When May Be Invoked

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA
PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner was accused for the crime of child abuse under several information filed against him. No bail was
recommended by the prosecution but he still filed separate application for bail on the different cases charged
against him. The trial court granted the application in all of the cases in the condition, among others, that the
approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment to ensure his presence at it and for the trial to
proceed even if he becomes absent during the course.

ISSUE: W/N right to bail may only be invoked after arraignment.

HELD: The trial court is wrong in its theory that there should be an arraignment first before bail could be granted.
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash the information against him. If the motion to quash was granted, then an
arraignment would not be needed anymore. The trial court could even ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings under Rule 114 Sec 2(b)
requiring the presence of the accused whenever required and under Rule 116 Sec 1(b) requiring the accused to
appear at the arraignment.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
ofRepresentatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of aCongressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems
between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she,
of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would
immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of
lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she
did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive
behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You
transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell,
took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was
not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on
to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend
her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying
out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not
feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital
affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of
the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
 The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital
rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the
slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the
rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife
but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship
with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the accused.
The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the
contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007

[Formerly G.R. No. 138328]

PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES, Appellee

vs.
SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, Appellant.

FACTS:

 On 25 February 1999, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation
of Section 5(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

 The testimony of AAA shows that appellant procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the
first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.

 From her testimony, it could easily be gleaned that AAA did not consent to the acts of lasciviousness and
the sexual intercourse.

 Appellant claimed that sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAA’s
real mother, who could not support her.

 the birth certificate indicates that AAA was born on "11 May 1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and
"Simplicio R. Delantar" (father), nowhere on the face of the birth certificate can the signature of appellant
be found

 According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did not get married to each other on the
date indicated in the birth certificate, or impliedly at least, not ever.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Certificate of live birth presented by respondent may serve as proof of filiation
and justify the imposition of the higher penalty on him
RULING: Appellant SIMPLICIO DELANTAR y REDONDO is found guilty of one count of violation of
Section 5(a), R.A. No. 7610

o Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states:

xxxx
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of
an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has
been revoked. (Emphasis supplied.)

 While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of birth appearing
in the civil register,80 yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not signed by the father
against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the alleged filiation.

 We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not
of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father.

 At best, appellant is AAA’s de facto guardian. Now, would this circumstance justify the imposition of the
higher penalty on him? We think not. We apply, by analogy, the ruling of this Court in People v. Garcia,85
where we held that the restrictive concept of guardian, legal or judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A.
No. 7659. Said provision, by way of amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, ordains that where
the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender is, inter alia, a guardian of
the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed.

 The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of
judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant’s case or, for that
matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another’s property. The
fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust

De Guzman v. Perez (2006)

Petitioners: ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN
Respondents: HERNANDO B. PEREZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND SHIRLEY
F. ABERDE
Ponente: Corona
Topic: Rights of Illegitimate Children
SUMMARY: The parent of an illegitimate child who fails to render support may be charged for abandonment
and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto P. De Guzman and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying
law in the University of Sto. Tomas.
Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to Robby in 1987. But, she and Roberto never got married. In 1991,
Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two children.
Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice. Also, when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto gave Shirley
P7,000. Other than these instances, he never provided any other support for his son.
In Taiwan, she worked for two years in order to support Robby. However, she reached the point where she had
just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby's needs. The child's continued education thus became
uncertain.
Despite his luxurious lifestyle, petitioner Roberto failed to provide support to Robby. On June 15, 2000, Shirley
filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.
ISSUE/S:
 WoN Roberto alone may be charged for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of
PD 603, contrary to his claim that “only if both parents are guilty” does criminal liability attach
o YES. According to PD 603: “Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
xxx xxx xxx (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in
life and financial conditions permit. xxx xxx xxx
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and
(4) the offender's station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate
education to the child”
o The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect
of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the
family's station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate
himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent's faithful compliance
with his or her own parental duties.
o BUT the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which
provides:
o “SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(emphasis supplied) x x x x x x x x x”
o The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as
"indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
 WoN the City Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice (in affirming the City Prosecutor’s resolution) acted
with grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause for charging Roberto
o NO. There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact financially capable
of supporting Robby's education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation
indicates that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paidup shares in the company. Petitioner's
assertion that the GIS is not evidence of his financial capability (since the shares are allegedly
owned by his father) is of no moment. The claim is factual and evidentiary, and therefore a defense
which should be interposed during the trial. The argument that criminal liability for neglect of
child under Article 59(4) of PD