CANON 14 CASES In her position paper, Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, Sampana argued that Nery’s
vs.
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 10196; September 9, 2014]
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
(Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for
making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged
the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien
adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to
Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could
represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a
marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana
₱100,000.00, in installment: (a) ₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) ₱50,000.00 on 2
October 2008; and (c) ₱40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts
since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the
petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they
needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing
was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not
receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to
12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the
petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, in
the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the
₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee
worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition
for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of
the ₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner
Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear
during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position
papers.
allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving "one
package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana
alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil
status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana
suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the
intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit
the documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred
marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for
adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption
case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of
malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report and recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a petition for
adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio
Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and ORDERED to
RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos with legal
interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the dutyof fidelity to the client’s cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to
the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client thatmay come
into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition
for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s
proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter
would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the
Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly
adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the
status of the petition.1âwphi1 He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even
kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds
upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana,13 we
already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon
him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a
repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after receiving
the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the
previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty for Sampana’s
malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from
the time of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013,
then 6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL RUBY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY. RUDOLPH DILLA BAYOT, Respondents.
[A.C. No. 10558; February 23, 2015]
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Michael Ruby (complainant) with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Erlinda B.
Espejo (Atty. Espejo) and Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot (Atty. Bayot) (respondents) for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The complainant alleged that he and his mother, Felicitas Ruby Bihla (Felicitas), engaged the
services of the respondents in connection with a case for cancellation and nullification of
deeds of donation. Pursuant to the retainer agreement dated August 29, 2009, the
complainant and Felicitas would pay Atty. Espejo the amount of ₱100,000.00 as acceptance
fee, ₱70,000.00 of which was actually paid upon the signing of the agreement and the
remaining ₱30,000.00 to be paid after the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO). The complainant and Felicitas likewise agreed to pay the
amount of ₱5,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing, which was apparently later reduced
to ₱4,000.00.
On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
payment for filing fee. On September 16, 2009, Atty. Espejo filed the complaint for
nullification and cancellation of deeds of donation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 219. However, the actual filing fee that was paid by her only amounted to
7,561.00; she failed to account for the excess amount given her despite several demand
letters therefor.
On September 23, 2009, Atty. Espejo allegedly asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the
amount of ₱30,000.00 – the remaining balance of the acceptance fee agreed upon –
notwithstanding that the prayer for the issuance of a TRO has yet to be heard. The
complainant asserted that the same was not yet due, but Atty. Espejo told him that Atty.
Bayot was in dire need of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the amount of ₱8,000.00
supposedly as partial payment for the balance of the acceptance fee and an additional
₱4,000.00 as appearance fee for the September 22, 2009 hearing.
On September 25, 2009, Atty. Espejo called the complainant informing him of the need to file
a separate petition for the issuance of a TRO. She allegedly asked for ₱50,000.00 to be used as
"representation fee." The complainant was able to bargain with Atty. Espejo and gave her
₱20,000.00 instead.
Meanwhile, on September 24, 2009, the RTC issued an Order denying the complainant’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO. The complainant alleged that the respondents failed to
apprise him of the denial of his prayer for the issuance of a TRO; that he only came to know of
said denial on November 3, 2009 when he visited the RTC.
On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited the amount of ₱4,000.00 to the bank
account of Atty. Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons
through publications, which was set at 2:00 p.m. on even date. However, Atty. Bayot allegedly
did not appear in court and instead met with the complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City
Hall of Justice, telling them that he already talked to the clerk of court who assured him that
the court would grant their motion.
Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to update him as to the status of
his complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their
counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of the
complainant and that he was merely a collaborating counsel.
In its Order dated January 7, 2010, the IBP-CBD directed the respondents to submit their
respective answers to the complaint.
In his Answer, Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not the counsel of the complainant; that he
merely assisted him and Atty. Espejo. He averred that Atty. Espejo, with the complainant’s
consent, sought his help for the sole purpose of drafting a complaint. He pointed out that it
was Atty. Espejo who signed and filed the complaint in the RTC.
Atty. Bayot further pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement that was
entered into by the complainant, Felicitas, and Atty. Espejo. He also denied having any
knowledge as to the ₱50,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo as filing fees.
As to the ₱12,000.00 that was given him, he claimed that he was entitled to ₱4,000.00 thereof
since the said amount was his appearance fee. He pointed out that he appeared before the
RTC’s hearing for the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009. On the other hand, the
₱8,000.00 was paid to him as part of the acceptance fee, which was then already due since
the RTC had already heard their prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
He also denied any knowledge as to the ₱20,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo purportedly
for "representation fee" that would be used to file a new petition for the issuance of a TRO.
Atty. Bayot admitted that he was the one who drafted the motion to serve summons through
publication, but pointed out that it was Atty. Espejo who signed and filed it in the RTC. He also
admitted that he was the one who was supposed to attend the hearing of the said motion, but
claimed that he was only requested to do so by Atty. Espejo since the latter had another
commitment. He denied requesting from the complainant the amount of ₱4,000.00 as
appearance fee, alleging that it was the latter who insisted on depositing the same in his bank
account.
During the said hearing, Atty. Bayot claimed that when he checked the court’s calendar, he
noticed that their motion was not included. Allegedly, the clerk of court told him that she
would just tell the judge to consider their motion submitted for resolution.
On the other hand, Atty. Espejo, in her Answer, denied asking for ₱50,000.00 from the
complainant as filing fees. She insisted that it was the complainant who voluntarily gave her
the money to cover the filing fees. She further alleged that she was not able to account for the
excess amount because her files were destroyed when her office was flooded due to a
typhoon. She also denied having asked another ₱50,000.00 from the complainant as
"representation fee," asserting that the said amount was for the payment of the injunction
bond once the prayer for the issuance of a TRO is issued.
Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
On May 3, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation, which recommended the penalty of censure against the respondents. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Bayot and the complainant had a lawyer-
client relationship notwithstanding that the former was not the counsel of record in the case.
That his admission that he was a collaborating counsel was sufficient to constitute a lawyer
client relationship. Moreover, considering that Atty. Bayot initially received the amount of
₱12,000.00 from the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner opined that he can no
longer deny that he was the lawyer of the complainant. The Investigating Commissioner
further found that: Parenthetically, Respondents had asked and demanded prompt payment
of their attorney’s fees or appearance fees and even asked for amounts for dubious purposes
yet they, just the same, performed their duties to their clients leisurely and lethargically.
Worse, when the trusting Complainant had noticed that his case was headed for disaster and
wanted Respondents to explain their obviously slothful and listless services, they disappeared
or became evasive thus fortifying the conclusion that they indeed have performed and carried
out their duties to Complainant way below the standards set by the Code of [P]rofessional
Responsibility. Nevertheless, the Investigating Commissioner found that the complainant
failed to prove that he indeed suffered injury as a result of the respondents’ conduct and,
accordingly, should only be meted the penalty of censure.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the
modification that the penalty imposed upon Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot was increased from
censure to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Atty. Bayot moved to reconsider the Resolution dated March 20, 2013 issued by the IBP Board
of Governors. The complainant likewise filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the IBP
Board of Governors to order the respondents to refund to him the amount he paid to the
respondents. In the meantime, Atty. Espejo passed away.
On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which dismissed the case
insofar as Atty. Espejo in view of her demise. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed Atty.
Bayot’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.
On December 3, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution, which, inter alia, considered the case
closed and terminated as to Atty. Espejo on account of her death. Accordingly, the Court’s
disquisition in this case would only be limited to the liability of Atty. Bayot.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which would warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court modifies the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.
Atty. Bayot claimed that he is not the counsel of record of the complainant in the case before
the RTC. He pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement entered into by the
complainant and Atty. Espejo. Thus, Atty. Bayot claimed, the complainant had no cause of
action against him.
The Court does not agree.
It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the counsel of record in the case that was filed in the
RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact that it was only Atty. Espejo who signed the retainer
agreement. However, the evidence on record, including Atty. Bayot’s admissions, points to the
conclusion that a lawyer-client relationship existed between him and the complainant.
Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC. He was
likewise the one who prepared the motion to serve summons through publication. He likewise
appeared as counsel for the complainant in the hearings of the case before the RTC. He
likewise advised the complainant on the status of the case.
More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received ₱8,000.00, which is part of the
acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement, from the complainant. It is true that it
was Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the said amount. However,
Atty. Bayot admitted that he accepted from the complainant the said ₱8,000.00 without even
explaining what the said amount was for.
The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client relationship existed
between Atty. Bayot and the complainant. "Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To
establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession." Further, acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, as regards the case before the
RTC, the complainant had two counsels – Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
xxxx
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Accordingly, Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep
the latter informed of the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or
property collected or received from the complainant. He may be held administratively liable
for any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, the Court emphasized that:
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him
by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession,
the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it
is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his
possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his
own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing
of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives
rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him.
And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. (Citations omitted)
Nevertheless, the administrative liability of a lawyer for any infractions of his duties attaches
only to such circumstances, which he is personally accountable for. It would be plainly unjust if
a lawyer would be held accountable for acts, which he did not commit.
The Investigating Commissioner’s findings, which was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors,
did not make a distinction as to which specific acts or omissions the respondents are each
personally responsible for. This is inequitable since either of the respondents may not be held
personally liable for the infractions committed by the other.
Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for the failure to account for and return the excess of the
₱50,000.00 which was paid by the complainant for the filing fees. The evidence on record
shows that it was Atty. Espejo alone who received the said amount and that she was the one
who paid the filing fees when the complaint was filed with the RTC. That Atty. Bayot had no
knowledge of the said amount paid by the complainant for the filing fees is even admitted by
the complainant himself during the proceedings before the IBP-CBD, viz:
ATTY. BAYOT: So, Atty. Espejo ask you for ₱50,000[.00] as filing fee.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That when he asked you about that, Atty. Bayot was not present.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
xxxx
ATTY. BAYOT: That later on you gave Atty. Espejo the ₱50,000[.00].
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That Atty. Bayot was not also present at that time.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
xxxx
ATTY. BAYOT: That never did Atty. Bayot ask you or followed-up from you the ₱50,000[.00]
that Atty. Espejo was asking as filing fee?
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
xxxx
MR. RUBY: You have nothing to do with the ₱50,000[.00] that was Atty. Espejo.
Further, in her Answer, Atty. Espejo admitted that she was the one who failed to account for
the filing fees, alleging that the files in her office were destroyed by flood. Likewise, the
demand letters written by the complainant, which were seeking the accounting for the
₱50,000.00 filing fee, were all solely addressed to Atty. Espejo. Clearly, Atty. Bayot may not be
held administratively liable for the failure to account for the filing fees.
Atty. Bayot cannot also be held liable for the ₱20,000.00 which Atty. Espejo asked from the
complainant for "representation fee." The complainant failed to adduce any evidence that
would establish that Atty. Bayot knew of and came into possession of the said amount paid by
the complainant.
On the other hand, Atty. Bayot is legally entitled to the ₱8,000.00 he received from the
complainant on September 23, 2009, the same being his share in the acceptance fee agreed
to by the complainant in the retainer agreement. He is likewise legally entitled to the
₱4,000.00 from the complainant on even date as it is the payment for his appearance fee in
the hearing for the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entitled to the ₱4,000.00 which the complainant deposited to his
bank account on October 23, 2009. Atty. Bayot admitted that there was no hearing scheduled
on the said date; their motion to serve summons through publication was not included in the
RTC’s calendar that day. Accordingly, Atty. Bayot is obliged to return the said amount to the
complainant.
As regards the complainant’s charge of gross neglect against Atty. Bayot, the Court finds the
same unsubstantiated. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by
the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license. Considering, however, the
serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend
only upon a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar.
The complainant merely alleged that, after the hearing on the motion to serve summons
through publication, the respondents had "made themselves scarce" and failed to update him
on the status of the case before the RTC. However, other than his bare allegations, the
complainant failed to present any evidence that would show that Atty. Bayot was indeed
remiss in his duties to the complainant.
However, the complainant’s November 4, 2009 letter to Atty. Espejo tells a different story. In
the said letter, the complainant asked Atty. Espejo to withdraw as being the counsel of record
in the case before the RTC in favor of Atty. Bayot since he was the one who actually prepared
the pleadings and attended the hearings of their motions. In any case, the charge of neglect
against Atty. Bayot was premature, if not unfair, considering that, at that time, the case before
the RTC was still in the early stages; the pre-trial and trial have not even started yet. That they
lost their bid for the issuance of a TRO is not tantamount to neglect on the part of Atty. Bayot.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entirely without fault. This administrative complaint was brought
about by his intervention when the complainant sought the legal services of Atty. Espejo. Atty.
Bayot undertook to prepare the complaint to be filed with the RTC and the motion to serve
summons through publication, attended the hearings, and advised the complainant as to the
status of the case without formally entering his appearance as counsel of record. He was able
to obtain remuneration for his legal services sans any direct responsibility as to the progress of
the case. Atty. Bayot is reminded to be more circumspect in his dealings with clients.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot is hereby ADMONISHED to exercise more prudence
and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to return to Michael Ruby
within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00)
representing his appearance fee received from the latter on October 23, 2009 with a warning
that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F.
VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8261 March 11, 2015
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C.
Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds
in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil
action they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to
be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis
pendens. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No.
8261), the complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio
and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located
at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; that on
August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under
the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort; and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the
annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute, whereby the complainants agreed to sell
the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the
complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the
plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008, which the RTC
granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto
and the defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated
May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several
phone calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1)
the annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. seeking the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546; and (2) the annotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants’
Motion to Withdraw Complaint; and that a copy of the letter request dated June 30, 2008
addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant
Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary
entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or
supporting documents on or beforesuch scheduled hearing. However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid
him for his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their
case. They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of
lis pendens without a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty.
Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified
complaint. Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 2009 that complainant
Robert Torres had been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598,
which included the mediation process; that the complainants, after having aggressively
participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had
been deceived into entering the agreement in the same way that they could not feign
ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as
alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that
the only payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees
of ₱1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr.
whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had
notarized the letter request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds,
he had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of
Deeds; and that the present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the
complainants against him with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 2009 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr.,
another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations
that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
on TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular
course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that
no irregularity occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party,
thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.’s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had
forged the signature of Atty. Cunanan. This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No.
8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 8261 because the complaints involved the
same parties and rested on similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to
reiterate the arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261. On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr.
manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala’s Comment.
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his
conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer
to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions are insufficient to
establish any censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the
general duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites
for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science
stamps and that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the present or of such denial in writing, stating
the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. A purely ministerial
act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its
discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Court underscores that registration is a merely
ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to
see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty.
Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not
the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been
falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to
examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of
the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found
the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it became
obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of duty, the complainants were
not bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing
the matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 117 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, it was ultimately within
the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or
invalidity of a document registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with
each other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the
amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty.
Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated
May 16, 2008. The complainants’ charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy
because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an
act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing
evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the
dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence
to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own
active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they
had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their
obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.
Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and
Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their
counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty.
Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half
of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively
show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation
was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters
subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly
stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right
to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged
failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts
to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he
continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico
S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 15 CASES
SIMON D. PAZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ, respondent.
[A.C. No. 6125; September 19, 2006]
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Simon D. Paz ("complainant") against Atty. Pepito A.
Sanchez ("respondent") for representing conflicting interests and violation of the lawyer's
oath.
The Facts
In his complaint dated 23 July 2003, complainant stated that sometime in 1995, complainant
and his partners, Alfredo Uyecio and Petronila Catap, engaged the services of respondent to
assist them purchase, as well as document the purchase, of several parcels of land from
tenant-farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also tasked to defend complainant's claim on
the properties against the claim of a certain George Lizares ("Lizares").
The complaint arose because respondent, allegedly after the termination of his services in
May 2000, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Board ("DARAB case")
in behalf of one Isidro Dizon ("Dizon") for annulment of Transfer Certificate Title No. 420127-R
("TCT No. 420127-R") in the name of complainant and his partners. Complainant explained
that Dizon's property, covered by Emancipation Patent No. 00708554/Transfer Certificate Title
No. 25214 ("TCT No. 25214"), was among those properties purchased by complainant with
respondent's assistance. Complainant alleged that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests when he represented Dizon in a case involving the same properties and
transactions in which he previously acted as complainant's counsel. Complainant added that
respondent filed the DARAB case with "malicious machination" because respondent used
complainant's old address to serve the complaint and summons, enabling respondent to
obtain a judgment by default in Dizon's favor.
Complainant also stated that on 23 June 2003, respondent, despite knowledge of
complainant's pending petition for review of judgment in the DARAB case, filed a civil case
("RTC case") against complainant and Sycamore Venture Corporation ("Sycamore") before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 483629-R ("TCT No. 483629-R"). Complainant pointed out that respondent should be
punished for forum shopping and preparing a false certification of non-forum shopping
because respondent failed to disclose complainant's pending petition before the DARAB.
Complainant also charged respondent with violation of the lawyer's oath because, "with
malice and full knowledge of the real facts," respondent filed groundless and false suits
against complainant, his partners and Sycamore.
In his comment dated 2 October 2003, respondent stated that he has been representing the
tenant-farmers, including Dizon, in their cases before the DARAB and the courts since 1978.
Respondent also represented the tenant-farmers against the claims of Lizares, who filed cases
for the cancellation of their emancipation patents.
Respondent confirmed that in 1995, complainant and his partners expressed interest in
acquiring Dizon's property. Respondent also explained that complainant and his partners, as
buyers of the tenant-farmers' properties, were impleaded as defendants in the Lizares cases.
Respondent came to represent complainant and his partners because they "did not get a
lawyer of their own and allowed respondent to represent them too."
On the DARAB case, respondent clarified that the complaint was filed on 15 May 1997 and
not, as complainant claimed, after respondent's services was terminated in May 2000.
Respondent declared that he was compelled to file the case because he felt responsible for
the cancellation of TCT No. 25214. Respondent explained that he lent Dizon's title to
complainant and his partners enabling them to transfer the title in their names. Denying that
there was "malicious machination" in the filing of the DARAB case, respondent stated that the
address he placed was the address of complainant in 1997. The 20 August 2002 DARAB
decision specifically stated that a copy of the complaint, summons and notices were duly
served and received by complainant and his partners. However, complainant and his partners
ignored the complaint, summons and notices, which led to the issuance of a judgment in
Dizon's favor. Moreover, there was entry of judgment on 21 November 2002 and the writ of
execution was issued on 10 December 2002.
On the RTC case, respondent explained that he was compelled to file the case when he
discovered that TCT No. 420127-R, in the name of complainant and his partners, was
transferred in the name of Sycamore. Respondent pointed out that unless TCT No. 483629-R is
nullified, the Register of Deeds cannot execute the DARAB decision. Respondent denied that
he violated the prohibition on forum shopping. Respondent also maintained that the cases he
filed were "justifiable, tenable and meritorious."
In a Resolution dated 12 November 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation.
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") set the case for mandatory
conference on 4 March 2004. Both parties appeared and were given ten days to submit their
position papers. Both parties complied.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2005-78 dated 12 March 2005
adopting, with modification, Commissioner San Juan's Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds insufficient evidence to hold respondent liable for forum shopping and for
filing groundless suits. However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of the
prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
On Respondent's Violation of the Rules
on Non-Forum Shopping
Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties to secure a favorable judgment.12 Forum shopping
exists if the actions raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. The mere filing
of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping.
The Court notes that the certification against forum shopping did not form part of the records
of the case. However, a comparison of the two cases reveal that there was no forum shopping.
Although both cases are related because Dizon's property is involved, the reliefs prayed for
are different. In the DARAB case, Dizon prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 420127-R in the
name of complainant and his partners. In the RTC case, Dizon's widow prayed for the
cancellation of TCT No. 483629-R in the name of Sycamore. Respondent cannot be held liable
for forum shopping.
On Respondent's Violation of the Lawyer's Oath
Lawyers take an oath that they will not wittingly or willingly promote any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. The Court notes that the cases are still
pending before the DARAB and the RTC. The Court, therefore, does not have any basis for
ruling if there was a violation of the oath.
On Respondent's Violation of the Prohibition against
Representing Conflicting Interests
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts." Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.
By respondent's own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizon's behalf against
complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondent's clients at that time. Respondent
was representing complainant in the cases against Lizares where respondent was duty-bound
to defend complainant's title over the properties against the claims of Lizares. While it is not
clear from the records that the Lizares cases included Dizon's property, it is undisputed that
respondent acted as complainant's counsel in the Lizares cases. At the same time, respondent
was also representing Dizon before the DARAB for cancellation of lis pendens involving Dizon's
property, which cancellation was needed for complainant to purchase the Dizon property. In
filing the second DARAB case on Dizon's behalf, respondent was duty-bound to assail
complainant's title over Dizon's property, which complainant had purchased from Dizon.
Respondent was clearly in a conflict of interest situation.
The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that he represented conflicting
interests. Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his
"duty and responsibility" to file the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation of TCT
No. 25214 and its subsequent transfer in complainant's name. Respondent stated that he "will
forever be bothered by his conscience" if he did not file the case. However, good faith and
honest intentions do not excuse the violation of this prohibition. In representing both
complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited himself from representing
Dizon against complainant in the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of interest.
In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as
well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer
must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent
In cases involving representation of conflicting interests, the Court has imposed on the erring
lawyer either a reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from six months to two
years.
In this case, we deem it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year as
recommended by the IBP.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez GUILTY of violating Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court SUSPENDS respondent from the practice of law for ONE
YEAR and WARNS respondent that the commission of a similar act in the future will merit a
more severe penalty.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO,
LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA,
HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS
TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL,
CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD
SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIÑO JR., respondent.
[A.C. No. 4763; March 20, 2003]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen
(17) years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and double-
dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to
respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of
officers and directors for distribution among faculty members of the university.
For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mariño Jr. as president of the UST
Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35 million. Instead
of creating a harmonious relationship between the contracting parties, the collective
bargaining agreement regrettably engendered disputes arising from the interpretation and
implementation thereof one of which even reached this Court.
The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one
unfortunately failed. In 1989 the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-
measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16) officers and directors of the UST
Faculty Union including respondent. The dismissal precipitated anew bitter legal battles which
were resolved by this Court in favor of the dismissed employees by ordering their
reinstatement with back wages.
In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the terms and conditions of a five (5)-
year collective bargaining agreement between UST and the UST Faculty Union retroactive to
1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the
administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement
for the payment of P7,000,000.00 from which P5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back
wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors of the UST Faculty
Union, including herein respondent, who were earlier ordered reinstated by this Court, and
the sum of P2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement. It appears from the record that only P5,000,000.00 for the back wages
and other claims of respondent Atty. Mariño and other concerned union officers and directors
was paid immediately by UST while the satisfaction of the balance of P2,000,000.00 was
apparently deferred to some unspecified time.
In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of agreement to settle the
salary increases and other benefits under the collective bargaining agreement effective 1988
for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total of P42,000,000.00. It was agreed that
the benefits accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be taken from the sum of
P42,000,000.00 which UST would release directly to the faculty members, while the remainder
of the P42,000,000.00 package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty Union which would
then disburse the balance to cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993. The
memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of P2,000,000.00 agreed upon in the
1990 compromise agreement as well as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mariño worth
P4,200,000.00 against the P42,000,000.00 outlay.
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took care of the disbursement of
P20,226,221.60 from the total commitment of P42,000,000.00 to pay for the following
expenses: (a) P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid obligations to faculty members under the
1986 collective bargaining agreement; (b) P13,833,597.96 for the salary increases of faculty
members from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992; (c) P192,623.64 for telephone, electricity and
water billings; and, (d) P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union as attorney's fees. The
expenses left a collectible sum of P21,773,778.40 from the obligation of P42,000,000.00. The
university however relinquished only P18,038,939.37 to the UST Faculty Union which was
P3,734,839.03 short of the balance of P21,773,778.40. In the meantime, the UST Faculty
Union placed P9,766,570.01 of the amount received from UST in the money market to earn as
it did make P1,146,381.27 in interest.
For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993, the UST Faculty Union
charged against the short-changed amount of P18,038,939.37 a total of P16,723,638.27
consisting of the following expenses: (a) P10,521,800.64 as the amount paid for salary
increases beginning 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993; (b) P578,296.31 which was refunded
to the faculty members whose salaries were reduced as a result of their participation in the
1989 strike; (c) P2,045,192.97 as amount paid to the faculty members representing their
December 1992 bonus; and, (d) P3,578,348.35 for reimbursements to the University of Santo
Tomas. The expenses left a balance of P5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder of P1,315,301.10 out
of the P18,038,939.37 earlier turned over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the deficit
amount of P3,734,839.03 which UST later turned over to the UST Faculty Union after
previously failing to deliver the amount. To the sum of P5,050,140.13, the UST Faculty Union
added the interest earnings of P1,146,381.27 from money market investments as well as the
amount of P192,632.64 representing the disallowed amount of expenses earlier deducted by
UST from the P42,000,000.00 package. All in all, the money left in the possession of the UST
Faculty Union was P6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty members in 1994.
Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of
transparency among the officers and directors of the union in the management and
disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty members. They initiated two (2)
complaints with the Office of the Regional Director, National Capital Region, Department of
Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022,
and another, on 16 November 1996, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028. In both
pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the officers and directors of the union led by
respondent Atty. Mariño because of their alleged failure to account for the balance of the
P42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and the attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00
which they deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members.
On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mariño
accusing him of (a) compromising their entitlements under the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement without the knowledge, consent or ratification of the union members, and worse,
for only P2,000,000.00 when they could have received more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to
account for the P7,000,000.00 received by him and other officers and directors in the UST
Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the
administration and distribution of the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under
the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00
in favor of the faculty members although the amount was denominated as attorney's fees.
Complainants asserted that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1; Rule 15.08 of
Canon 15; Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16; and Rule 20.04 of Canon 20, of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mariño filed his comment on the
complaint. He alleged that the issues raised therein were the same issues involved in the two
(2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and therefore constituted forum-
shopping, and further explained that he had adequately accounted for the disbursement of
the money demanded by complainants.
On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and the comment thereon to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety
(90) days from notice thereof.
On 18 May 1999 we received the Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as well as
the Resolution of 30 March 1999 of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Report which found the complaint meritorious and suspended respondent Atty. Mariño from
the practice of law "until such time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned
remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during his incumbency as President and
Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the
IBP."
On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the IBP Report and Resolution and
alleged the same contentions he previously asserted. On 27 October 1999 we referred the
case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and submission of report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice.
In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director found merit in the two (2)
complaints docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028
and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers and directors of the union led
by respondent Atty. Mariño because of their failure to account for the balance of the
P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the management of UST, and their
collection of exorbitant and illegal attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00.
On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal docketed as BLR-A-TR-52-25-10-
99 set aside the Order of the Regional Director. It found that the balance of the
P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union had been fully and adequately
accounted for by respondent and the other officers and directors of the union. Nonetheless,
the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the other officers and directors of the
union to distribute the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to
immediately hold the elections for union officers and directors in view of the expiration of
their respective terms of office.
On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60657. The Decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated
to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the case is allegedly still pending resolution.
On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board of
Governors adopting and approving the Report which recommended the lifting of Atty.
Mariño's suspension from law practice since he had sufficiently accounted for the funds in
question.
For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition with this Court to review the
IBP Resolution exonerating respondent from the accusations against him and lifting his
suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise required under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court if the case against respondent could still proceed in this Court. Nevertheless
since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory, and considering further the instructional
value of this case to members of the Bench, many of whom are engaged simultaneously in
other businesses or professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the instant case
once and for all.
In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. in the
manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and
the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record
shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted
for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of
agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mariño failed to avoid
conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he
played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being one of
the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the
attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying
such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union.
As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the
University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious
conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of
the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest
among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof." In the same manner, it is
undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-
interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.
Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations
respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the
property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent of
whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from
an attorney because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in
positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding
against a party even with the client's consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf
against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both
judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter
of the suit brought in behalf of his client.
In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of the 1990 compromise agreement,
this Court finds fault in respondent's omission of that basic sense of fidelity to steer clear of
situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his client, the faculty members of UST, open to
question. Atty. Mariño both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect
and advance the interest of union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This
obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the dismissed employees of
UST complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise
agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union
officers and directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
The facts would affirm this observation. In brokering the compromise agreement, respondent
received P5,000,000.00 as compensation for the dismissed union officials while only
P2,000,000.00 apparently settled UST's obligations in favor of the faculty members under the
1986 collective bargaining agreement when their original claim amounted to at least
P9,000,000.00. Worse, the P2,000,000.00 concession for accountabilities demandable long
ago in 1986 was paid only in 1992 under the memorandum of agreement, or a period of more
than two (2) years after the execution of the compromise agreement, in contrast to the
immediate payment of the P5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mariño and the other union officers and
directors.
Respondent Atty. Mariño ought to have disclosed to the members of the UST Faculty Union, if
not the entire bargaining unit of faculty members, his interest in the compromise agreement
as one of the dismissed union officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages and
other forms of damages, and also the reasons for reducing the claim of the faculty members
from more than P9,000,000.00 to only P2,000,000.00. As the record shows, the explanations
for respondent's actions were disclosed only years after the consummation of the
compromise agreement, particularly only after the instant complaint for disbarment was filed
against him, when the accounting should have been forthcoming either before or during the
settlement of the labor case against the management of UST.
Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and directors were to get for
themselves a lion's share of the compromise as they ultimately did, Atty. Mariño should have
unambiguously divulged and made clear to his client the compelling probability of conflict of
interests. He should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal representation to another
lawyer who could have acted on the matter with a deep sense of impartiality over the several
claims against UST and an unfettered commitment to the cause of the faculty members.
Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondent's dual role as lawyer
and president of the UST Faculty Union when he obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorney's fees so as not to pre-empt the
decision in G.R. No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not show any justification for such
huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his
tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had
collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union.
The situation of Atty. Mariño is not any different from that of an executor or administrator of
an estate who may not charge against the estate any professional fee for legal services
rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid for in his capacity as executor or
administrator. Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment
arising from the levy of attorney's fees by spelling out the terms and bases for the claim of
P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have
otherwise covered his legal services as well.
Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or
demanding the inexplicable attorney's fees, his actions were not transparent enough to allow
the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently. Clearly, he violated
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to "observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." Lawyers are vanguards
in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-
oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest.
As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly
with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more than imperative
during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of
law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and
candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a
lawyer's vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious
matter of public interest.
The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mariño failed to disclose at crucial moments
significant information about the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of
the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the memorandum of
agreement. A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from
UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the
faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent's part and guided
them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests.
In light of the irrefragable fact of respondent's misdemeanor, a possible mitigation of his
actionable conduct was that the attorney's fees and the compromise agreement were
negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous circumstances where his leadership and
that of his core officers and directors were incessantly challenged by complainants allegedly
aided by factions within UST itself. He might also have believed that the settlement achieved
immense benefits for his constituents which would not have been otherwise obtained if he
had chosen to relinquish the rein of legal representation to some other lawyer. Finally, it was
not improbable for him to suppose though wrongly that he could represent and in some
manner serve the interests of all of them, including his own, by pushing for and seeking the
approval of the agreements himself.
We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public
from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution
is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure
against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in
accordance with our ruling in Sumangil v. Sta. Romana. Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating
conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a
member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his
client.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with
a warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the
same act.
SO ORDERED.
PASAY LAW AND CONSCIENCE UNION, INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
[A. M. No. 1008; January 22, 1980]
FERNANDEZ, J.:
On June 5, 1971, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLACU) filed this disbarment case
against David D.C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant charged the
respondent with malpractice, gross misconduct in office, gross immoral conduct and/or
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
In a resolution dated June 22, 1971, this Court required the respondent to file an answer to
the complaint against him.
After the respondent had filed his answer and the complainant had submitted a reply, this
administrative case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On January 23, 1973, the Solicitor General, having found sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent after due investigation of the administrative case against him, submitted,
among others sixteen copies, in a sealed envelope, of his complaint against the respondent,
together with the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the investigation of the case,
the folder of exhibits, the record of the investigation not the case and the original Supreme
Court record.
The Solicitor General charged Atty. D.C. Paz with representing clients with conflicting interests
and gross misconduct in office.
Regarding the charge of representing clients with conflicting interests, the complainant
alleged that in 1969, in the course of the investigation then being conducted by the "Charlie
Division" of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, otherwise
known as the PARGO, on the complaint of Dr. Irineo P. Sia for anti-graft against the then ex-
Mayor Pablo Cuneta of Pasay City, the respondent, David D.C. Paz, was then PARGO's Legal
Officer and Chief Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid "Charlie Division"; that in the
series of follow-ups made with PARGO by Dr. Irineo P. Sia himself and at times in company of
Atty. Galileo P. Brion, President of the complainant, PLACU, of the aforesaid anti-graft
complaint against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent enlisted the help of Dr.
Irineo P. Sia and Atty. Galilee P. Brion in the gathering of evidence which included PLACU's
copies of the records of Civil Case No. 72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et al."; that in the course of the investigation
by the PARGO of the aforesaid anti-graft complaint, but prior to September 10, 1969, the
respondent even administered oaths to some persons who had given written statements
before the PARGO investigators; that on September 10, 1969, the respondent was detailed by
the then PARGO Secretary Ramon D. Bagatsing as Executive and Police Adviser to the Mayor of
Makati, Rizal; that on the same day, the respondent designated as division-in-charge Atty.
Rodolfo Navarro, who was then Team Leader of Charlie-two under PARGO's "Charlie Division"
to act for and in respondent's behalf while not in office and while performing his duties and
functions as such adviser in Makati, Rizal; that later on, after respondent had resigned from
the PARGO sometime in January 1970 and on the basis of the investigation conducted by the
PARGO on the aforementioned anti-graft complaint of Dr. Sia, the PARGO's successor, the
Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO) filed an anti-graft charge and another charge for
technical malversation both against Pablo Cuneta and others with the Pasay City Fiscal's
Office, docketed therein as I.S. Nos. 71712 and 71712-A. respectively; that on November 13
and 23, 1970, during the preliminary investigation by the Pasay City Fiscal's Office of I.S. Nos.
71712 and 71712-A, the respondent entered his appearance, participated and orally argued
therein as one of the counsels of Pablo Cuneta; that while in subsequent hearings thereof, the
respondent no longer appeared as counsel for Cuneta, it was only after his appearance had
been questioned by Atty. Brion; that inasmuch as at least up to September 10, 1969, the
respondent was then PARGO's Legal Officer and Chief Prosecutor, as well as head of PARGO's
"Charlie Division", he had access to, and necessarily acquired, directly or indirectly, knowledge
of the facts of the said anti-graft case, its weak as well as its strong points, and such
knowledge is confidential and should be guarded with great care, lest it jeopardizes PARGO, an
agency and instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines whose interest respondent
swore to serve and protect without any mental reservation, in the ultimate prosecution of the
said case; that there was, therefore, then a relationship of attorney and client between
respondent and the government; that for having appeared twice, participated and orally
argued as counsel for Pablo Cuneta during the preliminary investigation of the charges for
anti-graft and technical malversation filed by the CIO, successor of PARGO, against said Pablo
Cuneta and others before the Pasay City Fiscal's Office, the respondent violated Section 6 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics and Section 20 (e) of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court; and
that the alleged withdrawal of the respondent as counsel for Pablo Cuneta, although in this
connection there is nothing reflected in the records of the preliminary investigation, is of no
moment for he had already violated the aforesaid Canons of Legal Ethics and that
respondent's having appeared twice as Counsel for Cuneta in the preliminary investigation of
the aforesaid charge constitutes clear attempts on respondent's part to damage CIO's cause
against Cuneta.
On the charge of gross misconduct in office, the complaint stated that in the course of the
investigation by the PARGO of Dr. Sia's anti-graft complaint against the then ex-Mayor Pablo
Cuneta of Pasay City, but prior to September 10, 1969, the respondent borrowed and received
from Atty. Brion the PLACU's copies of the record or expedients of Civil Case No. 72967 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila entitled Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et al.,"
in the presence of Dr. Sia and Atty. Alidio for the purpose of making xerox copies of such
relevant documents therein to be utilized as evidence in the said anti-graft case; that
notwithstanding repeated requests by Atty. Brion, the respondent never returned to the
former the aforesaid PLACU's copies of the record or expedients, and when Atty. Brion
manifested before Pasay City Fiscal Pineda during the preliminary investigation on November
13, 1970 of the anti-graft and technical malversation charges against Pablo Cuneta and others
about the non-return to him of said expediente, respondent denied having borrowed and
received the same, to the prejudice of PARGO's prosecution of the said charges, so that
PARGO, through Atty. Brion, had to reconstitute the answer and its seventeen annexes which
formed part of the said record or expedients, and it was only then that these documents were
presented in the aforementioned preliminary investigation; and that the respondent's conduct
in this regard tended to prevent and obstruct the administration of justice by concealing
evidence, thus constituting gross misconduct in office.
In his answer filed on February 24, 1973, respondent, David D.C. Paz, specifically denied the
allegation contained in paragraphs 1 to 9 of the complaint on representing clients with
conflicting interests, the same being contrary to the evidence of record submitted to the
investigation conducted by Solicitor Eulogio Racquel Santos and averred that the respondent,
Paz did not participation the investigation of the Cuneta anti-graft case except to swear the
witnesses; that the Secretary of PARGO issued Mission Order No. 362 directing Atty. Rodolfo
Navarro and Engineers Platon Chaves, Ventura Villarosa, Gabriel Abellada, Jr. and agents Lysias
G. Manalo and Edilberto Arguelles, Jr. and Henry C. Consina to undertake a special mission and
carry out instructions given by the Secretary in connection with the confidential investigation
being undertaken by PARGO; that a g to the affidavit Of Lysias Manalo of the Philippine
Constabulary, the Secretary of PARGO, by virtue of Mission Order No. 362, the continuance of
the re-investigation of the complaint of Dr. Irineo P. Sia, against the ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta
and they for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that in fact, in 1969, the
respondent Paz was on detail as police ad. viser of the Mayor of Makati, Rizal and in 1970, he
from PARGO and transferred to Congress; that except for the self-serving declarations of Atty.
Brion and Dr. Irineo Sia, no other evidence was presented to prove that the respondent Paz
investigated the said anti-graft case in the PARGO; that it is true that respondent Paz appeared
among a battery of lawyers for Mayor Cuneta but when his appearance was questioned by
Atty. Brion, it was withdrawn; and that the anti-graft case against Mayor Cuneta was finally
dismissed.
Anent the charge of gross misconduct in office, the respondent denied the allegation in
paragraphs 1 to 6 of the second count, the same being contrary to the evidence of record and
alleged that the charge is a fabrication; that Atty, Brion was also a special assistant in the
PARGO; that when the respondent Paz resigned from the PARGO, he was granted a clearance
dated January 2, 1970 clearing him from any record or money accountability; that Hector
Lumba, Docket Officer of PARGO who was presented by Atty. Brion as a witness, admitted on
cross-examination that the respondent Paz had been cleared of accountabilities by the Docket
Section; and that at the time the clearance was granted, the respondent had no pending cases
in his possession that Atty. Brion admit" that the alleged expediente supposedly borrowed by
the respondent Paz was merely his lawyer's file as intervenor in Civil Case No. 72967; that his
motion for intervention was, however, denied; that the lawyer's file was allegedly finally
reconstituted and presented in the preliminary investigation of the anti-graft case against
Pablo Cuneta; and Atty. Brion declared that the respondent Paz "receipted" for the same
expediente but during the investigation conducted by Solicitor Racquel Santos, Atty. Brion
could not produce any receipt; that neither could Atty. Brion present any proof that he
addressed a written complaint or demand to PARGO for the return of the alleged expediente
and Dr. Sia admitted that the evidence gathered were turned over to Atty. Cuaresma and
Mangase, not to respondent Paz.
On the charge representing clients with conflicting interests, the evidence has duly established
that the respondent, David D.C. Paz, as PARGO's Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor and head
of the "Charlie Division", took part in the investigation of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor
Cuneta by administering oaths to witnesses and gathering evidence. He acquired knowledge
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the anti-graft case. The respondent obtained
confidential information and learned of the evidence of the PARGO against ex-Mayor Cuneta.
There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and client between the respondent David
D.C. Paz and the PARGO.
It is also a fact that at the early stages of the preliminary investigation conducted by the City
Fiscal of Pasay of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent appeared
as counsel for said Cuneta. This is the same anti-graft case investigated by the PARGO when
the respondent was head of the "Charlie Division" thereof. That the respondent later
withdrew his appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of no moment. He had already violated the
Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20(e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at a every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent has displayed a lack concern for his duties as a lawyer and an office of the
court. In Nombrando vs. Hernandez, this court said:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that
even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by
ham as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding
the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case,
for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise
to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84
Phil. 571, are apropos:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in
the forcible entry case. In the same cast of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further
said:
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interest. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as wok to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. ... It is founded on principles of public policy of good taste. As has been said in
another case, the n 43 not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like 's Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Under the circumstances, the respondent should be punished by suspension from the practice
of law for two (2) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same offense wig be dealt
with more drastically.
There is no sufficient evidence that the respondent had borrowed the record of Civil Case No.
72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled "Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City
Government, et al. According to Atty. Galilee Brion, the respondent issued a receipt for the
record. However, no such receipt could be presented at the investigation. Moreover, Dr.
Irineo Sia admitted that the evidence in connection with the Cuneta anti-graft case was turned
over to Attys. Mangase and Cuaresma, both of the PARGO. In view thereof, the respondent
cannot be held guilty of the charge of serious misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is found guilty of representing clients with conflicting interests
and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense win be dealt with i more drastically. The respondent is
exonerated of the charge of g TOSS misconduct in office.
SO ORDERED.
ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR., Respondent.
[A.C. No. 9976; June 25, 2014]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2539]
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the complaint for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Almira C. Foronda (complainant) against Atty. Jose
L. Alvarez, Jr. (respondent) for the following alleged infractions:
(1) Fraud and deceit in luring [the complainant] in transacting business with [the
respondent]; (2) Dishonesty and misrepresentation when [the respondent] misinformed
[the complainant] that [her] annulment case was already filed when in fact it was not;
(3) Issuing unfunded checks as payment for [the respondent's] obligations to [the
complainant];
(4) Violation of Canon 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities when [the
respondent] represented to [the complainant] that he know[s] of court personnel who will
help facilitate [the complainant’s] annulment case;
 (5) Violation of Canons 16.01 and 16.03 for failure to return [the complainant’s] money
despite numerous demands; and
(6) Violation of Canon 18.04 when [the respondent] misinformed [the complainant]
regarding the status of [her] annulment case.
Facts
The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the
Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. The respondent was
referred to her and the complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of ₱195,000.00 to
be paid as follows: 50% or ₱100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; 25% or ₱50,000.00
on or before June 10, 2008; and 25% or ₱45,000.00 before the filing of the case. The
complainant paid the amounts as agreed. The amount of ₱45,000.00 was even paid on June
10, 2008, after being informed by the respondent that the petition for the annulment of
marriage was ready for filing.
The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he received
the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the
complainant inquired about the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent
that her petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a decision by the
court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009,
the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized for the
delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out that it
was filed only on July 16, 2009.
The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed the contract
of service with the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were
going to discuss her case, she agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent invited her to
be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law. The
respondent encouraged her to invest ₱200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%)
interest per month.
The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue personal and
post-dated checks in her favor dated the 10th of each month starting July 2008 until June
10,2009, representing the five percent (5%) interest that the complainant’s money shall earn.
Thus, the complainant gave ₱200,000.00 to the respondent upon the security of thirteen (13)
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks. Eleven (11) of said checks were for ₱8,000.00
each. The other two (2) checks dated June 8, 2009 and June 10, 2009 were for ₱100,000.00
and ₱108,000.00, respectively.
According to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored
the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed
account. When she brought the matter to the respondent, he promised to pay her in cash. He
actually paid her certain amounts as interest through her representative. Nevertheless, the
respondent failed to pay the entire obligation as promised. Thereafter, the respondent issued
eight (8) Banco de Oro (BDO)checks as replacement for the dishonored UCPB checks.
However, the BDO checks were likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
In his Answer,9 the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July
2009 but this was not due to his own fault. The delay was caused by the complainant herself
who allegedly instructed him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband
were discussing a possible reconciliation. He further claimed that he filed the petition on July
16, 2009 after negotiations with the complainant’s husband apparently failed.
The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner in a lending
business and clarified that the said business was being managed by a friend. He further stated
that he was also involved in the said business as a partner.
The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued were honored by
the drawee-bank. He stated that prior to the presentment and dishonor of the rest of the
UCPB checks, he advised the complainant that the third check should not be deposited just yet
due to losses in their lending business caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their
obligations. Apart from the foregoing, the respondent denied most of the allegations in the
complaint, including the dishonor of the BDO checks, for lack of sufficient information to form
a belief as to the truth thereof.
By way of special and affirmative defense, the respondent asserted the following: that it was
the complainant who owed him notarial fee amounting to 80,000.00 as he notarized a deed of
conditional sale executed between her and a certain Rosalina A. Ruiz over a real property
worth 4,000,000.00; and that the contract he executed with the complainant was a mere
contract of loan. Being a contract of loan, he cannot be held guilty of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) since the checks he issued were to serve only as security for
it.
The parties were called to a mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD on January 18, 2010 by
the Investigating Commissioner. Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their
respective position paper.
In an undated Report, the Investigating Commissioner made the following factual findings:
From the foregoing, it appears that the following facts are not disputed. The complainant is an
overseas Filipino worker based in Dubai. During her vacation in the Philippines in May 2008,
she contracted the services of respondent to file a petition for the annulment of her marriage
for an agreed packaged fee of [P]195,000.00 which she paid in full by June 2008. Respondent,
however, filed the petition for the annulment of her marriage only in July 2009. In the
meantime, more specifically in June 2008, respondent obtained [P]200,000.00 from
complainant with the promise to pay the same with interestat 4% per month starting July
2008 until June 2009. Respondent issued complainant eleven (11) checks for [P]8,000.00 each
postdated checks monthly from 10 July 2008 until 10 May 2009 plus a check for [P]108,000.00
payable on 10 June 2009 and another check for [P]100,000.00 payable on 8 June 2009. When
presented for payment, the first two (2) checks were good but the rest of the checks were
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When complainant demanded payment,
respondent issued to her eight (8) new replacement postdated checks dated 25th of every
month from June 2009 to January 2010. All of the replacement checks, however, were
likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When respondent was unable
to pay respondent, complainant filed a criminal complaint against him for violation of BP 22
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. The criminal complaint was eventually
dismissed after complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain
amount by respondent.
The Investigating Commissioner found that there was basis to hold the respondent liable, to
wit: 1. Respondent Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is guilty of delay in the filing of the petition for annulment
of the marriage of complainant for almost a year. Initially, in his Answer, he claims that the
delay was due to the instruction of complainant to hold in abeyance the filing of the petition
as she and her husband discussed possible reconciliation. In his Position Paper, he claims that
the delay was due to the failure of the complainant to submit to an interview by the
psychologist and the time it took him to research on the guidelines on the matter. Finally, in
his Supplemental Affidavit, he admits the delay and apologizes for it. For delaying in filing the
petition for complainant, respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which pertinent read:
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE[.]
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and the negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
2. Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied
to her about the delay in the filing of the petition are very detailed. While denying he
misrepresented to complainant that the petition has been filed when it was not, respondent
did not care to refute also in detail the allegations of complainant. In his Answer, he simply
denied the same for the reason [that] he has no sufficient information to form a belief as to
the truth thereof. It should be noted, however, that the allegations pertains [sic] to things
respondent said and did[,] and are therefore[,] matters which he knew or should have known.
His denial is therefore tantamount to an admission. In doing so, respondent is guilty of
violating not only Canon 15 but also Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which read:
CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
xxxx
3. Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to
pay the same. This is admitted by respondent. Rule 16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his client
and his client’s interest was not fully protected. In fact, respondent repeatedly failed to
comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact that he subsequently paid complainant
more than the amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed
by her against him hardly serves to mitigate his liability. x x x.
4. He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for payment. This is
admitted by respondent. x x x.
The Investigating Commissioner, thereby, recommended the penalty of two years suspension
from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a heavier
penalty.21
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It directed the
suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for one year with warning that
repetition of the similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that "[a] lawyer, by taking the lawyer’s oath, becomes a
guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of
justice." He can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. For of all classes and professions, it
is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.
"Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession." Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine the full extent of the
respondent’s liability, and to impose the proper penalty therefor.
It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the respondent.
She expected the immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full
payment of attorney’s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the respondent filed the said petition
only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay in an attempt
to exculpate himself. At the end, the respondent admitted the delay and apologized for it. It
cannot be gainsaid that the complainant through her agent was diligent in following up the
petition. The different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of candor in his
dealings with the complainant.
"Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." "[H]e is required by
the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion." "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession."
Anent the ₱200,000.00 which was received by the respondent from the complainant, the
respondent argued that it was a loan and not really meant to be the latter’s investment in any
money-lending business. At any rate, the respondent issued 13 UCPB checks to serve as
security for the alleged loan; among which, only two of said checks were honored by the
drawee-bank while the rest were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
By reason of said dishonor, the respondent paid certain amounts in cash to the complainant as
interest to the said loan. Ultimately, the respondent issued eight BDO checks as replacement
for the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were also dishonored due to the
same reason – they were drawn against a closed account.
The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "[T]he issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action."
It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the
issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far
as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The relationship of
an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and
truthful when dealing with his client."
All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons 15, 17, Rule
18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable
under Rule 1.01 thereof pursuant to our ruling in Co v. Atty. Bernardino.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "[d]isbarment,
jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring
person."
"The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an attorney’s
misconduct has always moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost caution and
deliberate circumspection." While the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate
its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined
to impose a less severe punishment if through it the end desired of reforming the errant
lawyer is possible.
In Baldado v. Mejica, the Court found Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica guilty of violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in protecting the interest of his
client, and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of three months, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1
In Solidon v. Macalalad, the Court imposed on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) the
penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law for violations of Rule16.01 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In said case, Atty. Macalalad failed to file the
required petition and did not account for the money he received, as attorney’s fee, from the
complainant.
In Junio v. Atty. Grupo, Atty. Salvador M. Grupo was found guilty of violating Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for borrowing money from his client and was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one month.
In Wong v. Atty. Moya II, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II was ordered suspended from the practice
of law for two years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts,
he also had seriously breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP orders in the course of its proceedings.
Further, in Wilkie v. Atty. Limos, the Court held, to wit:
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he
was convicted in the criminal case filed against him.
In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the
respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dinohaving been found guilty of gross misconduct for
issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to
him by the complainant. But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, we meted out only a six-month
suspension to Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro for having issued several checks to the
complainants in payment of a pre-existing debt without sufficient funds, justifying the
imposition of a lighter penalty on the ground of the respondent’s payment of a portion of her
debt to the complainant, unlike in the aforementioned Lao and Rangwani cases where there
was no showing of any restitution on the part of the respondents. (Citations omitted and
emphases ours)
In the instant case, the Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges filed
against the respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant. The Court also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP-CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as
evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant's counsel. Therein, it
was acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of ₱650,000.00 in payment for the:
(1) ₱200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the complainant; (2)
₱195,000.00 for the attorney's fees he received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and
expenses that the complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed against the
respondent including the instant complaint with the IBP. Unlike in Solidon where the
respondent failed to file the required petition and did not account for the money he received,
the respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he
returned in full the money he received as attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the
trouble of preparing the required petition and in filing the same - not to mention the cost he
incurred for the purpose.
In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the Court finds
that the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is commensurate, with a
stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any
similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the
practice of law with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the offenses involved in this
case or a commission of similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. 's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014]
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint filed by Daria
O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter, against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from
Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed
by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually
resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer
Agreement dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's
music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take
over the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as
business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later
renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis &
Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and
in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and
filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business
partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole
proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who
initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept
the law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge
or information regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling.
Respondent admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied
that he took advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and
Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE as
her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent in several cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in his
office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing the latter
that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventory of all items at the
former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which] the latter
x xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the present administrator
of the building, Benjie Pinlac;
3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for
further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later informed that the
business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven days.
Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place to Novie Balageo which the latter
readily accepted;
 3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie Balageo
in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as partner of Novie
Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and Benjie
Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage of the
retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and] Complainant as
Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related by complainant to
Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s business;
3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie Balageo and
Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent [was unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it prudent]
to xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed his Motion to
Withdraw As Counsel. x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the [Complaint's]
subject matter. x x x
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for
a period of one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof that
respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant.
Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005
with respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the
rollo of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent
represented and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the
ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on
behalf of said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent
withdrew his appearance for Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The prohibition
against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has
acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. In Quiambao v.
Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is
actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between
Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer
Agreement. We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty.
Cabucana, Jr., this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the
party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument
that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its
professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment.
Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should
have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead
engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from
the practice of law ranging from six months to two years. We thus adopt the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY.
LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO
T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
[A.C. No. 10567; February 25, 2015]
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit dated December 4, 2009
filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily
Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty.
Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and
Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica
were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent.
Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor
cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael
Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law
office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment
case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of
the CPR, to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense, respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance
of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing,
and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with
the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela
and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof. Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor
cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, and that complainant did not have
any monthly retainer contract. He likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss
complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple, and
that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that
would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other
lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he
was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed and
terminated. The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimanded therefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010. The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been
retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified
theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
In a Resolution dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the
penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted in its Resolution dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013
Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the
rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and
(3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel
of complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of
a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste. In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented
conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client,
FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former
client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal
case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been
able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others,
ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As
an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work
to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in
deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm
exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even
adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of
unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members,
Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby
impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming,
herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively
sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should
suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal
fault for the law firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of
the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of
reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be
dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the
fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the
termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip
Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 CANON 16 CASES
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 8000; August 5, 2014]
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant
Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging
him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for
misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several
demands.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her
best friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the
issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who
represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into
a Contract of Legal Services (Contract), whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure
the release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as
downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US
visa. The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for
any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal
conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return
the said downpayment. However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the
agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy.
As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal
complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
In his Comment dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with
his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda
(Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered
the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business
relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and
family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn
referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied,
resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his
commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to
return the said amount to complainant. To buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures
supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails)
purportedly coming from the latter.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months,
with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for:
(a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he
contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of ₱350,000.00.
The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to respondent’s defense anent his
purported transactions with Pineda considering that the latter’s identity was not proven and in
light of respondent’s self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of
any probative value.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the
period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount of
₱350,000.00 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest
from the date of demand.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to
the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which
resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and
paying him the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth,
however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact
allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications
for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s identity considering that the
photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by
the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be
given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes
him unfit to practice law.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the
Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant.
This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule
18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed
to refund the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a
lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.
Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the
latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his
retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter.
Also, in Jinon v. Jiz, the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure
to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In
this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainant’s US visa and
return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an
immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a
graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it
appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from
six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of ₱350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that
"while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must
be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in
a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement." Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees,
the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal
fees he received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from
the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 5440; December 10, 2014]
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
(complainants) against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent). This case involves a
determination of whether respondent violated his duty to hold in trust all moneys and
properties of the client; his duty to account for all funds and property collected or received for
or from the client; and his duty to deliver the funds and property of the client when due or
upon demand under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts are summarized as follows:
On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent to
facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants. Complainants then gave respondent a check for ₱68,250.00 for the payment of
transfer taxes. They also gave respondent a check for ₱13,800.00 for respondent’s
professional fee.
Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups.
Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However,
respondent still failed to produce the title.
Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return
the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a
certificate to file action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money intended
for the transfer taxes. Respondent still did not return the money.
On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to settle the
transfer of the land title. However, respondent reneged on this promise. Complainants were
then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to
secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names.
Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants
who caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names. Complainants
were not able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the
deed of extrajudicial petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published
item in a newspaper of general circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay
where the property is located as required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of ₱13,800.00
despite all the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property. These
involved "being-pulled from the office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the
transaction [with the sellers]; going twice to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,]
Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance of a [n]ew owner’s duplicate copy of the title; going
twice to the office of the Register of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make verification and
submit the court [o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation and notarization of the Deed of
Absolute Sale."
Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from
complainants for the services he rendered in various cases:
1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas, for
Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Santa
Rosa, Laguna. This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, the issue of possession being intertwined with that of ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for Accion
Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was assigned to the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and in behalf of herein
complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and [o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of the
injunction, which was favorably acted upon. Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the
Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro et
al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they [filed]
against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable source, was
discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was amicably
settled.16 Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to prove his worth
as a lawyer by doing away with the requirements and expediting the cancellation of the
Marcaidas’ title.
The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. The parties were then called to a mandatory
conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. They were required to submit their
position papers. Respondent did not submit his position paper.
On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his
findings and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent
violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of
complainants. Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their
names.
Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants. Complainant Nicasio
San Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is immaterial.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of "censure and
warning," hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary
sanction of CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with the admonition that he be
extremely careful of his acts to forego severe penalty in the future.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It held:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for Respondent’s violation of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to effect the transfer of property despite
encashment of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to Returnthe amount of Sixty Eight Thousand
Two Hundred Fifty (₱68,250.00) Pesos to complainants within thirty days from receipt of
notice. (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)
On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. The IBP Board of
Governors denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated
June 22, 2013:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. (Emphasis and italics in the
original)
On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution
No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBP’s letter dated
October 7, 2013 transmitting the documents pertaining to the case.
In the manifestation and motion dated October 25,2013, respondent requested for a formal
hearing, reasoning that he "wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to] cross[-
]examine them and that of their witness." The manifestation and motion was denied by this
court in the resolution dated September 22, 2014.
The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to
adopt and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP
Board of Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the
high standards oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the
norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus]
. . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as
for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended
purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting
or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by the client. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
complainants’ name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty.
However, after three (3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to
accomplish the task given to him and even refused to return the money. Complainants’
alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify his
violation of his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the
following elements:
An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements
concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents
and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien
is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and
applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s
possession in the course of his employment.
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked
on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for
attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien,
he cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice
to the client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the
amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees .... "
We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance dated March
14, 2008, both complainants signed their comment to respondent's motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the motion be dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months. He is also ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of ₱68,250.00
with 6% legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent
is further DIRECTED to submit to this court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days
from payment. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in respondent Atty. Isagani A.
Mendoza's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 17
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 6788; August 23, 2007]
(Formerly, CBD 382)
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
₱5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court,
respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She
was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from
the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as
counsel for the complainant's daughter.
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an
indigent, he declined. Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a
relative who was a private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the
complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon. Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant.
She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty.
Ungson's acceptance fee.
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because
one of her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the
respondent for safekeeping. Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a
receipt dated July 15, 1992.
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. A few months later or in September
1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.
Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint.
However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.
Recommendation of the IBP
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and
ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent
violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however,
modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the
total amount, an additional suspension of six months.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For
this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
Governors.
declared unlawful:

The CBD noted that the receipt was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with
xxx xxx xxx
the PAO. It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a during their incumbency shall not:
friend's request. It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government
lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. The xxx xxx xxx
CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
client.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on
July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he
accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5,
Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant
as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail
to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public
faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice. vphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment
obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as
amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the
₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at
the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 19 CASES
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
[A.C. No. 7298; June 25, 2007]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which
threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of
documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August
2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic),
received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a
mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client,
submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant
rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the
latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice,
respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The
letter also contained the following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards,
complainant filed an administrative complaint with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to
Dismiss and Counterclaims) claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal
counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated
charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification
against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the
Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment
of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for
Usurpation of Public Functions and for violation of the Notarial Law.
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear. Both
parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found
that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the case. Thereafter, on 18
August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of
Decision) reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred
million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false, malicious,
defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a
groundless and false suit."
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline) alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position
paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that
he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without
considering his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his position paper
on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the
front page of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The
registry receipt attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail
to respondent on the same date.
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for
his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular
No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court
or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994,
expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial
agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute
contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his
failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently
dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition.
However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings,
the reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant's
subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint
against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen, dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
 primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to
be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to
another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent,
because such other proceedings or "action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues"
as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be
attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to
apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in
another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum
shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts. Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and
transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other
party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing
situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon
the same issue.
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against
forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be
avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person." Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach
a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the
same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule
requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible."
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed
defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required
certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his
Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the grant of the
present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to
complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to
file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyer's client.
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his
letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose
as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as
multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business
license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating
Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or
opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining
from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his
prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and
synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the
prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by
threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to
expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a
very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent's
disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution." While the
respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of
respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as
merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with
boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the
government commission of offenses punishable by the State." He further asserts that the
writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and
encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent's
threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel
the latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's intention to point out (1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the Honorable Presiding Judge
complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even Gorgonio Y. Ybañez on (sic) Civil Case No. 17473 for Ejectment.
contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim
is made on the date indicated. (2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio, Secretary of Atty. Napoleon
Corral, on February 23, 1990.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It
is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his (3) That on March 13, 1990, a "NOTICE OF APPEAL" was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon
client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to Corral, a copy of which was served on plaintiff’s counsel.
enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a
letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
(4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon Corral came to the Office
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory
of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and changed the date February 23, 1990 to
charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation
February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in February 1990, he filed a "REPLY
pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to
TO PLAINTIFF’S MANIFESTATION" claiming therein that he received the Decision not on
their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of February 1990.
Responsibility.

(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under
with particularly by personally and manually changing entries in the court’s record without
which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable.
the Court’s prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the
The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail
Philippine Bar much more so because in so doing he was found to have been motivated by
complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
the desire of suppressing the truth.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that
(6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS", among
disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote
other things he stated that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case at
the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the more
issue.
appropriate penalty is reprimand.

In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the paper
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the
prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction was initiated and done in the presence
IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G.
and with the approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court employees. According to
Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of
respondent, the correction was made because of typographical error he committed. He
Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
denied that Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is his secretary.
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
SO ORDERED.
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report on August 21, 1997 finding
JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
vs. six (6) months.
ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.
[A.C. No. 3548; July 4, 2002] On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution approving and adopting
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
RESOLUTION
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board’s decision. The
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Board, however, subsequently issued a Resolution on March 28, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration and further pointed out that the pleading is improper because his remedy was
On September 1, 1990, Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment charging Atty. to file the same with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof pursuant to
Napoleon Corral with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. Section 2 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The complaint alleges, inter alia -
Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
- letter of August 10, 1993. Again nothing was heard from respondent although he and
1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY
RESPONDENT FROM THE BEGINNING;
2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT
ALTERED THE COURT RECORDS;
3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER JUDGE IBAÑEZ
COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS.
that the hearings be continued even in his absence for the reasons he stated in his previous
complainant were furnished copies by registered mail.
Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6, 1994 hearing, for which
reason the investigator issued an order re-scheduling the hearing for the last time to February
24, 1994 giving respondent "a last chance to present his evidence" with the warning that
respondent’s failure to do so will compel the Commission to render a ruling based on the
evidence submitted by the complainant. The investigator, however, noted the complainant’s
letter of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter manifested that he was resting his case based
on the evidence submitted by him together with the complaint.

On February 15, 1994, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1.] the
Respondent’s claim that he was not afforded due process deserves scant consideration. The
complaint filed is not verified; 2.] in the hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
appear; 3.] unless complainant appears personally, be sworn to and questioned personally
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In
under oath, the complaint is defective; 4.] the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a
fact –
form of harassment; 5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to appear and be sworn
to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay.
. . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to be informed of the findings
and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set for
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
the last time the hearing on April 21, 1994 for the reception of respondent’s evidence.
made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committee.
On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement praying that the hearing be
reset on the last week of July 1994. Accompanying said motion was an "Answer To The Order
Respondent can not feign he was denied an opportunity to be heard in this case because as
Of The Commission Dated March 3, 1994" where he averred, among others, that: 1.] it was his
borne out by the records, hearings had to be re-scheduled several times by the investigating
right to cross-examine complainant with respect to the allegations in the complaint; 2.] the
commissioner to afford him the chance to present his evidence. The records disclose that
allegations in the complaint are not true and complainant’s use of the name "Reverend" was
when the case was referred to the IBP by Resolution of the Court dated January 30,
made to deceive the Commission; 3.] what respondent actually did was to correct the date of
1993, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued a Notice of Hearing dated July
his pleading which was erroneously typed by his secretary and this was done in the presence
12, 1993 ordering complainant and respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar
of the court employees with their knowledge and consent; complainant made it appear that
Discipline on August 19, 1993.
respondent falsified the records; 4.] the correction of the date in the pleading was done in
good faith; 5.] this is not the first time complainant filed complaints to harass people and to
In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, sent a letter dated August 10, misrepresent himself as a "Reverend"; 6.] in fact, complainant was nearly stabbed to death by
1993 informing the Commission that owing to his limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could families whom he ejected from their lands using donations of the church to buy the properties
not afford the expenses involved in attending the hearings and in view thereof, he requested in his name; 7.] respondent intended to file a complaint with the Bible Baptist Association of
that the hearings be held without his presence and that the case be decided based on the America and the Philippines to investigate complainant’s activities.
evidence submitted. Nothing was heard from respondent, although the records show that he
was furnished a copy of the notice.
To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner reset the hearing on July 28,
1994 with the warning that said setting is intransferable and that the Commission will proceed
On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and respondent did not with its investigation on said date with or without respondent’s presence. For failure of
appear. The investigator, however, noted the letter of complainant dated August 10, 1993. As respondent to appear on said date, the investigator issued an order considering the case
there was no showing that respondent received the notice of hearing, the investigator reset submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
the hearing of the case for reception of respondent’s evidence to September 30, 1993. Both
parties, who were duly furnished copies of the order, again did not appear on said date. The
Given the foregoing factual backdrop, respondent can not now complain that he was denied
hearing was again reset to November 8, 1993. Both parties likewise failed to appear on
due process. On the contrary, the Commission was lenient to a fault in accommodating his
November 8, 1993 hearing, which was re-scheduled on January 6, 1994. However,
numerous requests for continuance. Indeed, the chronology of events shows that the
complainant sent a letter dated November 4, 1993 addressed to the investigator requesting
prolonged silence of respondent and the belated filing of his motion to dismiss followed by the
"Answer" to the investigator’s March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately resorted to hinder the
proceedings.
The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side and
to adduce any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Entrenched is the rule that due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity
or a right to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings and opportunity to explain
one’s side. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.
In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction introduced by
respondent was made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court into believing that
the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 17473 was duly received by a certain Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent,
on February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on March 13, 1990 which was
clearly out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date
when he allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990.
Realizing that there was no February 29, 1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the date
again to February 28, 1990 by means of a "reply to Plaintiff’s Manifestation".
The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondent’s claim that the
correction was made in the presence of the Clerk of Court and other court employees was
denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who
declared that the alteration was surreptitiously made and would have been left unnoticed
were it not for the timely discovery thereof.
The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully supported by the
evidence.1âwphi1 However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed
of respondent.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended form his office as attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit;
2.] malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.] conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5.] violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6.] willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7.] willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.
While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a penalty as disbarment, the
inherent power of the Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be
exercised because it can not be denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a
lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.
The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain terms that: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates
that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding."
The Court "can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients." Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D.
Unto, the Court ruled that "The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity. Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport
himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession."
By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed,
respondent committed an act of dishonesty. Under pertinent rules, dishonesty constitutes
grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case, imposed a one-year suspension on
respondent therein for inserting in the records of the case a certification of non-forum
shopping and making it appear that the same was already part of such records at the time the
complaint was filed. A one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v.
Atty. Rolando Javier for deceiving his client into believing that he filed the petition on time
when in fact it was filed on a much later date. It should be stressed that brazenly resorting to
such a legal subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings toward his client is
not only a disgraceful indictment on respondent’s moral fiber and personal fitness to his
calling as a lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar. Such misconduct
warrants a similar penalty for the Court can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to
besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of
the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 20 CASES
ANA F. RETUYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ, respondent.
[A.M. No. 1388; March 28, 1980]
AQUINO, J:
This disbarment case is linked to Administrative Case No. 1431-MJ which was filed by Ana F.
Retuya against Municipal Judge Paulo A. Equipilag of Maasin, Leyte and which was decided on
July 16, 1979 (Retuya vs. Equipilag). The facts of that case, which also gave rise to this
disbarment case, are as follows:
Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor children, filed a claim for workmen's
compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the employer of her husband who died
in 1968. In a decision dated December 4, 1970 the Workmen's Compensation Unit at
Tacloban City awarded to Ana the sum of P8,792.10 consisting of (a) P6,000 as
compensation benefits, (b) P2,292.10 for medical and hospitalization expenses, (c) P200 as
burial expenses and (d) P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Iñego Gorduiz (Case No. 9728).
The employer appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the employer proposed to
compromise the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-half of the total award. Ana
accepted the proposal and directed that the amount be remitted to Fiscal Mamerto
Daclan through the Philippine National Bank's branch at Maasin, Southern Leyte.
The employer paid the reduced award on November 16, 1972. Ana sent to the employer
the receipt and release signed by her with a covering letter dated December 19, 1972
wherein she explained that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the joint motion to dismiss
the claim because he wanted twenty percent of the award as his attorney's fees. She was
willing to give him ten percent.
After she had cashed the check for P4,396.05, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and
pay his fee. Then, unexpectedly, in February, 1973, she was served with a warrant of
arrest issued in Criminal Case No. R-2362 of the municipal court of Maasin. To avoid
detention, she had to post bail in the sum of one thousand pesos.
It turned out that on January 12, 1973 Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana
had misappropriated his attorney's fees amounting to three hundred pesos and that he
had demanded payment of the amount from her but, she refused to make payment and.
instead, she went to Cebu and starved there for a long time.
On the basis of that affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a complaint for
estafa in the municipal court of Maasin. After posting bail, she filed a motion to quash
wherein she explained that she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz because he was
demanding one-third of the award: that when she did not accede to his demand, he
lowered his claim to eight hundred pesos, and that she bargained for six hundred fifty
pesos but he refused to accept that amount. Ana averred that the estafa case was filed
just to harass her.
Judge Paulo A. Equipilag denied the motion to quash. He granted the motion of Atty.
Gorduiz requiring Ana to produce a copy of the decision awarding her workmen's
compensation for her husband's death.
The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Erasmo M. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty.
Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted.
On November 22, 1973, the acting child of police filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
basis of the affidavit of Atty. Gorduiz ex. executed on that date stating that the
prosecution witnesses had allegedly become hostile and that he was no longer interested
in further prosecuting the case. Also, on that day, Judge Equipilag dismissed the case.
In spite of the dismissal of the estafa case Ana F. Retuya felt aggrieved by the proceedings
therein. In a complaint dated July 24, 1974 but filed in this Court on October 30, 1974, she
asked for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag. The
disbarment case against Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor General.
The case against Judge Equipilag was investigated by the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte.
This Court found that there was no justification for suspending respondent Judge. However,
he was admonished to be more prudent and circumspect in the discharge of his duties so as to
obviate the suspicion that, for an ulterior motive, he wall in cahoots with the offended party in
a criminal case for the purpose of using the strong arm of the law that the accused in an
oppressive and vindictive manner.
The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte to investigate the case
against Gorduiz. The fiscal in her report of July 8, 1975 recommended the of the case.
The Solicitor General disagreeing with that recommendation, filed in this Court against
Gorduiz a complaint wherein he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months because the
latter, in filing the estafa case, had promoted a groundless suit against his client.
Ana F. Retuya testified before the investigation Fiscal that in December, 1972 she was willing
to pay Gorduiz six hundred fifty pesos as his attorney's few but he demanded a bigger
amount.He lodged a complaint for estafa against her and was arrests She had to post bail in
the sum of one thousand pesos. As already stated above, the estafa case was later dismissed
when Ana paid Gorduiz sum of five hundred pesos.
In his testimony before the investigating fiscal and this Court's legal officer, respondent
Gorduiz denied that he demanded as attorney's fees an amount higher than three hundred
pesos. He explained that he filed the estafa cam because after Ana had received payment of
the award, she did not turn over to him the attorney's fees of three hundred pesos in spite of
her promises to pay the same and his demands for payment (Exh. 7 and 8).
Gorduiz declared that Ana filed the disbarment case against him in order that she could evade
the payment of his attorney's fees in the other cases which he had handled for her. It was also
possible that someone who had a score to settle with Gorduiz had instigated the filing of this
case against him.
He further declared that he filed the estafa case because he thought that Ana had absconded
when she stayed in Cebu City for a long time (23-24 tsn, June 26, 1979). He claimed that he
spent one hundred pesos of his own money in gathering evidence which was presented in the
workmen's compensation case. He had also advanced around two hundred pesos to cover the
expenses in the other cases which he had handled for Ana.
After reflecting on the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that there is
justification for suspending the respondent.
Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed
misappropriation of his attomey's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled
him and, therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he
had filed a suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her.
Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that "controversies with clients
concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with
his self- respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services; and
lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."
WHEREFORE, the respondent is from the practice of law for a period of six months counted
from notice of this decision. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar
Confidant's office.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J, concurring:
There was no case of estafa against Ana F. Retuya, respondent's client. When he filed one
against her he was guilty of harassment and firing an unfounded suit. I am for suspension for
six months as recommended by the Solicitor General.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J, concurring:
There was no case of estafa against Ana F. Retuya, respondent's client. When he filed one
against her he was guilty of harassment and firing an unfounded suit. I am for suspension for
six months as recommended by the Solicitor General.
CANON 21 CASES
JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.
[A.C. No. 5098; April 11, 2012]
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of:
(1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information received from his
client; and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the
legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty.
Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido
Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he
obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of
the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty.
Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino
Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty.
Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003,
IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for
representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract
which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L.
Cañete, respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the
sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information
divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of
sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of
Zenaida Cañete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the
absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before
accepting employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same
property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of
interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which his
duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with
which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had
formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes
omitted)
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules.5 The IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors
denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the
IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail
to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in
this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where
the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."7 The
prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client
that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion
to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is
present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument
for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. [emphasis ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty.
Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on
record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest
over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana,
the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the
property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge
that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.
 Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant
in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in
the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he
had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in
the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been
previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an
exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to
Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty.
Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete
before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that
although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s
adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the
adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also
being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Cañete. Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana
failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense
of representing conflicting interests.
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that
the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not
for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter
offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a
specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained
allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida
Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana,
Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. He also averred in
his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on
behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked
[the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex
"4") to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant
ignored it. Neither did she object to respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete
on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the
complaint against her. hi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. These opportunities were all afforded to
Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. This is all
that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the
powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have
already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 9537; June 10, 2013]
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee)
against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now
A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004 until
January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00).
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if
the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He
claimed that Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward from
the Bureau of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she claimed to
be not in the business of lending money, the former initially refused to lend money. But Atty.
Simando allegedly persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will
issue postdated checks and sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-
maker of Mejorado and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty.
Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo,
gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang
buwan ito, bayad ka na."
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the
latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts
of money. Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit:
Date Amount
November 11, 2006 Php 400, 000.00
November 24, 2006 200, 000.00
November 27, 2006 400, 000.00
December 7, 2006 200, 000.00
December 13, 2006 200, 000.00
TOTAL 1, 400, 000.00
When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed
and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr.
Lee instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in
touch with Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action.
However, even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked
Atty. Simando why no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that
he was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di
kasuhan din ninyo ako!"
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal
actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced to terminate her
contract with Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand letter
dated June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of the loans of
Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a co-maker and claimed
that novation had occurred because complainant had allegedly given additional loans to
Mejorado without his knowledge.
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she gave upon
him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get a
loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to
help her to favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him.
In his Answer dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that complainant, who is
engaged in lending money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated the financial
transaction between her and Mejorado. He narrated that complainant asked him if it is true
that Mejorado is his client as she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's
reward with the Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his client,
complainant signified that she is willing to give money for Mejorado's financial needs while
awaiting for the release of the informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado
will pay double the amount and that payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the
payment of his claim for informer's reward.
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an
investment but he signed as co-maker in all the receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high interest rates from
borrowers. He narrated several instances and civil cases where complainant was engaged in
money-lending where he divulged that even after defendants had already paid their loan,
complainant still persists in collecting from them. Respondent asserted that he knew of these
transactions, because he was among the four lawyers who handled complainant's case.
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close to each
other, the latter had given Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up at
the price of ₱500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional
investments made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around ₱2 Million which
included the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the latter required
Mejorado to issue five (5) checks with a total value of ₱7,033,500.00, an amount more than
the actual value which Mejorado received.
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the issued checks shall be
presented to the bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the
checks to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks.
Atty. Simando further denied that he refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He
claimed that complainant never instructed him to file legal action, since the latter knew that
Mejorado is obligated to pay only upon receipt of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyerclient relationship, since Dr.
Lee voluntarily made the financial investment with Mejorado and that he merely introduced
complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not Mejorado's
lawyer against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting interest as there was no case
between Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them.
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered into was a mere
investment. She insisted that she lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity
as co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan. To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the
written loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that the money received was a
loan with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as co-maker. She further claimed
that she did not know Mejorado and it was respondent who brought him to her and requested
her to assist Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for
Mejorado and agreed to sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the payment only of the loan
amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent
had signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his obligation was already extinguished
by novation holds no water, since what was being collected is merely his obligation pertaining
to the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even divulged confidential
informations he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against her in the
present case, thus, committing another unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January 15, 2010. Both
parties requested for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both failed to agree on
a certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated
the mandatory conference and instead required the parties to submit their respective position
papers.
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's motion for
reconsideration for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension. The
Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against respondent was
dismissed.
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument
for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's violation of the
above parameters, as established by the following circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
Atty. Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received by respondent and the latter's
representation in certain legal matters pertaining to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him albeit in a case
claiming rewards against the Bureau of Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced complainant and
Mejorado to each other for the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while having
knowledge that complainant's interests could possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests
which ironically such client's interests, he is duty-bound to protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients, respondent
consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant despite the
latter's instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory notes arising
from the loan agreement between his two clients;
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as
creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his
present or former client.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because complainant and
respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing
clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered
into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent
conflict of interest, moreso when he signed as co-maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an investment and not a loan is
difficult to accept, considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all along that the intention of the
parties was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be
presupposed that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and the consequences of signing as
co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability without exposing himself from administrative
liability, if not civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show
proof of receipts of various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and signed
by the respondent as co-maker, the latter, however, other than his bare denials, failed to
show proof that the money given was an investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter
however slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyer’s private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In
the process of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is
probability, not certainty, of conflict.
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid payment of his
liability. First, in his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there was novation
which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by Mejorado
for which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan. Finally, he alleged
that it was agreed that the investment with profits will be paid only after Mejorado receives
the payment for his claim for reward which complainant violated when she presented the
checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his
reputation as a lawyer.
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
informations which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed
cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer
should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any representation situation
from "the point of view that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of
impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a
client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of
the Bar.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 6664; July 16, 2013]
 DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from
the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.
Antecedents
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty.
Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the
interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his
interest.
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS
Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers
were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the
demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of
their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to
on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate
officials of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa was presented to the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC
formally charged Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility
of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover
to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in
exchange for their desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he
prepared, and in turn they received a deed of assignment covering land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period
of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November
27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told
them that whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or
defect would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was
concerned he had already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the
amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of
Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could
not liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS
Corporation but was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc. Upon their urging, Atty. Era
negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on
September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues
with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however,
that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. In this regard, they established Atty.
Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the
proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of
Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in said courts. They also submitted a
certification issued on November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate
in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by the
blotter logbook of that unit.
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and
praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and
respect reposed in him as their counsel.
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days
from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to
supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment. The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006, the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his
comment.
In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise
settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation,
on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his
group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison
by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and
diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim
that his legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003
upon the execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even
admitted during the mandatory conference that there was no formal termination of his legal
services; that his professional obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not
end upon execution of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to
it that the settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in
behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice
of law for six months, viz:
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and
diligence and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is
respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit
a more severe penalty.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for
two years.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180, denying
Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
Court). However, on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and
denied the motion for its lack of merit.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the
responsibility of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to
represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very same person whom
Samson and his group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the
demand letters and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa
charges against Sison and the others in the RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group
entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still
needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the
criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also
relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did
not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the
compromise by the trial court was still required, but also because the compromise would have
applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of
the Civil Code.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. He was
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust.
Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential
information xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests
of the client, either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to
foster an assumed public purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the
opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a
client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining
adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might
appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and
compromise adversary argumentation x x x.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving
the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if
the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary
obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns
all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as
sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is
that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and
costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with
the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them
of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was
either to outrightly decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or
to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should
now suffer the proper sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and
entered m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 10548; December 10, 2014]
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG), dated January 3, 2013 and March 22, 2014, adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant) against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The
notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
"unknown at the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both
parties wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty.
Francisco adopted his Answer. The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa
against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed
as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he
was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and
original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in
the amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the
amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check
in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was
undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for ₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez
by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet
(GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed
shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez ₱500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez ₱749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo ₱1.00
Edgar B. Francisco ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat ₱1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to
transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s knowledge.
This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes
property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the
presence of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s
money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the
true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated
and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating
its factual averments. A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked
her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the
affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the sale
of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco Del
Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale of
the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale had
already been farmed out to different corporations established by complainant and her
sister.
 6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money of
Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and
drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who
actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without
admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution
clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,
complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground
that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of
Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these
were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he
acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and
complainant was formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
shareholders. While he admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and
the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his
law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no
conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were
the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove,
the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her
lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of
In his Answer, Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete, where the Court ruled that "the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park,
fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the
where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original
defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely
incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez;
attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal
Jimenez’s orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he
motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell
prepared all the legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the
for the ploy of complainant.
purchase of the Forbes property.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United
States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s
son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares In the Commissioner’s Report, dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion case; that he acceded Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of
to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
result, almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of desistance
executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD
as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective
weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing
buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00;
in the records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco
that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as
and Jimenez. The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator
they were in constant communication with him; that all these representations, however,
and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said
turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when
Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the
he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed
against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the
report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s
ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also
pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were
"without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly
executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
and undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which
displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of
the CPR. Further, when he executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of
Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of
conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and
recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a
difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major
upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing
with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution
of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his
capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his
client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but
denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when
complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose
on his part. In his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez,
stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty.
Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the
documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These
documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for
Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of
candidacy and the proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the
United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and
Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal
and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and
complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him were now exhausting all
possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing his
duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act
or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks
of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element. To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of
the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession. "To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect
the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering
that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law."
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant
matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making
it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were
fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to
register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his
clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to
have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of
grave legal infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to
complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public
documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that
lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the Court
would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as
officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their
clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that the
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and
mustbe held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions.
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to
be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding
truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court.
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the
CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith
candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his
solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure
of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail
to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty
in this regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…" Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in
this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine
whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-
bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by
that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-
client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the
ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from
accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-
client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was
Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested documentation of
several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in
showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and
that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how
she supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what
and how she communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the
complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied
with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to
prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties.
Atty. Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself.
Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional
relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD
without even updating her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation
of the case apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s
children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks
were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may,
Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving
that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and,
based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to
establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo, the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to
discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be
divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from
the prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure
between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record
fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to
establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are
further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential
communication was relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she
sought legal advice from respondent in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant
failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult,
if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It
is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion
tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING
that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
NILO B. DIONGZON, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO, Respondent.
[A.C. No. 2404; August 17, 2016]
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's interests in the latter's business dealings is duty-
bound to keep the confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client relationship had
ended. If he represents any other party in a case against his former client over a business deal
he oversaw during the time of their professional relationship, he is guilty of representing
conflicting interests, and should be properly sanctioned for ethical misconduct.
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for review of the Resolution No. 2013-160 adopted by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on the complaint for
disbarment filed by the complainant against respondent Atty. William Mirano, whereby the
IBP Board of Governors found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interest, and
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year. The
respondent assails the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Antecedents
On the dates material to this case, the complainant was a businessman engaged in the fishing
industry in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. In 1979, he retained the respondent as his legal
counsel to represent him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10679 then pending in the City Court
of Bacolod City (Branch 1). In November 1981, the complainant again retained the respondent
as his lawyer in relation to the execution of two deeds of sale covering the boats the former
was selling to Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales (Gonzaleses). In January 1982, the
parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that covered legal representation in
cases and transactions involving, the fishing business of the complainant.
In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued the complainant for replevin and damages, and sought
the annulment of the aforementioned deeds of sale. They were represented by Atty. Romeo
Flora, the associate of the respondent in his law office. It appears that the bond they filed to
justify the manual delivery of the boats subject of the suit had been notarially acknowledged
before the respondent without the knowledge and prior consent of the complainant; and that
the respondent eventually entered his appearance as the counsel for the Gonzaleses against
the respondent.
On May 24, 1982, therefore, the complainant initiated this administrative complaint for
disbarment against the respondent by verified letter-complaint.
The respondent thereafter sought several times the extension of the time for him to file his
comment.
In the meantime, Atty. Flora, in an attempt to explain why the respondent had appeared as
counsel for the Gonzaleses, filed a manifestation claiming that the Gonzaleses had been his
own personal clients, and that he had only requested the respondent's appearance because
he had been indisposed at the time.
The complainant belied the explanation of Atty. Flora, however, and pointed out that Atty.
Flora was actually a new lawyer then working in the law office of the respondent. As proof, the
complainant submitted the stationery showing the letterhead of the law office of the
respondent that included Atty. Flora's name as an associate.
In his answer dated September 9, 1982, the respondent stated that the complainant had been
his client in a different civil case; that the complainant had never consulted him upon any
other legal matter; that the complainant had only presented the deeds of sale prepared by
another lawyer because he had not been contented with the terms thereof: that he had not
been the complainant's retained counsel because the retainer agreement did not take effect;
that he had returned the amount paid to him by the complainant; that he had appeared for
the Gonzaleses only after their evidence against the complainant had been presented; that
the complainant had approached him when he needed a lawyer to defend him from
an estafa charge: and that the complainant had even wanted him to falsify documents in
relation to that estafa case, but because he had refused his bidding, the complainant had then
filed this administrative case against him.
Proceedings before the IBP
The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The case was heard over a long period
of time spanning 1985 to 2003, and the IBP Board of Governors finally recommended on
February 13, 2013 that the respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as
the counsel for the opponents of the complainant with whom he had an existing lawyer-client
relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as an attorney; and that he should be
punished with suspension from the practice of law for one year.
The Court noted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors on April 1, 2014.
The respondent filed in this Court a Manifestation with Motion and a Supplement to
Manifestation with Motion, wherein he proceeded to argue against the findings although he
initially claimed not to have been furnished with the IBP Board of Governors'
recommendation. He posited that he still had a pending Motion for Reconsideration in the IBP,
and requested that this case be remanded to the IBP for disposition.
Ruling of the Court
We uphold the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors because they
were substantiated by the records.
On the preliminary matter of procedure being raised by the respondent, it is unnecessary to
remand this case to the IBP for further investigation and disposition by the IBP. Remanding the
case to the IBP would be superfluous and unnecessary. The complaint was filed in 1982, and
since then the case underwent three decades of hearings before different investigating
commissioners of the IBP. The matters subject of the complaint were extensively covered and
sifted. In our view, the records are already adequate for resolution of the charge against the
respondent, which, after all, is something that only the Court can ultimately do.
Was the respondent guilty of representing conflict of interest?
The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon
a legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns,
or for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that
moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and
confidence of his client. No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client
relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be
considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must contain all
the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer contract to the complainant, the terms
of which are stated below:
The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to take charge of the legal matters of the
former in connection with his fishing business, and the attorney accepts such retainer and
employment subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:
 1. That the term of this contract shall be for two "2" years beginning February, 1982 but complainant, the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become
is deemed automatically renewed for the same period if not terminated by both privy to the terms of the sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became
parties by virtue of an agreement to that effect and signed by them; unmitigated because the complainant had not expressly consented in writing to his appearing
in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It would have been more prudent for him to have excused himself
2. That the compensation to be paid by the client for the services of the attorney, .shall from representing either party in the civil case.
be three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month;
In cavalier fashion, the respondent has cited his accomplishments as a member and officer of
3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times by CLIENT on all business requiring his the IBP in his region to buttress his claim of being more credible than the complainant,
professional advice and opinion and when the ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a supposedly a convicted felon. But such a defense is unworthy of consideration in this instance
copy shall be sent to the CLIENT; because the praiseworthiness of one's accomplishments and professional reputation never
furnishes the license for any ethical lawyer to flagrantly and knowingly violate the Code of
4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer contract shall include Professional Responsibility.
consultations, opinions, legal advices, preparations and drafting of contracts and
other legal papers, and other legal works, in connection with the business of the On the penalty, we note that suspension from the practice of law for one year was imposed on
CLIENT, except those cases involving trials in court, which if they are entrusted the lawyer who had appeared as defense counsel for the accused in an estafa case despite
to the ATTORNEY, shall be subject to a new agreement; having written and sent the demand letter for the complainant in the same case.17 In another
case, the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who had initially drafted a deed of sale for
Both parties signed their retainer contract on January 20, IS82. Contrary to the assertion of the the client, and who eventually filed a case against said client to annul the same
respondent, the retainer agreement did not contain a suspensive condition that affected its contract.18 Such penalty is appropriate and commensurate for this case.
effectivity as of the date of its execution. It simply stipulated that the respondent would
represent the interests of the complainant in all matters pertaining to his fishing business, ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution adopted on February 13, 2013 by the Board
thereby formalizing their lawyer-client relationship. The respondent's insistence that the of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; FINDS and DECLARES Atty. William N.
complainant should return all the checks to the Gonzaleses relative to the sale of the fishing Mirano guilty of ethical misconduct due to conflict of interest,
boats was clearly not part of the contract. and, ACCORDINGLY, SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for ONE YEAR, effective
immediately upon receipt of this decision.
The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in 1979 and
lasted until 1982. The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not alter the Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Mirano in the Office of
juridical existence of their lawyer-client relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and a copy of this decision be
the sale of the boats to the Gonzaleses, the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in the furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the
capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and even notarized the same. He became aware of the country.
details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality generated by his lawyer-client relationship
with the complainant. SO ORDERED.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Specifically, Canon 15.03
demands that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists where a
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer
performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented
him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client
against the latter.15 The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and
confidence.16 A lawyer has a duty to preserve his client's confidence in him, even if their
relationship ends. The purpose is to assure freedom of communication between the lawyer
and the client in order to enable the former to properly represent and serve the latter's
interests. To use against the latter any information the former gains during the relationship is
deplorable and unethical.

When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the