1. G.R. No.

173034 October 9, 2007

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA
M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C.
VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for an infant is mother's milk. There is
nothing greater than for a mother to nurture her beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of course, for each
and every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how should this end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise
Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the
legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed
the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.3
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing the
questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral arguments on June 19, 2007. The Court
issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral Arguments) dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements1 entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may
be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in the affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the international
agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the due process clause and are in restraint of trade;
and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient standards.
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the WHO and Unicef "2002 Global Strategy on Infant and
Young Child Feeding;" and (3) various World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
The petition is partly imbued with merit.

1
On the issue of petitioner's standing
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the real party-in-interest, the Court adopts the
view enunciated in Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,4 to wit:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal
identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its
lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of
its constituents.
xxxx
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized x x x to act as the representative of
any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform
other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the
appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical. x x x The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make
more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6 where the Court ruled that an association has
the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests.7
Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a similar provision just like in Executive Secretary, that
the association is formed "to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care
industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the general
public."8 Thus, as an organization, petitioner definitely has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing
members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized9 to take the
appropriate course of action to bring to the attention of government agencies and the courts any grievance suffered by
its members which are directly affected by the RIRR. Petitioner, which is mandated by its Amended Articles of
Incorporation to represent the entire industry, would be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on governmental action that
would affect any of its industry members, no matter how few or numerous they are. Hence, petitioner, whose legal
identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a real party-in-interest which stands to be benefited
or injured by any judgment in the present action.
On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents are part of the law of
the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding
the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various
international instruments10 regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3)
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that
steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and
nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the
use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and
various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.13
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and
not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that the Code did
not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising,
promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)
embodies the incorporation method.14
In Mijares v. Ranada,15 the Court held thus:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part
of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.16 (Emphasis supplied)
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all states,17 i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign
immunity,18 a person's right to life, liberty and due process,19 and pacta sunt servanda,20 among others. The concept of
"generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law
because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka
in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are
part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These
principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If
there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law
principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:
Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom:
the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave
the way they do.
xxxx
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements:
duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long. x x x
xxxx
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the
practice. x x x
xxxx
Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the
way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only
as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice
an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.22 (Underscoring and Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.23
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they attained the status of customary law and
should they then be deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the United Nations
(UN) by virtue of Article 57,24 in relation to Article 6325 of the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, it is the
WHA which determines the policies of the WHO,26 and has the power to adopt regulations concerning "advertising and
labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce,"27 and to "make

3
recommendations to members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization."28 The legal
effect of its regulations, as opposed to recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind member states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption
of such conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when accepted by it in accordance
with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a
convention or agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such convention or agreement. Each Member shall
notify the Director-General of the action taken, and if it does not accept such convention or agreement within the time
limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make
an annual report to the Director-General in accordance with Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine
requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures with
respect to diseases, causes of death and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for
international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products moving in international commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after due notice has been
given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection
or reservations within the period stated in the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same
way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the recommendation would come into force for
member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA recommendations are generally not binding,
but they "carry moral and political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective
membership of the highest international body in the field of health."29 Even the ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere
recommendation, as WHA Resolution No. 34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense of Article 23 of the Constitution, the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to the present resolution." (Emphasis supplied)
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization at its sixty-seventh session, considered the fourth
draft of the code, endorsed it, and unanimously recommended to the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly the text of a
resolution by which it would adopt the code in the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of the WHO Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to recommendations made to it by the
Organization, and with respect to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states to
implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done with the
ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions,30 specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24
months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted
as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior.31
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946
Statute of the International Court of Justice.32 It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior.33 Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this
category.34 The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,

4
specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v.
Rañada37 and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..38
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency attached to the UN with the mandate to
promote and protect intellectual property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm creation, in
order "to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of its constituents."39 Other international
organizations which have resorted to soft law include the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (in the form of the Codex Alimentarius).40
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and
Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO member states, it provides an
excellent example of the power of "soft law" in international relations. International lawyers typically distinguish
binding rules of international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in
international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the political groundwork for improved
international cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states' normative duty
to cooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to
outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for
two reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and enhancing, international
cooperation on infectious disease controls is in a country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in
the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform the development of general and consistent state practice on infectious
disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary international law on
infectious disease prevention and control.41
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures recommended by WHO to address the
outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February
2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to close down schools/establishments, conduct health
surveillance and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a state to implement the IHR
Resolution was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said resolutions had great political influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such
rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents
have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states,
were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that
any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that
may be deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of
its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national
health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and
plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk
substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated
May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding
practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended
breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months;
(3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding
in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national
health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.

5
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total
ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of
breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it
follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the
constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented
by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance with those of the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to "young children"
or those from ages two years old and beyond:
MILK CODE RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and Section 2. Purpose – These Revised Rules and
adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there Regulations are hereby promulgated to ensure
is a need to protect and promote breastfeeding the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for
and to inform the public about the proper use of infants and young children by the promotion,
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and protection and support of breastfeeding and by
related products through adequate, consistent ensuring the proper use of breastmilk
and objective information and appropriate substitutes, breastmilk supplements and related
regulation of the marketing and distribution of products when these are medically indicated and
the said substitutes, supplements and related only when necessary, on the basis of adequate
products; information and through appropriate marketing
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling and distribution.
within the age bracket of 0-12 months. Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person
from the age of more than twelve (12) months
up to the age of three (3) years (36 months).
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain
instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares that "there is no
substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
MILK CODE RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The
adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there following are the underlying principles from
is a need to protect and promote breastfeeding which the revised rules and regulations are
and to inform the public about the proper use of premised upon:
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to
related products through adequate, consistent six (6) months.
and objective information and appropriate b. There is no substitute or replacement for
regulation of the marketing and distribution of breastmilk.
the said substitutes, supplements and related
products;
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR
imposes an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months old or
beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in
the promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague:
MILK CODE RIRR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. – Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing following are the underlying principles from
materials, whether written, audio or visual, which the revised rules and regulations are
for products within the scope of this Code shall premised upon:
be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and x x x x
broadcast unless such materials are duly f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of
authorized and approved by an inter-agency infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other
committee created herein pursuant to the related products are prohibited.

6
 applicable standards provided for in this Code.
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:
MILK CODE
SECTION 10. Containers/Label. –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to
provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a
7
Section 11. Prohibition – No advertising,
promotions, sponsorships, or marketing
materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes intended for infants and young
children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be
allowed, because they tend to convey or give
subliminal messages or impressions that
undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes
and/or replacements, as well as related products
covered within the scope of this Code.
Section 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of
products within the scope of this Code must be
objective and should not equate or make the
product appear to be as good or equal to
breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising
concept. It must not in any case undermine
breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect"
should not directly or indirectly suggest that
buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love,
intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner
bring better health to the baby or other such
exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The following
shall not be included in advertising, promotional
and marketing materials:
a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information
which discourage or tend to undermine the
benefits or superiority of breastfeeding or which
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes and
milk supplements. In this connection, no pictures
of babies and children together with their
mothers, fathers, siblings, grandparents, other
relatives or caregivers (or yayas) shall be used in
any advertisements for infant formula and
breastmilk supplements;
b. The term "humanized," "maternalized," "close
to mother's milk" or similar words in describing
breastmilk substitutes or milk supplements;
c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant
and milk formula.
Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any
phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be
allowed.
RIRR
Section 26. Content – Each container/label shall
contain such message, in both Filipino and
English languages, and which message cannot be
readily separated therefrom, relative the
 way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear,
conspicuous and easily readable and
understandable message in Pilipino or English
printed on it, or on a label, which message can
not readily become separated from it, and which
shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their
equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of
breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used
only on the advice of a health worker as to the
need for its use and the proper methods of use;
and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and
a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation.
5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health professionals; the RIRR totally
prohibits such activity:
MILK CODE
SECTION 7. Health Care System. –
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be
used for the purpose of promoting infant
formula or other products within the scope of
this Code. This Code does not, however,
preclude the dissemination of information to
health professionals as provided in Section 8(b).
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding
products within the scope of this Code shall be
restricted to scientific and factual matters and
such information shall not imply or create a
belief that bottle-feeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include
the information specified in Section 5(b).
6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education
of health professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the same.
MILK CODE
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products
within the scope of this Code may assist in the
research, scholarships and continuing education,
of health professionals, in accordance with the
rules and regulations promulgated by the
Ministry of Health.
8
following points:
(a) The words or phrase "Important Notice" or
"Government Warning" or their equivalent;
(b) A statement of the superiority of
breastfeeding;
(c) A statement that there is no substitute for
breastmilk;
(d) A statement that the product shall be used
only on the advice of a health worker as to the
need for its use and the proper methods of use;
(e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and
a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation; and
(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or
improper use of infant formula and other related
products including information that powdered
infant formula may contain pathogenic
microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately.
RIRR
Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code
shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any
activity on breastfeeding promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
speakers in classes or seminars for women and
children activities and to avoid the use of these
venues to market their brands or company
names.
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any
phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be
allowed.
RIRR
Section 4. Declaration of Principles –
The following are the underlying principles from
which the revised rules and regulations are
premised upon:
i. Milk companies, and their
representatives, should not form part of any
policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code
shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any

7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.
MILK CODE
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent
donations from manufacturers and distributors
of products within the scope of this Code upon
request by or with the approval of the Ministry
of Health.
8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.
MILK CODE
9
activity on breastfeeding promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
speakers in classes or seminars for women and
children activities and to avoid the use of these
venues to market their brands or company
names.
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health
Workers - It is the primary responsibility of the
health workers to promote, protect and support
breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young
child feeding. Part of this responsibility is to
continuously update their knowledge and skills
on breastfeeding. No assistance, support,
logistics or training from milk companies shall be
permitted.
RIRR
Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of This
Code - Donations of products, materials, defined
and covered under the Milk Code and these
implementing rules and regulations, shall be
strictly prohibited.
Section 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies
Not Covered by this Code. - Donations of
products, equipments, and the like, not
otherwise falling within the scope of this Code or
these Rules, given by milk companies and their
agents, representatives, whether in kind or in
cash, may only be coursed through the Inter
Agency Committee (IAC), which shall determine
whether such donation be accepted or
otherwise.
RIRR
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The
following administrative sanctions shall be
imposed upon any person, juridical or natural,
found to have violated the provisions of the
Code and its implementing Rules and
Regulations:
a) 1st violation – Warning;
b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a
minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation, including the
recall of the offending product;
c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a
minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to One
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos,
depending on the gravity and extent of the
violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of
the offending product, and suspension of the
 Certificate of Product Registration (CPR);
d) 4th violation –Administrative Fine of a
minimum of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) to Five Hundred (P500,000.00)
Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity and
extent of the violation; and in addition thereto,
the recall of the product, revocation of the CPR,
suspension of the License to Operate (LTO) for
one year;
e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations –
Administrative Fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the
offending product, cancellation of the CPR,
revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the
company concerned, including the blacklisting of
the company to be furnished the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);
f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five
Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be
made for every day the violation continues after
having received the order from the IAC or other
such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing
the company for the infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not
there is "repeated" violation, each product
violation belonging or owned by a company,
including those of their subsidiaries, are deemed
to be violations of the concerned milk company
and shall not be based on the specific violating
product alone.
9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.
The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3
of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code – The Code applies to the marketing, and practices related thereto, of the following
products: breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula; other milk products, foods and beverages, including bottle-
fed complementary foods, when marketed or otherwise represented to be suitable, with or without modification, for
use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and teats. It also applies to their quality and
availability, and to information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product being
marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as
separate and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional
requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics";
while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any food, whether manufactured or locally
prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the
nutritional requirements of the infant." An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12
months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and
protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as "any food being marketed or
otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose." This
section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code
cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be

10
intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code
also intends to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can
be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 242 and 5(ff)43 of the RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code, does not recognize that breastmilk
substitutes may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be considered and construed together. As held
in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of breastmilk
substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information
and educational materials should include information on the proper use of infant formula when the use thereof is
needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be
proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 345 and 446 together as they are interlinked with each other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, it is
important to deal first with the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general
under the 1987 Administrative Code,47 and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of
police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss
it..48 However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk
substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH.49
As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands,50 health information was already within the
ambit of the regulatory powers of the predecessor of DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with the duty to protect the
health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the dissemination of hygienic information among the people
and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing and
combating dangerous communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced
under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them."52 To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code
the power to "(6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and
environmental matters which have health implications."53
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically
delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate,
consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related
products; and the power to control such information. These are expressly provided for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring –
xxxx
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of
this Code. For this purpose, the Ministry of Health shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Code and the
accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.
xxxx
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of the purposes
and objectives of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for use by
families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design
and dissemination of information, and the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk
substitutes, supplement and related products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x

11
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and
intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points:
(1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of
breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing
the decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured
industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall
include the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods;
and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk
substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope
of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief
that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section
5(b).
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the appropriate use of the
products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant
women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and
factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-
a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely
prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that the control over information given to
the DOH is not absolute and that absolute prohibition is not contemplated by the Code:
a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate marketing and distribution of breastmilk substitutes,
to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code – The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for
infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and
breastmilk supplements when these are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate
marketing and distribution.
b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the marketing of and practices related to breastmilk
substitutes, including infant formula, and to information concerning their use;
c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on
infant feeding;
d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual informational and educational materials shall not use any
picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes and should include information on the health
hazards of unnecessary or improper use of said product;
e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and empowers the IAC to review and examine advertising,
promotion, and other marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide information to health professionals but such information
should be restricted to factual and scientific matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding; and
g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels should not contain information that would discourage
breastfeeding and idealize the use of infant formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling and advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements, specifically: a) that
there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant
formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR
prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased
emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.

12
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope
of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief
that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section
5.58 (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms "humanized," "maternalized," or similar
terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that there is any milk
product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with
the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to health workers regarding breastmilk
substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the
absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim to health workers that their products
are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their products
the exact opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to
avoid by mandating that all information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent, at the same
time giving the government control over planning, provision, design, and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is not a substitute
for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 260 of the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It implements Section 5(b) of the Milk Code
which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and
intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: x x
x (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such
materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of
its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any
picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers thereof. The buyers of
breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood
of pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related products when these are prepared and
used inappropriately.
Petitioner’s counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that formula milk is prone to contaminations and
there is as yet no technology that allows production of powdered infant formula that eliminates all forms of
contamination.62
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to contain the message regarding health
hazards including the possibility of contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with Section 5(b) of
the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and supplements and
related products cannot be questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising, promotion, and marketing that
is being assailed by petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, for products within the
scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly
authorized and approved by an inter-agency committee created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided
for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and marketing materials to an IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -

13
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency committee composed of the following members is hereby
created:
Minister of Health ------------------- Chairman

Minister of Trade and Industry ------------------- Member

Minister of Justice ------------------- Member

Minister of Social Services and Development ------------------- Member

The members may designate their duly authorized representative to every meeting of the Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on
products within the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and prohibit the printing, publication, distribution,
exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on
products within the scope of this Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for the exercise of its powers and functions as well as the
performance of its duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of Section 6(a) of this
Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend
to convey or give subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise
exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of this
Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes in line
with the RIRR’s declaration of principle under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products are
prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given to the IAC but
also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for prior
approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly insisted, during the oral
arguments on June 19, 2007, that the prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
xxxx
x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned by Petitioner is whether or not there is an absolute prohibition
on advertising making AO 2006-12 unconstitutional. We maintained that what AO 2006-12 provides is not an absolute
prohibition because Section 11 while it states and it is entitled prohibition it states that no advertising, promotion,
sponsorship or marketing materials and activities for breast milk substitutes intended for infants and young children up
to 24 months shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impression undermine that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the other Section, Section 12, provides for the
inter agency committee that is empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising and promotion materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and manufacture, it simply regulates the advertisement and
the promotions of breastfeeding milk substitutes.
xxxx
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken together with the provision on the Inter-Agency
Committee that processes and evaluates because there may be some information dissemination that are straight

14
forward information dissemination. What the AO 2006 is trying to prevent is any material that will undermine the
practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has authority or power to promulgate Rules and Regulations
regarding the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its rule making authority when it totally banned
advertising and promotion under Section 11 prescribed the total effect rule as well as the content of materials under
Section 13 and 15 of the rules and regulations?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total absolute ban. Second, the Inter-Agency Committee
is under the Department of Health, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes in
the Revised Rules?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Yes, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes intended for
children two (2) years old and younger?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency Committee that can evaluate some advertising
and promotional materials, subject to the standards that we have stated earlier, which are- they should not undermine
breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation with the other Sections, particularly 12 and 13
and 15, Your Honor, because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency Committee has that power to evaluate promotional
materials, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on advertisement regarding milk substitute regarding infants
two (2) years below?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition, however, we take exceptions and standards have
been set. One of which is that, the Inter-Agency Committee can allow if the advertising and promotions will not
undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your Honor.63
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or rejection of
advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be
related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable
standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code, which, at the
risk of being repetitious, and for easy reference, are quoted hereunder:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and
intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points:
(1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of
breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing
the decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured
industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall
include the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding methods;

15
and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes.
Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Health Workers. –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope
of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief
that bottle feeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section
5(b).
xxxx
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the appropriate use of the
products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and understandable message in Pilipino or English
printed on it, or on a label, which message can not readily become separated from it, and which shall include the
following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the
proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing agency for the enforcement of the
provisions of the Code. In relation to such responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code states that:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for use by
families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design
and dissemination of information, and the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the standards set forth in Sections
5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be objective and should not
equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It
must not in any case undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest
that buying their product would produce better individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or
in any manner bring better health to the baby or other such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing. Through
that single provision, the DOH exercises control over the information content of advertising, promotional and marketing
materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other related products. It also sets a viable
standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,64 the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."65
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.
4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health professionals, the Court also finds that there is no
inconsistency between the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b)66 of the Milk Code, in relation to
Section 8(b)67 of the same Code, allows dissemination of information to health professionals but such information is
restricted to scientific and factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of information to health
professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor
of the products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion, education and production of Information, Education
and Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said provision
cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of information to health professionals, as restricted by the
Milk Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)68 of the Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend
assistance in research and in the continuing education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and 32 of the RIRR

16
absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i)69 of the RIRR prohibiting milk manufacturers' and
distributors' participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives should not form part of any policymaking
body or entity in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing in said provisions which
contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it is the DOH which shall be principally
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to
decide which entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking bodies on breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's
prohibition on milk companies’ participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding
is in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving reasearch
assistance and continuing education to health professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain to research
assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it deals with breastfeeding promotion
and education for women and children. Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
assistance for research or continuing education to health professionals; hence, petitioner's argument against this
particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said sections of the RIRR provide that research
assistance for health workers and researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics committee, and with
certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on the recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research or educational assistance may be given
by milk companies or under what conditions health workers may accept the assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the
RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research done or extent of assistance given by milk companies are completely in
accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance, support, logistics or
training to health workers. This provision is within the prerogative given to the DOH under Section 8(e)74 of the Milk
Code, which provides that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes may assist in researches,
scholarships and the continuing education, of health professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Health, now DOH.
6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent with the Milk Code. Section 6(f) of the
Milk Code provides that donations may be made by manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes upon the
request or with the approval of the DOH. The law does not proscribe the refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it
purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request or accept such donations. The DOH then appropriately exercised
its discretion through Section 5175 of the RIRR which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations from
manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR that any donation from milk
companies not covered by the Code should be coursed through the IAC which shall determine whether such donation
should be accepted or refused. As reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not mandated by the Milk Code to accept
donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be forced to accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real
inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because the Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.
7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code, the
Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.76 is misplaced. The glaring difference in said
case and the present case before the Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) was expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to impose fines and civil penalties, while the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by the same law the power to review on appeal the order or decision of the CAA
and to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the
Court upheld the CAB's Resolution imposing administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,77 the Court upheld the Department of
Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The circular provided for fines for
the commission of prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the circular contravened the law because the DOE
was expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638 to impose fines or penalties.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the authority to fix or
impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot
provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority by providing for such fines or
sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null and void.

17
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations. Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes
the DOH to "cause the prosecution of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this
Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be imposed on violators of the provision of the Milk
Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions –
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one (1) year imprisonment or a fine of not less than One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the offense be
committed by a juridical person, the chairman of the Board of Directors, the president, general manager, or the partners
and/or the persons directly responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to any health worker, distributor, manufacturer,
or marketing firm or personnel for the practice of their profession or occupation, or for the pursuit of their business,
may, upon recommendation of the Ministry of Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of repeated violations of
this Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with these
revised rules and implementing regulations are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and regulations. Thus,
said provision is valid as it is within the DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.78 Such express grant of rule-
making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same.79 This is to allow
administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting the details and manner by which they are to implement
the provisions of a law,80 in order to make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in
administrative rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared
repealed or modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and in contravention
of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk
Code.
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:
x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented by the Respondents is unnecessary and oppressive, and is
offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution, insofar as the same is in restraint of trade and because a
provision therein is inadequate to provide the public with a comprehensible basis to determine whether or not they
have committed a violation.81 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f),82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85 22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289 as the provisions that suppress the trade
of milk and, thus, violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public
good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests.90 In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,91 it was held thus:
x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, despite the
fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the
unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the
Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." x x x It must be clearly
explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint
of trade. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body
(Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or
training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and
oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

18
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is unreasonable and oppressive. Said section
provides for the definition of the term "milk company," to wit:
SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, manufacturer, distributor of infant formula, follow-up
milk, milk formula, milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by any other description of such nature,
including their representatives who promote or otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing those
products;
On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides:
(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any other entity in the public or private sector engaged in the business
(whether directly or indirectly) of marketing at the wholesale or retail level a product within the scope of this Code. A
"primary distributor" is a manufacturer's sales agent, representative, national distributor or broker.
xxxx
(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in the public or private sector engaged in the business or
function (whether directly or indirectly or through an agent or and entity controlled by or under contract with it) of
manufacturing a products within the scope of this Code.
Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities defined
separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in Section 5(w) the
products manufactured or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk company," whereas in the Milk Code,
what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this Code." Those are the only differences between the
definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR.
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court
sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in the
RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code are practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about any change in
the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk
Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and
intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as
such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated
May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents
are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

19
 2. G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment
of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the
metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.2 Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum,
dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.3 In the Memorandum, the
President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols.4 The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in
the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.5 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence.6 Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.7
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
xxx
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the
conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national
security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates
whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove
well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine
Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those
perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila
streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained,
disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the
Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against
insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security
Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively
and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the
role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein

20
delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine
Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing
the security situation.
xxx.8
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center,
Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.9
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE
II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF
GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN
FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE
MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.10
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,11 dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines,
contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not
proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police
visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the
President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3)
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the
petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor
did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.12
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.13 The term
"interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.14 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

21
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."15
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate
the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by
the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed
the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming
that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has
suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP
purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither
is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment
of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might
threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence
of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This
Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or
in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.16 In not a few cases, the Court
has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.17 Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.18 In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition
almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling
the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the
deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the
aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the
military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of
the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine]
deployment."19
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces
is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are
beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial
review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution of the
controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the
parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court
is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the
general welfare.20 For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil
unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the
latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

22
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-
in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the
day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not
in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and
security.
xxx21
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the President’s power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary
because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.22 It
pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the
Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances
that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The
reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular
act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts
will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the
courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Tañada v. Cuenco23 puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution
as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be
a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,24 "[p]rominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question."
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."25 Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General
that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.26 Moreover,
the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.27 When political questions are involved,
the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.28
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.29 Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the
President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.30 A
showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for
the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.31

23
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its
own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation"32 before declaring
an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is
also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.33 That the intent
of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is
extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

24
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by
the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is
necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence:
"The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel
that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First
Sentence: "The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing
martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.34
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser
and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or
rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the
armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion
and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the
armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must
be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the
present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order
every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was
gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum,
he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings
continue to occur in Metro Manila..."35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by
lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis
to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of
the police force.

25
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts
that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3,
Article II36 of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling
of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the
Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines
joint visibility patrols.37 Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures.38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.39 It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.40 In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution.41
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in
civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The
real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence,
the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation
and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the
multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and
the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;42
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;43
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;44
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;45
5. Development of the culture and the arts;46
6. Conservation of natural resources;47
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;48
8. Enforcement of customs laws;49
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;50
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;51
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;52
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;53
13. Sanitary inspections;54
14. Conduct of census work;55
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;56
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;57
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.58
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.59 What we have here is mutual support
and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic
purposes has persisted,60 and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use
of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding

26
the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act61 of the US, the use of the military in
civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
§ 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.62
To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US
courts63 apply the following standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that
the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory64 George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for
assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH:
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in
nature, either presently or prospectively?
xxx
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even
when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief.1âwphi1 A mere threat of some
future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible
use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A65 does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,66 8(k)67 and 9(a)68 of
Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)69 of Annex A, all arrested
persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive
force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)70 of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in
character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the
deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law
enforcement.71
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain
ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to
call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in
the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized
the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s determination of the factual basis for
the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that
his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard
peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and
democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of
violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

27
 3. G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a
violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said
appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service
because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino
Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with
the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be
to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1ªvvphïl.nët
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by reason
of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S.,
11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United
States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law,
because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war does not make our
case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the
appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at
all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So ordered.

28
 4. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C.
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor,
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of
her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws
& Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board
and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

29
 5. G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M .
Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor,
Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,
Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and
Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and
the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355

30
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA
EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health,
and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards
the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not
only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its
very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to
remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete
and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes
regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called
upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty
to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

31
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia,
in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara);
and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit
that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

32
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails
to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right
to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that
the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the
poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives
that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty
of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated
as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them
(the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind
of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients
to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their
children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who
has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included
in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-

33
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July
16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs
and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product
or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall
be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made
part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit
family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be
adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in
the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide
for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and

34
for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals
to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the
status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act
No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the
role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials
in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest
extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a
full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices
that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

35
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it
is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon
the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling
was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess

36
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the
RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe
for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any
of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of
the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and
a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality
of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that
could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the
law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to
render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

37
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful
of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.

38
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its
true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the
RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem,
however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act,
or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

39
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference
and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as
an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws
of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives
in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion
of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm
shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-

40
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however,
it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum
by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:

41
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it
takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division.
All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei
of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of
the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human
cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from
the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right
now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the
ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized
ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be
banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on

42
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of
fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is
that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article
II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

43
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the
fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a
new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human
being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred
from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good
outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and
after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being
can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with
the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience
by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the

44
1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court
has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates
that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete
with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe
travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive
health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or
not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain
the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do
not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or
device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon

45
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the
way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from
the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point
of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or
to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot
fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso
under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

46
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy
against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only
be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also
those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the
risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –

47
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed
by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is
by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system
for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of
the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget
allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

48
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it
may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being
the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third
sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that
their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things
dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes
on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions
for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and
(2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers

49
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in
Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers.
They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9,
14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to
indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury
to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of
the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information,
choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others
of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which
is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods
and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one
hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and
who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents,
the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account
of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the

50
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they
call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution
reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule
of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of
the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions
on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or
any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

51
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed
to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a
general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-
to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other
words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom
of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying
the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it
should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.
The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the
law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back
to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The
fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate

52
danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred
for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid
of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which
balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of
the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden,
a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until
they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct,
i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests
of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this
realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying

53
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with
their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human
rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population
and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the
marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies
of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs
in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption
from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened.
As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of
a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222

54
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if
he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to
provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of
the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would
be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to
whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After

55
all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it
is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict
between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions,
were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of
services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive
means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right
not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by
the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

56
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario
of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information,
product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it
to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to
the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the
right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right
and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.

57
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation,
the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by
a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in
grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause
that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it
is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted
to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed
upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to
save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision
bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

58
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground
of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right
of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In
the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one
of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should
see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including
the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH
Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the
right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

59
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure,
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right
of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect
both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and

60
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions
to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society;
and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions.
Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition
of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places
more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical,
social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender
and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH
Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these

61
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at
the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention,
diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or
a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who
has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily
health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions
earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing
of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services.
For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to
a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with
the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and
safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the
need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use
. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives

62
that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with
the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target
the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples

63
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On
the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time
of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government,
the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore,
no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

64
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30)
days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy
of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient
and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already
been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

65
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and
the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters
of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a
law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-
bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather,
natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no
law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition
that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is
the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is

66
not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed
down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the
situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by
the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function
of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and
the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

67
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

68
 6. G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA
MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA
BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA
REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK
FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,
NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER
VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA
9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth
of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva
in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing
of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-
land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing
of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of
a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of
territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference
either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime
zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with
the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG

69
or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded
to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to
declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition
alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find
other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements
for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of
the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the
part of petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial
vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of
constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of
the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the
territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners
argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris.22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

70
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing
coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines
cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but
from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines
results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of
maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length
of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument
branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant
for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the

71
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime
area using RA 3046,
Extent of maritime
as amended, taking
area using RA 9522,
into account the
taking into account
Treaty of Paris’
UNCLOS III (in square
delimitation (in
nautical miles)
square nautical
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone 382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way
beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are
overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime
boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522
draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’
continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

72
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal
effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article
47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to
125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to
an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are
outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the
provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands.
Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line
which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough
Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya
kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime
zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A.
3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x
x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system.
This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of
islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North
Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the
baselines of Sabah:

73
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of
the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent
passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated
in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea
lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States,
in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative
guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely
to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation

74
binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation
is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the
exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in
RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

75
 7. G.R. No. 143855 September 21, 2010
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL
M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE
MEDALLA (Secretary of National Economic and Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The Facts and the Case
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging
in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:
Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino citizens and corporations
US$2,500,000.00 wholly owned by Filipino citizens.

Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but less For the first two years of R.A. 8762’s effectivity,
than US$7,500,000.00 foreign ownership is allowed up to 60%. After
the two-year period, 100% foreign equity shall
be allowed.

Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by foreigners. Foreign

investments for establishing a store in
Categories B and C shall not be less than the
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
US$830,000.00.

Category D US$250,000.00 per store of May be wholly owned by foreigners.

foreign enterprises specializing
in high-end or luxury products
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000 petitioners ***Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S.
Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales,
Jaime Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri
and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization
and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien
dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-
employment, and bring about more unemployment.
Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since
R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of
Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.

76
Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members of
Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the
subject law violates the rights of those vendors.
Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not
specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to
reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such
reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
The Issues Presented
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Court’s Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so.1 Legal standing
or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly,
standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the
passage of that law.2 To put it another way, he must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the law he complains of.3
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or
inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers4 or as legislators.5 Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when as
in this case the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.6
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.
The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is
wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
xxxx
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

77
But, as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara,7 the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of
principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.8ten.lihpwal
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.9
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it
does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.10 The key, as in all
economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services.1avvphi1
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving
them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him
without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts the
retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigner’s
right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police
power.11 The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to
that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’
right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business
to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional
mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the
retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law
itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus –
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals
from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed
to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing
activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales
representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

78
 8. GR. 169815
BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR) EMPLOYEES UNION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VII, CEBU
CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 dated April 8, 2005 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA) in LAO-N-2005-119 upholding
the disallowance by the COA Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO), Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City of
the P10,000.00 Food Basket Allowance granted by BFAR to each of its employees in 1999, and COA Resolution2 dated
August 5, 2005, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said Decision.
First, the facts:
On October 18, 1999, petitioner Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union, Regional Office No.
VII, Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1999 requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It
justified its request on the high cost of living, i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted the
cost of food commodities, has greatly affected the economic conditions and living standard of the government
employees of BFAR Region VII and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, i.e., food,
shelter, clothing and education."3 It also relied on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS),
pursuant to Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, and approved by the Civil Service
Commission on December 3, 1996. The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives that will help employees overcome
present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and dedication to public service."4 Regional
Director Corazon M. Corrales of BFAR Region VII indorsed the Resolution, and Malcolm I. Sarmiento, Jr., Director of BFAR
recommended its approval. Honorable Cesar M. Drilon, Jr., Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock of the
Department of Agriculture, approved the request for Authority to Grant a Gift Check or the Food Basket Allowance at
the rate of P10,000.00 each to the 130 employees of BFAR Region VII, or in the total amount of P1,322,682.00.5 On the
strength of the approval, Regional Director Corrales released the allowance to the BFAR employees.
On post audit, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City
disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance under Notice of Disallowance No. 2003-022-101 (1999) dated September
19, 2003. It ruled that the allowance had no legal basis and that it violated: a) Sec. 15(d) of the General Appropriations
Act of 1999, prohibiting the payment of honoraria, allowances, or other forms of compensation to any government
official or employee, except those specifically authorized by law; b) par. 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November
28, 1998, prohibiting the grant of food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentives/allowances, except those
authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President; and c) Sec. 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, or the
Salary Standardization Law of 1989, which includes all allowances in the standardized salary rates, subject to certain
exceptions.
On February 26, 2004, BFAR Regional Office No. VII, through Regional Director Corrales, moved for reconsideration and
prayed for the lifting of the disallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance the welfare
and productivity of the employees. Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary for
Fisheries and Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specific authority for its release. The
Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City denied the motion.
Petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) National, Quezon City. The
appeal was denied in a Decision dated April 8, 2005. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a
Resolution dated August 5, 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner cites the following grounds for its appeal:
1. The disallowance in question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined
under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.6
2. The Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-ego of
the President. His approval was tantamount to the authority from the Office of the President, as contemplated in DBM
Budget Circular No. 16, dated November 28, 1998.7
3. The grant of the Food Basket Allowance is in conformity with Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law.8

79
We deny the petition.
First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality. Petitioner invokes the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on social justice
to warrant the grant of the Food Basket Allowance. Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of
the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements
of principles and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is required. As we held in Kilosbayan, Incorporated
v. Morato,9 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."10
Second, petitioner contends that the approval of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Fisheries and
Livestock of the Food Basket Allowance is the law which authorizes its release. It is crystal clear that the DA
Undersecretary has no authority to grant any allowance to the employees of BFAR. Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16
dated November 28, 1998 states:
All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of
incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.
In the instant case, no Administrative Order has been issued by the Office of the President to exempt BFAR from the
express prohibition against the grant of any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentive/allowance to its
employees.
Petitioner argues that the grant of the Food Basket Allowance does not violate Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law. This law was passed to standardize salary rates among government personnel and do away with
multiple allowances and other incentive packages and the resulting differences in compensation among them.11 Sec. 12
of the law provides:
Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for representation and transportation
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM [Department of Budget and
Management], shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local
government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National
Government.
Under Sec. 12, as quoted, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates. The exceptions are:
1. representation and transportation allowance (RATA);
2. clothing and laundry allowance;
3. subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
4. subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5. hazard pay;
6. allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
7. such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM.
Petitioner contends that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the 7th category above, that of "other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM."
The Court has had the occasion to interpret Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758. In National Tobacco Administration v. Commission
on Audit,12 we held that under the first sentence of Section 12, the benefits excluded from the standardized salary rates
are the "allowances" or those which are usually granted to officials and employees of the government to defray or
reimburse the expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions. These are the RATA, clothing and laundry
allowance, subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel,
hazard pay, and others, as enumerated in the first sentence of Section 12. We further ruled that the phrase "and such
other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM" is a catch-all proviso
for benefits in the nature of allowances similar to those enumerated. In Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on
Audit,13 we explained that if these allowances were consolidated with the standardized salary rates, then government
officials or employees would be compelled to spend their personal funds in attending to their duties.
In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance is definitely not in the nature of an allowance to reimburse expenses
incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in
consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. It is a form of financial assistance to all officials and employees of BFAR.

80
Petitioner itself stated that the Food Basket Allowance has the purpose of alleviating the economic condition of BFAR
employees.
Next, petitioner relies on National Compensation Circular No. 59 dated September 30, 1989, issued by the DBM, which is
the "List of Allowances/Additional Compensation of Government Officials and Employees which shall be Deemed
Integrated into the Basic Salary." The list enumerates the following allowances/additional compensation which shall be
incorporated in the basic salary, hence, may no longer be granted to government employees:
1. Cost of Living Allowance (COLA);
2. Inflation connected allowance;
3. Living Allowance;
4. Emergency Allowance;
5. Additional Compensation of Public Health Nurses assigned to public health nursing;
6. Additional Compensation of Rural Health Physicians;
7. Additional Compensation of Nurses in Malacañang Clinic;
8. Nurses Allowance in the Air Transportation Office;
9. Assignment Allowance of School Superintendents;
10. Post allowance of Postal Service Office employees;
11. Honoraria/allowances which are regularly given except the following:
a. those for teaching overload;
b. in lieu of overtime pay;
c. for employees on detail with task forces/special projects;
d. researchers, experts and specialists who are acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
e. lecturers and resource persons;
f. Municipal Treasurers deputized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect and remit internal revenue collections;
and
g. Executive positions in State Universities and Colleges filled by designation from among their faculty members.
12. Subsistence Allowance of employees except those authorized under EO [Executive Order] No. 346 and uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Integrated National Police;
13. Laundry Allowance of employees except those hospital/sanitaria personnel who attend directly to patients and who
by the nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms, prison guards and uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and Integrated National Police; and
14. Incentive allowance/fee/pay except those authorized under the General Appropriations Act and Section 33 of P.D.
No. 807.
Petitioner invokes the rule of statutory construction that "what is not included is excluded." Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius. Petitioner claims that the Food Basket Allowance is distinct and separate from the specific
allowances/additional compensation listed in the circular.
Again, we reject petitioner’s contention. The Food Basket Allowance falls under the 14th category, that of incentive
allowance/fee/pay. Petitioner itself justified the Food Basket Allowance as an incentive to the employees to encourage
them to be more productive and efficient.14 Under National Compensation Circular No. 59, exceptions to the incentive
allowance/fee/pay category are those authorized under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) and Section 33 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807. Sec. 15(d) of the GAA for Fiscal Year 1999 or R.A. No. 8745 clearly prohibits the
payment of honoraria, allowances or other forms of compensation to any government official or employee, except those
specifically authorized by law. There is no law authorizing the grant of the subject Food Basket Allowance. Further, Sec.
33 of P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines does not exempt the Food Basket Allowance from the
general rule. Sec. 33 states:
Section 33. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a government-wide employee
suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as
may be promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each
department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment,
and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their
official employment.
We are not convinced that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the incentive award system contemplated above. The
decree speaks of suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, and other personal efforts contributed by an

81
employee to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or other extraordinary acts or
services performed by an employee in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, his official employment. In
the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance was granted to all BFAR employees, without distinction. It was not granted
due to any extraordinary contribution or exceptional accomplishment by an employee. The Food Basket Allowance was
primarily an economic monetary assistance to the employees.
Lastly, we note, as the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent did, that petitioner failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies. It stopped seeking remedies at the level of respondent’s Legal and Adjudication Office. It failed
to appeal the latter’s adverse decision to the Commission on Audit proper. The consequence for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is clear: the disallowance, as ruled by the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office
Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City and upheld by the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office National,
Quezon City, became final and executory. Sections 48 and 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines provide:
Section 48. Appeal from decision of auditors. – Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government
agency in the settlement of an account or claim may, within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal in
writing to the Commission.
Section 51. Finality of decisions of the Commission or any auditor. – A decision of the Commission or of any auditor upon
any matter within its or his jurisdiction, if not appealed as herein provided, shall be final and executory.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit – Legal and
Adjudication Office dated April 8, 2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

82
 9. G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
(hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues
that what really motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment,
which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross
violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a
fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.1 Under the
Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated
upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991, private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda
F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her
services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up
for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.3
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements
which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its
branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not
accepting married women for employment.4
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding
married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.5 Petitioner
nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992,6 which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for
non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and
this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of
P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner7. All of these
took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent,
who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly
expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and
that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation
of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its
decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification
that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which
should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for
the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT & T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of
November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent
NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through
the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the

83
inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the
matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been
considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and
remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and
retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political
life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II8 on the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands
the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section
3 of Article XIII9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the
State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article
XIII 10 mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable
them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor
Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a
signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 11
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 13 which
bans the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee
protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 14 also known as the "Women in Development and
Nation Building Act," which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for
appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted to
women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace
and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17 or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with
emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in
the Family Code, 18 women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article
130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided
with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes
of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar
establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a
woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex.
Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and
security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties
of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and
just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected
property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management
prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working
methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline,
dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and
best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or
those which may be provided by law. 20
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent
from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

84
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the termination notice
sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the
service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation
of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the
initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking
officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. 23
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy
into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee and not on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got
married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks
dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal.
Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over
the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private
respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female employees
contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is
her concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it
supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting
marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it
would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such
employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does
not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through less
than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women,
both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient
marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now
complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated
company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving.
Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her
collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her
concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor
arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster
its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private
respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence
and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent
execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue
in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served
her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was
contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her
from earning security of tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly
those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or
necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining regular employment is the

85
reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the
employer. 29
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably committed an act of
dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-
month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act
should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction
whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed
from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting
therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT & T. The
Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better
known as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The
forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and
which regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, 33 a
decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective
flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was
declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination
against married women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal provision of law.
Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary
occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight
attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has
already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women
and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the
validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which
amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced
verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or
on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against
it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards
that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require
employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight
attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet
been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight
attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy
of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employees. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work . . . .

86
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of flight attendants on
account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as
no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued
employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on
the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of
pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had
been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and
216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic
social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence
of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure
conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has
narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight
attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically
expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole
text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation 34 considered
as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a
policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get
married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the
project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of
the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to
women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its
repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the
marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on
the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group
which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among
other things, sex. 35
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women. And, where the
employer discriminates against married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination
is unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as
a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same,
but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement
of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded
as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 37
5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman
to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults
good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege
that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence, while it is true that the
parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences,
it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of
capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should
yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against
the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy
against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be effectively

87
interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the
land is not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

88
 10. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA
SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE,
NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which

89
is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished
since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the
country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation
of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led
to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in
the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly
53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the
entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary
growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

90
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151,
6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.

91
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of
due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as
a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

92
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation
of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the

93
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and
the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to
the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee
and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial

94
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even
if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause;
it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

95
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that
of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

96
 11. G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST
GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests
and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of
environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But
amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct
statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas
polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not
seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude
towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency
and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so
many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse
mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental
aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in
the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay,
[for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up
Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution
of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

97
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila
Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples
collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a
safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners,
testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage
Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on
the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean)
project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB
classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and
perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places
under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities
for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to
rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and
liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and
restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of
Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the
bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and
engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of
sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to
have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and
protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of
illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual
Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other
executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

98
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning
of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,
stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and
supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that
"requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist
and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal
systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They
argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be
located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with
and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents,
petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are
bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how
they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No.
8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard

99
is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the
scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs
and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of
sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which
prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec.
41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity
of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after
such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD
1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option
whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this
conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water
pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on
pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope
covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of
the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of
the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality
management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the
preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to
submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to
accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in
partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December
2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod
the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces
of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

100
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other
uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the
minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water
standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached
agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient
and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to the
instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the
agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of
agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring,
control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously
utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the
PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and
control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development
systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to
"flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was
made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain
as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and
drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or
the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and
regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon
consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the
law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other
man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters
of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or
out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of
any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high
tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the
level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on
December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial
waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the
latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in

101
which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a
rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states
that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and
functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of
Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement
within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the
provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in
Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping
of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and
liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions,
within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste
matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and
landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment
or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed
"when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of
RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and
regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for
domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other
concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and
the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized
cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its
implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by
private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation
permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate
subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue
a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to
strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste
management principles.33

102
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of
1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the
country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law
stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of
the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of
appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a
holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of
life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with
the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what
are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their
tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water
pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall
undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged
against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec.
20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain,
remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been
rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government
agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said
operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to
such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment,
insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup
operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the
matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore
it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as
collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to
undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are

103
situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have
been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in
Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec.
20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,
respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its
Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses
around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20,
by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their
respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents
assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the
definition of the phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition.
As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the
chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress,
commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet
the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on
the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a
specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such
instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident
and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As
earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the
agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on
the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17
and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of
general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem
to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh
impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to
pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution
incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and
in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any
person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that
pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay.
In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they
can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be
almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the
apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been
required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the
Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152,
covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

104
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be
stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no
time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA
9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and
the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have
septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river
banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers
and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the
Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized
structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies
of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water
Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art.
51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone
of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along
their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of
the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized
constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways.
The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments
set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting
waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory
tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of
which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as
alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites -
generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the
surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the
environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and
surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila
Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps
untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some
LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated,
nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for

105
solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5)
years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21,
2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA
9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in
roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like.
Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila
sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins
the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the
introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and
other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances
[and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or
other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all
concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion
of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants
and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be
accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to
these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or
imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that
different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic
functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable
claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of
the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It
implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even
be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal
of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No.
74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC
Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA
9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the
DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination

106
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government
Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate
guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of
jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers,
the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs
shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the
Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan
in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550,
in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations
designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs
and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within
a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with
the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA
9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this
Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a
reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation
clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons
on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all
levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of

107
their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and
succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the
Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this
Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

108
 12. G.R. No. 120095 August 5, 1996
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:p
The limits of government regulation under the State's police power are once again at the vortex of the instant
controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an
Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By
contending that the right to overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners
vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process
clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban
against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded
after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing
kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was
tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,1 the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3
establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training,
testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled
for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and
implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of
performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only
after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to received (not less than
US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing
artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program)
although they must pass the academic test.
In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January
27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the
constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their
licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was
discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation
consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion
for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the
circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court
concluded that the issuance constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.
We agree.
The latin maxim salus populi est surprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at
promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty

109
which virtually "extends to all public needs,"2 this "least limitable"3 of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro4 wrote:
"The police power of the State," one court has said... is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed "the law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of
legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of
the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere
with the right of the individual.5
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it
follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement,
does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that
the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with
mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented
annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for
various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women
composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion
(58%) by the end of 1991,6 the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to
Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of
our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions
"marked by physical and personal abuse."7 Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers"
compelled "urgent government action."8
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as
prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of
number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who
met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a
number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves
controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts.
Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993,
D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on
entertainment industry matters.9 Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6,
1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on
screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted,
petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,10 which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other
requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department
Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the
method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and
agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed
unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in
taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by
defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this

110
should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The test are aimed at segregating real artists
or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing
themselves to possible exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the
requirements for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement
for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the
place and nature or work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our
entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative
practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely
unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our
OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these
provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-
government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists
bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest
protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of
the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provisions on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this
Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon,11 in reference to the recurring problems
faced by our overseas workers:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.
It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their
employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing
workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been
accredited, their accreditation became a "property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention
untenable.
A profession, trade of calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.12
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare
and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use of his own property
so as not to pose injury to himself or others.13
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much
wider.14 To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to
practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional
Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary
proof that they has either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of
their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the
due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such
deprivation exists.

111
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support
their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom
to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of
the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."15 Equally important, into every
contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement
deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed
department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not
agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It
does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.16 We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.17 If classification is germane to the purpose of
the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does
not violate the equal protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined
for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinfore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring government to
protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical
reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the
right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a
measure of control.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

112
 13. G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers;
GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR
P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as
non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO,
RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO
MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and
FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as
National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in
his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly
propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation
and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping
away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like
tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market
niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing
age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and
services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of
three multilateral institutions — inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations — were discussed at
Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which
was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order
and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation,
from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike
the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT — the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT
was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body
administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and
the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body — the World Trade Organization — with the
signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . ,
(the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines — and this is of special
interest to the legal profession — will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication
through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.
Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the
basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

113
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional
powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated
and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release
and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is
embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco,
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with
a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of
the Philippines,3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a
resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that
the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization."6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated
legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as
Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection

114
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen
and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral
parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article
and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper
and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral
annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,8 the Solicitor General describes these two
latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such
as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and
qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions
of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and
petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties
thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
"Bautista Paper,"9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of
proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine
adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a
Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the
other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the
concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or
of the validity of the concurrence.

115
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec.
19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair
Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is
"vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial
power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners
into the following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and
Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners
directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in
promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively
ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether
petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this
suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with
these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case — was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon
as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively
waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not
cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the
defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral
part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of
petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave
constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved
here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the
merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND
SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN
PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?

116
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital
questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's
economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers.
Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its
three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are
violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the
WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of
the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx

117
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in
their memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or
compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified
in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of
its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of
local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to
foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products,
or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product."
(Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62
UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect
of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member
shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

118
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service
suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal
Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by
Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on
the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment
accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-
executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by
petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs.
1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of
sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can
give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to
implement the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly
render judgment grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying
that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles
found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have

119
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged
or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the
national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by
mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and
speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held
that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the

120
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions
rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of
the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in
general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any
member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns
at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially
the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, . . .
(emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos
Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from
the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing

121
countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out.
Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period
of six (6) years while developing countries — including the Philippines — are required to effect an average tariff
reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products
by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary
outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years.
For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and
a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any
basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will
be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents
have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier
stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy
in the international community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic
trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in
the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.
On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods
and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to
whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as promised by its promoters —
expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the
Filipino public?

122
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That
does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated
the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the
1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated
a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively
surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters
that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds
of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and frame-work
only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate
of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and
gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena,
rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must
grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the
vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this
undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under
Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our
national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only
relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of
agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . .
such limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international
agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives
and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been

123
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval
bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of
alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
"Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence
is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its
sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July
20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle
East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence,
all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted
in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or
not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example:
although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN
Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103,
"(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail,"
thus unquestionably denying the Philippines — as a member — the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of
conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts — both bilateral and
multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others,
to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States,
the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States.
Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor
and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by
the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to
taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties,
inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes,
inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on
board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as
those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals
from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa
for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.

124
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the
Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned.
Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any
question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach "of international
obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials
and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or
trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal
obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure
relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce
the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to
some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph
1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have
the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the
patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical
product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent
has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged
infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and
business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in the absence of proof to
the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process
shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product
obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used
in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly
understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the
identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.

125
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
"newness" of the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the
patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject,
Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized
copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the
making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial
identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1)
the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process
used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method
of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative
power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion,
if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process
and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit
that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in
turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President.
They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act
should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a
diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and
other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is
rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The
text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in
just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act,
Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a
view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories,
namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by
the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give
effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines.
It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill,
elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel,
free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
and refinancing available in the normal course of business."57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its
integral parts, 58 as follows:

126
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in
matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3, (hereinafter referred to as
"Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade
Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not
accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is
legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation
on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this
Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Tañada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the
agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order
which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time
was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for
Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he making a new submission which
improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this
question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for
ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well
as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali
Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his
earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution
does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final
Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance
with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance
as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is
the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately
reflected in the journal of yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.

127
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's
constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.
Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal
of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive
arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's
processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative
guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion
of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no
"patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise
of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between
the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.
After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the
East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers
to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31
countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections
against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation,
stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages
and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines
now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium.
Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.

128
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

129
 14. G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because —
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City
government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's
right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while
most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the
"new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a
"gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3
(2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the
Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on
the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1,
1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved
to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on
June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
—
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity
to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance,
which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of
additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification,
sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's
existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

130
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing
clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National
Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and
Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in
cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of
operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December
31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood
of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being
"contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of
the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice)
of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the
Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which
belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA
323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government
We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is
presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We
approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall
heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in
the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not
render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld
and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or
expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA
66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978];
and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file
the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
"the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

131
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean
that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta,
35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore
its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest
benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and
is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is
"the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force
that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As
was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was
beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny,
regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR
and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be
minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees;
that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section
13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise
from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a
franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under
this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of
taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio,
83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter
or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of
Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine
Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v.
Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No.
9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771
and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:

132
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local
governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race
tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and
other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits"
is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the
powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities
mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated
entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with
respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in
the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR
should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC
Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the
States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US
51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to
prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may
perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340
US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot
be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a
pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may
provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to
impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function
of government. (emphasis supplied)

133
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a
matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection
v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence,
it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to
empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance
provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-
Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480,
as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized
PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning
of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly
explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306
as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must
be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases
in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were
made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies
and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this
Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive
Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should
be.1âwphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The
state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a
matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the
legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot.
(Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

134
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48
SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal
one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra)
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for
such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
"morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth
and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 —
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of
validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not
undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some
provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question
the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this
Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted
to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family
but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost
their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are
directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For
the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

135
 15. G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2
dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19,
1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni
Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna
lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col.
[illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo
na ang "Jueteng".3
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3)
an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from
implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna
prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which
reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the
defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial
court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF
LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY
GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR
CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED SECTORS IS
REQUIRED.

136
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its
vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial
government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.6 They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior
consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express
provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.7
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the
state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations
around the country.8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated
as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.9 He also states that
his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been
granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no
power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government.11 He argues that this is
based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of
the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on
them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is
for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to
operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the
province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already
allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations
and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local
government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a
lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-
executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna.
Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of
the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms
of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.12
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the
local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic
Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to
operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter
designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs,
medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred
in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner,
as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and
proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution
or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by
law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

137
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,13 ordinances should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp.14
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance
the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and
if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power
to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like
the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.15
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio".16
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508,
Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is
nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise
above its source of power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the
country. These provisions state:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities
unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the
sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall
not be evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are
to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government,
but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that
lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.17 Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of
every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the
local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and

138
objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose
effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring
about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land,
range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will
be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part.
There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit.
That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing
the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a
policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of
implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private
respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial
Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

139
 16. G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution
No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his
candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under
the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political
party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained
his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended
the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their
leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity
to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner
claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek
the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26,
Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the
sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The
original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and
prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an
amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word
"office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the
opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many
offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening
opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the
number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal
opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

140
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers
to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear
State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not
properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any
one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be
accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise.
At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in
our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support
before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no other, in avoiding
confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January
2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the
election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run.
Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official
Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and
canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS
(₱450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough
to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the
elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every
polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15 Moreover, there
are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given
election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with
no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be

141
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates
and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure
orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract
from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections16 and
endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and
honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner
cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance
candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the
COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an
eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their
respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves
not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly
complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of
candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the
reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

142
 17. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M.
DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE,
JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading
ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into
the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This
practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political
bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel"
refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the
Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.
Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution
made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section
provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may,
for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any
other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund
release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was
modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and

143
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress,
they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and
individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a
legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it
was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an
era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had
already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the
SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving
₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It
has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public
works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which
would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork
Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were
created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development
projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators
and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released
directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure
projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the
1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as
found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to
submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing
agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective
CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on
Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to
be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be
published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."

144
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release
of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the
budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM,
purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School
Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty
Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how,
where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security
Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress
for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement
of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services
and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the
2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the
release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose
and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works
and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of
implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten
point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also
introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-
enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In
contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent certain
aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations
(NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the
law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of
school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the construction
of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under
the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No.
12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA
9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure
whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO,
provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

145
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given
₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200
Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft
projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x
x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the
said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but
the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition,
the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability
to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of
the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may
be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress,
the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded
to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos
recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating
to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the
energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep
Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending
Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous
Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo),
then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets
of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything
from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks
that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money
trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of
a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for
being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

146
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
"the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20
dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the
NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99 covering
the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The
purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the
appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the
highlights of which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their
respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without
considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by
NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156
Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or
in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the
projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this
writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the
relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition
for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin
M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of
the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel
System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and

147
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork
Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the
Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon,
in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to
2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and
the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to,
proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012
(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local
Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism,
the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM,
National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the
remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the
purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under
the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date
before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical
assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al.
filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated
October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently
did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the
issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal

148
standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888,
entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No.
164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the
re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability
of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall
be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as
they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910
for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing
and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional
use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic
by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court
observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the
useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article
which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that

149
he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the
Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes,
Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has
a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will
continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases
in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code 128 x x x.
So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse
to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA
Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA
Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and
prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this
Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be
utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a
prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by
the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos
Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it
was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only

150
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court
deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of
notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this
relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually
find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the
issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the
Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System,"
by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the
same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had
already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review"
exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases.
Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when
there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms
but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to
impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches
of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty
to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under
the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With
the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse

151
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional
force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of
these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure
that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that
each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised
may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves
"not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which
means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which
both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article
and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse
the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of
the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

152
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article,
was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the
Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the
only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court
reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the
purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity
to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the
proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that
the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they
are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas
of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the
case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be
that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally
lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an
aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it
follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority
must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be
merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this
wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter,
among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated
the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the
ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case
of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment
legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set
any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis
would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel
System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of
government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its
distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-
sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and
broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the
funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a
definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and,
second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential
Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

153
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the
PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the
use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164 belongs
the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce
laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the
three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-
equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the
"regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This
is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over
the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be
paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the

154
national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it
self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment
the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined
to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As
the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with
it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining
to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks
the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to
interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the
findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of
legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President
maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the
Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the
authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past
PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a
general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall,
within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and
submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further
authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district
concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by
each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project
identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special
provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify
PDAF projects.

155
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas
of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the
area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all
request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while
their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special
Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the
"Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with
the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically
articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be
utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification
by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt
very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are
triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a
legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense,
Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to
have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus

156
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have,
in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process.
In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been
using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on
this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative
and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to
local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The
conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as
follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum
from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a

157
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads
as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified
under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to
the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon,
explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the
law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a
bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is
a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be
the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his
power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide
for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific

158
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully
subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a
valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as
one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be
deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the
rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a
practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he
finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its
legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives
in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet
the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address
situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create
some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted
for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual

159
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited
state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of
said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program,
activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the
first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the
Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has
an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF
impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of
a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact
accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the
power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among
others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers"
when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the
conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another
office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel
and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

160
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is
intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as
"self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the
great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their
resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the
body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not
only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

161
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on
local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the
countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary
reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a
far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema
to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF
had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of
their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions
of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within
its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly
put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even
take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed
little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning
and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving
the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they
do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury.
Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD
910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is
the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such
funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.

162
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for
a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of
the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide
or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress
shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the
case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely
the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons,
an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal
year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in
specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or
in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word
appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the
constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is
necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the
legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money
collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of
1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be
used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent
share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910,
which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any
and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a
specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

163
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not
the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute
an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged
the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-
making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement,
known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as
contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated
rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand,
the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s
authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem
generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for
such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya
Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that
it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."251 Thus,
while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly
deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered
by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory
provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.

164
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President
to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects"
and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may
be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services
and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD
910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of
its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be
ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their
PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of
such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a
writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information
sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does
not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was
stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

165
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R.
No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the
list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did
petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them
with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be
pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court
to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern,
however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without
prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access
to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for mandamus
towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents
sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently,
off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund,
remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In
response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year
2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently
reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has
been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the
TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds
as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release
of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such,
PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

166
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They
explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds
covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining
PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted
is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein
has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or
not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following
the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website,
is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified
period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific
laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive
to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the
control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will
prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of
the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM
representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the
amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the
authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by
the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this
respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to
the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF
Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court
sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should
not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF
Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to

167
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must
only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid,
a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the
process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well
as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms
the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by
any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally
unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward
with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate,
the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what
has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its
cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the
Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and
present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene,
assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to
the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund
realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red
personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus,
the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and

168
the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund
under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not
covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated
or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘
prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide
the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and
utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal
offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.

169