D.2 NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC.

, After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter, we rule in the

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to
OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, our mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court of
respondents. justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question of evidence. But
evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which this Board, being
FACTS: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta merely a quasi-judicial body, is not strict about.
C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the
apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a
MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must
Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be
receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00. recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the
jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board.
allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial
in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the
Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of
petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the
principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is
is registered. registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this
well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants
herein would like us to.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be
applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial
ISSUE: Whether or not the law of Singapore should be applied in the case at bar.
notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they
RULING: YES.
offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death
benefits.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co.
(PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Complaint, it was stipulated that:
after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course
petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following:
of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in
whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other
Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;
time, the EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention,
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses;
including hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen
illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the
Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified
physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the Ministry
was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct
rendered its decision in this case as follows:
compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and
In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of
subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the
compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is
Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of
registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board
registry of the vessel whichever is greater.
issued the questioned Order.
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law
Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine
of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their
Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since
responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the existence
private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the
of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented and that
petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.
the Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of
Singapore.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of
C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law,
Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in
applying that law.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National
Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases
including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore
maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may
apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the
technical rules of procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial
trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security
Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and
resolved in favor of labor.
D.3 EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). ESI is another recruitment agency which
collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private
respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work
for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of
qualified applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist." In a facsimile
transmission dated November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from the
applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the
position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to
the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly
salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's
immediate dispatch.
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that
granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then
deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary—his
employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the
assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was
terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter, on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency
primarily on your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment
agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or
instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several
instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing
OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994,
against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western
Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City for
underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudi Arabian law may apply?
RULING
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed
by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law
between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the
contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states
that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g.
specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi
Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is
not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to
incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence
that the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal
and just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
 (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and (1) Was the belated filing of a sworn certificate of non-forum shopping in substantial
their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized compliance w/ the mandatory requirement?
cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 (2) Is the certificate of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country covered by
of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is the Rules of Court (ROC)?
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be RULING:
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he (1) YES. Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the SC cannot
so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated uphold petitioners’ contention that respondent's delay of more than 2years and 3
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. months in filing the required certificate of non-forum shopping may not be
Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of considered substantial compliance with the requirements of SC Administrative
the workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations reasons of oversight and inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance
Commission.The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid that could excuse her non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the
or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. above-mentioned Circular and Rule; that subsequent compliance with the
requirement does not serve as an excuse for a party's failure to comply in the first
instance.
D.4 HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES ARCILLA v. MA. LOURDES TEODORO
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides: “Certification against
G.R. No. 162886, 11 August 2008, THIRD DIVISION, (Austria-Martinez, J.)
forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint /other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief/in a sworn
FACTS:
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has
- Ma. Lourdes Teodoro initially filed w/ the RTC of Catanduanes an application for
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
land registration of 2 parcels of land therein. She alleged that she purchased the
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla, as shown by a deed of sale, w/ the
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
exception of the commercial building constructed thereon. Prior thereto, she also
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
alleged that Pacifico acquired the lots by virtue of the partition of his father’s
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
estate. Lastly, she presented an affidavit of quitclaim executed by the heirs of
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
Vicente Arcilla, Pacifico’s brother, in the latter’s favor. This case was transferred
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint/initiatory pleading has been filed.”
to the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes in view of the expanded jurisdiction of the said
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
court, as provided under R.A. 7691.
mere amendment of the complaint/other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
- In their opposition, the heirs contended that they are owners pro-indiviso of the
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
lots, including the building and other improvements thereon, by virtue of their
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses Vicente and Josefa Arcilla.
compliance w/ any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
Contrary to Teodoro’s claim, the lots were owned by their father who has
of court, w/o prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
purchased the same from Manuel Sarmiento in 1917, as evidenced by several
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
tax declarations. In moving to dismiss the application, petitioners and their
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
predecessors-in-interest sought to be declared as the true and absolute owners
shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
of the pro-indiviso subject lots and its corresponding registration and issuance of
This Rule was preceded by Circular No. 28-91, w/c originally required the
certificate in their favor as they had been in its possession since 1906.
certification of non-forum shopping for petitions filed with the SC and the CA; and
-
SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, w/c extended the certification requirement
- When the trial ensued, Teodoro subsequently filed a motion for admission of her
for civil complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and other
certificate against forum shopping, contending mere oversight and inadvertence
agencies. In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals: Circular No. 28-91 was designed to
in her failure to comply with the requirement of attaching the verification and said
serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
certificate to her complaint. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss (MD) the
of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
application for Teodoro for failure to comply w/ the mandatory requirement is a
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
ground for the petition’s dismissal upon motion and hearing. MTC dismissed the
procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
MD and confirmed Teodoro’s ownership and registered the 2 lots in her name.
possible.The same guideline still applies in interpreting what is now Section 5
RTC affirmed in toto on the ground of the appeal’s lack of merit. Petitioner’s
Rule 7 of the ROC.
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied. CA also denied the appeal and its
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
MR.
simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally settled that litigation is
ISSUES:
 not merely a game of technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed
as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Moreover, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford
every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.
It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-
forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be
interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum shopping.In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore,
is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-
compliance with the requirements, there were special
circumstances/compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive
aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or
"compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. De Guia v. De
Guia was cited in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform in holding that
“even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum-shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on
the merits pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on
grounds of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.”
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not
commit any error in proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein
respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum shopping. More
importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the petition for
land registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the
showing that she had no intention to violate the Rules with impunity, as
she was the one who invited the attention of the court to the inadvertence
committed by her counsel, should be deemed as special
circumstances/compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7 Section
5 of the ROC, as a rule, a dismissal w/o prejudice, and since there is no showing
that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition for
registration would entail a tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the
parties to re-submit the pleadings w/c they have already filed with the trial court,
and conducting anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention the
expenses that will be incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-
conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the judicial policy of just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
(2) YES. There is no merit to the heirs’ contentions that the verification and
certification subsequently submitted by respondent did not state the country/city
where the notary public exercised her notarial functions; and that the MTC simply
concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA;
that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
were notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for any
purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply w/ the requirement of Section 24
Rule 132 of the ROC that “the notarized document must be accompanied by a
certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is
stationed in the country in w/c a record of the subject document is kept,
proving/authenticating that the person who notarized the document is indeed
authorized to do so and has custody of the same.”
From the foregoing provision, it can be gathered that it does not include
documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For foreign public
documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our courts, the same must
be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in the country where
the documents could be found/had been executed. However, after judicious
studies of the rule, it basically pertains to written official acts, or records of
the official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines/of a foreign country. This is so
because the provision explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule
comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the
same. Thus, the contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was
submitted was defective, as it did not bear the certification provided under the
provision, is devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that the
respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed with
powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit forum
shopping.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present case because the
Rules of Evidence w/c were in effect at that time were the old Rules prior to their
amendment in 1989. The rule applied in Lopez, which was decided prior to the
effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,was Section 25, Rule 132, to wit:
“Proof of public or official record – An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.”
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25 Rule 132
became Section 24 Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the deletion of
the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein," which was
substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19.” Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
now reads as follows: “Proof of official record. - The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.”
 Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides: “Classes of documents. - For the
purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in
the foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in
Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. The SC agrees w/ the CA that had the Court
intended to include notarial documents as one of the public documents
contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only
the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25 Rule 132 were made
applicable to all public/official records without any distinction because the old rule
did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear under Section 24 Rule
132 that its provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents referred to
under paragraph (a), Section 19 Rule 132.
D.5 Wildvalley Shipping Co. Ltd., vs Court of Appeals
FACTS: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by private
respondent Philippine President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to
load iron ore.Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to
leave port, Mr. Ezzardel Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine
Roxas through the Orinoco River.He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February
11, 1988boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at
the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on
watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the portat 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel at mile 172.The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring
the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel.Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that the watch officer called the
master to the bridge.The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and
verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down,
the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of
the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.As a result of the blockage, the
Malandrinon, a vessel owned by petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was
unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance
Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
unearned profits. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the trial court’s
decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
ISSUE: WON Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
HELD:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony
of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent
evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant
Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to testify on the
existence of theReglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of
Venezuela) and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the
aforementioned posts for eight years. As such he is in charge of designating the pilots
for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the
documents that come into the office of the harbour masters.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in
the GacetaOficialof the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the GacetaOficial was
presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of
the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public
documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of
the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular
agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is
not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
 It is not enough that the GacetaOficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon
attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in
the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written
law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign
statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.At this juncture, we have to point out that the
Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading
about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event
or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite
the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela.
Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a
foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.
The Court finds that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the
pilot. Hence, the shipowner is not liable because the hiring of such pilot is compulsory.
D.6 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also
known as GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS
PETER PAULENZ and ANNE NICOLAY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS, Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch, National
Labor Relations Commission, and BERNADETTE CARMELLA MAGTAAS,
CAROLINA DIONCO, CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, MELVIN DELA PAZ, RANDY
TAMAYO and EDGARDO RAMILL
FACTS: On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-
operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what was then West Germany. The
Agreement affirmed the countries’ "common interest in promoting the technical and
economic development of their States, and recogni[zed] the benefits to be derived by
both States from closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of
"arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-operation." While the
Agreement provided for a limited term of effectivity of five (5) years, it nonetheless was
stated that "[t]he Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one
year unless either of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months
prior to its expiry," and that even upon the Agreement’s expiry, its provisions would
"continue to apply to any projects agreed upon x xx until their completion."
On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs
Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement
in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed the common
commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health
Insurance—Networking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to "enable
Philippine families–especially poor ones–to maintain their health and secure health
care of sustainable quality."It appears that SHINE had already been in existence even
prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement, though the record does not indicate when
exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless, the Arrangement stated the various
obligations of the Filipino and German governments.
In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing
organizations for SHINE. The Philippines designated the Department of Health (DOH)
and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation
of SHINE. For their part, the German government "charge[d] the
DeustcheGesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ)& GmbH, Eschborn, with
the implementation of its contributions."
Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for
SHINE on various dates between December of 1998 to September of 1999. The
employment contracts of all six private respondents all specified Dr. Rainer Tollkotter,
identified as an adviser of GTZ, as the "employer." At the same time, all the contracts
commonly provided that "[i]t is mutually agreed and understood that [Dr.Tollkotter, as
employer] is a seconded GTZ expert who is hiring the Employee on behalf of GTZ and
for a Philippine-German bilateral project named ‘Social Health Insurance—Networking
and Empowerment (SHINE)’ which will end at a given time."
In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post
of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and
private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course
Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors.
The dispute culminated in a letter dated 8 June 2000, signed by the private
respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH,
Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ. In the letter, it was claimed that
SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the
development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance
program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local
partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit
schemes were not sustainable—a philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolay’s lack
of understanding of the purpose of the project. Private respondents further alleged that
as a result of Nicolay’s "new thrust, resources have been used inappropriately;" that
the new management style was "not congruent with the original goals of the project;"
that Nicolay herself suffered from "cultural insensitivity" that consequently failed to
sustain healthy relations with SHINE’s partners and staff. The letter ended with these
ominous words: “The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are
very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no longer find any reason to stay
with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and
appropriately.”
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter, all similarly
worded except for their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that
the "project’s orientations and evolution" were decided in consensus with partner
institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer subject to modifications. More
pertinently, she stated: “You have firmly and unequivocally stated XXX that you and
the five other staff "could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL
of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately." Under the foregoing
premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation,
which I expect to receive as soon as possible.”
Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their
earlier letter was not intended as a resignation letter, but one that merely intended to
raise attention to what they perceived as vital issues. Negotiations ensued between
private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents
received a letter from Nicolay, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts
of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among others,
resulting to loss of confidence and trust."
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named
as respondents therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter
Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay.
GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the
governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ
had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the DFA, and that
it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE
Project and entered into the contracts of employment.
The LA issued an Order denying the MTD. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ
was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ
had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status.
GTZ filed with the LA a "Reiterating Motion to Dismiss," again praying that the MTD be
granted on the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had
earlier raised. No action was taken by the LA on this new motion. Instead, the LA
rendered a Decision granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. The Decision
concluded that respondents were dismissed without lawful cause, there being "a total
lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic]." GTZ was faulted for failing
to observe the notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise proceeded
from the premise that GTZ had treated the letter as a resignation letter, and devoted
some focus in debunking this theory.
Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the LA’s Decision or elevate
said decision for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by
way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The CA
promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZ’s petition, finding that "judicial recourse
at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he appropriate remedy of the petitioners
[being] an appeal to the NLRC x xx." A motion for reconsideration to this Resolution
proved fruitless for GTZ.
The Court required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition. The OSG took the
side of GTZ, with the prayer that the petition be granted on the ground that GTZ was
immune from suit, citing in particular its assigned functions in implementing the SHINE
program—a joint undertaking of the Philippine and German governments which was
neither proprietary nor commercial in nature.
The arguments raised by GTZ and the OSG are rooted in several indisputable facts.
The SHINE project was implemented pursuant to the bilateral agreements between
the Philippine and German governments. GTZ was tasked, under the 1991
agreement, with the implementation of the contributions of the German government.
The activities performed by GTZ pertaining to the SHINE project are governmental in
nature, related as they are to the promotion of health insurance in the Philippines. The
fact that GTZ entered into employment contracts with the private respondents did not
disqualify it from invoking immunity from suit, as held in cases such as Holy See v.
Rosario, Jr., which set forth what remains valid doctrine:“The mere entering into a
contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or
profit.”
ISSUE: WON GTZ can enjoy the Federal Republic’s immunity from suit.
RULING: The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign
state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the
State may not be sued without its consent." The doctrine is available to foreign States
insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is
to avoid "unduly vexing the peace of nations."
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany,
there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only
necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the
present suit was brought against GTZ.
Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as "the implementing agency of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany," a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG.
Assuming that characterization is correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the
ability to invoke State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the agency is
incorporated or unincorporated.
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its
entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may
ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will
depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is
incorporated or unincorporated.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical
personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the
City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no
separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the
government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government
Printing Office.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple
rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions
it is performing. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law
can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency.
It is useful to note that on the part of the Philippine government, it had designated two
entities, the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC), as the implementing agencies in behalf of the Philippines. The PHIC was
established under Republic Act No. 7875, Section 16(g) of which grants the
corporation the power "to sue and be sued in court." Applying the previously cited
jurisprudence, PHIC would not enjoy immunity from suit even in the performance of its
functions connected with SHINE, however, governmental in nature as they may be.
Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? In truth, private
respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ
was a "private corporation," and the Labor Arbiter acted rashly in accepting such claim
without explanation. But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence defining its legal
nature beyond that of the bare descriptive "implementing agency." There is no doubt
that the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the "implementing agency" in
behalf of the German government. Yet the catch is that such term has no
precise definition that is responsive to our concerns. Inherently, an agent acts
in behalf of a principal, and the GTZ can be said to act in behalf of the German
state. But that is as far as "implementing agency" could take us.The term by itself
does not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or unincorporated, whether it is owned
by the German state or by private interests, whether it has juridical personality
independent of the German government or none at all.
GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet
website. In the "Corporate Profile" section of the English language version of its site,
GTZ describes itself as follows:As an international cooperation enterprise for
sustainable development with worldwide operations, the federally owned Deutsche
GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH XXX.
GTZ’s own website elicits that petitioner is "federally owned," a "federal enterprise,"
and "founded in 1975 as a company under private law." GTZ clearly has a very
meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, which apparently owns
it. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a
legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine
corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the
Philippine government.
This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for
pause in adopting petitioners’ argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from
suit because it is "an implementing agency." The above-quoted statement does
not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal
Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under
private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, also makes reference to
GTZ and describes it in this manner:x xx Going by the principle of "sustainable
development," the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche
GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit GmbH, GTZ) takes on non-profit projects
in international "technical cooperation." The GTZ is a private company owned by the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Again, we are uncertain of the corresponding legal implications under German law
surrounding "a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany." Yet
taking the description on face value, the apparent equivalent under Philippine law is
that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the
Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that
"[e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity x xx to
sue and be sued in its corporate name."
It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly
GTZ itself has not been vested or has been specifically deprived the power and
capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court,
GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be sued
despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.We adhere to the rule
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular
subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, and following
the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental
owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the
Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. At the very least, like the
Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or
presume that GTZ enjoys immunity from suit.
____________________________________________________________________
This absence of basis in fact leads to another important point, alluded to by theLabor
Arbiter in his rulings. InHoly See v. Del Rosario, We stated then:In Public International
Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If
the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks
the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is
entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign
Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion."
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to
the courts varies. XXX
It is to be recalled that the LA, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for
petitioners to secure from the DFA "a certification of respondents’ diplomatic status
and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits." The
requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had GTZ obtained such
certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of
immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption
that the foreign party is indeed immune which the opposing party will have to
overcome with its own factual evidence. We do not see why GTZ could not have
secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes of this case.
Certainly, it would have been highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the LA
had denied the MTD. Still, even at this juncture, we do not see any evidence that
the DFA,The office of the executive branch in charge of our diplomatic relations, has
indeed endorsed GTZ’s claim of immunity. It may be possible that GTZ tried, but
failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed
herein.
Would the fact that the Solicitor General has endorsed GTZ’s claim of State’s
immunity from suit before this Court sufficiently substitute for the DFA certification?
Note that the rule in public international law quoted in Holy See referred to
endorsement by the Foreign Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign
office in the Philippines being the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the
Comment of the OSG is it manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZ’s claim, or that
the OSG had solicited the DFA’s views on the issue. The arguments raised by the
OSG are virtually the same as the arguments raised by GTZ without any indication of
any special and distinct perspective maintained by the Philippine government on the
issue. The Comment filed by the OSG does not inspire the same degree of confidence
as a certification from the DFA would have elicited
The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to
establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally
enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently,
both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they
refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it.
As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while
bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiter’s decision
been a "patent nullity." Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the
complaint, notwithstanding GTZ’s claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision
could have translated into a "patent nullity." As a result, there was no basis for
petitioners in foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the Court of
Appeals the petition for certiorari. It then follows that the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in dismissing the petition on that ground. As a further consequence, since
petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the
same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this
case, such as whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed, are
no longer susceptible to review, respecting as we do the finality of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision.
A final note. This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common
methodology employed in ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from
suit, one which focuses on the particular functions exercised by the party and
determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The nature of the
acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important
barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should
apply. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit
is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances
pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency
invoking immunity remain relevant.Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this
decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the
instrumentality or agency.
D.7 Catalina vs. POEA’s Administrator
Facts: Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a
domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root
Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on
behalf of its foreign principals.
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of the 728 other overseas contract
workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising
from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-
555).
The complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant
AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to
1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in
several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine
Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment
contracts with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas
employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and
conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position Classification :—————————
(Code) :—————————
(2) Company Employment Status :—————————
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :—————————
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :—————————
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :—————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :—————————
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :—————————
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :—————————
Months and/or
Job Completionxxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out
in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer
may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe deemed
necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the
Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's service with
cause, under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the
services of the Employee under this Agreement because of the completion
or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services
were being utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in
scope of such work, or by change in the type of construction of such work.
The Employer will be responsible for his return transportation to his country
of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy class
accommodation.xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of
contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This
shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will
be computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of
service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to
avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the
year in which said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be
accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day
of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours
work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is
applicable only when the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest
day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were
deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his
Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law
for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August
16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to
the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied
only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to
his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per
centumthereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty
per centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed
to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the
morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.. . . an
employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly day
of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional sum
equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with
his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less
than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after
five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruitin
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration
may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty
days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to the
other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the
worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of
service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruitin proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to
the Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases which they filed after 1
year from the termination of their employment contract.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired
portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely,
and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and
salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 13-14).
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the
Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment
shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of
the contract,” it appears that their suit has prescribed. Plaintiff contends that
the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the
Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be
applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The
Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr period provided by
the Amiri Decree should be applied.
ISSUE: whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing
law.
Ruling: As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is suigenerisin Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the
statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that
there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give
way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs
the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48
of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.”
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
propriovigoreinsofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402,
64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against
AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-
Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already
a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the
employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition
by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of
necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, The SC read the overseas-employment contracts in
question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and
parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire,
Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as
a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity
to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that
specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract
"as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law
does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict
of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of
Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]).
Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the
applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The
choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the
Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982),
the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and the late husband
of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the
employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own
misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject
to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines
or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is greater." Since the
laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of
private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a better compensation
package, SC applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the
grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
D.8 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)
Argued February 27, 1930 Decided May 5, 1930
Facts: Dick, a citizen of Texas, brought this action in a Texas court against Compania
General Anglo-Mexicana de Seguros S.A. (Compania General) a Mexican
corporation, to recover on a policy of fire insurance for the total loss of a tug (tugboat).
Jurisdiction was acquired through garnishment, by the issuance of ancillary writs
against the Home Insurance Company and Franklin Fire Insurance Company, which
reinsured parts of the risk which it had assumed in relation to the tugboat’s coverage
through contracts with the Mexican corporation. Service was effected to the
garnishees, New York corporations, by serving their local agents in Texas appointed
pursuant to Texas statutes, requiring the appointment of local agents by foreign
corporations seeking permits to do business within the state.Attorneys were appointed
for the garnishees by the trial court. But there is no contention that jurisdiction in
personam over it was acquired. Dick's claim is that, since the obligation of a reinsurer
to pay the original insurer arises upon the happening of the loss, and is not conditional
upon prior payment of the loss by the insurer, the New York companies are indebted
to the Mexican company, and these debts are subject to garnishment in a proceeding
against the latter quasi in rem, even though it is not suable in personam.
The garnishees concede that the inability to sue the Mexican corporation in
Texas in personam is not material if a cause of action against it existed at the time of
garnishment and there was within the state a res belonging to it. But they deny the
existence of the cause of action or of the res.Their defense was that this suit was not
commenced till more than one year after the date of the loss. The policy provided: "It
is understood and agreed that no judicial suit or demand shall be entered before any
tribunal for the collection of any claim under this policy unless such suits or demands
are filed within one year counted from the date on which such damage occurs."This
provision was in accord with the Mexican law to which the policy was expressly made
subject. It covered the vessel only in certain Mexican waters. The premium was paid
in Mexico, and the loss was "payable in the City of Mexico in current funds of the
United States of Mexico, or their equivalent elsewhere." At the time the policy was
issued, when it was assigned to him, and, until after the loss, Dick actually resided in
Mexico, although his permanent residence was in Texas. The contracts of reinsurance
were effected by correspondence between the Mexican company in Mexico and the
New York companies in New York. Nothing was in fact done in Texas.
Garnishees contended that, since the insurance contract was made and
was to be performed in Mexico, and the one-year provision was valid by its laws,
Dick's failure to sue within one year after accrual of the alleged cause of action was a
complete defense to the suit on the policy; that this relieved the garnishees of any
obligation as reinsurers and that they owed no debt to the Mexican company subject
to garnishment. To this defense, Dick demurred on the ground that Article 5545 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (1925) provides:"No person, firm, corporation,
association or combination of whatsoever kind shall enter into any stipulation,
contract, or agreement, by reason whereof the time in which to sue thereon is limited
to a shorter period than two years. And no stipulation, contract, or agreement for any
such shorter limitation in which to sue shall ever be valid in this state."Trial court ruled
in favor of Dick. On appeal to both Court of Civil appeals and Supreme Court of the
state, both courts treated the policy provision as equivalent to a foreign statute of
limitation; held that Article 5545 is related to the remedy available in Texas courts;
concluded that it was validly applicable to the case at bar, andaffirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The garnishees appealed to this Court.
Issue: (1) WON the Texas state courts correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case;
(2) WON Texaslaws should be applied
Held: (1) NO. Doubtless a state may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its
borders of rights acquired elsewhere which violate its laws or public policy, and, under
some circumstances, it may refuse to aid in the enforcement of such rights. But the
Mexican corporation never was in Texas, and neither it nor the garnishees invoked the
aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws. The Mexican corporation was not before
the court. The garnishees were brought in by compulsory process. Neither has asked
favors. They ask only to be let alone. We need not consider how far the state may go
in imposing restrictions on the conduct of its own residents, and of foreign
corporations which have received permission to do business within its borders, or how
far it may go in refusing to lend the aid of its courts to the enforcement of rights
acquired outside its borders. It may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its
borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them.
It is true that a state may extend the time within which suit may be brought in its own
courts if, in doing so, it violates no agreement of the parties. And, in the absence of a
contractual provision, the local statute of limitation may be applied to a right created in
another jurisdiction even where the remedy in the latter is barred. In such cases, the
rights and obligations of the parties are not varied. When, however, the parties have
expressly agreed upon a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates the
agreement and directs enforcement of the contract after the time has expired
increases their obligation and imposes a burden not contracted for.
It is true also that a state is not bound to provide remedies and procedure to suit the
wishes of individual litigants. It may prescribe the kind of remedies to be available in
its courts and dictate the practice and procedure to be followed in pursuing those
remedies. Contractual provisions relating to these matters, even if valid where made,
are often disregarded by the court of the forum, pursuant to statute or otherwise. But
the Texas statute deals neither with the kind of remedy available nor with the mode in
which it is to be pursued. It purports to create rights and obligations. It may not validly
affect contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas.
(2) NO. The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives the garnishees of
property without due process of law. A state may prohibit and declare invalid the
making of certain contracts within its borders. It may prohibit performance within its
borders. Even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are required to be
performed within the state and their performance would violate its laws. But, in the
case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of
reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the
making of the policy and contracts of reinsurance were done in Mexico or in New
York. And all things in regard to performance were to be done outside of Texas.
Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any purpose except by
Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas
is without significance. At all times here material, he was physically present and acting
in Mexico. Texas was therefore without power to affect the terms of contracts so
made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize
property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
D. 9 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague
Facts: Ralph Hague died of injuries he suffered when a car hit the motorcycle on
which he was riding as a passenger. The accident occurred in Pierce County,
Wisconsin which is immediately across the Minnesota border from Red Wing, Minn.
Both drivers in the accident were residents of Wisconsin as was Hague, who resided
in Hager City which is one and one-half miles from Red Wing, his place of
employment for the 15 years immediately preceding the accident. He commuted daily
to work from Wisconsin.
Neither driver had insurance. Hague, however, held an insurance policy
issued by Allstate Insurance Co. The policy, which was delivered in Wisconsin but did
not specify any applicable law, covered three automobiles and included uninsured
motorist coverage capped at $15,000 per covered vehicle.
After his husband’s death but prior to the filing of the instant case, Hague’s
wife moved to Red Wing, Minnesota. Subsequently, she married a Minnesota resident
and established residence with her new husband in Savage, Minn. At approximately
the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed respondent personal
representative of her deceased husband's estate. Following her appointment, she
brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota
law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband's three
automobiles could be "stacked" to provide total coverage of $45,000. Petitioner
defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be
stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law, since the insurance policy was
delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved
were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident.
The Minnesota District Court disagreed. Interpreting Wisconsin law to
disallow stacking, the court concluded that Minnesota's choice of law rules required
the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to apply
Wisconsin law as "inimical to the public policy of Minnesota," and granted summary
judgment for respondent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court.
The court likewise interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking. The court
emphasized that a majority of States allow stacking, and that legal decisions allowing
stacking "are fairly recent and well considered in light of current uses of
automobiles." In addition, the court found the Minnesota rule superior to Wisconsin's
"because it requires the cost of accidents with uninsured motorists to be spread more
broadly through insurance premiums than does the Wisconsin rule." Finally, after
rehearing en banc, the court buttressed its initial opinion by indicating "that contracts
of insurance on motor vehicles are in a class by themselves," since an insurance
company "knows the automobile is a movable item which will be driven from state to
state." From this premise, the court concluded that application of Minnesota law was
"not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate due process."
Issue: Whether the Minnesota court is correct in applying Minnesota law.
Held: Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Minnesota has a significant aggregation
of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that
application of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, and, accordingly, the
choice of law by the Minnesota Supreme Court does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
First, the decedent was a member of Minnesota's workforce. The State of
employment has police power responsibilities towards non-resident employees that
are analogous to those it has towards residents; as such employees use state
services and amenities and may call upon state facilities in appropriate circumstances.
Also, the State's interest in its commuting non-resident employees, such as
respondent's decedent, reflects a state concern for the safety and wellbeing of its
workforce and the concomitant effect on Minnesota employers. That the decedent was
not killed while commuting to work or while in Minnesota does not dictate a different
result, since vindication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee is an
important state concern. Nor does the decedent's residence in Wisconsin
constitutionally mandate application of Wisconsin law to the exclusion of forum law.
Employment status is not a sufficiently less important status than residence, when
combined with the decedent's daily commute across state lines and the other
Minnesota contacts present, to prohibit the choice of law result in this case on
constitutional grounds.
Second, petitioner was at all times present and doing business in
Minnesota. By virtue of such presence, petitioner can hardly claim unfamiliarity with
the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum
law to litigation in which the company is involved. Moreover, such presence gave
Minnesota an interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations insofar as
they affected both a Minnesota resident and court-appointed representative
(respondent) and a longstanding member of Minnesota's workforce (respondent's
decedent).
Lastly, in addition to the other contacts, respondent became a Minnesota
resident prior to institution of the instant litigation. She subsequently moved to Savage,
Minn., after marrying a Minnesota resident who operated an automobile service
station in Bloomington, Minn. Her move to Savage occurred "almost concurrently,"
with the initiation of the instant case. There is no suggestion that Mrs. Hague moved to
Minnesota in anticipation of this litigation or for the purpose of finding a legal climate
especially hospitable to her claim. The stipulated facts, sparse as they are, negate any
such inference. Her bona fide residence and subsequent appointment in Minnesota as
personal representative of her late husband's estate constitute a Minnesota contact
which gives Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery, an interest which the
court below identified as full compensation for "resident accident victims" to keep them
"off welfare rolls" and able "to meet financial obligations."
D.11
Saudi Arabian Airlines v Court of Appeals
Facts: Defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they
returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer.
When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did,
Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security
personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi,
the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to
Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah but she did not cooperate. In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so
did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah,
for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going
to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Because she
was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and
allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On
November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before is a conflict of laws that must be settled at
the outset. It maintains that private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occured in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended
Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is
properly a matter of domestic law.
Issue:
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts
occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation
Ruling:
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization,
or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
The starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test
or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the
possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or
points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn,
or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to
be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.
The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important because, as we have
seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a
given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
The SC are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondents
assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to
Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the
charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her
person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial
for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case,
we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and
observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed.
That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or
the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the
alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern
theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the most
significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now,
given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the relationship
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines
has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private
respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has
been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complaint of and the place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by
way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising
out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the
appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Moreover, we find untenable petitioners insistence that since private respondent
instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable
Saudi law on the matter. As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her
cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she never alleged
that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent
appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead
and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.