TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA v. AUGUSTO CE DAVID +

FACTS:
Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a
passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on said vehicles
for 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to
the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under postal
money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased from and issued by the Post
Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope
containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August 31, 1957; so does the
postal cancellation mark on the face of the money orders.
The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section
8(1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second
installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of
August; that the last working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that
consequently, the, remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation mark dated
August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether the remittance of Gonzaga covering the second installment of registration
fees for 1957, made by registered mail with postal cancellation dated August 31,
1957, was within the time fixed by law.

HELD:
The last working day contemplated in Sec. 8(1) of Act 3992 as amended should not
necessarily mean the last working day for the Motor Vehicle office. Under Sec. 6(b)
of said Act, providing for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of
cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is
considered the date of application. Consequently, Where the manner of payment
falls under said Section 6 (b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation as the
date of application, impliedly permits of a remittance or payment within that last
day of August that the Post Office may still effect cancellation; and the remittance, in
fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August 31, 1957. Clearly, therefore, the
remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the time fixed by law, as provided in
"Section 8(1), in connection with Section 6(b) of Act 3992, as amended.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN VS CA

G.R. NO. L-32116, 21 APRIL 1981

FACTS:
On February 13, 1961, the sheriff of Manila, sent a notice of sheriff's sale addressed
to Castro, announcing that her property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 would be sold at
public auction on March 10, 1961 to satisfy the obligation covering the two
promissory notes plus interest and attorney's fees.
Upon request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the
auction sale that was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10,
1961. But when April 10, 1961 was subsequently declared a special holiday, the
sheriff of Manila sold the property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 at a public auction
sale that was held on April 11, 1961, which was the next succeeding business day
following the special holiday.

ISSUE
Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged
property that was held on April 11, 1961, the next business day after the scheduled
sale of April 10, 1961 which was a special public holiday.

HELD

Respondent court ruled that the aforesaid sale is null and void. The pretermission of
a holiday applies only "where the day, or the last day for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday," or when the last day of a given period for doing
an act falls on a holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the
government for an act to be done, as distinguished from a period of time within
which an act should be done, which may be on any day within that specified period.
Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by the deputy
sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be made on the next succeeding business
day without the notices of the sale on that day being posted as prescribed in Section
9, Act No. 3135.

QUIMIGING VS ICAO

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought
an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for
support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She
then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure
to allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court
dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint,
ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a
cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she
was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only
“en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived
child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision
supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

GELUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought
an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for
support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She
then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure
to allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court
dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint,
ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a
cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she
was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only
“en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived
child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision
supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

DE JESUS VS SYQUIA

Facts:

This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the
purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1)
breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael as his
natural child and pay maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the barbershop
where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant
visitor at her home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy,
it will be christened in his name. On his trip to China and Japan, he was writing
letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition so that “junior” will be
strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where
they lived together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia.
She became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

Issue:

WON (1) there would be damages for the breach to marry. (2) WON Syquia is
compelled to recognize Ismael loanco as his natural child

Held:

The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia
for breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by
the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by

the production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs. Hon. Montano G.R. No.
182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregna
ncy but unfortunately the fetus died. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortilla
no’s claim for parental leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. Continental Steel posited th
at the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child
, a fetus, without legal personality. The appointed Voluntary Arbitrator , Atty. Monta
no, ruled in favor of Hortillano and that the 3 elements for the entitlement of bereav
ement leave(death,dependent, legitimate) and 4 elements for the death and accident
insurance(death, dependent, legitimate, legal document) are present. However, the
Continental Steel persistently argued that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so the l
iteral meaning of death should be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employee should be granted of bereavement leave and other be
nefits consisting of death and accident insurance considering his child died without j
uridical personality and the CBA did not specifically mention this qualification to be
entitled with such.
RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to those benefits. The SC said that in this case, the issue of
civil personality is not relevant. It is not a question before us whether the unborn chi
ld acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were p
assed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and
other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn
child upon the latter’s death. Also, life is not synonymous with civil personality. If th
e unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being del
ivered, qualifies as death.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel av
ers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general se
nse, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and oth
er death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in th
e interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted i
n favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted
in favor of labor.

Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate
applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because

under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within
the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.

DUMLAO VS QUALITY PLASTICS

Facts:
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-
662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago
Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarily Quality Plastic
Products,... Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November,
1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond,... Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment."
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision
had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria which he had... given as security under the bond. Oria's land,...
was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962.
The sale was confirmed by the lower court... in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products,
Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land.
Issues:
the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who,
being already in the other world, was never served with summons.
Ruling:
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court
that Oria was dead. It... specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the
person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case
No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His
juridical capacity, which... is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death.
WHEREFORE, the lower court' decision is reversed and set aside.

PT&T vs NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November
21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who
went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the
portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later
about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married
women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate
the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring
to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those
cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that
de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As
stated in the labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to

require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good
morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The
kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation
of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not
only for order but also imperatively required.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s
home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal
home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and
demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia
kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in
the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support
the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is
not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she
can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

BALOGBOG VS COURT OF APPEALS

In 1968, the respondents brought an action for partition and accounting, claiming
that they were the legitimate children of Gavino B., and as such they were entitled to
the 1/3 share of Gavino in Basilio’s estate. The petitioners denied knowing the
respondents. They alleged that Gavino died single and they are not aware that he
has two sons. The petitioners further questioned the validity of marriage between
their brother and Catalina.

ISSUE:
(1) WON the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of
marriage certificate.
(2) WON Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption
may be rebutted when there is a proof to the contrary. Although a marriage contract
is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place. Other evidences may be shown to prove the marriage.
(2) Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the
Civil Registry does not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate
children. The legitimacy was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses including
Catalina. Moreover, although made in another case, Gaudioso admitted that
Ramonito is his nephew.