G. Ryle y A. Ayer - Internal Relations

INTERNAL RELATIONS.
By M R . G. R Y L E AND M R . A. J. AYER.
I — M R . G. RYLE
T H E question whether relations are internal or intrinsical

to their terms is not univocal. For these adjectives are
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not merely metaphorical but are metaphors capable of
several different non-metaphorical translations.
I do not think that it would serve the ends of a sympo-
siastic discussion such as we are engaged in to probe too
closely into the interpretation of Bradley's obscure utter-
ances on the question, nor yet of the more or less dissimilar
views of Bosanquet, Joachim, Royce and McTaggart. For
I suppose we want to discuss philosophical and not
historical or hermeneutic questions. A local piety does,
however, induce me to make a brief prefatory remark or
two about Bradley's views before coming on to the philo-
sophical questions proper.
It is clear that both in his " Principles of Logic " and in
his " Appearance and Reality " Bradley is partly expound-
ing, partly expanding and partly criticizing theories of
Herbart. I am not well acquainted with Herbart's rather
odd form of Monadology, but I think that it was Bradley's
interest in this metaphysic and in the logical views which
underlie it which made it important for him (and for sub-
sequent English philosophy) to argue, after Lotze, for the
following points :—
(1) Some relational propositions are true and are not
analysable into complexes of attributive propositions—
meaning by an attributive proposition a proposition stating
that a certain particular has a certain quality. And things
are related to one another just as " really " as they have
qualities (though this is not saying very much).
(2) Relations are not substances ; or relations are only
exemplified in such facts as that something is in a certain
relation to something else.
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 155
(3) The fact that something is in a certain relation to

something else is often and perhaps always a sine qua non of
one or both of the somethings having at least one further
character.
I think that these three propositions are true ; and I

think too that very often when Bradley called relations
" internal " or denies that they are " external," he only

means that one or other of these propositions is true. So
that when he says that relations are not external, he some-
times only means that Herbart's Monadology is false on
one or other of these scores.
But sometimes he certainly has more in mind than this,
and is maintaining one or two or all of three other theories
which do not, I hope to show, follow from these innocent
three propositions about relations. And when he and his
followers argue to Monism or the Coherence Theory of
Truth from the internality of relations, they are, I think,
arguing from premisses about relational propositions which
are false.
I come now to the philosophical questions themselves.
And in what follows I shall frequently be using the sub-
stantive " relation " or " relations " when in strict accuracy
I should speak rather of the fact that something is in a
certain relation to something else ; I shall not adopt Moore's
distinction between relations and relational properties and
should, if required, distinguish instead between determin-
able and determinate relational propositions or facts and
between either of these and the forms of relational proposi-
tions or facts.
I am going to put forward and discuss one of the possible
translations of the proposition that relations are internal
to their terms, which can be made quite unambiguous.
It is not the only possible translation, but it is one which
it is important to have clear before we consider others.
The pair of terms " internal " and " external " might be
used as synonyms of the terms " essential " and " acci-
dental," and these can be made to have a perfectly clear
sense. For we can say that the having of one character
156 G. RYLE.
is essential to the having of another, and we can say that

the having of one character is accidental to having another.
For example, when one character, such as being extended,
is a logical sine qua non of another, say being square, then
being extended is essential to being square. And as from
something's being oblong it does not follow that it is green,
we can say that being green is accidental to being oblong.
In this use of the terms, it only makes sense to say that x is

essential or accidental to y when x and y signify the having
of characters. We cannot, in this use, say that Socrates
is essential or accidental to anything, or that something is
essential or accidental to Socrates, but only that Socrates'
being a man is essential to his being a husband, or that the
fact that Socrates is ugly is accidental to the fact that he is
a philosopher.
Now there are lots of cases where the having of one
character is in this way a sire qua non of the having of
another, as well as lots of others where the having of one
character is not a sine qua non of the having of another.
Many relations are internal to other characters in this way,
and many external to other characters. Being the husband
of Xanthippe may be a sine qua non of being responsible for
her debts and not be a sine qua non of being fond of her.
But so may a quality be internal to a relation or a relation
to a state or a dispositional property to a relation. Inter-
nality and externality (in this sense) to other characters
is not the monopoly of relations.
Whenever it is true that unless something is so and so,
it can't logically be such and such, being so and so is internal
or essential to or a sine qua non of being such and such. And
whenever it is true that a thing may be such and such
whether or not it is so and so, being so and so is external
or accidental to being such and such. Essentialness, in this
sense, is the inverse of an incompatibility ; for if the pro-
position " this is red " is incompatible with the proposition
" this is not coloured " or " not extended," then being
coloured or extended is essential to being red. And if
" this is red " is compatible with " this is not square," then
being square is accidental to being red.
Well, then, on this interpretation " relations are internal

to their terms " means one of two things. Either it means
(1) that if something is in a certain relation to something
else, their being so related is a logical sine qua non of each
of the things having at least one of its other characters ; or
it means (2) that if something is in a certain relation to some-
thing else, their being so related is a logical sine qua non of
each of the things having any of its other characters.

Either it means (1) that if Socrates was not Xanthippe's
husband, then at least one further proposition about Socrates
would be false and at least one further proposition about
Xanthippe would be false ; or it means (2) that if Socrates
was not Xanthippe's husband, then none of the other pro-
positions which are in fact true about Socrates and
Xanthippe could be true.
Let us consider the more economical interpretation
first.
It is certainly very often the case that if two things
which are in fact in a certain relation were not so related,
each would then be without at least one further character.
If I had never met Smith, I would not be fond of him or in
the habit of thinking of him. If I were not smaller than
Jones, I should not be frightened of him. And so on.
And it may be the case that for every character, rela-
tional or non-relational, that a thing possesses, there is some
further character which it also possesses, which it could not
possess but for the possession of the former. (It might, e.g.,
be the case that God knows or rejoices in every fact about
everything and that his knowing or rejoicing that a given
fact obtains entails that the fact does obtain. Then every
fact would be internal to another fact.)
I cannot prove that every character is in this way in-
ternal to some other character. But even if it is so, the
doctrine that every relation and in general every character
is in this way internal to some further character would
lead to no exciting consequences. It would still leave
it open for this or that relation or, in general, this or
that character to be external or accidental to some other
character.
158 G. RYLE.
What would be of serious—even disastrous—logical and

metaphysical importance would be a proof that relations
are absolutely internal in the sense that if any two (or more)
things whatsoever are in any relation whatsoever, their
being in that relation is a logical sine qua non of their terms
having any of their other characters. And sometimes it
does seem that Bradley and his followers are interpreting
in this way the proposition that relations are internal to their

terms, since some of their conclusions about the universe
do not seem to follow unless this is among their premisses.
(McTaggart's principle of Extrinsic Determination is some-
thing different, and sometimes Bradley seems to be half-
consciously assuming the truth of something like McTaggart's
principle and not that of the proposition that relations are
absolutely internal in this sense.)
Now it seems to me to be demonstrably false that any
relation is the logical sine qua non of all the other characters
of its terms.
(1) Simple inspection of certain special cases shows us
that the doctrine is false. For suppose two things A and B
are similar in being both of the same shade of green. So
far from its being the case that A's being green depends
on or has for its logical sine qua non the fact that it is of the
same colour as B, A and B would not be similar in colour
unless A was, say, pea-green and B was pea-green.
The quality is here the sine qua non of the relation and
not vice versa. And this is often the case. For Smith to
be running faster than Jones, Smith must be running and
Jones must be running.
(2) If one thing A was in a certain relation to another
B, say that of being north of it, it would follow, on this
doctrine, that any change of relative position would neces-
sitate a wholesale change of all the other characters of both
of them, colour, temperature, shape, size, elasticity, and
solubility in sulphuric acid. For otherwise a character
which survived the change of position would have belonged
to its possessor whether or not it was north (or south) of
the other, which is what we meant by calling a relation
external to a character. But in fact there is no inference
from the compass-bearings of objects to their colours, shapes,

sizes, etc. Moreover, the determinable character of being
somewhere or other in space could not, on this doctrine,
survive the change of place. So the universal proposition
would have to be true that whatever is in space, is north
of B, which is absurd.
(3) It would follow, too, from the doctrine so rendered,
that no universal could have more than one instance, or

that no two things could be similar in any respect. For if
for any particular whatsoever there is at least one unique
description, and if, as I think, for a description to be unique
it must contain at least one relational predicate which is
predicable of no other particular, then the fact that a given
particular is and is alone in this relation would have to be
a sine qua non of all its other qualities, states, dispositional
properties, etc. So nothing else could have any of these
qualities, states, dispositional properties, etc. Or, to put
it the other way round, if two particulars were in any
respect similar, then for the doctrine to be true it would
have to be the case that every relation in which the one
particular stood to everything else would have also to hold
between the other particular and those terms. But as the
one particular must stand to the other in at least one rela-
tion in which the latter cannot stand to itself (e.g., distance
from it), the condition cannot be fulfilled. So, if the two
are similar in a certain respect, there must be at least one
relation which is external to their having the character in
respect of which they are similar.
(4) There are plenty of cases in which two characters
are essential to each other. If something has some shape
or other, it has some size or other, and some position or
other and vice versa. O r if Smith is twice the height of Jones,
Jones must be half the height of Smith and vice versa. But
for the whole-hearted doctrine of the internality of relations
(on this interpretation) to be true, all the relations in which
a thing stands would have to be the sine qua nons of all.
Otherwise some relations would be external to some other
relations. But it is clear that most relations are not in this
way the converses of most others. From the comparative
160 G. R Y L E .
sizes of two things nothing follows about their comparative

temperatures or positions.
(5) It would follow, lastly, that no laws could hold of
particulars nor even be thought to hold ; nor could
propositions of the form, " most A's are B," or " many
A's are B," be true or be thought to be true. For it is
obvious that many rabbits (if there are rabbits) live in
different places and at different dates and in different

circumstances from many other rabbits. So these differ-
ences of relations should result in there being no proposi-
tions being true of all or even many of them. For other-
wise it will be true that many things, as being rabbits, have
such and such characters whether or not they live on the
Berkshire Downs, and this would be a case of a relation
being in this sense external or accidental to some other
characters.
These arguments seem to me to prove that relations
are not in this sense internal to their terms ; or that rela-
tions do not, in McTaggart's language, intrinsically deter-
mine all the other characters of their termsi
And I do not think that it is possible to escape this con-
clusion by either of two not unfashionable expedients. One
is to say that if we only knew more or if we only knew every-
thing we should then see that and how relations are the
logical sine qua nons of all the other characters of their terms.
Against this I am maintaining that we can and do now
know that some relations are not essential to some of the
other characters of these terms.
The other expedient is to say that relational propositions
are " in the end " not true or even, literally, false. What
they say is the case cannot really be the case. I do not
know what this means ; but at least it cannot support
the conclusion that relations are internal. For, on this
interpretation, to call a relation internal is to say that if
something were not in a certain relation to something else,
neither of its terms could have any of their other characters.
But if relational propositions cannot be " really " true,
this protasis cannot " really" imply this or any other
apodosis.
Before dropping this way of interpreting the internality

theory, I want to show that exactly the same interpretation
can be given to two other forms of words in which the
doctrine is sometimes propounded.
(a) It is sometimes put by saying that the relations in
which a thing is arc parts of the " nature " of the thing, or
that a thing's nature would be different if it was not in a
relation that it actually is in.

(b) And it is sometimes put by saying that the relations
in which a thing is help to make it " what it is " ; or that a
thing would not be what it is if it were not in a relation
that it actually is in.
Now in either of these two forms the proposition
'" relations are internal to their terms " could mean merely
that if we had a complete list of a thing's predicates, its
relational predicates would be items in the list. And this
tautology was, perhaps, worth while for Bradley to voice,
if Herbart's view was that the whole nature of a " Real "
was statable in attributive propositions (whether one or
several makes no odds). But this proposition is to us
innocuous and uninteresting.
Or, secondly, either of these ways of stating the inter-
nality theory might merely amount to saying that every
relation is essential (in our sense) to at least one further
character of each of its terms.
This might be true, though I know no proof of it. But
it has no important consequences and is compatible with
some or all relations being external or accidental to some
other characters.
Or, thirdly, either of these ways of Stating the inter-
nality theory might be another way of stating the absolute
internality theory with which we have already dealt. For
it might mean that if a thing is in a certain relation, that
relation is in suck a way part of the thing's nature that the
thing's nature would be in every way different if it were not
in that relation. And on the other formula the phrase
" what the thing is " may simply be a new name for " all
the thing's characters " ; so to say that in a different
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162 G. RYI.E.
relation the thing would not be what it is, could mean that
all its other characters have this relation for their logical
sine qua non.
And this we have seen is false.
But incidentally it seems to me improper to speak
absolutely of the nature of a particular (unless we are
referring to the complex of psychological dispositions in
virtue of which, for example, we call Socrates good or ill-

natured) . We can properly speak of the nature of triangles
or bicycles, or even, at a pinch, of the nature of this par-
ticular as a triangle or as a bicycle. In this sense we can
sensibly ask whether a certain character belongs to the
nature of bicycles, or to the nature of this as a bicycle.
But it seems to me worse than a mistake in English diction
to speak of the nature of Socrates or this pen absolutely,
that is without the complementary reference to a character
to be analysed, such as Socrates qua philosopher or this
qua a pen. McTaggart, I know, does deliberately use
the term " nature " as the name for the sum of the qualities
and relations of a particular, and I dare say Bradley and
some of his followers do so too. But it seems to me not
merely bad English, but a dangerous usage ; for the fact
that we can, in the other sense, discuss whether a certain
character is part of the nature of a certain " universal "
(as whether having pneumatic tyres is part of the nature
of a bicycle) does suggest that we can properly ask whether
a certain character is a necessary part of the nature of
Snowdon. And this gives a verbal plausibility to such
theories as McTaggart's principle of Extrinsic Determina-
tion or the affiliated theory of the internal] ty of relations
with which I must next deal.
We must turn now to quite another sense in which
relations are said to be internal to their terms. It said that
if A is in a certain relation to B then A would not be what
it is if it were not in that relation—and " be what it is "
means here not, as before, have the characters that it has
but be the thing that it is. Or, to put it another way, if
A is in a certain relation to B, anything that is not in that
relation to B is of logical necessity other than A—" other "
meaning not " differing in some or all characters from A "

but " being numerically different from A."
But I am at a loss with regard to this way of taking the
theory that relations are internal to their terms not so much
from failing to grasp the arguments for this conclusion but
from failing to make sense of the conclusion itself. For
I cannot satisfy myself that there is such a " predicate " as
" being the particular that it is " or " not being the par-

ticular that it is," and, consequently, I cannot understand
what is being said when we are told that if something was
not in a certain relation it would not be what it is.
First of all, there is no difficulty in having for the pre-
dicate of a proposition a definite description. I can
certainly wonder if " this is the face that launched a
thousand ships," or assert it or deny it. But " being the
so and so " is just the having of a complex character, a
character which is unshareable, indeed, for if anything has
it only one thing can do so, but it is a character none the
less. But for this interpretation " being the thing that it is "
must not be a descriptive phrase signifying a character. To
take an example. This is above that and, for this doctrine
to be true, if this were not above that, this would not be this.
Or again, if Socrates were not Xanthippe's husband,
Socrates would not be Socrates. Now " being this " or
" being Socrates " (taking " Socrates " to be a logically
proper name) certainly do not signify the having a quality,
the being in a state, the being of a kind, or the having a
dispositional property. Is it plausible to say that it signifies
the being in a relation ? If so, " this is this " must be an
assertion of identity and so be the short for " this is identical
with this," and " this is not or would not be this " must be
the short for " this is or would be numerically other than
this." And, it may be asked, what is wrong with the
ordinary doctrine that identity and otherness are bona fide
relations ?
I am not sure of this point, but I am not satisfied that
" this is (or is not) identical with this " is a significant
proposition. To what question could it be the answer ?
Or if I am acquainted with this and with that what
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164 G. R Y L E .
information could I require to give mc an intellectual motive

for asking Is this other than that or not ?
I am not, of course, suggesting that there are no uses for
the terms " same " and " other." I can want to know
on hearing that my room has been visited twice in an after-
noon whether the first visitor was the same person as the
second or someone else. Knowing, that is, that someone
visited my rooms at 3.0 p.m. and that someone visited my

rooms at 4.0 p.m., I can wonder whether anyone both
visited my rooms at 3.0 p.m. and visited them at 4.0 p.m.
Or, to take a slightly different case, knowing that some face
launched a thousand ships, I can wonder if this is or is not
that face.
But it seems to mc nonsense to ask if a particular is or
is not something else than itself, and nonsense, consequently,
to argue that a particular would be something else than itself
if it were not in a certain relation.
But even if I am wrong about this, the doctrine turns
out not to be in principle different from the doctrine that wc
have always discussed and I hope disposed of. For if " this
is identical with this "' is a relational proposition (which I
contest), then to say that if this were not in a certain other
relation it would not be in this alleged relation of identity
to this is simply to say that one relation is in our original
sense internal or essential to another. And while there is
no general objection to one relation being internal to
another, there seems no way of proving in general that any
sort of relation whatsoever must be internal to this (alleged)
relation of self-identity, and most people who believe that
self-identity is a relation would argue that it is patently
internal to any of the other relations that its term may be in.
But there still remains to be considered the view that
a particular in a certain relation would not be the particular
that it is, if it were not in that relation, where the expression
" it would not be the particular that it is " is rendered not
as a relational proposition but as some sort of attributive
proposition. That is, the proposition " if so and so, A
would not be A " is interpreted as being not of the form
" if so and so, A would not be identical with A," but simply
INTERNAL RELATIONS, 165
" . . . , A would not be A." " Being A " and not " being
identical with A " is the alleged predicate. And the theory
holds that relations are internal in the sense that A's being
A depends on or entails its being in a given relation to
something else. (I am taking " A " to be the logically
proper name or designation of a particular.)
Now, for this view to be true or false, it would have to be
significant to predicate a logically proper name or designa-

tion of a logically proper name or designation ; and it
would have to be significant to assert or deny that this was
this ; and the question " is anything this ? " would have
to mean something. But apart from the philosophical con-
sideration that such alleged propositions and questions
would contain no universals, it seems to me clear on inspec-
tion that they assert or ask just nothing at all. " This " is
not a predicate, and a sentence in which it pretends to
function as one is meaningless. So there could be no such
dispute as to whether this's being this does or does not
depend on its being in one or other of its relations.
I should perhaps just point out that my belief that
the question " Is this this ? " or " Is that not that ? " is
nonsensical involves just the same scepticism about
McTaggart's Principle of Extrinsic Determination. And
on this point I should say that I completely agree with
Professor Broad's way of disposing of this alleged principle.
For he shows that the principle amounts to this. A (" A "
being a logically proper name) has a certain character C.
If A were not C, A would not exist, since whatever was not
C would be other than A. But Professor Broad properly
points out that existence-propositions with logically proper
names for their subjects are meaningless. So it is meaning-
less to say " if so and so, A would not exist" or " if so and
so, A would exist.'"
I shall wind up this part of my paper by a summary of
the relevant things which I think are true.
(1) Some relational propositions state facts about their
terms, i.e., are true, and are not analysable into attributive
propositions. And I think that often Bradley was only
trying to say this, as against Herbart, but not being quite
166 G. RYLE.
cured of the superstition that all propositions are attributives

fell back to stating it by saying that relations really do
qualify or belong to their terms or are parts of their nature.
(2) Relations are not substances or, to put it loosely in
another way, a relational proposition about Socrates and
Xanthippe mentions two particulars and not three. Rela-
tions are only exemplified in the fact that terms are related.
(3) Relations are often and perhaps always internal

to or logical sine qua nons of some of the other characters
(relational or non-relational) of their terms ; but they are
often and I think always in the same way external to some of
the characters of their terms. In particular, some non-
relational character is generally if not always the logical
sine qua non of a relation.
(4) Relations are not absolutely internal in the sense
that if one thing is related to another, that relation is the
logical sine qua non of all the other characters of both the
terms.
(5) It is not the case or else it does not even make sense
to say that a particular would not be the particular that it
is if it were not in a relation that it actually is in.
But so far, 1 have not said a word about causation or
non-logical necessitation. And for several reasons I must
not shirk at least opening a discussion on this matter, though
I have myself no hope of closing it. For some people hold
that causal laws do state logical implications or else assert
" connections " which contain logical implications or else
assert " connections " which are homogeneous with or a
species of logical connections. And plenty of people, what-
ever their views on this matter, believe that everything in
the world is causally conditioned by everything else, in such
a way that nothing that exists or occurs could (causally)
have been quite what it is had anything else in the world
been different. So that whether or not all relations are
internal, at least all things and events are internally related.
(I think holders of the theory that all relations are internal
sometimes confuse their theory with this one. They
certainly use arguments which if valid would only establish
that everything is causally conditioned by everything else.)
Now it does not seem to me to be a question proper for

philosophers to discuss whether the universe is one big clock
—whether, that is, everything that is or occurs is causally
dependent for some or all of its characters on everything
else that is or occurs. If we deem it to be the function of
the experimental scientist to discover what is the cause or
effect of what, we ought, I think, to leave it to him to dis-
cover whether some states of affairs in nature are causally

independent of some others or not. It would be presumptuous
for us to ostracize a priori this or that scientific hypothesis.
It should, however, be mentioned that the one-big-clock
theory so far from being in harmony with our ordinary
beliefs is in direct conflict with them. For we ordinarily
believe in special laws, e.g., that unsupported bodies fall at
such and such a rate of acceleration, which laws seem any-
how to exclude not to include reference to most of the states
of most of the things in the world. O u r belief in special
laws may be, doubtless, so doctored as to become consistent
with the other view that the cause of a given state of affairs
can be nothing short of the whole state of the universe at
the previous moment. But the doctoring is required.
But it is a philosophical task to enquire what sort of a
fact, if any sort, is stated by those propositions which we
call laws—what, for example, we mean by the " if" in the
proposition " if water freezes, it expands," or what we
mean by the " involves " in " a rise in temperature involves
a quickening of the pulse," or, again, what we mean by
the " must " and " cannot " in a " shorter pendulum must
swing faster than a longer one," or " a longer pendulum
cannot swing so fast as a shorter one." And, to take another
class of cases, it is a philosophical task to enquire what we
mean when we say such things as " the glass broke because
a stone hit it," or " this wind will make the clouds dis-
perse."
There are three types of analysis which are given to
such causal propositions. Unfortunately, I cannot accept
any of them. (1) There is the view that these propositions
are or contain assertions of logical necessitation. (2) There
is the view that these propositions are partly records of
168 G. RYLE.
unbroken runs of observed concomitances in the past and

partly announcements (or else symptoms) of the fact that
their author feels sure that the concomitances will continue
unbroken. (3) There is the view that as laws are neither
propositions in formal logic nor yet compounds of singular
propositions severally asserting established or establishable
matters of fact, they are not propositions at all, and so are
not true or false, but are only " rules," i.e., imperatives or

optatives to think, talk or behave in certain ways.
(1) Dr. Ewing believes that causal laws are or contain
logical entailments or else are or contain something homo-
geneous with logical entailments. And he puts his finger
on the fact which makes many people anxious to adopt
such a view when he shows that we " argue " from one matter
of fact to another. But the evidence is worthless. For if
" argue " means " argue validly " in the sense of " demon-
strate," then it is not true that we can demonstrate either
the general proposition that water expands when frozen
or the particular prediction that this jug of water will burst
if it freezes. It is surely notorious that the data of induc-
tions are compatible with the falsity of the conclusions of
those inductions. The sense in which the making of general
hypotheses from empirical data or the making of particular
causal inferences can be called " arguing " is a different
sense. In this new sense it does not contain the discerning
of entailments. Even if Dr. Ewing was right in suggesting
that where we make good scientific inductions there lies
an undiscerned entailment (so that, I suppose, an induction
makes it probable that something entails something else),
still the induction would not be that " arguing " which, if
it happened, would be the discerning of the entailment.
Now it is not, of course, unreasonable to say that there
may be undiscerned entailments. Anyone who has ever
failed to follow a valid demonstration is in the position of
not discerning that something's being the case entails some-
thing else's being the case, although it in fact does so.
But it does seem to me patent that nature is not just a
theorem which happens to be too hard for us to reason out.
For it seems to me that Hume proved that certain sorts of
facts do not entail facts of certain sorts, namely, that par-

ticular matters of fact do not logically follow from different
particular matters of fact. The three propositions " this is
water," " this is freezing," and " this is not expanding,"
are discernibly not incompatible. O r " this water is expand-
ing because it is freezing " is a synthetic proposition, and
cannot be rendered into an analytic proposition whatever
new information comes to be added to our store.

So until someone shows that there is another sort of
" argument " or demonstration which can establish that
one proposition may " involve " another and yet be com-
patible with its contradictory, I see no future for this way
of analysing the " ifs " and " becauses " of causal laws or
particular causal inferences.
(2) On the other hand, I cannot accept either the sort
of analysis which Hume gives of such propositions as " if
water freezes, it expands." Its analysis, according to him,
would be, I take it, as follows :—(a) on each occasion on
which I have observed water freezing and on each occasion
on which others, on whose testimony I rely, have observed
it freezing, it has been observed to expand ; and (b) I feel
strongly disposed to expect water to expand when frozen
on the next occasion or on all subsequent occasions.
For we think that some such expectations are somehow
better justified than others, even though some of the latter
are in fact held with greater confidence than some of the
former. We think better of the expectations of the astro-
nomer and even of the meteorologist than of the expecta-
tions of the superstitious, though the latter's beliefs are
doubtless not less confident than the astronomer's and much
more so than the meteorologist's.
And merely psychological accounts, like that of Hume,
fail to explain how we can describe a belief as both con-
fident and silly.
(3) Of the view that " laws " are not true or false and
so are not propositions at all, I follow the reasons given,
though I cannot accept them. But I do not under-
stand the, I suppose, consequential doctrine that they are
" rules."
170 G. RYLE.
Against the ordinary view that " laws " are propositions,
it is pointed out that they do not state particular matters of
fact nor yet conjunctions of particular matters of fact. So
no observation or set of observations can verify them. Nor
are they propositions in formal logic or mathematics, so
they are not necessary truths or " tautologies/' as these are
rather misleadingly labelled nowadays. (I call the usage
misleading because " tautology " docs not mean in its new

use quite what it meant in the " traditional " logic.)
Now I cannot accept the verification principle in its
original simple form, if only because it leads to the con-
sequence that almost if not quite all our ordinary proposi-
tions are not propositions at all. For propositions about
the future, the past, and other people's experiences as well
as all general propositions, whether universal or particular,
have to be sacrificed or else violently misinterpreted. And
we are only left with a vanishingly small class of genuine
propositions, namely, genuinely singular propositions.
But, aside from this, I am unable to construe the con-
clusion that laws, not being propositions, are therefore
" rules." For the understanding of a universal imperative
or a universal optative seems to me to raise just the same
problems as the understanding of a universal indicative
statement. " Never expect water to contract on being
frozen " must be understood if it is to be obeyed, and if it
can be understood the barriers seem to be removed which
forbade us to understand " water never freezes without
expanding."
But even if " laws " ought to be or can be construed as
" rules," it remains the case that there are some such rules
which we should be better advised to adopt than some
others. In some way " sunlight extinguishes fires" is a
bad or unscientific rule. And we shall still need to know
what makes one rule better than another and why the
relative acceptability of a given rule varies with the amount
of empirical data as well as with the degree of simplicity
of the rule.
I have no answer of my own to the question which I put
by asking what we mean by the " i f " of a natural law,
given that we do not mean by it what we mean by the " if"

of a logical implication.
But there are one or two things that I should like to
clear up in the question itself.
First, it is not clear to me that we are right to speak of
causation as a relation, except in the loose way in which
we say that " if," " and," " either," " or," signify " rela-
tions " between facts or propositions. But what gram-

matical conjunctions signify are not homogeneous with what
prepositions, comparative adjectives, and some transitive
verbs signify. " Either—or " does not signify a relation
in the same sense of relation as " above " or " bigger than."
Facts or propositions are not of the same logical type as
things or particulars.
Next, it is a mistake to tie down the question to the
special point of inference to the future. Induction, doubt-
less, starts from concomitances observed before or at the
time of the induction ; but the inferences may just as well
be to past or contemporary as to future matters of fact.
The matters of fact to which, e.g., geologists and doctors
infer are very largely to matters of fact prior to or con-
temporary with the making of the inference. Prediction is
only more dramatic than " retrodiction " because we have
one non-inferential way of knowing the past, namely, by
memory, and no other way of knowing the future than by
causal inference. Similarly, we can often observe the
(roughly) contemporary, but not the future.
Next, the problem of causation and/or induction is
often set in a question-begging way, namely, by means of
verbs in the timeless present. Holders of regularity theories,
for instance, tend to slide from saying " thunder has regu-
larly ensued upon lightning " to " thunder regularly ensues
upon lightning." And Ramsey similarly slides from saying
that certain sorts of opinions have been useful more often than
harmful to saying that certain sorts of opinions are useful
more often than harmful. But patently the transition from
the past tense to the timeless present is that very transition
from recording to generalizing, the nature and warrant of
which are in question.
172 G. R Y L E .
Next, discussions of this sort of problems are apt to be

unduly restricted in scope, by assuming that causality holds
only between successive events, such as lightning and thunder
or taking poison and dying. But laws are only per accidens
laws of the sequence of events or states ; they are not laws
the less for stating (or seeming to state) the universal con-
comitance of quality with quality, or state with state, when
the concomitants exist at the same time. A high tempera-

ture does not precede a rapid pulse, nor does the poker
first get to a certain temperature and then become red.
And roses are red and scented at the same time.
Last, while it is true that no set of observed concomi-
tances can do more than give probability to a general hypo-
thesis or else a particular prediction or retrodiction ; and
further, while I think it is true that sets of observations can
in fact give such a probability, this does not, it seems to me,
explain what our (probable) conclusions mean. If induction
is sometimes in this sense rational, namely, that on such and
such premisses such and such a conclusion is not indeed
certain but more likely than not, yet still the conclusion
is some sort of a synthetic proposition. It still asserts that
something's having (or anything's having) one set of pro-
perties involves its having another set of properties, neither
set entailing the other. And we are still left with our
original question, what on earth is this " involving " ?
And, finally, I feel fairly sure that this question is not
one the solution of which requires us to know more of what
Locke calls the internal constitution of things. It is not
that we need to know more physics or more chemistry
before we can know what we mean when we say that water
expands when it freezes.
These inconclusive reflections about causation should
perhaps have been omitted. I have inserted them because
I want to know what Mr. Ayer and Professor Moore think
about the question, and because I think that the dispute
about the internality of relations in general is no longer
an exciting one.
II.—By M R . A. J . AYER.
I PROPOSE to begin my paper, not by criticizing Mr. Ryle's

treatment of the question whether relations are internal to
their terms, but by elaborating a solution of my own.
Subsequently, I shall consider how far I disagree with him,
and give my reasons for disagreeing where I do.

Many people may think that this question was settled
once for all by Prof. Moore in the paper on external and
internal relations which he read to the Aristotelian Society
in the year 1919. There, it will be remembered, he sug-
gested that to assert that all relations were internal to their
terms was equivalent to asserting, with regard to any
relational property p and any term x, that if x had p, then,
with regard to any termjy, it followed from the proposition
that j ; had not got p that y was other than x ; an assertion
which he said might be more simply expressed in the form
" x has p materially implies that (y has not p entails that y
is other than x)." And this, he maintained, was evidently
false. It was true indeed of some relations that they were
internal to their terms in this sense, but evidently not true of
all. For example, with regard to a coloured patch half of
which was red and half yellow, it was true that anything
which did not contain the red patch as a part would be
necessarily other than the whole patch, but it was not true
that anything which was not part of that whole would be
necessarily other than the red patch. For whereas " x
contains a red patch as a part " does follow from " x is a
coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow," " x is
part of a coloured patch half of which is red and half
yellow " does not by any means follow from " x is a red
patch." So that, in this instance, the relation, or rather
the relational property, of containing the red patch as a
part is internal to the whole patch, but the relational property
of being a part of that whole is external to the red patch. And
there is no difficulty in finding many other examples of rela-
tional properties which, by this token, are plainly external to
their terms. Accordingly Prof. Moore concluded that the
174 A. J. AYER.
" dogma of internal relations " was false, and he suggested

that philosophers had been led to believe it only because
they confused the false proposition " x has p materially
implies that (y has not p entails that y is other than x) "
with the undeniably true proposition " x has p entails that
(y has not p materially implies that y is other than x) " to
assert which is equivalent to asserting, with regard to
any term x and any relational property p, that if x has p it

follows, with regard to any termy which has not got p, that
y is other than x. And he showed conclusively that these
two propositions were not logically equivalent, and that the
second did not entail the first.
For my part, I accept Prof. Moore's interpretation of
the dogma of internal relations ; I agree that the dogma is
false ; and I think that the philosophers who believe it have
in fact been guilty of the confusion which he attributes to
them, though not of that confusion only. Nevertheless I
do not regard the question as having been definitively settled,
because I think that although Prof. Moore has correctly
interpreted the proposition which is really being expressed
by those who make the obscure assertion that " every
relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms " or
that " a thing would not be what it is if it did not stand in
the relations that it does," his own restatement of it is itself
misleading and obscure. For it looks as if he is taking
" othernesses " to be a relation which may or may not
hold between things, and I agree with Mr. Ryle that this is
a mistake. For clearly, to say of two things that they are
other than one another is to express a trivial tautology, to
say that they are identical is evidently to contradict oneself.
And therefore it may be urged against Prof. Moore that there
can never be any point in asking whether a thing which
has not got a relational property p is or is not necessarily
other than a given thing A. For, it may be said, the thing
about which you are asking the question must be either A
itself or some thing other than A. And it is surely senseless
to ask whether one thing is necessarily other than another,
or other than itself. In fact, I do not think that this is a
valid objection to Prof. Moore's solution of the problem of
internal relations : but I think that the fact that it provokes

criticism of this sort is a reasonable ground for objecting to
his terminology.
The point which he should have made clear is that the
propositions which such sentences as " anything which has
not got p is necessarily other than A " are intended to
express are not factual but linguistic, that they do not
concern empirical matters of fact but only the relationship

of symbols. They are what Carnap would call syntactical
propositions expressed in the material or pseudo-factual,
instead of in the formal, mode of speech. For to say that
anything which has not got p is necessarily other than A is
simply a way of saying that the proposition " A has p " is
analytic. And a proposition is said to be analytic when its
validity depends solely upon the definition of the symbols
out of which it is constituted, so that the negation of it is
self-contradictory.
Using the formal mode of speech, we define a relational
proposition, not as a proposition which asserts with regard
to a thing that it stands in a certain relation to something
else, but as a proposition which is expressed by a sentence
whose predicate contains a preposition or a transitive verb.
And now we may state the dogma of internal relations in an
entirely unambiguous form. We find that to assert that all
relations are internal to their terms is equivalent to asserting,
with regard to any relational proposition, that if it is true
then it is in fact analytic. And it is not difficult to see that
this assertion is false. But if we are required to prove that
it is false, we have only to produce examples of relational
propositions which may very well be true, without being
analytically true. For instance, it is in fact true that I am
now perceiving a piece of paper, and that the sofa in my
room is in front of the fireplace, and that the author of
Evelina was admired by Dr. Johnson. But none of these
true propositions is analytic. Although false, it is not self-
contradictory to say that I am not now perceiving a piece
of paper, or that the sofa in my room is not in front
of the fireplace, or that the author of Evelina was
not admired by Dr. Johnson, as it would be to assert
176 A. J. AYER.
that the author of Evelina did not write Evelina. Accord-

ingly we may say that whereas the relational property of
having written Evelina is internal to the author of Evelina,
the relational property which the author of Evelina, also
possessed of being admired by Dr. Johnson is not internal to
the author of Evelina, any more than the relational property
which the sofa in my room possesses of being in front of
the fireplace is internal to the sofa, or the relational pro-

perty which I now possess of perceiving a piece of paper is
internal to me. But if we say this, or if we say that the
author of Evelina would not have been what she was if she
had not written Evelina, but would still have been what she
was if she had not been admired by Dr. Johnson, or that
the sofa in my room would still be what it is if it were not
in front of the fireplace, or that I should still be what I am
if I were not now perceiving a piece of paper, we must
recognize that we are simply expressing, in a material mode
of speech, the linguistic fact that the proposition " the
author of Evelina wrote Evelina " is analytic, whereas the
propositions " the author of Evelina was admired by Dr.
Johnson," " the sofa in my room is in front of the fireplace,"
" I am now perceiving a piece of paper," are all synthetic.
It should be added that the use of pseudo-factual
terminology is particularly confusing in this context, because
a relational predicate which serves to express an analytic
proposition when combined with one descriptive phrase
may serve to express a synthetic proposition when combined
with another descriptive phrase, which nevertheless refers
to the same object. Thus to have written Hamlet is an
internal relational property of the author of Hamlet, but not
of the author of Macbeth, nor yet of Shakespeare. For it is
self-contradictory to say that the author of Hamlet did not
write Hamlet, but it is not •self-contradictory,, although it is
false, to say that the author of Macbeth did not write Hamlet,
or that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet. If we use the
current pseudo-factual terminology and say that it is
logically necessary for the author of Hamlet to have written
Hamkt, but not for Shakespeare or the author of Macbeth,
or that Shakespeare and the author of Macbeth could
conceivably have existed without writing Hamlet but the author

of Hamlet could not, or that Shakespeare, or the author of
Macbeth, would still have been himself if he had not written
Hamlet, whereas the author of Hamlet would not, we seem to
be contradicting ourselves : for we allow that the author of
Hamlet is the same person as Shakespeare, and as the author
of Macbeth. But when it is recognized that all that we are
saying is that " Shakespeare wrote Hamlet " and " the author

of Macbeth wrote Hamlet" are true synthetic propositions,
whereas " the author of Hamlet wrote Hamlet" is analytic,
every appearance of contradiction vanishes.
We see then that to believe the dogma of internal
relations is to believe that it is impossible for a sentence
whose predicate contains a preposition or a transitive verb
to express a true synthetic proposition, and that this is
plainly false. Indeed it is impossible to find even a single
term whose relational properties are all internal, or a single
relation which is always internal to its terms. That is to
say, every verbal expression which can occur as the subject
of a sentence which expresses an analytic relational proposi-
tion can occur also as the subject of a sentence which
expresses a synthetic relational proposition, and every verbal
expression which can occur as the predicate of a sentence
which expresses an analytic relational proposition can occur
also as the predicate of a sentence which expresses a
synthetic relational proposition. And it is also the case, I
think, that there is no relation which is external to all its
terms, and no term which can stand only in external
relations. That is, I disagree with those who hold that
such terms as " Socrates " or " this " or " I " can stand
only in external relations, or in other words that it is im-
possible for a sentence which has a proper name or a
demonstrative pronoun or a personal pronoun for its subject
to express an analytic relational proposition ; a view which
I hesitatingly attribute to Mr. Ryle on the strength of his
assertion that it is " improper to speak absolutely of the
nature of a particular unless we are referring to a complex
of psychological dispositions." For I can produce examples
which seem to me to show that this view is erroneous. For
M
178 A. J. AYER.
instance, the sentences " this is now present to me," " I

am the owner of my body," " Socrates is the object to
which the name ' Socrates' is in this sentence being used
to refer " all express what I believe to be analytic proposi-
tions. That is, I believe that it is self-contradictory to say
" this is not now present to me " or " I am not the owner
of my body " or " Socrates is not the object to which the
name ' Socrates' is in this sentence being used to refer,"

though I admit that if my view is correct the last of these
sentences must be interpreted as referring to itself and is
therefore exposed to the charge of offending against the
theory of types. This charge however would, I think, be
unfounded.* I think that there are sentences which can
legitimately refer to themselves, and that the example I
have given is one. But a full discussion of this point, even
if it were in my power to provide it, would be out of place
in this paper.
It is customary for those who believe that all a thing's
relational properties are internal to it to hold that the
same is true of its non-relational properties. And from this
proposition that all a thing's properties are internal to it it
follows that all the true propositions that can be expressed
about any given thing are analytic, and that they are all
deducible from one another ; where to say that a pro-
position p is about a thing A is to say that p is expressed by
a sentence which contains the symbol " A " as its subject
or else by some sentence which is equivalent to a sentence
which contains the symbol " A " as its subject. For every
proposition which ascribes a property to anything entails
the«proposition that the thing in question exists ; and if all
the properties of a thing are internal to it, then to assert
that it exists is implicitly to assert every fact about it.
If every true proposition about any given thing is deduc-
ible from every other then of course every true relational
proposition about a thing is deducible from any other true
proposition about it, and this is taken by Mr. Ryle to be the
dogma of the absolute internality of relations. Only he
uses the material mode of speech and says that, according
* The more I think about this, the more doubtful I become.
to this dogma, " if something is in a certain relation to some-

thing else, their being so related is a logical sine qua non of
each of these things having any of its other characters." I
think it is plainly a mistake to hold, as he does, that this is a
legitimate translation of the proposition that all relations
are internal to their terms. For to speak about the relation-
ship of terms and their relations is surely to speak, in our
terminology, about the nature of the propositions that are

expressed by sentences containing relational predicates, and
not about the relationship of propositions to one another.
The connexion between the proposition which Mr. Ryle
mistakes for the dogma of internal relations and the dogma
of internal relations as we understand it, is that they both
follow from the proposition that all a thing's characters are
intrinsic to it. But they do not follow from one another.
For although the proposition that every true relational
proposition about any given thing is deducible from any
other true proposition about it entails the proposition that
all the relational propositions in question are equivalent
to one another, it does not entail that they are analytic,
nor from the proposition that every true relational pro-
position is analytic does it follow that every true relational
proposition about a thing is deducible from any true pro-
position about it, but only that every true relational pro-
position about a thing is deducible from any true relational
proposition about it.
I think that the reasons which Mr. Ryle gives for
rejecting the view that every true relational proposition
about a thing is deducible from every other true proposition
about it are sound, and I shall not waste time in discussing
them. The only criticism that I have to make is that he
apparently failed to see that the view implied that every
true relational proposition about a thing was equivalent to
every other, or in other words that it was impossible for two
sentences which had the same symbol for their subject
and contained transitive verbs or prepositions as part of
their predicates to express two logically distinct true
propositions. For the fact that it implies this is alone
sufficient to show that the view is false.
M 2
180 A. J. AYER.
Mr. Ryle's way of stating the false proposition that

every true relational proposition about a given subject is
deducible from every other true proposition about it is
objectionable, because it leads people to suppose that he
is speaking about causal necessitation when he is really
speaking about logical necessitation. When he refers to a
character x as being the sine qua non of another character y,
he means to say only that if anything has y it follows logically

that it has x, but it would be excusable to infer from his
choice of words that he meant that it was causally impossible
for anything to have y without having x. Indeed he himself
is misled by his own terminology. For when he wants to
show that the possession of a relational property is some-
times the sine qua non of the possession of some other
character he says : " it is certainly very often the case that
if two things which are in fact in a certain relation were not
so related, each would then be without at least one further
character. If I had never met Smith, I should not be
fond of him or in the habit of thinking of him. If I were
not smaller than Jones, I should not be frightened of him.
And so on." But, in fact, the proposition " I have met
Smith " does not follow from " I am in the habit of thinking
of Smith " or even from " I am fond of Smith," nor docs the
proposition " I am smaller than Jones " follow logically
from " I am frightened of Jones." It may indeed be the
case that my being smaller than Jones is causally connected
with my fear of him and that my having met Smith is a
necessary causal condition of my being fond of him ; but Mr.
Ryle professes to be giving examples of logical, and not of
causal, necessitation. The mistake does not affect the
validity of his main argument, but it shows how misleading,
in this context, is the use of an ambiguous pseudo-factual
terminology.
It is unfortunate, furthermore, that Mr. Ryle should
have made this mistake, because it is most commonly made
by those whose doctrines he is engaged in refuting. For it
is a fact, I think, that the proposition that all a thing's
properties are intrinsic to it, from which the proposition
which we regard, and that which Mr. Ryle regards, as the
dogma of internal relations both follow, comes to be believed

not merely through the confusion of thought which Prof.
Moore exposed, but also through a confusion between the
notions of logical and causal necessitation. We may con-
cede to Prof. Moore that a belief in the internality of all
relations, which is supported by the argument that a thing
could not be what it is and fail to have the properties that
it has, does sometimes depend upon the confusion of the

false proposition that if any relational proposition is true,
then its contradictory is self-contradictory, which is the
dogma of internal relations, with the truism that if any
relational proposition is true it follows that its contradictory
is false. But I think that most of those who believe that all
relations are internal to their terms do so because they
confuse this proposition with the proposition, not referred to
by Prof. Moore, that the contradictory of any true relational
proposition is causally impossible. And it is easy to see how
they come to do this. For in any defence of the dogma of
internal relations there occur sentences such as " A could
not have existed without having p." And this form of
words might indeed be legitimately taken to express the
proposition that it is self-contradictory to deny that A has p ;
but it might equally well be taken to express the proposition
that A's having p is a necessary causal consequence of the
existence of A or of something of which the existence of A is
also a necessary causal consequence. These two propositions
are distinct from one another ; the first does not, as we shall
see, follow from the second ; but inasmuch as they can both
legitimately be expressed by the same form of words they
come to be identified. And philosophers who believe that
there is a sufficient reason for every fact, are deceived into
thinking that this obliges them to hold that all relations are
internal to their terms.
Of course, if it were true that causal necessitation
was a species of logical necessitation, then from the propo-
sition that the contradictory of every true relational
proposition was causally impossible it would follow that
the^ contradictory of every true relational proposition was
self-contradictory ; and the philosopher who succeeded in
182 A. J. AYER.
proving that there was a sufficient reason for every fact would
have a valid ground for believing the dogma of internal
relations. But in fact it is not the case that causal necessita-
tion is a species of logical necessitation, as Mr. Ryle has very
clearly shown by furnishing examples of causal laws which
can be denied without self-contradiction. He might indeed
have been content to quote Hume, who said " The contrary
of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never

imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with
the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable
to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less
intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction
than the affirmation that it will rise. We should in vain
therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it
demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could
never be distinctly conceived by the mind." On this point
I, like Mr. Ryle, am in complete agreement with Hume.
And I regard the view that causal necessitation is a species
of logical necessitation as having been definitely refuted by
him.
At the same time I follow Mr. Ryle in rejecting Hume's
own analysis of general propositions of law, though not for
the reason which Mr. Ryle gives. He rejects Hume's
analysis because it is " psychological." For he holds that
no merely psychological account of causation can explain
" how we can describe a belief as both confident and silly."
I admit indeed that the probability of a general proposition
of law is not always proportionate to the degree of belief
which any one person has in it, but I deny that this in itself
proves that no analysis of general propositions of law which
is psychological in Mr. Ryle's sense can be correct. For I
think that when we say that a confident belief is silly or
irrational we are saying, not that it fails to conform to some
" objective " or " absolute " standard of rationality, but only
that it is not related to observation in the way which is
generally recognized to be the most reliable. A super-
stitious belief on this view is one which is not arrived at by
any accredited method of reasoning. But of course there is
no certainty that our present standards of rationality, by
which probabilities are measured, will always be retained,

or that beliefs which are rational by contemporary standards
are necessarily true.
I think therefore that Hume's analysis of general pro-
positions of law could easily be reconciled with the fact that
the probability of a proposition does not always correspond
exactly to the intensity with which it is believed. There are
however other grounds for rejecting it as it stands. For

while it may be true that we should not, according to our
standards of rationality, have good reason for believing the
general proposition " if a then b " unless we had observed a
constant conjunction of events like a with events like b, there
is no contradiction involved in asserting this general pro-
position and at the same time denying that any events like a
or b ever have been observed. But if H u m e were right
there would be a contradiction ; for, on his view, part of
what we are asserting when we say that a is causally con-
nected with b is that events like a have actually been observed
in conjunction with events like b. Again, if Hume were
right it would be self-contradictory to speak of causal laws
which no one believed. But this is surely not the case.
Whether it is true or false to say for example that the sex of
a child is determined by a law which has never yet been
thought of, it is certainly not self-contradictory.
I follow Mr. Ryle also in rejecting the view of Ramsey
and Schlick that statements of law are not genuine pro-
positions and so can not be either true or false. This view
depends on the assumption that a synthetic proposition, to
be genuine must be conclusively verifiable, and this assump-
tion, as Mr. Ryle truly says, is unacceptable. For I think
it can be shown that no synthetic proposition whatsoever is
conclusively verifiable. And if, as I think we must, we take
partial verifiability as our criterion of significance, then we
have no occasion to rule out general propositions of law.
It does not follow from this however that the kind of
analysis which Ramsey and Schlick give of general pro-
positions of law can not be correct. Certainly Mr. Ryle's
objections to theories of this type are not conclusive. He
argues first that they can not account for the fact that some
184 A. J . AYER.
general hypotheses are more probable than others, and

secondly that the fact that a certain rule has worked in the
past affords no guarantee that it will work in the future. In
giving an analysis of what is meant by being rational, I
have shown how the first of these objections may be met.
As for the second, I deny that it is implied in the pragmatic
treatment of causation that the fact that a rule has worked
in the past affords any guarantee that it will work in the

future, or that it ought to be implied. On the contrary any
account of causation which implied this would be certainly
false. For Hume has shown conclusively that we can not
have any such guarantee and that it is a mistake to require it.
For my part, although for reasons already given I reject
Hume's analysis of causation in the form in which he states
it, I think that what would ordinarily be called a Humean
treatment of causation is correct. To begin with, I agree
with Hume and his followers that it is a mistake to analyze
causal propositions in terms of a relation of necessitation
which holds between particular events. For I can not
conceive of any observation or series of observations, that
would have the slightest tendency to establish the existence
of such a relation. Indeed Mr. Rylc himself would admit
that causal connexion holds primarily not between par-
ticular events but between kinds of events, or in other words
that every assertion of a particular causal connexion involves
the assertion of a general law. And he would agree also
with Ramsey's view of causal laws as variable hypotheticals,
according to which all general propositions of the form " x
causes j ' " are equivalent to propositions of the form " when-
ever x, then j , " provided of course that the " whenever " is
here taken to refer not to a finite number of actual instances
of A: but to an infinite number of possible instances. It is the
neglect of this proviso that vitiates Russell's analysis of
general propositions of law in terms of material implication.
Here we may point out, what Mr. Ryle apparently fails
to recognize, that this " reduction " of causal propositions
to variable hypotheticals is in itself to some extent an
analysis of causation. What further analysis can be given ?
We can say that " whenever x then y " is equivalent to
" x is a reliable sign ofj> " or to " the expectations which are
derived from taking x as a sign ofjy are invariably correct."
But it will be objected that this is to go round in a circle.
For we have not succeeded in eliminating the reference to
an infinite number of hypothetical events, but have merely
introduced it in a new form. To which our answer must
be that once it is admitted that general propositions of law
are not conjunctions of singular propositions it must be

recognized that it is impossible to give a correct analysis
of them in non-general terms. I think that Mr. Ryle's
uneasiness is due to the fact that he does not recognize this,
and desires to reduce general propositions of law to singular
propositions, thus setting himself an insoluble problem.
But I am prepared to hear that I am doing him an in-
justice.
Finally, I suggest that the proposition that there is a
sufficient reason for every fact is analytic. For to assert
it is, I think, equivalent to asserting that every true pro-
position is deducible from some set of propositions which
contains a variable hypothetical. And clearly it must
always be possible, given a number of singular propositions,
to formulate general propositions which will connect them
with one another. But this does not imply that we can
predict every event. For while we can always find laws
that will fit any given series of events, we can not possibly
know for certain that they will be compatible also with
events of which no account was taken when the laws were
formulated ; or, as Schlick puts it, we can not know for
certain that we are justified in " extrapolating " our laws.
Nor does it imply the false proposition referred to by Mr.
Ryle that " everything in the world is causally conditioned
by everything else," a proposition which in any case appears
to have little connexion with the dogma of internal rela-
tions. Nor, lastly, does it imply the dogma of internal
relations itself.

G. Ryle y A. Ayer - Internal Relations

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G. Ryle y A. Ayer - Internal Relations

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INTERNAL RELATIONS.

T H E question whether relations are internal or intrinsical

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(3) The fact that something is in a certain relation to

I think that these three propositions are true ; and I

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is essential to the having of another, and we can say that

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Well, then, on this interpretation " relations are internal

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What would be of serious—even disastrous—logical and

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from the compass-bearings of objects to their colours, shapes,

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sizes of two things nothing follows about their comparative

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Before dropping this way of interpreting the internality

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meaning not " differing in some or all characters from A "

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information could I require to give mc an intellectual motive

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cured of the superstition that all propositions are attributives

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Now it does not seem to me to be a question proper for

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unbroken runs of observed concomitances in the past and

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facts do not entail facts of certain sorts, namely, that par-

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given that we do not mean by it what we mean by the " if"

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Next, discussions of this sort of problems are apt to be

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I PROPOSE to begin my paper, not by criticizing Mr. Ryle's

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" dogma of internal relations " was false, and he suggested

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internal relations : but I think that the fact that it provokes

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that the author of Evelina did not write Evelina. Accord-

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conceivably have existed without writing Hamlet but the author

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instance, the sentences " this is now present to me," " I

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to this dogma, " if something is in a certain relation to some-

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Mr. Ryle's way of stating the false proposition that

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dogma of internal relations both follow, comes to be believed

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which probabilities are measured, will always be retained,

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general hypotheses are more probable than others, and

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