ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner, vs.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS,

respondents.

Statutory construction; Administrative or executive interpretations of statutes; Weight of consideration where statute has not been
interpreted by court of last resort.—Where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute, the rule is that courts will
give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the State.

Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of office charged with enforcement of statute.—The construction of the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.

Same; Construction of tax statutes; Rule on exemptions.—Exemption from taxation are not favored, and tax statutes are to be construed
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority

Statutory construction; Parts of statute should be harmonized.—A construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to
defeat compliance with the terms of a statute. Rather, courts should proceed on the theory that parts of a statute may be harmonized and
reconciled with each other.

Zamora vs. Collector ofInternal Revenue

Statutory construction; Antecedents or legislative history of statute to be considered in its interpretation.—Courts are permitted to look
into and investigate the antecedents or the legislative history of the statutes involved (Director of Lands v. Abaya, et al., 63 Phil. 559)

Adasa vs. Abalos

Same; Statutory Construction; The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule of procedure, is
that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.—The all too-familiar rule in statutory
construction, in this case, an administrative rule of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
need not be resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal
or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary

Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development,

Inc. (ACORD) vs. Zamora
Statutory Construction; Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction; While statutes and implementing rules are entitled to great
weight in constitutional construction as indicators ofcontemporaneous interpretation, such interpretation is not necessarily binding or
conclusive on the courts; The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions than
when applied to statutory provisions.—While statutes and implementing rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional
construction as indicators of contemporaneous interpretation, such interpretation is not necessarily
binding or conclusive on the courts. In Tañada v. Cuenco, the Court held: As a consequence, “where the meaning of a constitutional
provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical . . . executive interpretation thereof is entitled
to no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning.” The reason is that “the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions,” and that “except as to matters committed by the
constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporaneous or practical construction is not necessarily binding
upon the courts, even in a doubtful case.” Hence, “if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected.” The validity of the
legislative acts assailed in the present case should, therefore, be assessed in light of Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution.

JULIO ACCAOILI, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant and appellee

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PUNCTUATION.—The punctuation used in statutes may be referred to for the purpose of
determining the meaning and construction of a law. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by comma, and what follows the semicolon must have relation to the same
matter which precedes it. What follows a semicolon always has relation to the same subject matter of that which precedes it.
Asemicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of
a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The
comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference
being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be
referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute.

Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova

Statutes; Administrative Law; Couris; Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of justice are material in the construction
ofstatutes in pari materia.—The above-quoted opinion was reiterated and reaffirmed by the Undersecretary of Justice on November
28, 1973, in answer to the query of the Acting Chairman of the Foreign Trade Zone Authority as to whether or not Globe-Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation is “authorized under its franchise to set a relay station inside the Foreign Trade Zone in Mariveles,
Bataan, which will receive interstate communications for onward transmission by its main station in Manila.” The above-stated
opinions of the Secretary of Justice and Undersecretary of Justice are material because Republic Acts Nos. 4630 and 4617 are inpan
materia

Same: Same: Administrative construction of statute upheld—The lastquoted provision confirms that the existing public offices of
Interaational Record Carriers were duly authorized by their respective legislative franchises.
 Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan

Statutory Construction; The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases.—It is best to
stress at the outset that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.

Same; To date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.—“To this date, the Court has
not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.” While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague.
Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA
6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Same; In determining the constitutionality of a statute, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.—Generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a
“manifestly strong medicine” to be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.” In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has
been charged.

Same; Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.—Every statute is
presumed valid. On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable
doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

Same; The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law “void for vagueness” if the meaning can
be determined through the judicial function ofconstruction.—As to petitioner’s claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court
agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory construction. The
absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law “void for vagueness,” if the meaning can be
determined through the judicial function of construction. Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary
and usual meaning.

Same; Motions; Bill ofParticulars; Plea ofGuilty; When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.—When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite,
the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court
is Section 9 of Rule 116.

Orencia vs. Enrile

Statutory Construction; Contemporaneous construction of statute by executive officials bound to enforce the same.— Assuming
ambiguity in the applicable statute, it must receive a construction in accordance with and not
in disregard of the cardinal postulate of a public office being a public trust. Moreover, if there is any other principle of legal
hermeneutics that can be invoked, it is that of contemporaneous construction. “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly
erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.”

Tan, Jr. vs. Court ofAppeals

Remedial Law; Statutory Construction; Statute; Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.—We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural
rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing
the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It
is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption.

Insular Bank ofAsia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong
Labor Law; Administrative Law; Statutes; A labor regulation which in effect amends the Labor Code is null and void.—WE agree
with the petitioner’s contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the
then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code’s provisions on holiday pay, they in effect
amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.

Same; Same; Same; The nullity of the labor regulation on holiday pay lies in its exclusion of monthly paid employees from the
coverage of holiday pay contrary to what the Labor Code provides.—From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid
employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the
then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book III of the
implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of
working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all
days in the month whether worked or not.”

Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement
to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit—it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy
Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid
employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the
mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which
states that “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid
and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112)

Vda. De Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Statutory construction; Ascertaining policy of the law; Duty of courts once policy is ascertained.—Once the policy or purpose of the
law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary.

Same; Same; Interpretation of provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act.—No provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
should be interpreted as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective
of social justice.

Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Statutory Construction; Where a statute is susceptible ofmore than one interpretation, court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.—But even
granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to
every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute—its every word.
Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial
construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano

Same; Statutory construction; General repealing clause; Presumption against implied repeal.—A repealing clause in an Act which
provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is
certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore.

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Statutory Construction; Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied—
the court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.—Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit
and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.

Same; Names; Aliases; Criminal Law; C.A. No. 142; The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No.
3883.—The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in
Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties ofthe Director ofthe Bureau of Commerce and
Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November
1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade.—For a
bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; ”Alias” and ”Name,” Defined.—Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names
used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by
which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a
man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not
fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142.—Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day
forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended
by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.—While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions
of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists
a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the principle that a penal statute should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity
to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion ofthe court limited.—Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

Statutory Construction; P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those
found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135; There is no reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes granting
other franchises or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever
is not given in unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.—In fine, P.D. No.1869 does not have the standard marks of a law
granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. We cannot blink away from the stubborn reality
that P.D. No. 1869 deals with details
pertinent alone to the operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the rules and regulations concerning the operation of gambling
casinos such as the place, time, persons who are and are not entitled to play, tax exemptions, use of foreign exchange, and the
exemption of casino employees from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and the Labor Code. The short point is that P.D. No. 1869
does not have the usual provisions with regards to jaialai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not given a franchise to operate
jai-alai frontons. There is no reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or
special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in
unequivocal terms is understood
to be withheld.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “affected with public interest” means that an industry is
subject to control for the public good, and has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”;
Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power for the power to
protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.—Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget that
PAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase “affected with public interest” means that an industry is
subject to control for the public good; it has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power.”
Perforce, a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of police power. The
familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any
doubt must be resolved against the grant. The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to
disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power
to regulate public morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations. Constitutions are widely understood to
withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond
abnegation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and
every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.—It is stressed that the case at bar
does not involve a franchise to operate a public utility (such as water, transportation, communication or electricity)—the operation of
which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public. What is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of a gambling
franchise—a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and
every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers
and rights claimed under its authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It iswidely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is
capable ofbeing understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.—We reject this simplistic reading
of the law considering the social, moral and public policy implications embedded in the cases at bar. The plain meaning rule used in
the dissent rests on the assumption that there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The fact, however, that the
statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the
statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably wellinformed persons in either of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of the
statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the term “jai-alai” was never used and is nowhere to be found
in the law. The conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a
blind reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as “gaming pools” and “lotteries.” Sutherland tellsus
that a statute is “ambiguous,” and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its
terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees;Legislative Power; The so-called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not
come from a real Congress and it is therefore self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this alleged grant of a
franchise as a grant by the legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for plainly it is not.—There is another reason
why PAGCOR’s claim to a legislative grant of
a franchise to operate jai-alai should be subjected to stricter scrutiny. The socalled legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from a
real Congress. It came from President Marcos who assumed legislative powers under martial
law. The grant is not the result of deliberations of the duly elected representatives of our people. This is not to assail President Marcos’
legislative powers granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as the dissent would put it. It is given that in the exercise of
his legislative power, President Marcos legally granted PAGCOR’s franchise to operate
gambling casinos. The validity of this franchise to operate gambling casino is not, however, the issue in the cases at bar. The issue is
whether this franchise to operate gambling casinos includes the privilege to operate jai alai. PAGCOR says it does. We hold that it
does not. PAGCOR’s overarching claim should be given the strictest scrutiny because it was
granted by one man who governed when the country was under martial law and whose governance was repudiated by our people in
EDSA 1986. Thereason for this submission is rooted in the truth that PAGCOR’s franchisewas not granted by a real Congress where
the passage of a law requires amore rigorous process in terms of floor deliberations and voting by members of both the House and the
Senate. It is self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the
legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for plainly it is
not. We now have a real Congress and it is best to let Congress resolve this issue considering its policy ramifications on public order
and morals.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

Same; Construction and interpretation; Statute is not unconstitutional merely because it is not proper, necessary or denimble.—
Appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for— in other words, the Act is not proper,
necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional;
that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the
enactment of the legislation in question. Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the
people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly.