CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Bettina Angelica G.

Sese

ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO B. MANZANO

G.R. NO. 135083, 26 May 1999, En Banc (Mendoza, J.)

FACTS

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates

for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results were Eduardo
B. Manzano (103, 853), Ernesto S. Mercado (100, 894) and Gabriel V. Daza III (54, 275).
Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification which suspended Manzano’s proclamation
as the winning candidate. COMELEC Second Division granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Manzano admitted that he
is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955
of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws.
However, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship, Manzano is a dual citizen of the Philippines
and US. On May 8, 1998, Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to
intervene in the case for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion was opposed by Manzano. The
motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC enbanc rendered its
resolution, reversed the ruling of its Second Division, and declared Manzano qualified to run
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The COMELEC held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. However,
he was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. Although Manzano was issued an
alien certificate of registration, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States. When Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
voted in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. At the time of
the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, was not yet final. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be
settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727). on
the evening of August 31, 1998, Manzano was proclaimed vice mayor of Makati. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari and contends that the COMELEC enbanc erred in holding that
under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen.
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioner’s motion for leave to intervene granted.
2. Whether Manzano, a dual citizen, is disqualified from being a candidate for vice
mayor of Makati.

RULING:

1. Yes, petitioner has an interest in ousting Manzano. At the time petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the
winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have Manzano disqualified from running for
an elective local position. If Ernesto Mamaril, a registered voter of Makati City, was competent
to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate. Nor is petitioner’s
interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
May 20, 1998, after Manzano had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes
among the candidates. Under Sec 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has
yet been no final judgment rendered. The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve
petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the petition for certiorari.

2. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. The
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of the Constitution enumerates the following classes of Filipino
citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are
citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. With respect
to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Clearly, in including §5 in
Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160,
§40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. In Parado v. Republic it was held that
when a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Finally, much is made of the
fact that Manzano admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his
last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of
his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to
him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC applies
mutatis mutandis to Manzano in the case at bar: The Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. There is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to
lose Philippine citizenship must be “express” it stands to reason that there can be no such
loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either “express” or “implied.”
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen. Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith
that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings.