RE-READING PAULIN HOUNTONDJI’S AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: MYTH AND REALITY

BY IDOKO VINCENT EDACHE

Abstract
This paper revisits Hountondji’s famous critique of ethnophilosophy by re- reading and summarizing
his landmark text, African Philosophy: Myth & Reality and the debates that attended its sometimes
problematic reception by a number of African scholars. Indeed Hountondji’s central contribution to
African philosophy, the critique of ethnophilosophy, is implicated in the problematic of origins, which
can be construed as a quest for foundations, what is indeed philosophical in African thought and what
continues to be the enduring problems and challenges that face the contemporary African philosopher
in considerably harsher milieus and times. The paper ends with some responses to the disquisition.
Introducing Paulin Hountondji’s Discourse
Hountondji in his novel corpus firstly establishes the fact that there is no contention as to the
existence of African Philosophy and that is why he speaks of African Philosophy in the
conjunctive sense of “myth and reality” and not a disjunctive sense of “myth or reality”. He
further notes that what is really the question that begs for an answer is the nature of African
philosophy and this was all the more urgent in the wake of those proponents of African
philosophy who in a bid to advance the course have inadvertently mythicized it, danced to the
piper of their erstwhile colonial masters and hence suppressed it without knowing.

He thus declares the objective of the treatise as a purposeful exploration of the hitherto
contrived notion of African philosophy construed along mythological lines and how it can be
retrieved and applied universally. The first part, which is critical, leads to his famous critique
of ethnophilosophy. In effect, Hountondji needed to unseat the tacitly accepted orthodoxy in
structuring the field of African philosophy. The second part, the constructive alternative,
leads to his discussion of the essentials of a ‘real’ philosophy.

A Popular Concept of African Philosophy

Here Houndonji argues that Placide Tempels’ pioneering text to the ethnophilosophical
movement, “La Philosophie bantoue/Bantoe-filosofie” in 1945 in which he introduces the
Bantu subject (a kind of philosophy were the practitioners were unaware of doing
philosophy) features as a mere anthropological object, a passive presence awaiting the
attentions and ministrations of the European adventurist in material, intellectual and psychic
terms. Thus, a crucial problematic is raised: the colonizer can ‘civilize’ the ‘native’ on the
condition that she spiritually redeems herself and so, ethnophilosophy is at best a pseudo
philosophy. A critique he unveils is that most early ethnophilosophers were clergymen and so
conceived of philosophy in a religious sense and even from the non-clerical authors, we still
see a passionate search for an identity that was denied by their erstwhile colonizers.

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Thus, there is the assumption that culture is imbued with philosophy and philosophy seems to
change its identity once it touches the shores of the African harbor as behind its usage lies the
myth of primitive unanimity but contradictorily, even ethnophilosophers themselves seem to
disagree along different lines of thought. As against the objection of unity in diversity as seen
also in the sciences, Hountondji notes that while contradiction in science is a mark of
progress, contradictions in ethnophilosophical discourses are circular and lacking any base
for experimentation or verification. Thus, African scholars who engage in ethnophilosophy
are no better than their western counterparts in constructing doubtful mythological theories
and depictions of Africa.

Towards a New Concept of “African Philosophy”

On order to expound on what he conceives as what ought to be the true identity of African
Philosophy, Hountondji firstly identified the lack of self-criticism as the covert problem
among the ethnophilosophers. More so, unlike “real” philosophy that consciously and
critically engages its history, ethnophilosophy is a deranged metaphilosophy; a pre-
philosophy masquerading itself as a philosophy and lacking justification. Better put then,
ethnophilosophy rightly belongs to the History of African Literature in general.

This demarcation then assists in drawing a dichotomy among what is an African Philosophy,
non-African Philosophy and African non-philosophy. African philosophy then refers to a
literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems. Hence, the concept
“African” then is an unempirical, geographical and metaphysical one and so
“demythologizing” the idea “Africa” then is simply to free our faculty from prejudices in
order to allow it soar high.

Hountondji’s Final Remarks

Hountondji notes that he is well aware of certain perplexing questions arising from his text
such as the nature of science vis-à-vis philosophy but avers that such questions are outside
the scope of his discourse. He thus proposes that African Philosophy should understand the
ontology of philosophy on a universal scale and attend to the problematic therein rather than
bask itself in private and abstract esoteric dialogue.

Hence he stressed the need to resist the temptation of emphasizing cultural particularism in a
bid to unspoil western skepticism about the existence of African Philosophy and that much
effort should rather be invested in interrogating philosophically based issues from an African

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perspective wherever they may come from; not to be swallowed by these probing but to
develop and improve on such issues as they relate to Africa.

In the final analysis, African philosophy, though surely in existence must then develop a new
“objective” orientation engendered by the political liberty of free speech as seen in any place
where democracy is truly practiced.

Response to Paulin Hountondji’s Disquisition

On a positive note, the paper, by the admission of both the author and readers alike, serves to
define and demarcate the field of African philosophy from what is non-African Philosophy
and what is African non-philosophy. It is best remembered by most people as an attack on
ethnophilosophy and the proposition of a constructive alternative which for him is “real”
philosophy in an African perspective, trailing the universal and “stable” foundations of
scientific progress.

However, some lopsidedness as found in his discourse makes the case for some interesting
counter arguments. In one instance he tries to demarcate and define what African Philosophy
is and in another instance he declines from answering dilemmatic questions bordering on the
nexus of philosophy (African inclusive) and science thus making insufficient and
unsatisfactorily, his definition of African philosophy.

His thoughts also observably bear no political relevance as seen in his attempts to denigrate
ethnophilosophy, wherein he ignores the importance and possibilities inherent in indigenous
African traditions. And so, from the nature of the sharp cutting words he uses in his critique
of ethnophilosophy, one might become suspicious as to whether the real object of his
displeasure is African tradition and not what ethnophilosophers make of it.

Furthermore, one would not be out of place to in some sense charge Hountondji of “elitism,
philosophism and scientism” as seen in the fact that the philosophical stake in Africa is not an
interest that concerns only the “philistine” or “intellectual” strata of the petty bourgeoisie, for
the masses too must have to make their voices heard. And here dialectical materialism
becomes pertinent, with its irreplaceable role as philosophy of praxis and as philosophy of the
oppressed.

In the final analysis, despite the critiques leveled against Hountondji’s views, it still does not
detract from the viability of his work as a watershed; engendering progress in contemporary
development of the African philosophical thought.