namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.

RICARDO (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son),

C. SILVERIO, SR., petitioner, vs. Edgardo S.Silverio (son), Ricardo
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S. Silverio-Dee
HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO (daughter), and Ligaya
and ZEE2 RESOURCES, S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an
INC., respondents. intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-
2629) for the settlement of her estate was
filed by SILVERIO, SR.
DECISION In the course of the proceedings,
the parties filed different petitions and
appeal challenging several orders of the
VILLARAMA, JR., J p: intestate court that went all the way up to
the Supreme Court. To better understand
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule the myriad of factual and procedural
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to antecedents leading to the instant
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 8, consolidated case, this court will resolve
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP the petitions in seriatim.
Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and The Petitions
Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2013 denying petitioner's
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA nullified the CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court The first petition of the three
(RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp. consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No.
Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO
August 18, 2011 declaring the sales and derivative titles S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.")
over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as assails the Order of the intestate court
null and void. dated 16 June 2011 reinstating
The factual and procedural antecedents of the RICARDO SILVERIO SR.
case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the
estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died
without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. The administrator first appointed by
She was survived by her legal heirs, the Court was
EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but
by virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3
November 1999 filed by the heirs of
BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to
withdraw as administrator filed by
EDGARDO was approved by the intestate
court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was
appointed as the new
administrator. SIcTAC
Thereafter, an active exchange of
pleadings to remove and appoint a new
administrator ensued
between SILVERIO SR.
and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping
appointment of administrator is
summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January
2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as
administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO,
JR. was designated as the new
administrator. A motion for
reconsideration was separately filed
by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee
("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May 2005,
the intestate court issued an Omnibus
Order affirming among others, the Order
of 3 January 2005. In the same Order, the
intestate court also granted the motion
of SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as
administrator effective upon receipt of the
order and expunged the inventory report
filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the
intestate court acting on the motion filed
by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order
granting letters of administration
to SILVERIO JR. and
reinstated SILVERIO SR. as
administrator. Then again, the intestate
court acting on the motion for partial
consideration to the Order dated 12
December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR.
issued an Omnibus Order dated 31
October 2006 upholding the grant of
Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR.
and removed SILVERIO SR., as
administrator for gross violation of his
duties and functions under Section 1,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for
reconsideration of the above Order
whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other
hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. On 28 August 2008,
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
rendered a decision
reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator, the decretal portion of the
Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The portions of the
Omnibus Order upholding the grant
of letters of administration to and
 the taking of an oath of On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR.
administration by RicardoSilverio, filed before the intestate court, an urgent
Jr., as well as the removal of motion to be reinstated as administrator of
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the estate. Acting on the motion, the
administrator to the Estate of intestate court issued the now challenged
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent
and VOID. The writ of preliminary portion of the Order reads:
injunction earlier issued is MADE
xxx xxx xxx
PERMANENT in regard to the said
portions. Respondent RTC is "WHEREFORE, upon
ORDERED to reinstate posting of a bond in the sum of
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as TEN MILLION PESOS, the same
administrator to the Estate of to be approved by this Court, Mr.
Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby
Private Respondents. ordered reinstated as the
Administrator to the estate of the
SO ORDERED."
late Beatriz Silverio and to
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for immediately take his oath as such,
review on Certiorari before the Supreme and exercise his duties and
Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 functions as are incumbent under
challenging the 28 August 2008 decision the law upon the said
of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February position. caTIDE
2009, the Supreme Court issued a
xxx xxx xxx."
resolution denying the petition for failure
to sufficiently show any reversible error in xxx xxx xxx
the assailed judgment to warrant the
exercise by the Court of discretionary CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
appellate jurisdiction. Acting xxx xxx xxx
on SILVERIO JR.'s motion for
reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11 On 15 March 2011,
February 2011, denied the motion with heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and
finality. An entry of judgment was made LIGAYA represented by her legal
on 29 March 2011. guardian moved for the disqualification
and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO,
JR. based on the following grounds: (1)
Absence of the written consent of all
parties in interest allowing JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the
case considering that he appeared once
as counsel in the intestate proceedings;
(2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown
bias and partiality in favor
of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to
pursue several motions and even issued a
TRO in violation of the rules against forum
shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA's Petition for
Support and Release of Funds for Medical
Support has not been resolved; and (4) It
is in the best interest of all the heirs that
the proceedings be presided and decided
by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying
the Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition. The movants filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied
in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence,
the instant petition.
xxx xxx xxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxx xxx xxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus
Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered
among others, the sale of certain
properties belonging to the estate. The
portion of the order which is pertinent to
the present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above
premises considered, this Court for
the foregoing reasons resolves to
grant the following:
(1) . . .
(2) . . .
(3) Allowing the sale of the
properties located at (1) No. 82
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No.
137155 issued by Register of
Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City covered by T.C.T. No.
4137154 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No.
19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati
City covered by TCT No. 137156
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to partially settle the
intestate estate of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio, and authorizing the
Administrator to undertake the
proper procedure or transferring
the titles involved to the name of
the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of
the sale mentioned in Number 3
above to the payment of taxes,
 interests, penalties and other
charges, if any, and to distribute
the residue among the heirs
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo
S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya
S. Silverio represented by Legal
Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II,
Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee in accordance with
the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid
Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October
2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc.
("CITRINE") over the property located at
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City. CITRINE became the registered
owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as
evidenced by TCT No. 006-
201000063. CSTHca
A Deed of Absolute Sale was
likewise executed in favor of Monica P.
Ocampo (notarized on September 16,
2010) for the lot located at No. 82
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati
City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No.
006-2011000050 was issued to Monica P.
Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold
said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
(ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190
was issued on 11 February 2011 under its
name.
In the interim, or on 12 December
2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with
prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for,
the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February
2007. On 4 July 2007, the Court issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned
upon the posting of the bond in the
amount of two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE
posted the required bond on February 5,
2007 but in an order dated 3 January
2008, the Court ruled that the bond
posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed to
comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The
Court, however, did not reverse the ruling
granting the injunction but instead
ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with
A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also
increased the bond from two million to ten
million. On 29 February 2008, the Court
issued a Resolution approving the ten
million bond and issued the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28
August 2008 the Court of Appeals
(Seventh Division) issued a decision
reinstating SILVERIO SR. as
administrator and declaring the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction permanent in
regard to the appointment of committing any act that would affect the
administrator. titles to the properties and enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from
On 04 February
accepting, admitting, approving,
2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
registering, annotating or in any way
Application for the Issuance of Temporary
giving due course to whatever deeds,
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory
instruments or any other documents
Injunction (With Motion for the Issuance of
involving voluntary or involuntary dealings
Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
which may have the effect of transferring,
Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among
conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving,
others, that a TRO be issued restraining
alienating, or disposing in favor of any
and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR.,
individual or any entity of the subject
MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE
properties. Subpoena ad
HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-
testificandum and duces tecum was also
interest from committing any act that
issued by the intestate court
would affect the titles to the three
requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
properties.
OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of
On 14 February CITRINE to testify and bring with them
2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent any books and documents under their
Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null control to shed light on the circumstances
and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated surrounding the transaction involving the
16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the properties in question.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr.
2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the
filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121
Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18
in the name of Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. and
August 2011, the intestate court rendered
the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
the now assailed Order the decretal
S. Silverio.
portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate
"WHEREFORE, this Court
Court issued an Order granting a
hereby orders that:
Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or
anybody acting in their behalf from
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 16 September 2010
as VOID;
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 006-2011000050 in the
name of defendant MONICA
OCAMPO or any of her
successors-in-interest
including all derivative titles,
as NULL AND
VOID; TcEAIH
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title
TCT No. 006-2011000190 in
the name of ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC. or any
of its successors-in-interest
including all derivative titles,
as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of
Makati City to CANCEL
Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 006-2011000050,
Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 006-2011000190 and all
of its derivative titles; and
5. Reinstating the Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
2236121 in the name of
RICARDO
C. SILVERIO, SR. AND
THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and
AS TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds of Makati
City to CANCEL Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-
2010000063, in the name of
CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.
and all of its derivative titles;
and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
223612 in the name of
RICARDO
C. SILVERIO, SR. and the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
xxx xxx xxx 3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by
respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before
the CA questioned the following issuances of the
intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172— Order dated
June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as
Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 — (1) Order
dated March 23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.'s application
for preliminary injunction enjoiningSilverio, Jr. or anyone
acting on their behalf from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the subject properties and enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting,
admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or
any other documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia
properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011 which
denied Silverio, Jr.'s motion or disqualification and/or
inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated
June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for
preliminary injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 —
Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the
foregoing premises, the Court hereby
disposes and orders the following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No.
121172 is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the 16 June 2011 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO
C.SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator
is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA G.R. S.P. No.
121173 is partly DENIED for lack of merit
insofar as it questions the 23 March 2011
Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR's
Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao,
Jr. The petition is partly GRANTED in that
the Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion. AEIcTD
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No.
122024 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18
August 2011 Order declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title
and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia Property null and
void is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration 5 "insofar as its ruling in CA-
G.R. SP No. 122024" praying that the August 18, 2011
Order of the intestate court be affirmed. By Resolution
dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion for partial
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending that the CA
committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of
the Intsia and Cambridge properties upon the ground that
the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a
limited jurisdiction only and which does not include
resolving issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA
should not have stopped there and looked into the nature
of the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal
partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz
S. Silverio.
 Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of
the intestate court annulling the sales of the Cambridge
and Intsia properties. In the alternative, should the said
sales be upheld, petitioner prays that this Court (1)
declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net
remainder share of the late Beatriz less the
corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner and the
other legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order
respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of
sales for distribution of the residue among the
legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr.,
Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that
the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of
the sale of the subject properties to third parties after it
itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlement of
the estate, especially so when separate actions assailing
the new titles issued to said third parties were already
instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack of prior consent of
petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses
with a 50% conjugal share in the subject properties,
respondents point out that such is belied by the October
31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly
showed that counsels of all the heirs were present at the
hearing of June 16, 2006 and no objection was made by
them to the sale of the properties and the partial
settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together
with the transfer of titles of these properties in the name
of the Estate as prayed for in petitioner's Manifestation
and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not
challenged or appealed the said order authorizing the
sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the
day for petitioner to raise this factual issue before this
Court, not to mention that it cannot be ventilated in the
present appeal by certiorari as this Court is not a trier of
facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its
Comment contending that the intestate court improperly
nullified the titles despite the fact that the present
registered owners, who are indispensable parties, were
not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only in a
direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent
points out that petitioner himself recognized that a direct
action is required to annul a Torrens title as he initially
instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of Makati
City seeking to annul, among others, the TCT's issued to
respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After
failing to secure restraining orders in these two civil
cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated February 14, 2011 to annul the
said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case,
respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and
for value, of which the intestate court never made a
determination nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus
Motion and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated
March 4, 2011 contain allegations indicating that
respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in good faith and for
value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner's act of
filing a separate complaint with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court (Civil
Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch
143) constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping as
the former also prayed similar primary reliefs and setting
up the alleged nullity of the subject deeds of absolute
sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the
intestate court. EIAScH
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court
having jurisdiction over properties under administration
has the authority not only to approve any disposition or
conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by
the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held
in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
85: 6
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez
sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled
that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the
decedent's estate. In the early case
of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the
rule that the sale of the property of the
estate by an administrator without the
order of the probate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser. And in
the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx
It being settled that property
under administration needs the
approval of the probate court
before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not
bind the estate and is null and void.
As early as 1921 in the case
of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil.
347), We laid down the rule that a
sale by an administrator of property
of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is
null and void and title does not
pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt
that the probate court can declare
null and void the disposition of the
property under administration,
made by private respondent, the
same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the
probate court that has the power
to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89),
hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void
for as long as the proceedings
had not been closed or
terminated. To uphold petitioner's
contention that the probate court
cannot annul the unauthorized
sale, would render meaningless the
power pertaining to the said court.
(Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA
755). (italics ours)
 Our jurisprudence is therefore clear
that (1) any disposition of estate property
by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be
annulled by the probate court, there being
no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was
executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of
the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated
October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was
annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling
the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that said
ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were
executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196
was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual
decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent only with respect to the
appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the
grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the
sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction were in effect. cHDAIS
The CA's ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that
needs to be addressed is: Whether the
authority to sell the properties in question
granted under the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order, was nullified by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the
dispositive portion of the decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to
reasonably conclude that the grant of
authority to sell is still good and valid.
The fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The portions of
the Omnibus Order upholding the
grant of letters of administration to
and the taking of an oath of
administration by RicardoSilverio,
Jr., as well as the removal of
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL
and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is made
permanent in regard to the said
portions. Respondent RTC is
ORDERED to reinstate
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the
Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus
Order of the testate [sic] court in so far
as it authorizes the sale of the three
properties in question was not
declared by the Court of Appeals,
Seventh Division as null and void. It is
axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion
of the decision that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare
that it was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the intestate court when it
ordered the sale of the Cambridge
Property and Intsia Property as NULL and
VOID citing as justification the decision of
the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the
injunction order which was made
permanent by the Court of Appeals
(Seventh Division) was declared to be
limited only to the portion of the
Omnibus Order that upheld the grant
of letters of administration
by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal
of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and
nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction
issued by the intestate court in its Order
dated 23 March 2011 and challenged
by SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No.
121173, we find that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion as it was
directed against acts which were
already [fait] accompli. The preliminary
injunction sought to: (1)
restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or
anybody acting in their behalf or any
person from committing any act that
would affect the titles to the subject
properties belonging to the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2)
enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any giving
due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents
involving voluntary or involuntary dealings
which may have the effect of transferring,
conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving,
alienating or disposing in favor of any
individual or any entity the above-
enumerated properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio. However, the records
show that when the preliminary
injunction was issued on 23 March
2011 new titles over the disputed
properties were already issued to
CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC. 7 (Emphasis
supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting
upon pending motions filed by petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively, who injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents
are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by
over the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the
The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale
administrator of the estate petitioner and was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate
respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006
more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed
suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed the aforesaid sale.
by Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity
Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July
came when the heirs represented by their respective
4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
counsels interposed no objection to the same. SIDEaA
121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually
With costs against the petitioner.
reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28,
2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition SO ORDERED.
for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree with
the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the
said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained
only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus
Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to
and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have
expressly set aside as well the directive in the same
Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject
properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality
only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with
finality respondent Silverio, Jr.'s motion for
reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution
denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the
August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the
sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007]
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review
assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995 2and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May
15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more
or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her. TAaIDH
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis,
one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed
a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
trial court issued an Order 11denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner
Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of
Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos
from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar
also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
 On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the
twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to
file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed
the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate
children. CDTHSI
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for
the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated
September 12, 1995 and January 31,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and
the records of the case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellate court ruled that under Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had
legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 andPilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2,
Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus —
 With the well-known rule —
express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view — sweeping statement — of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny
what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall . . . have capacity
to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of
the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased. . . . 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions
for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this
Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and
Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings
in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one intends to return. They claim
that a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's
marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter's
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration. DScTaC
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which heresides at the time of his death."
In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence —
as contradistinguished from domicile — of the decedent
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile
is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied) STIcEA
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
"residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval andRomualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
 In the instant case, while petitioners established
that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased's children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceased's calling cards 49 stating that his
home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is
in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal
personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who
is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply
the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the
alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
 "The purpose and effect of a married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
decree of divorce from the bond of required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
matrimony by a competent held:
jurisdiction are to change the
To maintain, as private
existing status or domestic relation
respondent does, that, under our laws,
of husband and wife, and to free
petitioner has to be considered still
them both from the bond. The
married to private respondent and still
marriage tie, when thus severed as
subject to a wife's obligations under
to one party, ceases to bind either.
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
A husband without a wife, or a wife
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
without a husband, is unknown to
not be obliged to live together with,
the law. When the law provides, in
observe respect and fidelity, and render
the nature of a penalty, that the
support to private respondent. The latter
guilty party shall not marry again,
should not continue to be one of her heirs
that party, as well as the other, is
with possible rights to conjugal
still absolutely freed from the bond
property. She should not be
of the former marriage."
discriminated against in her own
Thus, pursuant to his national law, country if the ends of justice are to be
private respondent is no longer the served. 54 (Emphasis added) AcaEDC
husband of petitioner. He would have no
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
standing to sue in the case below as
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
control over conjugal assets. As he is
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
bound by the Decision of his own
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
country's Court, which validly exercised
stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
his own representation before said Court
obloquy on the other." 56
from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. 53 Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the
Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife,
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954
when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned
case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido
III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the
signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of
the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy,
a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse
is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of
the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent. HAaECD
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated
by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the
Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly
observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It
is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the
law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because
of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find
a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons.
We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to
its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxx xxx xxx
More than twenty centuries ago,
Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
 Therefore, this case should be remanded to the
trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation. TIEHDC
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states
that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for
letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as
far as known to the petitioner: . . . .
An "interested person" has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity
of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated
to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said
 cohabitation in proportion to their WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
respective contributions. Co-ownership Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming
will only be up to the extent of the proven the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
actual contribution of money, property or which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and its
industry. Absent proof of the extent October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners'
thereof, their contributions and motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
corresponding shares shall be presumed be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
to be equal.
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, JJ., concur.
and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
|||
the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. . . .
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, petitioner, vs.
As in other civil cases, the burden SEBASTIAN AGTARAP,
of proof rests upon the party who, as JOSEPH AGTARAP,
determined by the pleadings or the nature TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. SANTOS, and ABELARDO
Contentions must be proved by DAGORO, respondents.
competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party's own
evidence and not upon the weakness of [G.R. No. 177192. June 8, 2011.]
the opponent's defense. . . . 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's SEBASTIAN
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of G. AGTARAP, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
administration may arise from her status as the surviving G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, respondents.
 DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Before us are the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian
G. Agtarap (Sebastian) 1 and Eduardo
G. Agtarap (Eduardo), 2 assailing the Decision dated
November 21, 2006 3 and the Resolution dated
March 27, 2007 4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings —
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City,
a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the
estate of his deceased father
JoaquinAgtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 94-4055. AacCIT
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate
on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any
known debts or obligations. During his lifetime,
Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), 5 and second with Caridad Garcia
(Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and
Lucia had three children — Jesus (died without
issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children,
namely, Gloria, 6 Joseph, and Teresa 7 ). Joaquin
married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had
three children — Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his
death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-
(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been
leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since
April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an
imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he
prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and
declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who
would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b)
apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their
aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law;
and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive
and enter into possession those parts of the estate
individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an
order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his
comment, generally admitting the allegations in the
petition, and conceding to the appointment of
Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject
lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with
Lucia, and that, upon Lucia's death in April 1924, they
became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They said that their residence was built
with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and
the expenses of the extensions to the house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant
(Manong's Restaurant) was built with the exclusive
money of Joseph and his business partner. They
opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator
on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and
mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to
earn. They claimed that the best interests of the
estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or
regular administrator. DEICTS
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a
resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquin's estate. Consequently, it
issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed
an answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is
survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by
him as her husband. He also averred that there is a
need to appoint a special administrator to the estate,
but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best
qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to
be heard and to submit their respective proposed
projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000,
issued an Order of Partition, 8 with the following
disposition —
In the light of the filing by the heirs
of their respective proposed projects of
partition and the payment of inheritance
taxes due the estate as early as 1965,
and there being no claim in Court against
the estate of the deceased, the estate of
JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now
consequently — ripe — for distribution
among the heirs minus the surviving
spouse Caridad Garcia who died on
August 25, 1999. EcDTIH
Considering that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the
existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No.
(38255) which showed on its face that
decedent was married to Caridad Garcia,
which fact oppositors failed to contradict
by evidence other than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate
is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the compulsory heirs
thereunder.
The Administrator,
Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just
accounting of his administration from his
date of assumption up to the year ending
December 31, 1996 per Financial and
Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997
which was approved by the Court. The
accounting report included the income
earned and received for the period and
the expenses incurred in the
administration, sustenance and allowance
of the widow. In accordance with said
Financial and Accounting Report which
 was duly approved by this Court in its ———————————
Resolution dated July 28, 1998 — the TOTAL NET WORTH P14,177,500.00
deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real ===========
properties consisting of the following:
ILAND:
WHEREFORE, the net assets of
Two lots and two buildings with one the estate of the late
garage quarter located at JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of
#3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered P14,177,500.00, together with whatever
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 interest from bank deposits and all other
and 38255 and registered with the incomes or increments thereof accruing
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro after the Accounting Report of December
Manila, described as follows: 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the
TCT LOT AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL AMOUNT compensation of the administrator and
No. No. VALUE other expenses allowed by the Court, are
hereby ordered distributed as follows:
38254 745- 1,335 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00 TOTAL ESTATE —
B-1 P14,177,500.00
38255 745- 1,331 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
B-2 CARIDAD AGTARAP — 1/2 of the
———————— estate as her conjugal share —
TOTAL P13,330,000.00 P7,088,750.00, the other half of
============ P7,088,750.00 — to be divided among the
compulsory heirs as follows:

II. BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS: 1) JOSE (deceased) — P1,181,548.30

2) MILAGROS (deceased) — P1,181,548.30
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) P350,000.00 3) MERCEDES (deceased) — P1,181,548.30
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) 320,000.00 4) SEBASTIAN — P1,181,548.30
Building Improvements 97,500.00 5) EDUARDO — P1,181,548.30
Restaurant 80,000.00 6) CARIDAD — P1,181,548.30
———————————
TOTAL P847,500.00
 The share of Milagros Agtarap as HEIRS OF THE FIRST
compulsory heir in the amount of MARRIAGE:
P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will
1 JOSEPH AGTARA —
P236,291.66—share from
go to Teresa Agtarap and
) P MilagrosAgtara
Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and
p
half brothers Eduardo and
P295,364.57—as compulsory
Sebastian Agtarap in equal
heir of
proportions. ADCEcI
——————— Jose Agtarap
TERESA AGTARAP — P236,291.66 —
JOSEPH AGTARAP — P236,291.66 P531,656.23
WALTER DE SANTOS — P236,291.66 2 TERESA AGTARA — P236,291.66—share from
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP — P236,291.66 ) P MilagrosAgtara
EDUARDO AGTARAP — P236,291.66 p
P295,364.57—as compulsory
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His heir of
compulsory heirs are as follows: ——————— Jose Agtarap
—
COMPULSORY HEIRS: P531,656.23
GLORIA — (deceased) — represented by Walter de Santos — P295,364.57 3 WALTER DE — P236,291.66—share from
— ) SANTOS MilagrosAgtara
JOSEPH AGTARAP — P295,364.57 p
TERESA AGTARAP — P295,364.57 P295,364.57—as compulsory
PRISCILLA AGTARAP — P295,364.57 heir of
——————— Jose Agtarap
—
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P531,656.23
P295,364.57.
Adding their share from HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of
a)
the first marriage stand to receive the total CARIDAD AGTARAP – died on August 25, 1999
amount of: P7,088,750.00 – as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 – as compulsory heir
––––––––––––
 Total of P8,270,208.30 P1,181,458.30 — as compulsory
=========== heir
P236,291.66 — share from
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP – P1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir Milagros
P236,291.66 – share from Milagros —————————
P5,522,854.06
===========
EDUARDO AGTARAP – P1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
P236,291.66 – share from Milagros
SO ORDERED. 9
) MERCEDES – as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
P1,181,458.38 On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP: resolution 10 denying the motions for reconsideration
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of
Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
Caridad Agtarap) of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the
Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit: RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo
and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. ACIDTE
SEBASTIAN — P4,135,104.10 — share from
Caridad Garcia On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its
P1,181,458.30 — as compulsory Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads —
heir WHEREFORE, premises
P 236,291.66 — share from considered, the instant appeals
Milagros are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
————————— assailed Resolution dated August 27,
P5,522,854.06 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto,
=========== the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1
EDUARDO — P4,135,104.10 — share from [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2
Caridad Garcia [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the
 late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together
with their improvements, embraced by
TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255,
respectively, are first to be distributed
among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - 1/2 of the property. But since she is
deceased, her share shall be
inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros
and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - 1/2 of the property and 1/4 of the
other half of the property which
pertains to Lucia Mendietta's share.
Jesus Agtarap - 1/4 of Lucia Mendietta's share. But
since he is already, deceased (and
died without issue), his inheritance
shall, in turn, be acquired by
Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/4 of Lucia Mendietta's share. But
since she died in 1996 without issue,
5/8 of her inheritance shall be
inherited by Gloria (represented by
her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha),
JosephAgtarap and Teresa Agtarap,
(in representation of Milagros' brother
Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be
inherited by Mercedes (represented
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecile), Sebastian
Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/4 of Lucia Mendietta's share. But
since he died in 1967, his inheritance
shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla,
and children Gloria (represented by
her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha),
JosephAgtarap and Teresa in equal
shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtarap's estate,
comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the
subject properties and its improvements,
shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died
in 1999, her share shall be inherited
by her children namely
MercedesAgtarap (represented by
her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecilia),
Sebastian Agtarap and
Eduardo Agtarap in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal
shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died
in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by
 Gloria (represented by her husband
Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
TeresaAgtarap, (in representation of
Milagros' brother Jose Agtarap) and
1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Eduardo, all surnamedAgtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in
1967, his inheritance shall be
acquired by his wife Priscilla, and
children Gloria (represented by her
husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and
TeresaAgtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died
in 1984, her inheritance shall be
acquired by her husband Abelardo
Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in
equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their
respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA
denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to
the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1.—The Court of Appeals erred in
not considering the aforementioned
important facts 12 which alter its Decision;
2.—The Court of Appeals erred in
not considering the necessity of hearing
the issue of legitimacy of respondents as
heirs;
3.—The Court of Appeals erred in
allowing violation of the law and in not
applying the doctrines of collateral attack,
estoppel, and res judicata. 13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
ESTATE OF MILAGROS
G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN
DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE
FROM THE ESTATE OF
JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDI
NG THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE
OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER LAW IS ENDOWED WITH
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS
BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER
II.
INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF. 14
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
As regards his first and second assignments of
TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN
error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa
DISMISSING THE DECISION
failed to establish by competent evidence that they
APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF
are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus
MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE
of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED
certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted,
AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER
stating that the wife of their father Jose is
COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS
Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their
OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254
mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage
AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE
contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY
qualify as the best evidence of Jose's marriage with
OF PASAY BELONG TO THE
Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also
JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO
asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy
LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to
REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR
their opposition to the said motion. He further claims
EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS
that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF
Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs
JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO
had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He
CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER
points out that his motion was denied by the RTC
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
without a hearing. SCETHa
PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE With respect to his third assigned error,
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH estate properties subject of the controversy are in the
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia,
APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership
FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral
attack, but should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that
estoppel applies against the children of the first
marriage, since none of them registered any objection
to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad
and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have
already been settled in light of the payment of the
estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and
Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in
Milagros' name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of
Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is
applicable as the court order directing the deletion of
the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of
Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and
executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first
assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA
erroneously settled, together with the settlement of
the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in
contravention of the principle of settling only one
estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions
the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the
intestate proceedings despite the fact that a
proceeding was conducted in another court for the
probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to
Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from
Joaquin's estate. He states that this violated the rule
on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo
contends that the CA gravely erred when it affirmed
that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong
to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia,
notwithstanding that the certificates of title were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado
con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him,
the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited
jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and
authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general
jurisdiction. TacADE
The Court's Ruling
As to Sebastian's and Eduardo's common
issue on the ownership of the subject real properties,
we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the
trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate
of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. 15 The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. 16 As held in several cases, 17 a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then
the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a
court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
the final determination of ownership in a separate
action. 18 Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation
or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. 19Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse. 20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to
the instant case considering that the parties are all
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will
be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court's jurisdiction to settle the estate of
Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo
filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of
Joaquin's estate, he alleged that the subject
properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since
the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia.
He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to
contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition,
Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present
proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated
March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO
VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero
casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia
Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to
Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia
Garcia Mendietta). 21 When TCT No. 5239 was
divided between Francisco Barnes and
Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta,
was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No.
745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral
Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368,
consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was
covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184) 22 issued on April
23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta. HATICc
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that
Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on
February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is
worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained
an annotation, which reads —
Ap-4966 — NOTA: Se ha
enmendado el presente certificado de
titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las
palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y
poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en
tinta encarnada, las palabras "en
segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia",
en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28
de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto
de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente
cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record
No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido
presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro
Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el
Legajo T-No. 32184. IATHaS
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937. 23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto
de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia
Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced byen
segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the
second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be
gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of
Caridad's name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her
demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2)
conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia's share in the
properly covered by the said TCT was carried over to
the properties covered by the certificates of title
derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254
and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the
CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs —
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by
the death of the husband or the wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction
to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it
had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine
the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and
Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the
intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be
consolidated with the settlement proceedings of
Joaquin, being Lucia's spouse. 24 Accordingly, the
CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with
respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254
and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory
heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as
correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of
Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255 conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad
by virtue of the registration in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad
Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be
said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs.
Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holder's true ownership of
property.25 A certificate of title under the Torrens
system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as
an instrument for the deprivation of
ownership. 26 Thus, the fact that the properties were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. 27 The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia"
in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not
necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal
properties. 28
Neither can Sebastian's claim that Joaquin's
estate could have already been settled in 1965 after
the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld.
Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle
the estate of a deceased person. As provided in
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court —
SECTION 1.When order for
distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in
his possession. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive share to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases. cdrep
No distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the
heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate,
funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were
complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on
the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say
that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the
legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that
Sebastian did not present clear and convincing
evidence to support his averments in his motion to
exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his
negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of
Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was
never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the
latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well
as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995
hearing. 29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding
of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision. 30
Also, Sebastian's insistence that Abelardo
Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the
estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its
October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found
that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995,
and was later substituted in the proceedings below by
her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a
daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha
de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on
September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion
for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the
surviving spouse of MercedesAgtarap and the father
of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in
intervention. The RTC later granted the motion,
thereby admitting his answer on October 18,
1995. 31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing
of the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995,
Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any
objection when the intervention was submitted to the
RTC for resolution. 32
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and
there appears no compelling reason to hold that both
courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de
Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in
the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon
Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his
and Eduardo's admissions that Joseph and Teresa
were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin,
and to timely object to the participation of Walter de
Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately,
Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de
Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to
participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquin's compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively. 33
This Court also differs from Eduardo's
asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together
with Joaquin's estate, the respective estates of Lucia,
Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the
November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show
that the disposition of the properties related only to
the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited
above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to
determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well
as their respective shares after the payment of the
obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares
was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquin's estate, they being his legal
heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo's position
that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin's estate
pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros.
Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding
was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly
executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108,
Pasay City. 34 While there has been no showing that
the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana
share from Joaquin's estate in favor of Eduardo, has Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
already been probated and approved, prudence These cases are hereby remanded to the
dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for
Milagros' share in Joaquin's estate. further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of SO ORDERED.
Death. 35 He is survived by his wife Teresita
B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian ||| (Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. Nos. 177099 & 177192,
B.Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana [June 8, 2011], 666 PHIL 452-476)
Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the
assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March
27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with
modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not
yet be distributed until after the final determination of
the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian
shall be represented by his compulsory
heirs. aACHDS
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192
is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R.
No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the
Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded
in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed
until the final determination of the probate of her will,
and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of
his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented
by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998.]
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and
HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan,respondents.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
JUDGMENT; IN CASE A DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY
EXISTS BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION AND
THE BODY OF THE DECISION, EFFORT MUST BE
MADE TO HARMONIZE THE WHOLE BODY OF THE
DECISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE
PURPOSE AND JUDGMENT OF THE COURT. — The
decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents based on
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children are
therefore governed by the first clause of the second
paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would
be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on
said provision the children of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntaywho
were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial
court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are
considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke
their successional right of representation in the estate of
their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their
father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their
grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a
determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the
Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the
personalities involved over the decedent's estate. It
would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point
what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz
Castro, emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the
judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed
once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the
rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions
made as well as the directions and instructions given by
the court in the premises in conformity with the body of
the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute,
debate or interpretation." cdasia
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J p:
Which should prevail between the ratio
decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue
in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent
Isabel's petition for appointment as administratrix of her
grandmother's estate by virtue of her right
representation. Cdpr
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of
petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao.
Out of this marriage, three children were born namely:
Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio
Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years,
the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay filed a criminal case 1 against her husband Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a
complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging
her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the
custody and care of their children who were living with
their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as civil case
number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage
celebrated between Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared
null and void and of no effect as between
the parties. It being admitted by the
parties and shown by the record that the
question of the case and custody of the
three children have been the subject of
another case between the same parties in
another branch of this Court in Special
of Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be
litigated in this case.
"With regard to counterclaim, in view of
the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay
P50,000.00 for damages and that
defendant is willing to accept the offer
instead of her original demand for
P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded
said sum of P50,000.00 as her
counterclaim and to pay attorney's fees in
the amount of P5,000.00.
"SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
"From February 1965 thru
December 1965 plaintiff was confined in
the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although
at the time of the trial of parricide case
(September 8, 1967) the patient was
already out of the hospital he continued to
be under observation and treatment.
"It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that
the symptoms of the plaintiff's mental
aberration classified as schizophernia
(sic) had made themselves manifest even
as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he
was actually placed under expert neuro-
psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if
the subject has shown marked progress,
the remains bereft adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
"There is no controversy that the
marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after
plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This
fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
"Art 95. (sic) A marriage may be
annulled for nay of the following causes
after (sic) existing at the time of the
marriage: cdphil
"xxx xxx xxx
"(3) That either party was of
unsound mind, unless such
party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband or
wife.
"There is a dearth of proof at the
time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this
very complaint add emphasis to the
findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling
the patient, that plaintiff really lives more
in fancy than in reality, a strong indication
of schizophernia (sic). 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is
respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The
decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a
will. 6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995,
respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was docketed as Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she
alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an
Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal
properties even while the decedent has been alive and is
better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than
the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been
alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more
than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of
Administration be issued instead to him. 9
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after
filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the
special proceeding case alleging in the main that
respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof,
petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code
an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of
representation the legitimate relatives of her father or
mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel's
father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a
consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal
that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null
and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no
right nor interest in the estate of her paternal
grandmother — the decedent. 10 On October 16, 1997,
the trial court issued the assailed order denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order
dated January 9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as mentioned
above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well
as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a)
a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring the marriage of
respondent Isabel's parents "null and void" must be
upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and
had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that
petitioner's motion to dismiss was late having been filed
after the opposition was already filed in court, the
counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and
that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to
specifically deny respondent Isabel's allegation that she
is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the
decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner
proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that
there is a conflict between the body of the decision and
its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment
of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the
marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing declare a
marriage "voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide
and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of
the Civil Code before they are annulled is
"voidable." LLcd
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of
only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to
wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying
the proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. 14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows
that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, pertinent portions
of which are quoted hereunder, to wit:
"The arguments of both parties
judiciously and objectively assessed and
the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds
that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate considering the peculiar
nature of this special proceeding as of construing the judgment" (78 SCRA
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and
At the outset, this proceeding was not Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The
adversarial in nature and the petitioner reason is that the dispositive portion must
was not called upon to assert a cause of find support from the decision's ratio
action against a particular defendant. decidendi.
Furthermore, the State has a vital interest
"Per decision of the Court of First
in the maintenance of the proceedings,
Instance Branch IX of Quezon City,
not only because of the taxes due it, but
marked as Annex "A" of oppositor's
also because if no heirs qualify, the State
motion, the marriage of Emilio
shall acquire the estate by escheat.
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
"xxx xxx xxx Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art.
85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to
"The court rules, for the purpose of
marriages which are considered voidable.
establishing the personality of the
Petitioner being conceived and born of a
petitioner to file and maintain this special
voidable marriage before the decree of
proceedings, that in the case at bench,
annulment, she is considered legitimate
the body of the decision determines the
(Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the
nature of the action which is for
Phils.)." 15
annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to
"The oppositor's contention that the
dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The 1997 Rules
fallo of the questioned decision (Annex
of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed
"A" — Motion) prevails over the body
in actions, civil or criminal and special
thereof is not without any qualification. It
proceedings.'' 16 The Rules do not only apply to election
holds true only when the dispositive
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
portion of a final decision is definite, clear
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein
and unequivocal and can be wholly given
provided for. cdll
effect without need of interpretation or
construction. Special proceedings being one of the actions
under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a
"Where there is ambiguity or
motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under
uncertainty, the opinion or body of the
Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the
decision may be referred to for purposes
motion to dismiss may be filed "within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint." Clearly, the The fundamental distinction between void and
motion should have been filed on or before the filing of voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed
petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an never to have taken place at all. The effects of void
answer in ordinary civil actions. marriages, with respect to property relations of the
spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil
Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed
Code. Children born of such marriages who are called
out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent
natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
Isabel was already through with the presentation of her
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children
witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two
under Article 89 20 irrespective of whether or not the
witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad
improper but also dilatory.
faith.
The respondent court, far from deviating or
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
straying off course from established jurisprudence on this
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is
matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully
set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In
action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a
fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision
marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never
and the dispositive portion thereof which created the
been entered into but the law makes express provisions
ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of
to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally
Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the
wiped out. The status of children born in voidable
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under
marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in
89 which provides that:
force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
"Children conceived of voidable
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the
marriages before the decree of annulment
dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically
shall be considered legitimate; and
declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents
children conceived thereafter shall have
is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such
the same status, rights and obligations as
declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void
acknowledged natural children, and are
and the children born out of said marriage are
also called natural children by legal
illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles
fiction.'' 21 (Emphasis supplied)
80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify what
marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by
causes for which a marriage may be annulled. 19 the court abolishes the legal character of the society
formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy
 the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance." 22
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have
different legal connotations and implications. Annul
means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to
make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
with 23 whereas null and void is something that does not
exist from the beginning. A marriage that
is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases
to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court
action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from
the very beginning. cdrep
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument
that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must
control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents was void or voidable. Such argument
springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there
is a conflict between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of
procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue
as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order
is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the
parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of the decision or order which may
be somewhat confusing, 24 the same is not without a
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite,
clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect
without need of interpretation or construction — which
usually is "the case where the order or decision in
question is that of a court not of record which is not
constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on
which the judgment is based." 25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists
between the dispositive portion and the body of the
decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole
body of the decision in order to give effect to the
intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic
v. de los Angeles 26 the Court said:
"Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil
Code states that '[i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.'This
mandate of law, obviously cannot be any
less binding upon the courts in relation to
its judgments.
". . . The judgment must be read in
its entirety, and must be construed as a
whole so as to bring all of its parts into
harmony as far as this can be done by fair
and reasonable interpretation and so as to
give effect to every word and part if
possible, and to effectuate the intention
and purpose of the Court, consistent with
the provisions of the organic law. (49
C.J.S., pp. 863-864" [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the
decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the
marriage is voidable:
 "It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that
the symptoms of the plaintiff's mental
aberration classified as schizophernia
(sic) had made themselves manifest even
as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he
was actually placed under expert neuro-
psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if
the subject has shown marked progress,
he remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
"There is no controversy that the
marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after
plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This
fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
"Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be
annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) That either party was of
unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife; LexLib
xxx xxx xxx
"There is a dearth of proof at the
time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this
very complaint add emphasis to the
findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling
the patient, that plaintiff really lives more
in fancy than in reality, a strong indication
of schizophernia (sic)." 27
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared
null and void the marriage of respondent Isabel's
parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New
Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of
the children are therefore governed by the first clause
of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just
abovementioned. Based on said provision the
children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born
prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their
marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as
estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren,
including respondent Isabel, may invoke their
successional right of representation in the estate of
their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after
their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had
predeceased their grandmother. This is, however,
without prejudice to a determination by the courts of
whether the Letters of Administration may be granted
to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the
successional rights of the personalities involved over
the decedent's estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this
Castro, emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the
judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed
once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the
rights and obligations of those parties, and the
dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in
conformity with the body of the decision, must all be
spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving
absolutely no room for dispute, debate or
interpretation. 28
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of
discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED. LLjur
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. April 22, 2005.]
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in
their capacities as President and
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of
Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, and FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE
GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRI
AL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE
PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK
OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO,
DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES
claiming to be Special Administratrix,
and other persons/public officers
acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
For resolution is private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes' omnibus motion to cite petitioners in
indirect contempt of Court and for the disbarment and/or
imposition of disciplinary sanctions on petitioners'
counsel 1 for their refusal to comply with the final and
executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
This case began with a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez filed 25 years ago on September 24, 1980.
Forming part of the inventory of the estate were 2,029
shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance
Company (Philinterlife). During the pendency of these
proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael (all surnamed
Ortañez), the surviving legitimate spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent respectively, executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, partitioning it
(including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among
themselves. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029
shares to the Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG). 2
 However, private respondent, one of the in the name of the Estate of
illegitimate children of the decedent, was in the meantime Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as
appointed as special administratrix of the 2,029 the owner thereof without
Philinterlife shares of stock. When Jose Ortañez filed an prejudice to other claims for
omnibus motion seeking the approval of the sale of the violation of pre-emptive
shares of stock to FLAG and the release of private rights pertaining to the said
respondent as special administratrix, the trial court in its 2,029 Philinterlife
August 11, 1997 order, denied said motion. On August shares; CSDTac
29, 1997, the intestate court declared the extrajudicial
3. Directing the President and the
settlement made by Juliana, Jose and Rafael partially
Corporate Secretary of
void ab initio insofar as the transfer of the Philinterlife
Philinterlife to issue stock
shares was concerned. These orders were later upheld
certificates of Philinterlife for
by the Court of Appeals (CA) and this Court.
2,029 shares in the name of
In its order dated July 6, 2000, the the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by Ortañez as the owner
private respondent: thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violation of
WHEREFORE, premises
pre-emptive rights pertaining
considered, let a writ of execution issue
to the said 2,029 Philinterlife
as follows:
shares; and
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale
4. Confirming that only the Special
of the 2,029 Philinterlife
Administratrix, Ma. Divina
shares in the name of the
Ortañez-Enderes, has the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio
power to exercise all the
Ortañez to Filipino Loan
rights appurtenant to the
Assistance Group (FLAG);
said shares, including the
2. Commanding the President and right to vote and to receive
the Corporate Secretary of dividends;
Philinterlife to reinstate in
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any
the stock and transfer book
other person or persons
of Philinterlife the 2,029
claiming to represent it or
Philinterlife shares of stock
otherwise, to acknowledge
 and allow the said Special
Administratrix to exercise all
the aforesaid rights on the
said shares and to refrain
from resorting to any action
which may tend (to) directly
or indirectly impede,
obstruct or bar the free
exercise thereof under pain
of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate
Secretary, any responsible
officer/s of Philinterlife, or
any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or
otherwise, are hereby
directed to comply with this
Order within three (3) days
from receipt hereof under
pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer
Rivera and Pedro Borja are
hereby directed to
implement the writ of
execution with dispatch to
forestall any/or further
damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED. 3
Unfortunately, however, the writ of execution was
not enforced due to the resistance of herein petitioners.
To block the execution, petitioners filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
59736, questioning the order of execution, among others.
The petition was dismissed outright on July 26, 2000.
Petitioners then elevated the case to us. On February 23,
2004, a decision was promulgated by the Third Division
of this Court: 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing
petitioners' petition for certiorari and
affirming the July 6, 2000 order of
the trial court which ordered the execution
of its (trial court's) August 11 and 29,
1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 5
On April 27, 2004, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion for reconsideration and referral of this case to
the en banc allegedly in view of the conflicting rulings of
two divisions of the Court. In a resolution dated May 26,
2004, the Court denied the motion for lack of merit:
The Court deliberated on the
petitioners' omnibus motion for
reconsideration of the decision of
February 23, 2004 which denied the
petition for review on certiorari. It appears
to the Court that the motion merely
reiterates the same arguments earlier
raised and does not present any
substantial reason not previously invoked
 nor any matter not already considered
and passed upon by theCourt.
ACCORDINGLY,
the Court Resolved to DENY the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. This
denial is FINAL. 6
Thus on July 9, 2004, the February 23, 2004
decision became final and executory, and was recorded
in the book of entries of judgments. On October 1, 2004,
an alias writ of execution was issued by the
intestate court (the court of origin). In said writ, the
deputy sheriffs were ordered to enforce the August 11
and 29, 1997 and July 6, 2000 orders of the
intestate court.
Instead of complying with the writ, petitioners filed
on October 15, 2004, a motion to suspend
execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening
events, raising the following arguments: (1) the
intestate court had already revoked the appointment of
private respondent as special administratrix; (2) there
was a need to lay down the legal procedure in the
implementation of the writ and (3) there must be a
declaration that the price per share of the 2,029 shares
was only P1,000 which was its book value at the time the
shares were sold in 1989 and 1991. 7
Private respondent went back to this Court and
filed this omnibus motion asserting that petitioners "made
a travesty of the final and executory decisions of the
Lower Courts and this Honorable Court . . . when they
refused to comply with the Alias Writ of Execution issued
by the Lower Court." 8
Before we discuss the substance of private
respondent's motion, we note that attached to it were
mere photocopies of the supporting documents and not
"certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein" as required by the Rules of Court. 9 However,
given that the motion was verified and petitioners, who
were given a chance to oppose or comment on it, made
no objection thereto, we brush aside the defect in form
and proceed to discuss the merits of the motion. aIETCA
Furthermore, as held in Remman Enterprises,
Inc. v. CA, 10 Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court outlines the procedural requisites before the
accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) the
filing of a written charge and (2) an opportunity to be
heard by himself or counsel. All that the law requires is
that there is a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel. What is important is that the alleged
contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the
charges against him and to be heard in his
defense. 11 Petitioners were given this opportunity; they
in fact filed their Opposition. 12
Petitioners assert that private respondent engaged
in forum-shopping because the latter had previously filed
a similar motion in the intestate court. The argument has
no merit. The charge for indirect contempt must be filed
before the court against which the indirect contempt was
committed. Section 4, Rule 71 states:
SEC. 5. Where charge to be
filed. — Where the charge for indirect
contempt has been committed against
a Regional Trial Court or a court of
 equivalent or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be
filed with such court. . . .
Hence, the charge for indirect contempt for
disobedience to our February 23, 2004 decision was
correctly brought to us. As we explained in the case
of Igot v. Court of Appeals:
In whatever context it may arise,
contempt of court involves the doing of an
act, or the failure to do an act, in such a
manner as to create an affront to
the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. As a matter of practical
judicial administration, jurisdiction has
been felt to properly rest in only one
tribunal at a time with respect to a given
controversy. Only the court which
rendered the order commanding the doing
of a certain act is vested with the right to
determine whether or not the order has
been complied with, or whether a
sufficient reason has been given for
noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a
contempt has been committed. It is a well-
established rule that the power to
determine the existence of contempt
of court rests exclusively with
the courtcontemned. No court is
authorized to punish a contempt against
another.
The rationale that is usually
advanced for the general rule . . . is that,
contempt proceedings are sui generis and
are triable only by the court against whose
authority the contempts are charged; the
power to punish for contempt exists for
the purpose of enabling a court to compel
due decorum and respect in its presence
and due obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes and in order that
a court may compel obedience to its
orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience
thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would
operate to deprive the proceeding of half
its efficiency. 13
We now proceed to the merits of the motion to cite
for indirect contempt and for imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.
The private respondent alleges that the following
acts of the petitioners constituted indirect contempt under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: (1) petitioners'
failure to comply with the alias writ of execution served
upon them on October 12, 2004 and (2) their act of filing
a patently baseless motion (to suspend execution/period
of compliance by reason of supervening events) which
was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of
the final and executory decision of this Court.
On the other hand, petitioners allege that the
immediate execution of the subject decision would be
inequitable and should be suspended pending an order
of clarification of certain matters. According to them, the
certificates of the shares of stock were turned over to the
intestate court and not to private respondent because her
appointment as special administratrix had already been
revoked by the court.
Petitioners' obstinate refusal to abide by
this Court's February 23, 2004 decision demonstrates a
contumacious attitude which this Court cannot
countenance. This contumacy becomes all the more
glaring because of the strongly worded admonition in our
decision that "(p)etitioners and all parties claiming rights
under them are hereby warned not to further delay the
execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated
August 11 and August 29, 1997." 14 The previously
quoted July 6, 2000 order of the intestate court, which
was affirmed by this Court, also contained the following
directives:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other
person or persons claiming to
represent it or otherwise, to
acknowledge and allow the said
Special Administratrix to exercise
all the aforesaid rights on the said
shares and to refrain from
resorting to any action which
may tend (to) directly or
indirectly impede, obstruct or
bar the free exercise thereof
under pain of contempt. TIDHCc
6. The President, Corporate Secretary,
any responsible officer/s of
Philinterlife, or any other person or
persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, are hereby directed to
comply with this Order within
three (3) days from receipt
hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera
and Pedro Borja are hereby
directed to implement the writ of
execution with dispatch to forestall
any/or further damage to the
Estate.
SO ORDERED. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, petitioners' defiant non-compliance with
these directives, as proved by the sheriff's report dated
October 13, 2004, constituted indirect contempt. The
pertinent portion of this report stated:
That on October 12, 2004, when
Sheriff Borja went to the Philenterlife (sic)
Office to check whether there was already
compliance with the Alias Writ of
Execution, one of their staff told Sheriff
Borja that Mr. Jose Lee wanted to talk
with Sheriff Borja over the Telephone. In
their telephone conversation, Mr.
Jose Lee told Sheriff Borja that he had
already consulted his lawyer regarding the
matter.
 WHEREFORE, we respectfully
submit this report to the
Honorable Court with the information that
up to this writing, Philenterlife (sic) has not
submitted their compliance to the Sheriff
or to theCourt. 16
Petitioners' act of filing their motion to suspend
execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening
events also showed their continuing, stubborn resistance
to this Court's judgment. Indeed, one of the exceptions to
the principle of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events. Supervening events
refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become
final and executory or to new circumstances which
develop after the judgment has acquired finality. 17
The private respondent alleges that the revocation
of her appointment as special administratrix was made by
the intestate court in its May 12, 2003 and September 4,
2003 orders. 18 This is not disputed by the petitioners. In
short, this fact already existed before the decision of
this Court was promulgated on February 23, 2004
and before it became final and executory on July 9, 2004.
Therefore, the revocation of the appointment of private
respondent as special administratrix was evidently not a
supervening event.
Furthermore, this issue had already been raised in
petitioners' motion for reconsideration 19 of this Court's
February 23, 2004 decision and passed upon by
the Court in its resolution dated May 26, 2004 denying
the motion for lack of merit. Likewise, the increase in the
value of the shares from P1,000 to P4,000 was also
raised in the same motion for
reconsideration. 20 The Court stated that "the motion
merely reiterate(d) the same arguments earlier raised
and (did) not present any substantial reason not
previously invoked nor any matter not already considered
and passed upon by the Court." 21
Petitioners insist that there must be an order
laying down the legal procedure for the implementation of
the writ, which implementation did not include taking over
the management of Philinterlife and obtaining possession
of office premises. We disagree. The execution should
not be suspended for that reason.
Our February 23, 2004 ruling categorically stated
that the estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez was the lawful
owner of 2,029 Philinterlife shares. As lawful owner of the
Philinterlife shares, the estate can exercise all the rights
of ownership, including the right to vote the shares. If, by
voting the shares, the estate is able to elect its own
representatives who succeed in attaining management
control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a
legitimate consequence of our February 23, 2004
decision.
We call particular attention to the fact that in our
February 23, 2004 decision, we noted that petitioners,
with the rest of the FLAG-controlled directors and
stockholders, increased the authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 2,029 shares of
the estate 22 representing 50.725% of Philinterlife. We
observed that this was obviously calculated to make it
difficult for the estate to reassume its controlling interest
in Philinterlife. Thus, we ruled that, considering the nullity
of the sale of the 2,029 shares to FLAG, the increase in
Philinterlife's authorized capital stock was void ab
initio. 23 Consequently, any approval by the Securities
and Exchange Commission of this increase would
likewise be void ab initio. ETaSDc
Moreover, the directives to petitioners Jose
C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, as president and corporate
secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, were sufficiently
clear and needed absolutely no clarification in order to
exact their compliance thereto. Since the nullity of the
sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares to FLAG had been
confirmed, they were ordered to:
(1) reinstate the shares in the name of the
estate in the stock and transfer
book;
(2) issue stock certificates in the name of
the estate;
(3) acknowledge and allow the special
administratrix to exercise all the
rights appurtenant to the shares;
(4) refrain from resorting to any action
which may tend to directly or
indirectly impede, obstruct or bar
the free exercise of these rights
and
(5) comply with the order within three
days from receipt.
The first two directives were undoubtedly covered
by the duties and functions of the corporate secretary
and president of a corporation. The next two ordered
them not to resist the writ and the last directive provided
a period for their compliance. Given the foregoing, there
was never any need to clarify the procedure for the
implementation of the writ.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be
punished after charge and hearing. —
After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance
to a lawful writ, process, order or
judgment of a court . . .
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful
interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt . . .
(d) Any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx
In the recent case of Heirs of Trinidad de Leon
vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, we explained the
concept of contempt of court:
 Contempt of court is a defiance of
the authority, justice or dignity of
the court; such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation (12 Am. Jur. 389, cited in
14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the court's
orders, but such conduct as tends to bring
the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in
some manner to impede the due
administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly
declared that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of the court, and consequently,
to the due administration of justice (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil.
944;Commissioner of Immigration vs.
Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs.
Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). 24
Petitioners' disobedience to this Court's judgment
is an affront to the Court and the dignity with which it is
clothed. Their attempt to raise issues already laid to rest
by a final and executory judgment of no less than the
highest tribunal of the land constitutes a disrespectful and
insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and
impedes the speedy administration of justice. 25 As
mentioned in the beginning of this Resolution, this
controversy has been pending for 25 long years already.
Apparently, petitioners want to prolong it to
eternity. AacDHE
In Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Well-settled is the principle that a
decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the
land.
The reason for this is that litigation
must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard
against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any
attempt to prolong the controversies.
 The only exceptions to the general
rule are the correction of clerical errors,
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. 26
This case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptions. Moreover, the immutability of the
February 23, 2004 decision is all the more emphasized in
this case since it is this Court, the highest Court of the
land and final arbiter of all legal controversies, that
promulgated it. Thus, petitioners are bound by the finality
of our decision and cannot, under the guise of a phony
motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by
reason of supervening events, reopen a case already
decided with finality. Nor should they be permitted to
litigate anew questions or issues already laid to rest.
The fact is that virtually the same issues have
been elevated to this Court no less than three times: in
G.R. Nos. 128525, 135177 and 146006. Private
respondent obtained a writ of execution in 2000 but her
attempt to enforce the writ was unsuccessful. After our
February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory,
she obtained an alias writ of execution on October 1,
2004 but the petitioners again managed to frustrate her
efforts to execute the decision and torpedo its
enforcement.
As we ruled in Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
. . . Considerable time has already
elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice,
it is time that [the] controversy is finally
laid to rest. "Sound practice seeks to
accommodate the theory which avoids
waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to
speak of delay in the disposal of the case.
A marked characteristic of our judicial set-
up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should
act, and act with finality." In this case, the
dictates of justice do demand that
this Court act, and act with finality. 27
This Court is becoming impatient with the devious
tricks and maneuvers of petitioners.
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court penalizes
indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect
contempt. — If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against
a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months or both. . . .
Petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, for
their defiance and resistance to the October 1, 2004 alias
writ of execution enforcing this Court's February 23, 2004
decision — resulting in the frustration of its execution —
are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect contempt.
Finally, with regard to the administrative charge
against petitioners' counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, this Court resolves to refer it to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma
Aggabao, president and corporate secretary,
respectively, of petitioner Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, are hereby found GUILTY of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which the maximum FINE of
P30,000 is hereby imposed on each of them, payable in
full within five days from receipt of this resolution. They
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ,
are furthermore given a final non-extendible period of five
EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs.
days from receipt of this resolution within which to comply
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
within our decision and orders as aforementioned.
Special Sixth Division), MARIA
Petitioners are hereby warned not to file any more
PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
pleadings in connection herewith. Failure to comply with
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
our decision, orders and P30,000 fine within the five-day
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
period will subject them to imprisonment till full
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING
compliance. CDAHIT
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
In view hereof, petitioners' counsel, Atty. COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
Teodorico Fernandez, is likewise strongly warned to 156, respondents.
refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of
our judicial processes.
Hemedino M. Brondial, for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
De Jesus & Associates, for private respondents.
|||

SYLLABUS
 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE FOR
SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO "MINOR OR
INCAPACITATED" CHILDREN. — It is settled that
allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of
the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, deceased's legitimate spouse and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to
education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO
DECEASED'S GRANDCHILDREN. — The law clearly
limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of
their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE PROPERTIES CAN BE MADE. — In settlement
of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before
payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made
to meet those obligations.
4. ID., ID., ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN
OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID BEFORE THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. — The estate tax is one of
those obligations that must be paid before distribution of
the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. — The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR OVER PROPERTIES OF THE
DECEASED. — The right of an executor or administrator
to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration."
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul
and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and
the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045. LexLib
The facts show that on June 27,
1987, Hilario M. Ruiz 1 executed a holographic will
naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria
Pilar RuizMontes, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and
real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate. 2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately
thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents
in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown
reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's
death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval
of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. 3 Surprisingly, Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the
estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle
Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4 — was
leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered
Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond
turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the
balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair
and maintenance expenses on the estate. 5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of
P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the
release of P7,722.00. 6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to
probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were
issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate
of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an
"Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the
release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion
and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to
Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the
release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the
distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
 On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied
petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of
opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It
further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession
of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters
and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that
he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes'
motion for release of rent payments which opposition the
court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his
previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through
counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion
for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease
contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed
for another year. 7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate
court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be
necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from
their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in
abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes
and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. 8 The court stated thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the
arguments set forth thereon by the
parties, the court resolves to allow
Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take
possession of the rental payments
deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig
Regional Trial Court, but only such
amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and
allowances for support of Maria Cathryn
Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeli, which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as
they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining
to them.
As to the release of the titles
bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-
Montes and the above-named heirs, the
same is hereby reconsidered and held in
abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months
from the date of first publication of Notice
to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator
Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to
submit an accounting of the expenses
necessary for administration including
provisions for the support of Maria
Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice
Albertine Ruiz and Maria
Angeli Ruiz before the amount required
can be withdrawn and cause the
 publication of the notice to creditors with PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE
reasonable dispatch. 9 ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of
WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED,
of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the
AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
petition and sustained the probate court's order in a
UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
decision dated November 10, 1994 10 and a resolution
THE ESTATE." 12
dated January 5, 1995. 11
The issue for resolution is whether the probate
Hence, this petition.
court, after admitting the will to probate but before
Petitioner claims that: payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the
authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
"THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2)
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE to order the release of the titles to certain heirs and (3) to
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF executor of the will.
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND
CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156,
"Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and
DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH
family. — The widow and minor or
WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
incapacitated children of a deceased
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW
person, during the settlement of the
THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF
estate, shall receive therefrom under the
THE ESTATE OF THE
direction of the court, such allowance as
LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE
are provided by law." LLphil
POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the
ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE deceased the right to receive allowances for support
SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends
CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for
THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are
no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully
employed. In addition, the provision expressly states
"children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under
Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor
or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 13
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in
force at the time of the testator's death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of
their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled
to provisional support from the funds of the
estate. 14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and
duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist
even beyond the age of majority. 15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and
children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity. 16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate
court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered
the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to
private respondents six months after the date of first
publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles
to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the
following conditions:
"Sec. 2. Advance distribution in
special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion
and upon such terms as it may deem
proper and just, permit that such part of
the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed
among the heirs or legatees, upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in
Rule 90 of these Rules." 17
And Rule 90 provides that:
"Section 1. When order for
distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in
his possession. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful
 heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs." 18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax
have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations
only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs, or
when provision is made to meet those obligations. 19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the
release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after
the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
"notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he
died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of
those obligations that must be paid before distribution of
the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance. 20 Notably, at the
time the order was issued the properties of the estate
had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate
court to order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity 21 and settles only the question of whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. 22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will
was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in
his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release
of funds 24 and his motion for reconsideration of the
August 26, 1993 order of the said court. 25 Therein,
petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees
and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the
estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime
as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that
if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate,
the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the
same as in ordinary cases. 26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that
the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the
estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only
be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses of administration." 27 Section
3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
"Sec. 3. Executor or administrator
to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to
administer estate not willed. — An
executor or administrator shall have the
right to the possession and management
of the real as well as the personal estate
of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and
expenses for administration." 28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds
deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real
estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for
the release of additional funds for the same reasons
he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that
petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-
year rental income from the Valle Verde property.
Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
renewal of the lease. 29 Neither did he render an
accounting of such funds. cda
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of
ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled
and partitioned. 30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of
his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands
are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31 He
cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and
personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true
account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate
tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the
court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. 32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045
affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No.
10259 are affirmed with the modification that those
portions of the order granting an allowance to the
testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the
titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors
are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.
 UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J p:

Before us is a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831
affirming the dismissal 2 of the petitioner's complaint in
Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered
into a loan agreement 3 in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim
entered into another loan agreement, 4 this time in the
amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model
AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the
FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement 5 for the loan
dated December 13, 1980. jur2005cd
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving
a holographic will. 6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706.
On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. 7 During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement 8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and
one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume
the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them. SEIcAD
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities 9 was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its
assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
Demand letters 10 for the settlement of his
account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed
the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988,
the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were
issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines. 12 Accordingly, the complaint
was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S.
Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party decedent's account. Ruling that the joint agreement
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court
her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the held that the petitioner's cause of action against
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
63. 14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
decision was subsequently rendered by the court
FINDING THAT THE JOINT
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)
portion of the RTC decision reads:
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby PROBATE COURT.
rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
lack of merit. 15
FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
should have been filed with the probate court before THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE
which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT
also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO
by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981,
HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED
was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
IN THE ESTATE
However, the said agreement was void, considering that
PROCEEDING. 16
it had not been approved by the probate court, and that
there can be no valid partition until after the will has been The petitioner asserted before the CA that the
probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate
failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence;
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked
assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola,
contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of and that she cannot deny her liability under the said
assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union document; as the agreement had been signed by both
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer
necessary to present the same before the probate court I.
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver
to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings. II.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
have been presented before the probate court. 17 VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS
OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed
PROBATED.
its claim with the probate court as provided under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further III.
held that the partition made in the agreement was null
and void, since no valid partition may be had until after THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, NOT FINDING THAT THE
paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in PROCEEDING.
the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA IV.
affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE
WHEREFORE, premises HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
considered, the appealed Decision of the LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON
Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING
toto. ISAcHD GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED
SO ORDERED. 18 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-
APPELLANT UNION BANK.
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the
following errors to the CA: V.
 THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of
MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the
P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother
IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS Efraim Santibañez and his heirs to be in the nature of a
BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed
DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his heirs,
FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation
BANK. 19 solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the
provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the
deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in
promissory notes executed by the named respondents,
Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for
the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
the probate court to approve the joint agreement where
thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file
the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased
its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the
and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement
sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs
without any condition, she is now estopped from
of the deceased. cSITDa
asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner
also points out that the holographic will of the deceased
did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of
In her comment to the petition, respondent
the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the
Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to
said will. The active participation and resistance of
recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action
Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with
against the petitioner's claim amounts to a waiver of the
the probate court. She points out that at the time of the
right to have the claim presented in the probate
execution of the joint agreement there was already an
proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who
existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew
executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the
about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court
value of the tractors under consideration would be
which might delay payment of the obligation, the
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves
petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
agreement.
 According to the respondent, the trial court and the
CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was null
and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the
court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third
parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as
she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the
claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the
petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that
she had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement,
nor was there any document presented as evidence to
show that she had caused herself to be bound by the
obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues:
a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed
by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs'
assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid;
and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate
court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of
the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered. 20 The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation
and distribution of the estate. 21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
In testate succession, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the
public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a
will. 22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to
be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the
will. 23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibañez, left a holographic will 24which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal,
which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence,
my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-
quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have
escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so,
any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is
not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for
the probate of their late father's holographic will covering
the said tractors. aSCHcA
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding
had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of
the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose
of them in any way without the probate court's approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow. 26 Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be
a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. 27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of
its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine
the identity of the heirs of the decedent. 28 In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending
before the court and the latter had yet to determine who
the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act,
and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether
the heirs' assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing
the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties
thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and
take possession and use the above-described chattel
and each of them to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated
which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." 29 The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to
receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed,
the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by
the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money
claim with the probate court in accordance with Section
5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be
filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. — All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all
 claims for funeral expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced
by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor
may set forth by answer the claims he has
against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other
in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the
estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved
at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent's
estate in the probate court is mandatory. 30 As we held
in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: 31
. . . This requirement is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased
and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. 'The
law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue. 32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein
could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at
most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund
may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find
it unnecessary to delve into the matter further. DSTCIa
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities. 33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not
"by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming
1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit the same.
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines . .
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
." 34 However, the documentary evidence 35 clearly
is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of SO ORDERED.
Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the
petitioner's participation therein as a party be found.
Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence
was presented during trial to show that Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank
of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:

. . . [T]he court also finds merit to

the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence
to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
here. "The power to take judicial notice is QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
to [be] exercised by the courts with QUIAZON, petitioners, vs. MA.
caution; care must be taken that the LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
requisite notoriety exists; and every MARIA LOURDES ELISE
reasonable doubt upon the subject should QUIAZON,respondent.
be promptly resolved in the negative."
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107
SCRA 504). 36
DECISION
This being the case, the petitioner's personality to
file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88589, 1 the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal in
hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order
dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City
are AFFIRMED in toto. 2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-law
wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon
(Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc.
No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to
the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late father's
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters
of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. 5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, 7 the petition for settlement of decedent's estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo's
estate.
In a Decision 8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC
directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the
that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the the following grounds:
petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas,
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT
reads:
ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
Having attained legal age at this RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
time and there being no showing of any THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION
disqualification or incompetence to serve FOR LETTERS OF
as administrator, let letters of ADMINISTRATION WAS
administration over the estate of the PROPERLY FILED WITH THE
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS[;]
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
be posted by her. 9
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PRE-
affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 EXISTING MARRIAGE[;] [AND]
Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS
CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
by establishing a common residence at No. 26
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
ADMINISTRATION[.]12
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo's The Court's Ruling
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
We find the petition bereft of merit.
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of
Las Piñas City. The petitioners' Motion for Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
its Resolution 11 dated 7 August 2009. decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
The Issues
 Sec. 1. Where estate of
deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile
is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. 14 Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." 15 In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. 18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling
of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate
of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident
from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement
of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of
administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo's Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent's residence at the time of his death,
the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with
the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous. 20That Eliseo went
to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before
the courts of law renders untenable petitioners' position
that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners' submission that the lower courts' findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court. 21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners' contention
that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia's
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it
was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage. 22 It must be pointed out that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling inNiñal v. Bayadog 23 applicable
four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father's
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. 24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void
marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that
Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by
her father's marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse,
such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, 26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the
said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn
Eliseo's marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent's marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners,
the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the
probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated
more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record
of marriage can no longer be found in the National
Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing
that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia
and Eliseo's marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio. 27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom
letters of administration granted. — If
no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be
 granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79
provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for
letters of administration. — A petition
for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show,
so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, and
the names and residences
of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and
character of the property of
the estate;
(d) The name of the person for
whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall
render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one
who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of
kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees. 28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir
who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to
prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on
her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly,
the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her
right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled
to her legitime after the debts of the estate are
satisfied. 29 Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, areAFFIRMED in toto.SO
ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 150175. February 5, 2007.]
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF
DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely:
ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES,
 ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA
SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and
PACITA MENDOZA, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES,
namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA
BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR.,
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its
Decision 1 in the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of
the petitioners. The dispositive portion 2 reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55194, dated
31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of
the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794, dated 28 September 1986, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and
the Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession filed by the
heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for
Reconsideration 3 of the foregoing Decision was filed by
Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf
of the respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones. On 19
May 2006, petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-
heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel,
filed an Opposition to Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration, 4 to which the respondents filed a
Rejoinder 5 on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F.
Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office
entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for the
respondents. 6Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006
and 16 June 2006, respectively, a Reply 7 and
Supplemental Reply 8 to the petitioners' Opposition to
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Finally,
petitioners filed a Rejoinder 9 to the respondents' Reply
and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.
The facts of the case, as recounted in the
Decision, 10 are as follows —
Petitioners are the heirs of the late
Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting
of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-
Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina's daughter,
Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other
nephews and nieces of Donata, in
representation of her two other sisters
who had also passed away. Respondents,
on the other hand, are the heirs of the late
Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed
of his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of
Maximino.
xxx xxx xxx
Maximino was married to Donata
but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May
1952, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husband's
estate with the Cebu City Court of First
Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District,
designated as Special Proceedings No.
928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued
Letters of Administration appointing
Donata as the administratrix of
Maximino's estate. She submitted an
Inventory of Maximino's properties, which
included, among other things, the
following parcels of land . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The CFI would subsequently issue
an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
awarding ownership of the
aforementioned real properties to Donata.
On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said
CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds, and by
virtue thereof, received new TCTs,
covering the said properties, now in her
name. aCIHAD
Donata died on 1 November 1977.
Erlinda, one of Donata's nieces, instituted
with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of
Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
administrators of Donata's intestate
estate. Controversy arose among
Donata's heirs when Erlinda claimed
exclusive ownership of three parcels of
land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545,
and 58684, based on two Deeds of
Donation, both dated 15 September 1977,
allegedly executed in her favor by her
aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata
opposed Erlinda's claim. This Court,
however, was no longer informed of the
subsequent development in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Donata; and
as far as this Petition is concerned, all the
heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear
to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio
Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino,
filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino, which was initially granted by
the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order,
dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio
to collect rentals from Maximino's
properties. But then, Gregorio filed with
the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the
said properties were already under his
and his wife's administration as part of the
intestate estate of Donata. Silverio's
Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set
aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of
Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC
against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed
an Amended Complaint, on 11 December
1992. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded
in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino.
xxx xxx xxx
After trial in due course, the RTC
rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986,
in favor of the heirs of Maximino . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he RTC declared that the
heirs of Maximino were entitled to 1/2 of
the real properties covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and
58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey
to the heirs of Maximino the said
properties and to render an accounting of
the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the
RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August
2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs
of Donata filed the present Petition, . . . .
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court
found the Petition meritorious and, reversing the
Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property
filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794. This Court summed up its findings, 11 thus —
In summary, the heirs of Maximino
failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was
established between Donata and the heirs
of Maximino under Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code. Donata was able to
register the real properties in her name,
not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant
to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued
 by the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be
fairly and regularly issued, declared
Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino; hence,
making Donata the singular owner of the
entire estate of Maximino, including the
real properties, and not merely a co-
owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis
for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino
in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same
should have been dismissed. IcaHTA
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the
Decision of this Court raising still the arguments that
Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First
Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952, which declared
her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino
and authorized her to have Maximino's properties
registered exclusively in her name; that respondents'
right to succession to the disputed properties was
transmitted or vested from the moment of Maximino's
death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that
Donata merely possessed and held the properties in trust
for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Court's
ruling in Quion v. Claridad 12 and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los
Angeles, 13 respondents' action to recover title to and
possession of their shares in Maximino's estate, held in
trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by
petitioners as the latter's successors-in-interest, is
imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh
contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952,
being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation of
Donata that she was Maximino's sole heir, was a void
order, which produced no legal effect. Lastly,
respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain
procedural presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March
2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to
succession, thus, making justice "subservient to the
dictates of mere procedural fiats." 14
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and
clarify some points in its previous Decision in this case, it
does not find any new evidence or argument that would
adequately justify a change in its previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the
existence of any trust relations between petitioners and
respondents shall be examined in the light of Article 1456
of the New Civil Code, which provides that, "[i]f property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes." Hence, the foremost question to be
answered is still whether an implied trust under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently
established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative,
since there was insufficient evidence to establish that
Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that
Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the
disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to
settle Maximino's intestate estate), which declared her as
Maximino's sole heir. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No.
928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity.
Reproduced below are the relevant portions 15 of the
Decision —
At the onset, it should be
emphasized that Donata was able to
secure the TCTs covering the real
properties belonging to the estate of
Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated
2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the
said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted
by Donata herself, to settle the intestate
estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs
of Donata, were unable to present a copy
of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years
prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino
of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of
such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be
denied. It was recorded in the Primary
Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27
June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No.
1714. It was annotated on the TCTs
covering the real properties as having
declared Donata the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino. The non-
presentation of the actual CFI Order was
not fatal to the cause of the heirs of
Donata considering that its authenticity
and contents were never questioned. The
allegation of fraud by the heirs of
Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order,
but to the manner or procedure by which it
was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover,
the non-presentation of the CFI Order,
contrary to the declaration by the RTC,
does not amount to a willful suppression
of evidence that would give rise to the
presumption that it would be adverse to
the heirs of Donata if produced. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, effectively settled the intestate
estate of Maximino by declaring Donata
as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of her deceased husband. The issuance
by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its
conduct of the entire Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of
validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and
(n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, reproduced below — cTIESD
SEC. 3. Disputable
presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) That official duty has
been regularly performed;
 (n) That a court, or judge
acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing
provisions, this Court must presume, in
the absence of any clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, that the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties, and to have rendered a judgment
valid in every respect; and it could not
give credence to the following statements
made by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision.
xxx xxx xxx
There was totally no evidentiary
basis for the foregoing pronouncements.
First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for
Letters of Administration in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI
was not even referred to nor presented
during the course of the trial of Civil Case
No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then
could the Court of Appeals make a finding
that Donata willfully excluded from the
said Petition the names, ages, and
residences of the other heirs of
Maximino? Second, there was also no
evidence showing that the CFI actually
failed to send notices of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of
Maximino or that it did not require
presentation of proof of service of such
notices. It should be remembered that
there stands a presumption that the CFI
Judge had regularly performed his duties
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which
included sending out of notices and
requiring the presentation of proof of
service of such notices; and, the heirs of
Maximino did not propound sufficient
evidence to debunk such presumption.
They only made a general denial of
knowledge of Special Proceedings No.
928-R, at least until 1985. There was no
testimony or document presented in which
the heirs of Maximino categorically denied
receipt of notice from the CFI of the
pendency of Special Proceedings No.
928-R. The only evidence on record in
reference to the absence of notice of such
proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia
Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of
Maximino, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Aurelia's testimony deserves scant
credit considering that she was not
testifying on matters within her personal
knowledge. The phrase "I don't think" is a
clear indication that she is merely voicing
out her opinion on how she believed her
uncles and aunts would have acted had
 they received notice of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination,
the Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the
evidence on record, which did not include an actual copy
of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof
on 15 June 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply
to petitioners' opposition to their motion for
reconsideration of this Court's Decision. Respondents did
not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly
produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to
have been "fortunate enough to obtain a copy" thereof
from the Register of Deeds of Cebu. 16
Respondents should be taken to task for springing
new evidence so late into the proceedings of this case.
Parties should present all their available evidence at the
courts below so as to give the opposing party the
opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence
during the course of the trial. However, given that the
existence of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No.
928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by
the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certified true
copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may
provide new information vital to a just resolution of the
present case, this Court is compelled to consider the
same as part of the evidence on record. CacTSI
The CFI Order 17 in question reads in full as —
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion
of the Administratrix, dated January 5,
1960, that she be declared the sole heir of
her deceased husband, Maximino Suico
Briones, the latter having died without any
legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor
any legitimate brother or sister, nephews
or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident
today, nobody appeared to resist the
motion, and based on the uncontradicted
testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was
the nearest surviving relative of the
deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the
time of the latter's death, and pursuant to
the pertinent provisions of the new Civil
Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby
declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the
sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the
estate of the deceased Maximino Suico
Briones, and she is hereby entitled to
inherit all the residue of this estate after
paying all the obligations thereof, which
properties are those contained in the
Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this
Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact
issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as
earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of
properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of
Maximino's intestate estate, which was dated 2 October
1952. 18 Other than such observation, this Court finds
nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original
position in the Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court
was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should
be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, 19 and that
the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of
the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all
interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially
those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI
Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court
pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which
the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the
intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to
show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also
failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice
of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from
Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court
find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino's
siblings could have missed the published notice of the
intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order,
dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for
respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of
respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of
mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the
establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained
by this Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals 20 —
Procedural rules are designed to
insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a
practical system by which the parties to a
litigation may be accorded a full and fair
opportunity to present their respective
positions and refute each other's
submissions under the prescribed
requirements, conditions and limitations.
Adjective law is not the counterfoil of
substantive law. In fact, there is a
symbiotic relationship between them. By
complying faithfully with the Rules of
Court, the bench and the bar are better
able to discuss, analyze and understand
substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect
and enforce them. The other alternative is
judicial anarchy. EHCDSI
 Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the
general rule, and abandonment thereof should only
be done in the most exceptional circumstances. The
presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant
case are disputable presumptions, which are
satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by
evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to overcome the
given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI
that she was her husband's sole heir, it was not
established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in
bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she indeed
committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the
delay by which respondents filed the present case, when
the principal actors involved, particularly, Donata and
Maximino's siblings, have already passed away and their
lips forever sealed as to what truly transpired between
them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R
took place when all these principal actors were still alive
and each would have been capable to act to protect his
or her own right to Maximino's estate. Letters of
Administration of Maximino's estate were issued in favor
of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in
question was issued only on 15 January 1960. The
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Maximino's
estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is
the burden of the respondents to establish that their
parents or grandparents, Maximino's surviving siblings,
had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all
these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos, 21 the
degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the
principal actors to the transaction have already passed
away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit —
". . . But length of time
necessarily obscures all human
evidence; and as it thus removes from
the parties all the immediate means to
verify the nature of the original
transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence,
and against imputation of fraud. It
would be unreasonable, after a great
length of time, to require exact proof of all
the minute circumstances of any
transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or
apparent, with which it may be
encumbered. The most that can fairly be
expected, in such cases, if the parties are
living, from the frailty of memory, and
human infirmity, is, that the material facts
can be given with certainty to a common
intent; and, if the parties are dead, and
the cases rest in confidence, and in parol
agreements, the most that we can hope is
to arrive at probable conjectures, and to
substitute general presumptions of law,
for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of
trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to
the living; for, the legal presumption is
the other way; as to the dead, who are
not here to answer for themselves, it
would be the height of injustice and
cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and
 violate the sanctity of the grave, unless
the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond
a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was
Maximino's sole heir does constitute fraud, it is
insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, 22 considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable
presumptions of the regular performance of official duty
and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering
the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on
implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata's
misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose
upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the
Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents'
contention that their right to recover their shares in
Maximino's estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled
in jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an
express trust, is subject to prescription and
laches. DCESaI
The case of Ramos v. Ramos 23 already provides
an elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit —
"Trusts are either express or
implied. Express trusts are created by the
intention of the trustor or of the parties.
Implied trusts come into being by
operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code).
"No express trusts concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be
proven by oral evidence. An implied trust
may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid;
Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de
Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs.
Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21
SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are
those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some
writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an
intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S.
122).
"Implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction
as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction
by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of
the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are
ordinarily subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined
as a trust which is raised or created by the
act or construction of law, but in its more
restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed
always to have been contemplated by the
parties, the intention as to which is to be
found in the nature of their transaction,
but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S.
725). Examples of resulting trusts are
found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil
Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-
31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA
168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive
trust is a trust "raised by construction of
law, or arising by operation of law." In a
more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust,
a constructive trust is "a trust not created
by any words, either expressly or
impliedly evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice. It does not arise by agreement or
intention but by operation of law." (89
C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal
title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title
a so-called constructive trust in favor of
the defrauded party." A constructive trust
is not a trust in the technical sense
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49
Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee
cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him
(Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that
an action to compel a trustee to convey
property registered in his name in trust for
the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not
prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil.
776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810),
or that the defense of prescription cannot
be set up in an action to recover property
held by a person in trust for the benefit of
another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97
Phil. 875), or that property held in trust
can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles
vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs.
Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs.
Zuñiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA
1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May
31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147
Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to
express trusts. The basis of the rule is
that the possession of a trustee is not
adverse. Not being adverse, he does not
acquire by prescription the property held
in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190
provides that the law of prescription does
not apply "in the case of a continuing and
subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs.
Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs.
Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA
199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956,
10 SCRA 691). aEHTSc
The rule of imprescriptibility of the
action to recover property held in trust
may possibly apply to resulting trusts as
long as the trustee has not repudiated the
trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109
Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Graño, 42
Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O.G.
11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was
misapplied to constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava
and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare
with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon,
105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De
Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar
the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery
of the property held in trust where (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive ( Laguna
vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason,
55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule
regarding co-owners found in the last
paragraph of Article 494, Civil
Code; Casañas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil.
97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060,
May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive
trusts, the rule is different. The
prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on constructive
trust is now settled (Alzona vs.
Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4
SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman,
supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil.
973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga
vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason &
Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30,
1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may
supervene in an implied trust (Bueno
vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449,
January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-
17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is
resulting or constructive, its
enforcement may be barred by
laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur.
449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado,
supra; Compare withMejia vs. Gampona,
100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]
A present reading of
the Quion 24 and Sevilla 25 cases, invoked by
respondents, must be made in conjunction with and
guided accordingly by the principles established in the
afore-quoted case. Thus, while respondents' right to
inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the
time of Maximino's death, their enforcement of said right
by appropriate legal action may be barred by the
prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the
disputed properties based on implied trust is governed by
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads —
ART. 1144. The following actions
must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by
law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law
(specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within
which to bring an action for reconveyance of their
shares in Maximino's properties. The next question
now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period
be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action
for reconveyance of real property based on implied
trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or
issuance of the title to the property, 26 not only
because registration under the Torrens system is a
constructive notice of title, 27 but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her
name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated
any other claim to the same. DaTICE
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to
register and secure certificates of title over the disputed
properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The
respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the
disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after
the registration of the said properties in the name of
Donata. Therefore, respondents' action for recovery of
possession of the disputed properties had clearly
prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents' Complaint
before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays
for partition of the disputed properties, it does not make
their action to enforce their right to the said properties
imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for
partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as
the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as
provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears
to emphasize that Donata had never recognized
respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or
impliedly. 28 Her assertion before the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino's sole
heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-
owner or co-heir to the inherited properties;
Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common does not apply to
the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
 Other than prescription of action, respondents'
right to recover possession of the disputed properties,
based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The
defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in
permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently
of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is
statutory; laches is equitable. 29
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This
equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy,
which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the
peace of society. 30
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its
Decision the basis for barring respondents' action for
recovery of the disputed properties because of laches.
This Court pointed out therein 31that —
In further support of their
contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of
Maximino even emphasized that Donata
lived along the same street as some of
the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she
failed to inform them of the CFI Order,
dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance
in her name of new TCTs covering the
real properties which belonged to the
estate of Maximino. This Court, however,
appreciates such information differently. It
actually works against the heirs of
Maximino. Since they only lived nearby,
Maximino's siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with
Donata the status of the estate of their
deceased brother. Some of the real
properties, which belonged to the estate
of Maximino, were also located within the
same area as their residences in Cebu
City, and Maximino's siblings could have
regularly observed the actions and
behavior of Donata with regard to the said
real properties. It is uncontested that from
the time of Maximino's death on 1 May
1952, Donata had possession of the real
properties. She managed the real
properties and even collected rental fees
on some of them until her own death on 1
November 1977. After Donata's death,
Erlinda took possession of the real
properties, and continued to manage the
same and collect the rental fees thereon.
Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were
so obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real properties, in
exclusion of all others, which must have
already put the heirs of Maximino on
guard if they truly believed that they still
had rights thereto. EACTSH
The heirs of Maximino knew he
died on 1 May 1952. They even attended
his wake. They did not offer any
explanation as to why they had waited 33
years from Maximino's death before one
of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for
 Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985.
After learning that the intestate estate of
Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited
another two years, before instituting, on 3
March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794,
the Complaint for partition, annulment and
recovery of the real property belonging to
the estate of Maximino. . . .
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted
paragraphs, as well as respondents' conduct before this
Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence
and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action,
without any proffered reason or justification for such
delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who
are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when
the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage
laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the
courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the
aforesaid failings. 32
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and
Supplemental Reply to the petitioners' Opposition to their
Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed
properties in the name of Donata pursuant to such Order
was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the
respondents, 33 an order or judgment is considered void
when rendered by the court without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty,
circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void
judgment and a voidable one, thus —
". . . A voidable judgment is one
which, though not a mere nullity, is liable
to be made void when a person who has
a right to proceed in the matter takes the
proper steps to have its invalidity
declared. It always contains some defect
which may become fatal. It carries within it
the means of its own overthrow. But
unless and until it is duly annulled, it is
attended with all the ordinary
consequences of a legal judgment. The
party against whom it is given may
escape its effect as a bar or an obligation,
but only by a proper application to have it
vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it
will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel,
or a source of title. If no proceedings are
ever taken against it, it will continue
throughout its life to all intents a valid
sentence. If emanating from a court of
general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by
the ordinary presumptions of regularity,
and it is not open to impeachment in any
collateral action. . . ."
But it is otherwise when the
judgment is void. "A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights
are divested. From it no rights can be
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The
parties attempting to enforce it may be
responsible as trespassers. The
purchaser at a sale by virtue of its
authority finds himself without title and
without redress." (Freeman on
Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell vs.
McCahan, 41 Ill., 45;Roberts vs. Stowers,
7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill.,
396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph.,
418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed,
549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex.,
345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill.,
312;Commercial Bank of Manchester vs.
Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs.
Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs.
Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another
vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs.
Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs.
Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L.
& M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.) aDcTHE
It is not always easy to draw the
line of demarcation between a void
judgment and a voidable one, but all
authorities agree that jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is essential to the validity
of a judgment and that want of such
jurisdiction renders it void and a mere
nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-
existent. ( Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine,
55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga.,
130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga.,
247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9
Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs.
Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs.
Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs.
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill.,
32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam.,
364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs.
Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.) 34
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by
Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of
Maximino. Donata's fraud and misrepresentation may
have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order,
which already became final and executory, can only be
set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its
enforcement. 35 It cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack as is being done in this case. Note that
respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery
of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment
sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over
the properties issued in Donata's name. So until and
unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an
action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must
be brought within four years from the discovery of the
fraud. 36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to
know of Donata's fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the
course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for
the settlement of Maximino's estate, then their right to file
an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by
Donata for the settlement of Maximino's estate), has
likewise prescribed by present time.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 187524. August 5, 2015.]
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and
FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, substituted
by DR. RUEL B.
VILLAFRIA, petitioners, vs. MA. GRACIA
RIÑOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RIÑOZA
ALARAS,respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009
and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which
affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas,
Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows: HTcADC
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died
intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children
with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia
R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355,
each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family
home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT
Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu,
Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991,
they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second
wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased
and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria,
without their knowledge and consent. When
confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the
same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a
bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt
from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62
releasing her and her late husband's indebtedness
therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record
of any transaction involving the subject properties,
giving them certified true copies of the titles to the
same. When respondents went to the subject
properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8
cottages in the resort had been demolished. They
were not, however, able to enter as the premises
were padlocked.
 Subsequently, respondents learned that on
July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid
called Balita. Because of this, they caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject
properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu
and filed their complaint praying, among others, for
the annulment of all documents conveying the subject
properties to the petitioners and certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the
allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
subject properties. In the course of his testimony
during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended
that what they purchased was only the resort. 10 He
also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and
Sale which provides, among others, that respondents'
co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando
and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a
Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to
petitioners for P650,000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the
transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as
well as the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was
not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was undated, the date
of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left
side of the document was not signed. 13 The trial
court also observed that both documents were never
presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
registration and that the titles to the subject properties
were still in the names of Pedro and his second wife
Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers
of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On the
basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent portions of
its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
4. a) Declaring as a nullity the
"Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver
of Rights and Sale" (Exh. "1", Villafria)
notarized on December 23, 1991 by
Notary Public Antonio G. Malonzo of
Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20,
Book No. IXII, Series of 1991.
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exh. "2", Villafria),
purportedly executed by Benita T.
Riñoza in favor of spouses Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly
notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman,
marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, payment of lawful fees, except TCT No.
Book No. XXX, Series of 1991. 40353, which shall be exempt from all
expenses for its restoration.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any
and all improvements introduced by With no costs.
defendants Francisco Villafria and SO ORDERED. 15
Maria Butiong in the properties covered
by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's
51355 of the Register of Deeds for Judgment in its Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006
Nasugbu, Batangas. in the following wise:
5. Ordering defendant Francisco The person before whom the
Villafria and all persons, whose resort deed was acknowledged,
occupancy within the premises of the Alfredo de Guzman, was not
four (4) parcels of land described in par. commissioned as a notary public
4-c above is derived from the rights and from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date
interest of defendant Villafria, to vacate the certification was issued. Such
its premises and to deliver possession being the case, the resort deed is not
thereof, and all improvements existing a public document and the
thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of presumption of regularity accorded
the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza. to public documents will not apply to
the same. As laid down in Tigno, et
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the al. v. Aquino, et al.:
defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of The validity of a
decedent Pedro L. Riñoza, each in the notarial certification
capacity and degree established, as well necessarily derives from
as their direct successors-in-interest, the authority of the notarial
and ordering the defendant Registrar of officer. If the notary
Deeds to issue the corresponding titles public does not have the
in their names in the proportion capacity to notarize a
established by law, pro indiviso, in TCT document, but does so
Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and anyway, then the
40353 (after restoration) within ten (10) document should be
days from finality of this Decision, upon treated as
unnotarized. The rule
may strike as rather harsh,
and perhaps may prove to
be prejudicial to parties in
good faith relying on the
proffered authority of the
notary public or the person
pretending to be one. Still,
to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the
elaborate process devised
by this Court in order that
a lawyer may receive a
notarial
commission. Without
such a rule, the
notarization of a settlement/family home deed cannot
document by a duly-
appointed notary public
will have the same legal
effect as one
accomplished by a non-
lawyer engaged in
pretense.
The notarization of
a document carries
considerable legal
effect. Notarization of a
private document
converts such document
into a public one, and
renders it admissible in
court without further
proof of its
authenticity. Thus,
notarization is not an
empty routine; to the
contrary, it engages public
interest in a substantial
degree and the protection
of that interest requires
preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized
to act as notaries public
from imposing upon the
public and the courts and
administrative offices
generally.
Parenthetically, the
be considered a public document.
This is because the following cast
doubt on the document's
authenticity, to wit: aScITE
1.) The date of its execution
was not indicated;
2.) The amount of
consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the
Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed
notary public, Alfredo de Guzman, or
the purported buyer, the Spouses
Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, The Complaining Heirs insist that
were presented as witnesses. the settlement/family home and the
resort deed are void as their signatures
Concededly, the absence of
thereon are forgeries as opposed to the
notarization in the resort deed and/or
Villafrias who profess the deeds'
the lacking details in the
enforceability. After the Complaining
settlement/family home deed did not
Heirs presented proofs in support of
necessarily invalidate the transactions
their claim that their signatures were
evidenced by the said documents.
forged, the burden then fell upon the
However, since the said deeds are
Villafrias to disprove the same, or
private documents, perforce, their
conversely, to prove the authenticity
due execution and authenticity
and due execution of the said deeds.
becomes subject to the requirement
The Villafrias failed in this regard.
of proof under the Rules on
Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of As aforestated, the Villafrias
which provides: did not present as witnesses (a) the
Sec. 20. Proof of notary public who purportedly
private document. — notarized the questioned instrument,
(b) the witnesses who appear[ed] in
Before any private
the instruments as eyewitnesses to
document offered as
the signing, or (c) an expert to prove
authentic is received in
the authenticity and genuineness of
evidence, its due
all the signatures appearing on the
execution and authenticity
said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
must be proved either:
proper foundation must be laid for
(a) By anyone who the admission of documentary
saw the document evidence; that is, the identity and
executed or written; or authenticity of the document must be
(b) By evidence of reasonably established as a pre-
the genuineness of the requisite to its admission, was
signature or handwriting of prudently observed by the lower
the maker. court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the
 resort deeds as their veracity are
doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son
Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 24, 2006 raising the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no
settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the
nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the
number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court
ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of
Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed
was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant
action is really one for settlement of intestate estate,
the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction,
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues
of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that
said ruling is void and has no effect for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied by the
appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20,
2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for
submitting a verification of the petition, a certificate of
non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that
failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's
identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September
26, 2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling
reason to warrant a modification of the previous
denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became
final and executory on October 31, 2007 as certified
by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court. 20
On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied
petitioner's motion for leave to admit a second motion
for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007
Resolution, considering that the same is a prohibited
pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner's
letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to
take a second look at his petition for review
on certiorari and that a decision thereon be rendered
based purely on its merits was noted without
action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated
March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case
be rendered based on the merits and not on formal
requirements "as he stands to lose everything his
parents had left him just because the verification
against non-forum shopping is formally defective."
However, in view of the Entry of Judgment having
been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise
noted said letter without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an
Order issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its October
1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions
disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed,
on February 11, 2009, a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and Order before the CA assailing the
October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November
27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In its Decision dated
March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the
petition and affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the
following wise:
Although the assailed Decision
of the Court a quo has already
become final and executory and in
fact entry of judgment was issued on
31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless,
to put the issues to rest, We deem it
apropos to tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the
assailed Decision and Order of the
Court a quo, supra, should be annulled
and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated
above provides that the annulment of a
judgment may "be based only on
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of
Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal
stressed that:
There is extrinsic
fraud when "the
unsuccessful party had
been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping
him away from court, . . .
or where the defendant
never had knowledge of
the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff; . . ."
Otherwise put, extrinsic or
collateral fraud pertains to such fraud
which prevents the aggrieved party from
having a trial or presenting his case to
the court, or is used to procure the
judgment without fair submission of the
controversy. This refers to acts intended
to keep the unsuccessful party away
from the courts as when there is a false
promise of compromise or when one is
kept in ignorance of the suit.
The pivotal issues before Us
are: (1) whether there was a time
during the proceedings below that
the Petitioners ever prevented from
exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or
deception, practiced on them by
Respondents, and (2) whether the
Petitioners were kept away from the
court or kept in ignorance by the acts
of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort.
Instead, what We deduced as We
carefully delved into the evidentiary
facts surrounding the instant case as
well as the proceedings below as
shown in the 36-page Decision of the
Court a quo, is that the Petitioners
were given ample time to rebut the
allegations of the Respondents and
had in fact addressed every detail of
Respondent's cause of action against
them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of
the Court a quo's lack of jurisdiction
is misplaced. HEITAD
Our pronouncement on the
matter finds support in the explicit ruling
of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et
al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus:
It is elementary
that the active
participation of a party in
a case pending against
him before a court is
tantamount to
recognition of that
court's jurisdiction and
willingness to abide by
the resolution of the
case which will bar said
party from later on
impugning the court's
jurisdiction.
In fine, under the circumstances
obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a
quo's lack of jurisdiction.
Too, We do not find merit in the
Petitioners' second issue, supra.
As mentioned earlier, entry of
judgment had already been made on the
assailed Decision and Order as early as
31 October 2007.
xxx xxx xxx
It maybe that the doctrine of
finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition
for annulment. But the rules are
clear. The annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil actions of the
Regional Trial Courts is resorted to
only where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of
the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance
to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the
Supreme Court, that is their own look
out. The High Tribunal has emphatically
pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security
Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost
repeated to satiety is that
 "an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is
not a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal." A
party must have first
availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a
petition for relief before
an action for annulment
can prosper. Its obvious
rationale is to prevent
the party from benefiting
from his inaction or
negligence. Also, the
action for annulment of
judgment must be based
either on (a) extrinsic
fraud or (b) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of
due process. Having
failed to avail of the
remedies and there
being a clear showing
that neither of the
grounds was present,
the petition must be
dismissed. Only a annulment of title and recovery of possession are
disgruntled litigant
would find such legal
disposition
unacceptable. 23
When the appellate court denied Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated
April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the
following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL
PROCEEDING FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO
RIÑOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR
ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE
HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE
PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed
by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition
with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession,"
the allegations therein show that the cause of action
is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent
Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a
special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of
limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with
ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general
jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its
probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition
found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil
actions and ordinary civil actions. 25Thus, petitioner
argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio,
no effect for having been rendered in without Angelito, Lorna all surnamed Riñoza,
jurisdiction. and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R.
Rogador, Epifanio Belo and Ma.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised
Theresa R. Demafelix are the
before the appellate court that since the finding of
decedent's legitimate children with his
forgery relates only to the signature of respondents
first wife, while Benita Tenorio Riñoza, is
and not to their co-heirs who assented to the
the decedent's widow and Bernadette
conveyance, the transaction should be considered
Riñoza, the decedent's daughter with
valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the findings of
said widow. As such, said parties are
the courts below that his parents are builders in bad
co-owners by virtue of an intestate
faith for they only took possession of the subject
inheritance from the decedent, of the
properties after the execution of the transfer
properties enumerated in the
documents and after they paid the consideration on
succeeding paragraph; ATICcS
the sale.
3. That the decedent left the
The petition is bereft of merit.
following real properties all located in
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' Nasugbu, Batangas:
complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
xxx xxx xxx
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not
of judicial partition: 16. That the estate of decedent
Pedro L. Riñoza has no known legal
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
indebtedness;
1. That Pedro L. Riñoza, Filipino
17. That said estate remains
and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at
undivided up to this date and it will be
the time of his death, died intestate on
to the best interest of all heirs that same
November 16, 1989. Copy of his death
be partitioned judicially. 26
certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A"; Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of
respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
2. That Plaintiffs together with
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his
the Defendants enumerated from
known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only
interests thereon, may fall under an action for
known heirs of the above-mentioned
settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of
decedent. The plaintiffs and the
the complaint would readily show that, based on the
nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the
reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
Court provides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. — If the
decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial
or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate
to himself the entire estate by means of
an affidavit filled in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an
extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a
pending action for partition, or the sole
heir who adjudicates the entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit shall
file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the
public instrument, or stipulation in the
action for partition, or of the affidavit in
the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in
of
an amount equivalent to the value of the
personal property involved as certified to
under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any
just claim that may be filed under
section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the
next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice
thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for
partition of real estate. — A person
having the right to compel the partition
of real estate may do so as provided in
this Rule, setting forth in his
 complaint the nature and extent of
his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants
all other persons interested in the
property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing
provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a
complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the
complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2)
that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all
of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs
enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4)
that there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no
known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as
rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for the
partition of the same in accordance with the laws of
intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the
allegations of the complaint, the case is one for
judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of
action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties
of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that
when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so named
is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish
the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and
the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this
rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of
Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no
will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the
estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for
partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. 30 The reason is that
where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for them and to
deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the
complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending
obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit
the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of
Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if
they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Section 1 allows the
 heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition,
the said provision does not compel them
to do so if they have good reasons to
take a different course of action. It
should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts is sanctioned only if
the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for
partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without
good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly
held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property
to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply
for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has
been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing
an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is
expressly permitted by law. That the complaint
contained allegations inherent in an action for
settlement of estate does not mean that there was a
prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as
to the estate's properties as well as a determination of
the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and
extent of their titles to the estate, may also be
properly ventilated in partition proceedings
alone. 34 In fact, a complete inventory of the estate
may likewise be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no
debts. 35 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy
of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not
be compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties
being dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint
also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession does not strip the trial court off of its
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for
the annulment of certain transfers of property could
very well be achieved in an action for partition, 37 as
can be seen in cases where courts determine the
parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only
for the partition of estates but also for the annulment
of titles and recovery of ownership and possession of
property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v.
Bagayas, 39 wherein a complaint for annulment of
sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due
to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it
constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title
of the respondents therein, this Court found the
dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
 In Lacbayan v. Samoy,
Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for
partition premised on the existence
or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court
categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership
does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack. It must be borne in
mind that what cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. As pronounced
in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute
that a Torrens certificate of
title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is
not material to the case at
bar. What cannot he
collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and
not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is
that document issued by
the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title
referred to by law means
ownership which is,
more often than not,
represented by that
document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title
with the certificate of title.
Title as a concept of
ownership should not be
confused with the
certificate of title as
evidence of such
ownership although both
are interchangeably used.
(Emphases
supplied) TIADCc
Thus, the RTC erroneously
dismissed petitioner's petition for
annulment of sale on the ground that
it constituted a collateral attack since
she was actually assailing Rogelio
and Orlando's title to the subject
lands and not any Torrens certificate
of title over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not
preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In
fact, the determination as to the existence of the
same is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition
and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists, and
a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase
 may end with a declaration that plaintiff
is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the
premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in
order. . . .
The second phase commences
when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event[,]
partition shall be done for the parties by
the [c]ourt with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This
second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity
to be heard thereon, and an award for
the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the
rents and profits of the real estate in
question. . . . . 41
An action for partition, therefore, is premised
on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. 42 Unless and until the issue of
co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument
that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly
erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one
for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section
1 44 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691), 45 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of
ownership but also for annulment of title and
documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence,
considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction
in rendering its decision, the instant petition for
annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for
annulment of title alone, without the prayer for judicial
partition, the requirement of instituting a separate
special proceeding for the determination of the status
and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may
be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and had already presented evidence regarding the
issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent,
believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal's estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxx xxx xxx
It appearing, however, that in
the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances
of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not
only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case — subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances
of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject
Portugal's estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of
petitioners' status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial, . . .
. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents'
complaint and the causes of action alleged therein, as
well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at its
decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity
to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be
permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the
judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat,
the action filed herein is one for judicial partition and
not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently,
that respondents also prayed for the annulment of title
and recovery of possession in the same proceeding
does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking
for the annulment of certain transfers of property
could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must
be considered valid as to the heirs who assented to
the conveyance as well as their allegation of good
faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason
to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As
sufficiently found by both courts below, the
authenticity and due execution of the documents on
which petitioner's claims are based were inadequately
proven. They were undated, forged, and
acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were
executed. They were never presented to the Register
of Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed
notaries and buyers of the subject properties
presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the
co-heirs to the estate, actually acknowledged the sale
of the resort, the circumstances surrounding the same
militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only
was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita
undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the document
she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of
her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale
but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita
from a bank. AIDSTE
Moreover, credence must be given on the
appellate court's observations as to petitioners'
actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein
are concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain
as to the number and/or identity of the properties
bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the
impression that they bought both the resort and the
family home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria
claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was
only then that they presented the subject Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other
document which would evidence their actual payment
of consideration to the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite
of the blatant legal infirmities of the subject
documents of conveyance, petitioners still took
possession of the properties, demolished several
cottages, and introduced permanent improvements
thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court
that petitioners failed to adequately substantiate, with
convincing, credible and independently verifiable
proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the
subject properties. The circumstances surrounding
the purported transfers cast doubt on whether they
actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial
Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to
prove their authenticity and due execution. They
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim absolute
ownership of the subject lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent
purchasers for value and builders in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land
the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's
title. 52 However, in view of the manifest defects in
the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners
should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still
demolished several cottages and constructed
improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of
good faith cannot be given credence.
 Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality ||| (Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524 , [August
becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no 5, 2015])
longer be modified in any respect except to correct
clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the
parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. 53 It
is a fundamental principle in our judicial system and
essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to
the immutability of final judgment are allowed only
under the most extraordinary of
circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is given more
than ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access
to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence
presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the
Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the
courts below in the absence of any showing that the
same were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009,
respectively, of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October
1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar
as it concerns the resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 51354 and No. 51355, and
family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. P-01-1448. June 25, 2013.]
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO
C. SABIDONG, complainant, vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court
IV), respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
The present administrative case stemmed from a
sworn letter-complaint 1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before
this Court by Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant)
charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court
IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with
grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression
and abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainant's mother, is one of
the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as
Lot 11 (Lot 1280-D-4-11 of consolidation-subdivision plan
[LRC] Pcs-483) originally registered in the name of C. N.
Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro,
Iloilo City. 2 The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half
portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as
the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio.
Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the
Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the
MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Natividad in her
capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff
vs. Priscila Saplagio, defendant"). On May 31, 1983, a
decision was rendered in said case ordering the
defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11
leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due,
attorney's fees, expenses and costs. 3 At the time,
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3,
Iloilo City. HCTEDa
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted
an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a
letter dated January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the
Hodges Estate rejected respondent's offer in view of an
application to purchase already filed by the actual
occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate
Court to give priority to the actual occupants in awarding
approval of Offers". While the check for initial down
payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he
was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to
purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient
down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it
for approval of the Probate Court so that the property can
be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of
the priority given to them." 4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent
again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area
of 234 square meters for the amount of P35,100. Under
the Order dated November 18, 1986 issued by the
probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in
Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the
Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad,
Administratrix"), respondent's Offer to Purchase Lot 11
was approved upon the court's observation that the
occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their
desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this
date and considering time restraint and considering
further, that the sales in favor of the . . . offerors are most
beneficial to the estate . . .". On January 21, 1987, the
probate court issued another Order granting respondent's
motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor.
The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued
on June 27, 1989. 5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between
respondent and the Hodges Estate represented by its
Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby
conveyed to respondent on installment for the total
purchase price of P50,000. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the name of C.
N. Hodges was cancelled and a new certificate of title,
TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued
on December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later subdivided into
two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the corresponding
titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also in the
name of respondent, were issued on February 28,
1997. 6 TEAaDC
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of
the Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued on
March 3, 1998 by the probate court in favor of
respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot
11. 7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn
letter-complaint asserting that as court employee
respondent cannot buy property in litigation
(consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of
authority. Complainant specifically alleged the following:
3. Complainant and his siblings,
are possessors and occupants of a parcel
of land situated at Brgy. San Vicente,
Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No.
1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and
subdivided and became known as Lot 11,
then registered and titled in the name of
Charles Newton Hodges.
The Sabidong family started occupying
this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly
rentals until sometime in 1979 when the
Estate of Hodges stopped accepting
rentals. . . .
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987
that the property over which their house is
standing, was being offered for sale by
the Estate, the mother of complainant,
TRINIDAD CLAVERIOSABIDONG (now
deceased), took interest in buying said
property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD
CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an
ordinary housekeeper and
laundrywoman, who never received any
formal education, and did not even know
how to read and write. When Trinidad
Claverio Sabidong, together with her
children and the complainant in this case,
tried to negotiate with the Estate for the
sale of the subject property, they were
informed that all papers for transaction
must pass through the respondent in this
case, Nicolasito Solas. This is unusual, so
they made inquiries and they learned that,
Nicolasito Solas was then the Clerk of
Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Iloilo City and presently, the City
Sheriff of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito
Solas, then Clerk of Court III, MTCC, Iloilo
City, has knowledge, by reason of his
position that in 1983 Hodges Estate was
ejecting occupants of its land. . . . Taking
advantage of this inside information that
the land subject of an ejectment case in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo
City, whom respondent is a Clerk of Court
III, the respondent surreptitiously offered
to buy the said lot in litigation. . .
. DCATHS
7. Complainant nor any member of
his family did not know that as early as
1984, the respondent had offered to
purchase the subject lot from the estate . .
. . After receiving the notice of denial of
a
his offer to purchase, dated January 7,
1986, respondent made a second offer to
purchase the subject property the
following day, January 8, 1986, knowing
fully well that the subject property was
being occupied. . . .
8. Because of this denial,
respondent met with the family of the
complainant and negotiated for the sale of
the property and transfer of the title in
favor of the latter. Respondent made the
complainant and his family believed that
he is the representative of the estate and
that he needed a downpayment right
away. All the while, the Sabidong family
(who were carpenters, laundrywomen, a
janitor, persons who belong to the
underprivileged) relied on the
representations of the respondent that he
was authorized to facilitate the sale, with
more reason that respondent represented
himself as the City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a
sister of the complainant who was
fortunate to have worked abroad, sent the
amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos to complainant's mother, to be
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. . . .
After receiving the money, respondent
assured the Sabidong family that they will
not be ejected from the lot, he being the
City Sheriff will take care of everything,
and taking advantage of the illiteracy of
Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not
issue any receipt; CTAIDE
10. True enough, they were not
ejected instead it took the respondent
some time to see them again and
demanded additional payment. In the
meanwhile, the complainant waited for the
papers of the supposed sale and transfer
of title, which respondent had promised
after receiving the downpayment of
P10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995,
respondent again received from the
mother of complainant the amount of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly
for the expenses of the documentation of
sale and transfer of title, and again
respondent promised that
the Sabidong family will not be ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of
the complainant and his family,
respondent was able to secure an order
for the approval of his offer to purchase . .
. in Special Proceedings No. 1672 . . .;
13. Worse, respondent moved for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession in his
favor, which the probate court acted
favorably . . . . A writ of possession was
issued on June 27, 1989 . . .;
14. . . . respondent took advantage
of the trust and confidence which
the Sabidong family has shown,
considering that respondent was an
officer of the court and a City Sheriff at
that. The complainant and his family
thought that respondent, being a City
Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of
the title in their favor. Never had they ever
imagined that while respondent had been
receiving from them hard-earned monies
purportedly for the sale of the subject
property, respondent was also exercising
acts of ownership adverse to the interest
of the complainant and his family;
15. Being an officer of the court
and supposed to be an embodiment of
fairness and justice, respondent acted
with malice, with grave abuse of
confidence and deceit when he
represented that he can facilitate the sale
and titling of the subject property in favor
of the complainant and his
family; TCADEc
16. That when several thousands
of pesos were given to the respondent as
payment for the same and incidental
expenses relative thereto, he was able to
cause the transfer of the title in his favor. .
. .;
17. After the death of Trinidad
Claverio Sabidong . . . the respondent
received from the complainant the amount
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos . . .
When a receipt was demanded,
respondent refused to issue one, and
instead promised and assured the
complainant that they will not be ejected;
xxx xxx xxx
19. The complainant again, through
his sister-in-law, Socorro Sabidong,
delivered and gave to the respondent the
amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos as expenses for the subdivision of
the subject lot. The respondent facilitated
the subdivision and after the same was
approved, the complainant did not know
that two (2) titles were issued in the name
of the respondent. . . .;
20. Meanwhile, respondent
prepared a Contract to Sell, for the
complainant and his neighbor Norberto
Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant
to their previous agreement for the buyers
to avail of a housing loan with the Home
Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG).
Complainant attended the seminar of the
HDMF for seven (7) times, in his desire to
consummate the sale. However, when the
complainant affixed his signature in the
contract, he was surprised that the owner
of the subject property was the
respondent. When complainant raised a
question about this, respondent assured
complainant that everything was alright
and that sooner complainant will be the
owner of the property. Complainant and
his family, all these years, had believed
and continued to believe that the owner
was the estate of Hodges and that
respondent was only the representative of
the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared
to have been notarized on June 3, 1996,
however, no copy thereof was given to the
complainant by the respondent.
Respondent then, took the papers and
documents required by the HDMF to be
completed, from the complainant allegedly
for the purpose of personally filing the
same with the HDMF. Complainant freely
and voluntarily delivered all pertinent
documents to the respondent, thinking
that respondent was helping in the fast
and easy release of the loan. While the
said documents were in the possession of
the respondent, he never made any
transaction with the HDMF, worse, when
complainant tried to secure a copy of the
Contract to Sell, the copy given was not
signed by the Notary Public, . . .;
 22. The complainant [was] shocked
to learn that respondent had canceled the
sale and that respondent refused to return
the documents required by the HDMF.
Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he
can cause the demolition of the house of
the complainant and of his family.
Respondent threatened the complainant
and he is capable of pursuing a demolition
order and serve the same with the
assistance of the military. . . .; TICDSc
23. After learning of the demolition
[order], complainant attempted to settle
the matter with the respondent, however,
the same proved futile as respondent
boasted that the property would now cost
at Four Thousand Five Hundred
(P4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is
imminent. Clearly, complainant and his
family were duped by the respondent and
are helpless victims of an officer of the
court who took advantage of their good
faith and trust. Complainant later was
informed that the subject property was
awarded to the respondent as his Sheriff's
Fees, considering that respondent
executed the decisions in ejectment cases
filed by the Hodges estate against the
adverse occupants of its vast properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment
of Title of the respondent over the subject
property is pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 and a
criminal complaint for Estafa is also
pending preliminary investigation before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo
City, known as I.S. No. 1559-99, both filed
[by] the complainant against the
respondent. 8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement 9 dated
July 8, 1999, requiring respondent to file his comment on
the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999,
respondent submitted his Comment. 10
In a Resolution 11 dated July 19, 1999, Public
Prosecutor Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa
charge against respondent for insufficiency of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator
Benipayo issued an Evaluation and
Recommendation 12 finding respondent guilty of violating
Article 1491 13 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the
purchase by certain court officers of property and rights
in litigation within their jurisdiction. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended that:
1. this administrative complaint be
treated as an administrative
matter; DCcSHE
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas,
Clerk of Court IV, OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City
be SUSPENDED for six (6) months, with
warning that a repetition of the same
 offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual
issues regarding the delivery of
substantial amounts which complainant
alleged and which defendant denied, this
issue should be investigated and the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City should be designated
to hear the evidence and to make a report
and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt. 14
In a Resolution 15 dated January 22, 2001, this
Court adopted the recommendation of the Court
Administrator to treat the present administrative action as
a regular administrative matter and to designate the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City to hear the
evidence of the parties. The Court, however, noted
without action the Court Administrator's recommendation
to suspend respondent for six months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepaño forwarded the records of this case to
Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City
RTC. 16 In a Resolution 17 dated July 18, 2001, the
Court referred this case to the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Iloilo City for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from notice. By
Order 18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge
Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37,
dismissed the case for annulment of title, damages and
injunction against respondent for lack of
merit. 19 aDcHIC
In a Resolution 20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court
resolved to reassign the instant administrative case to
Executive Judge Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report
and recommendation within 60 days from notice. In a
Letter 21 dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge
Hortillo informed the Court that per the records, the
parties have presented their testimonial and documentary
evidence before retired Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo
required the parties to file their respective memoranda
within 60 days from notice, upon submission of which the
case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 22
In his Memorandum, 23 respondent maintained
that his purchase of the subject land is not covered by
the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil
Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade
after the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the
ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and
Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that
public trust was observed when complainant was
accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of Lot
11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting
that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent
cited the dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment
of title and damages which complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily
retired from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño,
requesting for the release of his retirement benefits
pending resolution of the administrative cases against
him. 24 In a Memorandum 25 dated September 24, 2007,
Senior Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño made the
following recommendations:
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas,
former Clerk of Court, MTCC, Iloilo
City for partial release of his
retirement benefits be GRANTED;
and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial
Management Office, Office of the
Court Administrator
be DIRECTED to
(1) WITHHOLD the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) from the retirement
benefits of Nicolasito S. Solas to
answer for any administrative
liability that the Court may find
against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448
(Formerly Administrative Matter
OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI
No. 99-659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-
P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P; and
(2) RELEASE the balance of his
retirement benefits. 26 HCEISc
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger
B. Patricio, the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City
RTC for investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his
final Report and Recommendation 27 finding respondent
liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty under A.M.
No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. Based on the evidence presented, Judge
Patricio concluded that respondent misappropriated the
money which he received for the filing of complainant's
loan application. Such money could not have been used
for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-11 since the same
was already subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when
respondent presented the Contract to Sell to
complainant. And despite respondent's promise to keep
complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the
subject property, respondent caused the issuance of a
writ of demolition against them. Thus, Judge Patricio
recommended the forfeiture of respondent's salary for six
months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution 28 dated September 29, 2008, the
Court noted Judge Patricio's Investigation Report and
referred the same to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum 29 dated January 16, 2009,
then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent
liable for serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty
and recommended the forfeiture of respondent's salary
for six months, which shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits. IaHSCc
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral
acts of extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the
amounts he received from complainant and Saplagio
without due notice, respondent failed to act with justice
and equity. He found respondent's denial to be anchored
merely on the fact that he had not issued receipts which
was belied by his admission that he had asked money for
the expenses of partitioning Lot 11 from complainant and
Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan applications did not
materialize, complainant should have returned the
amounts given to him by complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a
Resolution 30 requiring the parties to manifest whether
they are willing to submit the case for decision on the
basis of the pleadings and records already filed with the
Court. However, the copy of the Resolution dated
February 11, 2009 which was sent to complainant was
returned unserved with the postal carrier's notation "RTS-
Deceased." Meanwhile, in a Compliance 31 dated August
24, 2009, respondent expressed his willingness to submit
the case for decision and prayed for an early resolution of
the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from
acquiring property involved in litigation within the
jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision
reads:
Article 1491. The following persons
cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their
profession. AIHTEa
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that
public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust
and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
these persons. 32 "In so providing, the Code tends to
prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give
occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be
done." 33
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment
of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. 34 Where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil
Code attaches. 35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased
Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31,
1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not
be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that
time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate
then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action
of the judge. 36 A property forming part of the estate
under judicial settlement continues to be subject of
litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring
the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is
that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated. 37 The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. 38 Since there is no evidence to show
that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27,
had already been closed and terminated at the time of
the execution of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code. DTAaCE
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot
11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC)
and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find
him liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must
be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and
not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer's official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of
the office. 39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle;
and lack of fairness and straightforwardness." 40
In this case, respondent deceived complainant's
family who were led to believe that he is the legal
representative of the Hodges Estate, or at least
possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying
occupants of the estate's properties like complainant.
Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at
that, complainant's family completely relied on his
repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the
premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying
was for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through
respondent, complainant's family readily gave the
amounts he demanded and, along with Saplagio,
complied with the requirements for a loan application with
PAG-IBIG. All the while and unknown to complainant's
family, respondent was actually working to acquire Lot 11
for himself. DcAEIS
 Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the
Hodges Estate for the sale of the property to him, he
collected as down payment P5,000 from complainant's
family in July 1986. Four months later, on November 18,
1986, the probate court approved respondent's offer to
purchase Lot 11. The latter received further down
payment from complainant in the amount of P10,000
between 1992 and 1993, or before the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage 41 dated November 21, 1994 could be
executed in respondent's favor.
Thereafter, respondent demanded P3,000 from
complainant supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11
between the latter and the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until
respondent obtained title over said lot that the same was
subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B. The records 42 of
the case show that the Subdivision Plan dated April 25,
1996, duly approved by the Land Management Services
(DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-B,
was inscribed on February 28, 1997 — two years after
TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in
respondent's name on December 5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount
of P2,000 to defray the expenses for documentation and
transfer of title in complainant's name. In the latter
instance, while it may be argued that respondent already
had the capacity to sell the subject property, the sum of
all the circumstances belie an honest intention on his part
to convey Lot 11-A to complainant. We note the
inscription in TCT No. T-11836 43 in the name of C.N.
Hodges that respondent executed a Request dated
February 19, 1997 "for the issuance of separate titles in
the name of the registered owner." 44Soon after, TCT
No. T-116467 45 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-
116468 46 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the name of
respondent on February 28, 1997 — only eight months
after he executed the Contract to Sell 47 in favor of
complainant on June 3, 1996. aESHDA
Respondent's bare denials were correctly
disregarded by the Court Administrator in the light of his
own admission that he indeed asked money from both
complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record
clearly established that by misrepresenting himself as the
estate's representative and as a court officer having the
power to protect complainant's family from eviction,
respondent was able to collect sums totaling P20,000
from complainant's family. Even after the latter realized
they were duped since respondent was already the
owner of Lot 11, they still offered to buy the property from
him. Respondent, however, changed his mind and no
longer wanted to sell the property after nothing happened
to the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio.
This subsequent unilateral cancellation by respondent of
the contract to sell with complainant may have been an
afterthought, and plainly unjustified, based merely on his
own assumption that complainant could not make full
payment. But it did not negate the deception and
fraudulent acts perpetrated against complainant's family
who were forced into submission by the constant threat
of eviction. Such acts constitute grave misconduct for
which respondent should be held answerable. TaHDAS
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro
Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC
Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server,
RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court
stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary,
court personnel must comply with just contractual
obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. In that case, we said that court employees are
expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and
honesty not only in their official conduct but also in their
personal dealings, including business and commercial
transactions to avoid becoming the court's albatross of
infamy. 49
More importantly, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No.
6713 50 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public
officials and employees shall remain true to the people at
all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and
shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect
the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
Under Section 52, 51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty
and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses
with the corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first
offense. Section 58 (a) states that the penalty of
dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government
service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating
circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense should be considered in the determination of the
penalty to be imposed on the erring government
employee. However, no such mitigating circumstance
had been shown. On the contrary, respondent had been
previously held administratively liable for irregularities in
the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. In A.M.
No. P-01-1484, 52 this Court imposed on respondent a
fine of P5,000 for acting imprudently in notarizing
documents and administering oath on matters alien to his
official duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly OCA
IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No.
99-753-P), 53 respondent was found liable for simple
misconduct and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his
three (3) months salary to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. ECaSIT
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from
service on September 10, 2007, for this additional
administrative case he should be fined in an amount
equivalent to his salary for six months which shall
likewise be deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent
Nicolasito S. Solas, retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE
MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY. Respondent
is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6)
months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sabidong v. Solas, A.M. No. P-01-1448, [June 25,
2013], 712 PHIL 1-22)
 [G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]

THELMA
M. ARANAS, petitioner,vs.TERESITA V.
MERCADO,FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
 TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The probate court is authorized to determine the
issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted
by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of
the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse. HSDCTA
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on
January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita),and their five children,
namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V.Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his
first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson).He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of
Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu
(Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's
estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB). 1 The RTC
granted the petition considering that there was no
opposition. The letters of administration in favor of
Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an
inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992
for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She
indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death,
Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash
of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of
stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P22,708.25. 2 cEAIHa
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties
that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved
that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and
to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
 On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance
with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the
deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty
shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on
January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00. 6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to
require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days
within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on
the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had
submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order
expressing the need for the parties to present evidence
and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to
resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. 7
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval
of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine
Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what
properties should be included in or excluded from the
inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that
issue. 8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight
years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order
finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included,
and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing premises and considerations,
the Court hereby denies the
administratrix's motion for approval of
inventory. The Court hereby orders the
said administratrix to re-do the inventory
of properties which are supposed to
constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein
the properties mentioned in the last five
immediately preceding paragraphs hereof
and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this
order.
The Court also directs the said
administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to
her possession. She must render such
accounting within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof.
SO ORDERED. 9
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs
of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order
of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION
the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION)
had already come into the possession of and registered BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY
in the name of Mervir Realty. 10 Thelma opposed the OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
motion. EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for II
reconsideration, 11 stating that there was no cogent
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT
reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants'
JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of
ABUSE OF
what properties should be included or excluded from the
JURISDICTION(sic) AMOUNTING TO
inventory already estopped them from questioning its
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
IN HOLDING THAT REAL
Decision of the CA PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY
abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF)
and in ordering her as administrator to include real PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, REALTY CORPORATION) BE
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF
Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO
promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by S. MERCADO. ECTAHc
petition forcertiorari, stating: III
I THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
ABUSE OF TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION(sic) AMOUNTING TO JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED
IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL FROM QUESTIONING ITS
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON
THE LATE EMIGDIO THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES
S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
 INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO. 12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the
petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is GRANTED partially. The assailed
Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set
aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of
land known as Lot No. 3353 located at
Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301
square meters subject matter of the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989
and the various parcels of land subject
matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991
in the revised inventory to be submitted by
the administratrix is concerned
andaffirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly
filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the
RTC directing a new inventory of properties was
interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold
"shall be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and
constructive delivery," and to Article 1498 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public
instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of
the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had
transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir
Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353;
that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir
Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of
saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the
Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional
seven (7) parcels of land were included";that as to the
January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had
been "even at the losing end considering that such
parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given
monetary consideration through shares of stock";that
even if the assignment had been based on the deed of
assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land
could not be included in the inventory "considering that
there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate
planning scheme";that the RTC, as an intestate court,
also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property registered in the name of
third persons or corporation; that a property covered by
the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of
law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and
that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding
that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the
RTC the issue of which properties should be included in
the inventory. HCATEa
The CA further opined as follows:
 In the instant case, public Besides, public respondent court
respondent court erred when it ruled that acting as a probate court had no authority
petitioners are estopped from questioning to determine the applicability of the
its jurisdiction considering that they have doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
already agreed to submit themselves to its fiction and even if public respondent court
jurisdiction of determining what properties was not merely acting in a limited capacity
are to be included in or excluded from the as a probate court, private respondent
inventory to be submitted by the nonetheless failed to adjudge competent
administratrix, because actually, a reading evidence that would have justified the
of petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
dated March 26, 2001 filed before public because to disregard the separate
respondent court clearly shows that jurisdictional personality of a corporation,
petitioners are not questioning its the wrongdoing must be clearly and
jurisdiction but the manner in which it was convincingly established since it cannot
exercised for which they are not be presumed. 14
estopped, since that is their right,
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion
considering that there is grave abuse of
for reconsideration of Teresita, et al. 15
discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of limited jurisdiction when it issued the Issue
assailed Order dated March 14, 2001
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC
denying the administratrix's motion for
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
approval of the inventory of properties
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
which were already titled and in
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
possession of a third person that is,
properties had been either transferred by sale or
Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
corporation, which under the law
decedent during his lifetime?
possessed a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders, and in the Ruling of the Court
absence of any cogency to shred the veil The appeal is meritorious.
of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of I
Mervir Realty Corporation should stand Was certiorari the proper recourse
undisturbed. to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
 The first issue to be resolved is procedural.
Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita
and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma's contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action
for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in
nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as
follows:
The distinction between a final
order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order
or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12,
2002, which granted the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should
not be the subject of an appeal. The
reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity
of appeals in a single action, which
necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the
trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will
compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the
parties may interpose as many appeals as
there are incidental questions raised by
him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of
an appeal, but only after a judgment has
been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an
interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Then
 is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to. TCASIH
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying
Teresita's motion for the approval of the inventory and
the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for
reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the
approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject
to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals, 17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA
to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding
certain real properties from the inventory was
interlocutory and could be changed or modified at
anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a
final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not
settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village
lots." The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the
parties (3 Moran's Comments on
theRules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages
448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of
Appeals, 19 where the Court declared that a "probate
court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can
only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,that the
"patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction
and the principle that questions of title or ownership,
which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a separate action."
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals, 20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as
regards the said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to
the ownership, then the opposing
parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court
cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the
correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the
first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court, 21 which also governs appeals in special
proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final
orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be
the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule
states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters,
or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special
proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility
that material issues may be finally determined at various
stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special
proceedings, viz.:
Section 1. Orders or judgments
from which appeals may be taken. — An
interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment
rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful
heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or
in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented
on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;
(d) Settles the account of an
executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of
a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator;
and
(f) Is the final order or judgment
rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing,
unless it be an order granting or denying a
motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being
interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in
which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including
properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having
been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his
lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the
properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by
applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to
find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the
law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed
orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6 (a),Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct
the preparation and submission of the inventory of the
properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit
the inventory within three months from the issuance of
letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal
to be returned within three months. —
Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court
a true inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance. THacES
The usage of the word all in Section
1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory. 22 However, the word all is qualified by the
phrasewhich has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or
are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies
that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their
being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
"to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate." 23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion
on the question of what properties should be included in
the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, 24 the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of
the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be
included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
"positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of
the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy
ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts
should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action
taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion." 25 As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular performance of
its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial
court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial
court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third
parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered
by the administrator. Such determination is provisional
and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap: 26
The general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions
of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. As held in
several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the
said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there
poses no problem, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising
general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of
title. TcHDIA
However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may
provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties
are all heirs to the estate,or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or
 the parties consent to the assumption
of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased
spouse. 27 (Italics in the original; bold
emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain
the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the
properties in question in its assailed order of March 14,
2001, viz.:
In the first place, the administratrix
of the estate admitted that
Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of
Severina Mercado who, upon her death,
left several properties as listed in the
inventory of properties submitted in Court
in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which
are supposed to be divided among her
heirs. The administratrix admitted, while
being examined in Court by the counsel
for the petitioner, that she did not include
in the inventory submitted by her in this
case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in
the said estate of Severina Mercado.
Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercado's share in the estate of
Severina Mercado should be included in
the inventory of properties required to be
submitted to the Court in this particular
case.
In the second place, the
administratrix of the estate of
Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court
that she did not include in the inventory
shares of stock of Mervir Realty
Corporation which are in her name and
which were paid by her from money
derived from the taxicab business which
she and her husband had since 1955 as a
conjugal undertaking. As these shares of
stock partake of being conjugal in
character, one-half thereof or of the value
thereof should be included in the
inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix
of the estate of
Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court
that she had a bank account in her name
at Union Bank which she opened when
her husband was still alive. Again, the
money in said bank account partakes of
being conjugal in character, and so, one-
half thereof should be included in the
inventory of the properties constituting as
estate of her husband.
 In the fourth place, it has been
established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in
Badian, Cebu containing an area of
53,301 square meters as described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu is still registered in the
name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No.
CEB-12690 which was decided on
October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be
the owner thereof. Mervir Realty
Corporation never intervened in the said
case in order to be the owner thereof.
This fact was admitted by
Richard Mercado himself when he
testified in Court. ...So the said property
located in Badian, Cebu should be
included in the inventory in this
case. AECacS
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the
assignment of several parcels of land by
the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991
by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N
for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the
administratrix) was a transfer in
contemplation of death. It was made two
days before he died on January 12, 1991.
A transfer made in contemplation of death
is one prompted by the thought that the
transferor has not long to live and made in
place of a testamentary disposition (1959
Prentice Hall, p. 3909).Section 78 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977
provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all
property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer in contemplation of
death. So, the inventory to be approved in
this case should still include the said
properties of EmigdioMercado which were
transferred by him in contemplation of
death. Besides, the said properties
actually appeared to be still registered in
the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least
ten (10) months after his death, as shown
by the certification issued by the Cebu
City Assessor's Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the
procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated
that the directive to include the properties in question in
the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus
was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by
Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in
the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the
fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal
partnership of gains. 29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdio's estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to
include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The party asserting that specific property acquired during
that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal
partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that
party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them
by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In the
absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the
conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners
of the affected properties were, 31 and which of the
properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The
portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be
included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was
already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC
made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No.
CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of
Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot
3353 was still in Emigdio's name. Indeed, the RTC noted
in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his
death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all
in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in
Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various
interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of
Emigdio could have already threshed out their
differences with the assistance of the trial court. This
interpretation was probable considering that Mervir
Realty, whose business was managed by respondent
Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President.
In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family
corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale
executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A
notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did
not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction
under the deed, and what the contents purported to be.
The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. 32 As the Court
has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: 33
....Though the notarization of the
deed of sale in question vests in its favor
the presumption of regularity, it is not the
intention nor the function of the notary
public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place,
intended to have any binding legal effect
upon the parties thereto. The intention of
the parties still and always is the
primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
 It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange
of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real
properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be
inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of
assignment two days prior to his death was a
circumstance that should put any interested party on his
guard regarding the exchange, considering that there
was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer
of the pancreas at the time. 34 In this regard, whether the
CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an
estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the
facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered
by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not
be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly
surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.
This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode
of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.
However, justice and equity demand that
the titleholder should not be made to bear
the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State's agents, in the
absence of proof of his complicity in a
fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a
stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of
registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the
Torrens system shall forever be sullied by
the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed
their duties. 35 cEAIHa
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the
subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991,
such lots should still be included in the inventory to
enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue
on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction
of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted
the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed, 36 but it does not prevent the RTC as
intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory
of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the
RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special
and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective." 37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must
be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement
to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 39
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of
"may be heard and determined by the court having
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order
unwarranted and erroneous.
of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby WHEREFORE,the Court GRANTS the petition for
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC review on certiorari;REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
as an intestate court about the matters relating to the decision promulgated on May 15,
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to
decedent. 38 proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-
CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late
The determination of which properties should be
Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay
properties was well within the authority and discretion of
the costs of suit.
the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and SO ORDERED.
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.
As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial