Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) vs. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc. (PBMCI) (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 | 1973-06-05
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization ( PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union, composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
(PBMCI).
On March 1, 1969, PBMEO decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March
4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.)
as well as those in the regular second (from 7
A.M. to 4 P.M.) and and third shifts (from 8
A.M. to 5 P.M.). They informed the company -
PBMCI - of their proposed demonstration.
A meeting was called by PBMCI on March 3,
1969. The union was informed that any
demonstration should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the company. For which
reason, Atty. C.S. de Leon, as PBMCI's
spokesperson, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the
first shifts, who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA
and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike.
Another meeting was called in the afternoon
where PBMCI appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that the workers for the first
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for
work in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' All those who will not follow this
warning of the Company shall be dismissed.
PBMEO proceeded with the demonstration as
planned. PBMCI filed charges in the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) against the union
members and officers composing the first shift
for violating the CBA provisions on
strike/lockout.
The CIR issued an Order finding PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and its officers
(petitioners) as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and
were, as a consequence, considered to have
lost their status as employees of the company.
Petitioners claim that they received on
September 23, 1969 the aforesaid order and
that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday, a motion
for reconsideration (MR) of said order.
PBMCI averred that petitioners received the
order on September 22, 1969, thus the MR was
filed beyond the 5 day period under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations. The CIR dismissed the MR of
petitioner for being pro forma and for being
filed out of time.
Petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for relief
from the dismissal. Without waiting for any
resolution on their petition for relief, they filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Held:
Primacy of right of free expression and of
assembly over property rights
1. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression as well as their right of assembly and
of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution. The
pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence
of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning
to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
2. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions, and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusion
3. The rights of free expression, free assembly
and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights
also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
4. The superiority of these freedoms over
property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between
the means employed by the law and its object
or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent.
The mass demonstration by the petitioners was
not in violation of the CBA
5. The demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer. Said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their
right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
against the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig.
6. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence
of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment
of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, as "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.
7. The mass demonstration staged by the
employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, for such an
injunction would be trenching upon the
freedom of expression of the workers, even if it
legally appears to be an illegal picketing or
strike. The CIR concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike
"as the same is not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is a concerted act and
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work.
PBMCI is guilty of unfair labor practice
8. Because of the refusal on the part of PBMCI
to permit all its employees and workers to join
the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on
their freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances, the company committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 thereof guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concerted activities for .
. . mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-
1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three." The threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from
joining the mass demonstration.
Dismissal of the union leaders was a denial of
social justice
9. The dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the
workers for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor . . ." The Court of Industrial
Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man.
10. Even if the questioned Court of Industrial
Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders
of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The appropriate penalty if it
deserves any penalty at all should have been
simply to charge said one-day absence against
their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the
eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the
Union leaders depend on their wages for their
daily sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact that it is
a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same
time strengthening the oppressive hand of the
petty tyrants in the localities.
A violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction
11. It has been established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment
is null and void and confers no rights. Both the
Court of Industrial Relations andPBMCI
trenched upon the constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to
such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had
been subjected by the municipal police. Having
violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Procedural rules cannot prevail over the
Constitution
12. The exercise and enjoyment of their rights
must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court of Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegated
legislative power, when even a law enacted by
Congress must yield to the untrammelled
enjoyment of these human rights. Otherwise,
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal.
13. The motion for reconsideration was filed on
September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from
notice on September 22, 1969 of the order.
Does the mere fact that the MR was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by
the Constitution, is not only incompatible with
the basic tenet of constitutional government
that the Constitution is superior to any statute
or subordinate rules and regulations, but also
does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional
right over the Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
CIR may suspend application of its procedural
rules as may be equitable and just under the
circumstances
14. The suspension of the application of
Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with reference to the case at bar, is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, the C.I.R. charter. Under Section 20,
'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its
rules or procedure and shall have such other
powers as generally pertain to a court of justice:
Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question
or controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the Court shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable.' By this provision,
the industrial court is disengaged from the
rigidity of the technicalities applicable to
ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted
to the specific relief demanded by the parties
but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts
that may give rise to future disputes. (see Ang
Tibay v. C.I.R)
5 day period to file MR is unreasonable
15. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by
the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the
ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor.
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (1994) stating that the CHR's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political
Facts:
rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
A "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo
this case (were) not civil and political rights,
in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
(but) their privilege to engage in business.”
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
In an Order, the CHR cited the petitioners in
sent to the private respondents (being the
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the
officers and members of the North Edsa
stalls despite the "order to desist", and it
Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
imposed a fine of P500 on each of them. In a
notice, the respondents were given a grace-
separate Order, the CHR denied the petitioners'
period of three days (up to 12 July 1990) within
motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for
which to vacate the questioned premises of
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
North EDSA. Respondents were informed that
recourse to the Supreme Court.
their stalls should be removed to give way to
the "People's Park".
Held:
On 12 July 1990, the respondents, led by their
Commission on Human Rights is a fact-finding
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
body, and does not exercise quasi-judicial
with the CHR asking the CHR Chairman Bautista
powers
for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the
1. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was
demolition of the private respondents' stalls,
created by the 1987 Constitution. It was
sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
formally constituted by then President Corazon
EDSA.
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163 in the
exercise of her legislative power at the time.
The CHR issued an Order, directing the QC
The CHR replaced the Presidential Committee
Mayor's office (petitioners) "to desist from
on Human Rights. The powers and functions of
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
the CHR are defined by Sec. 17, Art. XIII of the
EDSA pending resolution of the
1987 Constitution.
vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
2. The CHR theorizes that the intention of the
appear before the CHR.
members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. However,
Convinced that on 28 July 1990, the petitioners
in Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, the
carried out the demolition of private
court stated:
respondents' stalls, the CHR ordered the
"The most that may be conceded to the
disbursement of financial assistance of not
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
more than P200,000 in favor of the private
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
respondents to purchase light housing materials
and make findings of fact as regards claimed
and food under the Commission's supervision
human rights violations involving civil and
and again directed the petitioners to "desist
political rights. But fact finding is not
from further demolition, with the warning that
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
violation of said order would lead to a citation
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
for contempt and arrest.
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have."
Scope of the CHR's investigative powers is
limited t0 “human rights violations involving
civil and political rights"
3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
as well as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights
can be understood to include those that relate
to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual,
along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
4. Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate,
on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights”
5. The term "civil rights" has been defined as
referring "(t)o those (rights) that belong to
every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of
the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil
action." Also quite often mentioned are the
guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches
and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
6. The term “political rights” refer to the right
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.
7. Recalling the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus
its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.
In any event, the delegates did not apparently
take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen
it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.
8. In the particular case at hand, what are
sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a
land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park." More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which,
this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life
and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It
is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its
is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking
at the standards discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we
are not prepared to conclude that the order for
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the private respondents can fall
within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
Scope of CHR's contempt powers apply only to
violations of its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers
9. On its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority
in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court."
10. That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power
to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess.
CHR has no power to issue injunctive writs
11. The constitutional provision directing the
CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need
protection' may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that
were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law'. It is never
derived by implication. (see EPZA vs CHR)
12. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and
legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper courts
on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued `by the judge of any court in which the
action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available
only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.
13. The Commission does not have legal
standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Ramas and
Dimaano
Facts:
Upon herassumption to office following the
EDSA Revolution, then President Aquinoissued
Executive Order No. 1 creating the
PresidentialCommission on Good Government
(PCGG). Pursuant to its mandate to recover
allill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives,subordinates
and close associates, PCGG created an AFP Anti-
Graft Board toinvestigate corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active serviceor
retired.
The AFPBoard investigated reports of
unexplained wealth of Major General Ramas,
the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986 (with the rank ofMajor
General) and filed a petitionfor forfeiture
against him and his office clerk and alleged
mistress, ElizabethDimaano.
Duringthe trial, respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the PCGGdoes not
have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers byreason of mere position held
without a showing that they are"subordinates"
of former President Marcos.
Moreover,during the raid conducted
onDimaano’s residence, there were items
seized that were not includedin the search
warrant. Respondents therefore seek these
items to beexcluded from evidence for being
illegally seized.
Notably, the search and seizure was conducted
onMarch 3, 1986 or five days after the EDSA
revolution. According to the Republic, the
items seizedare admissible since at the time of
their seizure, private respondents did notenjoy
any constitutional right. What was in place at
the time of the seizurewas a revolutionary
governmentand it effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which
wasthe basis of respondents’ exclusionary right.
Held:
PCGG Jurisdiction
1. PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and
cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
a. Ramas is not a‘subordinate’ as
the term is contemplated under EO
No. 1.
b. Mere position heldby a military
officer does not automatically make
him a "subordinate"as this term is
used in EO No.1 absent a showing
that he enjoyed closeassociation
with former President Marcos.
c. There must be a prima
facie showing that Ramas unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association orrelation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
d. Such closeassociation is
manifested either by Ramas'
complicity with former
PresidentMarcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by
the deposed President or byformer
President Marcos' acquiescence in
Ramas' own accumulation of ill-
gottenwealth if any.
2. The proper government agencies, and not
the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute
forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No.
1 and its amendments. The preliminary
investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986
falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with
the Solicitor General.
3. The right of the State to forfeit unexplained
wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel
Rights under theRevolutionary Government
(Legality of the seizure)
4. The Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum
a. The EDSA Revolution took place
on February 23-25, 1986. The
INTERREGNUM refers toperiod
after the actualand effective take-
over of power by the revolutionary
government following thecessation
of resistance by loyalist forces up
to March 24, 1986 -- immediately
before the adoption ofthe
Provisional Constitution).
b. During the interregnum, a person
could not invokeany exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither aconstitution nor
a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum During theinterregnum,
the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were
thesupreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and
scope of suchdirectives and orders.
one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of his
property.”
b. Although the signatories to the Declaration
did notintend it as a legally binding document,
being only a declaration, the Courthas
interpreted the Declaration as part of the
‘generally accepted principlesof international
law’ (customaryinternational law) and binding
on the State. Thus, the
revolutionarygovernment was also obligated
under international law to observe therights of
individuals under the Declaration.
6. After the EDSA Revolution, theresulting
government was a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution orlegal limitations
except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government,as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed underinternational law.
7. The search warrant, issued duringthe
interregnum, was valid. However, the seizure of
the items not included inthe warrant was void,
unless these items are contraband per se, which
they arenot.

5. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum

the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration), almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.

a. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is

asignatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “no