Redea vs CA

-special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

FACTS:
- Action for partition filed by petitioner Tancredo against his older half-brother, herein private
respondent Leocadio before the then Court of First Instance RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna which
was subsequently inherited by Branch 33 of the RTC, Siniloan, Laguna.
- The basic complaint for partition alleges that plaintiff Tancredo and defendant Leocadio are
both sons of one Maximo Redea and that the parties father, Maximo, left several pieces of
realty
- The trial court, based on the evidence presented, confined the partition to only the property
actually pertaining to the estate of the parties deceased father and co-owned by them
- petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal. The court gave due course to the notice
and directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA
- there being no appellants brief filed within the extended period, the CA issued a
resolutionconsidering the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the case
- eight (8) months after the CA issued the resolution, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof. In a resolution mthe CA denied the motion.
- petitioner filed a Petition for Relief bearing date December 27, 1999, anchored on Section
2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In that pleading, petitioner prays the CA to set
aside its dismissal, supra, reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period to file his appellants
brief which the CA denied for Petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the Court
of Appeals
ISSUE:
WON the rules should be relaxed to accommodate petitioner

DECISION:
NO.
Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural. Substantive laws, insofar as their provisions are
unambiguous, are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues on the merits. In contrast, courts generally
frown upon an uncompromising application of procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial
justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to decide cases based on a rigid application of
the so-called technical rules of procedure as these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice.
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty
to construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of substantive law and substantial
justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally construe the
rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making power by no less than the
Constitution.
It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally construe and even to suspend
the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict application of
technical rules must concede.
The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing rules of procedure. We
apply the settled principle that petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy.
Here, the record shows that petitioner in fact filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, which
the latter granted in its order of December 11, 1997 and ordered the elevation of the records to the CA.
In turn, the CA, in its resolution of September 28, 1998, required the petitioner, thru his former counsel,
Atty. Geminiano Almeda, to file his appellants brief. But petitioner failed to comply. Consequently, in its
resolution of March 9, 1999, the CA considered the appellants appeal as ABANDONED and DISMISSED
the same.
Petitioner presents himself as a mere farmer seeking the Courts leniency to the point of
disregarding the rules on reglementary period for filing pleadings. But he fails to point out any
circumstance which might lead the Court to conclude that his station in life had in any way placed his
half-brother in a more advantageous position. As we see it, petitioner failed to show diligence in
pursuing his cause.
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will
suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account of the gross negligence of his
previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to
fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his
appellants brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin
for new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and
allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of
these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
clients cause must be shown. Here, petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants brief. While this
omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the
annulment of the proceedings below.
To recapitulate, petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
He was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, as in fact he filed one.