ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact,
their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it
was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property,
or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation
of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the
executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not
adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive health be
achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and
population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming
that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population
control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a
birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible
parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the
Constitution
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees
it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the
manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in
the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-
one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed
of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and
the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS

ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series
of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of
its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police
power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of
property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to
Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13]
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the
ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear
showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void
and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting
the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying,
on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms
of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and
equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid
exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section
5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its
corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section
16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the
enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces
of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license
for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its
mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations
from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also
comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit
is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the
following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The
first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due
process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for
the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the
local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the
ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying
alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the
topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the
conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months.
Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty
like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under
Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that
the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of
the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just
compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking
only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial
use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or
by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The
concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or
things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the
object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121]
The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification
must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern
the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and
degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy
the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or
truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm
that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers
from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143]
A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves
the intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January
9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic
Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said
region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in
the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed
law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar
as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails
over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special
law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power
for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities
to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the
Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Ocampo vs HRET G.R. No. 158466, 15 June 2004

Facts: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th
district of Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was
elected for lack of residency in the district and was ordered to vacate his office.
Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he should be
declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be
declared as winner considering that the duly-elected representative is not
eligible for the office.
Ruling: No. The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise to the
right of the candidate who garnered the second highest vote to be declared
winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic precepts of
republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to ascertain the
new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.
OCAMPO VS. HRET

The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes and does not
entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected.[1]

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, filed by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), herein public respondent, committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing in HRET Case No. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs.
Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution[2] dated March 27, 2003
holding that "protestant" (herein petitioner) cannot be proclaimed the duly
elected Representative of the 6th District of Manila since being a second placer,
he "cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates";
and (b) Resolution[3] dated June 2, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.

facts:

On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private
respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected Congressman
of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections. He was
credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over petitioner who
obtained 31,329 votes.

On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral protest[4] against
private respondent, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District
of Manila on the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by
petitioner; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election
returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of
ballots written by one person or two persons. The case was docketed as HRET
Case No. 01-024. Petitioner prayed that a revision and appreciation of the
ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that, thereafter, he be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with counter-
protest[5] vehemently denying that he engaged in massive vote buying. He also
opposed petitioner's allegation that there is a need for the revision and
appreciation of ballots.

After the preliminary conference between the parties on July 12, 2001, the HRET
issued a Resolution[6] limiting the issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying
was committed by private respondent; and second, whether petitioner can be
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of Manila.

Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020, Bienvenido
Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023, Rosenda Ann M.
Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions declaring that private respondent
is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack
of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his office."[7] Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.[8]
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646,[9] which reads:

"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong."
Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified
in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and 01-023, the votes cast for him should not be
counted. And having garnered the second highest number of votes, he
(petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner's

motion to implement the afore-quoted provision.

On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private
respondent was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of
the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of whether petitioner can be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held:

"x x x Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective office. x x x

It is of no moment that there is only a margin of 768 votes between protestant

and protestee. Whether the margin is ten or ten thousand, it still remains that
protestant did not receive the mandate of the majority during the elections.
Thus, to proclaim him as the duly elected representative in the stead of protestee
would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy
as enshrined within our Constitution. In effect, we would be advocating a
massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the voters of the sixth district of
Manila.

Congressional elections are different from local government elections. In local

government elections, when the winning candidate for governor or mayor is
subsequently disqualified, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as the case may
be, succeeds to the position by virtue of the Local Government Code. It is different
in elections for representative. When a voter chooses his congressional
candidate, he chooses only one. If his choice is concurred in by the majority of
voters, that candidate is declared the winner. Voters are not afforded the
opportunity of electing a substitute congressman' in the eventuality that their
first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post
vacant. There can only be one representative for that particular legislative
district. There are no runners-up or second placers. Thus, when the person vested
with the mandate of the majority is disqualified from holding the post he was
elected to, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to
hold another election. x x x

This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative District of Manila will be without
adequate representation in Congress. Article VI, Section 9 of the Constitution,
and Republic Act No. 6645 allows Congress to call a special election to fill up this
vacancy. There are at least 13 months until the next congressional elections,
which is more than sufficient time within which to hold a special election to
enable the electorate of the Sixth District of Manila to elect their representative.

For this reason, the Tribunal holds that protestant cannot be proclaimed as the
duly elected representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila.

In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is unnecessary to rule on the

recount and revision of ballots in the protested and counter-protested
precincts.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to:

x x x x x x
2) DENY protestant's (petitioner) Motion to Implement Section 6, Republic Act
No. 6646 by declaring the votes cast for Mario Crespo as stray votes."
Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that "it is unnecessary to rule on the recount and revision of ballots in
the protested and counter-protested precincts." He maintains that it is the
ministerial duty of the HRET to implement the provisions of Section 6, R.A. No.
6646 specifically providing that "any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted."

In his comment, private respondent counters that what the law requires is that
the disqualification by final judgment takes place before the election. Here,
the HRET Resolutions disqualifying him as Representative of the 6th District of
Manila were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections. He also claims
that the Resolutions are not yet final and executory because they are the
subjects of certiorari proceedings before this Court. Hence, all his votes shall be
counted and none shall be considered stray.

The HRET, in its comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General, merely
reiterates its ruling.

The petition must be dismissed.

The issues here are: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of private respondent
should not be counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646; and (2) whether
petitioner, a second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional elections, can be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia,[10] we expounded
on the application of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there
must be a final judgment before the election in order that the votes of a
disqualified candidate can be considered "stray", thus:
"Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to
be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified
by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in
his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides."
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate
who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the
people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be
the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.[11]

In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost

twenty-two (22) months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Obviously, the
requirement of "final judgment before election" is absent. Therefore,
petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes to be declared the winner.[12] This principle has been reiterated in a
number our decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,[13] ABELLA VS.
COMELEC,[14] BENITO VS. COMELEC[15] and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.[16] As a
matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in
an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate
who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. [17]

In Geronimo vs. Ramos,[18] if the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot
qualify for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is thus
created. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the elections,
he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic
electroral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind
voters' preferences.[19]
At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress
formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the
Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

In the recent case of ENRILE VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,[20] we ruled that
a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. Worth reiterating is our pronouncement in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, thus:[21]

"It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to

pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Leovillo Agustin vs Romeo Edu

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of

Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular
early warning devices•. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional,
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already
equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to
other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy,
nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and
rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the
Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part
of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed
on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway,
there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that
blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car?
Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents.
It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally
identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta
thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set
forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could
be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the
totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In
the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the
past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What
is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the
fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended
to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called
to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads .
. .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his
quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year
before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her
religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has
not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the

recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that
the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism
providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power.

RULING:

“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among
all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA
G.R. No. 134625
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the
doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already
completed the units of course work required and finishd her dissertation and
was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she
committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her
dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr.
Medina.
UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval.
Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and
warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name
from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of
Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz
informed private respondent of the charges against her.
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree.
The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her
Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President,
which request was denied by President
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of
her right to substantive due process.
RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed
heard several times.
Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge
that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her
defense.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed
of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been
denied due process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and
given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written
explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and
the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she
sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have
an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative
context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of
justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of
persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of
Regents.

Tanada vs Angara
Justiciable Question; Theory of Auto-Limitation; Declaration of Principles and
State Policies

TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers,
taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National
Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our
constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of
the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would
not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited
by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and
intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict
or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise
of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of
evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.

Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the
international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages
to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries
can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within
the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which
is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy
rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in
its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent,
WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems
and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and
judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
 principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with
all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power.

Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,
the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
 with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has
entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept
of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly
what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of
the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on
August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August
11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate
was concurring in.
Estrada v. Desierto

FACTS:
 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
 Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends
of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both
houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as
Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of
the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the
ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full
of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles
formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of
all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes
declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief,
Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave
a similar stunning announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his
family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in
any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
 unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It
can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long
as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined
from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or
by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to
the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's
claim of inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.