Ignoranti facti excusat

Ignorance of law means want of knowledge of those laws which a person has a duty to know and
which everyman is presumed to know. Ignorance can be voluntary or involuntary. It is voluntary when
a person might by taking reasonable pains could have acquired the necessary knowledge. For
example every man can acquire knowledge of the laws which have been promulgated. Therefore
neglect to become acquainted with them is voluntary ignorance. On the other hand it is involuntary
when the ignorance is not of choice and it cannot be overcome by the use of any means of knowledge
known to him and within his power. For example ignorance of a law which has not yet been
promulgated.

Ignorantia juris non excusat or Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is a Latin maxim which means
"ignorance of the law does not excuse" or "ignorance of the law excuses no one." The rationale of this
maxim is that if ignorance of law was an excuse then any person charged with a criminal offense or
subject of a civil suit can claim that he or she was unaware of the law in question and avoid liability.
The law imputes knowledge of all laws to all persons within its jurisdiction. The doctrine assumes that
the law in question has been properly published and distributed, for example, by being printed in a
government gazette, made available over the internet, or printed in volumes available for sale to the
public at affordable prices.

Even though general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense is deeply rooted
in the American legal system, case law has recognized certain exceptions to the doctrine. For
example in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-201 (U.S. 1991) the court observed that the
proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know
and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Therefore the
Congress has softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to
violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years
ago interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out
an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of law cannot be excused. This special treatment of
criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws.

Let us now see the position in India. India being a country under British rule for a fairly
long period of 200 and odd years have adopted the British laws though slightly modified
to suite the Indian conditions and culture. Before the advent of the British power Indian
courts used to apply the personal laws of Hindus and Mohammadans to decide disputes
brought before it. If the litigants are Hindus then Hindu law will apply and if litigants are
Muslims Islamic law will apply. If one party is a Hindu and the other a Muslim then the
law of the defendant would apply. But during the British rule Indian courts started
applying the English common law to settle disputes along with Hindu law and other
purely Indian laws. However, by and large it is the English laws that predominate. So far
as the maxim is concerned India too applied the same with exceptions carved out.

The maxim was considered by the Hon Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat Mills Ltd V
State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1979) 118 ITR 326(SC). The Hon Court observed as
follows:

“It must be remembered that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. It
is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct
statement: there is no such maxim known to the law.”
So the Hon court in very clear terms has stated the law. There is no room for doubt. In a
case decided by the Hon Supreme court the judges openly admitted that they have never
heard of the law which was stated to have been violated by an illiterate person in a remote
village. Therefore, the Hon court acquitted the person charged for violating that
law. India did not bluntly apply the maxim.
Attention is again invited to the decision of the Hon Supreme Court in the case
of Commissioner of Income-tax v P.S.S. Investments P. Ltd reported in [1977] 107 ITR
0001 wherein the Hon court made these important observations which requires special
attention.
“The intelligence of even those with legal background gets staggered in this continuous
process of carving exceptions to exceptions. It seems more like a conundrum, baffling the
mind and requiring special acumen to unravel its mystique. One can only wonder as to
how the ordinary tax-payers, most of whom are laymen, can keep abreast of such
laws. Yet the maxim is that everyone is presumed to know the law. “

Thus it is clear that the courts have accepted ignorance of law as an excuse or refused to
impose penalty when the violation of law was not deliberate or was innocently violated.

Conclusion
In view of the discussions above the author is of the view that the maxim has to be applied
only in fit cases and that too facts and circumstance of the case warrants its application.
The study of the status of the maxim in England, US and India above clearly indicates that
courts are reluctant to accept the maxim bluntly. It cannot be totally done away with. My
submission is that in a fit case when circumstances clearly warrant it, the maxim need not
be applied and a person may be excused for his ignorance. It may not be admissible in
criminal matters but in other areas of law it can be applied only if it is warranted.

Qui prior est tempore

He who is prior in time is stronger in right.

Origin – The maxim has a Latin origin.

Explanation – The determination of the relative rights and priorities of successive

assignees of the same or overlapping rights has been a serious problem for the
Courts. When there are two or more competing equitable interests, the equitable
maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure (he who is earlier in time is stronger
in law) applies. This means that the first in time prevails over the others. Section
48 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies this principle in legislation. It is a
principle of natural justice that if rights are created in favour of two persons at
different times, the one who has the advantage in time should also have the
advantage in law. This rule, however, applies only to cases where the conflicting
equities are otherwise equal.

Illustration
If A mortgages or sells to B and afterwards C purchases at a Court-sale the then
existing right, title, and interest of A, C buys in the first case the equity of
redemption and in the second nothing at all. In such a case registration cannot
help, for on the very face of his certificate of sale, the property comprised therein
is not the property previously conveyed to B, but only the residue of A’s estate
after such conveyance.

Cases

Madras High Court in Duraiswami Reddi v. Angappa Reddi[1], held that the prior
transferee would be entitled to enforce his rights though his document is
registered later and even if the subsequent transferee entered into transactions
bona fide without knowledge of the first transaction. It was held that this result
was implicit and was a direct consequence of the combined operation of Section
47 of the Registration Act and Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In Chouth Mal v. Hira Lal[2], an agreement to sell land in favour of one defendant
was executed on 17th January, 1932. The sale-deed was executed in defendant’s
favour on 5th May, 1932. But in the meanwhile owners executed an usufructuary
mortgage of the same land in the plaintiff’s favour on 20th February, 1932. It was
held that the mortgage must have its due effect as against the subsequent sale.

In Hafiz Md. Anwar v. Jamuna Prasad Singh[3], it was stated that according to
Section 48 to the Transfer of Property Act, if the same property has been
transferred at different times the subsequent transfer shall not confer any right,
title or interest on the basis of the subsequent transfer vis-à-vis the first transfer.