HOLLANDE THE HAWK?

: An Unlikely Ally Emerges

Author(s): Kenneth R. Weinstein
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 177, No. 1 (MAY / JUNE 2014), pp. 87-96
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43555067
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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK?
An Unlikely Ally Emerges

Kenneth R. Weinstein

Few world leaders in recent years have been subject to the level of
derision faced by President François Hollande of France. Even before a
Paris tabloid exposed his late-night dalliances with actress Julie Gayet -
sending Hollande's then-companion and France's now former first lady
Valérie Trierweiler to hospitalization for severe depression, and making
the improbable Lothario the primary target of comedians on both sides of
the Atlantic - Hollande was the most unpopular president in the history
of France. Since then, things have gotten worse.
An inelegant man who never served as government minister, a leader
lacking the physical presence and political stature of his predecessors,
Hollande is an accidental president who came to power as the most palat-
able replacement for the man who was to be the Socialist Party's standard
bearer in 2012: the brilliant former finance minister and IMF president
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Strauss-Rahn abruptly quit politics after being
arrested, though the charges were later dismissed, in connection with the
rape of a chambermaid at the Sofitel hotel in New York in May 2011. Hol-
lande, in fact, campaigned as an Everyman, a candidate with middle-class
tastes (he prided himself on not even owning a car) who would be a "nor-

Kenneth R. Weinstein is the president and CEO of the Hudson Institute. He is deeply
grateful to Edouard Chanot of American University for research assistance with this article.

MAY/JUNE 2014 87

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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK?

mal president" - the antithesis of incumbent Nicolas Sar

as president was partly overshadowed by the drama of h
life and numerous friendships with the ultra-wealthy.
But Hollande's governance, which was supposed to b
and efficient, has been anything but. Unemployment alm
first year he was in office, to 10.3 percent, exacerbated in
enty-five percent rate he levied on those earning more
euros a year, which encouraged France's one percent and
leave in droves for London and Geneva, and discourag
and foreign direct investment.
Yet one of the ironies of Hollande's reign is that de
personal life and anemic economic policy, the most u
president in recent history has emerged as an increas
influential figure on the international stage.
With a US administration increasingly turned inward
responding to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's use of
not to mention his massive human rights violations, Holl
among international leaders in pleading for air strikes t
the regime. He intervened in both Mali and the Central
and has taken a far tougher stand against Tehran's nucle
Washington. Under Hollande, France has, surprisingly, be
of the void created by timorous American leadership, al
maintained a close relationship with the Obama administ

As Robert Kagan argued a decade ago in Of Parad

Europe's once great powers have for years, particularly si
Berlin Wall, shifted their focus from the realm of war a
to the more local task of building the Europe Union. Yet
has been one of the founding and driving forces behind
order, Paris's approach to the unified continent has been
yielding aspects of national sovereignty to the EU, Franc
political prerogatives that allow for an energetic foreign a
France's political culture explains some of this relucta
tralized as it is, the country's governing system favors the
which directs the legislature. This system lends more
action when the executive is willing. In the realm of fore

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 Kenneth R. Weinstein

presidents can also count on a remarkably disciplined corps of ci

vants steeped in their nation's strong military and diplomatic tr
This overall arrangement gives French diplomacy a remarkable c
cy. Whereas US foreign and defense policy can dramatically chan
short period of time, as the last decade has shown, the French reg
up to encourage its diplomacy to be far less susceptible to public
Moreover, the French system propagates and encourages a rat
fied understanding of world affairs in French society. Unlike in t
States, French opinion leaders, journalists, and policy organiz
not have much influence on foreign policy: their role is circumsc
the expertise of diplomats, viewed as operating in the realm of sta
est ( raison d'état), which is of necessity detached from everyday
and necessitating secrecy. This executive-centered regime, hie
and more secretive than the American system, allows both bo
as well as cynical ones: recent history brings to mind the 1985 R
Warrior incident, in which French intelligence agents bombed a
peace vessel docked in Auckland, New Zealand, that was destined
a French nuclear test in the South Pacific, killing one environmen
Even partisans of secrecy and an energetic foreign policy adm
the French system has significant drawbacks: as a consequence of
of separation of power and public deliberation, it takes time for
change a mistaken strategic course. These factors notwithstanding
has initiated a new foreign policy direction in recent years, the
two major events. One was the 2009 eurozone crisis, which fuele
doubt about the future of Europe, thereby opening up new poss
for France. The other was Nicolas Sarkozy's election as president
which reinvigorated the transatlantic relationship.
The euro crisis, as has often been noted, is not simply an e
one, but an existential one as well. Before it struck, France's elit
cially its near-homogenous senior civil servants, were pro-Europ
guided by a near-dogmatic optimism with respect to the wide

1. Respecting, as it were, the duplicity necessitated by raison d'état, an inter

government inquiry following the bombing denied involved by French agents in t
and whitewashed President François Mitterrand of any complicity in the case.
British and French press investigations on the twentieth anniversary of the attack
clearly that Mitterrand ordered the Directorate-General for External Security, the
intelligence agency, to sink the Greenpeace boat.

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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK?

benefits to be gained from European integration. Now,

who once dismissed Euroskeptics as "Flat-Earthers" painf
acknowledge that the EU has achieved peace but not
skepticism has challenged the legitimacy of Brussels acr
and bolstered calls for a return of the nation-state - in sh
eignty. In a national referendum in 2005, France reje
"European constitution" with a majority "non" of fifty-
this before the economic crisis). The EU's ongoing inabil
the eurozone crisis has caused
an even further decline in
"One of the ironies of
support. According to a Pew
Hollande's reign is that
poll, the EU's approval rating
in France fell from sixty-five
despite his comical personal
percent to forty-five percent
life and anemic economic between 2012 and 2013. For
France's foreign policy estab-
policy, the most unpopular
lishment, the crisis became
French president in recent an opportunity to loosen the
constraints of EU cohabita-
history has emerged as an
tion with Germany.
increasingly visible and During these same years,
influential figure on the Sarkozy also did much
groundwork to reinvigorate
international stage." French foreign policy. After
his election, he rapidly gained
respect on the international stage by audaciously declaring himself a
"Atlanticist" (a charged term in French politics, used to vilify someone a
subservient to American interests) , patching up US relations damaged b
the Iraq War, and adopting a more favorable posture toward Israel. H
made diplomatic waves in July 2008, when he persuaded Vladimir Putin
to halt his attack on Georgia as Russian tanks were poised to strike the
outskirts of Tbilisi. In 2009, the Gaullist Sarkozy reversed the once-sac-
rosanct Gaullist doctrine of military independence as France rejoine
NATO's integrated military command structure. He also took a firm
position against the Iranian regime in direct opposition to the Obam
administration, pushing the US Congress in 2010 to adopt tougher sanc-
tions on Tehran than the White House desired. Late in that same year, th
"Arab Spring" began to destabilize North Africa and West Africa, regio

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 Kenneth R. Weinstein

traditionally viewed as France's non-European near abroad, and

did not hesitate to fill the void left by a hesitant American pres
2011, Sarkozy took the lead in the fight to oust Libyan strongma
mar Qaddafi, partnering with British Prime Minister David Cam
convincing a reluctant President Obama to lead from behind.
lost reelection in the spring of the following year, but Hollande,
aware of his predecessor's popularity as a likely challenger in
readily built upon the foreign policies he established.

Although the Snowden revelations did less harm in France

any other Western European country, due in part to the French
understanding of raison d'état, the French-American alliance
a sensitive one. In a country where anti-America resentment c
resurface, the French president needs to maintain some ambigui
posture toward the US. Hollande has accordingly called his st
of "friend, ally, non-aligned." Yet he also knows that the transatl
ance offers the most reliable anchor for a robust French foreign
Reinforcing Sarkozy's Atlanticist shift, economic pressures and
evolution have drawn Paris closer to Washington on this fun
point. With a costly welfare state and public deficit reaching thre
of GDP, France simply cannot afford an entirely independent
strategy. Defense Ministry white papers from 2008 and 2013 show
of France's fighting forces from a Cold War military heavy on
to a more agile one grounded in intelligence and special op
and streamlined for asymmetric conflicts. The airstrikes in Liby
the necessity of the American defense umbrella under this new
eighty percent of the logistical effort (ammunition, intellige
came from the US.

Yet other major policy decisions in recent years showcase France's ind
pendence in pursuing a more muscular international policy. Americ
commentators have been surprised by France's relatively tough line
Tehran - with Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius almost derailing the ori
nal preliminary agreement sought by the United States in early Novemb
2013 as a "sucker's deal." However, except perhaps for the undiploma
reference to the US position, this relatively tougher line was generally co
sistent with past French policy. With the exception of the Jacques Chir

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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK?

presidency, Paris has taken a hard line toward Iran sin

revolution of 1979. France openly supported Baghdad
Iraq conflict, selling Mirage jets to Saddam Hussein and
Baathist regime fighter planes to strike Iran's petroleum
force France to end its support of Iraq, Iran undertook a
paign of terror against French targets in Lebanon and ev
itself. In 1985-86, nine French journalists and diplomats
tage in Beirut by pro-Iranian forces; a series of terror att
locations in Paris killed thirteen people. In response, Fran
matic relations with Iran until the end of the war in 1988.

In 2007, in analyzing the Iranian threat, Nicolas Sarkozy argued that

the world faced two untenable alternatives, either "the Iranian bomb or
the bombing of Iran." A year later, Sarkozy declared, "It is impossible to
shake hands with [President Ahmadinejad] , who dared state that Israe
should be wiped off the map." Sarkozy and his close advisers, in fact, spoke
scornfully of the Obama administration's efforts to extend an outstretched
arm to the Iranian president. In 2011, France recalled its ambassador to
Iran in protest against an attack on the British Embassy. France has also
uniformly supported tough sanctions against the Iranian regime, voting
in favor of all six UN resolutions.

Foreign Minister Fabius's move last November in Geneva could b

largely understood as a continuation of this policy, as well as a frustrate
reaction to months of direct negotiations between Iran and the US held
without French knowledge. Because of French criticism, the final interim
agreement, though massively flawed in the eyes of leading French dipl
mats, was significantly stronger than the original sought by US Secretary of
State John Kerry. The heart of French objections to the original deal w
the fate of the small heavy water reactor at Arak, which, when complete
could produce enough enriched plutonium as a by-product for a bomb;
the preliminary agreement signed in Geneva on November 24, 2013, wi
the P5+1 nations (the five permanent members of the Security Coun
plus Germany) , the Iranians agreed to halt further progress on the reacto

If its public rhetoric and foreign policies vis-à-vis Iran offer insight
into the hard-nosed side of French diplomacy, the country's military inte
ventions in Africa offer insight into its willingness to exert its hard power.

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 Kenneth R. Weinstein

Hollande 's decisions to intervene militarily in Mali and in

African Republic follow France's longstanding grand strategy
the role France plays in helping maintain order, especially in
more volatile parts of Africa.
Currently, the US Africa Command, headquartered in Stut
many, has only five thousand troops - less than half the force
on the continent.2 The French military takes special pride in it
with African terrain, nations, cultures, and traditions, and whe
France can rapidly dispatch troops to the continent. Françafríq
unique mix of military, economic, cultural, and political coop
her former colonies and sometimes unsavory governments, cri
ly by intellectuals and activists opposed to "neo-colonialism" -
bit in the five decades since decolonization but never disappea
economic, political, and humanitarian concerns, especially reg
roughly two hundred thousand French citizens currendy resid
ca, are significant. Although Hollande criticized Françafríque
presidential campaign, he has remained loyal to its tenets, in
the increase in violence in Africa left him no choice.

In Mali, for instance, the situation had been deteriorating rapid

since early 2012. Armed with weapons from Libya, two thousand jihadi
from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement
Unity and Jihad in West Africa, or Mujwa, a rival jihadist group, for
an alliance with the Salafist group Ansar Dine, and sought to bui
safe haven in Azawad, the desert in the north of Mali. From May 201
January 2013, different intervention options were considered to prev
the creation of an independent state of Azawad. At first, Hollande wa
ed African militaries to handle the initiative, with the backing of Fren
aerial support. In December 2012, UN Security Council Resolution 2
authorized an international force under African command to be formed

and deployed to Mali. But in January, the jihadists began an offensive

threatened Bamako, the capital, and Hollande soon after ordered
French army to intervene on January 11th. Led by special forces, a Fre

2. France can count on "temporary" forces in Ivory Coast (four hundred and fifty milita
personnel) , Mali (twenty-eight hundred) , Central African Republic (twenty-one hundred
Chad (nine hundred), and the Guinea Gulf (nine hundred), and "permanent" force
Gabon (nine hundred and fifty), Djibouti (two thousand), Senegal (three hundred
fifty), and Mayotte-La Réunion, a French overseas dominion (eighteen hundred).

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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK?

marine brigade of six hundred men advanced five hundred

days to reach Timbuktu, the main city in the Azawad, wh
jihadist control, while two hundred and fifty French Foreig
troopers built a bridgehead.
All told, between January and March, four thousand Fr
were deployed to Mali. (US support for the French mission
form of aerial refueling and planes to transport allied soldi
African nations, notably Chad and Togo, was critical to th
the beginning of March, the leader of AQIM, Abdelham
was killed in a bombing and, by the end of the month
hundred troops from France and neighboring Chad trac
jihadists in their sanctuary, the Adrar des Ifoghas, the nor
tainous region of Mali immediately south of Algeria. In in
one hundred and thirty jihadists were killed - as well as th
diers from Chad and six from France. A jihadist insurgenc
earlier looked as if it would come to control much of
beaten and dispersed. Sixty-two hundred UN soldiers we
the country in April. A cease-fire agreement was signed in
presidential elections were held in July.
Despite such success, however, Hollande 's policy in F
Africa has not always been forward-leaning. In March 2013
in Mali simmered, he initially refused a request by Pre
Bozizé of the Central African Republic (CAR) for help agai
Seleka militia coalition. Hollande 's hesitation proved costly
dia, the Seleka leader, drove Bozizé from power. In the fol
Seleka militias attacked churches and Christian commun
began fleeing the country as chaos spread under the threa
In early December, UN Security Council Resolution 2127
African-led mission in the country, with French support. F
specialists had already been on the ground for a month, pr
arrival of troops deployed the very day the UN authorized
that month, the US began to provide support to transport
from Burundi to take part in the French-led effort.
Hollande has essentially risked being accused of neo-c
the sake of preventing another mass slaughter in central A
the results have been mixed. In just forty-eight hours of
December 7-8, 2013, twelve hundred French marines se
ital, Bangui. Their mission was to disarm the Seleka and

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 Kenneth R. Weinstein

of humanitarian assistance, with the help of forty-four hundred

soldiers. Yet the challenge on the ground in CAR is far greate
Mali, despite France's formidable capability. The situation has
since January, as the Anti-Balaka Christian militias, seeking reven
profited from the departure of the Seleka militias. In February,
ordered four hundred more soldiers to the country. In the mids
turmoil, France has been forced into the role of peacekeeper, dis
both Muslim and Christian militias. Successes have been limited.

Beyond France's diplomatic effort to prevent proliferation in

and the military effort to bring stability to Mali and the Central Afr
Republic, however, the Syrian crisis best exemplifies France's ambiti
and limitations to exert its influence and power internationally. W
undeniable evidence emerged in August 2013 that Assad had laun
chemical attacks in Damascus, the leaders of France, Britain, and the U
ed States advocated punitive air strikes against Assad's regime.
Even after Parliament refused to support Prime Minister Came
call to intervene on August 29th - a historic setback for a British
er - high-ranking French defense officials were convinced that Pres
Hollande would order a strike on the Assad regime as soon as Au
31st. His government readied Rafale fighter jets and drafted press r
es announcing the attack. To bolster popular support for the pen
intervention, the French Foreign Ministry leaked an intelligence rep
detailing the chemical attacks.
Yet Hollande 's plans to strike limited targets in Syria came undone
twenty-four hours before the attack was to commence, when an inde
Obama chose to seek congressional support - a move that killed the i
tive, given, in part, the president's lackluster effort to press for Cong
approval. By failing to keep his word to respond militarily to Assad's prov
use of chemical weapons in Syria, Obama isolated and somewhat hum
ed Hollande. As the Putin and Obama governments drew up a hasty (
thus far problematic) agreement that called for the destruction of Sy
chemical weapons stockpile, the French president tried to put the best
on his lonely stand: "Our threat to strike convinced the Russians and
Syrian regime to agree to surrender their chemical weapons. So it was
cess for us. It was not as has been reported a victory for the Syrian regim

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 HOLLANDE THE HAWK ?

In the face of a complex geostrategic environment, Hol

managed to maintain France's balancing act, having be
favorite European interlocutor, despite the occasional rift
Indeed, the warmth between the two presidents was ev
press conference during Hollande 's February visit to Was
Obama has apparently grown to appreciate France's swif
tent military successes in Mali and efforts in the Central A
And now, given the apparent failure of Obama's cooperati
to destroy Assad's chemical stockpile, the American presid
French cover if he manages to somehow pull a rabbit out
redeem his disastrous Syria policy. Today, France is one of
countries in the West with big international ambitions
sure of capability to achieve them. Economic circumstance
European and the national level, have limited France's capa
power, but Hollande, like his predecessors, has made the m
difficult circumstances.

Hollande has none of the baggage of Prime Minister Cameron's

coalition government or German Chancellor Angela Merkel's politics of
austerity or strict limitations on the use of military force. Moreover, he
doesn't lecture the US about its National Security Agency. Much as Obama
needs Hollande, with municipal and European elections on the horizon,
the highly unpopular Hollande needs Obama even more. ©

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