86. ENRILE VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*
. Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.—In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and
is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.—It is worthy to note that
bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the
trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.—A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an
offense that, under the law existing at the time of its commission and the application for
admission to bail, may be punished with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he
is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because
these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.—All criminal cases within the competence of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.—The granting of bail is discretionary:
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph
3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or vio-
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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed
the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That
there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court.—For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,
241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called
to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in
Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997).—In resolving bail applications of the accused
who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit: 1. In all cases, whether bail is
a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
Page 1 of 22
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the
guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4.
If the guilt of the accused is not
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section
19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the
grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.—This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of
his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives,
his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should
be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life.—Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the
crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
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286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail is not a matter of right
in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.—This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of
the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of
right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua. Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by
the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for medical or
humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the
basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did
he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a
special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the
Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before the Supreme Court (SC).—The grant of
bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on
a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this
court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and
impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a better argument
for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the people they represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.—The majority’s opinion — other than the invocation of a general human
rights principle — does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian
grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules
of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution. This case leaves this
court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person
— petitioner in this case.
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is only to determine
the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail
hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.—The mandatory bail hearing is only
to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand,
mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because
of his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons; Yet, it now becomes the very basis
for petitioner’s grant of bail.—The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian
reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical condition or
for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent
developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to
Page 2 of 22
establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case. Yet, it now
becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Dissenting Opinions; The
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (SC) allows one (1) week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion.—The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the
submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-
SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.—A Member who disagrees
with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to
the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason
or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the case, but
based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence
“in the result” should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who
agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be
submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members. (Em-
288
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating
the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the
circulation of the majority opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that nowhere in the rules of
procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s
certification.—In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis
of the certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr.
Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous
debilitating conditions. This certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation
before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of the accused not
for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments. Nowhere in the rules of
procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s
health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative
detention is possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner
are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to
present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand
this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is
still the condition that prevails at present.—Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters
that are of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. His
illness is not a matter of general notoriety. Assuming that the medical ailments of
petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair
opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any
other medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires
that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to
ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present. That we make factual
determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically
privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the prosecution
and the accused, without the prosecution being granted the op-
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without consideration of any
rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held, casts
serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority has not set specific bases for finding
that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those
who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder.—It is unclear whether
this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s incarceration aggravates
his medical conditions or if his medical conditions are simply conditions which come
with advanced age. The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical
condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now
under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how grave
his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is
also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in
spite of the best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it
is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital
necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accused’s
detention. There is now no clarity as to when special bail based on medical conditions
and modified arrest should be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a matter of right merely for medical
reasons.—Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v.
Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006): Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee
or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners
who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the “selective
decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as
age increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink used to write and print the majority
opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already
strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that
the major-
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290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
ity’s inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have
been too speculative or premature.—Before the ink used to write and print the majority
opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already
strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that
Page 3 of 22
the majority’s inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may
have been too speculative or premature. Significantly, there is no guidance to
the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu propio or upon
motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail should be filed
before the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime charged in petitioner’s case is one
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules
require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional.—The crime charged in
petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant
of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow
petitioner to go about his other duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and our rules. In other words, there is no rule on whether
the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian considerations extends
even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially
tailored for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more prudent course of action would have
been for the Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme Court (SC), to exercise its discretion in
setting the amount of bail.—There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of
P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge
was P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated
on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the
majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00. The rules guide courts on what to
consider when setting the amount of bail. The majority opinion is sparse on the
evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
more prudent course of action would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this
court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; View that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the
arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any
person accused of crimes.—There are no specific and binding international law
provisions that compel this court to release petitioner given his medical condition. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the
arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any
person accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried
out in a dignified and humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the Supreme Court (SC) in Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470
(2007), was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the accused was not a
flight risk.—In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason,
it remanded the case to the trial court instead of applying the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these
principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail. It is true that the Constitution is replete
with provisions on both the respect for human dignity and the protection of human
rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law,
were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of
course, no reason for these rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be
applicable to Senators of our Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending the applicability of clear legal
provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more
conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human
rights norms.—The mere
292
invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should not
be cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and
statutory provisions and the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human
rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at
the conclusion or result that we want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with
the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous
analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that those that read a decision which does not fully
respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the
decision is the result of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law.—Those that read a decision which does not fully
respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the
decision is the result of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful public official
at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to
selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then
it will weaken the administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without
any determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and
unambiguous text of the Constitution.—The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner
without any determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear
and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own
opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and
obligations should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our
wealth of knowledge and experience.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
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Page 4 of 22
 Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G. Timbol, Ma. Donnabel T. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital,11 and
Tan, Marie Krizel P. Malabanan, Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B. Sagandoy, Jr., his Motion to Fix Bail,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by
Edwardson L. Ong, Erwin G. Matib and Kay Angela R. Peñaflorida for Juan Ponce the Sandiganbayan on
Enrile. _______________
The Solicitor General for respondents. 4 Id., at pp. 107-108.
BERSAMIN, J.: 5 Id., at pp. 103-157.
6 Id., at pp. 163-192.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is 7 Id., at pp. 193-221.
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The 8 Id., at pp. 222-241.
strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity 9 Id., at p. 241.
for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, 10 Id., at pp. 242-243.
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1 11 Id., at pp. 244-247.
12 Id., at pp. 249-256.
The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 20143 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
_______________
1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations
of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp.
307-309 (2009).
2 Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and
concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires and Alex L. Quiroz.
3 Id., at pp. 89-102.
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294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed
his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile
had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to
post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would
only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and
his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the
Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he
is charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime
charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
_______________
13 Id., at p. 13.
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296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Page 5 of 22
 x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken
into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of
the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged.
xxx
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he
is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the
Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However,
as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to
deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a
matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the
exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i)
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 84-88.
15 Id., at pp. 89-102.
297
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever
he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile
is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances — his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 16-19.
17 Id., at pp. 526-542.
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused
to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus, bail acts as a rec-
_______________
18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
19 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,
September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, where the Court said that the constitutional right
to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also Baradaran,
Shima, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72, p.
728 (2011).
20 Baradaran, id., at p. 736.
21 Id., at p. 731.
22 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564,
572.
299
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
onciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter
of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.25
_______________
23 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619,
628.
24 As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.
25 Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained
or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with
a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. 27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
_______________
26 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19 at p.
693.
27 Id.
28 Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance
as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
301
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 “such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provi-
_______________
Page 7 of 22
 29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
30 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
sional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been
aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled
in People v. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted
to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
xxxx
_______________
31 Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-
RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32 A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
303
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence
and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of
the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether
or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under
bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial
court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex parte determination where the Fiscal is
neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means —
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course
of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion
_______________
33 Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should
be denied.
4.
Enrile’s poor health justifies
his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that —
_______________
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Rollo, pp. 252-253.
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might
be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence
of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or
absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the
Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is
“charged with an offense punishable by.” It is, therefore, the
maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not
the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in
the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,37 simply because
the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
_______________
36 Id., at p. 260.
37 Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v.
Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution
for parricide in which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and
consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of
his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an ear-
_______________
38 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R.
No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis).
39 Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No. 157977, February
27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.
307
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 307
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
lier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect
for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because
he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from
the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple
drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by
Holter monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.
41 Id., at pp. 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).
308
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308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or nonfatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery
disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
43 Id., at pp. 334-335, 374-375.
309
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 309
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations
in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement
of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him
the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart
of the present condition of the accused vis-à-vis the facilities
of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but
probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no
facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective
of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court
has already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular
case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case,
is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding,
influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;
x x x47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).
46 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the
petitioner was for treason.
47 Id., at p. 462.
311
Page 10 of 22
 VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 311 of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
xxxx to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
that the petitioner “is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary _______________
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis,” and that in said institute they “have 49 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the
seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and Court observed:
medicine are no longer of any avail”; taking into consideration that the petitioner’s To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a
previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence
petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a
purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in
clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to the case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would
verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending
accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said trial.
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our 50 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6,
above quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran 2006, 484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., No. L-40867, July
(case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.
were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement
in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident
and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion 313
in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.48 VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 313
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by hostility.51
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by
for the trial. the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
meaningful consideration of the appli- Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in
_______________ the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
48 Id., at pp. 465-466. Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
312 Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sereno, CJ., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
cation for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused Peralta, J., For humanitarian reasons.
to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
issue of bail — whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly Villarama, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
the subject of judicial notice — that the courts can already consider in resolving the Reyes, J., On Sick Leave.
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The Court thus balances the Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due Jardeleza, J., No part. Prior OSG action.
process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly 314
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ DISSENTING OPINION

Page 11 of 22

LEONEN, J.:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. — Const., Art. III, Sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. — The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by
Anatole France, French novelist (1844-1924)
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of
the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of
right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed
to release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical
and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail 1 filed
before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this
Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to
find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution
and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very
special treatment is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented as
an expert witness who will be subjected to both direct and cross-examination so that
he can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his inferences as well as
the nature of the medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be
presented by the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be proper before
the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by
the Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter
of right on grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority’s opinion — other than the invocation of a general human
rights principle — does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian
grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules
of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad
hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail
should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking,
multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention,
315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have
to decide whether this is applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities
and not to the aging or sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this
country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal
discretion causing petitions for certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in
an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human
compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and
the stability of our entire judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime
of plunder punishable under Republic Act No. 7080. 2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan,
praying that he be allowed to post bail if
_______________
2 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as Amended by Rep. Act
No. 7659 (1993).
317
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 317
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him.3 On July 3, 2014,
the Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no
Page 12 of 22
warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the same Resolution, On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at
the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s arrest.4 the Philippine National Police General Hospital for medical examination until further
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to orders of the court.16
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in _______________
Camp Crame, Quezon City.5 11 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and 12 Id., at p. 2.
voluntary surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower 13 Id.
the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged age and 14 Id.
physical condition indicated that he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states: 15 Id., at p. 3.
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post 16 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of
guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old and
voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal; and (c) 319
Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8 VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 319
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail 9 dated This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General
July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a Reply10 dated July 11, 2014. Hospital is not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this
_______________ Order be declared invalid or null and void.
3 Ponencia, p. 294. On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution17 denying Enrile’s
4 Id. Motion to Fix Bail for being premature,18 stating that:
5 Id. [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
6 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5. shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused
7 Id., at p. 5. Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be
8 Id., at pp. 6-7. duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
9 Petition for Certiorari, Annex J. To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
10 Petition for Certiorari, Annex K. Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.19
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating that there were mitigating and
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) extenuating circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention health proved that he was not a flight risk.21 The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the
at the PNP General Hospital11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that “his advanced age and Motion on August 8, 2014.22 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.
frail medical condition”12 merit hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police General
Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan.13 He II
also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the
Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
medical facility.14 His prayer states: Motion to Fix Bail for prematurity. It
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place _______________
him under hospital confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon 17 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.
City, with continuing authority given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise 18 Id., at pp. 6 and 10.
his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow Enrile’s immediate access of, 19 Id., at p. 6.
or temporary visit to, another medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of 20 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
emergency or necessity, secured with appropriate guards, but after completion of the 21 Id., at pp. 3-5.
appropriate medical treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP 22 Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.
General Hospital.15

After the prosecution’s submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at 320
the PNP General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
resolve this Motion.
Page 13 of 22
 Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail based upon the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the Sandiganbayan — acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused through his or her arrest. 23 The consequent detention is to
ensure that the accused will appear when required by the Rules and by order of the
court trying the offense.24 The provisions on bail provide a balance between the
accused’s right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due process rights of
the state to be able to effect the accused’s prosecution on the other hand. That balance
is not exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court.
The grant of bail is ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a matter
of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114
provide:
_______________
23 See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278; 160 SCRA 1, 4 (1988)
[Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
24 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 3.
321
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 321
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance
as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable,
the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a
matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused
is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only
to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case
of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira25 where this court ordered the People’s Court to
conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being charged with a capital offense. 26 This
court reasoned that “the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the People’s Court to
exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in
force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail.”27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the People’s Court and gave the
following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the
petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise
of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for
the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor’s attitude is
not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence
or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular
question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success
of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to
do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who,
as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of
the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present
evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal
shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.28
_______________
25 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
26 Id., at p. 644.
27 Id.
28 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946)
[Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
323
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Page 14 of 22
 The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall
before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether
charged or not yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release
on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of
showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule
110, Section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is,
as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion,
by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the
right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits
or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence,
unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et
al.31 and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al. 32
_______________
29 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per CJ. Moran, En Banc].
30 Id., at p. 58.
31 112 Phil. 781, 782-783; 2 SCRA 888, 889 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].
32 149 Phil. 241, 247; 42 SCRA 184, 186 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this court’s instructions on the
application of the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated from
1981 to 1996.34 Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints filed against
judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 for granting bail to the ac-
_______________
33 336 Phil. 214; 269 SCRA 220 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
34 Id., at pp. 221-227; pp. 227-233, citing People v. Sola, 191 Phil. 21; 103 SCRA
393 (1981) [Per CJ. Fernando, En Banc], People v. San Diego, 135 Phil. 514; 26 SCRA
522 (1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc], People v. Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507; 170 SCRA
489 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007;
186 SCRA 620 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-
286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No.
94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v.
Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 421 [Per
Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993, 219
SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936,
September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v.
Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En
Banc], Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237
SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October
27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M. No.
MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v.
Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176; 240 SCRA 154 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second
Division], Santos v. Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11; 245 SCRA 56 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En
Banc], Sule v. Biteng, 313 Phil. 398; 243 SCRA 524 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 323 Phil. 724; 253 SCRA 601 (1996)
[Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
35 344 Phil. 415; 279 SCRA 1 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
325
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 325
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
cused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only lament on the deluge of
these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with
a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all,
there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of
fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including
lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may,
we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
“1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.”
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial
judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges
cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision ren-
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 430-431; p. 12.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
dered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable.
A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects
judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more
Page 15 of 22
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can
only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot
justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be
filed against judges who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was charged with
murder.39 Judge Bugtas initially denied the accused’s petition for bail but granted his
motion for reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing. 40 As a result, Judge
Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.0041 for being “grossly ignorant of the
rules and procedures in granting or denying bail[.]”42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
_______________
37 Id., citing Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237; 269 SCRA 220, 243-244
(1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
38 448 Phil. 45; 400 SCRA 37 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
39 Id., at p. 48; p. 41.
40 Id., at pp. 49-50; p. 46.
41 Id., at pp. 56-57; p. 48.
42 Id., at p. 56; p. 47.
43 389 Phil. 372; 334 SCRA 1 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
44 Id., at pp. 375 and 388; p. 13.
327
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 327
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined
P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with
possession of illegal drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail
or the prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a
hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a
violation of due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down
by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable.
He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could
be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak
or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the
law and the rules.48
_______________
45 486 Phil. 605; 444 SCRA 382 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
Division].
46 Id., at pp. 611 and 618; p. 385.
47 674 Phil. 324; 658 SCRA 535 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
48 Id., at pp. 340-341; p. 550, citing Directo v. Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5; 346 SCRA
223, 228-229 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v.
Flores, supra note 43 at p. 381; p. 19.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that bail
be granted without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution
argued that any grant of bail should be based only on their failure to establish the
strength of the evidence against him.49 The prosecution had no opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s
Motion to Fix Bail for being premature. The denial is neither “capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary [nor] despotic”50 as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. It was in accord
with the clear provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of
procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s Motion to
Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
release petitioner on bail for medical or
_______________
49 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.
50 People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116; 467 SCRA 137, 165 (2005)
[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004,
431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on
Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313; 420 SCRA 365, 378 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 541, 553;
423 SCRA 122, 133 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 660, 667; 323 SCRA
679, 686 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
329
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 329
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Page 16 of 22
humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as
respondent developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this
court to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile
may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
 It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile falls within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the
burden of Enrile to show entitlement to his right.
 The prosecution failed to establish that Enrile’s case falls within the exception;
hence, denial of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
 The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the Anti-
Plunder Law itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but
also the penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion temporal) by “consider(ing)
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code.”
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
 Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a
needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt
(if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in
issue, in its Opposition to Enrile’s motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong,
in the light of the prosecution’s continuing muteness to the defense’s repeated
challenge for the prosecution to produce any “single piece of paper showing
that Enrile received even a single peso of kickback,”
the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted that Enrile must first initiate, and
formally apply for, the formal proceedings (“bail hearing”) before the prosecution
may be called upon to discharge its duty of proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
 The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (“shall be bailable”) does not
become a prohibition (“shall not be bailable”). Indeed, the exception to a
mandatory right (“shall”) is a permissive right (“may”).
 A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence
and non-deprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the
exception to right-to-bail.
 Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is
demonstrated not being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.
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 Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical
condition, and having voluntarily surrendered.
 Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight
risk.
 Other circumstances negating Enrile’s disposition to become a fugitive from
justice are also present.
 The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this
stage of the proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right. 51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE
the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the
Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in favor of
Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and
equitable.52
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this
court in and out of formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the
discussion
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51 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.
52 Id., at p. 64.
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was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of a draft early this year. The
draft mainly adopted the legal arguments of the Petition which was centered on this
court taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic mitigating
circumstances that would lower the penalty to be imposed even before trial or a hearing
for the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong happened before
the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member
submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were vigorously
exchanged in writing.
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 Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common
position that there was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should
be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as
a petition or application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe and this member differed only in the treatment of mitigating circumstances
and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on
August 11, 2015, the member-in-charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of
dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter of
right and focusing the grant of bail on “humanitarian” grounds. The member-in-charge
committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This member
expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition
of petitioner was circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this
member responded with a letter addressed to all the justices, which stated:
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53 219 Phil. 432; 134 SCRA 466 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].
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In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the
proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out thoroughly so that
the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an accused charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail “for humanitarian
reasons.”
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and the
present canonical interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification
of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing
away with cross-examination and not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or
have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the
facts relating to the medical condition of the accused? Or are we substituting our
judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which
authorizes the accused to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits
symptoms which cannot be treated by the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial
requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayan’s decisions
in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused were tainted with grave
abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or if we are
able to hurdle the factual issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity,
should his detention rather be modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for
hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical
condition can be attended to,
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should he be returned to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work, does
this not nullify the very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on
what to consider when setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his
circumstances, what is our basis for setting this amount? What evidence have we
considered? Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the
accused entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention
and undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply his advanced age? What qualifies for
advanced age? Is it the medical conditions that come with advanced age? Would this
apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder?
Is he suffering from a unique debilitating disease which cannot be accommodated by
the best care provided by our detention facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there
sufficient evidence and rules to support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an
accused in his condition? Or are we now reading the general tenor of the declaration
of human rights to apply specifically to the condition of this accused? What entitles the
accused in this case to a liberal application of very general statements on human
rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015. The
member-in-charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written
reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he was
abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering on release on bail on
humanitarian \
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54 J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
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grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail was a matter of
right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of two
mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only
amendment to the majority opinion accepted by the member-in-charge was the
increase of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the
member-in-charge, emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe, and this member dissented.
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 During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the
ponente passed around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not the
version voted upon during the morning’s deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for
signature was substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version granting bail on
humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioner’s entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply because
the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of
the court at the time that the case was voted upon. But because the final version for
signing was
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55 Ponencia, p. 305.
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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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not the version voted upon, this member had to substantially revise his dissent. Since
the issue of mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right was no longer the
basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously
offer her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her filing
of a Separate Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.—A Member who disagrees
with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to
the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason
or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the case, but
based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence
“in the result” should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who
agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be
submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and
suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started
to speculate on the contents of the majority opinion. This may have created
expectations on the part of petitioner’s friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that the Decision had as yet not been
promulgated and served, made announcements as to their readiness to receive the
cash bond and process the release of the accused even if August 19, 2015
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote
and the date of promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioner’s arguments, the majority, instead of
denying the Petition for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even
argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the
certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating
conditions.56 This certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation 57 before
this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of the accused not for the
purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial
notice of a doctor’s certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on
evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’
findings on petitioner’s health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether
no kind of alternative detention is possible.
_______________
56 The enumeration of diseases on pages 307-308 of the ponencia is based on
the certification of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of determining
whether hospital arrest can continue. The hearing was not for the purpose of
determining whether bail should be granted on the basis of his medical condition.
57 Rollo, p. 373.
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Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.59
Page 19 of 22
 Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the
prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut
the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by petitioner in
this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify
Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at
present.
_______________
58 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
59 Id., at pp. 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun,
109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.
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That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one
who is obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence
by both the prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being granted the
opportunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without consideration of any rebutting
evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt
on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-
standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is
granted as a mandatory manner after a petition for bail is filed by the accused. The
medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require
immediate medical attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for such
releases. The closest that the majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective
of preventive incarceration during trial.60 (Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
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60 Ponencia, p. 310.
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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to their health OR whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are humanely
treated. Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to conduct
monthly jail visitations in order to “[e]nsure the promotion and protection of the dignity
and well-being”62 of detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be released to
a medical facility on humanitarian grounds “if their continuous confinement during the
pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their life.”63
In many instances, alternative detention — whether temporary or permanent — is
granted upon a clear showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the
physical condition of the accused, as proven through evidence presented in open court,
is absolutely requiring medical attention that could not be accommodated within the
current custodial arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that such alternative
custodial arrangements do not take place more than the time necessary to address the
medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan should ensure that
alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the state and, therefore, should be
sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to
the wealthy or powerful detainees.
_______________
61 Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated
in OCA Circular No. 107-2013.
62 A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), Sec. 1(3)
63 De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
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On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the Sandiganbayan already issued
Resolutions allowing accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital and continue medical examinations until further orders from the court, subject
to reportorial requirements and at accused’s personal expense. In particular, the
Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales’s report], the Court will hold in abeyance
action on accused Enrile’s motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital. However,
he is allowed to remain thereat until further orders from this Court. The Director or
Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to allow accused
Enrile to access another medical facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of
emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to be administered on
accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be provided for by the physicians of, the
PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE.
After completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside Camp Crame, accused
Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. The said director or
administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such visit/s of
Page 20 of 22
accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day following the said
visit/s.66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly
authorized representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to
continue with the medical examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a
report and recommendation
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64 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.
65 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
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to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The necessary medical
examination/s and/or procedure/s as determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken
at PGH or any government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the
appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus and competent
personnel to undertake the procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF
ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical
examination/s and/or procedure/s and submission of the required report and
recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at the Philippine
National Police General Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in
its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED.67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be
brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements
to the court. In granting bail to petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that
the Sandiganbayan’s decisions in relation to its supervision of the accused’s detention
were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not
seem to be suffering from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be
provided for by our detention facilities and temporary hospital arrest in accordance with
their order. How the majority arrived at a conclusion different from the
Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue
become the subject of intense discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
_______________
67 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.
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It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s
incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his medical conditions are simply
conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of
petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention
and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his conditions
are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is also no showing
as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the best
care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention
that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the
hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the
accused’s detention. There is now no clarity as to when special bail based on medical
conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical
condition is applicable only to those of advanced age and whether that advanced age
is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to whether this is applicable only
to cases involving plunder. There is no guidance in the majority’s opinion as to whether
this is only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
_______________
68 536 Phil. 413; 505 SCRA 573 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
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Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may
be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.
There may also be an existing proposition for the “selective decarceration of older
prisoners” based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases. 69
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special
kind of bail. Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court
for the trial.70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried,
friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would report
immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majority’s
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 69 Id., at p. 428; pp. 585-586, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-
Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 581; 367 SCRA 285, 299 (2001) [Per Curiam, En
Banc], People v. Gako, Jr., 401 Phil. 514, 541; 348 SCRA 334, 352 (2000)
[Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Pineda, Ernesto, The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), which in turn cited De la Rama v. People’s
Court, supra note 63, Archer’s case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep.
24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime
and The Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234 (2000).
70 Ponencia, p. 311.
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inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too
speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then
can be cancelled motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that
motion to cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be
granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is
strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary,
and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties would be to blatantly
flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the
basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency has
passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount
for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was
increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then,
upon the request of one member who voted with the majority, it was then increased to
P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. 71 The
majority opinion is sparse on the evidence it
_______________
71 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 9, which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.—The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable
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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the more prudent course of action
would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in
setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court
to release petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration 72 to uphold the value
and dignity of every person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on
lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only
implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and humane
manner.
_______________
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545; 407 SCRA 10, 57 (2003)
[Per J. Carpio, En Banc], this court stated: “Although the signatories to the Declaration
did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State.”
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 states that “[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
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