TESTATE INTESTATE PROCEEDING

SPOUSES SURIA, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF BRIGIDO M. TOMOLIN, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 157483, June 21, 2007

Facts:

Brigido M. Tomolin sold a parcel of land to the Petitioner Carlos Suria. After the sale, Petitioners
Carlos Suria and his wife Juanita, had the lot subdivided into several parcels. Thus, TCT No. T-
12112 in the name of petitioner Carlos Suria was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. T-12949,
12950, 12951, and 12952 were all issued in the names of petitioners. After two years, Tomolin filed a
complaint for Annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land and cancellation of TCT
No. T-12112 with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. The complaint
alleges, among others, that Tomolin, then seriously ill, and was then persuaded by petitioners into
signing the contract of sale and that they did not pay him the amount agreed upon. Few weeks later,
Tomolin died. He was survived by his
Nieces also the respondents, namely: Damiana Tomolin Perez, Caridad Tomolin Soria, Lucresia
Tomolin Declaro, and Lolita Tomolin Espina. The counsel for Tomolin filed with the trial court a
Notice of Substitution of a Party.

The trial court issued an Order allowing the substitution of the late Tomolin by his heirs, herein
respondents. Consequently, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' Opposition for lack of
merit.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order.
A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied. Thereupon, petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:
WON the heirs of Tomolin may continue to prosecute the action to annul the Deed of Absolute
Sale and to cancel TCT No. T-12112.

Held:
In Gonzales v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[4] we reiterated our long-settled ruling in
Bonilla v. Barcena[5] on how to determine whether an action survives or not, thus:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

In his complaint and amended complaint filed with the trial court, Tomolin prayed for the (1)
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land (2) cancellation of TCT Nos. T-12112,
T-12949, T-12950, T-12951, and T-12952 in the names of petitioners. There can be no dispute that
Tomolin's complaint affects primarily and principally property and property rights. Clearly, the action
survives his death. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's judgment
allowing the substitution of the late Tomolin.

G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

FACT:

Respondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with Jose D.
Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a
drainage system in Republic-Asahis compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City where the
respondent was to pay JDS five million three hundred thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) inclusive of
value added tax for said construction, which was supposed to be completed within a period of
two hundred forty (240) days. In order to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of
its undertakings JDS, shall post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand
pesos (P795,000.00). JDS executed, jointly and severally with petitioner Stronghold Insurance Co.,
Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond No. SICI-25849/g(13)9769.

Respondents engineers called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the
construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the
stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS.

dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by x x x JDS, [respondent] Republic-Asahi
extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said contract, and wrote a letter to
JDS informing the latter of such rescission. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the
contract shall not be construed as a waiver of [respondents] right to recover damages from JDS
and the latter's sureties.

Respondent] then filed a complaint against JDS and SICI. It sought from JDS payment representing
the additional expenses incurred by [respondent] for the completion of the project using another
contractor, and from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally.

According to the Sheriff, submitted to the lower court by Deputy Sheriff Rene R. Salvador,
summons were duly served on defendant-appellee SICI. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. died the
previous year, and JDS Construction was no longer at its address, and its whereabouts were
unknown.
petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the [respondents] money claims against [petitioner
and JDS] have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not the case,
[petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there
was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due
process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no ascertainment
of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. At this point in
time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer
participate in any liquidation.

Issue:

whether or not petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by
the death of Santos, the principal.

Ruling:

The CA ruled that SICIs obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the
death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
The Contract was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of
work and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.

The CA ruled that [p]erformance of the [C]ontract was impossible, not because of [respondents]
fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their
part to make satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to nonperformance of the
same. x x x [P]ursuant to the [S]urety [C] ontract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said
[C]ontract on the part of JDS Construction.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation.[8] Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.[9] Only
obligations that are personal[10] or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by
death.[11] Section 5 of Rule 86[12] of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those
claims are not actually extinguished.[13] What is extinguished is only the obligees action or suit
filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate.[15] Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe
out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use
his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSON

G. R. No. 33281, March 31, 1930
CHIN AH FOO AND YEE SHEE VS. CONCEPCION AND LEE VOO

FACTS:
Judge Concepcion acquitted Chin Ah Foo of the crime of murder on the plea of insanity and
ordered his treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code, with
the admonition that the accused be not permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining
the permission of the court. In compliance with this order, Chin Ah Foo was confined for
approximately two years in the hospital. During this period, his wife and father-in-law exerted
efforts to obtain his release. The family of the victim opposed to the allowance of the motions
contending that Chin Ah Foo was still insane as certified by the doctors. Judge
Concepcion allowed Chin Ah Foo to leave the hospital based on Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal
Code which states that: "When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as
a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court." The family of the victim filed a petition for certiorari questioning the order of the
respondent judge. They argued that under Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, the Director of
Health has authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum.

ISSUE: WON the court permit the insane person to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of
the Director of Health

HELD:

No. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the
Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can
be construed so that both can stand together.

The Director of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal
Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article
8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the
Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger.
Respondent judge exceeded his authority when he issued his orders without first having before him
the opinion of the Director of Health.

HABEAS CORPUS
G.R. NO. 159374, July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN VS. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were

Married for nine years. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter:
Ronnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter quarrel,
petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him
to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

The respondent wife filed a petition for habeas corpus of their three sons in the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner husband filed a memorandum alleging that the wife
is unfit and he also questioned the jurisdiction of the CA claiming that under
Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Acts of 1997”)
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition
for habeas corpus filed by respondent wife.
.

ISSUES: WON the petitioner is right in challenging the CA over the petition for
habeas corpus and insist that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
under R.A. 8369.

HELD: No. The petitioner invokes Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter;
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner is wrong. In Thornton v. Thornton,[7] this Court resolved the issue of the
Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family
courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not
in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively
by
family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary
remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the
writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The
writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction,
conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all
other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.

G.R. NO. 176563, April 02, 2007

LETICIA CAMARA AND MARK CAMARA VS. HON. ERNESTO PAGAYATAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Leticia Camara was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent

judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBP’s failure to
deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided
under the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary
compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 with
the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and to notify the
Court of compliance within such period.

LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office
in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk
of court. However, the respondent judge found LBP’s compliance insufficient
and ordered LBP to place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee,
in the form that is readily withdrawable.

Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies

with such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release
Camara from detention despite LBP’s compliance.

HELD: Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus
does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial court’s
jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is
respondent judge’s refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBP’s compliance
of the full amount of the preliminary compensation.

This is grave abuse of respondent judge’s contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess
of his jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000

NORBERTO FERIA Vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Norberto Feria has been under detention, by reason of his conviction
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide for the jeepney hold-up and killing of
United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. Some twelve
(12) years later, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to
the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City. It was then discovered that the
entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing.

The Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ

Of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this
case.

Held:

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests
on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is
not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the
restraint is illegal.

Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
petitioner’s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court.

Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for
all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so
charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack
by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to
initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No.
3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the
inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished
cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the records were lost afterpetitioner, by his own admission, was
already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same
incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with
Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm, the
records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.

G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

ERLINDA ILUSORIO vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER AND SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO

FACTS: Erlinda Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. Erlinda and
Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
thirty years. Thereafter, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
Upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200
mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in
New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment. Consequently, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

ISSUE: WON the petition of habeas corpus is proper remedy.

HELD: No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must
be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

G.R. No. 125901, March 08, 2001

Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing vs. CA

FACTS: Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing, husband and wife, have six children. The youngest
is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. According to
Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was
on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-
month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under her care, as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. She was
told that her employer went out for a stroll and was told to come back later. She returned to Angelita's
house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida and her husband looked for their missing son in other places. However, despite
their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita. Thus, she wen to to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw
her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy was already named
John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to
do so.
The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses. One of whom is Benjamin
Lopez, the brother of Tomas Lopez. He, declared that his brother, could not have possibly fathered
John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile.
The trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children,
the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The Court of Appeals however reversed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
HELD: Yes. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented
by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted
that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970,
before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that
ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between
1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not
presented in court. No clinical records, log
book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the
birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were
legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". This false entry puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court,
the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between
a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless
to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to
observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the
son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said
child.

G.R. Nos. 138268-69, May 26, 1999

JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL AND EDWIN MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The case before us is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jury Andal,
Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza, all convicted of rape with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 148-94 and 149-94. The case before us is a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza, all
convicted of rape with homicide.

The petitioners rely on the argument that the trial court was "ousted" of
jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was
made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the
accused. The petitioners cite the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No.
34[2], wherein in a separate opinion, Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that "Once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered
the judgement is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention."

ISSUE: WON the petition of writ of habeas corpus is the right remedy.

HELD: NO. We agree with petitioners that the extra-ordinary writ of habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation of the
petitioners' constitutional rights and that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
this review.

However, in this case, the court find that there was no violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due
process of law. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an attempt at a second
motion for reconsideration of a final decision of the Court, disguised as one for
habeas corpus. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a
result of a valid accusation, trial, and judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial. The factual milieu does not show a
mistrial or a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.

The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to try the case. The Court subsequently
affirmed the decision based on a careful consideration of the evidence presented
both by the prosecution and the defense.