Qualification of Witnesses - Marital Disqualification

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO
MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES
NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-
REJUSO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated July 29, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460.
The antecedent facts follow:
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind
several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.3
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and
the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein. 4
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot.
Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated
the subject lot to Andres, Jr.5
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting
examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the
affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. 6
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215. 7
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize
the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. 8 Thus, PO2
Alvarez’s report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant. 9
In its Order10 dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The
RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert
witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion in an Order 11 dated October 11, 2005.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however, dismissed their petition in the assailed
Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 29, 2011. The CA refused to take
judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice
cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she
is not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 was
reinstated.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of the reinstatement of Civil Case
No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
PO2 Alvarez as a witness.12 They stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on
whether the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery. 13
In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They also agreed with the CA that
her disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215.
We find in favor of petitioner.
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness
can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. While we agree with the CA in considering the RTC’s
Orders15 which dismissed Civil Case No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the
Decision16 of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent proceedings were even held in the
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC which were already submitted to the CA. That Civil Case No.
5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot be ignored.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 18 Grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence. 19
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines,20 we said that
a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section
20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section
21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of
marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a
witness by reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation
of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an
exception not embodied therein. We said:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based
on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-
disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility
and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions.
x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to
others.1âwphi1 We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been
denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the
qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in
evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the
testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will
be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But
the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is
called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled
the RTC ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with instances
wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. 24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed of
donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications of witness and possess
none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence.
In Tamani, we used the opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if
P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July
29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October II, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a
witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Rollo, pp. 14, 42. While Lydia Navarro Grageda is named as co-petitioner in the title of the petition, only Luisa
Navarro Marcos has verified it.
1
Id. at 47-52. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal
M. De Leon and Franchito N. Diamante.
2
Id. at 54-57.
3
Id. at 48.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 48-49.
9
Id. at 211.
10
CA rollo, pp. 24-25.
11
Id. at 26.
12
Rollo, p. 29.
13
Id. at 35.
14
Id. at 530-532.
15
CA rollo, pp. 262, 267-268.
16
Id. at 297-306.
17
Id. at 307-308.
18
Deutsche Bank AG v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 193065, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 82, 100.
19
Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, et al., G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013, p. 10.
20
G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013, p. 5.
21
238 Phil. 597, 602-603 (1987).
22
G.R. No. 171497, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 132, 144.
23
Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20,2011,654 SCRA 216,237.
24
Manzano, Jr. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 179323, November 28,2011, 661 SCRA 350, 357.
25
Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13,2012, 672 SCRA 200,209.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86743 August 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO RIZO y RABINO, defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the defendant, Rodolfo Rizo y Rabino, from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No.
5083 of the Regional Trial Court at Masbate, Masbate, the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Rodolfo Rizo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to pay the victim,
Felicidad Valencia, the amount of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to
acknowledge the offspring named John Paul Valencia as his legitimate son and to support the child at
P200.00 a month until he reaches the age of majority, and to pay the costs.
The record shows that on 28 May 1986, Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old mentally retarded
sister, Felicidad Valencia, was bigger than usual. She was suspicious and obtained a sample of Felicidad's urine which she
sent to a hospital for examination. The result showed that Felicidad was pregnant. 1 Upon questioning, Felicidad revealed
that the herein defendant-appellant, Rodolfo Rizo, the husband of her "yaya", Ana Rizo, had sexual intercourse with her in
the bodega. 2 Concepcion Dimen and her brother, Boy Valencia, confronted the accused and the latter admitted that he
had sexual intercourse with Felicidad. Consequently, the appellant was brought to the Masbate police station for
investigation. There, with the assistance of CLAO Atty. Osias Tambago, he also admitted having done the act. 3
In view thereof, Rodolfo Rizo was charged with the crime of Rape before the Regional Trial Court at Masbate, Masbate.
The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 5083.
On 22 October 1986, Felicidad Valencia delivered a baby at a Manila Hospital, whom they named John Paul Tiongson
Valencia. 4
At the trial, Dr. Emilio Quemi, a medical specialist at the Masbate Provincial Hospital, declared that he examined Felicidad
Valencia on 7 July 1986 and found her to be pregnant. He then issued a medical certificate relative to his findings. 5 He
also stated that Felicidad is a mongoloid whose intellectual capacity is below normal and comparably that of a 5-year old
child and could not distinguish between what is moral and immoral. 6
His observation was confirmed by Camila Ponferada, who conducts a school for children of pre-school age, and had
Felicidad for a pupil in the summer of 1986. 7
Felicidad Valencia, the victim, declared that she knows the accused, Rodolfo Rizo, whose nickname is "Ompoy" and
pointed to him in court. She related the manner the accused had sexual intercourse with her. She said:
Q Did Ompoy do anything to you?
A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).
Q What did Ompoy do to you?

A In the warehouse.
Q What did Ompoy do to you in the warehouse?
A (Witness touching her breast and demonstrating that she was undressed by Ompoy),
Q Now, did you have a panty with you then?
A I have a panty then.
Q Now, what happened to your panty?
A He removed my panty and my pants.
Q After Ompoy removed your pants and panty, what did Ompoy do to you?
A (Witness demonstrating that she was told to lie down by Ompoy and demonstrating
her two hands that Ompoy placed himself on top of her).
Q Did he make you lie down?
Q Now, after you lie (sic) down, what did Ompoy do?
A He placed himself on top of me. (Witness demonstrating that while she was lying down
Ompoy was on top of her).
Q Now, after that did it last long when Ompoy was on top of you?
ATTY. BOSA (continuing)
Q When you lied down did Ompoy also take off his pants?
Q After Ompoy took off his pants that was the time he lied on top of you?
Q Ompoy touched your private parts?
A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes that he placed his organ on her vagina).
ATTY. ANTONIO
Your Honor, may I make a manifestation that the fiscal and the private prosecutor should
refrain from. . .
COURT
She could hardly be heard of. I think you could also be given the privilege (sic) because
we could hardly get the testimony. I myself who is around a meter from the witness could
not hear the testimony. The mumbling and the nodding of the head is the only thing I
could see.
ATTY. ANTONIO
But there is a translation of her sister, Your Honor.
COURT
You can stay on your place to give an objection. Proceed.
Q Did Ompoy make a push and pull motion after she has inserted his organ to you?
ATTY. ANTONIO
Misleading, Your Honor, there was no showing that . . .
ATTY. BOSA
Leading question, Your Honor . . .
COURT
Reform the question.
Q Did the penis of Ompoy push into your vagina?
Q After Ompoy was through . . . may I withdraw my question . . . Do you know how many
times did Ompoy did that act to you?
A (Witness no answer).
ATTY.BOSA
It seems, Your Honor, that the witness could not comprehend the question.
COURT
Make the question simpler and short.
ATTY. BOSA
I think that would be all, Your Honor, for the witness.

COURT (to the Witness)
Q How did you know that the penis of Ompoy entered into your vagina?
A While in the bodega he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q How did you feel when the penis of Ompoy entered into your vagina?
A That we are in the bodega his penis entered into my vagina.
Q When the penis of Ompoy entered into your vagina, was it painful or not?
A (Witness shook her head signifying no).8
xxx xxx xxx
COURT (continuing)
Q Again what did Ompoy do to you?
A He held my right hand and told me "Fely come with me" and then I said "I do not like".
Q What else happened after that?
A Then I seated on a chair to get my paper to go to school then he held my hands.
Q After that what happened?
A He asked me.
Q Asked of what?
A He asked me to go to the bodega and he held my hands.
Q What did Ompoy do to you?
A He told me to go up the bodega and told me to lie down and he placed himself on top
of me.
Q When Ompoy was on top of you what happened?
A I was lying when he placed himself on top of me. (Witness demonstrating her two
hands)
Q Was Ompoy with or without pants when he lied on top of you?
A No pants.
Q Did the penis of Ompoy entered (sic) into your vagina when he was on top of you?
WITNESS (testifying)
A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes). 9
The defendant Rodolfo Rizo, however, did not confirm nor deny the testimony of Felicidad that he had sexual intercourse
with her. After the prosecution rested its case, the said accused, instead of presenting evidence in exculpation, filed a
motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) claiming insufficiency of evidence in that there is no evidence to prove his guilt
other than the inadmissible testimony of Felicidad Valencia who is mentally defective and, therefore, incompetent to
testify, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 130, Sec. 19 of the Rules of Court. 10
But the trial court found Felicidad Valencia to be a competent witness and rendered judgment against the accused.
Hence, the present recourse.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant insists that Felicidad Valencia is an incompetent witness so that he should be
exonerated from the charge of Rape.
The appeal is without merit. To begin with, the accused-appellant, knowing Felicidad Valencia to be mentally defective or
a mental retardate, did not object to her competency as a witness before she was placed on the witness stand. Hereunder
is what transpired in the court below immediately preceding her testimony:
COURT
That's all. Do you have any other witness?
ATTY.BOSA
We have, Your Honor. But before we will present our next witness, Your Honor, this is a
crime of justity (sic) and because of which we ask for the exclusion of the persons from
the court room not necessary to the attendance of the Court.
COURT
Exclude including these practicum.
ATTY.BOSA
Another thing, Your Honor, that we would like to ask from the Honorable Court that
because of the condition of the victim we prayed that we be given the privelege (sic) to
ask her leading questions. We have established already ample evidence of her mental
capacity by the Doctor, by the sister taking charge of her and by her teacher.
COURT
No objection, companero?
ATTY. ANTONIO
I object to that manifestation of the counsel, Your Honor, that he has submitted ample
evidence showing that the offended victim is allegedly retarded. There was no expert
witness that he presented before this Honorable Court that said witness is allegedly
retarded.
COURT
Objection with the privelege (sic) of asking . . . ?
ATTY. ANTONIO
Yes, Your Honor, because our position is that because he is asking this Honorable Court
that he be allowed to profound (sic) leading question on the ground that a victim is not a
normal person. Our position is that the victim is a normal person. 11
The appellant's failure to object to the competency of Felicidad as a witness operated as a waiver and the trial
court has no power to disregard it. In an early recorded case, 12 the Court said:
Had the opposing party interposed an objection to this witness on the ground of incompetency, her
testimony could not have been received. His omission to object to her operated as a waiver. The
acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper
questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He
may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, either expressly or by silence. In any case the
option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has
no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to,
nor to stake it out on his own motion. The disqualification of witnesses found in rules of evidence of this
character, is one not founded on public policy but for the protection and convenience of litigants, and
which consequently lies within their control.
Besides, the decision as to the competency of a person to testify rests largely with the trial court, and in this regard, the
trial court said:
The Court has observed that when Felicidad Valencia was called to the witness stand, she was led by her
sister. She is around four (4) feet tall, with slanting eyes, short small flat head, rounded and broad face,
very shy and with her tongue oftentimes protruding on her side lips of her mouth. Her hands and feet are
short, broad and stubby. She had high cheek bones and small nose with a depressed bridge. When she
was sworn to tell the truth and was asked twice by the interpreter she did not answer. However, when the
sister asked her to tell the truth, she nodded her head facing the sister. She speaks in stuttering soft
monosyllables sometimes accompanied by gestures and signs of her hands as well as the movements of
her head to indicate affirmative and negative response to a question. Questions she does not know, she
would not answer. She does not know her age, nor where she lives. She has not gone Grade one nor
beyond. She does not know the date, the time, and the number of times she was abused. During the trial,
her actuations and mannerism were too childish and innocent. She showed constantly opened mouth with
her tongue protruding on her side lips. Fely during the trial would untie her shoes on the witness stand
and lean on the shoulders of her sister. She would shake her head sidewise left to right or nod her head
and point her finger to her vagina (tsn, p. 241, Records). She would even yawn in the witness stand resting
her head on her two hands. She would be scratching her head with her tongue protruding on the side lips
of her mouth (tsn, p. 245, Records). These actuations in open court indicate mental abnormality and
innocent childish deficiency which are common forms of mental retardation considering that Fely is a
mongoloid of 22 years old. Yet, she is a credible and competent witness. 13
As to the reliability of her testimony, we quote hereunder the disquisition of the trial court which we find to be in accord
with human conduct and the natural course of events:
Why should Fely single out and point to the accused to have led her to the warehouse; that the accused
touched her breast and undressed her; that the accused removed her pants and panty; that the accused
made her lay down and lay on top of her; and that the accused placed his organ inside her vagina? The
victim is a mongoloid and mentally retarded who does not even know her age nor where she lives. How
could she fabricate and concoct this heinous crime if this incident were not true? It would be
incomprehensible to assume that Fely, a mongoloid whose mental age is comparable to a five (5) years
old, an innocent and mentally retarded girl, could invent a crime of rape against the accused. Neither
could her sister do so knowing that the accused had been their loyal worker for more than six (6) years
and the wife being the yaya of the victim and their laundry woman. It is against their own personal
interest to concoct a crime against the accused if the crime is not true. Considering the integrity of the
brothers and sisters who were mostly topnotcher professionals, they would not so easily advertise to the
whole world that their sister Fely had been raped, (sic) it was not true. There is nothing to gain in
inventing a rape case if it was not true; but the stigma of a lingering eternal dishonor of being raped.
xxx xxx xxx
As a matter of fact, Fely, the victim was candid and honest enough to say that those in the jeep to deliver,
did not touch her. Berto was in the jeep did not touch her. Other persons did not touch her. She does not
have male friends and that nobody has violated her except the accused (tsn, pp. 235-236, Records). So by
the simple process of elimination, the victim has excluded all others not to have touched her nor abused
her except the accused. 14
It results that the trial court did not commit an error in finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime for which he is
charged.
We note, however, that the trial court has ordered the defendant-appellant to recognize the offspring John Paul Valencia
as his legitimate son despite the fact that said accused is a married man. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. 15 That portion of the judgment appealed from, ordering the accused to recognize the child John Paul
Valencia as his legitimate son, should, therefore, be eliminated.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the only modification above-stated. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Ricardo B. Butalid.
1 tsn of January 21, 1987, pp. 9-10, 16.
2 Id., p. 17, also tsn of February 11, 1987, p. 42.
3 tsn of January 21, 1987, pp. 18-19.
4 Id., p. 19; see also Exhibit E, Original Record, p. 121.
5 Exhibit A, Original Record, p. 120.
6 tsn of January 19, 1987, pp. 10-12.
7 tsn of February 11, 1987, pp. 2-5.

9 Id., pp. 42-43.
10 Original Record, p. 276.
12 Marella vs. Reyes and Paterno 12 Phil. 1, 3-4.
13 Decision, pp. 5-6.
14 Id., pp. 8-9.
15 People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689; People vs. Bernardo, 85 Phil. 874.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181539 July 24, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision1 dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision2 dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information:
That on or about the 10th day of February 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with another person whose true name, identity and other personal circumstances have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one RAMON
JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned while said victim was inside
his car having a conversation over his cellphone, the said accused suddenly appeared and with intent to gain and by
means of violence approached the said vehicle and ordered said victim to open it and once opened thereafter stabbed the
said victim with a bladed weapon hitting him on the thorax thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, and thereupon took, stole and carried away the following, to
wit:
a) Two (2) NOKIA cellular phones
b) One (1) brown leather wallet
c) Undetermined amount of cash money
d) One (1) necklace
e) One (1) men’s ring all with undetermined value, belonging to said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA. 3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned. 4 After pre-trial was conducted, trial ensued.
The prosecution established that, as shown in the medico-legal report prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.)
Elizardo Daileg of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who autopsied the victim’s cadaver, the cause of
death was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax." In particular, three penetrating stab
wounds were inflicted on the upper left portion of the victim’s chest, "piercing the upper lobe of the left lung and
perforating the heart." He also suffered stab wounds in the right eye, stomach and left forearm and incised wounds in the
left upper eyelid and left palm.5
The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker at the time of his death. He was survived by his
widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, with whom he had no child. Filomena spent a total of ₱477,054.30 in funeral expenses in
connection with the burial of her deceased husband. Filomena stated that the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45 cellular
phones taken away from Ramon were valued at ₱3,500.00 each, while the necklace snatched from him was worth
₱20,000.00.6
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar:
On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Mark went out of his house to play ball in the basketball court.
He walked to the basketball court, played there, and at about 9:00 o’clock, he stopped playing as he then felt like
urinating. He went to a place near the basketball court where there were five cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat
man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man,
who entered a parked car. The two male persons who were then following the fat man then separated: one went to the
left side of the fat man’s car and stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle. While the other positioned himself
by the door at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides,
(Exhibit "L") depicting the car and the positions of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a
knife while his companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat
man repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat man’s personal
belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He followed them to a place which he
described as far and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a drawing representing the
place where he followed them (Exh. "M"). After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again
to a place which he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He recognized him as
the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin
Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided not to follow them and went home instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock
in the evening when he arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he returned to the scene of
the incident. There were many people gathered in the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested her
to call the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl. They went to a house in a far place, but
no one was there. He recognized and identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture (Exhibit "N") shown to him.
On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death threat. In the year 2003, his grandfather died in Nueva
Ecija and he attended the wake. He stayed there until his father, grandmother and another person, whom he does not
know but of the same age as that of his father, fetched him on September 12, 2003. He was taken to Antipolo where he
stayed at the house of the relatives of the victim until December 10, 2003, the day he initially testified in court. There was
no sign language interpreter in the said house. The relatives of the victim gave him some money which he used to buy for
two shirts, two pants and a pair of shoes.
Before going to the basketball court which is a little farther from their house at 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he already ate
his evening meal at 6:00 o’clock. There were six of them, boys and girls playing basketball. The basketball court was a full
court but they were not playing a real game, just running and shooting. At about 8:00 o’clock, they stopped playing, they
sat down and had soft drinks. After finishing his soft drink, he urinated in the shrubbery near the five parked cars.
He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know what building in Sikatuna Bliss was fronting the five
cars that were parked near the basketball court. It was the first time that he saw the fat man and the two male persons
who wore black bonnets which covered their whole face. The fat man was already inside his car when he was repeatedly
stabbed. The fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with the knife knocked twice on the window of the car.
The window of the car was half-opened when the fat man was immediately stabbed. The man with a gun was on the other
side of the car when he fired his gun once. He did not notice any argument between the fat man and his attacker. He kept
a distance of about eight to ten meters between him and the two men as he followed them. There were no persons
around when the two men attacked the fat man. After witnessing the stabbing, his initial reaction was to follow the
culprits. He did not call his playmates because they were still playing. In fleeing, the two male persons did not run. They
just walked fast. He had been [on] their trail for about nine minutes before they removed their bonnets. He followed them
for about thirty minutes.
When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the knife was buried under the ground. It was 9:56
o’clock when the men took off their bonnets. The man with the knife removed the bloodstained white t-shirt that he was
wearing and, along with his bonnet, threw it away in a place he described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00
o’clock, the two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with the gun who drove the motorcycle. He took the
same route when he walked back home. It was about 10:00 o’clock when he passed by the car of the fat man again. There
were no persons when he went back to the basketball court. Thus, he just went home to sleep and the following morning,
he gave his statement to the police.
On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit "O") showing the basketball court (Exhibit "O-1"),
the five parked cars near the place where he urinated (Exhibit "O-2"), the exact spot where he urinated (Exhibit "O-3") and
the car of the fat man (Exhibit "O-4"). When asked how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that
"there was light in the area which he described as near the flowing water where the accused removed his bonnet." He
stated that the light near the flowing water came from a light bulb and the distance from the witness stand up to second
door outside the courtroom represents how far he was from the man with the knife when the latter took off his bonnet. 7
Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a
licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the
Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal
University with a degree in teaching special education children.8
Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2, Quezon City when he testified.
He interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident happened on February 10, 2003,
he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk from his residence. A road separates the billiards hall from Sikatuna
Bliss.9
On that particular night, accused-appellant went to the billiards hall at around 7:00 in the evening and played billiards
against a certain Ruben. They played until around 10:00 in the evening. Just as they were finished playing, accused-
appellant’s sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived to fetch him for dinner. He went home with her. The following morning, after
having breakfast, he watched a basketball game and talked to his friends. At around noon, while on his way back to his
house, a neighbor, Vangie Barsaga, called him and informed him that police officers came to his house looking for him. At
around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day, he went to the nearest police station, Camp Karingal, where he presented himself
to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1, at that time Police Officer 3, Leonardo Pasco of that station’s District Police Intelligence
Unit. He asked SPO1 Pasco if they were looking for a certain Edwin Aleman and, upon receiving a positive answer, he
introduced himself. He was informed that he was a suspect in a killing incident. He was told to stay put while they were
waiting for the alleged eyewitness to arrive. On February 13, 2003, he was twice made to join a police line-up together
with five others. In both instances, they were ordered to turn around several times and they complied. Thereafter, he was
given a spot report: re: Voluntary Surrender of Alleged Suspect in a Robbery w/ Homicide Case by a police officer and was
informed that he would be turned over to the custody of the Criminal Investigation Division of Camp Karingal. 10
Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February 10, 2003 playing against Ruben until around
10:00 in the evening was corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of Ruben, who saw accused-appellant and Ruben
playing when she went to the billiards hall twice that night to fetch Ruben. 11 Hilda, accused-appellant’s sister, also
corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony that she fetched him from the billiards hall at around 10:00 in the evening of
February 10, 2003. She further stated that, upon getting home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner together and,
thereafter, watched some television shows until accused-appellant went to sleep some 30 minutes later. 12
Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during the police line-up.
Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one who prepared the spot report although it was his
superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark failed to identify accused-appellant during the police line-up. Another
defense witness, barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he was with Mark on February 13, 2003 when Mark
was asked to identify the robber-killer of the victim from a line-up. According to Barrientos, a police officer made a
gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of his hand and, after viewing the persons in the line-up, Mark shook
his head. The line-up was presented to Mark twice and he shook his head in both instances.13
After studying the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court rejected the defenses of accused-appellant for their inherent
weakness and implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed the prosecution’s evidence favorably, particularly the eyewitness
testimony of Mark and his positive identification of accused-appellant as the one who stabbed the victim. In particular, the
trial court found Mark’s testimony simple and credible. He had no ill motive that would make him testify falsely against
accused-appellant. While there were minor inconsistencies in his testimony, the discrepancies were inconsequential and
did not affect the truthfulness of Mark’s narration. Thus, in its Decision dated November 16, 2005, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
described and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, in relation to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Ramon Jaime Birosel as follows:
1. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of the victim;
2. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and
3. The amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIFTY-FOUR PESOS AND THIRTY CENTAVOS
(₱477,054.30) as actual damages.
He is also ordered to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(₱3,500.00) representing the value of the Nokia 3315 cellular phone, the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (₱3,500.00) representing the value of the S-45 Siemens cellular phone, and the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱20,000.00) representing the value of the necklace, which were all taken from the victim.
With costs against the accused.14
Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He anchored his appeal on the claim that the trial court
erred in convicting him for robbery with homicide. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at discrediting the eyewitness,
Mark.15
First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-appellant argued that, being a
deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to others as he has no formal education on sign language, Mark is
unqualified to be a witness. In fact, he was unable to give a responsive answer to some questions propounded to him
through the interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to play in a basketball far from his house than
in a nearer one.16
Second, accused-appellant asserted that Mark’s testimony was not corroborated by his alleged playmates or by the
"chubby girl" he mentioned in his testimony. Such lack of corroboration weakened Mark’s testimony. 17
Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new clothes and shoes from the private
complainant before he took the witness stand. This made his testimony highly suspicious.18
Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime in the two instances
that he was presented to Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s alleged positive identification of accused-appellant
doubtful.19
In its Decision dated September 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals held that the contentions of accused-appellant lacked
merit.20
The Court of Appeals declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has long been recognized. The witness may
communicate his perceptions to the court through an interpreter. In this case, Mark’s testimony was facilitated by
Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990.
With the help of Catinguil, the trial court determined that Mark is not mentally deficient and that he was able to tell time,
space and distance. He was able to draw and make sketches in open court to show the relative position of things and
persons as he perceived like a normal person. By using signs and signals, he was able to recount clearly what he witnessed
in the evening of February 10, 2003. According to the appellate court, the above established Mark’s competence as a
witness.21
The Court of Appeals also found that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the
thorax. This physical evidence is an eloquent manifestation of truth and its evidentiary weight is far more than that of
corroborative testimonies.22
The Court of Appeals rejected as groundless accused-appellant’s imputation to Mark of improper motive or bias. It also
pointed out the irrelevance of non-identification of an accused in a police line-up. What is important is the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime by the witness in open court. 23
Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of robbery with homicide. It upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for the said felony. The decretal
portion of the Decision dated September 28, 2007 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court [(RTC)], National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 is AFFIRMED.24
Accused-appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt on the very same grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals.
This Court is not persuaded.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant stabbed the victim several times, causing the latter’s
death, for the purpose of depriving the victim of his personal properties, which personalties accused-appellant took away
with him before leaving the scene of the crime. The killing of the victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore
constitutes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. This finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate
court is conclusive to this Court. Also, a review of the records show that both the trial and the appellate courts did not
miss, misapply or misinterpret any relevant fact that would warrant an alteration of their identical conclusions as to the
criminal responsibility of accused-appellant.25
The Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the concerns of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant has presented no
compelling reason that would justify the reversal of his conviction.
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that "all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses."26 A deaf-mute may not be
able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to
make observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute
from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and
symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to
make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. As this Court held in People v. Tuangco 27:
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their
ideas through a qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs. Sasota, the accused was convicted on the
basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a
matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by
the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the
particular method adopted."28
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the sanctity of an oath
and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason in ruling otherwise.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry
of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed special
education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as
interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.
Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful February 10, 2003 – the situation of the
victim who had just boarded his car; the respective positions of accused-appellant and his still unidentified cohort vis-à-vis
the victim; accused-appellant’s knock on the window of the victim’s car and the sudden series of stabs accused-appellant
inflicted upon the victim; the taking of the victim’s various personal properties; accused-appellant’s walk away from the
crime scene; and, the revelation of accused-appellant’s identity when he finally removed the bonnet that covered his face,
unaware that someone was secretly and silently watching. In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that
"despite intense and grueling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency upon material details that
could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before his eyes." 29 The imperfections
or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where
the witness is a deaf-mute.30 Besides they concerned material details which are neither material nor relevant to the case.
As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of Mark’s testimony, much less justify the total rejection of
the same. What is material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and personally saw what accused-appellant
did to the victim on the fateful night when the incident happened. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Mark,
which was affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the highest respect of this Court.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of the medico-
legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab
wounds in the thorax."31 The multiple mortal wounds inflicted on the victim constitute physical evidence which further
establish the truth of Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs any corroborative testimony which accused-
appellant requires of the prosecution. Moreover, the settled rule is that the positive and credible testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to secure the conviction of an accused.32
The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify falsely against accused-
appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this Court respects the unanimous
finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter.
Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him fails.1âwphi1 Indeed, the law requires not
simply an eyewitness account of the act of committing the crime but the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.33 Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up on February 13, 2003
was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open
court.34 Nevertheless, the records show that Mark identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the victim in a police
line-up on February 18, 200335 and, more importantly, in open court in the course of Mark’s testimony.
In sum, the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-appellant for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. Accused-appellant’s crime is punishable under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the law
prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is not attended by any aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be imposed.36 Considering that no modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime,
the penalty imposed by the trial and the appellate courts, reclusion perpetua, is proper.
The civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, the current amount of civil indemnity awarded in cases of
murder.37 Robbery with homicide belongs to that class of felony denominated as "Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons"38 under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and the killing or death of a person is committed
"by reason or on occasion of the robbery." The increase in the amount of civil indemnity is called for as the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, like murder, involves a greater degree of criminal propensity than homicide
alone where the civil indemnity awarded is ₱50,000.00.
The ₱50,000.00 imposed as moral damages is proper and conforms to recent jurisprudence.39
The reimbursement of actual damages in the total amount of ₱477,054.30 for various funeral-related expenses is proper as
it is fully supported by evidence on record. The same holds true for the payment of the value of the items taken from the
victim, namely, two cellphones at ₱3,500.00 each and the necklace at ₱20,000.00.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages (namely, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the
Decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-
118348 which found accused-appellant Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed
on the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages awarded to the heirs of the victim, which shall commence from
the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring.
2
CA rollo, pp. 32-42.
3
Records, p. 1.
4
Id. at 26; Order dated September 23, 2003.
5
Id. at 226; Exhibit "K," Medico Legal Report No. M-0425-03.
6
Rollo, p. 4.
7
Id. at 5-7.
8
Id. at 4-5.
9
Id. at 8-9.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 10. The first time was at around 8:00 p.m. and the second time was at around 10:00 p.m. when she finally
fetched Ruben.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 9-10.
14
CA rollo, p. 42.
15
Id. at 52-70. Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
16
Id. at 61-63.
17
Id. at 63-64.
18
Id. at 64-65.
19
Id. at 66-70.
20
Rollo, p. 12.
21
Id. at 12-13.
22
Id. at 13-14.
23
Id. at 14-17.
24
Id. at 18.
25
The general rule is that the factual findings of the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can alter the result of the case. (Navarrete v. People, 542
Phil. 496, 506 [2007].)
26
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 20.
27
399 Phil. 147, 162 (2000).
28
Id. at 163.
29
Rollo, p. 13.
30
People v. Tuangco, supra note 27 at 163.
31
Rollo, p. 13.
32
People v. Sabado, 398 Phil. 1107, 1120 (2000).
33
People v. Paracale, 442 Phil. 32, 43 (2002).
34
People v. Guillermo, 461 Phil. 543, 561 (2003).
35
Records, pp. 188-190; Exhibit "A," Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mark Almodovar y Cagolada.
36
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236, 260.
37
People v. Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 193, 206; People v. Laurio, G.R. No. 182523,
September 13, 2012, 680 SCRA 560, 572.
38
This felony includes robbery with homicide (paragraph 1), robbery with rape (paragraph 2), robbery with serious
physical injuries (paragraphs 3 and 4) and simple robbery (paragraph 5).
39
Id.
40
People v. Laurio, supra note 37 at 573. See also People v. Combate (G.R. No. 189301, December 15,2010,638
SCRA 797, 824) where this Court ruled that interest of 6%per annum should be imposed on the award of civil
indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and e'<emplary damages, from
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R.
No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the
deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality
of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in
1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel
Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased
at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila
on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages,
including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The
signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.
The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing
kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at
ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati
na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng
kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig
ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat
isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat
at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng
testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya
and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961
Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also
appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and
underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with
the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid;
that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel,
and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and
Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki,
inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all
properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the
expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will
of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment,
the summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was
procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some
other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of
the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the
deceased was not executed and attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the
purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three
attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on
appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon
consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in
question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of
the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision and such motion was
opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on
August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration
stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig
and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on
several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses
did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of
the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no
reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The
Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to
require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the
allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent
thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for
insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private
respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply
followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required
by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win
Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the
same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have
dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present
when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that
the win was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses
(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting
said testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged
last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content.
Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule
has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737,
743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo
and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26,
1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that
the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this
Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of
Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its
findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on
appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its
premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are
correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set
forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence
becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of
errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document,
Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental
witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be
admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good
standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to
petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered.
Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under
Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further
urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has
under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to
the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a
witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These
Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of
this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in
order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated
in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from
his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony
, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and
write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We
reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are
presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given
the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must
be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are
character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a
will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the
rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner
has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is
below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
one another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a
witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas
Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the
term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to
being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may
be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the
instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was
a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the
driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a
grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a
person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al.,
100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of
the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820
which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that
the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs.
Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the
time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly
proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same
Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind,
deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in
our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary
in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if
other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say,
his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical
Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol.
10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of
Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one
competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs.
First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible
witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to
testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined
as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs.
Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, such
persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity,
interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or
rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs.
Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is
Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the
belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del
Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is
one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may
allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be
competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not
mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that
they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the
contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies
must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's
position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses
were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of
fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in
finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to
enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under
the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses
were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or
document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15,
1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial
court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the
grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the
petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the
appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider
and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the
evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and
bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was
coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although
Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as
there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day
and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply
based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the
will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well
as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's
house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the
respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained
residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was
issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at
Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts
and that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on
April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be
witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the
deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the
Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde
Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia)
passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they
proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on
April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she
really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her
witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he
believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is,
therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by
Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates
of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as
contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names
of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel
Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received
such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent
Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and
that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior
occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data
appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on
April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since
Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a
public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is
evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To
contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs.
Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the
typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were
all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence
found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date
issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February
24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and
places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso.
Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the
appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in
paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a
special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner
contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to
Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been
suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the
execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent
appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and
review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will
without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record.
Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of
the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was
the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate
of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in
the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note
or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according
to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15,
1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate
court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when
the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on
Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have
been present to witness the will on that — day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano
lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961
were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the
will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her
presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from
giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15,
1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will,
the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly
and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the
will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The
attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in
permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the
attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still
be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the
respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the
other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at
worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and
attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely
detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the
photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. "
Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping
therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one
occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification
of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross
examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the
insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly
unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion
on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do
not require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective
testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions,
evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used
by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was
typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of
the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed
unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that
by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela
Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with
each other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human
experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series
of questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not
all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they
should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent
appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course
of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of
Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has
found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of
which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly
when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses
hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In
the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial
court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's
conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have
witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a
conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings,
jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record
to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel
made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among
the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel,
together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the
office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel
Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's
office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she
wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known
to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the
lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that
thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in the
presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end
of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel
Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the
bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel
Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso
Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial
Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G",
depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said
occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier
advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did
not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel
Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date
appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in
question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the
will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was
incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under
review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note
or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel
dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or
document. This fact jibes with the evidence — which the trial court itself believed was unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was
of sound disposing memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's
wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third
provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the
fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each
legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in
general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of
appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No.
L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated
above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on
record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no
misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by
this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The
above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments
of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted
properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in
reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is
unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April
15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the
will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing
the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register.
A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office
of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good.
The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture
be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the
will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who
constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who
prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are
disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the
testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that
they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the
Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, De Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Penned by then Acting Presiding Justice Juan P. Enriquez, concurred in by Associate Justices Mateo
Canonoy and Ramon C. Fernandez.
* Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, a member of the First Division, took no part.
2 Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 81-101.
3 Annexes " H " and " I ", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 154.
4 Annex "K", Petition; Ro 0, Vol- 1, pp. 167-198.
5 Annexes "L" and "M", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 199- 248.
6 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cecili Munoz
Palma and Mateo Canonoy.
7 Annex "N", Petition; Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 250-251.
8 Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 270-312.
9 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 317.
10 Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 323-354.
11 ROLLO, Vol. II, pp 363-385.
12 The citation of authorities which begins with Mamuyac vs. Abena 67 Phil. 289 (1939) lists some 35
leading cases up to Ran drez Tel Corp. vs, Bank of America, L-22614, Aug. 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191.
13 De Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 129 (1971); Bunyi vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504 (1971); Napolis vs.
Court of Appeals, 43 SCRA 301 (1972); Talosig vs. Vda. de Nieba 43 SCRA 472 (1972); Evangelista and Co.
vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416 (1973); Tiongco 9. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 (1974).
[G.R. Nos. L-38468-69. June 29, 1984.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO TUVERA y BAUTISTA alias "ENSO", CORNELIO DE LA
CRUZ alias "NELY", and MATIAS GULENG, Accused, CORNELIO DE LA CRUZ y DUMALAY alias "NELY", Defendant-
Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ponciano C. Gonzales, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ACCUSED IS ALWAYS A COMPETENT WITNESS FOR OR
AGAINST CO-ACCUSED. — An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact that he
had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy,
as well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this
connection, it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the
basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused (U.S. v. Shoup, 35 Phil. 56; U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599, 610).
2. ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; ALLEGATIONS OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN EXECUTION BELIED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Equally untenable is appellant’s attempt to repudiate his confession on ground of force and intimidation. He
claimed that he was mauled and tortured by his investigators, but he failed to identify his alleged torturers. Neither did he
file charges against them. He admittedly affixed his signature in the two affidavits and voluntarily swore to the truth of the
recitals therein before Judge Nemesio Molina of the Bacnotan Municipal Court, but never for a moment did he complain
of any alleged maltreatment. At the preliminary investigation, Judge Molina propounded questions to appellant, and it
appears that his answers thereto were confirmatory of the facts set forth in his affidavits. All these circumstances strongly
belie appellant’s allegation of coercion and duress.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; RIGHT TO SILENCE AND TO COUNSEL DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT. — As to the claim that appellant had not been informed of his
right to silence and to counsel at the time of the custodial investigation, it suffices to state that such constitutional
objection is unavailing for the reason that the confession in question was obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution (Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4).
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of San Fernando, La Union, in Criminal Cases Nos. 72 and 73, the
dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Cornelio dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(1) Murder, as charged in Criminal Case No. 72 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment for the rest of his natural
life and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P18,000.00 and to pay the costs;
(2) Robbery, as charged in Criminal Case No. 73, and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of from 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, plus the accessory penalties provided for by law and
to pay the costs.
For reasonable doubt the co-accused Matias Goleng is acquitted."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 14, 1972, a search party composed of policemen of Bacnotan, La Union, proceeded to the mountains of Bo.
Ubbog to look for Amadeo Orejudos, barrio captain of said barrio, who has been reported missing. In the course of their
search, they found the lifeless body of Orejudos lying near a shallow creek. The body was covered with branches, leaves
and some earth. Dr. Julita Draculan, who conducted the autopsy, described the victim’s injuries as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Anterior:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Wound, incised, 5 inches long, horizontally across the neck, depth causing injury to the trachea and severing big blood
vessels of the neck, left side.
2. Wound, lacerated, 1/2 inch long, below lateral end, eye, left.
3. Wound, lacerated, 1-1/2 inches long, diagonally above right eyebrow, depth causing fracture of the skull.
4. Wound lacerated, 2-3/4 inches long, diagonally and slightly above the median to wound No. 3, depth causing fracture
of the skull.
5. Wound, lacerated, 2 1/2 inches long, diagonally above lateral end, eyebrow left.
Posterior:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
6. Wound, incised, 4-3/4 inches long, 1/2 inch deep, horizontally, inferior portion, occipital region.
7. Wound, lacerated, 4 inches long, 1/2 inch deep, horizontally, just above wound No. 6.
8. Wound, lacerated, 3 inches long, parietal region, left, depth causing fracture of the skull."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon receiving information that the persons last seen in the company of the victim were Lorenzo Tuvera and Cornelio
dela Cruz, Pat. Espejo summoned them to the police station. In the ensuing investigation, Tuvera pointed to dela Cruz as
the killer of Orejudos. At first, dela Cruz denied the accusation and, instead, countered by charging that Tuvera was the
author of the crime. However, after Tuvera narrated the details of how dela Cruz perpetrated the crime, the latter readily
admitted responsibility for the killing of Orejudos. He also informed the police that he took the gun of the victim. Asked as
to the place where he had kept the gun, dela Cruz directed the police to a small hut in the mountains of Bo. Ubbog, where
they recovered a ‘Hi-standard’ Cal. 22 revolver with ammunitions, licensed in the name of the deceased Amadeo Orejudos.
Dela Cruz executed two written statements which he signed in the presence of the Chief of Police, the Fiscal, and Judge
Nemesio Molina of the Municipal Court of Bacnotan.
During the investigation, Tuvera also informed the police investigators that one Matias Guleng had offered dela Cruz the
amount of P4,000.00 to kill Orejudos.
Cornelio dela Cruz, Lorenzo Tuvera and Matias Guleng were subsequently indicted for murder qualified by treachery, and
in a separate information, dela Cruz and Tuvera were accused of the crime of robbery for having taken and carried away a
`Hi-standard’ revolver, Cal. 22 with ammunitions, belonging to the deceased Orejudos, valued at P300.00.
At the trial, Accused Tuvera, on motion of the prosecution, was discharged from the information and utilized as state
witness. His testimony in open court, as summarized by the Solicitor General, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"He testified that in the morning of September 14, 1972 he went to the mountains of barrio Ubbog, Bacnotan, La Union to
pasture his carabao (pp. 125-126, tsn, May 23, 1973). After transferring his carabao, he proceeded to his hut in the
mountains and found Cornelio dela Cruz there drying peanuts (p. 127, id). While Tuvera was making bamboo strands for
tying firewood, De la Cruz told him, "Here comes Amadeo Orejudos. I have some business with him. Do not interfere or
else you will be the first one to be killed or it will be you whom I will report as the killer." (p. 128, id). Upon hearing these
words, Tuvera got scared. (p. 129, id).
When Orejudos arrived, De la Cruz asked Tuvera to place the potful of peanuts on the stove and requested Orejudos to
shape a piece of wood into an arrow (pp. 130-133, id). Both Tuvera and Orejudos complied with the request of De la Cruz.
While Tuvera was putting the pot of peanuts on the stove, De la Cruz was standing beside Orejudos who was then
fashioning the piece of wood into an arrow (p. 136, id). Tuvera started to kindle fire in the stove, and as he raised his head
to pause after near exhaustion from blowing at the fire, he saw De la Cruz clubbing Orejudos three times with a piece of
wood about three feet long and about the size of a man’s wrist in circumference (pp. 136-137, id). The deceased Orejudos
was seated facing West, shaping the piece of wood into an arrow when De la Cruz, who was then on the side but a little
bit at the rear, delivered the first blow which landed on the left temple of the deceased (pp. 137-138, id). The first blow
felled Orejudos to the ground on his back, snoring (p. 138, id). De la Cruz stooped down and with all force struck the right
temple of the deceased (id). The third blow hit the forehead (pp. 138-139, id). The deceased was unable to parry any of the
blows because he was unaware of the attack (p. 139, id).
After inflicting the third blow, De la Cruz took the gun from the pocket of the deceased, pointed it to Tuvera and ordered
him to drag the body of the victim (p. 140, id). Tuvera could not drag the body because of fear so he asked De la Cruz to
help him do the job (id). Finally, both of them helped together drag the body to the creek where De la Cruz hacked the
deceased twice — the first landed on the neck; the second, on the nape (p. 141, 144-146, id). The bolo used by De la Cruz
in hacking the deceased belonged to the latter (p. 141, id). After the hacking, De la Cruz ordered Tuvera to cut branches of
an "aludig" tree which were used, in addition to earth, in covering the body."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant imputes as error the action of the trial court "in accepting and giving weight to the testimony of co-accused
Lorenzo Tuvera who turned state witness." It is noted that in assigning such error, appellant does not question either the
correctness or the propriety of Tuvera’s discharge under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. It is merely contended
that the testimony of said state witness is subject to the gravest suspicion and, therefore, not entitled to any weight or
credence whatsoever.
The contention is devoid of merit. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact
that he had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the
relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence.
And in this connection, it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and
convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. 1
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the defense, and it assessed the testimony of Tuvera to be convincing and credible. What is more, the
declarations of this witness find solid corroboration in the statements contained in the appellant’s affidavits. The latter not
only admitted having killed the deceased Orejudos, he also informed the police authorities of the place where he hid the
gun which he took from the victim. In fact, the police officers did recover the said gun at the same hut pointed to by him.
Equally untenable is appellant’s attempt to repudiate his confession on ground of force and intimidation. He claimed that
he was mauled and tortured by his investigators, but he failed to identify his alleged torturers. Neither did he file charges
against them. He admittedly affixed his signature in the two affidavits and voluntarily swore to the truth of the recitals
therein before Judge Nemesio Molina of the Bacnotan Municipal Court, but never for a moment did he complain of any
alleged maltreatment. At the preliminary investigation, Judge Molina propounded questions to appellant, and it appears
that his answers thereto were confirmatory of the facts set forth in his affidavits. All these circumstances strongly belie
appellant’s allegation of coercion and duress.
As to the claim that appellant had not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation, it suffices to state that such constitutional objection is unavailing for the reason that the confession in
question was obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 2
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification in Criminal Case No. 72, that the
amount of indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased Amadeo Orejudos is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. US v. Shoup, 35 Phil. 56; US v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599, 610.
2. Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4.

G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006
EUGENE C. YU, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine," Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in
Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 17 November 1994, the bodies of the
two victims were dug up in a shallow grave at Barangay Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmariñas Cavite.1 Charged to investigate
the abduction and killing was the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). After having conducted a thorough
investigation of the case, the PACC filed charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled, "Task Force Cabakid v.
Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and John Does." The same was docketed
as I-S. No. 94-557 and was assigned to a panel of Senior State Prosecutors of the DOJ. Later events that transpired as
narrated by herein petitioner Eugene Yu are not disputed.
On December 13, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution (Annex "C", ibid.) in the preliminary
investigation of the case, docketed as I.S. No. 94-557 finding probable cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas,
Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los
Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, Eduardo Constantino.
Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also named respondents in I.S. No. 94-557. The charges against them
however were dropped for lack of evidence to establish probable cause. Thereafter, an information was filed against
several accused, namely private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos among others, before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City presided by respondent judge. On December 16 and 17, 1994 after the
information was filed and while under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), private respondents
Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate sworn statements (Annexes "D" and "E,", ibid.) implicating petitioner in the
abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo Constantino. The PACC re-filed the complaint docketed as I.S. No.
94-614 for murder and kidnapping against petitioner. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements of private respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but
also failed to establish probable cause against him. On January 30, 1995, the DOJ investigating panel composed of Senior
State Prosecutors Henrick Guingoyon and Ferdinand Abesamis denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss (Annex "F", ibid.).
Thereafter, three (3) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of
Tagaytay City. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with the aforesaid court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause,
to deny issuance of warrant of arrest and to quash information (Annex "G", ibid.).
On December 8, 1995, respondent judge issued a resolution (Annex "H," ibid.), the dispositive portion reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds that probable cause exists against accused Eugene Yu as an
accomplice in the instant cases, and the prosecution is accordingly directed to amend the informations filed in these cases
for the inclusion of the same accused as an accomplice within ten (10) days upon receipt of a copy hereof. As a
consequence, let a warrant for the arrest of Eugene Yu be issued in these cases and bail for his provisional liberty is hereby
fixed at P60,000.00 each in theses cases.
"x x x x
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 6; 118-119)
Both the prosecution and the petitioner filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution.
The prosecution sought to maintain the original informations charging petitioner as principal, while the latter sought the
dismissal of the cases against him for lack of probable cause. Both motions were denied in an order of the court a quo
dated February 6, 1996 (Annex "I", ibid.).
In a petition for certiorari, docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 124380 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al.," the prosecution impugned the Resolution dated December 8, 1995 and the Order dated
February 6, 1996. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 14, 1996. The prosecution
refiled the same titled petition before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42208, "where it is currently
pending, entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al."
In the meantime, the prosecution filed a "Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information
accused Ochoa and de los Santos" on April 17, 1996 (Annex "J"). Petitioner opposed the motion. On March 6, 1997,
respondent judge issued the impugned order, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby resolves to GRANT the Petition
(to Discharge as State Witnesses & Exclude from the Information Accused Ochoa & de los Santos) filed by the prosecution
for being impressed with merit, and, accordingly, the same accused are hereby ordered discharged and excluded from the
information filed in these cases as State Witnesses.
"SO ORDERED." (Annex "A", p. 31)
Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases, claims that the orders were issued by public
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is no
legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses accused Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos (hereinafter
referred to as private respondents).2
From the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 dated 6 March 1997, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.3 In a decision4 dated 30 September 1999, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a
resolution dated 4 April 2000.5
Essentially, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no necessity for a hearing to determine a person’s qualification
as a state witness after the DOJ had attested to his qualification. Republic Act No. 6981, 6 Witness Protection and Security
Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority to determine whether or not an accused is qualified
for admission into the program. The appellate court held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981, upon the filing
by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused from the information, it is mandatory for the court to order the
discharge and exclusion of the accused.7
From this adverse decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The following issues are raised for resolution8 :
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DISCHARGE OF AN
ACCUSED IS NOT A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISCHARGED THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE DISCHARGED
AS STATE WITNESS.
Petitioner maintains that since the private respondents were already charged along with the other accused including him
(petitioner) before they were admitted to the WPSBP, their admission is a judicial prerogative which requires prior
determination by the trial court of their qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further asserts that the case of Webb v. De Leon,9 which the RTC relied on in granting the discharge of the
private respondents and their admission to the WPSBP, does not apply. In that case, Jessica Alfaro was not charged as a
respondent before her application and admission to the WPSBP. Thus, the issue of whether or not she can be discharged
from the information upon the filing of the petition for discharge never arose. On the other hand, petitioner contends in
this case that the private respondents were already charged along with the other accused, including him, before they were
admitted to the WPSBP and discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. Petitioner argues that if this were to
be allowed, the same is tantamount to permitting the prosecution to supplant with its own the court’s exercise of
discretion on how a case over which it has acquired jurisdiction, will proceed.
The argument of petitioner fails to persuade.
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the prosecution in the discharge of the private respondents
reads:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission
of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its
equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats
to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted
to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In
such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under
this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or information on the commission of the crime,
and thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be
known as the Witness.
xxxx
SEC. 10. State Witness. – Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the
State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;
b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness
pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an
accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of
the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for
discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private
respondents, is distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant
in the commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is
granted by the court.
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a situation where the information has
been filed and the accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this
rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from
the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. 10
On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section
17.
More to the point is the recent case of Soberano v. People12 where this Court held:
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in
equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the
accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court
is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
In this connection, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 698113 provides that the issuance of a certification of admission into the
program shall be given full faith by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the
criminal complaint or information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state
witness. This provision justifies the regularity of the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the discharge of the private
respondents.
The case of Webb v. De Leon,14 reiterated in the subsequent case of People v. Peralta,15 is quite elucidating in this regard.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from
prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness
is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never
been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A.
No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain
cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz:
"Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic disclocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been
dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a
necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in
investigative bodies/courts. Petitioner Webb’s challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that the petition to discharge is not supported by any proof or evidence. He
claims that the prosecution did not establish that the private respondents have complied with the requisites of Republic
Act No. 6981 because the certificate of admission from the DOJ showing that the private respondents were qualified, and
the memorandum of agreement between the DOJ and private respondents, as required by Section 5 16 of Republic Act No.
6981, were not presented before the trial court.
We reject the argument for being vacuous.

As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements executed by the private respondents regarding their
participation in the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears that they were included in an
alleged military operation and unaware that the persons they abducted were innocent civilians because they were misled
by their military superiors into believing that these individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account,
private respondents claim to have been oblivious that the persons subject of their surveillance were to be abducted and
subsequently killed.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does
not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual
issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion, 17 which we find not
present in the case at bar.
On the issue of failure of the prosecution to present the sworn statement and memorandum of agreement between the
private respondents and the DOJ, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6891 that the same be first presented in
court before an accused may be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ which is tasked to implement the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6981, has determined that the private respondents have satisfied the requirements for admission
under the WPSBP. This interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 by the DOJ deserves the respect of the
court under the principle that the determination of a government agency tasked to implement a statute is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 1999 and
4 April 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, for continuation of hearing to its conclusion with deliberate dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Acting Chairman
No Part
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Annex H, CA rollo, p. 199.
2
Rollo, pp. 31-33.
3
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45144.
4
Rollo, pp. 30-40; penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr. and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring.
5
Annex B, id. at 41.
6
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A WITNESS PROTECTION SECURITY AND BENEFIT PROGRAM AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
7
CA Decision p. 7; rollo, p. 36.
8
Id. at 14.
9
317 Phil. 758 (1995).
10
Pamaran, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated 2005 Ed., p. 531, citing People v. Ganiban, 91 Phil 844,
847 (1952).
11
Rule 110, Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
12
G.R No. 154629, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 125, 139.
13
SEC. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. – The certification of admission into the
Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required
not to include the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to petition the court
for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and
exclusion of the said accused from the information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the
offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits provided
under Section 8 hereof.
14
Supra note 9 at 800-801.
15
435 Phil. 743 (2002).
16
SEC. 5. Memorandum of Agreement With the Person to be Protected. – Before a person is provided protection
under this Act, he shall first execute a memorandum of agreement which shall set forth his responsibilities
including:
a) to testify before and provide information to all appropriate law enforcement officials concerning all
appropriate proceedings in connection with or arising from the activities involved in the offense charged;
b) to avoid the commission of a crime;
c) to take all necessary precautions to avoid detection by others of the facts concerning the protection
provided him under this Act;
d) to comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against him;
e) to cooperate with respect to all reasonable requests of officers and employees of the Government who
are providing protection under this Act; and
f) to regularly inform the appropriate program official of his current activities and address.
17
People v. Sison, 371 Phil. 713, 724 (1999).
18
Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Energy Industry Administration Bureau, G.R. No. 135925, 22 December
2004, 447 SCRA 482, 500.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 96848 January 21, 1994

vs.
ALEJANDRO SALOMON Y OLPANGO @ "ALE", @ "BOYET" and FELICIANO CONGE @ PEPING, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Anecio R. Guades for accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
The novel defense in this prosecution for rape is that the physical evidence of the complainant's violation was caused not
by the male organ but by the five fingers of one of the appellants that were thrust into her vagina in anger and not lust.
The defense faults the trial judge for giving credence to the complainant. It avers that her testimony should not have been
accepted at all because she is admittedly a mental retardate and therefore unreliable per se.
These curious arguments will not be dismissed out of hand by this Court. The appellants are entitled to be heard in their
defense, no less than the prosecution, although neither party is necessarily to be believed if its evidence falls short of the
strict standards of the law.
The trial court found that on October 11, 1987, while Sylvia Soria, a
20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan, Gandara, Samar, Alejandro
Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the
ricefield some ten meters away. There she was raped by Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her
brother Senecio, to whom she related her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their father. That same night, the
family walked the three-kilometer distance to the police station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of
his daughter by Salomon and Conge. 1 Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan
Tanseco, who issued the following certificate:2
A physical examination has been done on Miss Sylvia Soria, 20 years of age, a resident of Brgy. Casab-
ahan, Gandara, Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear, laceration on the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock position.
There are isolated erythematous areas on both thighs. There is also the presence of sandy particles on the
genital area. Speculum exam, however, showed negative findings.
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a four-month search that they were
arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being detained there for one month, they were taken back to
Samar.3 Following a protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed against them on August 9, 1988, with the
Regional Trial Court in Calbayog City.4
The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in detail the manner of her ravishment by
Salomon with the help of his co-accused Conge. She described how she was dragged to the ricefield by the two accused
and there undressed against her will. As Conge spread and pinned her legs, Salomon mounted and penetrated her,
although with difficulty because she was still a virgin. She felt pain in her vagina and "something slippery." She could not
cry out or repel the attack because the two were stronger than she and Conge was holding a bolo. 5 After her rape,
Salomon sucked and twisted her nipples and demanded that he suck his penis. Her low mentality was demonstrated in her
angry testimony of her refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an icedrop." 6
The prosecution presented several other witnesses, 7 including Dr. Tanseco, who affirmed her medical certificate of the
complainant's examination. On cross-examination, she declared that the laceration in Sylvia's vagina could have been
caused by penetration of a blunt instrument such as an average-sized penis.8
The two accused flatly denied the charge against them. Conge swore that on the night in question, Sylvia arrived at the
highway and loudly demanded a lamp from the people in Epifanio de Guzman's house. He approached her and said there
was no lamp to spare, whereupon, as he turned his back to leave, she hit him in the neck with a piece of wood, causing
him to stagger. In swift reaction, he caught Sylvia by the waist and pushed her to the ground and as she lay there exposed
(she was not wearing any underwear), he angrily shoved his five fingers into her vagina. Sylvia cried out at the top of her
voice. Fearing that her relatives might come, he withdrew his hands and immediately left the place. 9
Salomon corroborated his co-accused. He testified that he saw the whole incident, being then about three-arms length
away from the highway. 10 De Guzman agreed, saying that he was also in the yard of his house at the time, and playing his
guitar, when the encounter occurred. 11
Both Salomon and Conge also protested that they had not gone to Masbate in order to escape as the trial court held.
They pointed out that they were in fact investigated by the police the day following the alleged incident but no action was
taken against them. 12 The truth, they said, was that they had gone to Masbate to buy two horses on instructions from
Salomon's father, Epifanio, who had given them P3,000.00 for this purpose. 13
Judge Ricardo A. Navidad disbelieved the accused and found them guilty as charged. As conspirators, they were each
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and held solidarily liable to the complainant for P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P22,000.00
as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. They were also ordered to pay the
costs. 14
In the appellants' brief (incorrectly denominated as a Petition for Review), the defense suggests that the testimony of
Sylvia Soria is flawed because she is an insane person who was confined at the National Mental Hospital a few months
before the alleged incident. 15 It is also argued that her testimony was fabricated at the instance of her father, who had a
bone to pick with Salomon's father. The appellants insist that their own version of the incident is more plausible and
should not have been rejected by the trial court in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.
A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,
acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the
manner he can make them known to the court.16 Thus, in People v. Gerones,17 the Court accepted the testimony of a rape
victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or ten-year old "because she was able to communicate her
ordeal... clearly and consistently." In the case of People vs. Rondina, this Court declared:
The testimony of the offended party herself was especially telling and credible despite the fact that she
was somewhat mentally deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although she was really of limited intelligence,
the complainant nevertheless did not forget the harrowing experience she suffered during that frightful
night in the bushes when the three men seared her memory with the lust they forced upon her. The tale
she narrated in court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in anguish and remembered with
pain and as plain an unembellished as the simple life she led. If she spoke in forthright language at the
trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that horrible ravishment she could not push out of her
mind.
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask
her leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not
vitiate her credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases 18 that a woman will not expose
herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has
been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.
The defense points to a supposed hostility between Sylvia's and Salomon's respective fathers due to a conflict over a piece
of land and the administrative charge Epifanio filed against Restituto when they were both teaching at the local school. It
suggests that this was the reason for Sylvia's false charge against Salomon, who has simply been caught in the crossfire, as
it were, between Restituto and Epifanio.
The connection is far-fetched. It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will
subject a daughter to embarassment and even stigma, as in this case. There is no evidence that Sylvia's father is an
unnatural parent. Besides, the enmity itself is in the view of the Court not deep enough to provoke the charge, assuming
that Restituto Soria was willing to use his daughter to falsely accuse his enemy's son. Significantly, the complaint was filed
by Restituto against the son and not the father who was his real adversary.
The lack of a finding of spermatozoa during Sylvia's medical examination did not conclusively establish an absence thereof
because the examining doctor simply did not have the necessary equipment to make a more thorough report. 19 In fact,
she suggested another examination at the Calbayog General Hospital. 20 At any rate, we have held that the absence of
spermatozoa in the complainant's vagina does not negate the commission of rape; there may be a valid explanation for
such absence, as when the semen may have been washed away or when the rapist failed to ejaculate.21
The appellants decry the trial judge's conclusion that they had gone to Masbate to escape, but it appears that this was
really their intention. In the first place, it is not true that they were investigated before they left, for the fact is Salomon's
father stopped the investigation on the ground that there was no lawyer to represent them. 22 It is also noted that Salomon
used another name in Masbate and called himself Boyet instead of Ale, his real nickname. 23 Salomon and Conge traveled
from place to place in that province but were not able to buy a single horse during the four months that they were there.
Instead, they used the P3,000.00 Salomon's father had given them not only for their daily needs but also "in dancing and
drinking," as Conge put it.24 Well indeed has it been said that "wicked flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as
bold as a lion." The appellants' trip to Masbate was unmistakably a flight from justice.
And now let us consider the interesting defense of what we may call Sylvia's "manual rape" for lack of a more descriptive
term. Admitting the laceration in Sylvia's vagina, Salomon nevertheless maintains that it was caused not by his penis but
by Conge's fingers. Conge's purpose was to punish her and to disable her and thus prevent her from hitting him again.
The trouble with this defense is that it is too comical for words. It looks like a bawdy-house skit featuring a mad avenger
and his naughty fingers. Besides, the two accused and De Guzman have a confused recollection of how this remarkable
incident happened, the first perhaps in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence.
Conge declared in his affidavit that Sylvia hit him only once and then swore on direct examination that he was hit twice,
whereas both Salomon De Guzman swore he was hit only once.25 Salomon and Conge said that Sylvia was wearing pants
but De Guzman insisted with equal certainty that it was a skirt. 26 Salomon said Sylvia's pants were pulled down to her
knees, but Conge declared that she was completely disrobed, then said the pants came down only to her ankles. 27 Conge
first said his fingers were spread when they thrust them inside Sylvia's vagina but, sensing the trial court's disbelief,
recanted and said he put his fingers together in the shape of a cone before plunging them into Sylvia's bared organ. 28
We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the appellants, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime
of rape upon Sylvia Soria, with Salomon actually violating her as Conge helped restrain her while also frightening her with
his bolo. The crime was committed with force and intimidation, and worse, against a mental retardate, who fortunately was
nevertheless able to narrate the details of her outrage. The theory of the defense is absurd. The trial court was correct in
rejecting it. The assessment of the evidence, especially the credibility of the witnesses, is the primary function of the judge
presiding at the trial. We defer to the findings of the trial court in the case at bar, there being no showing that they were
reached without basis.
The Court cannot conclude this opinion without remarking on the extraordinary lengths to which an accused will go to
falsify the truth and evade the sanctions of the law. The defense in this case is illustrative of such desperation. What the
appellants have not considered is that the Court is not without experience in detecting falsehood and should not have
been expected to be deluded by the ridiculous story they blandly submitted. Counsel should remember that gullibility is
not one of the traits of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, except for the award of moral,
exemplary, and actual damages and attorney's fees, which were disallowed. The civil indemnity is retained at P30,000.00.
Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 TSN, November 25, 1988, pp. 8-27.
2 Exhibit "A," Records, p. 6.
3 TSN, December 14, 1988, p. 74.
4 Records, p. 18.
5 TSN, November 25, 1988, pp. 12-23.
6 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
7 Decision penned by Regional Trial Court Judge Roberto A. Navidad, Branch 32, Calbayog City, on
October 2, 1990, pp. 3-16.
8 TSN, January 16, 1989, p. 68.
9 TSN, June 14, 1989, pp. 41-50.
10 TSN, September 4, 1989, pp. 8-13.
11 Decision, pp. 25-26.
12 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 52 and TSN, September 4, 1989, p. 16.
13 TSN, June 14, 1989, pp. 59 and 61.
14 Decision, pp.
15 Appellants' brief, pp. 6-8.
16 Rule 130, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
17 193 SCRA 263.
18 People v. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596; People v. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656; People v. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754;
People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571; People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354; People v. Vinas, 202 SCRA 720; People
v. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233; People v. Rosell, 181 SCRA 679; People v. Albarillo, 188 SCRA 113; People v.
Comasis, 189 SCRA 649.
19 TSN, January 16, 1989, p. 72.
20 Ibid.
21 People v. Eclarinal, 182 SCRA 106; People v. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707; People v. Pomentel, 216 SCRA
375.
22 TSN, December 14, 1988, p. 58.
23 Ibid., p. 69.
24 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 62.
25 TSN, June 14, 1989, pp. 43-45; TSN, September 4, 1989, p. 10; TSN, De Guia,
p. 7.
26 TSN, September 4, 1989, p. 11; TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 45; No. 8, Exhibit "10"; Rollo, pp. 140-141; TSN,
De Guia, p. 14.
27 TSN, June 14, 1989, pp. 45-46; TSN, September 4, 1989, p. 12.
28 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 49; Decision, p. 38.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113791 February 22, 1996

vs.
ROLANDO MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her home in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
on 22 November 1989. She suffered extensive second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and
infected fourth degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with
the crime of parricide in an information filed on 29 June 1990 with Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The accusatory portion thereof read:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1989, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rolando Mendoza, armed with a
kerosene gas [sic] and with intent to kill his wife Maria Gina Mendoza, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and burn with the kerosene gas he was then
provided, the said Maria Gina Mendoza which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.1
Trial on the merits was had after accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment.2
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Paul Michael Mendoza, a five-year old child of the victim and the accused-
appellant; Jhun Avila, Teofisto Avila, and Rodora Avila, the victim's brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr. Nieto M.
Salvador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NRI). On its part, the defense presented the
accused-appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula, a childhood friend.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:
The accused-appellant and the victim were married on 30 January 1985 at the Sto. Cristo Parish Church in Bocaue, Bulacan
and lived in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.3 Their union bore three children: Paul Michael, the eldest, who was born on 7
June 1985,4 John-John, and Paula, the youngest.5
In the evening of 22 November 1989, the accused-appellant and his wife were in their residence with their children. At
around 4:00 a.m. the next morning, relatives of the accused-appellant went to the house of Jhun Avila (the victim's
brother) in Wawa, Balagtas, Bulacan, and informed him that his sister Gina "got burned." Two hours later, Jhun and his
father Teofisto Avila went to the house of Gina and her husband, only to discover that the latter were not there. They
found the things inside the house in disarray; saw a Coke bottle which smelled of kerosene, hair strands and burned
human flesh in the comfort room; and the burned clothes of Gina outside the house. They also noticed that the branches
and leaves of the atienza tree in front of the house were likewise somewhat burned. They proceeded to a neighbor's
house where Paul Michael, John-John, and Paula were temporarily sheltered. Paul Michael was sitting in a corner and
somewhat "tulala," while Paula was sleeping. Jhun then brought the children to his house. 6
As Erlinda Porciuncula informed the Avila family that Gina had been brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital in Pasay
City, Teofisto, Jhun, and Rodora proceeded there.7 According to Jhun, however, they were not able to talk to Gina that day
as she was inside the operating room. It was only after two days that Jhun was able to see Gina, who lay "naked with all
the hospital gadget[s] in the mouth and at the head and she was completely bald and her body was burned." 8 Jhun
likewise testified that Gina was unable to talk to her sister Rodora nor her father Teofisto. 9
Gina died on 30 November 1989. Dr. Noel Minay, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, conducted the autopsy and determined
the cause of death to be "hypostatic pneumonia; infected 4th degree burns"; 10 and in his Autopsy Report, 11 he entered
the following post-mortem findings:
Burns, extensive, second to fourth degree, with skin grafts, excepting the back of the neck and head, pelvic area,
buttocks, whole of the back, posterior aspect of the right leg, and lower anterior third of the leg aid foot, left side.
Lungs, with foci of consolidations at the bases; transections shows (sic) yellowish mucoid material in the lower part
of the tracheo-bronchial tree.
Brain and other visceral organs, marked congestion.
Stomach contains small amount of yellowish fluid material.
This report also indicated that the cause of death was "HYPOSTATIC PNEUMONIA; INFECTED FOURTH DEGREE BURNS."
Dr. Nieto M. Salvador testified on the certification and autopsy report, in view of Dr. Minay's resignation from the NBI
sometime after he examined the cadaver of the victim. 12
In the evening of 30 November 1989, Jhun told Paul Michael that his mother Gina had died. Paul Michael then narrated to
him what actually happened to his mother that fateful evening. Because of these revelations and the findings of the
doctor, Jhun reported the matter to the police authorities in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 13
Jhun Avila had gone five times to the residence of Gina and the accused-appellant from 23 November 1989 to 30
November 1989, yet he did not see the accused-appellant; in fact, the latter never showed up during the wake nor burial
of Gina. It was only when the accused-appellant was arrested in the house of a woman in Longos, Balagtas, Bulacan, 14 that
Jhun saw him for the first time after the incident.
The medical expenses incurred for the hospitalization of Gina amounted to P88,750.00, of which, her parents were able to
pay only P18,000.00. For the balance, Teofisto had to sign a promissory note to be paid on installments. 15
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon.
In his testimony during the presentation of the evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael declared that one
evening inside their house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth and then tied her up. However, the witness did not
answer succeeding questions which sought to elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at his father
throughout this period. He later revealed that he saw matches and kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his
mother was now in heaven because she was dead. 16 During his rebuttal testimony on 12 October 1992, Paul Michael
categorically declared that it was his father who "burned" his mother. The accused-appellant, who was drunk at that time,
first tied the victim's hands behind her back, then "poured kerosene" on the front of her body and set her aflame. Paul
Michael further declared that his father tied-up his mother because they quarreled when his mother wanted him (Paul
Michael) to go with the accused-appellant to the street corner, but his father refused. Finally, many times before, his
parents quarreled because his father was always drunk. 17 Pertinent portions of Paul Michael's testimony on rebuttal are as
follows:
Q When your father Rolando Mendoza testified on direct examination, he stated that when he returned to
your house in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan on November 22, 1989, he saw your mother was jumping up and down
while her dress was already burning. What can you say about that?
A It is not true, Sir.
Q Why do you say that it is not true?
A Because it was he who burned my mother, Sir.
COURT:
How did he burn your mother?
A At first he tied up my mother, then he poured kerosene [sic] upon my mother, Sir.
Q What was tied, the hands or the feet of your mother?
A The hands, Your Honor.
Q How was it tied?
A At the back, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the reason why she was tied up?
A Yes Your Honor. They were quarreling because my mother wanted me to go with my father to [sic] street
corner.
Q Then what happened next?
A Because of that they quarreled already.
Q What you mean is that your mother was objecting you to go [sic] with your father?
A My mother wanted me to go with my father but my father refused me [sic] to go with him, Your Honor.
Q What would you do at the street corner with your father?
A She just wanted me to accompany my father.
Q And because of that quarrel, your father tied the hands of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Then he put kerosene [sic] at the front body [sic] of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And after putting kerosene [sic], what did he do next?
A He lighted it, Your Honor.

Q Was that the first time that you[r] mother and your father quarreled?
A Many times, Your Honor.
Q What was the cause of their quarrel?
A Because my father was always drunk, Your Honor.
Q At the time when your mother was tied and then kerosene [sic] was poured upon her dress, was your father
drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Your father always went out and when he returned he was always drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor. 18
The defense, of course, had a different story to tell.
Erlinda Porciuncula, who grew up with the accused-appellant and was like a sister to him, testified that at around 8:30 p.m.
of 22 November 1989, Rolando Mendoza came to her house asking for help because his wife burned herself. Together
with the accused-appellant, she borrowed the owner-type jeep of her neighbor so they could bring his wife to the
hospital. They proceeded to St. Mary's Hospital, but the attending physician advised them to bring the victim to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH). At the hospital, the staff could not admit the victim due to the unavailability of rooms.
On the way to the PGH, the victim, who was lying in the front seat of the jeep, told Porciuncula that she was fed up with
her life and was entrusting her children to her. They then went to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital where the victim was
immediately given first aid and transferred to "the isolated Room No. 328." The accused-appellant requested the witness
to buy medicine and inform the relatives of the victim of what had happened, which she acceded to. She was able to visit
the victim three more times before the victim died on 30 November 1989, and on two of these occasions, she saw the
accused-appellant at the hospital. 19
Accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza testified that on 22 November 1989, between 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., three persons who
wanted to befriend him visited him in his house. These three persons, of whom the accused-appellant could only name
one, brought a bottle of liquor and had a drinking session with him, which lasted about an hour or two. As these three
persons were leaving, the accused-appellant offered to accompany them to the road. After doing so, he returned home,
whereupon he saw his wife jumping up and down and removing her burning clothes. He saw a pail of water which he then
used to douse out the flames. At this time, his wife cursed him and said: "Putang-ina mo sawang-sawa na ako sa buhay na
ito," and "Huwag mo akong pakialaman." 20 The accused-appellant did not mind her, merely proceeded to remove her
dress and cried for help. The neighbors came over and he entrusted the children to them. Several others arrived and he
asked one of them who owned a vehicle to help him bring his wife to the hospital. They were able to bring her to St.
Mary's Hospital, but since the hospital did not have a burns specialist, they were advised to bring the victim to a hospital
in Manila. The driver of the jeep, however, refused to bring them to Manila as he had neither a driver's license nor gas. The
accused-appellant was instead brought to Bocaue, Bulacan, and there he was able to procure another vehicle and borrow
some money. Eventually, his wife was brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital after the PGH refused to admit the victim.
He stayed with his wife from the time she was admitted up to the time she died, and even bought the needed medicines.
He did not attend her wake nor burial because of the threats his brother-in-law made. When asked if he knew why his wife
burned herself, he surmised that she was "aburido" 21 from all their financial difficulties. 22
In giving full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael, 23

the trial court observed that:
As provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a person who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his perception to others, may be a witness. A four-year old boy can already speak clearly, can understand
things happening around him, and ready to study, to read and to write. For families who can afford, a four-year
old child is already sent to the nursery to begin his/her studies. An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the best
observer to be found. He is little influenced by the suggestion of others and describes objects and occurrences as
he has really seen them (Pp. vs. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9). Paul Michael was five months over four years when the incident
happened. He could perceive things happening around him. This was the reason why when his grandfather and an
uncle found him in the house of a neighbor, he was in a state of shock, or at least dumbfounded (tulala). Because
he knew the implication of what had happened to his mother. He knew that the burning of his mother might
cause her death. If, indeed, he could not yet perceive things, such happening would pass unnoticed and without
impact on him. Unless a child's testimony is punctured with serious inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that
he was coached, if he can perceive and make known his perception, he is considered a competent witness (Pp. vs.
Cidro, et al., 56 O.G. 3547).
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on was that his
father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer anymore. The
Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight
and whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness was presented, the
private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court likewise directed the accused to sit farther away
thereby placing the accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely
and extensively without hesitation. 24
The trial court rejected the version of the accused-appellant, stating that:
Accused Rolando Mendoza made the defense that his wife Maria Gina Avila-Mendoza burned herself. He,
however, lost courage when Gina died. After Gina's death, he left the hospital and never returned. He failed to visit
her during the wake and even during the burial. He was forced to come out only when arrested in a house of a
woman in Longos, Balagtas, Bulacan. Against such behaviour of his may be applied an interpretation of flight in
criminal law - that flight of the accused is an evidence of guilt and a guilty conscience (U.S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil.
310). Accused gave as a reason for his failure to attend the wake and burial of his wife the threat of his brother-in-
law to kill him if anything would happen to Gina. It is said that the wicked flee even when no man pursueth,
whereas the righteous are as brave as a lion (U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486). If, indeed, accused was not guilty and
nothing bothered his conscience, he would be brave as a lion to meet his brother-in-law and face any and all
consequences. In the same way that if his conscience is clear, no threat, real, or imaginary, in the whole world
would prevent him from staying by the side of his wife during her last moments on earth. The fact that he went
into hiding, ashamed or fearful of the death of his wife is an indication of his guilt. Further, the burning in the
dress and body of Gina gives support to the claim of the prosecution that she was burned. Paul Michael testified
that the hands of his mother were tied at the back. Jhun Avila testified that the branches and leaves of the atienza
tree were burned. They tend to show that Gina was tied at the back, placed near the trunk of a tree and burned.
Being tied, only the front portion of her body would naturally be burned. The tendency of one who burns himself
is to burn his whole body and not stay stationary in one position so that both his front and back portions of his
body would be burned. In this case, however, only the front portion of Gina's dress and body were burned as well
as the branches and leaves of the atienza tree. That indicates that while the victim was burning, she remained
stationary in the place where she was tied. 25
Accordingly, the trial court convicted the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rolando Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the parents of the victim Maria Gina Avila-Mendoza the sum of
P88,000.00 representing the amount of hospital bills of the victim. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 26
In this appeal, the accused-appellant prays for a reversal of the lower court's decision, maintaining that if his evidence is
considered in its entirety, it would show his innocence. The accused-appellant underscores the fact that:
[A]fter November 22, 1989, the date of the incident, the child Paul Michael Mendoza had been and remains under
the custody and care of the parents and brothers and sisters of the late Maria Gina Mendoza, who in full and
unwavering anger, hatred, hostility, resentment, revenge and spite against the accused, pursued the charge
against the accused and the ones who brought the child to the court to testify. 27
He thus asks this Court to disregard the testimony of Paul Michael for being "open to serious question and consideration"
as it was "often attended [by] unintelligible answers and punctuated by contrary answers to previously given answers";
"[b]esides the child's tender age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or inadequacy of sense of duty to tell the truth." He further
claims that per the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer, the victim did not die of burns but of hypostatic pneumonia. 28
After a thorough examination of the records and scrutiny of the evidence, we find no merit in this appeal. The accused-
appellant's seven-page Brief miserably fails to present convincing grounds why the challenged decision should be
overturned.
The lower court convicted the accused-appellant primarily on the basis of the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael
Mendoza, and it is obvious that the pith of the present appeal is the child's competency to testify and the credibility of his
testimony.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses . . . .
With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 21(b) of the abovementioned rule reads:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision
in United States vs. Buncad, 29 this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point, says: "But this much may be
taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of
the particular child is to be investigated." (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638) 30
While on the same subject, Underhill declares:
§ 257. Children on the witness stand. - Under the common law, competency of a child under the age of fourteen
years to testify must be shown to the satisfaction of the court. He is presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown
to be competent it is immaterial how young he may be when he testifies. He is competent if he possesses mental
capacity and memory sufficient to enable him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the transaction he
has seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, and
comprehends the character, meaning and obligation of an oath. If the witness fulfills these requirements, it is
immaterial as bearing upon his competency that he is unable to define the oath or to define testimony. In the wise
discretion of the court, a child four, five, six and for such ages as seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen or
fifteen years of age may be shown competent to testify. It may not be said that there is any particular age at which
as a matter of law all children are competent or incompetent . . . . 31
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection,
and (c) capacity of communication. 32 And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. 33 As held in United
States vs. Buncad, 34 quoting from Wheeler vs. United States, 35 and reiterated in People vs. Raptus 36 and People
vs. Libungan: 37
The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his
manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to
disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these
matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review
unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous. 38
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. We agree. A close and careful examination of the
testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above average
intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling
events and relating them to such recollections. The initial hesitancy of Paul Michael to name his father as the author of the
crime was sufficiently explained by the trial court as follows:
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on was that his
father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer anymore. The
Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight
and whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness was presented, the
private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court likewise directed the accused to sit farther away
thereby placing the accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely
and extensively without hesitation. 39
We defer to such observation and explanation. Indeed, there are certain matters that aid the trial court in assessing the
credibility of a witness which are not available to the appellate court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the inflection of the
voice of the witness. The trial court had the distinct opportunity to make such observations and to avail of such aids while
Paul Michael was on the witness stand, 40 thusly, we find no reason to disregard the assessment made by the trial court.
The accused-appellant's contention that Paul Michael's testimony could have been influenced by the relatives of Gina, who
were full of "unwavering anger, hatred, hostility, resentment, revenge," more so since the child had been in their custody
since after 22 November 1989, is unacceptable. The charge is nothing but unmitigated speculation as not a shred of
evidence was offered in support thereof. Not even the rigorous cross-examination Paul Michael underwent dented the
probative force of his testimony; on the contrary, it merely added strength thereto as it elicited nothing less than the boy's
adherence to truth.
We realize how extremely painful it was for Paul Michael to reveal that it was his father who burned his mother. He knew
that such a revelation could send his father to jail and thus brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did, nevertheless,
it was to expose the truth and give justice to his mother who met an excruciatingly painful death. Verily, "from the mouths
of children we get the truth." 41
Neither are we persuaded by the accused-appellant's claim that the cause of death of his wife was hypostatic
pneumonia and not due to the burns she sustained. Such a claim borders on misrepresentation, for as earlier shown, both
the Autopsy Report (Exhibit "H-1") and the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination (Exhibit "H-1") indicated the cause of
death to be "hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree burns." Moreover, as testified to by Dr. Nieto Salvador, the
proximate cause of the hypostatic pneumonia was Gina's recumbent position due to the fourth degree burns she suffered.
Thus:
COURT:
What could have caused hypostatic pneumonia?

A The victim was recumbent because of her intensive infections in front of her body and therefore she was
always lying down which could have caused the hypostatic pneumonia.
What you mean [is] it [was] because of the fourth degree burns the victim sustained in front that's why she was
always lying down and unable to change her position?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you mean that hypostatic pneumonia can be acquire[d] by merely always lying down?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is that the only cause?
A That's why it is called hypostatic because hypostatic means that the assumed position of the patient is
recumbent and the recumbent position of the patient would greatly affect the fluids in the lungs as it can't flow
down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you say that hypostatic pneumonia may also be caused by fourth degree burns?
A Yes, Sir. 42
It goes without saying that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious act. 43
Finally, the accused-appellant was never seen after the death of his wife - neither during her wake nor at her burial. His
whereabouts were unknown. He did not even bother to visit his children or inform them where to find him in case they
needed him, knowing all too well that he was the only parent left to them. In short, he was even afraid to see his children;
he could not trust them. In a manner of speaking, he was afraid of his own shadow. All his protestations of innocence are
thus belied by his flight as indicative of guilt on his part, or of his guilty mind. It has been said that the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion. 44 The explanation proffered for his flight is lame and
feeble, moreover, he offered no credible proof that indeed the family of his wife had threatened him bodily harm.
The trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of intoxication. The
accused-appellant committed the felony in question in a state of intoxication and there was no sufficient proof that it was
habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. 45 It failed, however, to award civil indemnity to the children of
the victim. Conformably with current case law, they should be awarded the sum of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the challenged
decision of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1414-M-90 is, AFFIRMED, subject to the
above modification on the additional award of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, to the heirs of the victim, Gina Avila
Mendoza.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Original Records (OR), 1; Rollo, 7.
2
OR, 5.
3
Exhibit "B"; TSN, 25 March 1991, 4.
4
TSN, 18 February 1991, 4.
5
Id., 9.
6
TSN, 25 March 1991, 6-13.
7
TSN, 7 June 1991, 4.
8
TSN, 25 March 1991, 16.
9
TSN, 25 March 1991, 14. Rodora however testified that Gina whispered to them that the accused-appellant, who
was drunk, tied her, doused her with kerosene, and lit her up (TSN, 2 August 1991, 8), but the trial court did not
believe the said testimony.
10
Exhibit "H" (Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination).
11
Exhibit "H-l."
12
TSN, 20 December 1991, 1-13.
13
TSN, 25 March 1991, l7-19.
14
Id., 19-20.
15
Exhibit "F"; Id., 15-16.
16
TSN, 18 February 1991, 11, 13-21.
17
TSN, 12 October 1992, 2-5.
18
TSN, 12 October 1992, 3-5.
19
TSN, 9 March 1992, 2-12.
20
These translate to: "Child of a prostitute, I'm sick and tired of this life" and "Don't mind me."
21
This translates to "to fed up with."
22
TSN, 10 July 1992, 2-20; TSN, 3 August 1992, 2-5.
23
Who was only 4 years, 5 months and 15 days old when the incident occurred; and 5 years, 8 months and 11 days
old when he initially testified.
24
Rollo, 26-27.
25
Rollo, 27-28.
26
Id., 29.
27
Appellant's Brief, 3; Rollo, 51.
28
Id., 4-6; Id., 52-54.
29
25 Phil. 530, 536 [1913].
30
This is now § 505, vol. 2 [1940 ed.], 595, Wigmore's treatise.
31
Underhill's Criminal Evidence, vol. 1, Fifth ed. [1956], § Section 257, 646-651.
32
Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 2 [1940 ed.], § 506, 596.
33
Id., § 507, 597. See also Underhill, op. cit, 651.
34
Supra note 29.
35
159 U.S. 523 [1895].
36
198 SCRA 425, 433 [1991].
37
220 SCRA 315, 323 [1993].
38
Supra note 29 at 536-537.
39
Rollo, 26-27.
40
People vs. Lagrosa, Jr., 230 SCRA 298, 306 [1994].
41
People vs. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 545, 556 [1989].
42
TSN, 20 December 1991, 11-12.
43
Article 4(l), Revised Penal Code; RAMON C. AQUINO, The Revised Penal Code, vol. 1, 1987 ed., 68.
44
Proverbs, 28:1; U.S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510, 512 [1913]; U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486, 487 [1918]: People vs.
Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 177 [1992]; People vs. Castor, 216 SCRA 410, 420 [1992]; People vs. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675,
688 [1993], People vs. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16, 33 [1993].
45
Article 15, Revised Penal Code.
437 Phil. 499
CARPIO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated September 13, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, convicting appellant Roberto Pansensoy ("appellant" for brevity) of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court also ordered appellant to
pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The Charge
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando L. Gonzales filed an Information [2] charging appellant with the crime of murder,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of May, 1994, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Hilario Reyes y Inovero, hitting him on his forehead, thereby inflicting upon him a mortal gunshot wound, which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on February 20, 1995, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial
on the merits followed.
The Trial
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Analie Pansensoy, eyewitness to the actual shooting of the victim;
(2) Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim; (3) SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote,
the police officer who conducted the investigation of the incident; (4) Gregoria Reyes, mother of the victim; and (5)
Rogelio Fullente, neighbor of the victim. For its part, the defense presented the appellant as its lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
Analie Pansensoy ("Analie" for brevity), twenty-eight years old, is the legitimate wife of appellant. She testified that she
had been living-in with the victim, Hilario Reyes ("Hilario" for brevity), since February 1994. On May 8, 1994, she and
Hilario were in the house they were renting at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. Hilario was lying down inside the house. She
stood up when she heard a knocking on the door. As she opened the door, she saw appellant holding a gun. She
embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun away from him but she failed. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a
bench. Appellant approached Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative.
Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single. Hilario answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the count of
three shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground. [4]
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, physician, conducted the autopsy on the victim at the St. James Funeral Parlor at past midnight on
May 9, 1994. He found a single gunshot wound on the forehead which was the cause of death. He opined that the entry
shows the area of smudging which indicates that Hilario was shot at close range. The distance of the muzzle of the gun
from the forehead could be less than three inches. He also opined that the person who fired the shot and Hilario were
facing each other.[5]
SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, member of the Philippine National Police, conducted the investigation on the shooting of Hilario.
He took the statements of Gregoria Reyes and Analie in the police station a day after the incident. He did not conduct an
ocular inspection at the scene of the crime.[6]
Gregoria Reyes ("Gregoria" for brevity), mother of Hilario, testified that she came to know about the death of her son
through a neighbor, Roger. She found out that her son was dead upon arrival at the hospital and was taken to the funeral
parlor. She saw the gunshot wound on the forehead of her son. On the same night of May 8, 1994, she went to the police
station where she saw Analie give her statement to the police. She also gave her statement to the police. As a result of the
death of her son, she incurred expenses in the amounts of P10,000.00 and P30,000.00 for the funeral and the burial,
respectively. At the time of his death, her son was managing two passenger jeepneys, one of which he was also driving. He
was earning P800.00 a day.[7]
Rogelio Fullente ("Rogelio" for brevity), fifty-six years old, is a co-driver of Hilario in the Antipolo-Marikina route. He was
the neighbor referred to by Gregoria in her testimony as Roger, who reported to her the shooting incident. He has known
Hilario for ten to fifteen years. In the evening of May 8, 1994, he was in his home in Lumang Bayan which was about ten
meters away from where Hilario was staying. According to him, their houses were separated by a driveway which could
accommodate one jeep. He heard several knocks and opened the door of his house. When he opened the door he found
out that somebody was knocking on the door of Hilario and ordering him to come out. The first time he saw the man
knocking on Hilario's door, the man was not carrying anything. When he heard a gunshot, he opened the door again and
saw the man carrying something before he left. Rogelio further narrated that when the man asked Hilario to come out,
Hilario was standing by the door. The man asked Hilario if he loved his wife and Hilario answered yes. The man then fired
a shot and Hilario's head bent forward before he fell down. He does not know the caliber of the gun but just heard the
gunshot. He went to the parents of Hilario to report the incident. On cross-examination, Rogelio testified that when
appellant knocked on the door, it was Hilario who opened the door. Hilario sat on the bench by the door. When Hilario
answered yes to appellant's question of whether he loved his wife, appellant immediately fired a shot. Rogelio testified
that he watched appellant fire the shot and then left to report the incident to the parents of Hilario. [8]
Version of the Defense
As expected, the defense had a different version as told by the appellant himself.
Appellant, twenty-eight years old and a security guard, invoked self-defense in his testimony. He testified that Analie is his
wife and they have three children. According to him, their relationship as husband and wife was normal.
On May 8, 1994, at about 6:30 p.m., a certain Amadong Bisaya ("Bisaya" for brevity) told him that he saw his wife with their
youngest child and "Tisoy", referring to Hilario, board a jeep on their way to Lumang Bayan. He had met Bisaya before
when the latter told him some time in April 1994 that he always saw appellant's wife with another man. He asked Bisaya to
accompany him to Lumang Bayan where Bisaya pointed to the room where his wife and "Tisoy" entered.
The appellant kicked the door of the room and there he found his wife and "Tisoy" lying beside each other. They were only
clad in their underwear. He dragged his wife out of the room by her hair and while doing so, he saw "Tisoy" pull a gun
from the table which was covered with clothes. He let go of his wife and jumped on "Tisoy" to grab the gun.
While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit the testicles of "Tisoy" with his knees. "Tisoy" fell on his knees but
was still holding the gun. Still grappling for possession of the gun, appellant held on to the back portion of the gun and
part of the trigger, while his other hand held Hilario's hand which was holding the butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt
down, appellant was able to twist Hilario's hand and to point the barrel of the gun towards the latter.
The gun suddenly went off. At that moment, "Tisoy" was holding the trigger of the gun. "Tisoy" was shot on the head and
fell down. It was "Tisoy" who was holding the trigger when the gun fired and hit him on the head. "Tisoy" was still holding
the gun when he fell to the floor.
He confronted his wife and pulled her hair and slapped her. His wife was just seated in the corner of the room. He asked
her where their child was. But before she could answer, their child went inside the room and embraced her mother very
tightly. He tried to pull their daughter away from Analie but the latter did not let go of the child. He told Analie that he
would kill her too if she did not release the child. He started to count "one, two", which made his wife release their
daughter. He left the room with the child and proceeded to their house. "Tisoy" was still sprawled on the ground face
down when he left."[9]
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie and rejected the version of the appellant that he
acted in self-defense. It found the testimony of Analie credible and observed that she remained unperturbed during the
cross-examination. The trial court also noted that appellant, who was then a security guard, was charged by his employer
with the crime of qualified theft for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver. Appellant allegedly committed the theft on May 8,
1994, the very same day the shooting incident happened. The gun used in shooting the victim was not found at the scene
of the crime but the slug recovered was that of a .38 caliber revolver. Although appellant was subsequently acquitted of
the charge, the trial court considered this as "evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime." The trial court further
noted that appellant went into hiding from the time the shooting incident happened until the case was filed in court on
August 24, 1994.
The trial court pronounced judgment thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of
murder and is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is hereby further ordered to pay the
heirs of Hilario Reyes y Inovero the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P40,000.00 and P20,000.00 as actual or
compensatory and moral damages, respectively.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED."[10]
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues
Appellant is before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE ANY OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES."
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Self-Defense
Appellant insists that he acted in self-defense. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an accused from
criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1) there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the person
defending himself has not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression. [11] The burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused.[12] In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. [13]
Appellant asserts that the unlawful aggressor was the victim and his death could be attributed to himself alone. By his own
testimony, appellant tried to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Hilario. According to him, he kicked the door, and
when it opened he saw his wife and Hilario inside the room clad in their underwear. He pulled the hair of his wife and
dragged her outside while she was embracing him. At this point, Hilario pulled a gun from the table. He let go of his wife,
jumped on Hilario and grappled for possession of the gun. While trying to wrest the gun from Hilario, he hit Hilario's
testicles with his knees. Hilario fell on the floor but was still holding the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was able
to hold and twist Hilario's hand, pointing the gun towards the latter. The gun suddenly went off and Hilario was hit on the
head.
On the other hand, Analie testified that when she opened the door to their room, she saw appellant holding a gun. She
embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun from him but failed. Hilario went out and sat on a bench. Appellant
approached him and asked him questions. Appellant counted and, at the count of three, shot Hilario in the head.
The conflicting versions of the prosecution and of the defense as to who initiated the aggression was settled by the trial
court which gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie over that of appellant. The trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, was convinced of the truthfulness of Analie's
testimony and not that of appellant's.
Undeterred, appellant's first assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution,
questioning in particular the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, Analie. According to
him, Analie's testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and appellant had been separated for more than three years but
this is belied by the fact that their youngest daughter is barely a year old. He also points out that appellant's version that
he dragged his wife outside by pulling her hair was more believable and in accord with human behavior rather than
Analie's version that appellant took time to interrogate the victim regarding how much the latter loved his wife and other
personal circumstances before shooting him.
We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation of the trial court. We reiterate the time tested doctrine "that a trial
court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence." [14] The alleged flaws in the testimony of
Analie do not serve to impair her credibility or diminish the truthfulness of her remarks as to who initiated the aggression
and fired the shot.
The allegedly incredible statements do not pertain to the act of killing, but rather to minor or incidental matters which
happened before and after the fact of killing. Analie's testimony that she had been separated from appellant for three
years which, as pointed out by appellant, was belied by the age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair
her credibility. Analie's 3-year separation from appellant does not preclude Analie's still having a child with appellant. As to
Analie's version that appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him, suffice it to say that it is a matter of common
observation that the reaction of a person when confronted with a shocking or unusual incident varies.[15] As admitted by
appellant himself, it was the first time he saw his wife and Hilario together, veritably confirming what Bisaya had told him
some time in April 1994 that Bisaya always saw his wife with someone else. It was not at all strange for appellant to have
asked Hilario if he really loved his wife. Were we to agree with the appellant and treat each strange or unusual event in the
occurrence of a crime, such as appellant's interrogation of the victim, as basis for reasonable doubt, no criminal
prosecution would prevail.[16]
In any event, a thorough evaluation of the transcript of stenographic notes indicates that Analie, as observed by the trial
court, testified in a candid and straightforward manner as follows:
"Q: Why do you know said Hilario Reyes?
A: He is my live-in partner.
Q: When did you start to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
A: February 1994.
Q: Up to what time did you become to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
A: Three months.
Q: What was the reason why your live-in relationship lasted only three months?
A: Because Roberto killed Hilario Reyes.
Q: When was this Hilario Reyes killed?
A: May 8, 1994.
Q: Where was he killed?
A: At Lumang Bayan.
Q: In what municipality?
A: Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal.
Q: How did you know that he was killed?
A: He was shot by Roberto Pansensoy.
Q: How did you know that he was shot by Roberto Pansensoy?
A: Because Roberto went there and he was holding a gun.
Q: On May 8, 1994 that you said Hilario Reyes was shot by Roberto Pansensoy, where were you?
A: Inside the house, sir.
Q: Whose is that house you are referring to?

A: We are renting that house.
Q: With whom?
A: Hilario Reyes.
Q: Before this Hilario Reyes was shot, what was he doing?
A: He was already lying down.
Q: Lying down where?
A: Inside the house, sir.
Q: How long was he lying down?
A: Around fifteen minutes.
Q: After lying down for fifteen minutes, what did you do next?
A: I stood up because Roberto knocked on the door.
Q: What happened next after this Roberto knocked on the door?
A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto holding a gun.
Q: After you opened the door and you saw Roberto holding a gun, what happened next?
A: I embraced Roberto and tried to wrestle the gun away from him but I did not succeed.
Q: When you were not able to succeed in taking the gun away from him, what happened next?
A: Hilario went out, sat on the bench and Roberto approached him.
Q: And after Hilario went out and sat on the bench and Roberto approached him, what happened next?
A: Roberto asked Hilario; do you really love my wife? And Hilario said, Yes.
Q: Who was this wife Roberto was referring to when he asked Hilario?
A: That's me.
Q: After Hilario answered that he really loved his wife which is you that is being referred to, what happened next?
A: Roberto asked Hilario; are you still single, are you not married?
Q: What was the response of Hilario if there was any?
A: He answered yes.
Q: What happened next?
A: Roberto counted one to three and at the count of 3 he shot Hilario.
Q: Was Hilario hit by the shot that was made by Roberto?
A: Hilario was hit on the forehead and he sprawled on the ground." [17]
Analie remained straightforward and consistent all throughout her cross-examination:
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you are the wife of the accused Roberto Pansensoy, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you legally married to accused Roberto Pansensoy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And if you remember, when were you married?
A: 1990.
Q: Where were you married?
A: At Negros Occidental.
Q: You stated that on May 8, 1994, you were at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what particular place at Lumang Bayan is that?
A: Inside the village.
Q: What were you doing then inside the village?
A: We are renting a house there.
Q: Who is your companion while renting that house?
A: Hilario Reyes.
Q: And who is this Hilario Reyes?
A: The victim.
Q: What is your relation with the victim?
A: Live-in partner.
Q: How long have you been living in together, Madam Witness?
A: Three months.
Q: On that date May 8, 1994 you stated a while ago that you were resting together with Hilario Reyes, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Inside the room of the house being rented by Hilario Reyes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was Hilario Reyes doing then?
A: He was laying (sic).
Q: Lying where?
A: Inside.
Q: Thereafter, what happened next while Hilario Reyes was resting?
A: I heard Roberto knock on the door.
Q: After which, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto.
Q: What did you do upon seeing Roberto on the door?
A: He was holding a gun and I embraced him, because I wanted to take the gun away from him.
Q: Is it not because you feel that Roberto Pansensoy might inflict harm on your living in partner, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir, I wanted to avoid trouble."[18]

From Analie's testimony, it is all too apparent that the first requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful aggression did
not come from the victim but from appellant himself. The aggression not having come from the victim, appellant's claim
of self-defense cannot prosper. The trial court relied on Analie's testimony to convict appellant and we find that her
testimony is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie's testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely objected to her
competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. [19] However,
objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived
as in the case of other witnesses generally.[20] The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or
she is first offered as a witness.[21] In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's failure to make a timely
objection to the admission of Analie's testimony.
We note that Rogelio was presented to corroborate Analie's testimony, but he gave a rather confusing account of what he
allegedly saw or heard on the night of the shooting. During his direct examination, he claimed that he heard a gunshot,
but on cross-examination he claimed that he opened the door of his house and actually saw appellant shoot Hilario. In any
event, it is well-settled that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused.[22] On the other hand, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, if it is not only uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful by itself[23] as in the instant case.
Moreover, appellant's behavior after the incident runs contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Appellant's act of fleeing
from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the police authorities are circumstances highly indicative
of guilt and negate his claim of self-defense.[24]
Lastly, we find it unnecessary to consider as corroborative evidence the charge of qualified theft for the loss of a .38
caliber revolver filed against appellant by his employer security agency. The trial court discussed at length that the offense
was committed on the same day the shooting incident happened and that the slug recovered from the scene of the crime
was from a .38 caliber revolver. According to the trial court, while the gun was not recovered from the scene of the crime,
it was "safe to assume that the accused had a gun when he went to the place of the victim." While SPO1 Anclote testified
regarding the nature of the slug, he admitted that he never inspected the scene of the crime and that the slug was merely
handed to him by SPO2 Catanyag who was not presented in court to testify. Hence, reliance on this as evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime rests on shaky ground and is superfluous in light of Analie's credible eyewitness
account.
Second Issue: Passion and Obfuscation
Appellant argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in his favor. According to
appellant, when he confirmed with his own two eyes that his wife was cheating on him, he lost his self-control and that his
actuation arose from a natural instinct that impels a husband to protect his wounded feelings. There is basis for this claim.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should concur:
(1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) the act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[25]
Appellant was on his way home from his duty as a security guard when he met Bisaya who told him that he saw his wife
and youngest child board a jeepney with the victim, Hilario. Appellant and Bisaya followed them. Appellant claims that he
saw his wife and the victim lying beside each other, clad only in their underwear. Analie claims that they were just resting
inside the house at the time appellant arrived. Under any of these two circumstances, it is easy to see how appellant acted
with obfuscation because of jealousy upon discovering his legitimate wife in the company of another man and the brazen
admission by this man that he loved his wife. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Analie brought their child
along to her trysting place with Hilario. Extreme emotional pain could result from such a situation and produce such
passion and anguish in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive him of self-control. To be blinded by passion and
obfuscation is to lose self-control.[26] In this case, there is a clear showing that there were causes naturally tending to
produce such powerful passion as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control.[27]
Furthermore, the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the appellant might have regained his equanimity. It appears that only a few minutes elapsed
between the time appellant discovered the two in the room and the killing. Thus, appellant can be given the benefit of this
mitigating circumstance.
Third Issue: Qualifying Circumstances
The Information alleges two qualifying circumstances: treachery and evident premeditation. If appreciated, any one of
these will qualify the killing to murder. However, the trial court convicted appellant of murder without stating the
circumstance which qualified the killing to murder.
In view of our earlier pronouncement crediting in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, we have to rule out treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances. Treachery cannot co-
exist with passion and obfuscation.[28] The reason for this is that in passion, the offender loses his control while in treachery
the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses reason and self-control cannot deliberately employ a
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. [29]
Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot co-exist with the circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.[30] The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a
composed judgment.[31]
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity) submits that evident premeditation is present to qualify
the killing to murder. According to the OSG, premeditation is apparent from the fact that appellant went to the scene of
the crime already carrying the gun which he used to shoot the victim. The OSG argues that while appellant may have been
a security guard, he had no legal justification for bringing the gun to the victim's residence. His act of bringing the gun to
the crime scene is a clear indication of his preconceived plan to kill his wife's lover. The elements of evident premeditation
as a qualifying circumstance are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution
of his will.[32]
Verily, a finding that there was a preconceived plan to kill would negate passion and obfuscation.
However, nothing in the records shows how and when appellant hatched his plan to kill, or how much time had elapsed
before appellant carried out his plan. On the contrary, appellant was on his way home from his duty as a security guard
when he chanced upon Bisaya who told him that he saw his wife and child with Hilario. The mere fact that he brought his
gun along or happened to have it in his person does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a preconceived plan to kill. The
carrying of arms, if customary, does not indicate the existence of the second requisite. In People vs. Diokno,[33] the Court
held that the accused being from the province of Laguna and it being customary on the part of the people of Laguna to
carry knives, it cannot be inferred with certainty that the intention of the accused who carried knives was to look for the
deceased in order to kill him. In like manner, it cannot be inferred with certainty that appellant already had the intention to
kill Hilario when appellant carried his gun on his way home after his duty as a security guard.
Fourth Issue: Damages and Penalty
In view of the foregoing, the crime proven in this case is not murder, but only homicide [34] with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal. With the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the penalty which may be imposed
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as well, which allows the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence, with the minimum period within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law and
the maximum period within the range of the latter after appreciating any modifying circumstances. Appellant can thus be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.[35]
As for damages, the trial court ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts: P50,000.00 as
indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Hilario. The amount is awarded
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime [36] and the consequent death of the victim.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of this Court to correct
any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. [37] Therefore, we
delete the award of P40,000.00 as actual damages. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable.[38] Since the prosecution did not present receipts to prove the actual losses suffered, such actual damages
cannot be awarded. We raise the award of moral damages from P20,000.000 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence[39] for the pain wrought by Hilario's death as testified to by Gregoria, mother of the victim. [40]
The trial court overlooked the award for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of Gregoria on her son's daily
income. The absence of documentary evidence to substantiate the claim for the loss will not preclude recovery of such
loss.[41] Gregoria testified that her son had been earning P800.00 daily as manager and driver of two passenger
jeepneys.[42] This amounts to P19,200.00 monthly excluding Sundays. The defense did not object to Gregoria's testimony
on her son's earning capacity. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment.[43] It was also established that at the time of his death, Hilario was thirty-six (36)
years old.[44] Loss of earning capacity is computed based on the following formula:[45]
Net = life expectancy x Gross Annual - living expenses
Earning Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)
Capacity [2/3(80-age
at death)]
x = 2(80-36) x GAI - [50%of GAI]
x = 2(44) x P 230,400 - P 115,200
x = 88 x P 115,200
x = 29.33 x P 115,200
Net earning capacity = P 3,379,200.00
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is
MODIFIED. Appellant ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of actual damages of
P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
and loss of earning capacity in the amount of P3,379,200.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, Rollo, pp. 18-24.
[2]
Original Records, pp. 1-2.
[3]
Ibid., p. 17.
[4]
TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 3-6.
[5]
TSN, September 6, 1994, pp. 3-10.
[6]
TSN, October 20, 1995, pp. 2-12.
[7]
TSN, December 22, 1995, pp. 3-19.
[8]
TSN, January 26, 1999, pp. 2-16.
[9]
TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 2-18; TSN, March 19, 1998, pp. 2-7.
[10]
Rollo, p. 24.
[11]
People vs. Dorado, 303 SCRA 61 (1999).
[12]
People vs. Tadeje, 310 SCRA 426 (1999).
[13]
People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705 (1998).
[14]
People vs. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516 (1998); People vs. Jimenez, 302 SCRA 607 (1998).
[15]
People vs. Aranjuez, 285 SCRA 466 (1998).
[16]
People vs. Calma, 295 SCRA 745 (1998).
[17]
TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 3-6.
[18]
TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 9-11.
[19]
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provide as follows:
SEC. 22 Disqualification by reason of marriage.- During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
[20]
Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE, 1991 Ed.
[21]
Ibid.
22]
People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94 (1998).
[23]
People vs. De la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164 (1998).
[24]
People vs. Macuha, 310 SCRA 14 (1999).
[25]
People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999).
[26]
People vs. Leonor, 305 SCRA 285 (1999).
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
People vs. Germina, 290 SCRA 146 (1998).
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).
[31]
Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE CRIMINAL LAW, 378 (1981).
[32]
People vs. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451 (1998).
[33]
63 Phil. 601 (1936).
ART. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
[34]
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.
People vs. Peña, 291 SCRA 606 (1998); People vs. Galapin & Beira, Jr., 293 SCRA 474 (1998); People vs. Pepito et al., 310
[35]
SCRA 128 (1999).

[36]
People vs. Adoc, 330 SCRA 626 (2000); People vs. Solis, 291 SCRA 529 (1998).
[37]
People vs. Juachon, 319 SCRA 761 (1999).
[38]
People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998).
[39]
People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999).
[40]
TSN, December 22, 1995, p. 11.
[41]
See Note 36.
[42]
TSN, December 22, 1995, p. 12.
[43]
People vs. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567 (1999).
[44]
Original Records, p. 7.
[45]
Silvestre, supra.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975
AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and CONRADO V.
POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner.
Conrado V. Posadas for and in behalf of other respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter, Leonora, on
October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty four year old victim (Criminal
Case No. 104).
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she
disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed
because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they reported the
crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa, on
March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoño said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoño against Leonora was mentioned during the
investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoño for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoño. Catalina's statement on this point
is as follows:
Q — Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the incident involving Leonora
Ordoño?
A — We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's Office and also when I testified
in court in the case of my daughter Rosa Ordoño but then my daughter Leonora Ordoño was still in
Manila, sir.
During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she was no longer
afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoño because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoño.
The case against Avelino Ordoño, where Leonora Ordoño was the complainant, was elevated to the Court of First Instance
of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented Catalina Ordoño as the
second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her
competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against
her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other;
xxx xxx xxx
Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoño's motion for the reconsideration of the adverse
ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.
The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his
wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes committed
by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or should it be given a
latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital discord?
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704).
In the Francisco case, the wife, as a rebuttal witness, was allowed to testify against the husband who was charged with
having killed his son and who testified that it was the wife who killed their son.
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR 133,
220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that
any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape
perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother). *
That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the daughter is close
to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and assistance in
time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually utters the
word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord.
Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoño, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of October 11,
1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word,
Avelino desisted.
That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications,
positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.
In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it was held that the wife was a competent witness against the husband in a
prosecution for rape committed by the husband against his stepdaughter, who is the wife's natural daughter because the
crime was "an outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as well as a crime against humanity itself". The
court adopted the interpretation that "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other"
may refer to a crime where the wife is the individual particularly and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the
husband is being prosecuted (See Dill vs. People, 19 Colo. 469, 475, 36 Pac. 229, 232).
In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090, it was held under the statutory provision that husband or wife shall in no
case be a witness for or against the other, except in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other,
that the wife was competent to testify against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest committed
against his stepdaughter.
In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539, it was held that the wife may testify against the husband in a case where he
was prosecuted for incest committed against their eleven-year old daughter because incest is a "crime committed against
the wife". (See Owens vs. State, 32 Neb. 167, 49 N.W. 226; Lord vs. State, 23 N.W. 507, 17 Neb. 526; People vs. Segura, 60
Phil. 933).
The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoño could testify against her husband, Avelino Ordoño, in the case
where he is being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* As noted by Wigmore, the marital disqualification rule consists of two parts: (1) the incapacity of one
spouse to testify for the other, a disqualification designed to obviate perjury, and (2) the privilege of one
spouse not to testify against the other, a right designated to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness
(U.S. vs. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182,187; 2 Wigmore on Evidence 731).
Wigmore notes that the privilege has no longer any good reason for retention. "In an age which has so far
rationalized, depolarized, and de-chivalrized the marital relation and the spirit of Femininity as to be
willing to enact complete legal and political equality and independence of man and woman, this marital
privilege is the interest anachronism, in legal theory, and an indefensible obstruction to truth, in practice".
After noting that some States had abolished the privilege, the American Bar Association's Committee on
the improvement of the Law of Evidence in 1937-38 recommended its abolition (8 Wigmore on Evidence
232).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and
BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr.,
with the crime of Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of
sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of
said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of
1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria
M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule,
contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition,
respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an
order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an
order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary
restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal
Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27,
1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on
September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of the instant petition, to
wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin
F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it
appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when
in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his
wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime
committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his
wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the
said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of
the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make
the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant
case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court,
through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133,
220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule that any
offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that,
WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION,
IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except
in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape committed by the
husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the husband against his wife. Although the
victim of the crime committed by the accused in that can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless,
applied the exception for the reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands
to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act
comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the
wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions,
"identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals
which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial
disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from testifying
against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view
would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could
conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed
and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19,
1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria
Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 See Annexes "A", "B", and B-1" of the Petition (Rollo, pp- 11-15).
2 Annex "C" of the Petition (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
3 Rollo, p. 39.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Ibid., p. 76.
6 Ibid., p. 87.
7 Ibid., p. 99.
8 G.R. No. L-39012, January 31, 1975,62 SCRA 270, at 273.
9 Id., p. 274.
10 Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel assisted the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga in filling the instant
petition for certiorari (rollo, pp. 9-10). Furthermore, she file on Aug. 22, 1977 a memorandum in support
of the petition (rollo, pp. 68-74), and, on Dec. 28, 1977, a pleading entitled Chronologically — Effected
Observations and Circumstances in Support of or to Butress Memorandum for Private Petitioner Victoria
M. Manaloto, dated August 18, 1977 informing this Court that the trouble in her marital relation with her
husband the herein private respondent is "beyond repair." (rollo pp- 105- 108).
11 People vs. Fransisco 78 Phil 694, 704 (cited in Ordono vs. Daquigan, supra.).
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez, petitioner, versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM,
Br. 72, and Maximo Alvarez, respondents."
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson3 pending before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez
committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998
gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his
sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan
Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez
knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged
wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez,
the door of said house was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.
COURT:
You may proceed.

xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister (and witness pointing to
the person of the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez." 4
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled emotions," prompting the
trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion 5 to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant
to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution
to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying
and deleting her testimony from the records.7 The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the
other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.8
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the
trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of
the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where
the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.12
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133,
220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when
an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against
the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife
Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital
life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his
wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be
preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave
a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between
petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident.
Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is
no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may
be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered
to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairman
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
2
Penned by Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now a
member of this Court) and Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion.
3
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 19933-MN and captioned "People of the Philippines vs. Maximo Alvarez".
4
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), June 21, 1999 at 3-7.
5
Rollo at 44-47.
6
Id. at 48-58.
7
Id. at 85-87.
8
Id. at 88.
9
Under Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended.
10
Rollo at 101-134.
11
People of the Philippines vs. Francisco, No. L-568, July 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 694, and Cargill vs. State, 220, Pac., 64,
65; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A.L.R., 133.
12
People of the Philippines vs. Francisco, id.
13
No. L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270.
14
Supra.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT and COLD STORAGE CO., INC., and THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Efrain B. Trenas and Sergio D. Mabunay for petitioners.

Ricardo J. Gerochi for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be
examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, without infringing on
her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130. The trial court, presided by the
respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the affirmative and required the wife to appear and testify. The petitioners
sued for certiorari but the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition 1 and denied their motion for reconsideration.2 Hence
this appeal.3
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N.
Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment
rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 39827. Named as defendants
were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The
complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La
Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it;
that summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the
collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that,
because the summons was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila
acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was void.1ªvvphi1.nêt
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the company was placed under
receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as
such he had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case 39827. They denied entering
into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate
obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to
Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request
was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of the Rules of Court:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. 4
This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband
and wife to testify in each other's behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other.5 The fundamental
theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the
disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled "Disqualification by reason of ... relationship."
On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional reasons has been offered 7 for the privilege, the "true explanation [which] is
after all the simplest"8 and which constitutes "the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege," is
the natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life
partner.9
Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the
case and, indeed, in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was apparently one
that could reasonably be expected to be made. Thus, the complaint charged
13. — That in obtaining the judgment by default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. defendants, in gross and evident bad faith, and in fraudulent
conspiracy, made it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of P150,000.00
from defendant Marciano C. Roque thru defendant Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an authority vested upon
defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the alleged Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
allegedly evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the said corporation signed by
defendant Jose Manuel Lezama and attested to by Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita B. Lezama and that
defendants spouses Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita B. Lezama had manipulated the books of the corporation by
making it appear that such fictitious loan was then in existence.
On the other hand, the answer claimed
13. That the herein defendants specifically deny all the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint; the
truth is, that the herein defendants have not conspired and acted in bad faith with the plaintiff [Marciano C.
Roque] in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the rendition of the said judgment
referred to therein; for the truth is, that the herein defendants, in their capacities as President-Manager and
Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., believing as they believe that the obligation sought to
be enforced by said civil action being legitimate and the allegations of the complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827
of the Court of First Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem it wise to contest the same; that the obligation
of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., which the defendant Marciano C. Roque sought to
be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was legitimately contracted in
accordance with law; that said obligation was duly entered in the books of the corporation and that the said loan
is not fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of the said corporation.
Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was
Paquita Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry in the books of
the corporation.
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan transaction was above board that Dineros, the company
receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or against her husband," but rather as
an adverse party in the case.
It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays into his opponent's position on the strength of section 6 of
Rule 132 which provides:
Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by
leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading
questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party and the
witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be
cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud
against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the
alleged fraud without violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?
It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable only against her. 10 It is even
suggested that "each may testify in his or her own behalf, although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other
spouse, or against his or her own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other spouse." 11 Upon the
other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify will transgress section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if
her testimony will support the plaintiff's charge.
The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make it appear
that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to
testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme: "that it was
Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of
the corporation."
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked
questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will
turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The
interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would
tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty
she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or against
her husband without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no
reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony
could operate only against himself or herself.12
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be
inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident
purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile
witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the
spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party.13
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife
as an instrument of fraud; for then what better way would there be to prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in
fraud immune to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party? This argument overlooks the
fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband
or the wife from becoming the means of the other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be
expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance
obtains.
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that there is no evidence
available to him other than the Lezamas' testimony to prove the charge recited in the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are versed, and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1
Resolution 52, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Nov. 24, 1965.
2
Resolution 12, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Jan. 6, 1966.
3
While the appeal was pending in this Court, the receivership was dissolved and, consequently, Jose S. Dineros,
who was originally made a party respondent, was dropped and the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.
substituted in his stead. Resolution, Oct. 26, 1966.
4
Rule 130, sec. 20(b).
See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2227 at 211, sec. 2228 at 216 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereafter cited as 8
5
Wigmore].
6
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 603 at 737 (3d ed. 1940) [hereafter cited as 2 Wigmore].
7
For instance, in United States v. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182 (1915) the basis of the rule is said to be the
"considerations of public policy growing out of the marital relation." Said the Court: "To allow one to testify for or
against the other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to endanger the
harmony and confidence of the marital relation." At 187. On the other hand, in People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694
(1947), the Court gave as reasons for the privilege the following: "First, identity of interests; second, the
consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence
because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other."
At 703.
8
8 Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212.
9
Id., sec. 2228 at 217.
10
See 8 Wigmore 227.
11
97 C.J.S. 477.
12
See Menzel vs. Tubbs, et al., 53 NW 653, 656 cited in 58 Am. Jur. 129.
13
97 C.J.S. 477.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The antecedent facts follow:

Hence, this appeal.

We find in favor of petitioner.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

G.R. No. 86743 August 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Q Did Ompoy do anything to you?

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

Q What did Ompoy do to you?

Q What did Ompoy do to you in the warehouse?

Q Now, did you have a panty with you then?

A I have a panty then.

Q Now, what happened to your panty?

A He removed my panty and my pants.

Q Did he make you lie down?

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

ATTY. BOSA (continuing)

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

Q Ompoy touched your private parts?

But there is a translation of her sister, Your Honor.

You can stay on your place to give an objection. Proceed.

ATTY. BOSA (continuing)

Misleading, Your Honor, there was no showing that . . .

Leading question, Your Honor . . .

Reform the question.

ATTY. BOSA (continuing)

Q Did the penis of Ompoy push into your vagina?

A (Witness nodded her head signifying yes).

Make the question simpler and short.

I think that would be all, Your Honor, for the witness.

A While in the bodega he inserted his penis into my vagina.

A That we are in the bodega his penis entered into my vagina.

A (Witness shook her head signifying no).8

xxx xxx xxx

Q Again what did Ompoy do to you?

Q What else happened after that?

A Then I seated on a chair to get my paper to go to school then he held my hands.

Q After that what happened?

A He asked me to go to the bodega and he held my hands.

Q What did Ompoy do to you?

Q When Ompoy was on top of you what happened?

Q Was Ompoy with or without pants when he lied on top of you?

Hence, the present recourse.

That's all. Do you have any other witness?

Exclude including these practicum.

xxx xxx xxx

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

* Penned by Judge Ricardo B. Butalid.

1 tsn of January 21, 1987, pp. 9-10, 16.

2 Id., p. 17, also tsn of February 11, 1987, p. 42.

3 tsn of January 21, 1987, pp. 18-19.

4 Id., p. 19; see also Exhibit E, Original Record, p. 121.

5 Exhibit A, Original Record, p. 120.