Torbela vs.
Rasario 661 SCRA 633 the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
FACTS:
The spouses Eugenio and Marta Torbela received a parcel of land
from Marta’s sister. Upon the death of the spouses, the Land was
adjudicated in equal shares among their children. These children
executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over the land in favor of
their nephew, Dr. Rosario. Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
was executed, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he
only borrowed the land and was already returning it to his aunts
and uncles. The latter Deed was notarized but was not
immediately annotated on the title of the land, hence, the title was
still in the name of Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosario mortgaged the land to
Banco Filipino for a loan. Dr. Rosario failed to pay the loan and
the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed.
The children then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject land against Dr. Rosario and Banco
Filipino. The trial court ruled in their favor which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether an express trust was created in this case.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that “Express trusts are created by direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create
a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended.”62 It is possible to create a trust
without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere
fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an
intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial
whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to
create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.”
DINAH C. CASTILLO v. ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, GR No.
171056, 2009-03-13
Facts:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla
(Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her
search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw
(Urbana), and sister Perla K.
Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land
consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She
was able to secure an Order[6] dated 4 March 1999 issued by
Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf &
Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K. Mortilla, et
al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot
13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled
on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 1
public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside
the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately
went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its
Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did
not show her any document to prove... ownership of Lot 13713
by Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of
Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and
influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights
or interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on
Execution by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996),
[Dinah] C. Castillo vs.
Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit Point
Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-
interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said case.
Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them
(Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever,... her adverse claim is
against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds
no title over the property.
The LRA distinguished between two systems of land...
registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands
under the Property Registration Decree, and the other is the
system of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344
(now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree).
These systems are separate and... distinct from each other. For
documents involving registered lands, the same should be
recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The
registration, therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system
produces no legal effect.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX
DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION
ACT
Ruling:
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of
possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation
of ownership of property, real or... personal.[40] Title, therefore,
may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of
exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of
property.[41] Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere...
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.[42]
Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an
Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the
decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,... issued
subsequent to the original registration.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration
Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for
the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in
any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner's tax
declaration.
As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and
petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former
is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other
certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and
indefeasible as to
Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is
binding upon the whole world, including respondent public
officers and even petitioner herself.
"[c]uriously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 2
co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713
stated in TD
No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent."... t
must be remembered that Summit Realty had already...
acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name
over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible
evidence of its ownership of the said property
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions
and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in
accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her
documents.
Respondents' actions were only consistent with the
recognition... of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by
sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system,
and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
Principles:
Transfer Certificate of Title not conclusive evidence of
ownership
Dear PAO,
I wanted to buy a certain property owned by my neighbor. He
presented to me a Transfer Certificate of Title or TCT of this
property under his name. Is this TCT sufficient evidence for me
to believe that he owns the property?
Sincerely yours,
DJ
Dear DJ,
For your information, the case of Luz Nicolas v. Leonora
Mariano (G.R. No. 201070, August 1, 2016), touched on the
differentiation of the legal meaning of Title and Certificate of
Title. In this case, the Honorable Supreme Court Associate
Justice Mariano del Castillo said:
“By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with
title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.”(Emphasis supplied, citing
Lee Tek Sheng v. CA. 354, Phil. 556 [1998])
For emphasis, the Honorable Supreme Court Associate Justice
del Castillo further stated:
“Torrens system of land registration ‘merely confirms ownership
and does not create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners
of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who
has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized
by law.’” (Emphasis supplied, citing Peralta v. Heirs of Abalon,
G.R. Nos. 83448/183464, 30 June 2014)
Similarly, in the case of Dinah Castillo v. Antonio Escutin (G.R.
No. 171056, 12 March 2009), the former associate justice of the
Supreme Court, the Honorable Minita Chico-Nazario,
emphasized that “Title” may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property. “Certificate of Title,” on the
other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to
the land itself.
Hence, even if the TCT of a property is named after a certain
person, the true ownership of the same may have already been
vested to another through the execution of a certain deed (like:
deed of sale, deed of donation, etc.), which necessarily gives
the title. Considering this, it would be best for you to first check
on the appropriate Registry of Deeds, whether the said property
had already been transferred to another person and/or an
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 3
annotation regarding any transaction/proceeding involving the
said property is being undertaken, for your security.
Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely
based on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of
the same. The opinion may vary when the facts are changed or
elaborated.
We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057
(January 17, 2005) Case Digest
Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands
Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title
of a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and
Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an order of
general default against the whole world except as to Angeles
and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano
in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the
heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent
Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due
on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from
any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous
and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was
not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 4
 classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application
for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title
under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of
land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by
the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the
property; as well as the tax declarations executed by the original
owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide
claim of ownership.
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 5
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No.
179987 September 3, 2013 Possession, Property
Registration Decree, Regalia Doctrine
NOVEMBER 13, 2018
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering the property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of
the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for
the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed
the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the
CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. What are the classifications of public lands?
1. Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the
property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
RULING:
1.
Classifications of land according to ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is
considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use
or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land,
and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 6
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State
is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be
classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department
exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer
intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.
2.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession – possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring
the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY
v.
MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010FACTS:Respondents claim to
be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land inParañaque
City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio.Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.Respondents
assert that the original occupant and possessor land wastheir
great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son,
PedroValdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupiedand possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He
also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio marrie
d Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario
Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal
office for the construction of their house within the land. On April
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 7
21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rightsover the land in favor of
Ebio.On March 30, 1999, the Office of the
Sangguniang Barangay
of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking
assistance from theCity Government of Parañaque for the
construction of an access road alongCut-cut Creek located in
the said barangay. The proposed road will runfrom Urma Drive
to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lotoccupied
by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and
the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when
severalofficials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cuteight (8) coconut trees planted on the said
lot.On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter
to therespondents ordering them to vacate the area within the
next thirty (30) days,or be physically evicted from the said
property. Respondents sent a reply,
asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing
intent for afurther dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC
of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ
of preliminaryinjunction against petitioners.ISSUE:Whether or
not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from
thealluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks
of Cut-cut creek.This being the case, the law that governs
ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which remainsin effect, in relation to
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands
contiguousto creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions
or sedimentsfrom the waters thereof, belong to the owners of
such lands.Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effectsof the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that
alluvialdeposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of
the public domain asthe alluvial property automatically belongs
to the owner of the estate towhich it may have been added. The
only restriction provided for by law isthat the owner of
the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject
toacquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired
by prescription. No matter how long the possession
of the properties has been,there can be no prescription against
the State regarding property of publicdomain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription asagainst the
State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion,the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does
not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 8
 REPUBLIC VS. CA
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3
requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2) through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank. Deposits
made by human intervention are excluded.
FACTS:
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a
parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and
Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of
three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the
recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the
registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite
the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their
fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer). The
Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that
the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was
any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that
accretion happened without human intervention and that the
transfer of the dikes occurred only after.
ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place
RULING: No
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not
evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually
through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in
question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly
doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone witness
testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but
the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not
included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was
indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual.
When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river
beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to
protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of
the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the
Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public
property.
Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note:
The lands sought were not even dry land. The entire area was
under one to two meters of water.
GRANDE v. CA
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who
likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 9
Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration
purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as
the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the
current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000
sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an
action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they
were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created
by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly
trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated
that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to
vacate the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the
CA, however, the decision was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically
belongs to the riparian owners?
HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the
owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure
become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a
specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included,
and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the
Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land
since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the
Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only
entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have
acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by
prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934,
when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil
Code, which only took effect in 1950.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land
(mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion
since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at
bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the
present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 10
banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
which is held to be part of the sea
2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands
added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea
form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to
make the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary
for public use. Until such declaration is made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Mindanao
Medical Center vs CA andAlejandro Y de JesusG.R. No. L-
40912, September 30, 1976
Facts:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the
respondent Alejandro deJesus, applied with the Bureau of
Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-hectare land situatedin barrio
Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands
through theDavao Land District Officer, accepted the sealed
bids for the purchase of the subjectedland. Irineo Jose bidded
P20 per hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50
perhectare. The director annulled the said auction for the reason
that sales applicantEugenio de Jesus failed to participate in the
bid. Another bidding was held on October3, 1934 and Eugenio
de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid submitted by
Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as 10%
deposit of the price of theland at P110.50 per hectare. That on
November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award
order to Eugenio de Jesus with regards to the said lot stating
the coverage ofthe land which is located in Davao with an area
of 22 hectares at P100.50 per hectareor P2210 for the whole
tract.On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the
sales application ofEugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of
the said land is needed by the Philippine Army for military
camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081 hectares
which is theland in question. On September 7, 1936, President
Manuel Quezon issuedProclamation No. 85 thereby declaring
the said lot to be withdrawn from sale andsettlement and
reserving the same for military purposes under the
administration of theChief of Staff, Philippine Army. On
November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45covering
the 8
th
and 10
th
installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area
afterthe sales application was amended which did not include
the military camp. Thereafter,on May 15, 1948, the Director of
Lands ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio deJesus for
the tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares. On the
same date, thesecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
likewise granted a sales patent toEugenio de Jesus containing
an area of 20.6400 hectares.On August 11, 1956, President
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 11
Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation No.85 and
declared the disputed lot open to disposition under the
provisions of Public
Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then o
n October 9, PresidentRamon Magsaysay revoked this
Proclamation and reserved the same lot for medicalcenter site
under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon,
onDecember 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
applied for Torrens registration
of the said lot with the Court of First Instance of Davao, claimed
“fee simple” title to the
said land on the strength of the proclamation reserving the area
for medical centerpurposes.Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the
son and successor-in-interest of Eugenio deJesus opposed the
registration on the ground that his father acquired a vested
rightover the said lot by virtue of award order. Likewise a certain
Arsenio Suazo filed hisopposition claiming that the 2 hectare
portion on the northeastern part of the said lotbelongs to him.
After due hearing, the court rendered judgement in favor of
theMindanao Medical Center. The two oppositors filed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.On July 2, 1974, the Appellate
Court denied the claim of Arsenio Suazo at the sametime
affirmed the appeal of Alejandro de Jesus, hereby decreeing the
said lot in thename of the Alejandro and ordered Mindanao
Medical Center to relinquish the lot tosaid appellant. On July 5,
1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved
forreconsideration but the Appellate Court denied the motion on
June 17, 1975. Forthwith,the petitioner elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court for appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title
over the wholecontested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of
the Proclamation No. 350 reserving thesaid land for medical site
purposes.
Conclusion:
Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the
lot with area of12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No.
350 reserving such land for medical sitepurposes.The Supreme
Court held, that:1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity
and it proceeds from the recognizedcompetence of the
President to reserve alienable lands of the public for
specificpublic use or service. The law authorizes the President
to designate tract ortracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the commonwealth of thePhilippines. A special
proprietary right was vested in Eugenio de Jesus when thesales
award was issued to him in 1934 which was for 22 hectares
(later found tobe 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey). The
privilege of occupying public landsconfers no contractual or
vested rights and the authority of the President towithdraw such
lands for sale or acquisition by public, or to reserve them for
publicuse may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Such
proclamation of thePresident to reserve lands terminates any
rights previously acquired by persons
who settled thereon in order to obtain preferential right of
purchase. Patentspreviously granted, reserved from sale are
void.2. The gratuitous assumption that the military "camp
site" was executed betweenEugenio de Jesus and Secretary
Serafin Marabut would be void since he held nodominical rights
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 12
over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936.
Inthat year, Proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withdrew the areafrom sale or settlement and reserved it for
military purposes. However, therespondent Appellate Court
rationalized that the subject of the donation was notthe land but
"the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de
Jesusover it. It is true that the gratuitous disposal in donation
may consist of a thing orright. But the term "right" must be
understood in a "propriety" sense, over whichthe processor has
the jus disponendi. In true donations there results aconsequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of
his assets. Eugenio deJesus cannot be said to be possessed of
that "proprietary" right over the whole33 hectares in 1936
including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time
this12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the
mass of disposablepublic lands by Proclamation No. 85 and
excluded in the Sales Award.Impoverishment of Eugenio's
assets as a consequence of such donation istherefore
farfetched. In fact if we were to assume in gratia argumenti that
the12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the
same may not bethe subject of donation. What is conferred on
the applicant is merely the right totake possession of the land. In
other words right granted to the sales awardee isonly
possessory right not proprietary right for the fundamental reason
that prior tothe issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land isretained by the State
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land
Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented
by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
o possession of the Infiels over the landdates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
o land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain
o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than P45M worth of improvements
o ownership and possession of the land sought to
be registered was duly recognized by the government when
the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition
by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient
o it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 13
  The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
(OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial
decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
Opposition to INCs application.
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it Cadastral Court and Court of Appeals = Rendered in favor of
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
INC.
perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations
ISSUE: May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
when the subject property has been declared as alienable only
excess of 1,024 hectares.
after June 12, 1945?
Republic v Iglesia ni Cristo
G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009
HELD: No.
FACTS:
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by
The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Cadastre located in Ilocos Norte.
government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), title to a public land should show that their title was acquired
represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay- law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has
Currimao. Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing already been declared alienable and disposable by the
cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before
lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration No. the application for registration was filed by INC.
(TD) 508026 covering the subject lot, and the September 7,
1
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in
1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of
the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for
INC.
the period of possession is the actual possession of the property
and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be
1

LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 14

already alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration of title is filed.
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of
PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled
that the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD
1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed.
The possession of INC has been established not only
from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of
the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its
predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he
inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from
his parents. These possessions and occupation from Sabuco,
including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to
Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had
not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses
TOPIC: Lands declared by the courts as agricultural lands
prior to the introduction of land classification.
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 83290 SEPTEMBER 21, 1990
FACTS: In 1912, the Court of Land Registration of Zambales,
through Judge James Ostrand, confirmed the title of Justo de
Perio over two parcels of land in Zambales, namely Parcel No.
1, which consists of an area of 11,697 sq.m., and Parcel No. 2,
which consists of 340,820 sq.m.
In 1985, herein respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint
for the annulment of the decree, alleging that the decree in LRC
No. 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the
land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still
within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom
only in 1961, and as such, cannot be the subject of disposition
or alienation as private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land are forest land.
RULING: It was held that the lands are agricultural. Act No.
926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law
on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was
the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his
title to the two parcels of land. A person who had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of
public agricultural land for a period of at least ten years prior to
July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over
the land he had so possessed and occupied.
*SEC. 54 OF ACT 926
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal
successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine
Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may
apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 15
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx6. All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of
July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten
years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Facts:
 A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the
land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon.
 The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of
the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon,
which was made in accordance with law.
 The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession
of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her.
 The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880,
Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish
pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza. After
having been in possession thereof for about eight years,
and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza sold it to Valentin Susi.
 Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon,
with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the
price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption,
except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when
Angela Razon commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said
land.
 Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied
to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof.
 After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 16
 Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon and issued the
proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands
 Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
in question.
o GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either
Issue: by purchase or by grant.
o EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time
 Who is then the rightful owner of the land? immemorial.
o Application for decree of registration is a condition
Held:
precedent to acquisition of title. Non-compliance gives rise to
 SC in their decision favoured Valentin Susi. According to mere possessory right.
SC there is, the presumption juris et de jure established o An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain
in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending by prescription.
Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government were complied with, for he has FACTS:
been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho
title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General
said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by also because he was an alien.
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of ISSUEs:
title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. o Whether or not Oh Cho had title
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the o Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already registration
ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, HELD:
beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
did not thereby acquire any right. purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception
LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 17
to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of

registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa

decree of registration had they applied for the same. The
application for the registration of the land was a condition
precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos.
Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title.
This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but
since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never
ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is
disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
****END****

LTD DIGESTED CASES (P.1-3 0F THE SYLLABUS) 18