Kabaka

The Church of Uganda and the Exile of Kabaka Muteesa II, 1953-55
Author(s): Kevin Ward

Source: Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 28, Fasc. 4 (Nov., 1998), pp. 411-449
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1581559
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THE CHURCH OF UGANDA AND THE EXILE
OF KABAKA MUTEESA II, 1953-551
BY
KEVIN WARD
(University of Leeds)
On 30 November 1953, Sir Andrew Cohen, Governor of the B

Protectorate of Uganda, summoned the Kabaka of Buganda to
House, Entebbe. The 29-year-old Kabaka, Edward Walugembi M
II, was accompanied (at Cohen's request) by the three chief offic
the Buganda Kingdom: Paulo Kavuma, the Katikkiro (prime mi
Matiya Mugwanya, the Mulamuzi (chief justice), and L.M. Mpag
Muwanika (treasurer). Cohen presented an ultimatum, demanding
ances of loyal co-operation from the Kabaka. When these assur
were not forthcoming Cohen informed the astonished group th
Kabaka was under arrest and would be transported forthwith to Lon
Cohen had a reputation as a young and progressive colonial a
istrator. He had been closely involved in the working out of po
colonial strategy in London before being appointed Governor of
in 1952. He had many close contacts in the British Labour p
Buganda, geographically at the centre of the Protectorate of U
had been accorded special status by the 1900 Agreement, which
nised the 'traditional' institutions of Buganda, including the mo
and the territorial chiefs appointed by the Kabaka.4 Similar agre
were made with other monarchical societies, but these never am
to quite the special recognition given to Buganda. The 1900 Agre
among other things, consolidated the religious division of off
political power between the three religious groupings in Bu
Protestant, Catholic and Muslim, giving the Protestants a predo
position, but distributing just sufficient power and office to the
which had fought and lost in the religious wars of the 1890s,
they did not feel totally excluded, while always knowing thei
The 1900 Agreement held great symbolic meaning for Baga
terms both of national pride and the prestige attaching to the mon
C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998Journal of Religion in Africa, XXVIII, 4
412 Kevin Ward
For the British also it had symbolic importance-but this was often
rather obscured for colonial officials by the day to day frustrations of
dealing with irksome 'traditional' attitudes to the exercise of power and
the lack of accountability (at least in the bureaucratic terms understood
by British colonial administrators). Clashes between colonial 'modernisers'
and the 'traditional' Kiganda Protestant oligarchy occurred from time
to time in the first half of the century.5 But it was the arrival of Cohen,
with radical progressive plans for the constitutional development of the
Protectorate as a whole, which precipitated what was for Buganda per-
haps the greatest crisis of the colonial regime.6 Cohen wanted to inte-
grate Buganda much more closely into the structures of Uganda, so
that Uganda as a whole could develop towards greater responsibility
and gradual self-government. The events which provoked the break-
down in relations between Governor and Kabaka were triggered out-
side Uganda, by an after-dinner speech to the East African Dinner
Club in London made by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Oliver Lyttleton,
on 30 June 1953. He envisaged constitutional progress in terms of a
federation of the East African territories. This unguarded statement-
for it was not indicative of any carefully constructed policy-provoked
deep fears of settler domination in East Africa, fears about which
Baganda leaders had always been particularly vocal, ever since moves
for 'Closer Union' (as it was called) had been mooted in the late 1920s
by Kenya white settlers. In response to the outcry which greeted
Lyttleton's speech, the British authorities rapidly engaged in damage
limitation, with soothing statements designed to allay fears. But the
furore generated in Buganda did not die down, and soon threatened
to derail Cohen's own plans for constitutional development in Uganda.
Cohen's decisive action in deporting the Kabaka was meant to regain
the initiative and to restore the constitutional path which the Governor
envisaged. He hoped that Buganda would come quickly to accept the
deportation as a fait accompli, would desert the Kabaka (who had not
been a particularly popular figure) and agree to the appointment of a
new, more compliant, alternative. Things did not turn out that way.
For two years Uganda's larger constitutional development was subor-
dinated to the campaign for the restoration of the Kabaka. Cohen's
realism enabled him gradually to admit the necessity of acceding to
this demand, and it was he who supervised the negotiations which
resulted in the Kabaka's return on 17 October 1955, nearly two years
after his exile.
The Crisis involved in different ways all the faith communities of
The Exile of Kabaka Muteesa II 413
Uganda. For the Catholics it presented an opportunity to advocate a

reassessment of the Protestant dominance in the structures of the Buganda
state. For the Protestants-the Native Anglican Church (the Church of
Uganda)-it precipitated a crisis of church-state relations both at the
colonial level, and, more especially, about the place of the Protestant
church within Buganda. The role of the Kabaka as member of the
Anglican church, as protector of all religious groups in Buganda, as
traditional religious symbol of Kiganda nationalism, were all called in
question. Church leaders, both lay and clerical, in Uganda and in
Britain, were key actors in the protracted negotiations which eventu-
ally led to the restoration of the Kabaka.
The Crisis was exhaustively reported and commented on, both locally
and in the international press. British newspapers employed British
Uganda residents (particularly Makerere University lecturers) to send
regular despatches to London. The 1960s saw the publication of a num-
ber of perceptive accounts of the events, including Anthony Low's
Buganda and British Overrule (1960), and David Apter, The Political Kingdom
in Uganda (1961). Apter's book was republished in 1997, with a long
preface providing an overview of the political and constitutional issues,
nearly half a century on, from the perspective of Uganda's troubled
history since Independence. Both the Kabaka and his Katikkiro have
written autobiographical accounts which pay close attention to the events
of the deposition. From the 1960s also dates Fred Welbourn's Religion
and Politics in Uganda 1952-1962 (1965), which directly deals with the
important religious element in the Crisis.7
The present study explores this religious dimension. Religion could
never be left out of consideration in the negotiations about the return
of the Kabaka. Most importantly, this was because the constitutional
position of the two major Christian bodies in Buganda (and, by exten-
sion, in Uganda as a whole), stable for over half a century, was now
seriously put into question. If the place of Buganda in the colonial state
had to be renegotiated, so too did that of the religious bodies. The
maintenance of the status quo in terms of religion could no longer be
taken for granted, but had to be actively defended, particularly by the
Protestant elite, against increasingly vocal sections of Buganda society
which demanded change. Quite apart from these constitutional issues,
the crisis provoked a profound questioning of the role of the churches
in society at large. The public esteem, which the churches had per-
haps too easily taken for granted, was radically challenged. Moreover,
the position of the Kabaka in any new settlement, indeed whether he
414 Kevin Ward
would return at all or would be replaced, was enmeshed in questions

of personal morality and the marriage discipline of the Church of
Uganda, and these too became issues of public debate.
The study relies on a wealth of new detail provided by the opening
of the British archives of both government (the Public Record Office
at Kew in London) and church (especially the Lambeth Palace Library,
but also the CMS archives in Birmingham).8 Geoffrey Fisher, Arch-
bishop of Canterbury at the time, took a day to day interest in the
affair, both as ecclesiastical statesman and as a pastor concerned for
the moral welfare of the Kabaka in exile. Edward Carpenter's biogra-
phy of Fisher devotes two chapters to Uganda. Unfortunately, Carpenter
did not have the detailed knowledge of the complexities of Uganda's
history to make the extensive material comprehensible and made numer-
ous mistakes in the spelling of Ugandan names.9 As well as using the
archive material, this study is based on acquaintance and conversations
with a number of the players in the crisis, including Katikkiro Paulo
Kavuma and E.M.K. Mulira in Uganda, Apolo Kironde in London,
and Bishop Leslie Brown.
The Background
The Anglican Church and the Monarchy in Buganda
As a result of the religious wars of the late 1880s and 1890s, the
Protestant party (with the help of Lugard and British imperialism) had
emerged victors in Buganda. The King, Kabaka Mwanga, had himself
reluctantly joined the Protestant party, without actually becoming a
Christian.'0 In 1897 he was deposed and deported to the Seychelles,
and there he was finally baptised. His one-year-old son, Daudi Cwa,
was installed as titular Kabaka. In practice, the powerful Katikkiro,
Apolo Kaggwa, and his fellow Protestant chiefs, commanded a deci-
sive voice in the state, within the boundaries set by British over-rule.
Catholics participated in government too, especially in those counties
like Buddu which had been assigned to them in the religious settle-
ment; they had a secure and valued position, but it was a subordinate
one as far as the central levers of power were concerned. This state of
affairs was consolidated and enshrined in the 1900 Buganda Agreement,
which Bishop Tucker and the missionaries of the Church Missionary
Society had a substantial hand in negotiating. Daudi Cwa came of age
in 1913, but found that he remained marginalised by the powerful per-
sonality of Sir Apolo Kaggwa. Kaggwa was forced into retirement in
1926 by British colonial officers keen to modernise the administration
of Buganda and to promote a new generation of Protestant mission

educated Baganda: a renewal rather than an overturning of the Protestant
hegemony." Yet the Kabaka largely failed to claw back any real meas-
ure of power. In his later years he lived in relative seclusion, disgruntled
about his place within the British colonial establishment. Cwa equally
failed to fulfil the expectations of the Anglican Church as a role model
and exemplar of Christian morality and family life. In particular his
relations with his ring wife were fraught.
A focus of opposition to elite politics from the 1920s came from the
Bataka movement, which asserted the rights of clan chiefs (the bataka).
They claimed to speak for the mass of the peasantry, over against the
network of aristocratic families who had been the main beneficiaries of
the 1900 Agreement: the so-called Mengo clique (named after a hill in
Kampala which had become the seat of the Kabaka's government and
of the Lukiiko, the assembly of Baganda notables). The Bataka at times
appealed to the Kabaka for support, of at least a symbolic kind, for
they were well aware that his actual power was strictly circumscribed.
Opposition towards the Protestant oligarchy often consisted of an alliance
between these traditionalists and younger members of the elite trained
in the mission schools; the majority of members from both these groups
tended themselves to be Protestants. By and large the Roman Catholic
Church (at least its hierarchy) stood on the side-lines in these conflicts,
which were seen as essentially quarrels within the dominant group.
The Native Anglican Church (NAC: the Church of Uganda, com-
monly known as the Protestants) was, in contrast to the Catholic Church,
enmeshed in political society in a number of overlapping, and at times
contradictory ways. It had a quasi-established position in colonial Uganda.
The Bishop of Uganda was third in precedence in the colonial state
after the Governor and the Kabaka.'2 There were strong links, social
and professional, between Government House at Entebbe and the
Bishop's residence at Namirembe. In Bishop Tucker's time (1890-1911),
the Church had often seemed the dominant partner in this alliance.
But under Bishop Willis (1911-34) the balance moved in favour of the
government, as Willis's successor, C.E. Stuart acknowledged in retirement:
On the side of the Church being identified with the state, Max Warren, [General
Secretary of CMS] warned me that my friendship with successive Governors might
cause trouble in future but I always felt that when you have Christian or enlight-
ened Governors it was the duty of the Church to co-operate with them.'3
This cosy relationship did indeed become a major liability during the
1953 Crisis, which broke only months after Leslie Brown, Stuart's suc-
cessor, had arrived in the country.
416 Kevin Ward
The NAC was closely identified with the group of Baganda Protestant
chiefs who had consolidated their power in 1900. It was they who dom-
inated the lay representation on the Diocesan Synod, a body which
covered the whole diocese of Uganda. One of the major causes of fric-
tion between the church leadership and the Protestant chiefs had always
been over marriage discipline-this was to turn out to be a major issue
in the negotiations about the return from exile of the Kabaka. Soon
after arriving in Uganda, Bishop Brown noted that 'the whole tone of
the ruling class in Uganda is rotten': chiefs would often mark their
political promotion by taking on another wife. The Bishop recalled stay-
ing in the house of a chief with four wives, who all attended house
prayers after he had preached on the virtues of monogamy in the
church that very evening. 'There is no public conscience about this
matter although it is recognized as sin.'"4 Missionaries hoped for a moral
breakthrough among the younger, better educated and progressive
Baganda. To this extent both church leaders and the colonial govern-
ment were united in desiring an erosion of the influence of the older
generation of chiefs. On the other hand, the younger generation was
often a severe critic of a church hierarchy which seemed all too sub-
servient to the political and colonial establishment.
Anglican Church leaders were inclined to regard the Bataka move-
ment as embued with an anti-Christian ethos in its appeal to tradi-
tional cultural values. But even groups which retained a strong Christian
identification, such as the Bamalaki (which began in 1914) and the
African Orthodox Church (established by Reuben Mukasa Spartas), had
strong Bataka sympathies and they were hostile both to the Protestant
political oligarchy and to the Native Anglican Church, from which their
leaders had indeed defected. Even among the clergy of the NAC there
were Bataka sympathies. Here discontent often manifested itself in the-
ological rather than overtly political concerns. One such incident was
Bishop Willis's proposal in 1920 to erect a cross over the altar in
Namirembe Cathedral. Willis had the support of Kaggwa and many
of the great chiefs. But he was opposed by a considerable body of the
Baganda clergy. In advancing the case against the cross, the clergy
claimed the spirit of Mackay (the pioneer missionary of the 1870s and
1880s) and the Uganda martyrs of 1885 and '86. But underlying the
controversy was resentment at the low status of a 'peasant' clergy in a
church dominated by a lay aristocracy and by a foreign hierarchy which
seemed to identify itself too closely with the colonial power.15
It was important for the Church of Uganda that the Kabaka was
a Protestant. But it was very difficult for the Kabaka to combine his
traditional role as 'father' and 'husband' of all Baganda with being a

role-model for Christian marriage. Cwa did not fulfil this ideal, and
Muteesa II rather conspicuously flouted Church teaching, not least dur-
ing the period of his exile. Taddesse Tamrat has shown how this was a
constant source of conflict between the Emperors of Ethiopia and the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a tension never resolved.'6 For Ugandan
Anglicans a more immediate comparison during the Kabaka's exile was
furnished by the marital difficulties of the British royal family: the 1936
abdication, and the issues around Princess Margaret's marriage (which
surfaced towards the end of the Kabaka's exile in London).'7
The Anglican Church in the wider Ugandan context
In 1926 the diocese was divided into two: 'Uganda' and 'Upper
Nile'. The diocese of Uganda consisted of the southern parts of Uganda,
both Buganda and the other kingly states, as well as areas to the south
and west of Uganda under Belgian rule: Boga in the Congo, and
Ruanda-Urundi. Bishop Stuart, Bishop from 1934 to 1952, was a per-
son of wide sympathies and eirenic temperament, who laboured hard
to contain the political attacks on the Anglican establishment in Buganda,
at the same time as dealing with the spiritual conflicts within the church
caused by the Revival movement, the Balokole (The Saved People).
Stuart was succeeded by Leslie Brown, a theological teacher who had
worked in Kerala in South India, a fine liturgist and historian of South
Indian Christianity. The General Secretary of the Church Missionary
Society, Max Warren, regarded Brown as a person of simple life-style
and piety, in marked contrast to the 'prince bishop' tradition of Tucker
and Willis. Warren felt that the world of political intrigue, which seemed
to be part and parcel of ecclesiastical affairs in Uganda, would be alien
to Brown's experience and natural inclinations, quite apart from the
social demands of being a colonial Bishop. 'He is the first bishop [sc:
in Uganda] not to have had some private means,' remarked Warren,
implying some apprehension about how he would manage. (Nevertheless
he had had a considerable hand in the appointment, as advisor to the
Archbishop of Canterbury who made appointments of colonial bishops.)'8
The Upper Nile diocese consisted of the northern and eastern parts
of Uganda, largely non-Bantu speaking and without traditional rulers
(at least ones that had received colonial recognition). In 1936 the 33
year old Lucien Usher-Wilson, a schoolmaster from King's College,
Budo (the principal Anglican school in Uganda), had been appointed
bishop. By 1953, he was thus very much the senior bishop in terms of
418 Kevin Ward
Ugandan experience (though not in precedence) when Brown arrived.

There had always been a tension between the two dioceses, a tension
which J.V. Taylor saw symbolised in the heraldic 'bar wavy' which
divided the coat of arms of the Church of Uganda. It was meant to
represent the Nile,
[b]ut it subtly suggested a situation of two nations-the elite and the rest-and
that unspoken thought haunted relationships in state and church for many years.
The situation was made:worse when the single diocese had to be divided, by the
decision to make only one new diocese, of the Upper Nile, rather than several
less polarized subdivisions. When eventually the arms were adopted by the newly
constituted Province of Uganda in 1961, the unhappy bar wavy was omitted.
Unfortunately it takes more than a gesture of heraldry to heal the wounds of dis-
regard.... 19
Stuart expressed the problem even more bluntly when he talked of the
'almost pathological jealousy of Upper Nile' in relation to the diocese
of Uganda, and its dominant group the Baganda.20
Another hot potato for the colonial church was the question of the
inclusion of the Church of Uganda in an East African 'Provincial' struc-
ture. This had first surfaced in 1928 when the Ugandan Synod had
given its approval to working towards the creation of an autonomous
East African Anglican Church.21 The Synod had been firmly guided to
that decision by Bishop Willis. But the scheme had come to nothing,
largely because of the strong opposition of Kenyan Anglicans. They
associated the proposal with the political discussions of the time about
Closer Union, widely regarded by Africans, with considerable justification,
as a stratagem to entrench white settler power. Even in Uganda, which
was not directly affected by settler domination and its attendant fears,
there was a vocal minority who opposed the idea of a Province; accord-
ing to Willis, they were the same conservatives who had earlier caused
him trouble over the affair of the Cross. Among the signatories of a
memorandum opposing the Province, was C.M.S. Kisosonkole, father
of the future wife of Muteesa. By the 1950s these fears, whether of an
Anglican Province or an East African Federation, were very keenly felt
in Uganda. Buganda in particular was acutely conscious of the pre-
cariousness of its own peculiar constitutional status at a time when all
kinds of political changes were being mooted. It was the issue which
sparked off the Crisis of 1953.22
Conflict within the Church in Buganda-the Namasole crisis of 1941
Kabaka Cwa died in 1939, in his mid-40s. He left a young widow,

Lady Irene Namaganda, one legitimate son, Edward Muteesa, aged 15,
and many other children. His chosen successor was reported to be

Prince George Mawanda. But Christian pressure from leading Protestant
chiefs insisted on the succession going to the only son who was legiti-
mate in the eyes of the Church: Muteesa. On the accession of her son,
Lady Irene became Namasole, the Queen Mother, traditionally a figure
of considerable power at court and in the affairs of state. In 1941 she
became pregnant. There was some sympathy for her, as she had endured
some 15 years of neglect by her husband, virtually a prisoner of the
Lubiri (palace). But there was an outcry when it transpired that she
wished actually to marry the father of her child. He was a young man
called Peter Kigozi, some 20 years her junior, a church teacher who
had recently completed his training as a school teacher at Bishop Tucker
College, the Anglican clergy and teacher training institution. If this was
an embarrassment for the Church, the proposed marriage outraged tra-
ditionalists, who did not mind the pregnancy (there was a suggestion
that she should go to South Africa for the birth), but who regarded
the proposed marriage as an insult to Kiganda tradition, which did not
countenance the remarriage of the Namasole. In all probability this
also articulated continuing resentment at the way in which the new
Kabaka had been imposed on Buganda by the moral rigidity of the
Church. Many of the senior chiefs who were closely identified with the
Church supported the Namasole-people such as the Katikkiro, Martin
Luther Nsibirwa, and the venerable Hamu Mukasa, still a figure of im-
mense gravitas. He had been a prominent lay member of the church
since the 1890s.
Bishop Stuart arranged a marriage by special licence, thus avoiding

the public reading of banns and preempting any public opposition. He
also himself conducted the wedding during Lent, against normal church
practice-creating the impression the Church was bending the rules to
please the Namasole. The Lukiiko (assembly of Buganda chiefs) con-
demned the marriage, dismissed Irene from her office of Namasole and
appointed someone else in her place. Nsibirwa was forced to resign as
Katikkiro. Stuart was subjected to abuse from traditional chiefs, whose
own marriages were also 'irregular'. It brought a new political dimen-
sion to the thorny question of the Church's marriage discipline.23 The
fact that the Balokole revivalists came out in strong support of the for-
mer Namasole caused this movement to be regarded with even greater
suspicion by many Baganda. The revivalists were themselves at log-
gerheads with Stuart on many issues, but on this they gave him full
backing.24 In fact many of the revival leaders from Buganda-men like
William Nagenda-were from the same social stratum of the Protestant
420 Kevin Ward
oligarchy, with whom the traditionalists were in conflict. Irene's hus-

band, Peter Kigozi, was himself to become strongly identified with the
Balokole movement. Eventually he was ordained and has become a
Canon. Significantly, he has served in Kampala diocese since its cre-
ation in 1972, rather than in the staunchly traditionalist diocese of
Namirembe. Traditionalists feared that the Kabaka might fall under
what they considered to be the malign influence of the Balokole move-
ment, subversive to Kiganda values. The strict moral code of the
Revivalists was hardly attractive to a pleasure-seeking Kabaka, but it
did offer solace and strength to a neglected wife in her own struggle
with an adulterous husband.
Land and the preservation of culture
In 1945 Nsibirwa again became Katikkiro. Almost immediately, he

was assassinated on the steps of Namirembe Cathedral, the day after
he had steered through the Lukiiko the Buganda Land Acquisition Act.
This was a measure which authorised the alienation, under certain speci-
fied circumstances, of land within Buganda to the Uganda Protectorate.
(The need for land to extend Makerere College was one such purpose
envisaged.) Bishop Stuart had already come under considerable criti-
cism for negotiating in 1940 a deal with mining companies which was
seen as giving away the mineral rights of the Church, as well as the
Church land on which minerals might be found.25 These issues became
the focus of renewed criticism of the Church of Uganda. Two out-
spoken critics were Ignatius K. Musaazi (1905-1990) and Semakula
Mulumba (bor 1913). Musaazi, often described as the father of mod-
ern Ugandan nationalism, went to England in the 1920s.26 He studied
at St Augustine's College, Canterbury, with the intention of becoming
a priest. But on returning to Uganda he found there was no place for
a man of his educational sophistication in the structures of the NAC:
he was not the typical 'peasant pastor' but neither, in a racially stratified
society, could he be accepted as equal to missionaries. He became a
teacher at Budo, but his Bataka sympathies soon got him involved in
opposition politics, landing him in gaol in the early 1940s. A pioneer
of Trade Unionism, he eventually went on to establish what is usually
regarded as the first modern political party in Uganda, the Uganda
National Congress in 1952. His detailed knowledge of Anglicanism was
supplemented by Mulumba, who had a Catholic background. A reli-
gious brother of the Bannakaroli order,27 he was sent by the White
Fathers to study at the School of Oriental and African Studies in
London in 1944, where he became influenced by the Pan-Africanist

views of people like Nkrumah and Kenyatta. He was sent back to
London by the Bataka movement in 1947 to lobby the British author-
ities on land issues. He became a trenchant critic of both Catholic and
Protestant establishments in Uganda.28 When Bishop Stuart was in
London for the 1948 Lambeth Conference, he invited Mulumba for
tea. Mulumba wrote a contemptuous refusal, scorning bishops who
preferred dining with the Governor and having tea parties rather than
discussing substantial issues.
Bishop Hannington [the first Anglican Bishop who was killed on his way to Buganda
in 1885] thought that his Christian views dispensed him from obedience to our
Kabaka. His Christianity did not shield him from the spears of our Kabaka's exe-
cutioners, anyway.29
For good measure Mulumba also warned Stuart against flirting with
the idea of an East African Province, and advised him to dissociate
himself from the 'scandalous Abalokole movement'.
Actually, on this occasion Stuart had not been interested in genteel
chat. He had invited Mulumba to discuss a substantial issue: a letter
from 'Timosewo Luule of Kikandwa and 217 other members of the
Church of Uganda', a memorandum in fact from Bataka sympathisers.
In it, Stuart was castigated for a wide ranging catalogue of sins:
Instead of being zealous for the spiritual interest of his flock, he works diligently
in co-operation with the British Government in their secret scheme for the acqui-
sition of Africans' land.
He sanctioned and incorporated in the Church the religious society of people
who profess to be THE SAVED [ie the Balokole revivalists]. He did so in order
to confuse our creed with their own.
He trampled under foot our indigenous traditions and customs in the case of
the marriage of our Namasole. Contrary to the regulations of the Church, he did
not publish the Banns for the purpose of ascertaining whether there were any
impediment to the marriage which, incidentally, took place in Lent. The sudden
uprooting of the national traditions and customs is not at all welcome to any
nation.
In order to mar the prestige of the African Clergy, he recommended Canon
Aberi Balya to be appointed Assistant Bishop of Uganda. Aberi Balya, to be frank,
although widely known for his 'saintliness' and 'simplicity', is a man with hardly
any elementary education, judging by moder standards of education in Uganda.
However, the DICTATOR of Canterbury ordered that Canon Aberi Balya should
be consecrated Bishop at any cost. So we are now greatly honoured and most
particularly privileged to have a 'Cure d'Ars' in Uganda. We certainly agree with
Bishop Stuart that 'Saintliness' and 'simplicity' work wonders in the world of saints
and simpletons, but it is our considered opinion that Uganda of today is no longer
such a world. We understand that our Bishop Balya is a stamp fashioned by Bishop
Stuart for, of course, the holy purpose of endorsing both Church and Government
documents designed for the promotion of African interests.3
422 Kevin Ward
Everything about the Memorandum-the nimble repartee, the biting

sarcasm, the reference to the cure d'Ars (the French Catholic priest St
Jean Vianney)-point to Mulumba himself as the author of the Memo-
randum. Not surprisingly, considerable pressure was put on the pur-
ported Anglican memorialists, especially the clergy, to repudiate their
signatures-Rev. Samwiri Nganda, a Rural Dean, subsequently wrote
an abject letter of apology to Stuart. Luule also reported to Mulumba
that the Bishop, now back in Uganda, was 'bamboozling' a priest to
confess his sin before the Synod.31
Ever since 1920 there had been demands by Baganda Anglicans for
their own Bishop. Willis had instead appointed a European assistant
(Greshford Jones), with the title Bishop of Kampala. Jones had no pre-
vious African, let alone Ugandan, experience. The appointment was
not a great success and there was no attempt to find a European suc-
cessor when Greshford Jones retired in 1924. But Willis continued to
block any suggestion of an African bishop.32 A generation later the issue
could no longer be delayed-not least because in 1939 the Roman
Catholics had appointed Joseph Kiwanuka as Bishop of Masaka, the
first modern African Catholic bishop. This was not good for Anglican
claims to be pioneers of indigenous leadership. In the 1940s Bishop
Stuart agonised about the choice of an assistant. His problem was that
there were no Baganda priests whom he considered really suitable. This
was a measure of the failure of the Church to produce clergy of intel-
lectual and social standing. Canon Bina had the education-he had
been educated at Budo-and he was a Muganda; but he was not
regarded as having the spiritual qualities of Balya, a Mutoro described
by E.M.K. Mulira (in striking contrast to Mulumba's dismissive invec-
tive) as a 'prince among peasants'.33 The decision to appoint Balya
rather than a Muganda in 1947 seemed a snub to Buganda, the fount
of Christianity in Uganda. It was also the occasion to articulate various
Kiganda grievances, including fears of land alienation. As the follow-
ing letter of protest put it:
The Cathedral at Namirembe belongs to the King of Buganda and to the Baganda
and is not for other nationalities.
You [Bishop Stuart] have shown yourself a bad ruler but we are not going to
allow Balya to be consecrated unless you are looking for war in Buganda. We ask
that a Muganda be consecrated because we were given power to rule ourself and
the 1900 [Agreement] does not allow people of other tribes to sit on our councils.4
This appeal to the 1900 Agreement, as a charter for the rights and
liberties of the Buganda nation, was to be of central importance in the
dispute which led to the expulsion of the Kabaka, and in the negoti-
ations to bring him back. In this case, it did not prevent the conse-
cration of Aberi Balya as Assistant Bishop, in Namirembe cathedral.
The marriage of the Kabaka
In 1939, at the age of 15, Muteesa succeeded his father as Kabaka.

He was a student at King's College, Budo, the prime institution of the
Anglican Church. After further studies at Makerere College, he was
sent by the British authorities to Cambridge for three years. Returning
in 1948, he announced his engagement to Damali, the daughter of a
prominent Protestant landowner, C.M.S. Kisosonkole.35 Traditionalists
viewed the proposed marriage as ultra vires, because Kisosonkole belonged
to the Nkima (Monkey) clan, whose head, the Mugema, was the cer-
emonial 'jaja' (grandfather) of the Kabaka. The Kabaka, consequently,
did not marry from this clan. But a glance at the genealogy in M.S.M.
Kiwanuka's History of Buganda36 shows that this was not entirely true-
quite a number of royal wives from the Nkima clan are recorded. The
point was that no son of such a union had ever become Kabaka. The
grave impediment for a Christian Kabaka was that, since he was expected
only to have one wife and that wife happened to be ow'enkima [from
the monkey clan], only the sons of such a union would be legitimate
and possible successors. Muteesa himself had only inherited the throne
because he was the son of the Christian marriage; Cwa himself favoured
an 'illegitimate' son, George Mawanda. Despite these criticisms, the
wedding went ahead in Namirembe cathedral in November 1948.
Damali was never really accepted in court circles at the Lubiri (palace),
where the Nalinnya, Alice Zalwango, the Kabaka's 'official' sister, held
sway. 'She lives in the past where Kings did whatever they liked', noted
Stuart, who also mentioned that the staunch Anglican chief Ham Mukasa
had nicknamed her 'Setani'!37 The Nalinnya was said to have encour-
aged the Kabaka in his extra-marital affair with Kate Lukira, wife of
Enoch Mulira, who was from a prominent Kiganda Protestant family,
and the brother of E.M.K. Mulira.38
By 1949 both the Nabagereka (the official title of the wife of the
Kabaka) and Kate Mulira were pregnant, and Mulira was threatening
to cite the Kabaka in a divorce case. Damali gave birth to a daugh-
ter, Dorothy Nasolo. Given the unhappy state of her marriage, Damali
found support from the Balokole revivalists, who took a strong stand
on the sanctity of Christian marriage. Bill Butler, a rather sanguine
and enthusiastic missionary support of the Revival movement, claimed
that both Lady Irene and Damali had 'got saved' in the months after
424 Kevin Ward
Damali's wedding. 'I believe it will not be long before he [the Kabaka]
too accepts the Lord Jesus as his personal Saviour.'39 This was wishful
thinking. Although the Bishop exerted informal pressure on all parties
to save both marriages, the Kabaka's marital affairs remained troubled.
The scandals of 1949 subsided somewhat. Enoch Mulira dropped the
threat of divorce proceedings in which the Kabaka would have been
involved. But in 1953 an even more delicate and difficult issue arose-
the Kabaka had fallen in love with Damali's younger sister, Sarah. This
was to complicate matters in the attempts to secure the Kabaka's return
from exile.
Meanwhile, the 'impediment' of the King's marriage to a member

of the Nkima clan had been resolved through the fortunate 'discovery'
that Damali's paternal grandfather, though brought up in an Nkima
household, actually belonged to the Mmamba (lung fish) clan. By means
of this sleight of hand, Bataka traditionalists were hoping to find an
ally rather than an opponent in the Kabaka. But they were bitterly
disappointed by Muteesa's refusal to back the demands of the Bataka
in the disturbances of 1949. Cwa had on occasion given tacit support
to Bataka traditionalists; Muteesa seemed much more in the pocket of
the Protectorate government. The deportation was to transform the
relations between the young Kabaka and the traditionalist groupings
within Buganda.40
The Deportation of Kabaka
We are sorry of course that he is a Jew as we have been rather spoilt by having
such keen churchmen in the past but he is such a nice man...4
This was Bishop Stuart's initial reaction to the arrival in 1952 of Sir
Andrew Cohen as Governor. Cohen quickly confirmed the amicability
between Namirembe and Government House, Entebbe, which had char-
acterised church-state relations in the past. Stuart, indeed, was flattered
to be urged by Cohen to stay on as bishop 'at this critical time'. Stuart
had been dithering for too long about whether to retire. The consul-
tations in London to find his successor were at an advanced stage, and
Archbishop Fisher, rather exasperated, made it clear that Stuart should
retire.42 Cohen was a liberal, a radical, a modemiser in terms of colonial
thinking, prepared to take substantial steps towards gradual decoloni-
sation. He saw himself as a friend of the peasants against the tradi-
tional elite; but he was also a great proponent of the importance of
incorporating the modern westernised intelligentsia into governance.43
In March 1953, Cohen introduced substantial changes in the govern-
ment of Buganda, providing for the devolution of responsibility, for the

provision of a number of services (in education and health) to the local
government, and introducing a majority of directly elected members of
the Lukiiko (the assembly of notables). The reforms, initiated by the
British Government in consultation with the Kabaka and his ministers,
but without public discussion, did not satisfy radical opinion in Buganda,
either Bataka populists, or Musaazi's new party, the Uganda National
Congress. But it did offer tantalizing possibilities of fundamental con-
stitutional change in Buganda, not only for Bataka and peasants and
young radicals, but also for the Catholics, the largest single religious
community in Buganda. It was also a new situation for the Kabaka-
posing the question: would he remain essentially a ward of the Protectorate
government and dominated by the old Protestant establishment, or
would the new democratic element in Buganda politics enable him to
re-integrate the Kabakaship as the focus of populist sentiment? The
sense that Uganda was entering a period of fundamental change and
the uneasiness which this engendered was exacerbated by Cohen's strong
affirmation of the development of Uganda as a unitary state. What pre-
cisely this entailed was further confused by the casual remarks of the
Colonial Secretary made in his speech to the East Africa Dinner Club
on 30 June:
Nor should we exclude from our minds the evolution, as time goes on, of still
larger measures of unification, and possibly still larger measures of federation of
the whole of the East African territories.44
Cohen, realising the sensitive nature of the issue, acted swiftly to reas-
sure an alarmed public that there was no change of policy, that there
was no intention to impose federation without consulting local opinion.
But all sections of Ugandan opinion were united in expressing appre-
hension at the intentions of the Secretary of State. The Lukiiko demanded
firm guarantees that Buganda's constitutional position would not be
tampered with. Cohen considered that he had given all the assurances
needed and feared that Buganda was developing in an isolationist direc-
tion which serious jeopardised his constitutional plans for Uganda as a
whole. He insisted that the Lukiiko withdraw its demands that Buganda
be transferred from Colonial Office jurisdiction to that of the Foreign
Office and be given a date for separate independence. The Lukiiko
refused to withdraw. It was the Kabaka's continued insistence on artic-
ulating these views, unacceptable to the Governor, that resulted in the
confrontation of 30 November. The outcome was the withdrawal of
recognition of the Kabaka on the grounds of 'disloyalty': transgressing
his role as defined in the 1900 Agreement.
426 Kevin Ward
Cohen had made plans for these eventualities early in November.

He hoped that support for Muteesa within Buganda would quickly
haemorrhage, and that a new Kabaka could be chosen. He hoped, too,
that both Anglican and Catholic Churches would help in promoting a
climate of opinion which would make this possible, relying on the fact
that the Catholic Church had little interest in the status quo, and know-
ing the long-standing disgruntlement of many Anglican clergy against
the elite. Moreover, neither Church could be happy with the Kabaka's
private life.45 But the deportation put Leslie Brown, the new Bishop of
Uganda, in an invidious position. He had arrived in Uganda for the
first time in March 1953. He was regarded by officials in London and
Entebbe as saintly but politically naive. In Buganda, the political involve-
ment of the Anglican bishop in affairs of state was taken for granted
and in the popular surge of shock and disaffection with the Governor,
Brown was accused of being privy to the deportation. His reluctance
to speak out was taken as approval of what the Governor had done.
Brown always strenuously denied having known anything beforehand.
He had had dinner with Cohen a few days before, and in retrospect
was struck by the unwonted lack of conviviality, which he put down
to Cohen's reluctance to compromise the Bishop by making him party
to the plan.46 Cohen was well aware of the key role of the Anglican
church in containing the crisis:
I think that the Anglican Church will need careful handling not only at this end
but also in England. The Bishop of Uganda is not experienced politically and is
really by nature a theologian rather than an administrator. Inevitably he is drawn
into political discussions by the Baganda, many of whom believe that it is the
Bishop of Uganda's function to take part in politics.47
Max Warren, the General Secretary of the CMS in London, was to

regret that the traditional mediatorial role of the Church had not been
called into play on this occasion.48 Anglican loyalist chiefs, such as the
Katikkiro Paulo Kavuma, tended to exonerate the Bishop from com-
plicity in the deportation-Ham Mukasa drove from his home in
Mukono to hear from the lips of the Bishop that he had not known,
and was satisfied.49 For Brown it was always something of a relief that
with a clear conscience he could deny any private knowledge. But 'pro-
gressive' chiefs like Katikkiro Kavuma were themselves under suspicion,
and Kavuma, who had been present at the fateful meeting in Entebbe,
was criticised for not doing more to support the Kabaka.50 The gen-
eral impression created was that the Anglican Church of Uganda was,
at the very least, insufficiently vocal in its protest. As one member of
the church, A.L. Kamya, put it:
What is worrying me much is the opinions of the people, about our Church. The
majority of people are grieved to see that the Church of Uganda has not assisted
in the deportation of the Kabaka [sc. has not spoken out against it]. We all
expected justice from the church. The Baganda still regard the Bishop as the chief
advisor of His Excellency... I am telling you the truth as long as your Church
is silent during this critical time the Church of Uganda is doomed.5'
If Cohen miscalculated the depth of anger the deportation would pro-

voke in Buganda, he also seriously underestimated the effects in London.
In a despatch to the Secretary of State on 7 November, three weeks
before the deportation, he wrote:
It is extremely unpalatable to me to have to suggest deposing a ruler because he

will not accept 'No' to a request for a fixed date for independence. But I venture
to express the view that the Kabaka would get little support from opinion in
England. Our record of political, economic and educational advance in this coun-
try during recent years is good and there would be no difficulty whatever in mak-
ing out an absolutely solid case on this record.52
Cohen's initial stance, once the Kabaka had arrived in London, was
that the British government should simply refuse to contemplate nego-
tiating for his return, but should encourage a speedy election of a new
Kabaka. In this strategy, Cohen did not reckon with the success of the
delegation which was speedily dispatched to London by the Lukiiko
precisely to initiate such negotiations. In the immediate aftermath of
the exile, Cohen had persuaded a reluctant Lukiiko to appoint the three
chief ministers of the Buganda government as regents: Paulo Kavuma,
Latimer Mpagi (both Protestants), and Matiya Mugwanya (a Catholic).
Their position was a difficult one and they were constantly being accused
of being too moderate in their dealings with the British Protectorate
authorities, insufficiently committed to Muteesa personally and luke-
warm in promoting his return. The London delegation chosen by the
Lukiiko, on the other hand, consisted of men selected in the expecta-
tion that they would mount a vigorous campaign for the rights of
Buganda and for the Kabaka. The heart of the delegation consisted of
three young educated members of the Protestant elite: Apolo Kironde,
E.M.K. Mulira, and Thomas Makumbi. Kironde, a grandson of Sir
Apolo Kaggwa, had recently qualified as a lawyer and was regarded
as having strong Uganda National Congress sympathies. Immediately
after the deportation, probably at the instigation of the Lukiiko, he filed
a case in the high court in Kampala challenging the legality of the
Governor's withdrawal of recognition of the Kabaka. Mulira and
Makumbi were related. Without, at this stage, having any reputation for
'extremist' political sympathies, and in good standing with the Anglican
church, they could be relied on as moderate but articulate defenders
428 Kevin Ward
of Buganda's rights. They were not personally close to the Kabaka

himself-indeed Mulira was the brother of Eridadi Mulira, who had
threatened litigation over the Kabaka's affair with his wife. Two other
people were active in the delegation in its early stages: Amos Sempa,
more a Buganda traditionalist than a young radical, and Matiya Mug-
wanya, the Catholic regent, and grandson of Sir Stanislas Mugwanya.
Mugwanya was in many ways cosest personally to the Kabaka. Although
a Protestant, Muteesa's father had cultivated close relations with the
Mugwanyas, the leading Catholic family in Buganda-perhaps this was
motivated by a common feeling of exclusion from the levers of power.
In the early stages of the crisis Mugwanya was regarded by Cohen as
being much more vigorous in his sympathies for Muteesa than Kavuma.
But, in the first few weeks of the Kabaka's exile in December 1953,
this relationship quite suddenly soured.53 Mugwanya fell out with the
other members of the London delegation and returned to Uganda. It
seems that his relationship with Muteesa was also adversely affected,
with serious consequences some years later when, on two occasions,
there was the possibility of Mugwanya being elected as Katikkiro. The
roots of the estrangement, both from the younger Protestant members
of the deputation, and from Muteesa himself, lay in the contacts forged
with Musaazi and the Congress immediately after Muteesa's arrival in
London. Possibly the Kabaka had made overtures to Musaazi even
before his exile-Musaazi was in Uganda at the time, and returned to
London on the very day of the deportation. The Catholic Church had
grave reservations about Congress, considering it to be dangerously
Communist in its sympathies. Mugwanya's sudden departure from
London at the end of December 1953 was not explained in the Colonial
Office records at the time; there is just a hint at what might have hap-
pened in a letter written in 1957 by Sir Frederick Crawford, Cohen's
successor as Governor of Uganda. He was writing about the obvious
hostility between Mugwanya and the Kabaka in connection with the
elections to the Lukiiko in 1957:
Mugwanya had let him [ie the Kabaka] down terribly in London during his exile
when he had told the late Cardinal Griffin [the Archbishop of Westminster] that
he (the Kabaka) was a Communist and had then asked to leave London before
the rest of the Buganda delegation-thus deserting him.54
Though the precise gloss put on this by Crawford may be open to

question, it does give an important clue to what might be the origins
of Mugwanya's estrangement from the Kabaka.
Despite these undercurrents within the Delegation, it was in fact very
successful in mobilising vital sections of British public opinion in favour
of the Kabaka, in ways which quickly dashed Cohen's sanguine hopes

of a speedy resolution of the crisis by the dumping of Muteesa in favour of
another candidate. The Delegation was listened to sympathetically by
a number of parliamentarians, not only from the opposition Labour
party (where Cohen himself had many contacts) but in the Government
too. It was important to get the support of Max Warren of the CMS,
not only because of CMS's historic importance for Buganda, but because
Warren had massive influence in shaping Church of England attitudes
to colonial issues. He was a respected advisor of Archbishop Fisher,
who took a keen interest both in the political questions of Uganda and
in advising the Kabaka on the marriage difficulties which could not be
extricated from the more public aspects of the crisis. Briefed by Warren
and Bishop Stuart (now in retirement in England) and the Lukiiko del-
egation, Fisher made an early and powerful statement on the under-
lying political implications of the crisis:
Their deepest fear and horror... is that before they can control or stop it, Uganda
will have become a multi-racial state... with Africans for ever yoked, if not sub-
ordinated to, Europeans and Asians. The Africans know that they cannot take
over themselves now. But they are alarmed lest Europeans (increased in numbers
by economic developments) and Asians get so entrenched that by the time Africans
can take over full government they will be saddled with partners, European and
Asian, whom they do not want.55
But it was perhaps Bishop Stuart who, more than anyone else, jeop-
ardised Cohen's strategy. In an outspoken letter to The Observer on 27
December 1953, he strongly criticised Lyttleton's speech and the whole
idea of an East African Federation. The Observer omitted some of the
more intemperate phrases, but a copy of the full letter reached Uganda
and was immediately published in translation in Ebifa, the Protestant
Luganda language newspaper, including this provocative assertion: 'Un-
less I am wrong there will be bloodshed in the whole of Africa and
Mr Lyttleton will be responsible. If Mr Lyttleton were employed by
the Russians he could not have served them better.' Unsurprisingly the
Colonial Office took great exception to this: 'We find it almost incred-
ible that a person of his experience and standing could have written
in this way.'56 But in Buganda Stuart became a hero overnight-some-
thing which had eluded him in his long years as Bishop. By contrast,
Bishop Brown was put in an even worse light, as he reflected ruefully:
'His "loyalty" and my "treachery" are being constantly contrasted.'57
The Bishop of Upper Nile also deprecated Stuart's letter; but from a
rather different perspective. He felt that many people outside Buganda
were sceptical about whether the Kabaka's stand was really in the inter-
ests of Uganda as a whole.
430 Kevin Ward
For this reason they [educated Ugandans outside Buganda] have no desire to be
pushed into this so-called 'self-government' at any near-future stage, which would
only mean domination by the Baganda before their own leaders have had time
to develop in education and experience.5
This opinion, which had been the initial reaction of the small group
of educated Anglicans from outside Buganda whom Bishop Usher
Wilson had talked to in the immediate aftermath of the deportation,
tended to become muted as the fate of the Kabaka became linked with
the general constitutional progress of Uganda, and the Kabaka was cast
in the unlikely role as champion of all Ugandans struggling against
colonialism.
The immediate consequence of the general critical reaction in Britain,

not least from Anglican leaders, was that it ended all hope that the
crisis would be resolved by the election of a new Kabaka. This was
despite Cohen's attempts .to mobilise sections of Buganda to this end,
and the efforts of the Colonial Office to use the Kabaka's marital prob-
lems to discredit him. Wild speculation about incest and homosexual
practices also circulated, which Max Warren hinted might have emanated
from a Colonial Office dirty-tricks department.59 Stuart noted:
The governor is, not unnaturally perhaps, annoyed with me for backing his return.
He thinks I have delayed the choosing of a new Kabaka and so delayed the coun-
try settling down. In a way I agree with him. I always said before I left that when
I had left I would not enter into things out there. But when the delegation appealed
to me I didn't see how I could refuse.6
Quite apart from reflecting the strength of feeling in general among

Baganda, there were also considerations of Anglican self-interest. One
was the fear that the Catholics would 'capitalise on the situation' and
that a new Kabaka might declare himself a Catholic. Paradoxically, in
view of Muteesa's failure as an exemplar of uxoriousness, the need to
defend the sanctity of Christian marriage in the Church of Uganda led
to backing for the existing Kabaka. Despite her personal marriage prob-
lems (in fact these may even have reinforced her vehement support for
her husband's rights), Muteesa's wife, the Nabagereka Damali, was par-
ticularly vehement in emphasising this. In a letter to Max Warren she
called the deportation an act of profanity against the throne compa-
rable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor:
It is no secret that Mutesa's brothers are out of wedlock and therefore in the eyes
of the Church illegitimate offsprings. Mutesa himself was chosen not because he
was the eldest, but because he was the only one inside the wedlock. Now the
Government has banished him and is giving instructions to 'appoint' another
Kabaka.
Damali wondered rhetorically who would be suitable. She rejected the

idea of her only child, a daughter, succeeding. 'If it is one of the others
[ie the brothers of Muteesa], what place is Christianity and Christian
marriage going to be relegated to in the life of the people?'6'
The problem for the Anglicans-and it was a big one-was that
Muteesa himself refused to conform to the ideal of a Christian monarch.
He attended a Billy Graham rally at Harringay, and listened dutifully
to the fatherly advice of Fisher, who was to become skilled at lectur-
ing the British royal family on its Christian duty.62 But, in a conflict
between Christian and Kiganda norms of kingship, Kiganda expecta-
tions proved stronger and more attractive. Early in 1954 the Nabagereka
travelled to England for a short visit and there was talk of a reconcil-
iation. Soon after her return she found that she was pregnant. But
Damali's sister also visited England. InJanuary 1955 Damali gave birth
to a son, Henry Kimera Katabaazi. Some months later Sarah also gave
birth to Muteesa's child, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi.
Negotiationsfor the return of the Kabaka
By early 1954 it was becoming clear to most people, and not least
to Cohen himself, that the deportation had been a severe miscalcula-
tion. Cohen was anxious to move the issues on from this single issue,
and advised the Colonial Office that a constitutional conference might
be a way out of the impasse. On 23 February the British government
announced the setting up of a Commission to be led by Sir Keith
Hancock an Australian constitutionalist, Director of the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies in London. The announcement was accompa-
nied by a statement about 'the primarily African character of the coun-
try'-which was meant as another effort substantially to alleviate the
fears which had caused the crisis in the first place. Much of the next
few months was spent in getting the Lukiiko to agree to participate in
the Commission, and to appoint delegates. Parallel to these negotia-
tions, Cohen was active in persuading 'moderate' voices to accept an
invitation from the Lukiiko to serve as members of the Commission-
he was particularly anxious that the Catholics be represented, and lob-
bied Archbishop Cabana of Rubaga not to forbid clerical participa-
tion.63 The list of members eventually included the Lukiiko delegates
in London who were trying to negotiate the Kabaka's return: Makumbi,
Kironde and Mulira; these lay Protestants were supplemented by J.G.
Ssengendo-Zake and Y. Kyazze, and by (something of an outsider to
432 Kevin Ward
the Protestant elite), Yusuf Lule, a Muslim convert to the Church of

Uganda and a Makerere college lecturer. There were three Catholic
clerics: Bishop Kiwanuka of Masaka, Mgr. J. Kasule (from the area of
Buganda under Mill Hill rather than White Father supervision), and
Fr. Joachim K. Masagazi, the editor of the influential Catholic news-
paper Munno.4 The Regent, Matiya Mugwanya, was a key lay Catholic
presence. The Lukiiko suggested two Americans: Ralphe Bunche and
Ernest Kalibala, the latter actually a Muganda who had lived in the
United States for many years and was married to an American.65 The
British government vetoed Bunche, and would have liked to exclude
Kalibala, but were eventually persuaded to include him. Kalibala had
been the first Muganda to gain a PhD from the USA. Returning in
the early 1930s he had got a job as a Protestant schools inspector with
the CMS, but, resenting the pay differentials of missionaries and the
obvious difficulty of accommodating him in the race-conscious social
hierarchy of colonial Uganda, he had soon left.66 He founded the Aggrey
memorial school, one of the first independent schools (that is, neither
government nor mission) in Uganda. In line with much protest political
activity in this period, Kalibala had contacts with the Bataka move-
ment, contacts he was to renew during his stay in Uganda as a mem-
ber of the Lukiiko delegation to the Hancock Commission.
The delegates to the Hancock Commission were weighted towards
the relatively young, educated and progressive. All of the Protestants
were lay and many were vaguely sympathetic to the stance of the
Uganda National Congress. Cohen was somewhat worried by the lack
of representation of traditional ssaza chiefs. His desire to dilute Congress
influence also helps to explain his enthusiasm for Catholic participation
(which in contrast to the Protestants was largely clerical). Catholic par-
ticipation in discussions about basic constitutional issues represented
an important step forward for a group which had been more or less
excluded from such discussions for 50 years. The Commission met at
Namirembe, in the house of the Bishop of Uganda, but the bishop was
not himself a member of the Buganda delegation, which consisted exclu-
sively of Baganda. The deliberations-of the Namirembe Conference
began in June 1954 and continued until September of that year.67 Its
task was to examine a new constitutional relationship between Buganda
and the rest of the Protectorate of Uganda. The question of the Kabaka's
return was not on the agenda, at least officially. Hancock produced a
report which had positive benefits for all sides. It recognised both the
continued importance of Buganda as a separate entity in Uganda, and
also the development of Uganda as a unitary state. For Buganda itself,
it provided for a consolidation of Cohen's reforms initiated in March

1952: the devolution of services to the Lukiiko, the further development
of democratic participation in elections and progress towards minis-
terial responsibility. It envisaged the creation of a constitutional mon-
archy. The London delegates had talked of the Kabaka as a 'spire'
rather than a 'pillar'-his role in the new constitution would be dec-
orative rather than functional. But the reality was that the new con-
stitution gave the possibilities of a much more active involvement in
affairs of state, as was to be apparent once the Kabaka returned.68 The
still unanswered question was the identity of the Kabaka-Muteesa or
another. Cohen was gradually coming round to accepting that the only
way of resolving the dispute was to allow Muteesa to return. This was
the advice he was getting from the leaders of both Churches. Bishop
Brown wrote to Cohen in July 1954:
I believe that the emotional strength of the attachment to Mutesa is so strong that
there is no way to secure the trust and co-operation of the Baganda in going for-
ward together unless Mutesa has been given the chance to come back, provided,
of course, that he gives assurance of loyal cooperation in future.69
Bishop Kiwanuka, for the Catholics, was writing in the same vein in
November 1954
In my view the crisis of last November has created a deep gulf between the
guardians and the great majority of the Baganda. So long as this gulf exists it will
be extremely difficult for the guardians to carry the Baganda with them in the
execution of the great schemes designed to benefit them... I am almost certain
that our efforts to create a new situation in Buganda by the new constitution may
not come to anything unless a real attempt is made to bring about reconciliation
between the guardians and the Baganda... De duobus malis, minus est eligendum-
the Constitution can't be accepted till Kabaka problem is resolved. This is the
lesser evil than the problem of his return.70
Throughout 1954 Katwe, a teeming 'working class' suburb in the Kibuga

(that part of Kampala which was under local Buganda administration
rather than under direct Protectorate control), had been the centre of
popular protest and expressions of support for the Kabaka. Many of
the Luganda vernacular newspapers, particularly important in keeping
up the momentum of popular agitation, had their offices there. Katwe
was the hub of Buganda's populist politics, and was an important base
of Congress support (Bataka sympathies were also expressed in Katwe,
but its base was more rural than urban). Cohen had not taken into
account the power of these forces in creating, and then sustaining, sup-
port for Kabaka Mutesa. Another powerful nexus of support centred
around the Kibuga, a mile or so from Katwe, and the person of
the Nabagereka Damali, the wife of the Kabaka. Despite her personal
434 Kevin Ward
problems, Damali assumed symbolic importance in the campaign to

restore her husband. She was in close touch with a group of powerful
progressive Protestant women like Rebecca Mulira, the daughter of Ham
Mukasa and wife of E.M.K. Mulira. Mrs Mulira realised that women
must transcend purely church networks like Mothers Union and YWCA
and organise politically. She established the Uganda Women's Congress.71
A delegation of Anglican women-Rebecca Mulira, her step-mother
Sarah Mukasa (wife of Ham), Mrs Damali Mpagi (wife of the regent
Latimer Mpagi) Mrs Mary Kadumukasa (daughter-in-law of the late
Sir Apollo Kaggwa), Mrs Yunia Kamanyi (the wife of the secretary to
the Omuwanika, the Buganda treasurer) and Mrs Yoeri Kaizi (whose
husband was a clergyman and secretary to Bishop Brown) persuaded
the Bishop to accompany them in a delegation to meet Cohen in
February 1954.72 The fact that they came from 'progressive' circles in
good standing with the Church gave them some clout. Cohen described
the group thus:
[T]here is a powerful pressure group of these women organised by people close

to the Nabagereka which is having an influence on the general attitude. It is said
that emotionally all Baganda women regard themselves as being at the disposal
of the Kabaka and that this is at the root of their feeling. Certainly the women
seem to have been even more emotionally affected than the men.73
Cohen had also quickly come to the conclusion that there was little
support among clergy of either church for the election of a new Kabaka.
Bishop Festo Lutaaya, the Muganda Anglican assistant bishop, was one
of the few clergy who had openly criticised Muteesa for immorality.
He even criticised Bishop Brown for conducting the funeral of Princess
Alice Zalwango, who had died of a heart attack on hearing the news
of the deportation. Lutaaya argued that throughout her life she had
worked against the interests of the church. Brown did not often hear
accusations that he was too sympathetic to the traditionalist cause! Luta-
aya was one of the few clerics who was willing to speak publicly in
less than enthusiastic terms about the Kabaka's return. At a service
in Mukono'parish church to commemorate the death of Bishop Willis
in 1954 (Willis had been Bishop of Uganda from 1911-1934) Bishop
Lutaaya continued to castigate the Kabaka for his failure to lead a
Christian life. This provoked an altercation with Thomas Makumbi (the
Lukiiko delegate to London and headmaster of Bishop's School, Mukono),
and a walk-out of the congregation.74 Support from such an eccentric
individualist would not get the Governor very far. Brown, shocked by
the constant barrage of complaints wherever he travelled, was able to
transmit the depth of feeling everywhere on the issue. Cohen tended
to think that Brown's 'meek and saintly character' and his political
naivety gave 'an unduly gloomy view' of how much support Muteesa
had-by which Cohen meant that he thought Brown's estimate of that
support was exaggerated. But he realised that his strategy of encour-
aging an alternative Kabaka was not going to work. Moreover the
Archbishop of Canterbury, reflecting general church opinion in England,
continued to press for Muteesa's return:
The continued exclusion of the Kabaka after a constitutional settlement would
antagonize Africans all over the continent, unless it could be vindicated on grounds
which appear to them as indubitably just and free from racial bias. I do not believe
it would be possible to provide such a vindication. The character of the Kabaka
should not be taken into account. Deposition cannot rest upon his marital rela-
tions, while rumours of immoralities of a worse kind rest on no evidence at all,
and according to the best advice I can get are groundless.5
And yet it was almost a year after the conclusion of the Hancock com-
mission and the announcement in November 1954 of the acceptance
by the British government of its recommendations, before Muteesa was
able to return. Partly this was because the Colonial Office, which had
initially been sceptical about Cohen's insistence on the necessity of
deportation, was now less than enthusiastic when Cohen himself began
to advocate for Muteesa's return. Moreover, it was by no means cer-
tain that the Lukiiko would accept the constitutional compromises worked
out by Hancock. In November 1954, judgement was given in the case
initiated by Apolo Kironde way back in December 1953 challenging
the validity of the Kabaka's expulsion. While in London, Kironde had
hired WJ.K. Diplock and Dingle Foot to present the Buganda case.
In a complex judgement, the Chief Justice of Uganda vindicated the
right of the British government to withdraw recognition of the Kabaka,
but declared that the Governor had erred by citing the wrong section
of the Agreement (Article 6 rather than 20) to justify the withdrawal
of recognition. Whatever the precise legal interpretation of the mean-
ing and implications of this verdict, Kiganda opinion took it as a vic-
tory and there were scenes of rejoicing.76 An impromptu service that
evening in Namirembe cathedral had the nature of a thanksgiving for
the vindication of Buganda's cause, despite efforts by church leaders to
play down the triumphalism.77
In February 1955 a prophet named Kiganira set himself up at
Mutundwe, one of Kampala's many hills. Possessed by the Lubaale
Kibuuka (the deity concerned with war in the Kiganda pantheon). Kiga-
nira spoke out against the deportation of the Kabaka. Both Kiganira's
own message and neo-traditionalist groupings who latched on to the
436 Ketin Ward
upsurge of interest caused by Kiganira, used this as an opportunity to

criticise both Protestant and Catholic Churches for their insistence on
monogamy, and for such teaching as forgiveness of sin: 'Who was to
forgive Bishop Brown his sin of having arranged the deportation of the
Kabaka?'78 There was a fear that in this climate the Lukiiko would de-
cide to reject the Hancock proposals out of hand. But lobbying by the
more moderate forces, including Mugwanya and Kironde and Mulira,
was partly responsible for producing a favourable vote in the Lukiiko
in May 1955. The formal ratification of a new Buganda Agreement
was to be conditional on a successful outcome to the negotiations to
bring back the Kabaka. Yet another Lukiiko delegation (this time of a
much more traditionalist complexion than the London or Namirembe
ones) was dispatched to London to arrange the mechanisms for his
return. After much negotiation, it was agreed that a transitional agree-
ment would be signed by the Lukiiko, after which the Kabaka would
be allowed to return, whereupon the Agreement would be ratified. As
part of these transitional arrangements, elections were held for the office
of Katikkiro. In August 1955, members of the Lukiiko voted by a nar-
row margin to appoint Michael Kintu (yet another relative of Sir Apolo
Kaggwa-this time a son-in-law). Kintu received 40 votes to the 37
votes for Mugwanya, his main rival. Kavuma (the sitting Katikkiro) got
a derisory four votes: he was punished for his perceived lack of com-
plete support for the Kabaka. This was another indication of the impor-
tant transformations which were taking place in Buganda politics since
the initiation of direct elections to the Lukiiko in 1953. The popular
election of Lukiiko members meant that the numerical strength of the
Catholics throughout Buganda could no longer be discounted, and for
the first time there was a strong group of Catholics represented, who
were in a position to press for election of a Catholic Katikkiro. The
possibility of a decisive Catholic influence was regarded with consider-
able apprehension, for somewhat different reasons, both by the tradi-
tional Protestant elite and by the Kabaka. Pressure was exerted from
both quarters to prevent this eventuality.79
The return of the Kabaka
Muteesa's return was fixed for 17 October 1955. There was a vale-
dictory party at Claridges in London. Guests included the Archbishop
of Canterbury, Bishop Stuart, and Revd. Michael Scott (the campaigner
for the rights of the Herero people of Namibia). Seretse Khama, also
The Eile of Kabaka Muteesa II 437
an African ruler in exile in London, and his wife Ruth were invited.
Two planes were chartered to carry the Kabaka and his entourage.80
The flight was carefully timed to arrive at 9 a.m. in Entebbe, where
Sir Andrew Cohen officially welcomed the Kabaka. The first event in
an arduous itinerary which took the next three days, was to drive to
Namirembe Cathedral to be met by Bishop Brown and the senior clergy
and to participate in a thanksgiving service.81 In the afternoon there
was a courtesy visit to Rubaga, the Catholic centre. There followed an
over-night ceremony at the Lubiri, the royal palace, which involved
the completion of traditional burial rite ceremonies (Okwabya Olumbe) of
members of the royal family who had died during the absence of the
Kabaka. On the next day there was an official visit to the Lukiiko,
during which the 1955 Buganda Agreement was formally signed. It was
noted that there were no church or mission representatives at this sign-
ing, in marked contrast to the situation in 1900. The fact that CMS
had such an important part in brokering the 1900 Agreement had often
been used during the years of the Kabaka's exile as a reason for Anglican
interest in a favourable outcome to the dispute between Buganda and
Her Majesty's Government. After signing the Agreement the Kabaka
and the Governor watched a football match, Buganda versus the Rest
of Uganda, which fortunately turned out to be a one-all draw.
Despite the vital role played by the Anglican church in securing the
return of the Kabaka, the Church in Buganda remained weakened and
unpopular. Relations between Kabaka and Bishop were cool, with
Muteesa's marital affairs a continuing source of mistrust. Once back in
Uganda, Muteesa invested Sarah with the honours and title of the sec-
ond wife of a Kabaka, Kabja. He cast doubt on the paternity of his
son by Damali and refused to allow the child to be baptised.82 By con-
trast, he was eager to recognise Sarah's child as son and heir-and
earnestly desired him to be baptised. This Bishop Brown refused to do,
in accordance with the practice of the Church of Uganda that only
children born in Christian wedlock should be baptised as infants. When,
in 1957, the Kabaka did succeed in getting a priest, Revd. M. Kaizi,
to perform the baptism privately at the palace, the Bishop withdrew
the priest's licence. He also put Mr and Mrs Kisosonkole (the parents
of both Damali and Sarah) under discipline because they attended the
ceremony.83
The Bishop and his assistant bishops (Festo Lutaaya, Dunstan Nsubuga,
and Erika Sabiiti) tried to impress on the Kabaka privately the serious-
ness with which they regarded the situation:
438 Kevin Ward
We told him clearly that his example is quite definitely encouraging the spread
of paganism and irreligion in the country. He has been talking for some time of
getting a judicial separation from Damali. I am not opposed to this in principle,
provided a statement is issued making it perfectly clear that Damali remains his
wife and the legal Nabagereka. It would be a completely impossible situation for
the Church if the result of a separation was that he took Sarah about with him
everywhere as his wife. I could certainly not conduct a service in church if he
came and sat in state with Sarah.8
For both traditionalists and supporters of Christian monogamy, the

Kabaka was a cultural symbol. Women had been at the forefront of
the campaign for the return of the Kabaka, led by the Nabagereka
herself, who adopted bark-cloth as a sign of protest. John Taylor men-
tions one Mothers Union representative telling him that 'as long as the
Kabaka is in exile, all Christian marriage is weakened'.85 On the other
hand, in 1955 (at the height of the excitement generated by the prophet
of Kibuuka at Mutundwe) Bishop Brown received a memorandum enti-
tled 'Native marriages keep our country in health', denouncing mono-
gamy as being responsible for a decline in Buganda's population from
7 million to a mere 700,000!86 The Kabaka's own marriage affairs at
the time of his exile threw into sharp focus the profound incompati-
bility of traditional Kiganda and traditional Christian marriage ethics.
In normal times the two systems co-existed uneasily but without too
much friction. The crisis had led to a reassertion and open espousal
of traditional values. This in turn forced the Church to face the con-
sequences of its failure to inculcate and commend its Christian mar-
riage practice.
The basic cause of empty churches everywhere in Buganda every Sunday is the
failure of Christian marriage to be established and the sense of sin and resentment
people have at the Church's rule and about baptism of illegitimate children.87
Missionaries had long been concerned about decline in church atten-

dance, and the fact that only the enforced attendance of children from
church schools kept numbers respectable in Buganda-in contrast to
the rapid growth of the church in other parts of Uganda. Brown noted
a marked falling off of communicants at the annual Luwero confirmation
service: 549 in 1952, 333 in 1953, 217 in 1954 and 165 in 1955.88
The Kabaka's return did nothing to reverse this trend, as the Bishop
noted a year afterwards:
The number of people in churches has decreased even since the Kabaka came
back and on the Day of Thanksgiving for his return the churches were almost
empty. It is being put about everywhere that it was the old gods who brought
the Kabaka back. The apparatus and dances of witchcraft have been publicly
shown before the Kabaka on his safaris.89
One pastor had said to the Bishop, 'We all wanted the Kabaka back
but we wanted him to return as Kabaka and not as god.'9? While the
Kabaka did not initiate this revival of traditional religious symbolism,
the church felt that he should do more to discourage it. The Kabaka,
on the other hand, felt that a revival of traditional sentiment was more
of a demonstration of exuberance at the restoration of the Kabaka than
symptomatic of any deep-seated anti-Christian feeling.91 Part of the
problem for the Anglican Church was its place in the colonial struc-
ture which made it the target of resentment.
If the Kabaka had no wish to attack the church (and indeed had
good reason to feel some gratitude for its part in his return), he made
it clear soon after his arrival that he wanted to punish those individ-
uals whom he deemed had not been sufficiently forthcoming in their
support for him during his exile. Even before his return it was rumoured
that his personal assistant Musa Parma, had been undermining both
Kavuma and Mugwanya in their campaigns for the Katikkiro. Soon
after his return a campaign began to force the resignation of those
ssaza chiefs who were deemed to have been lukewarm in their sup-
port. Often these were those who had been most loyal to the British-
in fact those whom Cohen had hoped might be willing to accept an
alternative to Muteesa as Kabaka. Chiefs who had a reputation for
loyalty to their churches were often seen by Cohen as most likely to
respond positively to his enticements; they now became the target of
Muteesa's anger. By the end of 1955 the chiefs of Bulemezi and Kyaggwe
and Alexander Kironde, the Roman Catholic chief of Buddu (the
Pokino), had all resigned.92 Accompanied with this campaign emanat-
ing from the Kabaka and his entourage was a disturbing amount of
rural violence and intimidation. For example, a minor chief had his
head shaved and was forced to endure a mock naming ceremony
because he was alleged to have boasted that he would change his name
if the Kabaka ever returned. These events were given unfavourable
publicity in the foreign press.93 Under the new Agreement, the British
had no direct say in the appointment of chiefs and ministers in the
Buganda government, and Cohen was obviously reluctant to jeopardise
the new arrangements by even seeming to interfere. The Kabaka for
his part tended to play down the violence and talked of 'administra-
tive adjustments'.94 But E.M.K. Mulira accused the Kabaka of irre-
sponsibility: starting a fire and then sitting back and expecting others
to put it out.95 This endeared him neither to the Kabaka nor to the
traditionalist members of the Lukiiko.
440 Kevin Ward
The signing of the 1955 Buganda Agreement thus inaugurated a

period of more active political participation by the restored Kabaka
than had been possible for a long time, since before the 1900 Agreement.
The most serious consequence of this was in the attitude to the Catholics.
Cohen's reforms to the Lukiiko in the months preceding the deporta-
tion of the Kabaka had introduced a popular element in the election
of Lukiiko members, and this had greatly influenced the Catholics actual
and potential clout. The Kabaka's efforts to discredit Mugwanya (aided
by the Mmengo Protestant establishment) had been important factors
in preventing Mugwanya's election as Katikkiro in August. Subsequently
Mugwanya was returned to the Lukiiko in a by-election, as member
for Mawokota (one of the defeated candidates was Paulo Muwanga, a
member of Congress).96 But the Kabaka refused to ratify his election
on the grounds of conflict of interest, in that he had accepted a job
with the East African High Commission.97 The Kabaka's campaign
against Mugwanya may have sprung from the personal animosities
which had first surfaced in the weeks immediately after his Deportation,
but he also wanted to avoid changing the religious configuration of
Kiganda politics in any substantial way. As he made clear in a speech
to the Lukiiko in November 1957:
From what I see these days I am certain that there is too much contention and
rivalry; therefore, it is clear that the time has not yet come to break away from
the existing convention in the appointment of the more senior posts in the admin-
istration.98
This meant that the old religious division of the spoils, by which the
office of Katikkiro and the majority of senior posts should continue
to go to Protestants, was reaffirmed. But to justify the continuation of
sectarianism as a way of curbing sectarian rivalry looked completely
disingenuous to Catholics. Sectarianism was a major weapon in the
Kabaka's offensive, made possible by the new Agreement, to dominate
the Lukiiko and the Buganda's political machine. As a Special Branch
paper put it:
Since his return from exile, the Kabaka has consistently schemed to gain a hidden,
but nevertheless, firm, control of the Buganda Lukiko. In theory, the Kabaka is
a constitutional monarch, and as such is above politics, but in practice, a success-
ful politician in Buganda today must learn that the Kabaka is also above criticism."
Catholics were more likely to see it as a wider ploy by the Protestant

oligarchy to retain power. But they also feared that it was playing into
the hands of a left-wing ideology inimical to religious values of any
kind-the activities of supposedly Protestant-dominated moder political
parties within Buganda and in Uganda generally had to be taken into

account. A complaint from Catholics in Masaka over the continued
victimisation of Mugwanya put it this way:
There is only one object in all this, and that is to blindfold the Catholics and so
keep them out of politics... The exclusion of religion from politics is unadulter-
ated communism, which has originated from you, your Highness, the present
Kabaka of Buganda.""
The Kabaka was acting in ways which could hardly be construed as

anything but anti-Catholic. Apart from the personal animosities involved,
Muteesa possibly saw the Catholic church as much more difficult than
the Church of Uganda to get a handle on, much more conscious of
itself as a separate institution with its own integrity.
On the other hand, his relations with radical and even not so rad-
ical Protestant politicians were equally fraught. Mulira's criticisms of cor-
ruption in the Kintu government landed him in severe trouble, censure
and exclusion from the Lukiiko in 1956 and 57, and even a brief pri-
son sentence for refusing to pay a fine imposed by the Lukiiko.'10 The
other members of the London delegation also despaired of achieving
much through concentrating on internal Buganda politics, especially in
a machine which was so tightly controlled by the Kabaka, and to look
for access to the fluid national debate and the burgeoning Uganda-wide
political parties which Baganda tended to dominate. Mulira and Makumbi
formed the Progressive Party. Kironde had all along been noted for
his sympathies for Congress. Matiya Mugwanya became the first President
of the Democratic Party in 1956. In the next few years, this party
became the main vehicle for Catholic political opinion both in Buganda
and Uganda as a whole. Benedicto Kiwanuka returned at this time
from legal studies in Britain, and in 1958 was elected as President-
General of the Uganda-wide party. Kiwanuka was critical of the 'coterie
of hardline and selfish political racketeers' whom the Kabaka gathered
around him.'02 Political analysts have, on the whole, been concerned
to emphasise that DP was not a confessional party-and that Kiwanuka
in particular wanted to give it a wide appeal to all, especially those
who feared the anti-Christian rhetoric of the socialistically-orientated
and supposedly pro-Communist, pro-Soviet parties, such as Congress,
started by the secularised Protestant intelligentsia.'03 Undoubtedly, the
Anglican church authorities were also somewhat alarmed by the radi-
calism of these parties, created by their mission-educated products. But
they were also equally alarmed at what they considered to be an increas-
ingly strident assertion of Catholic rights. Archbishop Fisher's comments
442 Kevin Ward
are important here, as he continued to have an important role in the

constantly changing configurations of Uganda's politics as Independence
approached. In July 1957 Fisher met an important Lukiiko minister,
A.K. Sempa, a bastion of the Protestant establishment. Sempa had
asked the Archbishop about the possible constitutional implications of
having a Catholic Katikkiro (new elections for this position were loom-
ing; Sempa was anxious to forestall a repetition of the 1955 situation
when Mugwanya had almost won, but wanted to be prepared to deal
with an unwelcome Catholic victory). Sempa noted that a Protestant
Katikkiro took part in religious functions on state occasions, and at the
coronation of a Kabaka, handed him a Bible. Fisher felt that, while a
Muslim might be persuaded to comply with these Protestant traditions,
a Catholic probably would boycott them. Fisher continued to expatiate:
Roman Catholics, of course, deliberately try to get political power, and having got
it to exclude anybody but themselves: but in the modem world there is no chance
that they would be allowed to monopolise the religious set up of a country by
making the Kabaka embrace Roman Catholicism at his state functions: seculari-
sation and a sense of religious impartiality would prevent that. So what would
happen, no doubt, would be that the religious side of the Kabaka's state functions
would disappear altogether. That is what has happened in so many European
countries and is a reductio ad absurdum of the Roman Catholic system-that
unless they can have the whole of the religious set up of a country, they would
prevent anybody else having it: so exit Christianity.'?4
Such sentiments gave a specious rationale for the hostility of all sec-
tions of Uganda Protestant opinion (traditionalist, progressives and rad-
ical) to Catholic participation on equal terms in the political life of the
country. It remained a potent source of tension between Catholics and
Protestants in independent Uganda, long after the question of Buganda's
Protestant quasi-establishment had ceased to be a relevant issue.
Conclusion
The exile of the Kabaka and the circumstances of his return were
of crucial importance for late colonial Uganda, not least for the reli-
gious institutions which were of such central importance to Buganda's
life. After 1955 the Kabaka had enormous political powers within
Buganda, in particular to control and manipulate the Lukiiko, and
effectively to diminish the impact of the democratic element which had
been introduced as a result of Cohen's reforms. He used this to bol-
ster up what was seen as the traditionalist Protestant hegemony at the
expense of an increasingly substantial, vocal and discontented Catholic
constituency. One could envisage that, if it had not been for the depor-
tation crisis, Cohen might have exerted much more effective influence
in fostering co-operation and 'power sharing' between the two major
religious groups, rather than confrontation, exclusion and a deep sense
of injustice on the side of the Catholic community. Once Cohen had
realised that Kabaka Muteesa must return he had made it clear that
he wanted to be in office to welcome him back. He retained the respect,
indeed the affection, of a wide range of people whom the crisis had
cast as opponents. But in 1957 he was replaced as Governor by Sir
Frederick Crawford.'05 The 'Mengo Protestant establishment' was itself
a complex entity, consisting of a spectrum of attitudes to Kiganda tra-
dition and to participation in wider Uganda politics, and varying degrees
of allegiance to the church.
The Church of Uganda was in fact deeply shaken and weakened by
the whole crisis. Its perceived identification with British colonialism had
damaged its credibility. But, equally, the appeal to a traditional Protestant
establishment by the Kabaka to consolidate his new powers was hardly
what the church needed. It often involved the promotion of those who
were nominally Protestant but whose allegiance to the faith was most
problematic, either because they were actively hostile to its values or
simply were unable to practise those values. The younger Protestant
politicians were increasingly secularised and saw the political as divorced
from religion if not inimical to religion, in ways which the Democratic
Party (the natural forum for Catholic political activity in the moder
sector) tried to avoid. The Kabaka might claim to support a continu-
ing Protestant political supremacy in Buganda, but this gave little com-
fort for the Church of Uganda, which saw his support often identified
with a revival of traditional religious values, and which could only
regard the Kabaka himself as personally a liability to the Protestant
cause. When the possibility of a restoration of the Kabakaship was
raised, a quarter of a century after its abolition, there were some voices
arguing for a revival of a close identity between church and monar-
chy. In 1989, an Anglican priest, Revd. A.M. Kasozi, circulated to the
members of the Constitutional Committee (set up by President Museveni
and the National Resistance Movement) a plea for Damali's son Henry
Kimera Katabaazi to be the candidate for Kabaka in a future restored
kingdom.
Ladies and gentlemen, This is the prince I am proposing for the highest position
of the head of state of Uganda (sic!) I am sure he is acceptable not only in Buganda
but also in all other regions of Uganda. Her is a chapion (sic) of the religious
organisations and of Christian marriage he is after all the great, great grandson
of Mutesa I, the founder of modem Uganda.106
444 Kevin Ward
Kasozi was an eccentric and his views were totally ignored both inside
the Commission and in Kiganda society.'07 His proposal that 'the heir
to the Christian marriage' should become Kabaka was seen as hope-
lessly outdated, and irrelevant to a religious pluralist society. When the
Uganda government did make it possible for a Kabaka to be appointed
the choice was obvious and undisputed: he was the chosen heir of his
father-Ronald Mutebi, son of Muteesa and Sarah. The coronation was
performed by the Bishop of Namirembe (the successor to the Bishops
of Uganda who had performed the ritual in 1913 and 1942), but great
emphasis was made on an impartiality of religion, with Catholics and
traditionalists and Muslims being involved. Whether or not the revived
monarchy can remain immune from the political conflicts of the Uganda
state, there seems confidence that it can avoid becoming an issue in
the religious divide. Nevertheless, the larger issues of religious sectari-
anism remain.
NOTES
1. I have tried to use the 'new' orthography (which was just coming into use i
1950s) when using Luganda words, but earlier forms are often used in the source
are retained in quotation. For example, I use the form 'Muteesa', but writers
1950s tended to use the spelling 'Mutesa'. I have retained Bantu prefixes. So B
is the name of the country; Baganda, the people; Muganda, an individual p
Kiganda, a way of signifying that which belongs to Buganda.
2. For a personal account of these events, see Paulo Kavuma, Criis in Bugand
(London, 1979), Chapter 3.
3. For a biography of Cohen, see Dictionary of National Biography 1960-69 (Ox
1971). R. Robinson described Cohen thus: 'Of giant stature, appetite, and energy
ish in charm and enthusiasm, the intellectual dreamer of the Colonial Office wa
of the most anti-colonial and unofficial of the imperial officials who finally dism
the tropical African empire.'
4. See Anthony Low & Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955
don, 1960): part 1: 'The Making and Implementation of the Uganda Agreeme
1900'.
5. The most celebrated case was the enforced retirement of Sir Apolo Kagg
1926. For an account see David Apter, The Political Iingdom in Uganda' A Study in Bureau
Nationalism, 1961 (Revised 3rd edition, London 1997), pp 149-58. For an accou
Kaggwa's opponent, cf. J.R.C. Postlethwaite, I Look Back (London, 1947).
6. Though not the last crisis between Buganda and the State of Uganda-fo
situation which led to the second exile of the Kabaka in 1966 and the abolition of
the Kingdom of Buganda as a separate unit in the republic of Uganda, see, inter
alia, Phares Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Urfilled Hopes (London, 1992)
Chapter 5.
7. F.B. Welbour, Reliion and Politics in Uganda 1952-1962 (Nairobi, 1963).
The Kabaka of Buganda, Desecration of my Kingdom (London, 1967).
Bibliographical details of other books mentioned here have been given in preceding
notes.
E.M.K. Mulira completed a history of Namirembe diocese some 20 years before his
death in 1996, but unfortunately never found a publisher for the manuscript.
8. In the subsequent referencing:

PRO = Public Record Office, Kew, London.
LP = Archives of Lambeth Palace Library, London.
CMSA = Archives of the Church Missionary Society, Birmingham.
9. Edward Carpenter, Archbishop Fisher-His Life and Times, (Norwich, 1991), Chapters
43 & 44. His mis-spellings include 'Mulieri' for Mulira, 'Omukana' for Omukama, and
Katakirro for Katikkiro. He mistakenly gives UMCA (the Anglican Universities' Mission
to Central Africa) a role in Uganda. Inexplicably Carpenter calls the Kabaka's mar-
riage 'morganatic'!
10. For an account of the pre-20th-century history of the Kiganda monarchy see the
following:
M.S.M. Kiwanuka, A Histogy of Buganda from earliest Times to 1900 (London, 1971),
Kiwanuka's translation of Apolo Kaggwa's Basekabaka b'e Buganda [The Kings of Buganda]
(Nairobi & Kampala 1971), B. Ray, Myth, Ritual and Kingship in Buganda (Oxford, 1991)
and C. Wrigley, Kingship and State (Cambridge, 1996).
11. In addition to Apter, op. cit., see,J.R.C. Postlethwaite, I Look Back (London, 1947).
12. Cf. Leslie Brown, Three Worlds, One Word, (London, 1981).
Also Lambeth Palace Library [LP] Lang Papers. Volume 115. Willis to Lang, 7.6.1932.
Willis asked if a senior Roman Catholic bishop takes precedence over a young Anglican
Bishop (he was enquiring on behalf of his recently appointed assistant, eventually his
successor, C.E. Stuart). Willis hastened to assure the Archbishop that the precedence
of the Bishop of Uganda was not in question.
13. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Stuart to Fisher, January 1954.
14. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 133. Brown to Fisher, 15.7.1953.
15. For the Cross affair see CMSA G3/A7/0: A.B. Lloyd to G.T. Manley, 3.12.1919
and Mika Sematimba to Manley, June 1920.
16. Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527, (Oxford, 1972).
17. Kabaka Muteesa II himself made the comparison with Edward VIII on a num-
ber of occasions, and (according to Stuart) even before the deportation, had talked of
abdicating and settling in Britain as a way out of his marriage difficulties. 'Now he can
do so at government expense,' noted Stuart soon after Muteesa had arrived in London.
cf. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 133. Stuart to Fisher, 3.12.1953.
18. Max Warren, Travel Diaries for 1955. Pat Hooker, daughter of Warren, kindly
let me look at these diaries, which are in her possession.
19. J.V. Taylor, 'The Secret People', a lecture delivered on 21 June 1977 to cele-
brate the centenary of the Church of Uganda. Pamphlet in Selly Oak Colleges Library,
Birmingham.
20. LP Fisher Papers. Stuart to Fisher, 1951.
21. A 'province' in Anglican terminology is either an independent Church (which
may be coterminous with a nation state or consist of a wider grouping of countries)
under an Archbishop, or an autonomous unit under an Archbishop within a national
church (as in the provinces of the Church of England or of Canada).
22. For the problems of inclusion in an East African province see LP Davidson
Papers. East Africa Volume I: 'Proposed formation of a Province of East Africa, 1914-
1928', particularly Willis to Davidson, 2.2.1928 and 20.2.1928.
23. For a general discussion of the Namasole affair, see Apter, op. cit., pp. 213-14.
For the specific consequences for the church, see CMSA. G3/A7/dl. Stuart to
Hooper, 7.7.1941 and Stuart to Lang, 30.10.1942.
24. See Kevin Ward, "'Obedient Rebels": the Relationship between the early "Balokole"
and the Church of Uganda: the Mukono Crisis of 1941', in Journal of Religion in Africa,
1989, fasc. XIX, pp. 194-227.
25. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 49. Stuart to the Governor of Uganda, SirJohn Hall,
2.7.1948. In this letter Stuart confessed 'I always get a bit muddled over land matters.
I do not really understand them... I am rather under the impression that the land
officer at the time did promise us things that perhaps he had no power to promise.'
446 Kevin Ward
26. For an obituary of Musazi see the Uganda newspaper NeVw Vision, Saturday 27
October 1990.
For other biographical details, see 'Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the
Disturbances in Uganda during April 1949', Government Printers, Entebbe, 1950.
27. Named after the Catholic martyr Charles (Karoli) Lwanga.
28. For information about Mulumba see John Waliggo 'Ganda Traditional Religion
and Catholicism in Buganda 1948-75' in E Fashole-Luke et al. (editors), Christianity in
Independent Africa, (London, 1978), pp. 413-25.
29. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 49. Mulumba to Stuart, 2.7.1948.
30. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 49. Memorandum of T.B. Luule of Kikandwa, enclosed
in a letter sent by Mulumba to Archbishop Fisher, 25.8.1948.
Kikandwa is probably the district of Kampala near Namirembe rather than the place
in Ssingo county-in which case the signatories were probably members of the Cathedral
congregation: I am grateful to Amos Kasibante for pointing this out to me.
31. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 49. Letter of apology from Samwire Nganda.
32. CMSA. G3/A7/0 Memorandum of Interview with Bishops Willis & Gwynne
15.4.1924.
33. Mulira was interviewed byJohn Kalimi. See his 'Church and State Relations in
Uganda with particular reference to Namirembe Diocese 1950-1990', BD dissertation
ATIEA, June 1991. In Bishop Tucker College Library.
34. CMSA. G3/A7/dl. Summary of a letter of protest at Balya's consecration,
14.10.1947.
35. The Anglican shrine at Namugongo, where the Uganda martyrs had been exe-
cuted in 1886, was part of the Kisosonkole's mailo land.
36. M.S.M. Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda until 1900 (London, 1971). Appendix:
Genealogies of the Kings of Buganda.
37. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Stuart to Max Warren, 25.1.1954. 'Setani' =
Satan.
38. Paulo Kavuma, op. cit., p. 14.
39. CMSA. Annual letter of Butler, 1949.
40. Cf. 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda dur-
ing April 1949' (Government Printer, Entebbe, 1950).
41. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 109. Stuart to Fisher, 26.3.1952.
42. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 109. Stuart to Fisher, 11.2.1952 & 26.3.1952. Fisher
to Stuart, 14.2.1952.
43. See article in DNB, op. cit.
44. The speech is reported in PRO CO 822/568 'Withdrawal of Recognition from
the Kabaka of Buganda'. Part B.
45. See Philip O. Oruni, What is Rightfor Uganda?, Local Government Publication,
London, 1994, pp. 153-6.
Oruni suggests that Cohen made particular promises of a reassessment of their polit-
ical position in Buganda in return for support. This book is well researched and con-
tains much important information; unfortunately Oruni does not give any precise details
about the sources of his material. I have not myself seen any material in the PRO
records to support this conclusion.
46. I talked with Bishop Brown on a number of occasions about these matters at
his retirement home in Cambridge.
47. PRO CO 822/569. Cohen to Gorell Barnes, 31.12.1953.
48. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Warren to Fisher, 8.1.1954.
49. Personal communication with Bishop Brown.
50. Paulo Kavuma, op. cit., p. 50.
51. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Letter of A.L. Kamya (that seems to be his name,
though the signature is almost impossible to decipher) to Bishop Stuart.
52. PRO CO 822/567 'Withdrawal of Recognition from the Kabaka of Buganda.
Part A'. Cohen to Secretary of State, 7.11.1953.
53. Hints of a rift first appear in the CO files as early as 8 December-only a week
after the deportation and soon after the arrival in London of the delegation. cf. PRO
822/568. Sir A Savage to Secretary of State, 8.12.1953.
54. PRO 822/1478. 'Election to the Buganda Lukiiko 1957-59', Crawford to
W. Mathieson, 23.4.1957.
55. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Fisher to Lyttleton, 6.1.1954. Also in PRO CO
822/892 'Statements of Policy with Regard to the Political Development of Uganda
1954-56.
56. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Colonial Office to Fisher, 15.1.1954.
58. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Usher Wilson to Stuart, 11.1.1954.
59. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Warren to Fisher, 21.1.1954. Any suggestion of
spreading disinformation was denied in the CO.
60. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Stuart to Fisher, January 1954.
61. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. The Nabagereka to Warren, 22.12.1953.
Nabagereka was the official title for the wife of the Kabaka. Traditionally, the chief
wife had been entitled 'Kaddulubaale'-but this had strong associations with the ven-
eration of the national gods, the Balubaale, and so was not used once the Kabakaship
had become a 'Christian institution'.
62. Princess Margaret's statement of renunciation of marriage to Peter Townsend
'mindful of the Church's teaching that Christian marriage is indissoluble' was made on
1 November 1955, just two weeks after the Kabaka had returned to Uganda. cf.
Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 289f.
63. PRO CO 822/894 'The Constitutional Position in Buganda' Cohen to Barnes,
1.4.1954.
64. Cohen was anxious for participation from the Mill Hill area of Kiganda Catholicism
(this was eastern Buganda), in addition to the Masaka area of the White Fathers, judg-
ing the Mill Hill missionaries 'better balanced than the White Fathers'. By this he meant
something like: more understanding of British colonial sensitivities. PRO CO 822/894
'The Constitutional Position in Buganda' Cohen to Barnes, 1.4.1955. Munno is here
described as 'closely controlled by the White Fathers'. Elsewhere Cohen commented 'It
expresses a moderate point of view except where a Catholic principle is involved.' (CO
822/957 'The Press in Uganda' Cohen to Gorell Barnes 8.5.1955.)
65. I am grateful to Rodney Orr, who is doing research in Edinburgh on African
American missionaries in Eastern Africa, for information on Kalibala's American con-
nections.
66. CMSA. G3.A7.0 Williams to Hooper, 18.10.1934.
67. For an account of the Namirembe Conference see Low & Pratt, op. cit., Appen-
dix I, pp. 317-349.
68. PRO CO 822/894 'The Constitutional Position in Buganda'. Report to the
Lukiko of London Delegation, 5.1.1954.
69. PRO CO 822/751 'Future of Mutesa', Bishop Brown to Cohen 25.7.1954.
70. PRO CO 822/751 'Future of Mutesa', Bishop Kiwanuka to Cohen 20.9.1954.
71. PRO CO 822/751 'Future of Mutesa', Cohen to Secretary of State, 8.8.1954.
72. Reported in Uganda Mail, 5.2.1954. Newspaper cuttings in PRO CO 822/959.
73. Ibid.
74. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Lutaaya to Fisher, no date [1954].
75. PRO CO 822/751. Fisher to Lennox-Boyd (Secretary of State), 23.10.1954.
76. One phrase from the verdict-'The Governor had not the power' [referring to
the fact that the use of article 6 was judged ultra vires]-became a popular slogan in
Katwe streets patois (and doubtless beyond Katwe) in subsequent months. PRO CO
822/909 Cohen to Secretary of State 4.10.1955.
77. PRO CO 822/768. Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 4.11.1954.
78. PRO CO 822/1191. 'Neo-Paganism in Uganda'. The question was asked by
Sekabanja, representing the Ugandan Nationalist Movement Party (one of the ephemeral
448 Kevin Ward
parties formed around this time). Kalibala was also regarded as using the Kiganira phe-
nomenon as a means of increasing his own popularity.
For Kiganira and the attacks of Bataka BU on Catholic churches in particular, see
John Waliggo, 'Ganda Traditional Religion and Catholicism' in E. Fashole-Luke et al.
(editors), Christianity in Independent Africa (London, 1978).
79. PRO CO 822/898. Cohen to Mathieson, 20.8.1955.
Cohen wrote just before the election, when it seemed likely that Kintu would win
because of the strength of political lobbying. He felt that there was 'influence from
London behind it' (ie that the Kabaka was actively promoting Kintu's candidature). 'I
am told that the Catholics are boggling a bit for fear that, if Mugwanya were elected
Katikiro, they might lose their right to have Catholic saza chiefs in specified saazas. It
is possible therefore that a number of Catholics may not vote for Mugwanya.'
Cf. also John M. Waliggo, 'The Catholic Church and the Root-Cause of Political
Instability in Uganda' in H.B. Hanson & M. Twaddle, Reliion and Politics in East Africa,
(London, 1995), p. 108 and
A.G.G. Ginyera-Pincwa, 'Religion and Politics: Some Related Constitutional Issues',
unpublished paper presented to the Fifth National Theological Week, Ggaba, 2 August
1990.
80. These (according to Colonial Office calculations) included the Diplocks and Dingle
Foots, and Mary Stuart (wife of the former bishop of Uganda), with Lord and Lady
Hemingford (Hemingford had been headmaster of King's College, Budo 1940-7, dur-
ing which time Muteesa was a student), John V. Taylor and Canon and Mrs Max
Warren also mentioned as possible passengers. PRO CO 822/909 'Inauguration of the
Buganda Agreement'.
81. There was a long tradition of celebrating important national or state occasions
at the Anglican 'national shrine'. This event inaugurated a new practice, which became
common in subsequent decades, of Uganda leaders returning from exile marking their
return, by a thanksgiving service at Namirembe.
83. CMSA. G3/A7/dl. Brown to Bishop Erika Sabiti, 14.11.1955.
85. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 150. Taylor to Warren, 24.1.1954.
86. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 164. A copy sent by 'Kateyanira's Party' to the
Archbishop. The Memorandum was signed by 'L.N. Kasirye of Bwayise'.
87. CMSA. G3/A7/dl Brown to Bishop Sabiiti, 14.11.1955.
88. CMSA. G3/A7/dl ibid.
89. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 182. Brown to Warren, 27.12.1956.
90. Ibid.
91. Even before his return Muteesa alerted the Archbishop of Canterbury to the
issue: 'It may have looked to your Grace from over here that during this period there
has been a definite falling away from the Church of Christ in Buganda, caused by the
many political cross-currents.' He explained that he did not want to defend such a
falling away 'but there has been a lot of exaggeration'-Buganda still had strong Christian
foundations. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 164. The Kabaka to Fisher, 27.7.1955.
92. PRO CO 822/815. 'Incidents of intimidation arising from the return of the
Kabaka of Buganda'.
93. They received particularly unfavourable comment in Southern Rhodesia, where
it fuelled white fears of black rule and the campaign to prevent the break-up of the
Central African Federation. This was ironic, in that it was fears of a similar Federation
in East Africa which had provoked the Kabaka crisis in the first place.
The case of intimidation was reported in The Times 28.12.1955; Kironde's resigna-
tion the next day.
94. PRO CO 822/815. 'Freddie' [the Kabaka] to 'Alan' [Lennox-Boyd, Secretary
of State], 15.12.1955.
95. PRO CO 822/815. Mulira's words were reported by Cohen to the Secretary
of State, 20.11.1955.
96. Muwanga was to be chairman of the Military Commission in 1979-80, in the
period before the elections which returned Milton Obote to power for the second time.
97. PRO CO 822/1478. Election to the Buganda Lukiiko 1957-9.
The British had been very concerned, when Mugwanya lost the election for Katikkiro,
to reward him in some way, and had found him a position with the newly formed
Commission.
98. Speech quoted in Albert Bade, Benedicto Kiwanuka: The Man and his Politics,
(Kampala, 1996), p. 29.
99. PRO CO 822/1358. Special Branch Paper March 1958.
100. PRO CO 822/1478. Letter from Bukobogo-Kalisizope, Kasaka District: The
Exclusion of Religion from Politics, 26.4.1957.
101. Cf. Apter, op. cit., pp. 376ff.
102. Bade, op. cit., p. 31.
103. Cf. Michael Twaddle, 'Was the Democratic Party a Confessional Party?' in
Fashole-Luke, op. cit.
104. LP Fisher Papers. Volume 194, Memorandum of a conversation with Sempa
(in London at the time and staying in the Strand Palace Hotel) 18.7.1957.
105. Apolo Kironde, who lives in London, spoke with great warmth about Cohen.
The peculiar circumstances of Uganda had cast him as an opponent of African nation-
alism, but Kironde recognised him as someone who had been working for progress and
the achievement of independence. (Interview with author in the North British Hostel,
King's Cross, 1996.) I am grateful to Amos Kasibante for putting me in touch with Mr
Kironde. Robinson in the Dictiona9y of National Biography entry puts it this way: 'In one
way or another his measures helped to awaken the slumbering genius of African nation-
alism, and, wittingly or unwittingly, he did more to bring about the fall of empire and
the rise of the nationalists than most African politicians were able to achieve between
them.' Cohen went on to serve on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations,
before returning to Whitehall to participate in the new Ministry of Overseas Development
in 1964. He died in 1968.
106. Memorandum given to me by A.M. Kasozi, 11 October 1989 entitled 'The
Story of Flight Lieutenant Prince Henry Kimera Katabaazi. Kasozi mentions that he
was chaplain of Mengo hospital at the time when Damali delivered her child in 1954.
He claims that Kavuma had arranged for her to go to England for three weeks soon
after the Kabaka's exile and that during that time she had become pregnant. Sarah
delivered her child, Ronald Mutebi, some three months later.
107. Personal observation. I was at the time living in Buganda.

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The Church of Uganda and the Exile of Kabaka Muteesa II, 1953-55

Author(s): Kevin Ward

On 30 November 1953, Sir Andrew Cohen, Governor of the B

C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998Journal of Religion in Africa, XXVIII, 4

The Crisis involved in different ways all the faith communities of

Uganda. For the Catholics it presented an opportunity to advocate a

would return at all or would be replaced, was enmeshed in questions

The Anglican Church and the Monarchy in Buganda

of Buganda and to promote a new generation of Protestant mission

traditional role as 'father' and 'husband' of all Baganda with being a

The Anglican Church in the wider Ugandan context

Ugandan experience (though not in precedence) when Brown arrived.

Conflict within the Church in Buganda-the Namasole crisis of 1941

Kabaka Cwa died in 1939, in his mid-40s. He left a young widow,

and many other children. His chosen successor was reported to be

Bishop Stuart arranged a marriage by special licence, thus avoiding

oligarchy, with whom the traditionalists were in conflict. Irene's hus-

Land and the preservation of culture

In 1945 Nsibirwa again became Katikkiro. Almost immediately, he

London in 1944, where he became influenced by the Pan-Africanist

Everything about the Memorandum-the nimble repartee, the biting

The marriage of the Kabaka

In 1939, at the age of 15, Muteesa succeeded his father as Kabaka.

Meanwhile, the 'impediment' of the King's marriage to a member

The Deportation of Kabaka

ment of Buganda, providing for the devolution of responsibility, for the

Cohen had made plans for these eventualities early in November.

Max Warren, the General Secretary of the CMS in London, was to

If Cohen miscalculated the depth of anger the deportation would pro-

It is extremely unpalatable to me to have to suggest deposing a ruler because he

of Buganda's rights. They were not personally close to the Kabaka

Though the precise gloss put on this by Crawford may be open to

of the Kabaka, in ways which quickly dashed Cohen's sanguine hopes

The immediate consequence of the general critical reaction in Britain,

Quite apart from reflecting the strength of feeling in general among

Damali wondered rhetorically who would be suitable. She rejected the

Negotiationsfor the return of the Kabaka

the Protestant elite), Yusuf Lule, a Muslim convert to the Church of

it provided for a consolidation of Cohen's reforms initiated in March

Throughout 1954 Katwe, a teeming 'working class' suburb in the Kibuga

problems, Damali assumed symbolic importance in the campaign to

[T]here is a powerful pressure group of these women organised by people close

upsurge of interest caused by Kiganira, used this as an opportunity to

The return of the Kabaka

For both traditionalists and supporters of Christian monogamy, the

Missionaries had long been concerned about decline in church atten-

The signing of the 1955 Buganda Agreement thus inaugurated a

Catholics were more likely to see it as a wider ploy by the Protestant

parties within Buganda and in Uganda generally had to be taken into

The Kabaka was acting in ways which could hardly be construed as

are important here, as he continued to have an important role in the

8. In the subsequent referencing:

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