CASE LAW:

Facts:
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was passed
as an exercise of police power. The said law’s main provisions are the following:
1. a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
2. an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act
or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
3. an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;

Notes by: Maria Resper S. Lagas

JD-WT I
Constitutional Law II
EH303
4. a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry;
5. a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
6. a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
 liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
7. a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, an alien, and in behalf of all other alien residents in the Philippines who are
engaged in retail business, questioned the said law for many reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law;
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue:
1. Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws?
2. Does the law violate the due process of laws?

Held:
1. No. An alien’s stay is for his personal convenience. He/she, in fact, owes allegiance to
his birth country. An alien lacks sympathy, loyalty, and enthusiasm for Filipino
customers and indeed, an alien’s temporary stay in the Philippines is for him to exploit
Filipinos and then go back to his/her original country. The practices resorted to by
aliens in the control of distribution, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities
and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate
happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices,
 manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a
national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the Republic Act No.
1180. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national
over the alien in the retail trade.
The Supreme Court finds that it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted
within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit
of equal protection established by the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the

Notes by: Maria Resper S. Lagas

JD-WT I
Constitutional Law II
EH303
law is a valid exercise of police power since the legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers.
GENERAL RULE: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along
the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens
as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

2. No. The state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied. Petitioner's main argument that retail is a common, ordinary
occupation, and should not prohibited because we are free men is a wrong assumption.
The legislature and the Supreme Court had found that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices. The
law is reasonable and even necessary to free the national economy from alien
dominance. The legislature has the discretion to determine the necessity of an
enactment.

CONCLUSION QUOTE
The law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated.
The law does not violate the due process of
law clause because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident — as a matter of fact it seems not
only appropriate but actually necessary —
and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature,
with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may
 not interfere.

The removal and eradication of the shackles

of foreign economic control and domination,
is one of the noblest motives that a national
legislature may pursue. The framers of the
Constitution could not have intended to
impose the constitutional restrictions of due
process on the attainment of such a noble
motive as freedom from economic control
and domination, thru the exercise of the
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS:
Petitioner the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. - There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
ISSUE:
WON the imposition of tax is harsh and oppressive, and whether the state has the power to impose
such?
RULING:
Petitioner submits that the 30% tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint
of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because
it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is
one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that
it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which
exercises it.
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by
the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry. It was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
"It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that ‘inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation." Taxation has been made the
implement of the state's police power.
1. Nature, scope and characteristics of Police Power as a fundamental and inherent power of the state.
 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such
as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
 "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that ‘inequities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)

FACTS:
On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic
Technology Act of 1992" and Sec 15 of said law states that:
“no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having
obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board”

On September 12, 1995, SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to
comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be
transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available. After
petitioner failed to respond to numerous notifications and her failure to submit her appeal for
rechecking to the PRC of the recent board examination which she took and failed., SLMC issued a
"Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos.On March 2, 1999,
petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.

It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner Santos'
separation from work is her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a
precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from the Board

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certification requirement constitute just cause
for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of tenure and whether the state has
the power to regulate the qualification?

RULING:

Petition is without merit.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may
be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. Practice of medicine has been
closely regulated by the State. The regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.

The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State's inherent
police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The
state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements.

1. Nature, scope and characteristics of Police Power as a fundamental and inherent power of the state.
 Police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in
prescribing the specific requirements.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs. BALITE PORTAL

MINING COOPERATIVE

FACTS:

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal
area, situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Marcoppers acquisition of mining rights
over Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subsequently challenged before this Court in Apex Mining
Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al., however, the Court found that Apex did not comply with
the procedural requisites for acquiring mining rights within forest reservesProduction Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive
Director, docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v. Marcopper Mining
Corporation.

On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133
to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), 8 which in turn applied for an
integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.In due time, the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated
MPSA application of petitioner.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 10 which provided,
among others, that:

The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to,
studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating
agreements…such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said
parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the
nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state
utilization espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted
before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

Meanwhile, on January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases,
setting aside the judgment of the RPA. 12 This MAB decision was then elevated to this Court by way
of a consolidated petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 132475 and 132528.

On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals assailed that the memorandum did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of
the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through
studies. Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are
not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable. Being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the
permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the national interest so
requires. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the memorandum issued by the secretary of DENR divested petitioner’s right to the gold
rush under EP No. 133 and whether the state has police power to do so

RULING
Petition is dismissed. Under no circumstances may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded
as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No.
133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded
when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and
utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or
irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of
the Constitution, 21 since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or
amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. 22cräläwvirtualibrä

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION, INC

FACTS:

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private
residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs
parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the 2 streets is a
concrete perimeter wall approximately 15 feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects
Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its
eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by
iron gates. Point is, Neptune Street, a private owned property was requested by MMDA to open its
gates for public use.

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it
is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to ensure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that
the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there
is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.

Petitioner informed respondent through a notice

ISSUE:

Has the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) the mandate to open
Neptune street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

DOES IT EVEN HAVE POLICE POWER? (Capslock para intense)(To answer this
question, we must first understand what police power is, who has police power and whether
MMDA is political subdivision, a local government unit, or a legislative body)

RULING:
What is police power?
 Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public
safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

Who has the power to exercise police power?

Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.

The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

What is local government unit and what is its functions and limits with regards to police
power?

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law

and has substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state. Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.
Provincial government - sangguniang panlalawigan,
city government - sangguniang panlungsod
municipal government - sangguniang bayan

How did MMDA came to be?

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units;

created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila
Area.The MMC (Metro Manila Council) was the "central government" of Metro
Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services
common to the area. It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were
subject to the MMC's approval.

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were
devolved to the MMA. Not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila”
 Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for
the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was
limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local
boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review of legislation proposed by
the local legislative.
With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration
of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA

Is MMDA a local government unit, a political subdivision?

MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with

legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.

Why is it not a political subdivision?

The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No.
7924, the creation of MMDA failed to do so. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official
elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA

And why is it necessary/relevant to be one?

The MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No.
7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare
of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal
and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

What are the functions and limitations of MMDA? Is the exercise of police power included?

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
 policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.

Why the emphasis that MMDA is of an administrative character and not a political
subdivision important?

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature

Is the present case analogous to the two Sangalang cases? What is the sangalang case?

In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the court upheld a zoning ordinance

issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an
exercise of police power. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along
Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments
in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the
full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated
the commercial from the residential section of the villag

Both Ordinances, Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No.
81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, means that Jupiter Street was not for
the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street
was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for
security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the
"deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Demolition of wall was a legitimate exercise of police
power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning
ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was
warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public
convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion
along the public streets adjacent to the Village.

Is the Sangalang case the same with the present case?

The two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning
ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice sent by
 petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA,

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree
(P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater
powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

BAUTISTA VS. JUINIO

FACTS:
Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista challenged the validity of an energy
conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869 of 1979 (the government’s response to the
protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974) for being allegedly violative of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It states that the use of private motor vehicles with
H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from "[I2:00] a.m. Saturday morning to
5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday” with
the exemption of (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (c) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e)
TC (Tourist Cars). Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the
penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-
specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction.

Petitioners: while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable--energy conservation, the
provision banning the use of H and EH vehicles is unfair, discriminatory, amounting to an arbitrary
classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause.
: Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use
and enjoy their private property while others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted
freedom."
: the ban imposed, in result and effect is class legislation since the rich have the option to
not use their heavy cars but two small cars which would be counterproductive to the purpose of
energy preservation.
ISSUE:
Is LO1 869 AND MC 39 a violation of due process and equal protection clause or is within the
bounds of police power?

RULING:

SC holds the petition without merit.

On due process

Its Whereas clause is not offensive to the due process despite its police power measure may be of
arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character:[Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply availability
underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability
of the country's economy and sustain its developmental growth. What is undeniable is that the
action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be
the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent.

In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed
governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is
settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As
stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ It
would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.'"

On equal protection clause:

Petitioners argued that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles
classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such
category. But to assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination, that finds no support in reason.

5. To identify, demonstrate and analyze how police power may be validly exercised in light of the limitations attached
to it.

 The action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution
(somehow requisite ang appropriateness of response is ruling within the limitation of police
power)
 "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’” (In case due process and police
power conflicts, rule in favor of police power.)

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FACTORAN

FACTS:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers, in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten
the development of mineral resources

EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for
the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-
production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.

DENR issued Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted
into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.”

And Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and
gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and
claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE:

WON DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both
contravene or subvert the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211

RULING:

Regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those
granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the
police power of the State over the sanctity of the contract:

"The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of contracts
is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such
provisions are restricted to contracts which respect property, or some object or value, and confer
rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby
be affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate
and control them.”
The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 is geared towards a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth. The exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary
to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Administrative Order No. 57 does not automatically convert mining leases and agreements to
production-sharing agreements. The use of the term "production-sharing agreement" in the same
provision implies negotiation between the Government and the applicants.

In simpler terms, Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 of the DENR Secretary which effectively
converted existing mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements
within one year from effectivity are valid, inasmuch as the subject sought to be governed by the
questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of E.O 279, and that mining leases or
agreements granted by the State are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the State. And because the purpose of upholding public interest is in line
with article 12, exercise of police power must be given due course. (according to nachura and
sa akong nasabtan)

5. To identify, demonstrate and analyze how police power may be validly exercised in light of the limitations attached
to it.

 The State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public
needs.

AMELIA CABRERA VS. MANUEL LAPID

FACTS:

Amelia M. Cabrera filed a petition to the Office of the Ombudsman against Manuel Lapid,
Fernando Baltazar, Reynaldo F. Cabrera and Superintendent Diony Ventura, respectively, in their
capacities as Governor of Pampanga, Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga and Superintendent of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Region 3, Pampanga.
Petitioner accused respondents the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a
tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. A month after commencing
operations, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond
as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Despite pleas from petitioner,
respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond.

Respondents insisted that the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was erected on the
seashore, at the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. Governor Lapid argued
that DA is the government agency authorized to enter into licensing agreements for fishpond
operations, and the fishpond operation was not covered by a fishpond lease agreement or
application. Governor Lapid also referred to the certification by the Municipal Health Officer of
Sasmuan issued before the actual demolition of the fishpond, describing it as a nuisance per se and
recommending its abatement

Petitioner argued that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the
municipalities.
ISSUES:

WON the demolition in the proper exercise of police power?

RULING:

It was a valid exercise of police power.

Ombudsman ruled that the repealing clause of R.A. No. 7160 expressly repealed only Sec. 2, 6 and
29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704 so that in harmonizing the remaining provisions of P.D.
No. 704 and the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 applicable to the grant of fishery privileges, the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the government agency authorized to grant fishpond
license or permit in areas not identified as municipal waters or not declared as alienable or
disposable by the DENR. Since it appears from DENR records that the subject property has not
been declared disposable or included in areas devoted for fishpond development, the Ombudsman
concluded that the lease agreement entered into by petitioner was void ab initio. In view of the
illegality of the lease agreement, the Ombudsman ruled that its demolition was justified. The
Ombudsman described the demolition as a valid exercise of police power and in accordance with
the provision of Sec. 28 of P.D. No. 704 directing the removal of any fishpen or fishpond that
obstructed the free navigation of a stream or lake. It also upheld the authority of the district health
officer to determine the abatement of a nuisance without need of judicial proceedings.

Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to
the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question
following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman ruled that there was
no violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the words of the Ombudsman, "those
who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve
the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."