John Doe vs. VMI

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA


Roanoke Division

JOHN DOE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. _________
7:20CV58
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
BOARD OF VISITORS OF VIRGINIA )
MILITARY INSTITUTE, )
J.H. BINFORD PEAY, III, )
WILLIAM J. WANOVICH, )
BRAYDEN A. CARVER, )
CARTER T. MCCAUSLAND, )
JORDAN M. BENNETT, )
RYAN A. HOOPS, )
and )
TYLER E. HAMILTON, )
)
Defendants. )
)

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff John Doe, 1 by and through undersigned counsel, files this Complaint against

Defendants, Board of Visitors of Virginia Military Institute, J.H. Binford Peay, III, William J.

Wanovich, Brayden A. Carver, Carter T. McCausland, Jordan M. Bennett, Ryan A. Hoops, and

Tyler E. Hamilton.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. John Doe brings this action for violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments

Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“Title IX”); for violations of the 14th Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; unlawful hazing in violation of the Virginia Code, Va.

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“John Doe” is a pseudonym for Plaintiff due to the nature of the allegations contained in this lawsuit. See
John Doe’s Motion and Memorandum for Leave to Proceed Under a Pseudonym and to Seal Identifying
Documents. Mr. Doe seeks to protect his privacy and the other victim’s privacy, who is identified as “John
Doe 2.”
Code Ann. § 18.2-56; assault; battery; false imprisonment; intentional infliction of emotional

distress; and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief and

respectfully demands a trial by jury on all counts so triable.

INTRODUCTION

2. This matter involves claims related to numerous unlawful acts committed against

John Doe, a first-year cadet, during cadet training at the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) in

January 2018. These unlawful acts consisted of waterboarding and other acts of hazing, including,

but not limited to, sexual assault and/or sexual harassment, that were tantamount to torture, and

are part of the adversative training approach that VMI uses to train its cadets.

3. These torturous and degrading acts violated Title IX, deprived John Doe of his

Constitutional right to equal protection, and denied him the educational benefits and opportunities

that can only be realized through attendance at VMI.

4. These acts were committed by upper-class cadets who are given broad authority by

VMI to execute its adversative approach and who swore an oath acknowledging their duty of care

to the first-year cadets under their charge.

5. VMI had actual knowledge of these acts, and other acts of hazing at VMI, including,

but not limited to, sexual assault and sexual harassment, which posed, and continue to pose, an

unreasonable and pervasive risk of Constitutional injury to male cadets enrolled at VMI.

6. VMI responds aggressively to allegations of hazing involving female cadets but

shows deliberate indifference to allegations of hazing involving male cadets, because of long-held

and outdated gender stereotypes about young men, in violation of Title IX and the 14th

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

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7. Because of those stereotypes, although VMI treats the hazing of female cadets as

unacceptable, VMI minimizes the hazing of male cadets as “boys being boys” engaging in

traditional and customary masculine rites of passage.

8. As a result of VMI’s policy and practice of responding differently to the hazing of

male cadets than the hazing of female cadets, hazing of female cadets seeking the educational

opportunities and benefits offered by VMI is virtually non-existent, while the hazing of male cadets

seeking those same opportunities and benefits is rampant.

9. Further, through its policy and practice of treating hazing of male cadets

significantly less seriously than hazing of female cadets, VMI has unlawfully persisted in

systematic, intentional, differential treatment of, and therefore discrimination against, male cadets

seeking the educational opportunities and benefits that can only be realized through attendance at

VMI.

10. VMI’s deliberate indifference to these acts, and other acts of hazing involving male

cadets at VMI, caused the above-mentioned harm to John Doe—that is, but for VMI’s deliberate

indifference, VMI would have exercised proper control over these upper-class cadets who were

part of the established command structure.

11. This action seeks to hold VMI accountable for the real and dangerous consequences

of VMI’s discrimination against male cadets seeking the educational opportunities and benefits

through attendance at VMI, in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, and to hold

all Defendants responsible for the criminal and tortious misconduct which harmed John Doe and

forced him to withdraw from VMI.

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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

12. Plaintiff John Doe is of full age and majority and, at all relevant times, was a citizen

of the Commonwealth of Virginia, residing in Lexington, Virginia. John Doe at all relevant times

was a first-year student of VMI and a member of the Corps of Cadets. As a direct result of the

allegations contained in this Complaint, John Doe was forced to withdraw from VMI and now

resides in Montgomery County, Virginia.

13. Defendant Board of Visitors of Virginia Military Institute (“Board of Visitors” or

“VMI”) is a public institution formed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and located

in Lexington, Virginia, and is part of the statewide system of public higher education operated by

the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Board of Visitors is the chief policy making and oversight

authority for VMI, and is comprised of 16 members, 12 of whom must be graduates of VMI. VMI

is a recipient of Title IX federal funds as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The Board of Visitors’

principal place of business is 319 Lechter Avenue, Lexington, Virginia 24450.

14. Defendant J.H. Binford Peay III (“Defendant Peay”) is VMI’s Superintendent, or

chief executive officer of the school. Defendant Peay (VMI Class of 1962) is of full age and

majority and, at all relevant times, was a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia, domiciled and

residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant Peay is named here in his individual capacity and in

his official capacity as VMI’s Superintendent.

15. Defendant William J. Wanovich (“Defendant Wanovich”) is VMI’s Commandant

of Cadets. Defendant Wanovich (VMI Class of 1987) is of full age and majority and, at all relevant

times, was a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia, domiciled and residing in Lexington,

Virginia. Defendant Wanovich is named here in his individual capacity and in his official capacity

as VMI’s Commandant of Cadets.

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16. Defendant Brayden A. Carver (“Defendant Carver”) is of full age and majority and,

at all relevant times, was a citizen of the State of Florida, domiciled in Okaloosa County, Florida,

and residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant Carver at all relevant times was a student of VMI

and a member of the cadet-cadre. Defendant Carver is named here in his individual capacity.

17. Defendant Carter T. McCausland (“Defendant McCausland”) is of full age and

majority and, at all relevant times, was a citizen of the State of Kansas, domiciled in Sedgwick

County, Kansas, and residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant McCausland at all relevant times

was a student of VMI and a member of the cadet-cadre. Defendant McCausland is named here in

his individual capacity.

18. Defendant Jordan M. Bennett (“Defendant Bennett”) is of full age and majority

and, at all relevant times, was a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia, domiciled in Roanoke

County, Virginia, and residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant Bennett at all relevant times was

a student of VMI and a member of the cadet-cadre. Defendant Bennett is named here in his

individual capacity.

19. Defendant Ryan A. Hoops (“Defendant Hoops”) is of full age and majority and, at

all relevant times, was a citizen of the State of Texas, domiciled in Tarrant County, Texas, and

residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant Hoops at all relevant times was a student of VMI and

a member of the cadet-cadre. Defendant Hoops is named here in his individual capacity.

20. Defendant Tyler E. Hamilton (“Defendant Hamilton”) is of full age and majority

and, at all relevant times, was a citizen of the State of Connecticut, domiciled in Fairfield County,

Connecticut, and residing in Lexington, Virginia. Defendant Hamilton at all relevant times was a

student of VMI and a member of the cadet-cadre. Defendant Hamilton is named here in his

individual capacity.

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21. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1331 because this litigation involves federal claims arising under, inter alia: (1) Title IX of the

Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; and (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

22. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged herein

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as they are so related to the Plaintiff’s claims in the action within

the original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

23. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial

part of the events and omissions giving rise to the case and the damages sustained by the Plaintiff

occurred in Lexington, Virginia, which is part of the Western District of Virginia. Venue is proper

in the Roanoke Division because the Plaintiff currently resides in Montgomery County, Virginia.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

24. VMI was established in Lexington, Virginia in 1839 and is part of the state-

supported system of higher education in the Commonwealth of Virginia. As such, VMI receives

funding from both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the federal government.

25. VMI’s governing body is the Board of Visitors whose members are appointed by

the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Board of Visitors appoints the

Superintendent, who serves as the chief executive officer of, and has executive responsibility for,

VMI. The Superintendent possesses final policymaking authority, to include the authority to issue

General Orders that the faculty and students are required to obey.

26. The student body is organized as a military Corps, called the Corps of Cadets, under

the immediate command of the Commandant of Cadets.

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27. The Commandant of Cadets is appointed by the Board of Visitors, at the

recommendation of the Superintendent, and is responsible for the organization, discipline,

administration, and basic military instruction of the Corps of Cadets, under the direction of the

Superintendent.

28. VMI aspires “to be the premier small college in the Nation, unequaled in producing

educated and honorable citizen-leaders, with an international reputation for academic excellence

supported by a unique commitment to character development, self-discipline and physical

challenge, conducted in a military environment.”

29. To achieve this aspiration, VMI employs an adversative training model that

emphasizes physical hardship, mental stress, lack of privacy, and exacting regulation of behavior.

The goal of this system is to mold character and produce citizen-leaders.

30. First-year cadets, called “Rats,” must endure seven months of harsh and demeaning

treatment by upperclassmen in a boot-camp-like initiation program called the “Rat Line,” which

is executed by members of the cadet-cadre under the military direction and discipline of the

Superintendent and Commandant of Cadets.

31. In the spring semester, first-year cadets complete the “Rat Line” and become 4th

Class cadets. 4th Class cadets are granted more privileges; however, their daily routines are still

controlled by the cadet-cadre under the military direction and discipline of the Superintendent and

Commandant of Cadets.

32. Students and graduates of VMI realize unique benefits and opportunities that are

not available at other colleges within the state-supported system of higher education in the

Commonwealth of Virginia. Specifically, VMI has notably succeeded in its goal to produce

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citizen-leaders; among its alumni are military generals, political leaders (including the current

Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia), and business executives.

33. VMI’s substantial endowment reflects the loyalty of its graduates and influential

alumni network; VMI has one of the largest per-student endowments of all undergraduate

institutions in the country.

34. VMI’s long and illustrious history is marred by an ugly history of both race and

gender-based discrimination. At the core of this ugly history is VMI’s proverbial Golden Rule,

which, to this day, has the dogmatic support of many within the VMI community: that its

adversative training model is infallible, and any changes that remotely alter or weaken these

training methods must be fought at all costs.

35. VMI became racially integrated in 1968, almost a century after the United States

Military Academy. VMI only started to admit women in 1997—more than 20 years after the

United States service academies—and only after the Supreme Court of the United States found

VMI’s male-only admission policy unconstitutional as it violated the Constitution’s Equal

Protection Clause. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

36. Notably, as part of its failed efforts to maintain VMI’s male-only admission policy,

the Commonwealth of Virginia claimed that admitting women would destroy VMI’s adversative

training model, which in turn would destroy the school itself. The Commonwealth of Virginia

supported its claim with the findings of a task force, convened by the Commonwealth of Virginia

and composed of “experts” in women’s education, who concluded that VMI’s adversative training

model was inappropriate for most women.

37. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected this, and other

arguments, and ruled that VMI’s male-only admission policy was unconstitutional. However,

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VMI’s long-held belief that its training methods were infallible and that women are not suited for

them persisted.

38. For example, before begrudgingly implementing the Supreme Court’s decision, the

Board of Visitors seriously considered the viability of privatization, which would enable VMI to

remain all-male, but require that it forego millions of dollars in state and federal aid. This

financially unsound option had support from a substantial segment of the VMI community that

demanded the preservation of the adversative method, which could only be achieved by the private,

all-male option.

39. Ultimately, the Board of Visitors rejected this option by a 9-8 vote, because

privatization would require VMI to raise $250-$300 million in endowment and the Department of

Defense threatened to terminate the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs at VMI.

40. During the planning process for the integration of women, VMI leaders fought hard

to preserve the harshness of the its adversative training model. One member of the Board of

Visitors wrote to VMI alumni stating, “VMI Alumni, if you allow Ginsburg et al. to do to VMI

what Pat Schroeder et al. have done to the United States Navy, you are not the exemplars of

manhood we thought you were.”

41. During planning, Major General Josiah Bunting III, then-VMI Superintendent and

the architect of VMI’s integration plan, wrote that VMI would “go [its] own way as [it] always

has,” unlike other military academies that “since coeducation, have abandoned their adversative

systems.”

42. True to Major General Bunting’s words, the first classes of female cadets were

given identical treatment to their male counterparts and were made to feel “as unwelcome as any

of the young men.”

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43. Nevertheless, over the next decade, for a variety of reasons, VMI’s adversative

approach, including the Rat Line, underwent changes, most of which were met with resistance

from the VMI administration and drew the ire of the VMI community because they diluted, or

merely appeared to dilute, the adversative training model and the VMI experience.

44. Certain minor changes engendered resentment among male cadets who viewed it

as preferential treatment to females, including, inter alia:

a. Curtains in barracks so that women could change in privacy;

b. Minor adjustments to dress and appearance rules, allowing females to have

slightly longer haircuts and wear “conservative” cosmetics on certain

occasions; and

c. The installation of private examination rooms in the post hospital.

45. When proposed changes threatened a more tangible impact on the adversative

training model, the VMI administration either fought those changes or silently held the status quo,

including, inter alia:

a. The administration applied the same physical fitness requirements to female

and male cadets that comprised a portion of the cadet’s physical fitness grade

and put females to the same test as males in the biweekly “Rat Challenges,”

e.g. rope challenges, obstacle courses.

b. The cadet-cadre’s arsenal of insults, so central to the adversative approach,

would still include terms and phrases that demean or minimized the female

cadets, and created a sexually hostile environment. Female cadets would be

called “brother rats.” The cadet-cadre could still use phrases like “raping your

virgin ducks,” and “rolling your hay tight as a tampon.” Superintendent

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Bunting specifically ordered that “hardy old VMI words” like “dyke,” “bone,”

and “running a period” were not to be outlawed.

c. VMI’s initial policy regarding pregnant cadets was to dismiss both the

pregnant cadet and the cadet that caused the pregnancy. Only after

intervention from women’s rights groups did VMI create a new official policy:

that permitted a pregnant cadet to remain at the school “so long as their

condition did not prohibit them from fulfilling their duties.”

46. By 2008, VMI’s inflexible commitment to its adversative approach had manifested

in its handling of sexual assault and sexual harassment allegations, prompting the U.S. Department

of Education, Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) to open an investigation into whether sexual

harassment at VMI was creating a hostile educational environment that was limiting the

educational opportunities at the school.

47. On May 9, 2014, the OCR released a Letter of Findings after a lengthy investigation

into numerous allegations of gender-based discrimination by VMI against female cadets and

female faculty members.

48. The OCR found that VMI was in violation of Title IX because it “permits an

environment hostile to female cadets both in the barracks and in the classroom.”

49. The OCR determined that “VMI failed to respond in a prompt and equitable manner

to complaints of sexual harassment and sexual assault of which it had notice and that this failure

permitted a sexually hostile environment to exist for cadets that was sufficiently serious as to deny

or limit their ability to participate in VMI’s program.”

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50. As a result of the OCR investigation and findings, VMI agreed to implement a

Voluntary Resolution Agreement and committed to take specific steps to address the identified

areas of non-compliance.

51. These steps included, among others, revising “its Title IX grievance policies and

procedures to provide for prompt and effective responses to alleged sexual harassment” and

providing “training to ensure that all members of the VMI community – including cadets, faculty,

administrators and other staff – are trained regularly on issues related to sexual harassment and on

the requirements of Title IX.”

52. Notably, the Voluntary Resolution Agreement, “place[d] particular emphasis on

training for staff and cadets involved in investigating and responding to complaints of sexual

harassment.”

53. The results of the OCR investigation and the remedial actions taken by VMI have

reduced the number of sexual harassment and hazing incidents involving female cadets. However,

the results of the OCR investigation and the remedial actions taken by VMI have also served to

reinforce long-held institutional gender stereotypes about women thereby further contributing to a

system where, in practice, male cadets are treated differently than female cadets based solely on

their gender.

54. Put another way, even after the 2014 OCR investigation, male cadets attending

VMI are made to endure systemic acts of hazing and abuse, to include sexual assault and sexual

harassment, at the hands of more senior cadets, because those acts are part of the VMI tradition –

the very fabric of the Institute. Female cadets, on the other hand, are now generally immune from

such acts because they result in unwanted attention that further results in unwelcome change to

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VMI’s “infallible” adversative training model. As VMI has continually demonstrated, anything

that threatens its training methods must be fought at all costs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

55. On or about January 30, 2018, Defendants McCausland and Carver conspired to

haze and assault Cadet John Doe 2 (“John Doe 2”), in what Defendant McCausland would later

describe as “all part of a Rat Mission, a VMI tradition.”

56. Using his authority as a senior member of the cadet-cadre, Defendant McCausland

directed Cadet Joseph Hammer (“Hammer”) to steal John Doe 2’s mattress (referred to in the

incident report as his “hay”) and bring it to Defendant Carver’s barracks room where John Doe 2

would be forced to retrieve it.

57. Later that night, at approximately 11:00 pm, Hammer informed John Doe 2 that his

“hay” was in Defendant Carver’s barracks room. Hammer further informed John Doe 2 that

Defendant McCausland had ordered John Doe 2 to retrieve the mattress as part of a “Rat Mission.”

58. As directed, John Doe 2 entered the barracks room to retrieve his hay and was

immediately assaulted by Defendant Carver, who physically subdued John Doe 2 before ordering

him to leave the room without his mattress.

59. Shortly after this initial incident, Defendants McCausland, Carver, Bennett, Hoops,

and Hamilton (together the “Defendant Cadets”) conspired to haze and assault both John Doe and

John Doe 2.

60. Specifically, after learning that John Doe 2 would return with another first-year

cadet to complete the “Rat Mission,” Defendant McCausland summoned the other Defendant

Cadets to Defendant Carver’s barracks room where they planned the second assault and staged the

room for their attack.

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61. On or about January 31, 2018, between 12:00 am and 1:00 am, John Doe 2 returned

to Defendant Carver’s barracks room with Plaintiff John Doe where the Defendant Cadets were

lying in wait, along with two other cadets who were not otherwise involved with the incident.

62. As previously ordered, John Doe 2 entered the blacked-out barracks room while

John Doe waited in the hallway outside.

63. Once again, after entering the room, Defendant Carver immediately physically

assaulted John Doe 2 and wrestled John Doe 2 into submission. Defendants Carver and Bennett

subsequently bound John Doe 2’s feet with duct tape so he could not escape.

64. Defendant Carver then stepped outside of his barracks room, saw John Doe

standing in the hallway and, using his authority as a senior cadet, ordered John Doe to enter the

room.

65. Upon entering the barracks room, John Doe was immediately physically assaulted

by Defendant Carver, who, inter alia, grabbed him and placed him in a headlock while Defendant

Bennett bound his upper body with a strap and bound his feet with duct tape so, like John Doe 2,

he could not escape. John Doe was subsequently placed under a bed by Defendants Carver and

Bennett. As a result of this assault, John Doe suffered both physical and emotional injuries.

66. After both John Doe and John Doe 2 were restrained, Defendant Carver started to

play the “Adhan,” the Islamic call to prayer (referred to in the incident report as “ISIS music”),

purportedly to simulate conditions in Afghanistan and to intimidate John Doe and John Doe 2 who

were told they were the Defendant Cadets’ “prisoners.” Defendant Carver regularly played the

Adhan to ridicule his roommate, who was of Jewish descent.

67. Next, Defendants Carver and Bennett took John Doe 2 to the front of the room,

ordered him to lay down on his back, at which point Defendant Carver placed a towel over his face

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and poured water over the towel until John Doe 2 started to cough. This is a torture technique

known as “waterboarding.”

68. The waterboarding technique has been used to interrogate detainees at both

Guantanamo Bay Cuba and the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. It consists of binding an individual,

lying the individual on his back, covering his face with a towel, and pouring water over his face,

resulting in the sensation of near drowning. Waterboarding is considered torture by many domestic

and international scholars and is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Waterboarding was

specifically banned for use by the United States military in 2006, which Congress reaffirmed in

2015.

69. After the two Defendants finished waterboarding John Doe 2, John Doe was taken

to the front of the room, ordered to lay down on his back, at which point Defendant Carver placed

a towel over his face. Defendant Bennett pushed the towel partially into John Doe’s mouth and

the two Defendant Cadets proceeded to waterboard him—pouring two cups of water over his

mouth as he gasped for air. As a result of this assault, John Doe suffered both physical and

emotional injuries.

70. While Defendants Carver and Bennett waterboarded both John Doe and John Doe

2, Defendant McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton, who helped orchestrate and plan the attack,

never attempted to intervene or stop the torture.

71. After the two Defendant Cadets finished waterboarding John Doe, Defendant

Carver ordered John Doe and John Doe 2 to “get in their cave” in the leg hole of a desk, where he

subsequently doused them with Febreze air freshener.

72. While trapped under the desk, the Defendant Cadets asked which of the two would

win in a “naked” wrestling match. The two male cadets were then summoned out from under the

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desk and freed from their restraints so they could wrestle for their freedom in front of their

assailants—with only the “winner” being allowed to leave.

73. John Doe was told to remove his pants and John Doe 2 was told to remove his shirt.

John Doe protested, explaining to Defendant Bennett that he was not wearing anything under his

pants. Defendant Bennett directed John Doe to remove his shirt instead before ordering the two

first-year cadets to begin wrestling.

74. Eventually the wrestling became too loud and another cadet in the same room

demanded that the wrestling stop. Up to that point, no other upper-class cadet intervened to stop

the assault. As a result of this orchestrated assault, John Doe suffered both physical and emotional

injuries.

75. Defendant Bennett told John Doe that he had won the wrestling match and he could

now leave Defendant Carver’s barracks room and return to his own room. Fearing for John Doe

2’s safety, John Doe replied that he would not leave without John Doe 2.

76. Defendant Bennett next ordered John Doe and John Doe 2, who were still partially

naked, to stand back-to-back before using duct tape to bind them together. Once they were bound

together, the two first-year cadets were told they could leave Defendant Carver’s barracks room.

77. Later that day, John Doe reported the incident to an upper-class cadet who reported

the incident through the chain of command to Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Faust, the Assistant Title

IX Coordinator, whose immediate supervisor is Defendant Wanovich.

78. On or about February 2, 2018, Lieutenant Colonel Faust notified VMI police

officer, L.E. Hunt, “of a hazing incident that occurred in [sic.] Barracks on 1/30/18.” It is unclear

why Lieutenant Colonel Faust waited two days to notify the VMI police department, or other

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appropriate law enforcement agency, about a serious incident involving criminal conduct,

including, but not limited to, torture and sexual assault.

79. The Virginia Code defines “Sexual abuse” as “an act committed with the intent to

sexually molest, arouse, or gratify any person, where: . . . The accused forces another person to

touch the complaining witness’s intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts.”

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.10. “Intimate parts” include “the genitalia, anus, groin, breast or buttocks

of any person.” Id.

80. Remarkably, the Assistant Title IX Coordinator, who as a result of the OCR

investigation was supposed to receive extensive training on issues involving sexual assault, sexual

harassment, and the requirements of Title IX, failed to process John Doe’s complaint—which

included allegations of naked wrestling and unwanted touching—in accordance with procedures

that met the Title IX requirements.

81. On or about February 2, 2018, Officer Hunt initiated a law enforcement

investigation by interviewing each cadet involved. During that investigation, Defendant

McCausland admitted to Officer Hunt that “the incident was all part of a Rat Mission, a VMI

tradition.” Defendant McCausland’s admission establishes that these types of assaults are routine

and commonplace at VMI.

82. Further, during her investigation, Officer Hunt learned that Defendants Carver and

McCausland had taken pictures during the assault with their cell phones. Incredibly, Officer Hunt

directed the two Defendants to delete the photos in her presence (presumably to protect VMI)

thereby destroying evidence that could be used in any subsequent criminal action and denying

John Doe access to evidence that could be crucial to this action. Officer Hunt’s direction to delete

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evidence of a potential crime, evidence that could embarrass VMI, violates VMI policy and

demonstrates that VMI acted with deliberate indifference.

83. VMI did not conduct an independent Title IX investigation into the allegations of

sexual misconduct as it is required to do by law and by the 2014 OCR Voluntary Resolution

Agreement.

84. Furthermore, as discussed in greater detail below, VMI did not take immediate

steps to eliminate the hostile environment it created or to protect John Doe during the pendency of

any Title IX investigation, to include the resolution of his complaint, as it is required to do by law.

85. Upon information and belief, if two female cadets had been ordered to strip naked

and wrestle for their freedom in the presence of numerous male assailants, VMI would have

immediately contacted law enforcement, would have processed the complaint in accordance with

procedures that met the Title IX requirements, would have conducted a proper Title IX

investigation, and would have taken immediate steps to protect the victims during the pendency of

the investigation and resolution of the complaint.

86. VMI’s failure to respond to the allegations of sexual misconduct subjected John

Doe to a hostile environment, the effects of which VMI failed to appropriately remedy.

87. As a result of the law enforcement investigation, VMI initiated disciplinary

proceedings against Defendants McCausland, Carver, and Bennett, with a disciplinary hearing

scheduled for March 14, 2018.

88. On or about March 11, 2018, Mr. William T. Woodrow, III, an attorney

representing Defendant McCausland, was provided with John Doe’s contact information and

contacted John Doe regarding the disciplinary hearing. Remarkably, Mr. Woodrow attempted to

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have John Doe “prepare” a declaration that minimized the incident and even went so far as to send

him a draft template with instructions on what he should say.

89. In an email dated March 11, 2018, Mr. Woodrow stated to John Doe, “Once you

fill a draft in, send it to me so I can clean it up if needed and I will send it back to you for signing.”

When John Doe refused, Mr. Woodrow attempted to minimize the incident, stating that VMI was

overreacting by trying to punish Defendant McCausland.

90. Mr. Woodrow further stated to John Doe that “VMI provided us with their witness

list and both you and Cadet Bennett (whose parents also don’t want him to be involved) are on it.

So the committee will very likely be calling you to testify, and that is out of our hands.”

91. On March 13, 2018, John Doe received an e-mail from Lieutenant Colonel Faust

ordering him to attend the disciplinary hearing because he was going to be called as a witness.

92. John Doe, via e-mail that same date, asked Lieutenant Colonel Faust for more

specific instructions because, as a victim in this case, he was not sure what his rights were nor was

he sure what to expect at the hearing. By way of example, but not exclusion, John Doe was not

informed that any lawyers would be present or that he would be entitled to have legal counsel

present. John Doe never received a reply from Lieutenant Colonel Faust.

93. On or about March 14, 2018, in response to Lieutenant Colonel Faust’s order, John

Doe appeared at Defendant McCausland’s disciplinary hearing where he was directed to wait in

the same waiting room as his assailants. This is clear evidence of the inadequacy of VMI’s

response to John Doe’s complaint.

94. Furthermore, on or about March 14, 2018, John Doe, as ordered by VMI, testified

at Defendant McCausland’s disciplinary hearing against his free will and without the assistance or

19
advice of counsel. Again, this is clear evidence of the inadequacy of VMI’s response to John

Doe’s complaint.

95. As a result of this egregious incident, to include VMI’s unlawful and inadequate

response, John Doe was subjected to a hostile environment, to include shunning from other cadets,

and deprived of his sense of security and person, forcing him to withdraw from VMI and seek an

education at another institution.

96. Accordingly, John Doe was deprived of his Constitutional right to equal protection

and denied the educational benefits and opportunities that can only be realized through attendance

at VMI.

COUNT I
Gender Discrimination in Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(Defendant VMI)

97. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

98. VMI’s woefully inadequate response to the January 31, 2018 incident—in which

upper-class cadets abused, tortured, and sexually assaulted and/or sexually harassed Plaintiff and

another male cadet—is emblematic of a school-wide policy and practice of intentional

discrimination against male cadets in the implementation of VMI’s adversative approach and in

the handling of complaints related thereto.

99. For many years, VMI had a policy and practice of being deliberately indifferent to

all cadets in the implementation its adversative approach. Specifically, with VMI’s implicit

approval, the upper-class cadet-cadre regularly subjected all cadets, who until 1997 were all male,

to misconduct and abuse, including but not limited to hazing, sexual assault, and sexual

harassment, in pursuit of VMI’s mission to produce “citizen-leaders”.

20
100. After the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights found VMI in violation

of Title IX in 2014, VMI developed a unified policy and grievance procedure that it strictly

enforces whenever a female cadet makes a complaint related to VMI’s adversative approach, even

if that complaint did not involve sexual conduct prohibited by Title IX.

101. Since 2014, because of this strict enforcement policy, female cadets are subjected

to hazing and abuse far less frequently, which has lowered the risk of harm for female cadets and

has allowed female cadets to take full advantage of the educational opportunities that VMI has to

offer.

102. Since the 2014 OCR investigation, Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich have

willfully turned a blind eye to incidents of hazing involving male cadets, allowing the upper-class

cadet-cadre to abuse male cadets, including, but not limited to, hazing, sexual assault, and sexual

harassment, because of long-held and outdated gender stereotypes about young men.

103. Upon information and belief, VMI has a strict enforcement policy for female cadets

specifically to avoid unwanted attention that further results in unwelcome change to VMI’s

infallible adversative training model.

104. The misconduct and abuse against male cadets in the implementation of VMI’s

adversative method, was and continues to be, severe and objectively offensive enough to deprive

many male cadets of access to educational opportunities at VMI.

105. Upon information and belief, Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich have also

responded to complaints of such hazing and abuse from male cadets with deliberate indifference,

because of, inter alia, their adherence to the “Golden Rule” and their long-held and outdated

gender stereotypes about young men.

21
106. Through this cycle of abuse and deliberate indifference to the abuse, VMI has

created a discriminatory hostile educational environment in which hazing of male cadets is

pervasive and harmful, and in which reporting of such hazing is discouraged at an individual and

institutional level.

107. Known examples of the harmful implementation of the adversative method that

male cadets are forced to endure, while female cadets are not, include, inter alia:

a. A male cadet was tied to a chair and beaten by upper-class cadets with socks that

contained bars of soap;

b. A male cadet was ordered to defecate in another cadet’s container of protein

supplement;

c. Male cadets were ordered to workout in upper-class cadet’s barracks rooms, while

chewing tobacco or with a full mouth of water, with the intended purpose that the

male cadets would only be able to breathe through their mouths; and

d. During a training session, a male cadet was ordered to stay on the pullup bar, despite

his complaints that he was about to vomit, resulting in him vomiting on himself;

108. As a direct result of this policy and practice, Plaintiff entered VMI with a

substantially heightened risk of suffering mental and physical harm through its adversative

approach, and on January 31, 2018, did suffer such harm, through sexual misconduct, torture, and

other torts at the hands of upper-class cadets executing VMI’s adversative approach.

109. Upon information and belief, had Plaintiff been a female, he would not have

suffered this harm in the first place—because VMI’s strict enforcement deters such behavior

against female cadets—or, at a minimum, VMI would have strictly enforced its anti-hazing policy

and taken meaningful corrective action.

22
110. VMI’s differential treatment of female and male cadets constitutes a policy and

practice of intentional discrimination against cadets on the bases of sex in violation of Title IX.

111. As a result of VMI’s policy and practice of intentional discrimination, Plaintiff

suffered physical and emotional harm, as well as a violation of his rights under Title IX, and is

entitled to damages in an amount not ascertainable as this time.

112. As a result of VMI’s policy and practice of intentional discrimination, Plaintiff has

suffered irreparable harm, such that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are

inadequate to compensate for his injury; considering the balance of hardships between the Plaintiff

and Defendants, a remedy in equity is warranted; and that the public interest would not be

disserved by a permanent injunction.

COUNT II
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(Defendant VMI)

113. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

114. Since at least 2014, Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich have had actual

knowledge that the cadet-cadre regularly subjects male cadets not only to hazing and abuse in the

implementation of the adversative approach, but also to sexual harassment.

115. Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich exercise substantial control over all cadets

and total control over the context in which the sexual harassment of male cadets occurs, VMI’s

adversative training model.

116. Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich have treated complaints of sexual

harassment from male cadets with deliberate indifference, which has created a hostile educational

23
environment in which this sexual harassment is pervasive and harmful, and in which reporting of

this harassment is discouraged at an individual and institutional level.

117. Known examples of harmful sexual harassment that male cadets are forced to

endure include, inter alia:

a. An upper-class cadet ordered a male cadet to pick his favorite porn star and give a

PowerPoint presentation about that porn star to a room full of female cadets;

b. An upper-class cadet ordered a male cadet to wear woman’s leopard-print

underwear for an entire week without changing or cleaning the underwear;

c. An upper-class cadet ordered a male cadet to strip down to his underwear and

execute a “Rat Mission” outdoors in the plain view of other cadets.

118. Upon information and belief, VMI’s policy of deliberate indifference to the sexual

harassment of male cadets emboldened, and continues to embolden, senior cadets to push the

boundaries of the adversative method that VMI administers and is ultimately responsible for.

119. On January 31, 2018, Defendants Carver, McCausland, Bennett, Hoops, and

Hamilton ordered John Doe 2 and Plaintiff to complete a “Rat Mission.”

120. In addition to physical assault and waterboarding, the January 31, 2018 “Rat

Mission” led by Defendants Carver, McCausland, Bennett, Hoops, and Hamilton included forced

naked wrestling in the presence of multiple cadets, where only the winner had the permission of

the Defendant Cadets to leave the scene of the crime and return to his barracks room. Defendants’

actions were severe and objectively offensive that Plaintiff was deprived of the educational

opportunities that VMI has to offer.

121. Plaintiff was both sexually assaulted and sexually harassed when Defendants

Carver, McCausland, Bennett, Hoops, and Hamilton, who were upper-class cadets, forced him to

24
partake in a winner-takes-all naked wrestling match in front of several other cadets, including his

assailants.

122. But for VMI’s history of deliberate indifference to male cadet hazing, to include

sexual assault and sexual harassment, Plaintiff would not have been sexually assaulted and

harassed (let alone waterboarded) by Defendants Carver, McCausland, Bennett, Hoops, and

Hamilton.

123. VMI also responded to the January 31, 2018 incident with deliberate indifference.

Not only was its response to this sexual misconduct complaint insufficient, but it was essentially

non-existent for Title IX’s purposes, as VMI did not identify the incident as potential sexual

assault, or at a minimum sexual harassment, but instead categorized the incident as “hazing.”

124. By failing to respond at all to this flagrant sexual harassment, VMI again exhibited

deliberate indifference to the sexual assault and/or sexual harassment that Plaintiff suffered, even

after VMI leadership had actual knowledge of what had transpired and despite having the authority

to investigate and take meaningful corrective action.

125. This sexual harassment and the ensuing deliberate indifference were sufficiently

severe to create an environment at VMI so hostile that Plaintiff had no choice but to leave and

pursue educational opportunities (including military training) at a different school.

126. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff is but one of many male cadets that has been

denied educational opportunities as a result of Defendant VMI’s, Peay’s, and Wanovich’s

deliberate indifference to sexual harassment against male cadets.

127. Upon information and belief, if two female cadets had been ordered to strip naked

and wrestle for their freedom in the presence of numerous male assailants, VMI would have

immediately contacted law enforcement, would have processed the complaint in accordance with

25
procedures that met the Title IX requirements, would have conducted a proper Title IX

investigation, and would have taken immediate steps to protect the victims during the pendency of

the investigation and resolution of the complaint.

128. But for Plaintiff’s gender, Plaintiff would not have been subjected to the above

sexual harassment or at a minimum would have seen a swift and equitable resolution of his

complaint.

129. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the student-on-student sexual harassment

that Plaintiff suffered caused Plaintiff physical and emotional harm, and as such Plaintiff is entitled

to compensatory damages in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

130. As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to sexual harassment—

implemented through the action and inaction of Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich acting in

their official capacities—Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm, such that remedies available at

law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for his injury. Considering the

balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendants, a remedy in equity is warranted; and

the public interest would be served by a permanent injunction.

COUNT III
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Defendants VMI, Peay (in both his individual and official capacity), and Wanovich (in
both his individual and official capacity))

131. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

132. Plaintiff is a member of the male gender, a protected class under the Equal

Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

26
133. Since 2014, Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich were operating under the color

of state law, and exercised substantial control of, and final policymaking authority over, the

conduct of upper-class cadets, in particular their treatment of male cadets.

134. VMI has a custom and practice of treating the hazing of male cadets with deliberate

indifference, because of long-held and outdated gender stereotypes about young men.

135. This practice of hazing male cadets is so permanent and well-settled that it

constitutes a custom or practice of intentional discrimination against male cadets.

136. Despite having this absolute control and authority, Defendants VMI, Peay, and

Wanovich have been deliberately indifferent to the hazing of male cadets in the past, creating the

hostile environment that directly led to the hazing and sexual harassment that Plaintiff suffered on

January 30, 2018.

137. As administrators with final decision-making authority over the adversative

training methods employed at VMI, Defendants Peay and Wanovich—through their actions and

inaction—have exhibited deliberate and callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights and, in fact,

caused the violations of Plaintiff’s federal rights.

138. Upon information and belief, had Plaintiff been a female, Plaintiff would likely not

have been subjected to hazing, torture, and sexual harassment at all, and, at a minimum, would

have received a prompt and equitable resolution and meaningful corrective action.

139. VMI’s selective treatment of cadet-cadre misconduct against male and female

cadets constitutes a policy and custom of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, because of

long-held and outdated gender stereotypes about young men.

27
140. Defendants’ policy and practice of intentional discrimination violated the Equal

Protections Clause, and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under

§ 1983, in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

141. As a result of VMI’s policy and practice of intentional discrimination—

implemented through the action and inaction of Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich acting in

their official capacities, Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm, such that remedies available at law,

such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate Plaintiff for his injury. Considering the

balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendants, a remedy in equity is warranted; and

the public interest would be served by a permanent injunction.

COUNT IV
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Defendants VMI, Peay (in both his individual and official capacity), and Wanovich (in
both his individual and official capacity))

142. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

143. Plaintiff is a member of the male gender, a protected class under the Equal

Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

144. On January 31, 2018, Plaintiff was subjected to discriminatory student-on-student

sexual harassment, when Defendants Carver, McCausland, Bennett, Hoops, and Hamilton forced

Plaintiff to wrestle naked with another male cadet in the presence of multiple cadets.

145. As a result of this discriminatory sexual harassment, Plaintiff suffered physical and

emotional harm in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

146. Upon information and belief, if two female cadets had been ordered to strip naked

and wrestle for their freedom in the presence of numerous male assailants, VMI would have

immediately contacted law enforcement, would have processed the complaint in accordance with

28
procedures that met the Title IX requirements, would have conducted a proper Title IX

investigation, and would have taken immediate steps to protect the victims during the pendency of

the investigation and resolution of the complaint.

147. At all relevant times, Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich were operating under

the color of state law, and exercised substantial control, and final policymaking authority over, the

conduct of the Defendant Cadets, in particular their treatment of male cadets.

148. Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich responded to Plaintiff’s complaint with

deliberate indifference, by not even categorizing the incident as sexual harassment, but instead as

“hazing.”

149. As administrators with final decision-making authority over the adversative

training methods employed at VMI, Defendants Peay and Wanovich—through their actions and

inaction—have exhibited deliberate and callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights and, in fact,

caused the violations of Plaintiff’s federal rights.

150. As a result of the deliberate indifference exhibited by Defendants VMI, Peay, and

Wanovich, Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional harm.

151. Defendants’ deliberate, callous indifference to the student-on-student sexual

harassment violated the Equal Protections Clause and, as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory

and punitive damages under § 1983, in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

COUNT V
Hazing in Violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-56
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)

152. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

29
153. On or about January 31, 2018, as part of a “Rat Mission” at VMI, Defendants

Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton intended to, and did, haze Plaintiff, a first-

year student attending VMI, so as to cause bodily injury to Plaintiff.

154. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton, individually or in

combination, actively or passively participated in the following acts, inter alia:

a. Physically assaulted Plaintiff in a blacked-out barracks room;

b. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by putting him in a headlock, binding his arms

and legs to prevent his escape, and then placing him under a bed;

c. Physically assaulted Plaintiff by waterboarding him, creating the sensation

of near-drowning and resulting in Plaintiff temporarily choking and gasping for

air;

d. Physically forced Plaintiff and John Doe 2 into the cramped leg space under

a barracks desk, dousing them in, and forcing continuous inhalation of, Febreze;

e. Orchestrated, and forced Plaintiff to wrestle naked with John Doe 2; and

f. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by duct-taping Plaintiff to John Doe 2, after

Plaintiff refused to leave John Doe 2 with Defendants Carver, Bennett,

McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton for fear of John Doe 2’s safety.

155. These intentional physical acts were against Plaintiff’s will, recklessly or

intentionally endangered Plaintiff’s health and safety, and inflicted bodily injury on Plaintiff, in

connection with Plaintiff’s initiation, or as a condition of continued membership, as a cadet in the

VMI Corps of Cadets.

30
156. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional harm,

and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages in an amount that is not

ascertainable at this time.

COUNT VI
Assault
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)
157. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

158. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton intended to make

harmful and offensive physical contact with Plaintiff throughout the incident on January 31, 2018,

and as they committed the above-referenced acts.

159. Plaintiff was aware of these acts and was in reasonable apprehension of an

imminent battery from these acts.

160. This reasonable apprehension caused Plaintiff mental and emotional harm in an

amount that is not ascertainable at this time and resulted in Plaintiff withdrawing from VMI and

transferring to another institution to seek a college education.

161. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional harm,

and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages in an amount that is not

ascertainable at this time.

COUNT VII
Battery
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)

162. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

163. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton intended to, and

did, make harmful and offensive physical contact with Plaintiff.

31
164. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton individually or in

combination, inter alia:

a. Physically assaulted Plaintiff in a blacked-out barracks room;

b. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by putting him in a headlock, binding his arms

and legs to prevent his escape, and then placing him under a bed;

c. Physically assaulted Plaintiff by waterboarding him, creating the sensation

of near-drowning and resulting in Plaintiff temporarily choking and gasping for

air;

d. Physically forced Plaintiff and John Doe 2 into the cramped leg space under

a barracks desk, dousing them in, and forcing continuous inhalation of, Febreze;

e. Orchestrated, and forced Plaintiff to wrestle naked with John Doe 2; and

f. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by duct-taping Plaintiff to John Doe 2, after

Plaintiff refused to leave John Doe 2 with Defendants Carver, Bennett,

McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton for fear of John Doe 2’s safety.

165. These physical acts were unwanted and without Plaintiff’s consent.

166. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hamilton, and Hoops had no legal

justification or excuse for these unwanted physical acts.

167. The conduct of Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hamilton, and Hoops

was willful and wanton, so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff.

168. These unwanted physical acts also caused Plaintiff mental and emotional harm

resulted in him withdrawing from VMI and transferring to another institution to seek a college

education.

32
169. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional harm,

and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages in an amount that is not

ascertainable at this time.

COUNT VIII
False Imprisonment
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)

170. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

171. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton restrained

Plaintiff’s liberty by binding his upper body with a strap and his feet with duct tape so he could

not leave the barracks room.

172. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton further restrained

Plaintiff’s liberty by binding him to John Doe 2 with duct tape and leaving them in the hallway or

stoop.

173. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton further restrained

Plaintiff’s liberty by preventing Plaintiff from leaving the barracks room until he participated in a

naked wrestling match with John Doe 2.

174. These physical acts were unwanted and without Plaintiff’s consent.

175. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton had no legal

justification or excuse for these unwanted physical acts.

176. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional harm,

and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages in an amount that is not

ascertainable at this time.

33
COUNT IX
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)

177. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

178. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton intentionally or

recklessly committed, inter alia, the following acts, individually or in combination:

a. Physically assaulted Plaintiff in a blacked-out room;

b. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by putting him in a headlock, binding his arms

and legs to prevent his escape, and then placing him under a bed;

c. Physically assaulted Plaintiff by waterboarding him, creating the sensation

of near-drowning and resulting in Plaintiff temporarily choking and gasping for

air;

d. Physically forced Plaintiff and John Doe 2 into the cramped leg space under

a barracks desk, dousing them in, and forcing continuous inhalation of, Febreze;

e. Orchestrated, and forced Plaintiff to wrestle naked with John Doe 2; and

f. Physically subdued Plaintiff, by duct-taping Plaintiff to John Doe 2, after

Plaintiff refused to leave John Doe 2 with Defendants Carver, Bennett,

McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton for fear of John Doe 2’s safety.

179. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton’s conduct was not

only outrageous and intolerable, but also exhibited such recklessness as to evince a conscious

disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.

180. Plaintiff experienced severe mental and emotional distress resulting in him

withdrawing from VMI and transferring to another institution to seek a college education.

34
181. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton’s conduct directly

caused the resulting emotional distress, and as such, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and

punitive damages in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

COUNT X
Civil Conspiracy
(Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton)

182. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs into this Count by reference as

though fully restated herein.

183. On the night of January 30, 2018 and continuing into the morning of January 31,

2018, Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton conspired to subject

Plaintiff to the torts alleged in Counts VI through IX.

184. Alternatively, on the night of January 30, 2018 and continuing into the morning of

January 31, 2018, Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton conspired to

subject Plaintiff to lawful training through unlawful means, namely the torts alleged in Counts VI

through IX.

185. In furtherance of this agreement, these Defendants took the following concerted

actions:

a. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton conspired to

assemble in Defendant Carver’s barracks room to subject Plaintiff to a Rat Mission

that intentionally or recklessly resulted in the torts alleged in Counts VI through

IX.

b. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton participated in,

and coerced other cadets to participate in, the torts alleged in Counts VI through

IX.

35
c. Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton did not intervene,

and coerced other cadets not to intervene, while Plaintiff was being subjected to the

torts alleged in Counts VI through IX.

186. Through their willful and wanton conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy,

Defendants Carver, Bennett, McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton exhibited such recklessness as to

evince a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.

187. As a result of the concerted actions of these Defendants, Plaintiff suffered damages

in an amount that is not ascertainable at this time.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in its favor and against the Defendants as

follows:

(a) Injunctive relief against Defendants VMI, Peay, and Wanovich compelling said

Defendants to:

i. Create an educational environment utilizing training methods that allow all

male students to take advantage of the educational opportunities that VMI has to

offer, to be determined at a later time;

ii. Create and strictly enforce a grievance policy and procedures that deter any

violations of said training methods against all sexes and encourages complaints

from all sexes related to said training methods;

iii. Any and all injunctive relief, not yet determined, that the Court deems just

and proper;

(b) Compensatory and nominal damages in an amount to be proven at trial pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 and § 8.01 of the Virginia Code;

36
(c) Compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Carver, Bennett,

McCausland, Hoops, and Hamilton in an amount not less than $350,000, pursuant

to § 8.01-38.1 of the Virginia Code;

(d) Punitive damages against Defendants Peay and Wanovich in their individual

capacities under federal common law in an amount that the Court deems just and

proper;

(e) Interest from the date of judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961;

(f) Costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff, in this case pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988; and

(g) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all counts so triable.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 28, 2019


/s/ Ryan C. Berry
Ryan C. Berry, VSB 67956
Timothy A. Furin, VSB 92993
Daniel Sage Ward, VSB 45978
WARD & BERRY, PLLC
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 4500
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 331-8160
(202) 331-8162 Fax
ryan@wardberry.com

Counsel for Plaintiff John Doe

37
7:20cv00058

0423- $400.00 Conrad


3318791
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Roanoke Division

JOHN DOE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. _________
7:20CV58
)
BOARD OF VISITORS OF VIRGINIA )
MILITARY INSTITUTE, )
J.H. BINFORD PEAY, III, )
WILLIAM J. WANOVICH, )
BRAYDEN A. CARVER, )
CARTER T. MCCAUSLAND, )
JORDAN M. BENNETT, )
RYAN A. HOOPS, )
and )
TYLER E. HAMILTON, )
)
Defendants. )
)

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED UNDER A PSEUDONYM AND TO SEAL


IDENTIFYING DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff John Doe respectfully moves for leave to proceed under pseudonym and to seal

documents that disclose his identity. Plaintiff brings hazing and sexual discrimination claims

against the Board of Visitors of Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) and individuals in the VMI

administration, as well as tort claims against five former cadets, including among other things,

hazing, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that upper-class cadets committed these torts as part of VMI’s

infamous “Rat Line”—a VMI-authorized “adversative” boot-camp-like initiation program

intended to test the physical and mental strength of first-year cadets, but implemented by the cadet-

cadre and the administration in a way that discriminates against male cadets.

1
Illustrative of this policy of sexual discrimination, VMI responded to Plaintiff’s

administrative complaint with deliberate indifference, leaving Plaintiff with no choice but to

transfer to a different school. Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains his aspirations of pursuing a career

in the Marine Corps and is currently enrolled in a Reserve Officer Training Corps (“ROTC”)

program at another university. Simply by filing this Complaint and calling into question the

propriety of VMI’s adversative training model, Plaintiff puts a target on his back. VMI is well

represented within the active- and reserve- military communities—including the Marine Corps—

with alumnae who overwhelmingly and stridently defend VMI’s adversative approach. If his

identity is made public, Plaintiff will be put at a substantial risk of future retaliation—physically,

mentally, and career-wise. These substantial risks warrant protection of Plaintiff’s privacy, and

the relief sought in this motion is tailored to fit that purpose.

STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS MOTION

The following facts, relevant to the instant motion only, are taken from the allegations in

the Complaint.

In the early morning of January 31, 2018, Plaintiff, a first-year male cadet, was ordered by

Defendant-Cadets to a barracks room for what one Defendant-Cadet later characterized as “Rat

Mission, a VMI tradition.” The Defendant Cadets proceeded to unlawfully haze Plaintiff in a

variety of harmful ways, including but not limited to: physically assaulting Plaintiff into

submission; waterboarding Plaintiff; 1 physically binding Plaintiff with duct-tape, forcing him into

a cramped space with another first-year cadet and dousing them both with Febreze; forcing

1
Waterboarding technique has been used to interrogate detainees at both Guantanamo Bay Cuba and the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. It consists of binding an individual, covering his face with a towel, and pouring water over his face,
resulting in the sensation of near drowning. Waterboarding is considered torture by many domestic and international
scholars and is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Waterboarding was specifically banned for use by the U.S.
military in 2006.

2
Plaintiff to participate in a naked wrestling match with the other first-year cadet; and duct-taping

Plaintiff to the other first-year cadet before permitting them both to return to their own barracks

room. See Compl. ¶¶ 55-76.

The next day, Plaintiff reported the incident to an upper-class cadet who reported the

incident through the chain of command to VMI’s designated Assistant Title IX coordinator, who

proceeded to do nothing for two days. On February 2, 2018, VMI’s Assistant Title IX coordinator

reported the incident as “hazing” to the VMI police. At no point did VMI or the police treat the

incident—which involved senior cadets forcing two first-year cadets to wrestle naked in front of

their peers—as a sexual assault and/or sexual harassment case that required compliance with Title

IX regulations. During and following the investigation, Plaintiff became a pariah within the

school’s cadet community. VMI prides itself, and demands that all cadets pride themselves, on

the school’s tried-and-true adversative training method, which include “Rat Missions” like the one

Plaintiff endured. Because he simply spoke up against this pillar of VMI’s status quo, Plaintiff

endured social and educational ostracization and targeting from upper-class cadets in the already

physically rigorous training program. The final straw came when VMI allowed Defendants

Carver, McCausland, and Bennett, who orchestrated the hazing and sexual assault and/or sexual

harassment, to return to VMI after serving temporary suspensions. Upon information and belief,

Defendants Carver, McCausland, and Bennett are VMI graduates and are currently serving as

commissioned officers within the U.S. military.

Plaintiff had no choice but to leave VMI and find a new school. See Compl. ¶ 95. With

the help of the Marine Corps, Plaintiff was able to transfer to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and

State University (“Virginia Tech”), where he is currently in his junior year and on track to graduate

3
in 2021. After graduation, Plaintiff will be commissioned as a Marine officer, and embark on what

Plaintiff hopes will be a long and successful career in the military.

For many 18-year-olds, the abuse Plaintiff endured at the hands of future commissioned

officers, along with the general indifference of VMI’s administration towards that abuse, would

have been enough to call it quits and give up on pursuing a career in the military. Plaintiff,

however, did not quit. He comes from a family with deep roots in the military and, despite having

every reason to be disillusioned, Plaintiff remains committed to following his dreams and

dedicating his life to public service.

On average, VMI produces approximately 200 commissioned officers in each graduating

class. Upon information and belief, a substantial portion of those commissioned officers remain

in the active or reserve forces beyond the minimum four-year requirement, with many serving a

full career in the military. This vast network of alumnae overwhelmingly holds VMI in the highest

regard and specifically revere the “Rat Line,” “where the bonds of brother rat spirit are forged.”

Once Plaintiff graduates from Virginia Tech and is commissioned as an officer, he will join

what is sure to dozens of VMI graduates within the Marine Corps’ very small officer community,

not just graduates that will be Plaintiff’s equals but also Plaintiff’s superior officers. These

graduates are likely to harbor ill-will towards Plaintiff for challenging the propriety of the VMI

way and will have ample opportunity for retaliation. Plaintiff has already experienced retaliation

from VMI cadets and the VMI administration in the fallout of the January 31, 2018 incident. With

this motion, Plaintiff merely seeks to avoid similar retaliation in the future.

ARGUMENT

“The decision whether to permit parties to proceed anonymously at trial is one of many

involving management of the trial process that for obvious reasons are committed in the first

4
instance to trial court discretion.” James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993). While there

is a presumption in favor of the public’s access to the names of litigants, this presumption is “not

as an absolute, unreviewable license to deny. The rule rather is that under appropriate

circumstances anonymity may, as a matter of discretion, be permitted.” Id.

To determine whether a litigant’s right to personal privacy and confidentiality overcomes

this presumption, the Fourth Circuit has established a non-exclusive set of factors that include:

Whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the
annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in
a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature; whether identification poses a risk
of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or even more
critically, to innocent nonparties; the ages of the person whose privacy interests are
sought to be protected; whether the action is against a governmental or private
party; and, relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an
action against it to proceed anonymously.

Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 273 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing James, 6 F.3d at 238).

These factors, taken together, heavily favor Plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff is a 20-year old

male, still setting the foundation for what he hopes will be a long and successful career in the

military. He had hoped to set that foundation at VMI, even after he suffered, at the age of 18,

through hazing and sexual assault and/or harassment at the hands of upper-class cadets who had

sworn an oath to take care of him. Unfortunately, VMI’s woefully inadequate response eliminated

that option. Plaintiff’s youth is particularly relevant here, given that one of several substantial

risks he faces, if forced to name himself, is to his future as a career military officer. Doe v. Alger,

317 F.R.D. 37, 40 (W.D. Va. 2016) (permitting a pseudonymous filing where the Plaintiff was a

“young adult” and “so ‘may still possess the immaturity of adolescence,’ as many college students

do”) (quoting Yacovelli v. Moser, No. 1:02-cv-596, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9152, at *24

(M.D.N.C. May 20, 2014)).

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Plaintiff’s interest in proceeding pseudonymously is not merely to avoid the annoyance

and criticism attendant to bringing litigation, but instead to protect other legitimate interests such

as his safety, well-being, and career. First, Plaintiff rightly wants to avoid being identified as the

victim of the misconduct at issue here, which is inherently personal in nature, namely suffering

through torture, sexual assault and/or sexual harassment, at the hands of his peers and in front of

several of others. See Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Courts generally allow a

plaintiff to litigate under a pseudonym in cases containing allegations of sexual assault because

they concern highly sensitive and personal subjects.”).

More importantly, however, Plaintiff wishes to avoid the substantial risk of retaliation that

he faces by challenging the VMI status quo. J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 200

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011); Stegall, 653

F.2d at 186) (“Courts generally find a risk of retaliatory harm in cases where the moving party

provides evidence that psychological damage or violent threats are anticipated if a party’s identity

is disclosed.”). At its core, Plaintiff is seeking to rid VMI’s adversative approach of its harmful

excesses, which, in this case, directly resulted in Plaintiff being waterboarded, physically assaulted

and sexually assaulted and/or harassed by the upper-class cadet-cadre. If history is any lesson,

VMI can be expected to perceive this as a challenge to VMI itself, and fight the change at all costs,

with the vocal and financial support of its alumnae. See Compl.¶¶ 24-50; see also Katharine T.

Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of United States v. Virginia, WOMEN AND THE

LAW: STORIES 133 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds. 2011) (explaining

that VMI alumni contributed substantial sums to fund VMI’s defense of its male-only policy,

which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in 1996).

6
Plaintiff has already experienced retaliation for making an administrative complaint with

the administration in the spring semester of 2018, his final months at VMI. Because of VMI’s

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights and well-being, Plaintiff spent that semester ostracized

by a substantial portion of his fellow-cadets, targeted by upper-class cadets executing VMI’s

adversative approach, and without a single friend or ally at the school. This retaliation created

such a hostile environment that Plaintiff had no choice but to leave VMI. By filing

pseudonymously, Plaintiff is merely trying to avoid similar or even worse treatment, from VMI

alumnae, not in the public at large, but in the small Marines Corps community that he will soon

join. D.P. v. Montgomery Cty., No. 2:19-CV-38, 2019 WL 2437024, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 11,

2019) (considering among other things the size of the plaintiff’s community in permitting a

pseudonymous complaint). To be clear, the substantial risks facing Plaintiff, were he identified,

are not just exclusion among the Marine Corps’ VMI alumnae. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

Rhode Island, 794 F. Supp. at 74 (quoting Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 161 (N.D. Cal.1981))

(“The common thread running through these cases is the presence of some social stigma or the

threat of physical harm to the plaintiffs attaching to disclosure of their identities to the public

record.”). The retaliation Plaintiff would face can take many forms that will have a substantial

impact on, or harm to, Plaintiff, depending on the authority that the VMI alumna holds. For

example, inter alia, Plaintiff’s peers or superior officers might treat him differently, which may

result in physical harm to Plaintiff; Plaintiff could be given less favorable assignments during the

assignment process; or Plaintiff’s officer evaluation or efficiency reports could be adversely

affected.

The substantial threats to Plaintiff’s physical and mental health, and to his career, warrant

the relief Plaintiff seeks in this case. Through the deliberate indifference of the VMI administration

7
and the ensuing ostracization by most VMI cadets, VMI has already come close to derailing

Plaintiff’s life and military career. Plaintiff wants to be certain that other branches of the VMI

family don’t succeed where the institution itself failed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion to

proceed under pseudonym and order that all documents that identify Plaintiff’s identity are

henceforth sealed.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 28, 2019


/s/ Ryan C. Berry
Ryan C. Berry, VSB 67956
Timothy A. Furin, VSB 92993
Daniel Sage Ward, VSB 45978
WARD & BERRY, PLLC
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 4500
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 331-8160
(202) 331-8162 Fax
ryan@wardberry.com

Counsel for Plaintiff John Doe

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