the Court of
Appeals, which, considering that the sum awarded in said decision
plus the amount claimed in the first three (3) causes of action set forth
in defendant's counterclaim aggregated P173,000.00, forwarded the
records to this Court, pursuant to section 17 of Republic Act No. 296.
Although this Act was subsequently amended by Republic Act No.
2613 to increase the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, insofar as civil cases decided by courts of first instance are
concerned, to those in which the value in controversy does not exceed
P200,000.00, we retain such appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, for
the pertinent facts are not disputed, and the issues raised in the appeal
hinge on the conclusions deducible from said facts and the law
applicable thereto (Section 17, subparagraph (61, of Re. public Act No.
296). It appears that on December 20, 1938, Margarita David executed
a will constituting several legacies in favor of specified persons and
naming her grandnieces Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro and her
sister Priscila de la Fuente de Sison — hereafter referred to as Mrs.
Teodoro and Mrs. Sison, respectively — as heirs of the residue of her
estate, subject however, to the condition that, if Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs.
Sison should die leaving no descendants, the properties inherited by
these sisters shall pass one-half to the heirs of the father of the
testatrix and the other half to the heirs of her mother. Herein defendant
Gonzalo H. David is one of such heirs of the parents of Margarita
David. On October 21 1939, Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison were legally
adopted by Margarita David as her children. Soon later, or on
September 6, 1940, Margarita David, donated to said sisters practically
the same properties bequeathed to them in her aforementioned will.
UPON the demise of Margarita David, in Manila, on February 24, 1941,
Special Proceeding No. 58881 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
was instituted for the settlement of her estate, and Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
was originally appointed executor of the aforementioned will, whereas
Gonzalo D. David, who is a member of the Bar, acted as his counsel.
Subsequently, Mr. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison extrajudicially partitioned
among themselves the properties bequeathed and donated to them by
Margarita David. Plaintiff herein, Carlos Moran Sison, is the husband of
Mrs. Sison. On or about May 9, 1950, defendant herein caused to be
annotated on the titles of several lands acquired by Mrs. Sison as
above stated a notice of adverse claim, for the fees of Jose Teodoro,
Sr., as executor of the will of Margarita David, and his (defendant's)
fees as counsel for said executor. It turned, however, that on or about
February 28, 1949, said properties were assigned by Mrs. Sison to
Priscila Estate, Inc. — a corporation organized on that date by her and
plaintiff herein, aside from some nominal parties — in exchange for
shares of stock thereof. Hence, on September 8, 1951, said
corporation filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, in G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 99, an "Urgent Petition Ex-Parte" to lift
defendant's adverse claim, insofar as one of the abovementioned
properties — that covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20338 of
the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila and located at the
intersection of Sto. Cristo and M. de Santos streets, San Nicolas,
Manila — upon the ground that said property belonged already to the
corporation which wanted to sell it, and that there were other properties
of the estate of Margarita David which sufficed to answer for said
adverse claim. The motion was granted by an order of the same date,
"provided that should any objection be interposed later on", the movant
"obligates itself to file the corresponding bond to satisfy" what may be
due to the adverse claimants. On September 26, 1951, defendant
herein filed in said cadastral proceedings, on his behalf and that of
Jose Teodoro, Sr., a "Petition for Bond", praying that the sale of the
property at Sto. Cristo street be disapproved "and/or a bond of
P12,000 be forthwith furnished" by the Priscila Estate, Inc. In support
of this petition, which led to the institution of the case at bar, defendant
alleged, in paragraphs 2 to 7 thereof :
2. That the movants herein object to the urgent petition ex-parte on the
ground that the property to be sold herein is one of the few properties
inherited from Da. Margarita David which is not encumbered, because
practically all of the properties of the heiress Priscila F. de Sison are
mortgaged, and the Priscila Estate, Inc., is operating on an overdraft,
which is the reason why these properties are to be sold;
3. That the reason there is an overdraft is that new buildings or
improvements have been made as conjugal properties of Carlos Sison
and Priscila de la Fuente, and now, the paraphernal properties
inherited from Da. Margarita David is being sold to pay for the
obligations of these conjugal properties;
4. That if the movants were informed or served copy of this petition to
sell the property, they would because it is in contravention of the
provisions of the Last Will and Testament of the late Da. Margarita
David to the effect that if Priscila de la Fuente dies without
descendants, then the inheritance will go to Narcisa de la Fuente, and
vice versa, and if both of them die, then all the properties of the late
Da. Margarita David will be divided as follows: One-half of all the
properties would go to the legatees on her father's side and the other
half of all the properties would go to the legatees on her mother's side;
5. That of course, the incidental remedy would be to show where the
said properties or the proceeds thereof went in case the above
conditions should occur, and what properties were acquired in lieu of
the same, considering the earning of the properties and the expenses
therein;
6. That answering the statement of petitioner that there are other
valuable properties of the estate, still annotated with the adverse claim,
it is respectfully offered that the said properties are mortgaged and in
case of foreclosure, the adverse claim is relegated to a subsequent
position as posterior to the mortgages inscribed on the back of the
aforesaid titles;
7. That the properties mentioned in par. 4 of the ex parte petition,
namely, One-half pro-indiviso interest of the lands in OCT Nos. 21063,
Pampanga, composed of 3 lots, are assessed at P3,748.31, and
12861, Pampanga, composed of 2 lots, are assessed at P1,614.39
and TCT No. 12829, Pampanga, composed of 2 parcels, are assessed
at P12,677.58, and the Manila property (land only) in TCT No. 60851,
composed of 2 lots in Tondo, are assessed at P846.00, so that all in all
the said properties actually are assessed at P9,020.14 plus P846.00
for Manila or P9,866.14, and are insufficient to meet the P17,000.00
claim of the Estate of Sideco, the Executor's fee of P4,000.00 with
interest, and the attorney's fees of P5,000.00, which may still be
increased on appeal.
Soon later, or on October 6, 1951, plaintiff commenced the present
action. In his amended complaint therein, he alleged that the averment
in the above-quoted paragraph 2 was made with malice and evident
intent to put him in ridicule, for defendant knew him (plaintiff) to be the
president of Priscila Estate, Inc. and, by the statements contained in
said paragraph, the defendant, "in effect, implied with clear
malevolence and malignity that plaintiff is incompetent and unfit to
manage the affairs of the Priscila Estate, Inc."; that in paragraph 3 of
defendant's petition for bond, he alleged that plaintiff "has been
converting the paraphernal properties of his wife into conjugal, thus
clearly implying that he, the plaintiff, has been and still is, scheming to
enrich himself at the expense of his spouse", which allegation is
"utterly false and completely irrelevant and immaterial to the point at
issue"; that the clear implication of the above-quoted paragraph 4 is
that the aforementioned urgent petition ex-parte of Priscila Estate, Inc.
"was inspired by the condemnable desire of the plaintiff as president of
Priscila Estate, Inc., to avoid the supposed fideicommissary provision
of the Last Will and Testament of the late Margarita David so that he
could enrich himself at the expense of the relatives of Margarita David,
who might eventually inherit the properties of Priscila de la Fuente de
Sison"; that the allegations in said paragraph 4 were "irrelevant to the
point raised" in defendant's "Petition for Bond"; that as a lawyer,
defendant knew that said allegations were "unfounded in law", the
aforementioned fideicommissary provision having been nullified and
rendered inoperative when Margarita David adopted Mrs. Teodoro and
Mrs. Sison and, thereafter, donated to them "practically ill the
properties" disposed of in said will; that said allegations in defendant's
"Petition for Bond" were "clearly uncalled for and unnecessary"; and
that, on account of the allegations made in the three (3) paragraphs
above mentioned, plaintiff "suffered, and is still suffering, from mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feeling, moral shock and social
humiliation", for which he should be indemnified in the sums stated at
the beginning of this decision.
In his answer, defendant denied that his aforementioned allegations
were tainted with malice and the intent of slandering the plaintiff and
averred that they were proper and necessary to protect his interests
and those of his client Jose Teodoro, Sr.; that the petition for bond, in
which said allegations were contained, is an absolutely privileged
communication; and that plaintiff has no cause of action against him,
for the party in interest in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 99, in which
said petition had been filed, was Priscila Estate, Inc., not plaintiff
herein.
Defendant further set a counterclaim, with four (4) causes of action.
The first was bared upon the fact that, in an "opposition" filed by the
plaintiff, through his counsel, in the aforementioned Special
Proceeding No. 58881, on March 31, 1951, the following allegedly
"impertinent "false" and "scandalous" statements were "maliciously and
illegally" made:
"Why, if we do not watch out, some day we shall again be confronted
with another petition for additional counsel's fees by Gonzalo David for
filing his present SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR COUNSEL'S
FEES. And if this goes on, we might hear the end of this Testate
Estate but, surely, never the end of David's claim for attorney's fees."
xxx xxx xxx
"Merely to read the foregoing relation of alleged legal services
rendered by Gonzalo David is to laugh. One gets the impression that
David's time is more precious than gold and that for him to merely read
or receive anything pertaining to this Testate Estate must cost some
money. What a man!"
xxx xxx xxx
"This claim for associate attorney's fees is ridiculous. It betrays an
unpardonable ignorance of the law on the part of Attys. Gonzalo David
and Jesus Ocampo who claim to have 'a well-established law office in
Escolta, Manila'.
"It might be purely coincidental, but the amount of ten (10%) percent
being asked for by Gonzalo David sounds very familiar. Is it possible
that ten percenters have arrived even in the halls of justice? Some
people, it would seem, need the reminder that our courts have no
similarity whatsoever with the Import Control Administration."
By way of second cause of action, defendant asserted that, in a motion
filed, on August 7, 1951, in said special proceeding, plaintiff, through
his counsel, made the following "malicious, scurrilous, scandalous,
false . . . and irrelevant" allegation:
"Surely, there must be a limit to judicial generosity, especially if such
generosity would inevitably jeopardize the interest of the heirs who are
entitled to protection by this Court from lawyers who already had been
overpaid. If this present tendency continues, Gonzalo David, the
frustrated heir, might yet blossom into a forced one."
As third cause of action, defendant alleged that on September 28,
1951, plaintiff "without any basis or reason, whatsoever, maliciously
and illegally filed a criminal complaint for libel" against the defendant in
the office of the City Fiscal of Manila who dismissed the charge
because it was "wanting in basis, reason and merit."
In each one of the aforementioned three (3) causes of action,
defendant alleged also, that, in consequence of the plaintiff's acts
therein described, he (defendant) has suffered and continues to suffer
from mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock and social humiliation, because of which he
prayed for judgment against the plaintiff in the sum of P50,000.00 for
each cause of action.
Defendant's last cause of action is premised upon the allegation that,
owing to the unjustified and unjustifiable complaint filed in this case, he
(defendant) had to avail himself of the services of counsel at an
expense of P10, 000.00, which plaintiff should be made to pay.
The amendment motu proprio made by the lower court on December
29, 1954, of its decision dated December 10, 1954, is assailed by the
defendant as a nullity, upon the ground that none of the parties had
filed any motion or petition therefor, and that said amendment did not
involve a correction of mere clerical mistakes, but a substantial
modification, not only of the award for the plaintiff, but, also, of the
findings of fact and the reasons for said award. There is no merit in this
pretense, for the amended decision was rendered nineteen (19) days
after the promulgation of the original decision, or within the
reglementary period to appeal therefrom, and before any appeal had
been taken by the parties herein, so that the lower we court still had
jurisdiction and control over the case. Moreover, said amendment is
authorized by Rule 124, section 5, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
which every court shall have power x x x to amend and control its
processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice."
Defendant has made several assignments of error, contesting the
propriety of the conclusions made in the decisions appealed from on
the merits of plaintiff's amended complaint and the demerits of
defendant's defenses. In this connection, we note that the lower court
sustained the former and rejected the latter, upon the ground that the
allegations in defendant's petition for bond "are based on malicious
and unfounded grounds"; that said petition is a qualifiedly privileged
communication, because the privilege exists only if the allegations
therein are pertinent or relevant to the case; that said allegations "were
impertinent and irrelevant to the issue then under inquiry, for all he
(defendant) wanted in said petition was the filing of a bond"; and that
the defendant went out of his way; to harass and cause damage to the
plaintiff, for the former had caused his adverse claim to be annotated
on property worth much more than the amount of said claim, for which
reason said annotation is "Presumed" to have been made it with
malice."
At the outset, it should be noted that the pertinency or relevancy
essential to the privilege enjoyed in judicial proceedings, does not
make it a "qualified privilege" within the legal connotation of the term.
Otherwise, all privileged communications in judicial proceedings would
be qualified, and no communications therein would be absolutely
privileged, for the exemption attached to the privilege in said
proceedings never extends to matters which are patently unrelated to
the subject of the inquiry. The terms "absolute privilege" and "qualified
privilege" have established technical meanings, in connection with civil
actions for libel and slander.
In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum:
For the sake of clearness of application privileged communications are
often divided into two classes: Absolute privilege; and conditional or
qualified privilege, the second sometimes being called 'quasi privilege.'
In cases of absolutely privileged communications, the occasion is an
absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie
presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former class the freedom
from liability is said to be absolute or without condition, regardless of
the existence of express malice, as contrasted with such freedom in
the latter class where it is said to be conditioned on the want or
absence of express malice. (53 C.J.S., 141- 142.)
An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of
the occasion on which it is made, no remedy is provided for the
damages in a civil action for slander or libel. It is well settled that the
law recognizes this class of communications which is so absolutely
privileged that even the existence of express malice does not destroy
the privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, and some
eminent judges, in dealing with particular applications of the rule, have
doubted or questioned the rationale or principle of absolutely privileged
communications. As to absolutely privileged communications, a civil
action for libel or slander is absolutely barred. (53 C.J.S., p. 142.) .
Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does
absolute privilege. It relates more particularly to private interests, and
comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual
malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be
true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has
an interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or
private, either legal, judicial, political, moral, or social, made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty. Briefly stated, a
qualifiedly privileged communication is a defamatory communication
made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice,
and as to such communications there is no civil liability, regardless of
whether or not the communication is libelous per se or libelous per
quod. (53 C.J.S., pp. 143-144.)
In the case of communications qualifiedly privileged, there must be
both an occasion of privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith.
(53 C.J.S., p. 145.)
To the same effect is the American Jurisprudence, from which we
quote:
On the ground of public policy, the law recognizes certain
communications as privileged and, as such, not within the rules
imposing liability for defamation. A privileged communication or
statement, in the law of libel and slander, is one which, except for the
occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, would
be defamatory and actionable.
Privileged communications are divided into two general classes,
namely: (1) those which are absolutely privileged; and (2) those which
are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged, as defined in subsequent
sections. (33 Am. Jur., p. 123.)
An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by
reason of the occasion on which or the matter in reference to which, it
is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may
bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even though
it may have been made maliciously. (33 Am.. Jur., pp. 123-124.)
A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where
circumstances exist, or are 'reasonably believed by the defendant to
exist, which cast on him the duty of making a communication to a
certain other person to whom he makes such communication in the
performance of such duty, or where the person is so situated that it
becomes right in the interests the person of society that he should tell
third persons certain facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do. This
general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: A
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has
a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, even though it contains matter which, without this
privilege, would be actionable, and although the duty is not a legal one,
but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The essential
elements of conditionally privileged communication may accordingly be
enumerated as a good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement
limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication
in a proper manner and to proper parties only. (33 Am. Jur., pp. 124-
125.)
Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the
following language:
Absolute Privilege — In this class of cases it is considered in the
interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express
their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all
questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are
absolutely forbidden, even of it be alleged and proved that the words
were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350,
pp. 387388.)
In the less important matters, however, the interests and welfare of the
public do not demand that the speaker should be freed from all
responsibility, but merely require that he should be protected so far as
he is speaking honestly for the common good. In these cases the
privilege is said not to be absolute but qualified; and a party defamed
may recover damages notwithstanding the privilege if he can prove
that the words were not used in good faith, but that the party availed
himself of the occasion wilfully and knowingly for the purpose of
defaming the plaintiff. (Section 389, p. 415; italics supplied.)
Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it
is made, what distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication
from one which is only qualifiedly privileged is, therefore, that the latter
is actionable upon proof of "actual malice", whereas its existence does
not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided that, in the
case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in question are
pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the subject matter of
the communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a few decisions
have required probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute
privilege, but such decisions not only do not reflect the view of the
clear weight of authority, but, also, have acknowledged the wisdom of
such view, although its non-application was sought to be justified by
the special conditions obtaining in each case (See Harshaw vs.
Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411, 1413).
The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged
communications is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
"The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and is
practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts
of state, including, it is said, communications made in the discharge of
a duty under express authority of law, by or to heads of executive
departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in
the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as
for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that
members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages." (33 Am. Jur., 123-124.)
It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial including
all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged (Newel on The Law of
Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 388, 391-392, 407; 53 C.J.S. 165, 167,
173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-12545
[April 30, 19591). As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has put it:
"For reasons of public policy which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, it appears to be the prevailing rule in the
United States that statements made in a pleading in a civil action are
absolutely privileged and no action for libel may be founded thereon
when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false
and malicious such statements may be. 33 Am. Jur. 144, 145, Libel
and Slander 149; 16 ALR 746, supplemented in 42 ALR 878 and 134
ALR 483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42
ALR 2d 820.)
Hence, the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely
privileged, and no civil action for libel or slander may arise therefrom,
unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to the subject matter
thereof.
In this connection, the lower court appears to have labored under the
impression that the only remedy therein sought was "the filing of a
bond". However, defendant specifically prayed in said petition that the
sale intended to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc. be disapproved
"and/or the bond of P12,000 be forthwith furnished by" said
corporation. Moreover, the body of the petition clearly indicates that
said prayer for disapproval of the sale was merely a subtle and tactful
way of seeking a reconsideration of the order of September 8, 1951
granting plaintiff's urgent petition ex-parte of the same day, copy of
which was served on the defendant two days after the filing of said
urgent petition and the issuance of said order. Indeed, it is alleged in
the petition for bond of defendant herein and Jose Teodoro, Sr. that
they "object to the urgent petition ex-parte on the ground that the
property to be sold herein is one of the few properties inherited from
Da. Margarita David, which is not encumbered." In other words, they
were opposed to said urgent petition, which was granted by the order
of September 8, 1951, and hence, they wanted this order reconsidered
and set aside, and this would be the result, if the lower court
disapproved the sale contemplated by Priscila Estate, Inc. The filing of
a bond was evidently intended to be pressed only if the first part of the
prayer was denied.
Now, the reasons adduced in support of the petition for disapproval of
the sale and implied reconsideration of the order of September 8,
1951, or for the filing of a bond, were: (1) that practically all of the
properties of Mrs. Sison were mortgaged; (2) that the Priscila Estate,
Inc. (to whom said properties had been assigned) is operating on an
overdraft, and this is why said properties are to be sold;(3) that said
overdraft is due to new buildings or improvements x x made as
conjugal properties" of plaintiff herein and his wife; (4) that the
paraphernal properties inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita David
are being sold to pay obligations of said conjugal properties; and (5)
that the sale contemplated to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc., will
defeat the fideicommissary provision in the last will and testament of
the late Margarita David, to the effect that the properties transmitted by
her to Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison should, in the event of their death
without any surviving descendant, pass to the other persons indicated
in said will.
Obviously, these allegations are, not only pertinent, but material to the
relief prayed for by the defendant. They indicate clearly that, unless the
annotation of the adverse claim of Jose Teodoro, Sr. and defendant
herein is maintained or a bond is filed by the plaintiff, it will become
harder and still harder to trace the paraphernal properties of Mrs. Sison
and because, even if traced, there is a likelihood that said adverse
claim may be defeated either by subsequent obligations contracted by
the conjugal partnership of Mr. & Mrs. Sison, or by Priscila Estate, Inc.,
or by rights thereafter acquired by third parties acting in good faith and
for value. Whether or not the reasons given sufficed to justify the
granting of the relief sought by the defendant and Jose Teodoro, Sr. is
of no moment. Nothing but relevancy to said relief was necessary for
defendant's petition to have the benefits of the absolute privilege
conferred by judicial proceedings. Such privilege is unaffected, either
by actual malice or by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances
made in the course of said proceedings.1
At any rate, the allegations in question in defendant's petition for bond
were neither malicious nor unfounded. Thus, it is a fact that most, or at
least, several of the most valuable properties transmitted by Margarita
David to Mrs. Sison were mortgaged. Those subsequently assigned by
Mrs. Sison to Priscila Estate, Inc. were encumbered altogether for
P397,717.00. In order to construct the Priscila Building No. 3 on a
paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary to borrow ONE
MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) from the RFC. The Priscila Estate,
Inc., of which plaintiff is the president began its operations with an
overdraft line of P236,517.00. Most of the paraphernal properties of
Mrs. Sison were transferred to said corporation. In fact, the same
asked that the annotation, on the certificate of title of one of those
properties, of the adverse claims of the defendant and Jose Teodoro,
Sr., be cancelled, upon the ground that said property now belongs to
the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison.
What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation, entitled C
M S Estate, Inc., to which some properties of Priscila Estate, Inc. (most
of which had been originally inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita
David) were transferred. The C M S Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of
one million pesos (P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of the par
value of P1,000 each, of which 950 non-voting preferred shares, and
50 are common voting shares. All of these common voting shares, in
addition to 50 non-voting preferred shares, were subscribed by the
plaintiff, whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred shares and no
common shares. Four (4) other persons had each a nominal holding of
one (1) non-voting preferred share. As the sole holder of all the voting
common shares, plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and permanent
control over the management of this new corporation. In fact, the
letters "C M S", which are the initials of his name, Carlos Moran Sison,
appear in the corporate name "C M S Estate, Inc.," for the seeming
purpose of representing to the public that plaintiff was, for all intents
and purposes, the corporation itself.
Considering that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila Estate, Inc.,
most of the properties of which had come from Margarita David, and
the antagonism that had arisen between him and the defendant in the
course of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Margarita
David — which antagonism was crystallized and sharpened in several
litigations and many acrid, if not virulent incidents between the same
parties — it is understandable, as well as natural and logical for
defendant to be apprehensive about the fate of his aforementioned
adverse claim and that of Jose Teodoro, Sr., if the order directing the
cancel at on of the annotation thereof were not reconsidered and set
aside, or plaintiff were not required to file a bond for guaranty the
payment of said adverse claims.
The alleged gross disparity between the amount thereof and the value
of said properties is immaterial to the case at bar. To begin with, the
properties were heavily encumbered. Besides, the transfer thereof to
Priscila Estate, Inc., the subsequent assignment of some to C M S
Estate, Inc. and, then, the sales that had been made and the one
sought to be made in favor of third persons, tended to place said
properties beyond the reach of said claimants. Then too, bad faith
should not, and cannot be imputed to creditors, much less "presumed",
merely because they seek the maximum possible guaranties for the
protection of their rights. At any rate, the alleged bad faith in the
annotation of the adverse claims does not warrant an inference of bad
faith in the allegations of the petition for bond.
The lower court erred, therefore, in rendering judgment for the plaintiff
under his amended complaint and said judgment should be reversed.
We will now consider defendant's Counterclaim. The first two (2)
causes of action therein are based upon allegations, made by counsel
for the plaintiff, in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings,
which, as such, are absolutely privileged. Considering that said
allegations — although sarcastic, to the point of being, perhaps,
unnecessarily pungent and harsh, as well as tending to detract from
the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice —
were relevant to the subject-matter of the aforementioned pleadings,
the causes of action predicated thereon are necessarily untenable.
So is the third cause of action under defendant's counterclaim. The
dismissal, by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila, of the complaint for
estafa therein filed by the plaintiff is insufficient to warrant a judgment
for damages in defendant's favor, there being no competent evidence
that, in filing said complaint, plaintiff had acted in bad faith, knowing
that the charge was groundless.
As regards the fourth cause of action in said counter-claim, it should be
noted that plaintiff is a member of the bar. As such, he must have
known that the petition for bond in question is an absolutely privileged
communication, and that the allegations therein made were pertinent
and relevant to the remedy sought in said petition. More important still,
he knew that the basic facts therein stated were true. Aside from this,
some of the inferences drawn by him therefrom are purely his, not
necessarily deducible from said facts, and although he allegedly
suffered injury to his reputation in consequence thereof, there has
been not even an attempt to prove that it had adversely affected either
his credit, or any of his business transactions, or his social or domestic
relations. In other words, aside from the fact that plaintiff's complaint is
clearly unfounded, the record strongly indicates that it was filed with a
harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances surrounding this case,
plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation (Article 2208 [4], Civil Code of the
Philippines).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and
another one shall be entered dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint,
as well as the first three causes of action in defendant's counterclaim,
and sentencing plaintiff to pay to the defendant, by way of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, the sum of P3,000, with interest
thereon it the legal rate, from the date on which this decision shall
become final, aside from the costs. It is so ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 156183 : February 28, 2007]
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. VICENTE C. PONCE and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 from a decision2 and
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA).
In 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal
complaints against petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family,
hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for estafa against petitioner in
the Makati Prosecutor's Office docketed as I.S. No. 97-39547. In
essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him
out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation.
It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for
estafa that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder
affidavit,4 submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter5
purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit. It was prefaced with
the quotation "For every extraordinary fortune there is a great crime"
and the text:
An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.
Second example is the Alcantaras.
a) Overshipment of log; b) Land grabbing;
c) Corruption of public office; d) Corporate grabbing.
The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in
the sur-rejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described as being the
forefather of all the cases he had filed against the Alcantaras. In SEC
Case No. 2507 which the Securities and Exchange Commission en
banc decided against him, Ponce accused the Alcantaras of
defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation.
On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against
respondent Ponce with the Makati Prosecutor's Office6 in connection
with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the statements
therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati
Prosecutor's Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an
annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to
the said affidavit but had given it thereafter.
The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda
P. Saulog.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution7 finding
probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of an information8
in court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63.
However, respondent Ponce filed a Petition for Review with the
Secretary of Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution
dated February 28, 2000.9 This reversal was based on the finding that
the newsletter was a privileged communication, having been submitted
to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended
annex to respondent's sur-rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice thus
directed the withdrawal of the information.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration10 but it was denied.11
Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August
29, 2002, the CA found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion, set aside the latter's resolution and directed the
reinstatement of the criminal case.12 After unsuccessfully moving for
reconsideration in the Department of Justice, respondent Ponce
attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari . The case was docketed as G.R. No.
157105. However, we denied respondent Ponce's motion for extension
for time to file his petition13 as well as his subsequent motions for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was
decided, the Office of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the
resolution of the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw
information, which the trial court granted on September 28, 2001.14
The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential element of
publicity precluded the commission of the crime of libel. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial court denied
the motion in an order dated March 21, 2002.15
On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered
the assailed decision.
The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA,
in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that
Judge Salvador had not committed grave abuse of discretion for
granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against respondent
Ponce.
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code,16 has the following elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance;
(2) publicity or publication;
(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even
a dead person and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.
The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or
not the controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication,
which would exempt it from libel.
According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute
privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence
of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in
hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement imposed to
maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.
In this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to
petitioner's submission, instantly shows that there was sufficient
reference to the "newsletter" which justified the Justice Secretary and
respondent Judge in holding that private respondent actually intended
the said article to be included as an annex attached to said pleading
and that the same was merely omitted and belatedly submitted to
Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such
"sufficient reference" is shown by the fact that the newsletter is about
SEC Case No. 2507 the very same case being discussed by private
respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and hence,
petitioner's claim that Annex "F" mentioned together with Annex "E",
both articles showing the "devious maneuvering" of petitioner in the
said case, refers to another article. And even if the supposed Exhibit
"F" could refer also to that article "So The Public May Know," such
circumstance will not exclude the subject "newsletter" as an intended
annex to the said pleading as in fact private respondent explicitly
mentioned "articles" without stating that there were only two (2)
particular articles being referred or which of those articles caused to be
published by his counsel.
As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent
Judge adopted, the "newsletter" containing the defamatory statement
is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa then under
preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit,
dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the Sur-
Rejoinder Affidavit of the "newsletter" discussing the alleged "corporate
grabbing" by petitioner will tend to support private respondent's case of
estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged "corporate grabbing"
will highlight or manifest petitioner's propensity for dishonest dealing or
fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no doubt that the subject
"newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for
estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of
absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent
from liability for libel or damages.
In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial
proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all
doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People v. Aquino, our Supreme
Court has emphasized that "it is the rule that what is relevant or
pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer, and the
words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The doctrine
of privileged communication has a practical purpose.
xxx
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has
been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has
been written. There is publication if the material is communicated to a
third person. What is material is that a third person has read or heard
the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself." Our
Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in
the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to
another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with
respect to the subject matter of the communication, such
communication does not amount to publication. Applying this rule by
analogy to the present case, private respondent's submission of the
"newsletter" intended as an annex to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S.
No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting the
preliminary investigation in said case, does not amount to publication
for the reason that the sending of such material was made specifically
for the purpose of including the same as evidence in the preliminary
investigation. That such submission was belatedly made does not take
out the material from the absolutely privileged communication rule.
Prosecutor Bautista had a legal duty to perform with respect to the
subject communication, which is to consider the same along with the
other evidence submitted by private respondent as complainant in I.S.
no. 97-39547, in determining the existence of probable cause for the
commission of the crime of estafa and that petitioner as accused-
defendant therein should be tried for such offense. Under the
circumstances and in the lawful exercise of private respondent's right
to present evidence in support of his accusations against petitioner in
the criminal complaint for estafa, We fail to see how such submission
of documentary evidence omitted from the annexes to the Sur-
Rejoinder Affidavit, could amount to publication that would give rise to
private respondent's liability for a libel charge especially when there is
no proof of the alleged circulation of copies of the subject "newsletter"
except to the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-
39547 was then in the preliminary investigation stage. Petitioner's
feeble argument that Prosecutor Bautista remains a third person
because the subject "newsletter" was never included or formally
offered as evidence, hardly convinces Us to hold that there was actual
publication for purpose of finding a prima facie case for libel against
the private respondent. He must be reminded that the case for estafa
was still at the preliminary investigation stage and there is no
requirement of a "formal offer" of such documentary evidence or
supporting documents to establish probable cause (citations
omitted).17
Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary
investigation, it was vested with a privileged character. While Philippine
law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolute
privilege extends to statements made in preliminary investigations or
other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of Borg
v. Boas18 makes a categorical declaration of the existence of such
protection:
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial
proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned
and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature
have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are
proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for
crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or
the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person
for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same
cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for
defamation. (Emphasis ours)
The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no reason
why we should not adopt it.
Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as "a communication made bona
fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest . . . made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained [in]criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable."19
While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its
abuse can lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly
on this account will give rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine
itself rests on public policy which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice.20 It is as a rule applied liberally.21
The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged
communication must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a
matter alleged in the course of the proceedings need not be in every
case material to the issues presented but should be legitimately related
to the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may become
the subject of inquiry in the course of trial.22
Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a
criminal complaint against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts
involving greed and deceit, and were disclosed only to the official
investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the privileged
communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the
complaint under investigation because, like the averments therein, they
also involved petitioner's alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
September 13, 2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the
defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of the attitude
which the judiciary should take interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law
in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of speech and
press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding, the
facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the order of their
occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally,
judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the
Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition
to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga,
with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and
O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to
the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys
was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing,
including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and
contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. Briefly
stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano
de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he
would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3
which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant
and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which
was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of
the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice
of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having
this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was
informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the
justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he
could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against
four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his
house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the
complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first
instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation,
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and
denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not
proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge,
the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it
is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent
be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the
proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of
first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents
were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and
six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the
peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the
auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal
reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the
charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for
complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but
whether the papers were forwarded to the Governor-General as
requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants,
was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following
information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of
Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally,
and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of
the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed,
and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this
town of Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him
heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is
found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently
immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy
of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and
positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating
which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no
less serious, but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for
the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of
your Honor and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of
this town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and
interests of its inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest
solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this
town will not be administered in accordance with law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad
conducts as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some
respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to
present an administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan
Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case
there were made against him various charges which were true and
certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the
peace, far from charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has
roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently
performed the acts abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits
herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show
his mistaken valor and heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with
deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the
justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing
him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition
mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the
affidavits upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive
Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the
exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and
Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense,
coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, file on
December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of
which was to retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the
defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire
administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino
appealed making the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants
for a new trial.
2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the
objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation
in this case arose.
3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which
the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement
was unqualifiedly privileged.
5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden
was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements
were true and free from malice.
6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the
defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings,
administrative and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter
of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident
objection to the admission of the administrative proceedings on the
ground that the signatures were not identified and that the same was
immaterial, which objection was partially sustained by the trial court.
Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which the attorney
for the defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very
foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall continue to
consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating specifically
the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The
administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial.
These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information,
the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be
understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust
could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by
themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all
knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the
accused. The records in question are attached to the rollo, and either
on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to
the introduction of the administrative proceedings by the prosecution,
or that a new trial should have been had because under section 42 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on account
of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this
court to call in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the
complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or finally,
because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in
administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the
basis action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone
the trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to
it. To this action, the Government can not explain for it was the
prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain
principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel
warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and
general discussion of freedom of speech and press and assembly and
petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus
to clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these
basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set
down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for
revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues
de Cien Años" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.)
describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist
upon, said: "
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by
declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos
delegates.
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad"
and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino
people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations."
(See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the
work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously
guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition
that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so
dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would
protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The
Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee
to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly
and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley
in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the
Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the
inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic
acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are
not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the
counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which the American people demanded before giving their
approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be
forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and
parcel of the Organic Law — of the Constitution — of the Philippine
Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not
threadbare verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases.
(Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204
U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would
inadequately answer. But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual
is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the
Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all
the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of
Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F.
and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public
officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to
assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part
of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the
facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to
the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but
only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y.,
510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person
or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy,
'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though,
as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to
the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank
of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest
a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is
thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest
or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E.
and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E.
C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or
a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged
is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the
law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be
made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through
some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of
the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then
lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See
White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See
White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12
Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street
Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander
and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to
the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute
must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic
Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position
to test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of
a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested
in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and
vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of
a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a
judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges
and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the
proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is
sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the
Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-
General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on
the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action
took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the
Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of
1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs.
Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B.,
344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the
sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those
established in other cases in which private individuals have been
convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of
the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339;
U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29
Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on
the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690).
The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the
Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more
publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the
charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of
Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge
against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in
the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact,
made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who
could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are
not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we
invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil.,
365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather
commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and
appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19072 August 14, 1965
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
RAMON A. GONZALES, offended party-appellant,
vs.
RICARDO ALVAREZ, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as offended party-appellant.
Gerochi and Geduspan and F.R. Regalado and Associates for
defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
dismissing the information for libel in Criminal Case No. 8551.
The main facts are not disputed. It appears that Ramon A. Gonzales,
appellant herein, is defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 7925 in
Branch V of said court, entitled People v. Paciente, for robbery in band
with homicide, while Ricardo Alvarez, the appellee, is special counsel
in the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo who filed Criminal Case No.
7925.
The appellant Gonzales filed a motion to quash the information in said
criminal case and one of the grounds interposed by him was that
Alvarez has no authority to file the information as he is occupying the
position of chief clerk in the office of the provincial fiscal (classified
position) and cannot be appointed special counsel (unclassified
position), such arrangement being prohibited by section 684 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The appellee herein, in turn, filed an opposition to the motion to quash
and therein made some statements which the appellant Gonzales
thinks are derogatory to him and libelous.
As an offshoot of the above, and on complaint of the herein appellant
Gonzales, the City Fiscal of Iloilo filed Criminal Case 8551, for libel,
pertinent portions of which read:
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1960 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused with
deliberate intent, without any justifiable motive and with purpose of
impeaching the reputation, virtue and credit of Ramon A. Gonzales, a
lawyer by profession and duly elected councilor of the Municipality of
Lambunao, a person of good standing in the community, did then and
there wilfully and criminally cast dishonor, contempt, discredit and
ridicule upon the person of said Ramon A. Gonzales and with
malicious intent of exposing said Ramon A. Gonzales to public hatred,
contempt, ridicule, dishonor and discredit, filed an "Opposition to the
Motion to Quash" with Branch V, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, in
connection with Criminal Case No. 7925, entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Claro Paciente et al." for robbery in band with
frustrated homicide, wherein the said Ramon A. Gonzales appears as
counsel for the accused, the context of which is hereinbelow quoted:
xxx xxx xxx
"that the said Opposition to the Motion to quash contains false,
malicious and defamatory allegations tending to impute and impeach
the honesty, virtue, honor, reputation and integrity of the undersigned,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
but just so the undersigned could expose to the court the hypocrisy,
dishonesty and unfair practices of the movant further explanations here
have become a necessity.
Mr. Gonzales says that there is no law authorizing the employment of
Special Counsel, and yet in his very Annex "B" to his motion to quash
even his sick eyesight could see and read that that law is Sec. 1686 of
the Revised Administrative Code. He dangles the law before the eyes
of this Court and at the same time tells the Court that there is no such
law. Ethical lawyers would never stoop to such base chicanery and
double talk, bound as they are by their oath of doing no falsehood and
by their dealings with their fellow lawyers and with court.
xxx xxx xxx
As the court will notice, this is the second time in his motion to quash
that Mr. Gonzales has resorted to perversion and falsehood. Who is
Mr. Gonzales trying to fool anyway?
xxx xxx xxx
when in truth and in fact the above quoted allegations are false, untrue
and malicious."
The appellee filed a motion to quash the said information on the sole
ground that the facts charged do not Constitute an offense. Over the
objection of the appellant, the lower court granted the motion on the
theory that the alleged libelous statements are privileged. Dissatisfied,
the offended party and the government have interposed the present
appeal.
The lone error assigned by appellant Gonzales is the holding of the
lower court that the statements under question are relevant and
pertinent to the resolution of the motion to quash, hence, absolutely
privileged. The Solicitor General, in his brief, discusses the case in the
same vein.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code classifies as privileged
communications —
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act preformed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
Applying this provision in the case of Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-
11268, January 28, 1961, this Court there stated that utterances made
in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are
absolutely privileged. 1
Newell, in his work "The Law of Slander and Libel," describes absolute
privilege thus —
"In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public welfare
that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and
speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects;
and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even if it
be alleged and proved that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly,
and with express malice." Sec. 350, pp. 387-388" (quoted in Sison v.
David, supra.)
otherwise mislead the trial court. Note that the words complained of
would mean practically just that the movant was dishonest, unethical
and insincere because he tried to mislead the court. As heretofore
stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the writer in
matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial
pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found
occasion to express its opinion on privileged communications, to wit:
... . A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communication. ... .
It is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no
allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned
statements to the cause.

It does not matter, therefore, whether or not there was malice on the
port of the herein appellee in making the statements complained of,
since said statements are contained in a judicial pleading and
protected by the mantle of privileged communication. But in further
interpreting the above-quoted provision of the Revised Penal Code,
this Court in the case of Tolentino v. Baylosis, G.R. No. L-15741,
January 31, 1961, held that counsel, parties, or witnesses are
exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided
that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or
material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry.
Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error
was committed by the lower court in considering the questioned
remarks of the appellee as privileged and in consequently dismissing
the information for lack of cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against the Appellant Ramon Gonzales.
Bengzon , C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

The test of relevancy has been discussed in the aforecited case of Separate Opinions
Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra, to wit:
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
"... . As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. I concur, but cannot help expressing stern disapproval that appellee
The matter to which the privileged does not extend must be so should have stooped to unseemly personalities against a brother
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy attorney, perhaps in the mistaken belief, altogether too common, that
that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In insults can strengthen a weak argument, which, of course, they never
order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not do.
be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial. ... ." (Ruling Case Law, Vol. 17, p. 366; quoted
with approval in Smith Bell & Co. v. Ellis 48, Phil. 475, 481-482).
(Emphasis supplied)

The issue in the original criminal case at its stage when the alleged
libelous statements were made was the propriety or correctness of the
motion to quash filed by the herein appellant Gonzales. The herein
appellee, in his opposition to that motion to quash merely challenged
the question on his authority to file the information for the reason that
there is no law authorizing an employee in the classified civil service to
be appointed special counsel without the approval of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and the other ground raised by the
appellant that the information did not mention the name of the offended
party. There seems to be some reason for the appellee to believe that
the appellant Gonzales was quite unfair and deliberate in stating that
there is no law authorizing his appointment as special counsel, for
section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Republic Act 1277, expressly grants authority to the Secretary of
Justice to appoint any lawyer in the government service to temporarily
assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties.
And, furthermore, according to the appellee, contrary to what is
claimed in the motion to dismiss, the information specifically mentions
the names of the offended parties. At any rate, whether appellee's
assumption of the impropriety of appellant's motion is meritorious, in
using the words complained of, his (appellee's) aim was merely to
denounce what he considered unethical and dishonest practices on the
part of the opposing counsel, and to point out that the latter was
without sincerity in filing the questioned motion. While the language, it
is true, may be a little too strong and vociferous it is nevertheless in
relation and pertinent to the cause for which it was written, because it
was to stress appellee's point in opposing what he thought would
 II. SOURCES OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
1. Those enumerated under Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
2. Those declared as privileged by specific provision of a law (Statutory
Privileged Communications).
3. Those declared as such by Privilege Communications by
Jurisprudence.
ARTICLES SAYING THAT BARANGAY JUSTICE SYSTEM IS PART
OF “ADR”
Dispute resolution mechanism in the Philippines
By: Domingo Desini et al
University of the Philippines College of Law
In the Philippines, the government structure of the barangays and
other sectors of the community so that they may serve the criminal
justice system more comprehensively and effectively, secs, 399 – 422
of the Local Government code of 1991 (RA 7160) is a recognized
example of ADR
LGA, OADR partner for basic ADR training
June 03, 2019
MANDALUYONG CITY – Barangays, being the country’s basic political
unit, are at forefront of local governance, owing it to its strategic
position being at the grassroots.
The Local Government Code of 1991 has given the barangays the role
of amicably settling disputes at the community level as a means for
people to reach resolutions on certain issues without having to burden
neither their time nor their pockets, and likewise to unclog the dockets
of the country’s judicial system.
But despite such efforts, a high rate of recurrence of cases involving
the same parties, continue to plague the Barangay Justice System -
with insufficient capacities amongst members of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in effectively facilitating mediation and conciliation
pointed as one of the culprits to this prevailing problem.
In order to curb this issue and address identified competency gaps, the
LGA in partnership with the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(OADR) of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the mandated agency in
promoting the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), trained two
batches of Lupon members on Basic ADR Skills. Barangays coming
from Regions III, IV-A and NCR attended the training held on May 20-
22, 2019, while the training for Regions III and IV-A was held on May
27-29, 2019 at the BSA Twin Towers, Mandaluyong City.
Participants were composed of the Punong Barangay, three (3)
members of the Lupon, and the Barangay Secretary, with the first
batch composed of barangays coming from urban areas and second
batch coming from rural areas.
On the first day of lecture-discussion and structure learning exercises,
participants were given a refresher course on the Katarungang
Pambarangay (KP) law, understanding conflict, and various modes of
settlement under the KP.
On the second day, groups were organized as participants share their
current practices and challenges in implementing the KP law followed
by a lecture-discussion on the skills for effective mediation, restorative
justice and the barangay justice system.
During the program’s culmination, participants were engaged in true to
life case simulation that gave opportunity for Lupon members to apply
their learning and demonstrate their newly-sharpened mediations
skills.
The Basic ADR Skills Training for Lupong Tagapamayapa is part of
implementing the Barangay Newly Elected Officials (BNEO) towards
Grassroots Renewal and Empowerment for Accountable and
Transparent (GREAT) Barangays Program which aims to enhance
capacities of the barangays in ensuring that the general welfare of their
respective constituents and the delivery of basic services and facilities.
Settling disputes thru creative solutions
FROM THE STANDS - Domini M. Torrevillas (The Philippine Star) -
July 17, 2017
It happens much too often: residents of barangays fighting (sometimes
to the death) over a negligibly-sized piece of land, usurped parking
space, careless remarks about one’s looks, or with a cantankerous
neighbor habitually looking for trouble. Thanks to a justice system
called Katarungang Pambarangay, passed as PD 1508 and revised
under R.A. 7160, such disputes are settled by a pacification
committee or a Lupon Tagapamayapa to effect extrajudicial settlement
of minor cases and bring opposing parties together and effect amicable
settlement of differences. The system is aimed at reducing the load of
the lower courts.
The principal author of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law was the
late Alfredo F. Tadiar, best known as “the Father of Alternative Dispute
Resolution” in the Philippines. His serious commitment to the delivery
of social justice through creative dispute settlement rewarded him the
distinct honor and privilege of serving as chair of the Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) Department of the Supreme Court Philippine
Judicial Academy from 2004-2015.
Aside from settling minor issues among barangay residents which
could blow up unattended, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is
applied to reaching amicable settlement of disputes among higher level
parties such as multinational corporations and employer-employee
relations. A lecture (“Aligning Judicial Remedies with Alternative
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Solving Problems in Diverse
Communities”) delivered by Lawyer Golda S. Benjamin at the Silliman
University College of Law last week explained the need to shatter
some paradigms unconsciously perpetuated by those who practice law
and given the privilege and burden of solving society’s problems. The
Distinguished Persons Public Lecture Series 2017 was sponsored by
PROCESS, a non-profit, non-government organization in honor and in
memory of Professor Tadiar.
Attorney Benjamin quoted Professor Tadiar who once wrote:
“Unsuitability of judicial proceedings for everyday interpersonal
disputes relates to the nature of the judicial process as essentially
punitive and backward looking. It is simply concerned with the issue of
‘who did what to whom’ and not to the why and wherefore. Only the
symptoms are recognized but not the cause of the malady.”
In accordance with Tadiar’s declaration, what Atty. Benjamin would like
changed is the “What-should-I-do-attorney?” paradigm. She said there
is an ever-pervasive obsession of lawyers to be addressed as “ ATTY”
and pompously correct clerks when they address them as Sir/Madam.
“This paradigm often makes us forget that most of the time, clients
know what they want to happen in a dispute and often, they already
have suggested solutions. However, clients do not always have the
confidence to lay down their proposed solutions because they always
feel that the lawyer would know the better solution.”
For example, Attorney Benjamin spoke about a court-annexed
mediation case she handled, in which her client was sued by a close
friend demanding payment of a debt. When she asked the creditor why
she was suing her friend who was willing to pay her debt, the creditor
said it was her lawyer who insisted that they go to court, despite
Attorney Benjamin’s letters asking for a meeting to settle the dispute.
Lawyers need to be trained not to sacrifice creativity before the “altar of
the law.” The strict devotion to the law and the contract “makes us
forget other ways of solving problems apart from going to the courts.
There’s always mediation, public campaigning, and finding allies who
can help bring all parties to the table.”
For example, a case she handled involved settling the price of
bananas between farmers and an exporting company. Instead of going
to the courts where Benjamin’s client farmers would have possibly lost,
they employed many strategies, reaching out to the company with a
clear and thorough study of the prices of bananas in the area,
presented world prices, and asked government officials to help bring
parties to the table. At mediation the lawyers were physically not
seated at the negotiation table. The farmers were negotiating with the
company managers, also not lawyers. They settled at a price, with
clear repercussions for failure to deliver contractual volume. “If we
insisted on fighting in court, violence would have erupted in the
community, parties would have been stuck in litigation for many years,
and farmers’ debts would have grown to insurmountable levels. Social
justice would have died before the altar of the law.”
Rules on Mediation before the National Privacy Commission
Pursuant to the authority vested in the National Privacy
Commission through Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 10173,
otherwise known as the “Data Privacy Act of 2012,” to facilitate
or enable settlement of complaints through the use of alternative disput
e resolution processes; and consistent with Republic Act No. 9285,
otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,”
declaring it the policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy
in the resolution of disputes and the freedom of the parties to make
their own arrangements to resolve their disputes, the following Rules
on Mediation before the National Privacy Commission are hereby
prescribed and promulgated.
RULE I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Application and Interpretation. In applying and
construing the provisions of these Rules, consideration must be given
to the need to promote candor among the parties, the confidentiality of
the mediation process, and the independence of the determination and
resolution of the parties of their dispute, all of which shall foster
prompt, economical, and amicable resolution of disputes.
SECTION 2. Scope. These Rules shall apply to all complaints filed
before the Commission.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Circular, the
following terms are defined, as follows:
a. Commission – refers to the National Privacy Commission.
b. Complaint Proceedings – proceedings before the Complaints and
Investigation Division commenced sua sponte or by the filing of a
sworn affidavit or verified complaint, including investigations, except
those arising from breach notifications.
c. Discovery Conference – a meeting pursuant to an Order to Confer
for Discovery issued by the investigating officer during complaint
proceedings.
d. Investigating Officer – refers to the personnel of the Complaints and
Investigation Division assigned by the Commission to preside over
complaint proceedings.
e. Mediation – refers to the voluntary process in which a mediation
officer facilitates communication and negotiation, and assists the
parties in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding a dispute.
f. Mediation Officer – refers to the personnel of the Legal Division
assigned or designated by the Commission to conduct mediation.
RULE II
PROCEDURE
Section 1. Willingness to Mediate. – The parties, by mutual
agreement, may signify their interest to explore the possibility of
settling the dispute by mediation during the discovery conference or at
any stage of the complaint proceedings thereafter.
Section 2. Application for Mediation. – The parties shall jointly file
with the investigating officer an Application for Mediation manifesting
their earnest commitment to engage in a meaningful settlement
process and their willingness to abide by these Rules and the orders
issued by the assigned mediation officer. No application for mediation
shall be approved without payment of the mediation fee.
Section 3. Order to Mediate. – The investigating officer shall issue an
Order to Mediate, which shall state the following: (a) the approval of
the Application for Mediation; (b) the suspension of the complaint
proceedings for sixty (60) days pending the mediation proceedings; (c)
the name of the assigned or designated mediation officer who shall
preside over the mediation proceedings; and (d) the date, time, and
place when the parties shall appear before the mediation officer for the
preliminary mediation conference. Copies of the Order to Mediate shall
be furnished to the mediation officer and the parties.
Section 4. Preliminary Mediation Conference. – The mediation
officer shall receive the appearances of the parties and inform them of
the mediation process and the manner by which the proceedings will
be conducted. The mediation officer shall stress the benefits of an
early settlement of the dispute and endeavor to achieve the most fair
and expeditious settlement possible.
Each party shall be allowed to make a brief statement of their
respective position and preferred outcome. The mediation officer shall
explore common ground for settlement and suggest options for the
parties to consider.
When necessary, the parties shall agree on the schedule of the next
mediation conference and the mediation officer shall issue an order
therefor.
Section 5. Separate Caucuses and Subsequent Conferences. –
The mediation officer may, with the consent of both parties, hold
separate caucuses with each party to enable a determination of their
respective real interest in the dispute; provided, that each party shall
be afforded equal time and/or opportunity to ventilate such interest and
motivation. The mediation officer may call such conferences/caucuses
as may be necessary to facilitate settlement.
The mediation officer shall hold in confidence any matter disclosed
during the separate caucuses and shall exercise reasonable prudence
and discretion in the safeguarding of such information.
Section 6. Mediation Period and Extension thereof. – The
mediation officer shall endeavor to achieve a mediated settlement of
the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the preliminary mediation
conference, but shall, in every case, be afforded the initial period of
sixty (60) days to achieve the same.
Upon reasonable ground to believe that settlement may yet be
achieved beyond the initial mediation period of sixty (60) days, the
period to mediate may be extended for another thirty (30) days by the
mediation officer. Should no agreement be reached within the
extended period, another non-extendible period of thirty (30) days may
be jointly requested by the parties subject to the discretion of the
mediation officer.
Section 7. Mediated Settlement Agreement. – A mediated
settlement agreement following successful mediation shall be jointly
prepared and executed by the parties, with the assistance of their
respective counsel, if any. The execution of a mediated settlement
agreement shall terminate the mediation proceedings. The mediation
officer shall certify that the contents of the agreement have been
explained, understood, and mutually agreed upon by the parties, and
that the provisions thereof are not contrary to law, public policy,
morals, or good customs.
Section 8. Confirmation by the Commission. – The mediation officer
shall issue a resolution submitting the mediated settlement agreement
to the Commission within five (5) days from the signing and filing
thereof. Copies of the resolution shall be furnished to the parties and
the investigating officer. The Commission shall thereafter issue a
resolution confirming the mediated settlement agreement within fifteen
(15) days from submission of the resolution and mediated settlement
agreement.
Section 9. Effect of Confirmed Mediated Settlement Agreement. –
A confirmed mediated settlement agreement shall have the effect of a
decision or judgment on the complaint, and shall be enforced in
accordance with the Commission’s rules and issuances.
Section 10. Failure to Reach Settlement. – If the parties are unable
to arrive at a settlement of their dispute, or it becomes apparent that a
settlement, given the disparity of the respective positions of the parties,
is not likely or achievable within the sixty (60) day mediation period or
the reasonable extension of such period under Section 7, the
mediation officer may declare the mediation unsuccessful and
terminate the proceedings by issuing a Notice of Non-Settlement of
Dispute and furnishing the investigating officer and the parties with
copies thereof.
Section 11. Resumption of Complaint Proceedings. – Upon receipt
of the Notice of Non- Settlement of Dispute issued by the mediation
officer, the investigating officer shall issue an order lifting the
suspension of the complaint proceedings, which shall resume as a
matter of course. Copies of the order, including the notice of the next
hearing date of the complaint proceedings, shall be furnished to all the
parties.
Section 12. Field Mediation. – The personnel of the Legal Division
shall be authorized to conduct mediation proceedings between parties
during the conduct of regional discovery conferences by the
Complaints and Investigation Division.
RULE III
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Personal Appearance by the Parties. – Individual parties
are required to personally appear during mediation conferences.
Representatives may appear on behalf of individual parties; provided,
that they are authorized by special power of attorney to appear, offer,
negotiate, accept, decide, and enter into a mediated settlement
agreement without additional consent or authority from the principal. If
the party is a partnership, association, corporation, or a government
agency, the representative must be authorized by a notarized
Secretary’s Certificate, Board Resolution, or any equivalent written
authority to offer, negotiate, accept, decide, and enter into a mediated
settlement agreement.
Section 2. Effect of Failure of Parties to Appear. – If any of the
parties fail to appear without prior notice and justifiable reason for two
(2) consecutive mediation conferences/caucuses at any stage of the
mediation, the mediation officer may order the termination of the
mediation proceedings. The mediation officer may also require the
non-appearing party to explain why said party should not be required
to pay treble the costs incurred by the appearing party, including
attorneys fees, in attending the mediation conferences/caucuses, and
be henceforth permanently prohibited from requesting mediation at any
other stage of the complaint proceedings before the Commission.
Section 3. Presence of Lawyers in Mediation. – Lawyers, upon the
discretion of the mediation officer, may attend the mediation
conferences in the role of adviser and consultant to their clients and
shall cooperate with the mediation officer towards securing a
settlement of the dispute. They shall help their clients comprehend the
mediation process and its benefits and assist in the preparation of a
mediated settlement agreement and its eventual enforcement.
Section 4. Venue. – Mediation proceedings shall be conducted within
the Commission premises. Upon request of both parties, the mediation
officer may authorize the conduct of a mediation conference at any
other venue, provided that all related expenses, including
transportation, food, and accommodation, shall be borne by both
parties. If a change of venue is requested by one party, it must be with
the other’s conformity and they shall agree on the terms of handling
the expenses.
Section 5. Confidentiality. – The mediation conferences shall be held
in private. Persons other than the parties, their representatives,
counsel, and the mediation officer may attend only with the consent of
the parties and upon approval by the mediation officer. Anyone present
during a mediation conference shall not disclose any information
obtained in the course thereof to any other person, nor utter the same
through other means.
The mediation proceedings and all incidents thereto shall be kept
strictly confidential, and all admissions or statements therein shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, unless otherwise
specifically provided by law. However, evidence or information that is
otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become
inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its use in
mediation.
No transcript or minutes of the mediation proceedings shall be taken,
and the personal notes of the mediation officer, if any, shall likewise be
inadmissible nor cognizable in any court, tribunal, or body for whatever
purpose and shall be securely destroyed upon termination of the
mediation proceedings.
Section 6. Mediation Fees. – The mediation fee in an amount
prescribed by the Commission shall be paid by the parties upon the
filing of the Application for Mediation.
Complainants may be exempted from the payment of the mediation fee
and enter into mediation proceedings as indigents upon submission of
a certificate of indigency issued by the barangay captain at their place
of residence.
RULE IV
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 1. Amendments. – These Rules or any portion thereof may
be amended or supplemented by the Commission.
Section 2. Separability Clause. – If any part, article, or provision of
these Rules are declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts not
affected shall remain valid.
Section 3. Transitory Provision. – These Rules shall apply to
pending complaints, provided the parties express their interest to settle
the dispute by mediation.
Section 4. Effectivity. – These Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
 Foreign articles

The without prejudice rule, The without prejudice rule has been
fundamental to the administration of civil justice. This rule renders
inter-party communications made in aid of settlement both inadmissible
in evidence and immune from disclosure. The court may, however,
deviate from this rule in exceptional circumstances. Preserving
confidentiality in settlement negotiations is all the more important after
the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) came into force, where the court must
facilitate just and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the
overriding objective. In the absence of a secure and private negotiating
sphere, the parties would be reluctant to unveil their genuine needs
and generate compromise options for fear that what they say could be
used to their disadvantage in subsequent proceedings

The primary justification for this rule is the public policy of encouraging
the parties to resolve their differences rather than litigate them to a
finish. In Cutts v Head, 9 Oliver L.J. said,

“ parties should be encouraged so far as possible to settle their

disputes without resort to litigation and should not be discouraged by
the knowledge that anything that is said in the course of such
negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the failure to reply
to an offer as an actual reply) may be used to their prejudice in the
course of the proceedings. They should … be encouraged freely and
frankly to put their cards on the table”