G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994 On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No.
6735 entitled
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the
Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition
within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their
power of initiative under the Local Government Code of
1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to
repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the
Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a
letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local
initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local
initiative because its subject is “merely a resolution and not
an ordinance.”
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the
proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the
petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on
July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people
regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986.
The new Constitution became “less trusting of public
officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the power to
amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
“amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
o W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voter therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative
and referendum.
“An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for
a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of
initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the
Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a
national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local
initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.”
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
(POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING
OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA,
based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter
which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the
family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.
Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE:
violation of non-delegation of powers
HELD:
SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular,
Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no
authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject
to delegation.
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule
and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too
many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
“power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation.
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B.
ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in
behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges
during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have
not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding
Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,
the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for
taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial
court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.
Issue:
whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle
which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by
failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by
the delegate, the Board of Medical Education
Held:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency
like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly
the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in
Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and
regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of
the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
G.R. No. L-58184 October 30, 1981
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the
following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary
implementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment of the
interest of our members; 2) Illegal terminations and
suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3)
Unconfirmation of call sick leaves and its automatic
treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence
(AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our
Collective Bargaining Agreement."
Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed,
with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised
Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with
a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being
imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the
approval of private respondent.
Subsequently, respondent Ministry, certified the labor
dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was set for
hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission.
Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor
union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the
Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the
petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed
indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal
cause of the labor dispute.
It is now the submission of petitioner labor union Free
Telephone Workers Union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in
so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to
the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power
and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free
collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative
powers. There is likewise the assertion that such conferment
of authority "may also ran contrary to the assurance of the
State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective
bargaining.
ISSUE:
Whether BP 130 amending Art. 264 of the Labor Code is an
undue delegation of legislative powers?
HELD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister
of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or
likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same
the National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face
unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative power. To repeat, there is no ruling
on the question of whether or not it has been
unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to
the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining,
as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the
matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be
stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory
arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite
understandable in labor disputes affected with a national
interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must
be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate
of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take
due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no
violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. It is of course manifest that there is such
unconstitutional application if a law "fair on its face and
impartial in appearance is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand. It does not
even have to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional
application would be discernible if what is ordained by the
fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or
disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
During the pendency of the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, both petitioner labor union and private
respondent are enjoined to good faith compliance with the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130. No costs.
G.R. No. 82849 August 2, 1989
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL
DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND
CEBU OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (COACVEA) respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with its employees, increasing the salaries
by P200 for the years 1986 and 1987 and P300 for 1989. It
was stipulated in the contract that if ever there were
legislations passed that would increase salaries greater than
the one in the CBA, the company would pay the difference.
RA 6640 was passed which directs minimum daily wage to be
increased by P10 per day. The Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Drilon promulgated
Implementing Rules and Regulations for RA 6640, Section 8 of
which provides that increases by companies will not be
credited as compliance if these weren’t stated in the CBA in
anticipation of RA 6640. The petitioners argue that the
provision is null and void on the ground that it unduly
expands the provisions of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a
prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to
implement.
HELD: No. Implementing rules cannot provide for a
prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative
regulations must harmonize with the law and not unduly
expand it. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of
the respondent Assistant Regional Director dated April 7,
1988 is modified in that petitioner is directed to pay its 208
employees so entitled the amount of P62.00 each as salary
differential for two (2) months and P31.00 as 13th month pay
differential in full compliance with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6640. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic
6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes
the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective
bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage
increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This
decision is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created
(through the enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-
related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180
(Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was
enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and
energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any
person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil
and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the imposition of tarrif
violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of
others in the oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif
violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel
Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag
Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition
and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section
15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when
to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring the
implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price
Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and
(3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the
formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell
in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not
justiciable (cannot be settled by the court) and that the
petitioners have nolocus standi since they did not sustain
direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No.
8180.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power.
Held:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19,
Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex,
the three major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and
unreasonable and therefore considered void. The depletion
of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180
to be considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil
industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its
declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. A law having a single
general subject indicated in the title may contain any number
of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the
foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of the deregulation of the
downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does
not violate the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition
on undue delegation of legislative power. The tests to
determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are
the completeness test and the sufficiency test. The
completeness test demands that the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches the
delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to
delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15 provides for
the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the
completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for the
judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the
sufficiency test.
Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared
unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial
Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S.
MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M.
ZANORIA, respondents.
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school
officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court
of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded
not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with
preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the
case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed
for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1)
the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run toreclusion
perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court
as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV
where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A.
No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation
fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have
jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court
the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment
of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative
department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the
case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828,
considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php
3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal
courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge
Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court
of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.