Israel's War with Iran

Author(s): Ze'ev Schiff

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2006), pp. 23-31
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032140
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 Israel's War With Iran
Ze'er Schiff

THE START OF SOMETHING NEW

THE RECENT fighting in Lebanon may have looked to some like old
news, just another battle in the long-running Arab-Israeli war. But it
also represented something much more disturbing: the start of a new
war between Israel and Iran.
The Israeli defense establishment, which regards Hezbollah as
a frontal commando unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,
certainly saw things this way. The Iranians may not have been phys
ically present on the frontlines in Lebanon, but they were active there
nonetheless. A number of Revolutionary Guard members were killed
in the Israeli incursion into the town of Baalbek (close to the Syrian
border) on August 1, and Israeli intelligence claims that Iranians
helped Hezbollah fire the land-to-sea missile that almost destroyed
an Israeli warship in mid-July. Most of Hezbollah's arms-including
modern antitank weapons and the thousands of rockets that rained
down on Israel-came from Iran (as well as Syria). Iranian advisers
had spent years helping Hezbollah train and build fortified positions
throughout southern Lebanon.
Iran, in fact, has been heading steadily toward a confrontation with
Israel for some time now, and its aid to Hezbollah was meant to ensure
that it would have a ready strategic response if Israel took action
against it. From Israel's perspective, it is lucky that the war broke out
when it did. Things would have been quite different if Hezbollah's
patron had already been armed with nuclear weapons and the means
to deliver them. From Iran's perspective, accordingly, the conflict
started too soon. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Tehran did not

ZE 'E V S C H I F F is Chief Military Correspondent for Haaretz.

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 Ze'ev Schff
give Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, permission to
launch a major operation against Israel on July 12. Hezbollah's
strike-which resulted in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and
the killing of several others-was supposed to be relatively minor, just
one more in a long series of provocations across Israel's northern border.
Nasrallah seems not to have expected the powerful Israeli response
that followed, and he quickly proposed an immediate cease-fire and
a prisoner exchange.
In the aftermath of the conflict, several questions need to be asked.
Why did Israel not strike even sooner, as soon as it determined that
Hezbollah was building a vast stockpile of rockets that could threaten
Israeli population centers? What motivated Israel's government to
strike back when it did and with such force? Why did Israel turn the
kidnapping, however serious on a tactical level, into a full-scale strate
gic war against Hezbollah and Lebanon? And what, finally, does the
aftermath of the war mean for Israel's looming showdown with Iran?

PROVOCATION

HEZBOLLAH 'S STOCKPILING of rockets in southern Lebano

began shortly after Israel's withdrawal from the country in May 2000
From the start, Israel's then prime minister, Ehud Barak, knew exactly
what was going on. But a violent new Palestinian intifada had broke
out that same year and was occupying much of Israel's attention. It
never even occurred to Barak to launch another large-scale military
campaign in Lebanon so soon after Israel's pullout.
When Ariel Sharon succeeded Barak the next year, he continued
to monitor Hezbollah's buildup of rockets and its bunker construction
Like Barak, however, Sharon chose not to act; already fighting
battle with the Palestinians, he was loath to open a second front. This
thinking persisted even after Israel noticed, in December 2003, tha
Iranian aircraft flying to Syria, ostensibly to pick up aid for victims of
a recent earthquake, were actually transporting missiles for Hezbollah.
Sharon's advisers cautioned him that the world would interpret a
massive Israeli military operation in Lebanon as an unnecessar
preemptive war and that Israel could not afford the diplomatic iso
tion that might result.

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 CORBIS

Lack ofvision: Ehud Olmert in a helicopter over nothern Israel, July 26, 2006

Why, then, did Israel change its mind this pastJuly? The explanation
has partly to do with internal politics. At the time, Israel's government
was relatively new, having taken office in April, and its three top
officials-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz,
and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni-had little military experience.
Novice leaders often respond drastically to provocations. Israel had
suffered several other kidnappings in recent years without reacting
vigorously. In the eight months before the July 12 attack, Hezbollah
tried five times to abduct Israeli soldiers, and Israel repeatedly asked
France and the United States to warn Syria that the consequences
would be dire if the provocations continued.
Then, on June 25, Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier near the bor
der with the Gaza Strip, killing two of his companions in the process.
Hezbollah struck soon after, and Nasrallah publicly linked the two
events, declaring that he would conduct joint negotiations for all the
abducted soldiers. It was likely fear of this Hamas-Hezbollah link
that spurred Israel to act. At a security cabinet debate on July 12,
Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz (a former defense minister and

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 Ze'ev Schff
chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces) warned that the connection
between the two groups had to be broken without delay, as did the
link between Hezbollah and Iran. Israel's leaders agreed and decided
to launch a large-scale counterattack, using IDF plans that had been
prepared in advance.
The question then became whether to approve a heavy air strike
on Hezbollah headquarters in Dahia, a Shiite neighborhood of Beirut.
Once Israel's intelligence agencies were able to establish that almost
no civilians were living in the buildings that would be targeted, the
security cabinet voted five to two to start the war.

INTO THE BREACH

AT FIRST, some Israeli ministers (such as Mofaz) proposed launching
a large-scale attack on Lebanon's civilian infrastructure, arguing that
the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, which includes two
Hezbollah ministers, should be held responsible for the July12 attack.
They also pointed out that according to a UN briefing, the Lebanese
government had sanctioned Syria's arms transfers to Hezbollah and
granted wounded Hezbollah fighters the same official compensation
as members of the Lebanese army.
Nevertheless, Israel decided against an assault on Lebanon's infra
structure after Washington warned Jerusalem that such a massive
move would weaken Siniora. Israel decided instead to direct its forces
at stopping Syria and Iran from delivering arms to Hezbollah. This
meant targeting bridges, main traffic arteries, and the Beirut airport.
Israel was careftil to keep its objectives for the war limited. Civilians
were never deliberately targeted, despite the thousands of missiles
being fired by Hezbollah at Israeli population centers. Israel also
decided to leave Syria alone and went to extraordinary lengths to
publicly persuade Damascus that it was not in danger-despite the fact
that Syria continued to smuggle rockets and launchers to Hezbollah.
The Israelis did not want to enlarge the war or give Tehran an excuse
to intervene directly to help Damascus.
Olmert's government also decided not to try to eliminate Hezbollah
completely. Nonetheless, the security cabinet called for "intensive
fighting" against the militia, "including strikes against its infrastructure

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 Israels War With Iran

and command centers, its operational capabilities, its war materiel and
its leaders."
Israel's other goals for the war were to secure the release of the
abducted soldiers, stop the launching of missiles, and compel Lebanon's
aovernment to take responsibility for the
country's south. It also sought to reoccupy a Israel went to
narrow strip of territory along the Lebanese
border to stop Hezbollah from restoring its extraordinary lengths
positions there. From the start of the war, to convince Syria it
Israel's leaders assumed that at some point a
new international peacekeeping force would
was not in danger.
denlov in the region along with the Lebanese
army. In the past, Israel had rejected the utility of such peacekeepers.
But in this case it embraced them, resolving to drive Hezbollah out of
the area and then hand it over to an international contingent.
What has now become clear is that Israel badly mishandled the
conduct of the war. Its leaders assumed that the air force could accom
plish many of its objectives single-handedly-a classic mistake, and
one probably connected in this case to the fact that Israel's chief of
staff, Dan Halutz, is himself an air force officer. As a consequence
of such thinking, the IDF failed to mobilize its reserves when the war
broke out and, when it finally did, waited too long to send them into
Lebanon. By the time it did, on August 9, the UN Security Council
had already passed a cease-fire resolution.
The result of this delay was that Hezbollah was able to continue
firing Katyusha rockets-at a rate of over 200 a day-into northern Is
rael until the end of the campaign. Thanks to good intelligence,
Israel's air force was successful at stopping the firing of long-range
missiles from north of the Litani River (which runs some 25 kilometers
north of the Israeli border), but it never managed to eliminate the
more portable and easy-to-conceal short-range rockets in the south.
As a consequence, the Israeli home front had to endure a sort of war
of attrition. Considering the number of missiles fired at population
centers, there were relatively few casualties. But the attacks did cause
a large amount of damage and gave Israelis a sense of impotence.
While the IDF did score a victory of sorts by damaging Hezbollah
and destroying its Beirut headquarters, even this was only a partial one.

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 Ze'ev Schff
According to Israeli estimates, over 40o Hezbollah fighters were killed.
But the group's top leaders escaped unharmed, and Hezbollah was not
forced to release the abducted soldiers. Hezbollah also scored a major
public-relations victory in the eyes of the Arab world. That an Arab
militia could stand up to the IDF, the most powerful military force in
the Middle East, was counted a success, notwithstanding Hezbollah's
heavy losses and the considerable destruction wrought in Lebanon.

FALLOUT
IN POLITICAL TERMS, Israel will have accomplished something if the
Security Council's resolution ending the war is ever implemented. That
resolution, 1701, reiterates the main principles of an earlier measure (Res
olution 1559) that called on Hezbollah to disarm and on the Lebanese
government to exercise its sovereignty in the country's south. Resolution
1701 also prohibits all arms shipments to the country without the con
sent of the Lebanese government and authorizes the creation of a large
international force to help the Lebanese army exercise its responsibility.
Unfortunately for Israel, full implementation of Resolution 1701
now looks unlikely. Hezbollah has already declared that it will not
disarm, and the Lebanese government has tacitly accepted this, on
the condition that Hezbollah refrain from any public display of its
arms. What this means, in effect, is that southern Lebanon will not
be completely demilitarized. Complete demilitarization would require
Israel to occupy the entire area or the international force to risk a
confrontation with Hezbollah, neither of which is likely to happen.
To make matters worse, Resolution 1701 makes no reference to
Hezbollah's rockets in northern Lebanon. Nor has any method been
agreed on to prevent more arms from being smuggled into the country.
Cross-border shipments from Syria, some of which originated in
Russia, have already resumed.
Of course, Hezbollah's position in southern Lebanon has been
seriously weakened. It has promised Siniora's government that it will
refrain from any acts of violence against Israel. Should it breach the
deal and open fire, it will find itself in a confrontation with Beirut.
But the war has shaken Israel to its core. The aftershocks were still
being felt at the time of this writing, with large groups of reserve soldiers

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 CORBIS

Lost in the wilderness?Israeli reserve soldiers leavingLebanon, August 6, 2006

complaining about the war's mismanagement and calling for Olmer

Halutz, and Peretz to resign. Israelis are frustrated that their governme
was not able to protect them from Hezbollah's missiles; indeed, Israeli
civilians have not suffered such frontal attacks since Israel's War
Independence, in 1948. As a result, like in the aftermath of the 19
Yom Kippur War and the first Lebanon war, in 1982, rising numbe
of Israelis are now demanding that a state commission of inquiry b
impaneled (as of this writing, only a less independent cabinet committ
had been agreed on). There is certainly a need for such an investigation
but the danger exists that it could be used by politicians to elimina
rivals. And if fighting in Lebanon resumes while the inquiry is
progress-as seems possible-the deliberations could have a demo
alizing effect on Israel's fighting forces, especially its reserves.
One way or another, the war and its aftermath will probab
weaken the standing of Olmert and his party, Kadima. His plans f
unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank have now bee
shelved; the Israeli public is in no mood to deal with such a realig
ment. Before the war, many believed that Israel and its army we
quite capable of coping with the risks that would come from abandonin
territory. That belief has now been called into question.

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 This is especially so since Is
Foreign Affairs rael's military seemed surprised by
EDITORIAL INTERNSHIPS the course of the war-especially
by Hezbollah's large stockpile of
modern antitank weapons, which
proved deadly when Israeli armor
started crossing the border. By the
time of the cease-fire, 47 Israeli
tanks had been hit by antitank
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ous interns have included recent grad
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 Israel's War With Iran

some time, its defense establishment has seemed confused about the
threats facing the country. On the one hand, Israel has defined Iran's
emerging nuclear power as the most serious threat to its existence. At
the same time, Israel has acted as if Palestinian terror were more
important. To be fair, the threat that Israel faces from Palestinian
terrorists is very serious, and dealing with it can be very troublesome.
Nevertheless, Israel has become quite successful at countering and
coping with suicide attacks. Given the much more existential danger
that Iran represents, Israel should make Iran its top priority.
Coping with Tehran will require both political and military efforts.
Israel is not alone in confronting the nuclear threat from Iran; the
problem is shared by the UN and the international community, and
Jerusalem hopes that the UN Security Council and the International
Atomic Energy Agency will make Iran pay for its illegal weapons
program. Although aware that it cannot solve this problem on its own
through military means, Israel has nonetheless continued to relent
lessly develop its military options, including securing a second-strike
capability against Iran.
To make space for the coming confrontation-whether diplomatic
or military-Israel should try to ease the pressure on the Palestinian
front by working toward political compromises and settlements.
Israel should also make concerted efforts to reach a peace accord with
Syria, in order to establish a buffer between Israel and Iran. Olmert
and his successors must do everything they can to make sure that if a
new battle with Iran breaks out-a direct one this time-Israel is in
the best position possible to deal with it.0

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