(21.
) IN RE CUNANAN (94 Phil 534)FACTS: not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are at-
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’
Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After
its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for re-
consideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE:Whether or not RA No. 972 is constitutional.
HELD:No. It is not constitutional.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession,
as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands
of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved
by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their super-
vision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Even considering the power
granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative func-
tion, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously estab-
lished rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate indi-
viduals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and
tempted to be revoked or modified.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the
rules set in place by the SC but the lack of will or the defect in judgement of the court, and this
power is not included in the power granted by the Constitution to Congress, it lies exclusively
within the judiciary.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within
the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because
they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third,
because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already
been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force
nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar ex-
aminations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law,
as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of
these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present al-
ready prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something con-
trary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
IN RE SHOOP
MALCOLM; November 29, 1920
Points to consider:
1st
2nd Difference between Civil Law and Common Law
3rd
4th Distinguish strains of common law: What are the bases?
5th
3. How did the Court arrive at the conclusion that there is Anglo-
American tradition?
1st
2nd What system is in place?
3rd
4th References to American jurisprudence
5th
6th Laws superseded or modified
7th
7. Identify what is that important question the Court needed to
resolve and how it helped solve the Shoop case.
FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the
Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in
his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of
New York.
- The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission with-
out examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine
Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have prac-
ticed at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But ad-
mission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the
discretion of the Appellate
Division in several cases: 1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of
the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of
the American Union or in the District of Columbia 2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another
country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common
Law (ECL).
ISSUEWON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established
HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't. established
by the Congress.
- In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its
decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories
and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances
where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the
few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-
American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to
those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesn’t establish a prec-
edent with respect to future applications.
Reasoning
On TERRITORY: a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US b. We are NOT an orga-
nized territory incorporated into the United
States but c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either d. Like Puerto Rico, we
may not be incorporated but we are a
territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a form of territorial
government, so to that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen.
e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word "territory" to be limited to the
technical meaning of organized territory or it would have used the more accurate expression.
f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement since the full phraseology
indicates a SWEEPING INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the US.
On COMMON LAW jurisdiction:
(On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?)
g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to be a very
large proportion of the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case
law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the old English cases.
h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law" it would seem proper to
say that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that Com-
mon Law if its statute law and its case law to a very large extent includes the science and applica-
tion of law as laid down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the American
cases.
i. Common Law adopted by decision: i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codifica-
tion and
remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred sim-
ilar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction today.
ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a general sense
iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence of the courts where
practical considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision.
iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo- American jurisprudence are used
and applied by the courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with the
LOCAL WRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and
subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER FOREIGN case law system used to any substan-
tial extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of
the Philippines is based on the ECL.
j. IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law here
has
not been definitely decided by the SC. But there is a similarity to the quotations from the Ameri-
can decisions cited with reference to the ECL.
ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am jurisprudence only in "xxx...so far as they
are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with exist-
ing law; nevertheless, many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have, to
all intents and purposes, been IMPORTED into this jurisdiction, a RESULT of the enactment of
new laws and the organization of new institutions by the Congress of the US...xxx"
iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with a new one modeled after the judicial
systems of the US. Therefore, those Spanish doctrines and principles in conflict with the new one
were abrogated.
iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and application of the terms and provisions we
borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-Am precedents, we review the legislative history of such
enactments.
v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided by the doctrines of Common Law.
Neither ECL or American Common Law is in force in this Islands...save only in so far as they are
founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and aren't in conflict with existing
law."
vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINE COMMON LAW influenced by the ECL or American Com-
mon Law.
vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our jurisdiction is based upon Anglo- Ameri-
can case law precedents-exclusively in applying those statutory laws which have been enacted
since the change of sovereignty and which conform more or less to the American statutes, and-to
a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws.
k. PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as
follows: Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal Procedure, and
Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code, Marriage Law, Mortgage Law, Railway laws, Law of Wa-
ters.
ii. There were also special laws having limited application. iii. The foregoing written laws had
acquired the force of statute
law by change of sovereignty. iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since
Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of Stare Decisis. 1. Manresa' s discussion
of Art. 6 of the Civil shows how far from a case law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are
governed by:
a. 1st, by written law b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force
because it is the acknowledged manner on how things
are done and not jurisprudence) c. 3rd, by judicial decision (when in practice, these were
considered last; the development of case law was impeded because the courts were free to disre-
gard any information or decisions of other courts.)
d. 4th, by general principles of law l. SPANISH STATUTE LAW
i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately with the change of sovereignty
ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property inconsistent with the Constitution and Amer-
ican principles and institutions were superseded.
iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon those same
Spanish statutes.
m. CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES i. It appears that the bulk of present
day Statute Law is
derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative in a sense of having been COPIED, and in
the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority.
ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are used and relied upon to a
greater or less degree. Although in many cases, the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net
result is the building up of a very substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case law.
n. CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and apply-
ing the
remnants of the Spanish statutes thus showing how permanent the hold of the Anglo-Am Com-
mon Law has on our jurisprudence.
ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying the law on those subjects, which are
still governed by the remaining portions of the Spanish statutes, as exhibited in the groups of
cases cited in the footnotes.
iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of law and in the large majority of
such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of the Court in developing jurispru-
dence.
iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law which is based almost exclusively,
except in cases where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo- Am Common
Law.
o. COLLATERAL INFLUENCES i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of
Bench and Bar vs. The abundance of
digests/reports/textbooks on English/Am. courts. ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authori-
ties in the decisions of the court, plus, the available sources for study
and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-Am iii. Therefore, there has been developed and
will continue a common law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Phil Common Law) based upon the ECL
in its present day form of an Anglo-Am CL, which is effective in all of the subjects of law in this
jurisdiction, in so far as it does not conflict with the express language of the written law (where
the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories)
or with the local customs and institution.
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the
petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers,
and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justi-
fiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve
and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative
of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue
in the practice of law according to existing rules.4. The reason advanced for the pretended clas-
sification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge
and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972
is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being insep-
arable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.6. Lacking in eight votes to declare
the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of
article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.