Criminal Procedure | 1

RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Effect of Denial
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of
the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about the
personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt.
The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions
were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the
trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that
after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the
precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital
offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for
it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a
fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free.
(People v. Alicando)
No arraignment in absentia
We hold that AGUILAR had not been legally arraigned when a plea of "not guilty" had been entered for her together with the
other defendants who had refused to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea in absentia. Under both the 1964 Rules of Court
and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a defendant must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
Even under Sec. 62 of the Manual of Courts Martial, it is provided that "during arraignment, the accused and personnel will stand
(Nolasco v. Enrile)
Plea to A Lesser Offense
RULE 116, Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing
his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, circ. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval. The essence of a plea-bargaining agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty
to a lesser offense than that charged against him. Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure1 provides the
procedure therefor.
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the
crime charged. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President)
Plea to a Capital Offense
RULE 116, Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of his culpability. If the accused desires, he may present evidence on his behalf. A judge who fails to observe
it commits grave abuse of discretion. (People v. Sevilleno)
The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, especially in cases where the capital penalty
may be imposed, is that the court should be sure that defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred against him

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SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
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and the character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. For this reason, the Court requires that in every case
under a plea of guilty, where the penalty may be death, the trial court should call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the
guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant and not only to satisfy the trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining
whether accuse understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. (People v. Tiongson)
Under the new formulation three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered
by the accused:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. (People
v. Camay)
What is Searching Inquiry?
The indispensable requirement of searching inquiry was elucidated in People v. Mangila (2000): To breathe life into this rule, it
is mandatory for TCs to:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused’s plea;
(2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.
(People v. Francisco)
Where the court failed to conduct the prescribed searching inquiry” into the voluntariness of the accused’s plea of guilty and full
comprehension thereof, the plea of guilty is deemed made improvidently and rendered inefficacious. (People v. Gumimba)
A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term (because the
accused is aware of that) but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at
the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we said, of a lenient
treatment, or upon a bad advice or promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
"remorse". It is the duty of the judge to see that he does not labor under these mistaken impressions, because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
A "searching inquiry" likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed
under a state of duress and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently - either by actual threats of physical
harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes. The trial judge should have so satisfied
himself in the case at bar, considering especially the tender years of the accused (who was about twenty at the time of the trial)
and his vulnerability to ill-advised suggestions from outside influences.
Above all, the trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly, guilty. This is possible say, by requiring
him to narrate the tragedy or say, by making him re-enact it, or by causing him to furnish missing details.
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," as to the number and character of
questions he may put to the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured
according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age, educational attainment, and social status of the accused
confessing guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself that:
(1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and
(2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his testimony.
This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the same time, that they will be true
to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law. (People v. Dayot)
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that the
defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and
character of the questions propounded. Judges are not required to go into obsessive detail about the psychological, educational
and sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of questions he
is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail which
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furthers the end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice
and defeats the purpose of the law. (People v. Alicando)
Plea to Non-Capital Offense
RULE 116, Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary — When the accused pleads guilty
to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.
Effect of Improvident Plea of Guilty
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this
Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated
by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt –
one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the
other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s
plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. (People v. Baharan)
Plea must be Unconditional
In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's
right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. An accused
may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon
him. In such cases, the information should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant, or
the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty. (People v. Patrick de Luna)
Illegal arrest waived if not raised in arraignment
A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment
without any objection, as in this case. Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are, therefore,
deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. (People v. Aminola)
Accused-appellant challenges the legality of his warrantless search and arrest for the first time in his appeal. He argues that such
was illegal, since none of the instances wherein a search and seizure may be done validly without a warrant was present. Such
argument is untenable.
First of all, accused-appellant never raised this issue before his arraignment. He never questioned the legality of his arrest until
his appeal. On this alone, the contention must fail. It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (People v. Tan)
Daan v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 163972-77 (2008)
• Petitioner, together with Mayor Kuizon, were charged for three counts of malversation of public funds. In addition to
the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee. During pre-trial, the accused
o In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a
plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender
will be appreciated in their favor.
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o In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of
not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty,
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual.
o On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto
with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
• Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead
guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual for it will strengthen the cases
against the principal accused, Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of these criminal acts.
• However, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. This compelled
petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Is the lesser offense of falsification of a public document by a private individual necessarily included in the crime
of falsification of public document by a public officer, hence, petitioner may plead guilty to the former? YES.
• As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion
should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
• An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former
as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
o In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for
the lesser offenses. In the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took
advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato,
Leyte.
o In the same vein, he may plead guilty for rendering account by an accountable officer instead of malversation
of public funds.
o Therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser
offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses. Moreover, petitioner is not an accountable
officer in that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of
local government funds, not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00
involved in this case.
People v. Janjalani
GR No. 188314 (2011)
• An RRCG bus was driving from Navotas to Alabang via EDSA. As they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-
EDSA bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.
• According to Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on
the bus together and paid together, the two sat away from each other, and the eyes of one of them was reddish.
o As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on
getting off the bus.
o Immediately after this, Andales felt an explosion and saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either
lying on the ground or looking traumatized.
• The Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
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• Accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN an exclusive interview, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident.
• At pre-trial, the accused Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. Subsequently,
the RTC convicted the three accused-appellants of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
ISSUE: W/N accused-appellants’ guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. YES.
• The SC has consistently ruled that “all trial judges ... must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it...
that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.”
• The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
o The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the
defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused.
o The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the... significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is
stringent and mandatory.
• Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual
milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge -... multiple murder - based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge.
o The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made
two other confessions of guilt - one through an extrajudicial... confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
o Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching
inquiry" in this... instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused's plea of
guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
• Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that
which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the... accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
• Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Brig. Gen (Ret.) Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 172476-99 (2010)
• Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of
Brigadier General. when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
• During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of
15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects.
• AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,
executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors.
o Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds
of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of
P10,500.00 per square meter.
o Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of
the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
• Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General
Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1)
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violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation
of public funds or property through falsification of public documents.
• After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
and falsification of public documents.
• The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations
for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
• The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On
review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and
affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the subject property.
• The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military
(OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s
name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-
Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final
disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.
• A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that petitioner indeed participated in and
affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner
could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of
P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued
prosecution.
• Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors.
• The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence
petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan err in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against? NO.
• The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001,
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Sec. 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Sec. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case
may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court
on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.

• If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
• Under Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with
the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared
before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:
Sec. 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an
accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before
the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x

• Sec. 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Sec. 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx
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• Sec. 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Sec. 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day
period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the
accused appears before the court.
• Furthermore, Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment
obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s
arraignment, as mandated by Sec. 7 of RA 8493.
RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH

Defined
RULE 117, Sec. 3. Grounds — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not charge an
offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the
allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to
quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the
case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a
merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of
the prosecution (Antone v. Beronillo)
Waived if not pleaded
RULE 117, Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor — Failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in par.
(a), (b), (g), (i) of Sec. 3 of this Rule.
Exceptions: Where no offense is charged
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
Where liability for the offense has been extinguished
Double Jeopardy
No jurisdiction over person
As to the regularity of appellant’s arrest, we have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, before arraignment.
Here, appellant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and actively participated in his trial. He raised the issue of the
irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to the CA. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court through his counsel-assisted plea during the arraignment, by actively
participating in the trial, and by not raising the objection before his arraignment. (People v. Palma)
Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection
interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
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acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying
his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Rebellion
v. People)
Facts do not constitute offense
It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such ground, the test is "whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation
contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against the
charge under the information must be proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds
for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense". (Soriano v. People)
Rule on Double Jeopardy
CONST. (1987), Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
(see cases under Rule 115 supra)
Jeopardy will attach even if case is dismissed by a Motion to Dismiss
Test of Identity of Offenses
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A.
No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The legislative intent of
totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the
accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists (People v. Pimentel)
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.
A simple act may offend against two (or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional act or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. (People v. Doriguez)
No double jeopardy for prosecution of graver offenses under special circumstances (Sec. 7)
Remedy v. denial of motion to quash
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is
not allowed under Sec. 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can
be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon
denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule and is a recourse that must
be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";
the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed
with dispatch in the consideration thereof"; or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons
to justify a petition for certiorari.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment
or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within
any of the cited instances. (Galzote v. Briones)
Herrera and Maraino v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 119660-61 (2009)
• Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all
members of the Paranaque Police Station, were charged with 2 counts of murder, for killing Shi Shu Yang and George
Go, before the Sandiganbayan (SB).
 Criminal Procedure | 9
• During the arraignment, Herrera and Mariano pleaded not guilty and filed a Joint Petition for Bail and raised the issue
of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the prosecution to allege in the Information that they committed the crimes “in relation
to their office.”
• However, on the same day, Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the Informations to allege that the offense was
specifically committed in relation to their public position or office.
• Herrera and Mariano were arraigned anew on September 1992, and both entered their pleas of not guilty. They also
withdrew their prior objections to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the SB.
• During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that Herrera and Mariano were public officers at the time of the commission of
the crimes and thus the cases were consolidated and a joint trial on merits ensued.
• According to the prosecution, this is what happened:
o The police officers were lighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant owned by Go, and when
Go came down with his pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who introduced himself as a policeman,
asked for the license of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that he will bring the firearm to the police station for
verification. Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu to board their jeepney.
o The police officers also ordered the Go and Yang to undergo medical examination and thus they were taken to
the Paranaque Community Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and Yang were brought to Timothy Street,
Multinational Village where they were killed.
• The defense on the other hand claims that:
o Herrera and Mariano were just assisting Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination. Prior to the
shooting incident, they were informed that George Go was previously arrested by Barrera for illegal possession
of firearm.
o They brought Go and Yang to the PCH and on the way back to the police station, they heard a struggle ensue at
the back of the patrol van as Alcalde said, “George, bitawan mo ang baril ko.” And then they heard successive
shots.
o When they looked back, they saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm (later on, they said it was an
armalite) with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted to pacify the trouble but alas there were more shots and
they found Go and Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified individually but they said almost
the same things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s findings that Go was positive for alcohol and that Go
had no signs of physical injuries.
• What really happened:
o Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street which was a practically deserted area, isolated from traffic
and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera, and petitioner Herrera brought out the two handcuffed victims from the back
portion of the patrol van in order to eventually salvage them.
o Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking an alleged interrogation and was trying to get the name of Shi Shu
Yang, whose identity was then not yet immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also participated in
shooting at the unarmed victims.
• The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts of murder and denied petitioners’ Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera and Mariano filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N H&M’s conviction will place them in double jeopardy. NO.
• H&M insist that SB erred in convicting H&M for the crime of murder under the amended Informations as they had
earlier been arraigned under the original Informations for murder and their arraignment under the amended
Informations placed them in double jeopardy. HOWEVER, the SC found this argument untenable.
• SB ordered the amendment of the Informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of
the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial
of the case on the merits.
• Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioners’ plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim
of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
 Criminal Procedure | 10
1. there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
2. the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and
4. the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.
• In the present case, H&M pleaded not guilty to the two original Informations for the crimes of murder. Thereafter, in
their Joint Petition for Bail, H&M raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to
allege in the information that the crimes were committed “in relation to their office.” On the same day, public
respondent ordered the amendment of the Informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy
to attach, i.e., that the Informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.
• Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. H&M cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original Informations
as the prosecution failed to allege in the Informations that the crimes were committed “in relation to their office.”
Thus, petitioners were not placed in danger of being convicted when they entered their pleas of not guilty to the
two original Informations which were insufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction.
• Furthermore, it was well¬within the power of SB to order the amendment of the two original Informations. Sec. 4, Rule
117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint
or Information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity
to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or Information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Sandiganbayan’s Decision finding petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera y
Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals for two (2) counts of murder,
for the killing of Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan.
Liezl Co v. Harold Go
GR No. 164669-70 (2009)
• 6 December 2001 – NBI raided a commercial establishment named A-K Video Store, located at 1214 Masangkay Street,
Manila. They had acted upon the information relayed by complainant Liezl Co (Co) that cell cards that were stolen from
her were being sold at A-K Video Store. The store was owned by Go. Lim, who was found administering the store at the
time of the raid, was arrested. A total of thirty (30) boxes of cell cards worth P332,605.00 were seized from the store.
• An Information was filed before the RTC of Manila charging Lim with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing law).
• Lim moved for a reinvestigation of his case and was granted by the RTC. The arraignment that was initially scheduled
on 21 November 2002 was rescheduled on 22 January 2003, and further rescheduled thereafter pending the
reinvestigation proceedings. Pending the reinvestigation of Lim's case, petitioner filed a complaint against Go before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612. The reinvestigation of the case
against Lim was conducted together with the preliminary investigation of Go. In a Review Resolution, the prosecutor
found probable cause against Lim and recommended the prosecution of Go. So an Information against Go was filed.
• Respondents filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ assailing the Review Resolution. Thereafter, respondents moved
for the consolidation of Criminal Cases on the ground that these cases arose from the same series of incidents and it was
granted.
• 16 January 2004 – the ASec. of the DOJ issued a Resolution reversing the Review Resolution and directed to withdraw
the informations against respondents Lim and Go. So the Assistant Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations
seeking the dismissal of the cases filed against respondents.
• 1 February 2004 – the date set by the RTC for the arraignment of the respondents and for pre-trial, the respondents were
arraigned, and the prosecution and the defense marked their evidence and submitted their stipulations of facts. Thereafter,
the defense counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila, through Assistant Prosecutor Corpuz, had already filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations. The RTC
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases on the ground that the Prosecutor and the DOJ would not prosecute these
cases.
 Criminal Procedure | 11
ISSUE: Are the rights of the two (2) accused against double jeopardy violated, considering that they expressly moved for
the dismissal of the criminal cases against them? NO.
• The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of
the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given their express consent to the termination
of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy
is inapplicable to this case.
• At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment
for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The constitutional provision,
therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
• This Court finds the proceedings conducted on 11 February 2004 highly unusual in that the RTC judge had arraigned the
respondents before granting the respondent's oral motion to dismiss solely based on the Resolution of the ASec. of Justice
dated 16 January 2004, a copy of which was attached to the Motion to Withdraw Informations filed by the public
prosecutor on 27 January 2004. The irregularity is even more pronounced when we consider the fact that the public
prosecutor, whose office had filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations on 27 January 2004, agreed to have respondents
arraigned on 11 February 2004. Added to the fact that the defense was allowed to move for the dismissal of the case even
without a written motion, such irregularity arouses suspicions that the arraignment of the respondents after the public
prosecutor was already ordered to withdraw the Informations was intended to aid respondents in raising the defense of
double jeopardy should another case based on the same incidents be filed against them. While this Court does not make
any conclusive findings of bad faith on the part of the RTC judge and the public prosecutor, it deems it proper to
issue a reminder to officers of the court to avoid all appearances of suspicious or questionable behavior so as not
to unduly strain public trust.
ISSUE: Was the order of the presiding judge of RTC in dismissing criminal cases for the sole reason that the DOJ ordered
the withdrawal of the corresponding informations, and without making an independent assessment and finding of
evidence, valid? NO.
• Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not
bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of its duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the
case based on the a􏰃davits and counter-a􏰃davits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of
the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced
before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
• The failure of the trial court judge to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates
the complainant's right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This
Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a
prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw Informations anew.
• In dismissing the criminal cases against the respondents, the RTC in this case relied on the unwillingness of the DOJ to
prosecute these cases and the awkward situation in which the public prosecutor would find himself.
People v. Odtuhan
GR No. 191566 (2013)
• On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor
Alagon. He later filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and
declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the
meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina and thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
• Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and
(2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
• The RTC held that the facts constitute the crime of bigamy. There was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina
and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon. It further held
 Criminal Procedure | 12
that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
• Respondent appealed to the CA on certiorari and it concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an
offense.
ISSUE: W/N the motion to quash by respondent is proper. NO.
• A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information
filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information. In this case however, there is sufficiency of the allegations in the information to constitute the crime of
bigamy. It contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) that
respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
• Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning
should not be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to
resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
• Respondent’s claim that there are more reasons to quash the information against him because he obtained the declaration
of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him is without merit. Criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, there is already liability. The time of
filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.
• It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition on review on certiorari is granted. The CA’s decision is set aside and the case is remanded to the RTC.