A.

JURISDICTION
1. DUERO VS. CA 373 SCRA 11

Topic: Jurisdiction and the application of estoppel

FACTS: Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in
the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the
land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private
respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land. On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before
the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner and the Ruenas
executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered
on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the
ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement,
and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. Petitioner presented his
evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private
respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot. On June 10, 1996, private respondent
filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente,
Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse
claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Private respondent then filed before
the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial.
The RTC again denied the Petition. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he
alleged that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR. Private respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

Issues:

1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case

2) Whether the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after he
has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

RULING:

1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129.

2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because,
if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the
mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the
summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about
the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then
filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for
Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of
the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This
motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when
the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default,
denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions
for reconsideration The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot
be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.
Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings
and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself
barren of jurisdiction over the action Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty
of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and
its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it
issued, are annulled and set aside.

2. GONZAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

394 SCRA 472

FACTS: In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land from Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was specifically
denominated as Lot No. 19 and which the spouses mortgaged to the Social Security Commission as a
security for their housing loan. Meanwhile, the spouses started to construct their house on Lot No. 18,
and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informed
them of such mistake but the spouses instead offered to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their premises, thus they
continued building their house thereon. However for failure on the part of the spouses to pay their
obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was consequently foreclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and a new
one was issued in the name of SSS. After such foreclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18 and 19
and demanded from lucky homes to reform their contract. Lucky home however refused. This prompted
the spouses to file an action for reformation of contract with damages before the RTC. The RTC however
dismissed the action for lack of merit and awarded lucky homes moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Subsequently then, a writ of execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion to recall such writ,
questioning now the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Housing and land use regulatory board. Subsequently, the spouses went to the CA to annul RTC’s decision.
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the spouses were estopped from question RTC’s jurisdiction
pursuant to the case of Tijam.. On the other hand spouses contended that the doctrine in Tijam case has
been abandoned.

ISSUE: Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?

HELD: Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine
laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently
held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at
any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will
bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked
the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private
respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted
their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction
during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its
decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively
waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

3. Manila Bankers vs. Kok Wei

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Re: Jurisdiction

DOCTRINE

complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner
or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court.
In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now
in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction.

FACTS: Respondent Eddy Ng Kok Wei, a Singaporean businessman, expressed in a letter addressed to
Petitioner Manila Bankers his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
Respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000 for the purchase of a 46-square condominium
unit. After over a month, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price.

Petitioner executed a contract to sell in favor of respondent. The contract expressly states that the unit
“shall substantially be completed and delivered” to respondent on 8 may 1990. 1% of the total amount
shall be charged against petitioner in case of delay in the delivery of the unit.

The final turn over of the unit was pushed to a later date (21 May 1990). Respondent returned to the
Philippines a couple of times, and for those times he found his unit still unlivable. Exasperated, respondent
sent petitioner a letter demanding payment for damages he sustained. Petitioner however ignored the
demand. Respondent then filed a complaint before RTC against respondent for specific performance and
damages.

During pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and eventually occupied
it on 12 April 1991. Respondent’s cause of action has been limited to claim for damages.

Trial Court: Manila Bankers is liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its
obligation to Eddy.

CA: affirmed Trial Court’s decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that
petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.
ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over Manila Bankers’ case.

HELD: Yes. On petitioner’s contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section
1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:

“SECTION 1. – In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:

xxx

“C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

x x x.”

Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have
consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit
buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court.
In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now
in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction.

4. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PARTIES

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment against Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita in her answer alleged that her husband Manuel
is already dead. During the trial, respondent Lolita moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: 1. Complaint failed to plead an indispensable party; 2. Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691; 3. Trial court erred in ordering
substitution of deceased Manuel by his heirs; 4. Trial court must also dismiss case against Lolita in
accordance to Section 6, Rule 86; REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I – CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY.
BRONDIAL’S 2017 SYLLABUS COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO
(The Poypis’) 13 RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time (after 6 years). Respondent
appealed to the CA which granted the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel;
2. Whether or not respondent may still assail the question of jurisdiction of Manuel on her motion to
dismiss?

RULING: 1. NO, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant
is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. “Summons is a writ by which the defendant
is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person.” In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead
even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.

2. NO. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was the
court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches
finds no application in his case. Instead the principles relating to jurisdiction are pertinent therein.Since
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which
are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a
motion to dismiss if filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If thee objection is not raised either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or
the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above quoted Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court. As a question of jurisdiction raised here is that over the person of Manuel, the same is
deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim
the defense since “lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which
can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.”

FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE

558 SCRA 63
TOPIC : JURSDICTION / ESTOPPEL BY LACHES

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found
him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on
the case .The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has
already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4
years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein,
the principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said
issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA.

RULING: No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as
to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In
Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches. In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could
not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the
milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead
to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the
appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Petition for
review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.

B. Hierarchy of Courts

1. AGAN JR. vs. PHIL. INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINAL, CO. INC 420 SCRA 575
TOPIC: Jurisdiction and Hierarchy of Courts

FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted a proposal to the DOTC for the development of
NAIA Terminal 3. After a careful examination, the DOTC created the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project. PBAC however, awarded the project to Phil.
International Air Terminals Co (PIATCO). AEDC filed before the RTC of Pasig a Petition for Nullity of the
Proceedings and for Prohibition. The other air service providers of MIAA also claimed that the awarding
of the project to PIATCO would somehow jeopardize their employment or concession-contracts. PIATCO
commenced an arbitration proceeding before the International Chamber of Commerce against the Gov’t
of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and MIAA and alleged that Philippine courts are without
jurisdiction to review its case against the government and that the submission of the case to the SC is a
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts as trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC with
respect to a special civil action for prohibition, thus, resort must first be had before the trial courts.

ISSUE: Whether the arbitration proceedings availed of by PIATCO deprived the SC of its jurisdiction over
the case?

RULING: No. After a careful examination of the FACTS of the case, the controversy involves significant
legal questions which the SC cannot just ignore. The rule on the hierarchy of courts will also not prevent
the SC from assuming jurisdiction as the rule may be relaxed when the redress sought cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts and where exceptional and compelling reasons justify the availment of the
remedy. In the present case, It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar
that call for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of
transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of the country’s premier
international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first impression and
they entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant cases. It is also
established that petitioners in the present case who have presented legitimate interests in the resolution
of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the
arbitration clause and hence, cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy and
decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the present controversy, including those raised by
petitioners, cannot be made before an REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I – CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON
ATTY. BRONDIAL’S 2017 SYLLABUS COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE
SERRANO (The Poypis’) 7 arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious
determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to allow the parties to settle
the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO Contracts which
the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.

2. LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL VS. ATIENZA, JR.

420 SCRA 562

FACTS: Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section
492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. Section 493
of that law provides that “the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board of directors.” All
other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of LGUs shall
be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions
of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern
its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out with its Calendar
of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting the
synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together
with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. Respondent City Council of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of representatives of the
District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after
the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance
be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through
legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. Mayor signed
and approved the city ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court.

Held: No. Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional
and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse
to this Court should be allowed. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent
with the RTC and CA in certain cases. SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance of the
hierarchy-of-courts rule was…
 3. ST. MARY CRUSADE FOUNDATION, INC. VS. RIEL 745 SCRA 73

FACTS: The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and
lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Respondent Judge initially gave due course
to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution. The
petitioner moved for a MR but was denied by the RTC. Hence the petitioner came to the court alleging
that the respondent judge had unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance
of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court;
that the judge acted without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the
further damage and prejudice of herein petitioner, thus, the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus is proper

RULING: NO. The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing
the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling
reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to
free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.23 There being no
special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy
of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Finally, the land covered by the petition
for judicial reconstitution related to the same area that formed the UP campus. The UP’s registered
ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been settled under the law. Accordingly, the
dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP’s
registered ownership.

4. INTRAMUOS Administration vs. Offshore Construction and Development Co.

FACTS: In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease: Baluarte
De San Andres, Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao and Revellin De Recoletos. All three (3) properties were
leased for five (5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003.

Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However,
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore Construction’s non-
conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries’ Philippine-Spanish
architecture in the area.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several
demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction
would pay its arrears.

To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the Department of Tourism’s monthly
operational expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano
Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the offer, and the parties
executed a Memorandum of Agreement covering the period of August 15, 2004 to August 25, 2005.
However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears, which amounted to P13,448,867.45
as of December 31, 2009. On March 26, 2010, Offshore Construction received Intramuros’ latest demand
letter.

Original Proceedings (MeTC)

Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court on April 28, 2010.
Offshore Construction filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim. On July 12, 2010, Offshore Construction filed a Very Urgent Motion, praying that
Intramuros’ complaint be dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule on non-forum shopping, lack
of jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia. It argued that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case since the relationship between the parties was not one of lessor-lessee but
governed by a concession agreement.

In its October 19, 2010 Order, the Metropolitan Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Preliminarily, it found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, Offshore Construction’s motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had
no jurisdiction over the case.

It held that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint. While there were lease contracts between the
parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s
relationship as one of concession. Under this concession agreement, Offshore Construction undertook to
develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for which it incurred expenses. The trial court found that
the issues could not be mere possession and rentals only

Appellate Proceedings (RTC – Rule 40)

Intramuros appealed the MTC Order with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the MTC Order in toto.

Appellate Proceedings (SC – Rule 45)

Intramuros filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the RTC decision. In its Petition for Review,
Intramuros claims that the MTC could have determined the issue of jurisdiction based on the allegations
in its complaint. It points out that “jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
[in] the complaint” and that the trial court’s jurisdiction is not lost “just because the defendant makes a
contrary allegation” in its defense.

ISSUE:

WON the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros Administration (YES)

RATIO:

It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of
the property involved. Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who
unlawfully withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession.
To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint
must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint.

There is a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following:

(a) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter’s right of possession;

(c) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(d) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

A review of petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made.

The Metropolitan Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint because the parties’ situation has allegedly become “more complicated” than one of lease.

Respondent’s defense that its relationship with petitioner is one of concession rather than lease does not
determine whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The
pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s
jurisdiction.

Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove the Metropolitan
Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint.

To emphasize, physical possession, or de facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment
proceedings. Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has
jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts
have been alleged, such as in this case.

Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession, as there
is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover
possession of real property.

5. Bureau of Customs vs. Gallegos

C. Residual Prerogative

1. KATON VS. PALANCA 437

SCRA 565
TOPIC: DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office
of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real
property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan for the purpose of
eventual conversion or reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon
to apply for homestead patent. Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of
Lands, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore
certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. However,
there were also several favorable endorsements that were made to survey the island under the
request of herein respondents. Then, the records show that, on November 8, 1996, one of the
respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for the portion of the island
consisiting of 8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on
June 8, 1972. The respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. 14527 and
OCT No. G-7098 on March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. Petitioner
assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain
portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were
obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in
favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the
reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right
to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested
for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. Respondents aver that they are all bona
fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation
purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. Respondents
contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because
an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead
applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over
the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. Respondents filed their Answer
with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they
also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial
court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of
the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order
dated July 29, 1999. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied
by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited
motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of
prescription invoking residual prerogative.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual
prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition
on an issue not raised in the Petition?"

RULING: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are
evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court
shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus: "x x x
[T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
 failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the
rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute
of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied) On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.
– A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice
of appeal in due time. "A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with
respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. "In
appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon
the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties. "In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts
is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case
or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal
of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The
CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on
appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules. REMEDIAL LAW
REVIEW I – CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL’S 2017 SYLLABUS COMPILED
& UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis’) 10 To be sure, the CA
had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action.

5. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
PAT-OG, SR. VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
765 SCRA JUNE
FACTS: Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third
year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative
Region (CSC-CAR) for misconduct and a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its
Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct. On
December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit. The Ruling
of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the CSC-CAR and adjudged Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct. Pat-og filed a
motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He
contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by
a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. CA affirmed the
resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as
the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following

ISSUE: WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against Pat-og?

HELD: In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the
Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction
over administrative cases against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the
CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative
Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)
expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction,
in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction
exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the others.

E. ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

1. First Sarmiento Property Holdings vs. Phil. Bank of Communication

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS vs. PBCOM

FACTS:

On June 19, 2002,First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40 million loan, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over parcels of land. On September 15, 2003, the loan was increased to P100,000,000.00.
On January 2, 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, claiming
that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal
amount and accrued interest on the loan.

On December 27, 2011, First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage with the RTC. However, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of
the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees.On December
29, 2011, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder.

On January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and paid a
filing fee of P5,545.00. First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan of P100
million from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. RTC
issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for 72 hours, enjoining the registration of the certificate
of sale with the Registry of Deeds-Bulacan and directed the parties to observe the status quo ante. PBCOM
opposed that RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for
annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair
market value of the mortgaged properties.

On January 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos City, Bulacan issued a certificate
of sale to PBCOM. On April 3, 2012, RTC-Malolos dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and ruled
that following the ruling in the case of HGC vs. R. II Builders and NHA, that an action for annulment or
rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objective and nature of the action which is to
recover real property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage.

RULING:

YES! In the case at bar, the underlying question for this Court's resolution pertains to jurisdiction, or to
be more precise, whether the Regional Trial Court attained jurisdiction over petitioner's Complaint with
the amount of docket fees paid.

Annulment of real estate mortgage has a subject incapable of pecuniary estimation because it was not
intended to recover ownership or possession of the mortgaged properties sold to respondent during the
auction sale.

Jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case" brought before it for
resolution. Courts exercise the powers conferred on them with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction
over: "(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and
(d) the remedy."

Jurisdiction over the thing or the res is a court's authority over the object subject of litigation.62 The court
obtains jurisdiction or actual custody over the object through the seizure of the object under legal process
or the institution of legal proceedings which recognize the power and authority of the court.
Jurisdiction over the parties is the court's power to render judgment that are binding on the parties. The
courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs when they file their initiatory pleading, while the defendants
come under the court's jurisdiction upon the valid service of summons or their voluntary appearance in
court.

Jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case is the court's authority to hear and
determine cases within a general class where the proceedings in question belong. This power is conferred
by law and cannot be acquired through stipulation, agreement between the parties, or implied waiver
due to the silence of a party.

Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with Congress given the plenary power, for cases not
enumerated in Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.