The Kashmir Conflict


&
Cross-Border Terrorism

Muhammed Yüşen
Cleveland State University
Department of Political Science
October 2013
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Abstract

This paper discusses the linkage between the Kashmir issue and state-sponsored cross-

border terrorism. After the sequence of events, Kashmir plunged into a permanent territorial

conflict. Both India and Pakistan have insisted upon their rightful claim to Kashmir; fought two

wars (1947-48, 1965) over Kashmir. In 1987, Pakistan attained the nuclear capability. Buoyed by

the confidence of being a state that possesses nuclear capability, Pakistan has been sponsoring

and supporting cross border terrorism since 1989 by putting psychological pressure on India in

order to resolve the Kashmir issue to the Pakistani satisfaction.

In order to prove that there is a linkage between the Kashmir issue and cross-border

terrorism, first, I have given a background of the Kashmir issue. Second, I discussed Pakistan's

attainment of nuclear capability in 1987, and how Pakistan began sponsoring terrorism in order

to force India to resolve the Kashmir issue. In order to support my argument that “the essence of

the problem between the two countries is that India and Pakistan have vastly different

approaches to the situation,” I suggested current examples of the Kashmir and cross-border

terrorism. For the resolution, multi-track processes of peace-building need to continue for a

longer period of time, and without any break, in order to generate an atmosphere of trust and

reduce misperceptions between the peoples of India and Pakistan.

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After gaining independence from the British Empire, British India was partitioned based

on the two nation theory. At the time, there were 565 princely states each of which ruled by

different princes. However, there were three problematic states; Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh,

and Hyderabad. Territorial disputes over Junagadh, and Hyderabad were resolved by the Indian

government. However, Jammu and Kashmir has remained as a disputed area because of several

reasons. One important reason was the Pakistani perception that Kashmir would integrate better

with Pakistan because of the fact that Kashmir has a predominantly Muslim population.

Secondly, the ruler Maharaja Hari Singh’s prolonged indecisiveness on whether to accede to

India or Pakistan during the intervening period. It made Kashmir even more critically important.

As a result of his indecisiveness, Pakistan got time, and chance to attack the Kashmir Valley.

India committed the mistake of not driving them out of Kashmir even though it was militarily

capable. Within one week, Pakistan had already occupied one-third of the Kashmir Valley. This

sequence of events has plunged Kashmir into a permanent territorial conflict. Both India and

Pakistan have insisted upon their rightful claim to Kashmir, fought two wars (1947-48, 1965)

over Kashmir. With the 1971 Indo-Pakistani, although it was not concerned with the Kashmir

issue, Pakistan committed the mistake attacking India, and was defeated. As a result of this

defeat, Pakistan realized that it could not win a conventional war against India, and decided to

embark on the nuclear program. In 1987, Pakistan attained the nuclear capability. Buoyed by the

confidence of being a nuclear-weapons state, Pakistan has been sponsoring and supporting cross

border terrorism since 1989 by putting psychological pressure on India in order to resolve the

Kashmir issue to the Pakistani satisfaction.

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The genesis of the Kashmir conflict is a direct outcome of the two-nation theory, on the

basis of religion (Jain, 67. Paul, 177). The Hindu ruler of predominantly Muslim Kashmir,

Maharajah Hari Singh, originally sought independence for his territory (Jain, 67). Religion was

the primary identity rather than language or ethnicity. During that time, the prominent leader of

the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct

nations with different cultures, which did not dine together or intermarry. He claimed that

Muslims would not get socio-justice, nor would remain safe in India. Therefore, Jinnah

demanded a separate Pakistan (Paul, 87-8, 171).

Jinnah noticed the ruler Singh’s indecisiveness, and used the opportunity to attack. Under

Jinnah’s orders, Pakistani army attacked, and invaded the Kashmir Valley on October 20, 1947

(Gurung, 1). Following Pakistan’s invasion of Northern Kashmir, the ruler Singh, who was

unable to withstand the Pakistani army’s overwhelming power to defend the state, turned to the

Indian government for military assistance. India demanded that Singh, first, sign the Instrument

of Accession, and only on that condition, India would provide military assistance to them.

Ultimately, Singh decided to sign the Instrument of Accession on 26 October, 1947. Upon Indian

government’s quick acceptance of the accession agreement on 27 October, 1947, and the State of

Jammu and Kashmir officially became an integral part of India. Meanwhile, Pakistan had already

occupied one-third of the Kashmir Valley (Gurung, 1-6. Jain, 64). This is how the Kashmir issue

was transformed into a permanent territorial conflict.

During the war in January 1948, India took this issue to United Nations in order to show

the international community that India was not an aggressor, and that Pakistan had attacked and

illegally occupied the Kashmir Valley. Furthermore, India claimed that Pakistan gave transit to
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invaders, allowed them to use Pakistan as a base of operation, supplied military and economic

transport to the rebels, and permitted Pakistani nationals to fight and train tribesmen. Pakistan

denied India’s claim that it was aiding terrorists in Kashmir; instead it argued that they were

acting independently. Additionally, Pakistan challenged the legal status of the accession

agreement signed by Maharaja Hari Singh. Pakistani officials argued that a plebiscite should

decide Kashmir’s legal status, and determine people’s wishes instead (Gidvani, 722-31). The

United Nations intervened to resolve the issue. In August 1948, under the resolution of the

Security Council, India and Pakistan were asked to hold plebiscite to determine people’s wishes.

However, neither of them cared, nor vacated the territory. Finally, on March 1948, there was a

ceasefire between India and Pakistan due to the United Nation’s mediation. From April 1948 to

1957, the United Nation passed a series of resolutions. However, after 1957, the United Nations

could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the U.S.S.R. began exercising its veto

power in favor of India (in-class notes).

After the end of the second war fought over Kashmir in 1965, the Tashkent Declaration

was signed between India and Pakistan on January 10, 1966. Peace had been achieved by the

intervention of the great powers, who pushed the two nations to a ceasefire for fears the conflict

could escalate and draw in other powers. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the U.S.S.R. (now in

Uzbekistan) beginning on 4 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. The

Soviet Union, represented by Premier Kosygin, mediated between Indian Prime Minister Lal

Bahadur Shastri, and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan. After the signing of the

agreement things began to deteriorate. The day after the declaration, Indian Prime Minister

Shastri died of a sudden heart attack. In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war
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— though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses — and were disappointed

at the return to the status quo. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a

no-war pact or any renunciation of the guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. The agreement was,

therefore, nullified (Khan, 16. Rid, 6).

In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, although it was not concerned with the Kashmir issue,

Pakistan committed the mistake of attacking India. This war ended disastrously for Pakistan,

resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state with India’s full military

support. “India’s direct military role in the dismemberment of Pakistan created a strong

vengeance lobby against it in the Pakistani establishment and the negative repercussions spilled

over to every realm of the two countries’ relationship” (Jain 68). After the Simla Agreement

signed between India and Pakistan on July 2, 1972, both countries resolved to iron out their

differences by “peaceful bilateral negotiations.” However, Pakistani President Z. A. Bhutto was

very much humiliated after the agreement. He feared that the two-nation theory was becoming

insufficient to keep Bangladesh as a part of Pakistan (in-class notes). He realized that Pakistan

could not win the conventional war against India. Upon his arrival to Islamabad from Himachal

Pradesh, Bhutto was convinced that Pakistan must develop nuclear weapons even if they had to

“eat grass” (Jain, 50. in-class notes). He was sure that development of nuclear weapon

technology would give Pakistan the psychological security, as well as ensure its national security.

India’s first nuclear test conducted under Indira Ghandi’s regime in 1974 further agitated,

and provoked Pakistan into thinking an alternative security paradigm. Psychologically

overcharged, Bhutto decided to give a call to Dr. Abdul Khan. He asked Dr. Khan to leave his

occupation in the Netherlands, and return to Pakistan in order to team up with scientists and
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engineers to create HEU (highly-enriched uranium), and develop nuclear weapon technology for

Pakistan’s national security (in-class notes). Although India and Pakistan had signed the Simla

Agreement to resolve their differences by “peaceful bilateral negotiations,” Pakistan was

determined to zero in on developing nuclear weapons to meet any threat from India’s

overwhelming preponderance in conventional weapons. He was sure that development of

nuclear weapon technology would give Pakistan the psychological security, and also ensure its

national security. At the start of the military conflicts, Pakistan had trained tribesmen and

terrorists, and suffered major losses for it. However, with the backing and confidence of nuclear

arms, Pakistan could support cross-border terrorism, without a violent reprisal from India (Jain,

50). At the same time, the Pakistani ISI actively participated in supporting and promoting

terrorism in India’s northern part as an indispensable part of state policy in order to destabilize

India since it had been responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan (Jain, 68).

Bhutto was determined to make Pakistan a nuclear-weapon state so that Pakistan could

become more confident, powerful enough to meet any possible threat from India. To strengthen

and accelerate the process, Pakistan had diverted the entire funding from United States to the

building of nuclear weapons. The United States was aware of the situation, however, did not take

any action. Finally, in 1987, Pakistan attained nuclear capability, for which it was striving since

early 1970s.

For Pakistan, nuclear attainment served three purposes. First, it weakened India’s position

in South Asia. Second, it brought a sense of national security to Pakistan. Third, it made Pakistan

more confident in dealing with India, particularly in regards to Kashmir. Pakistan’s nuclear

capability started spreading fear to India, and even to other countries, as they worried about the
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possibility of terrorist groups being able to gain access to those nuclear weapons. Therefore,

cross-border terrorism has been at the fore for India, while Kashmir has been at the fore for

Pakistan. With the attainment of nuclear capability, Pakistan became even more presumptuously

bold to fight a proxy war in Kashmir in late 1980s (Jain, 70. in-class notes). It indicates that

Pakistan had begun linking the Kashmir with cross-border terrorism after attaining the nuclear

weapons capability. This was a result of the fact that Pakistan's nuclear status put it on par with

India in terms of military power.

Pakistan exhibited its nuclear capability by responding to the nuclear-weapons tests

carried out by India in May 1998. As two nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan realized that

they had the crucial responsibility to keep the nukes safe and secure. In order to develop a better

friendship with Pakistan, Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, took the historic bus trip to Lahore in

1999. Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration on

February 21, 1999. Both leaders agreed on resolving their issues through peaceful bilateral

dialogue. They also emphasized that both countries should “forget and forgive” what happened

in the past, and commit themselves to developing a new vision so that both countries could

progress socially and economically (Grare, 2, 20-22. Jain, 69). The Lahore Declaration was

definitely a great progress in their relationship, which had been under great stress since the

nuclear-weapons tests in May 1998.

Unfortunately, the Lahore spirit was dampened by General Pervez Musharraf’s extremely

precarious offensive against India in Kargil in May-June 1999. That was a prearranged act of

violation of the Line of Control according to the 1972 Simla Agreement. Because General

Musharraf had carried out offensive without consulting President Sharif, he acknowledged that
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he was let down by General Musharraf. That particular misadventure poured all ongoing efforts

of friendship and diplomacy down the drain (Jain, 70). What was evident about the 1999 Kargil

Conflict was that it clearly revealed that decision-making power on defense and security issues

was in the hands of the Pakistan’s military elites.

Under the 1972 Simla Agreement, both countries had agreed on resolving their issues,

particularly the Kashmir issue, through “peaceful bilateral negotiations.” The composite

dialogues dated all the way back to May of 1997. However, with start of the military regime in

Pakistan, and their irreconcilable positions on Kashmir, and the aftermath of the terrorist attack

on the Indian parliament while all the ministers and members of the parliament was in the house

in December 2001, the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan was suspended (Jain, 70).

In 2003, the United States, as a facilitator, urged both countries to initiate the dialogue

process once again. In 2004, the peace process seemed to be progressing. There were four rounds

of talks during the time that took place and that included eight issues. Pakistan wanted Kashmir

to be the forefront so there was an emphasis on confident building measures to provide relief to

the Kashmiri. However, 2008 Mumbai attacks, during which over 183 people were killed

(including 22 foreigners: American, and Israeli), disturbed and complicated the peace process.

Since the 2008 Mumbai attack, there has been no peace dialogues between India and Pakistan

(Jain, 71).

With regard to the Kashmir issue, two significant developments occurred. First, Pakistan

attained the nuclear-weapon capability, and claimed strategic parity vis-a-vis India after having

successfully carried out six nuclear-weapons tests in response to India’s five in May 1998. The

tests naturally boosted up Pakistan’s moral courage to confidently deal with India on Kashmir
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and many other bilateral issues. It is without a doubt, that the nuclear factor has greatly

contributed to an unceasing rivalry and antagonism between India and Pakistan. Secondly, as

Pakistan’s key policy instrument, Pakistan has continued sponsoring terrorism, and contributing

to unrest in the state of Jammu and Kashmir by putting psychological pressure on India in order

to resolve the Kashmir issue to the Pakistani satisfaction. Its weakening effects reflect the

uncompromising approaches adopted by New Delhi and Islamabad as regards the Kashmir issue.

For instance, India has linked the resolution of Kashmir issue to a permanent dismantlement of

state-sponsored cross-border terrorism, while Pakistan persists on resolving the Kashmir issue

first before embarking upon permanently ending cross-border terrorism in the Kashmir Valley.

In order to understand the linkage between the Kashmir issue and terrorism, one has to

understand that there were different definitions or ideologies between the two countries of what

exactly terrorism was. To Pakistan, terrorism had three main components; terrorism, first, was a

threat to humanity and civilization, terrorism included state terrorism with regards to the

situation in Kashmir. Furthermore, there should also be a distinction drawn between the Islamic

religion and terrorism. Thus, Pakistan viewed Kashmir issue as a freedom struggle and an

entitlement to freedom. Throughout this time, Pakistan has been supporting terrorist

organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkatul-

Mujahideen (HuM), and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), and giving them moral, diplomatic, and

material support, in order to force India to resolve the Kashmir issue through plebiscite so that

people can decide whether to accept India or Pakistan.

India, on the other hand, claims that Pakistan has sponsored cross-border terrorism as an

instrument of its state policy to destabilize India. Emergence of those indigenous terrorist
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organizations, which were established with Pakistani funding in the late 1980s to destabilize the

state of Jammu and Kashmir, as a major force in the region, caused the death of around 60,000

people in Pakistan alone, as publicly acknowledged by the Pakistani President Zardari in 2012.

Therefore, New Delhi consistently demanded that Pakistani leaders thoroughly and properly

cope with the mutual foe of terror for the sake of national security of both states. However,

Pakistan has always brought up the argument that it is also a victim of terrorism, however, has no

control over terrorism claiming that those terrorist groups are non-state actors (Jain, 70). During

the latest address to the United Nation General Assembly, the 13th and current Prime Minister of

India, Manmohan Singh, affirmed his stance towards terrorism of Pakistan, and Kashmir. He

even stated that state-sponsored cross-border terrorism is a particular concern of India, and that

Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism in the region (Siasat, 29 September 2013). There is a very

big dilemma because both sides stand very strongly in their stances.

The essence of the problem between the two countries is that India and Pakistan have

vastly different approaches to the situation. With a near irreparable relationship, the two cannot

come to an even footing to find a resolution to satisfy both parties and the growing incidents of

terrorist violence is clearly indicative of them. After losing two wars over Kashmir, as well as

several other military conflicts, Pakistan became even more determined to develop nuclear-

weapons. With the nuclear attainment in 1987, it officially started sponsoring terrorism in order

to destabilize India and force it to resolve the Kashmir issue to the Pakistani satisfaction. The

important linkage and connection between the Kashmir issue and cross-border terrorism has been

further substantiated by a series of cross-border artillery exchanges in the disputed territory of

Kashmir over the past two months. This has “led to the death of at least eight soldiers on both
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sides, and plunged diplomatic relations to their lowest ebb in years. In the latest episode, on

September 24, 2013, a militant raid on an Indian Army base in Indian-controlled Kashmir

resulted in the deaths of at least 10 people, causing an outcry in India” (Walsh, 1). The reality is

that both countries are struggling with a conflict that has deep cultural, religious, and historical

implications that cannot be easily resolved as neither side wants to submit the the demands of the

other.

The Kashmir issue will remain unresolved due to the current geopsychology of both

Pakistan and India. The problem is deeply rooted in historical and cultural differences, which

need to be dissolved by getting rid of the old mindsets and psychocultural biases. Multi-track

processes of peace-building need to continue for a longer period of time, and without any break,

in order to generate an atmosphere of trust and reduce misperceptions between the peoples of

India and Pakistan. A greater degree of communication and increased people-to-people contact

would be helpful. Also, geopolitical and geopsychological issues, which are crucial, need to be

addressed. The idea should be to prevent future war so it will not endanger the aura of the South

Asia region. The cross-border terrorism cannot be stopped with the threat of nuclear war

preventing from Pakistan dealing with their problems in open war. While the nuclear attainment

has given Pakistan the ability to breed cross-border terrorism, the nuclear power gives them a

responsibility to the populace of South Asia. With this in mind, India and Pakistan can come

together, to meet this responsibility, define new goals, and determine better priorities for their

nations and for Kashmir. Only then can peace be brought to the region.