NATURAL RESOURCES WITH LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Case No. 1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

FACTS:

 On August 11, 1960, spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan sold separate
half portions of lands to Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March
18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold
their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the
property recorded for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband
Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the
same years.
 On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed an application for registration in
her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters located at
Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
 The Director of Lands filed an opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor
her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish
titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
 After due trial, RTC adjudicated titles over the subject parcel of land to private
respondents pursuant to the Land Registration Law. The decision was appealed,
but CA affirmed the lower court’s decision; hence this petition.
 The petitioner argued Maria has failed to establish by conclusive evidence of her
fee simple title or imperfect title which entitles her to registration neither under the
land registration act or public land act, and that private respondent has miserably
failed to overthrow the presumption that the land is public land belonging to the
state.
 Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her
title to the land in question through documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of
Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her testimony that her
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question for more
than 20 years and that the attending fiscal did not cross-examine her to test her
credibility because he is personally aware of the facts showing that the land
being applied for is a private land.
ISSUE: WON the bare statement of private respondent that the land applied for has
been in the possession of her predecessors-in- interest for more than 20 years
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in
proceedings of this nature?
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The most basic rule in land
registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the
Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even
though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons.
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively
presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since
July 26, 1894 or prior thereto.
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or
more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly
formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. The private respondent
failed to discharge this burden. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20)
years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase
"adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by which she
described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are
mere conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation.

Case No. 2
JOSE REYNANTE v. CA
G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992
FACTS:

 More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents,
over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of
188.711 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.
 During the tenancy, herein petitioner constructed a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms he had planted on lots 1 and 2
 covering an area of 5,096 square meters and 6,011 square meters respectively.
These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT No. 25618 and the
Liputan River.
 After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written agreement
denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI NG
KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984 with herein petitioner whereby the latter
for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he
was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights
therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama at tagapamahala."
 Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and
the two huts located therein to private respondents. Private respondents
thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued
to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the
nipa palms he had planted therein.
 On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner
vacate said portion since according to them petitioner had already been
indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof,
petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
 Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry
with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner.
 The Trial Court viewed the location and the distance of the constructed nipa hut
and the subject "sasahan" which appears exists long ago, planted and stands
adjacent to the fishpond and the dikes which serves as passage way of water
river of lot 1 and lot 2. During the course of the hearing, both counsel observed
muniment of title embedded on the ground which is located at the inner side of
the "pilapil" separating the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant with a height of
20 to 25 feet from water level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially
observed that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the
plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the
public domain.
 On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint and finding that petitioner had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
 Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the decision
rendered by the lower court was reversed and, subsequently, the decision was
affirmed by CA on the ground that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation
and hence the property of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of
accretion?
RULING:
 NO.The court stated that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. Granting without conceding that
lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which
the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.
Relying on the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. CA, the SC held that an accretion
does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under
the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the
land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided.
The failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said
accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons. It is undisputed that
petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and
unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner's
possession over the property must be respected.
ADDITIONAL NOTE: SC held that an action for forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and actual title to the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by
a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. On the
other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action
for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property. Hence,
the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents' possession over lots
1 and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over
lots 1 and 2.
 Case no. 3
Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources
GR No. 135383 Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:

 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA
and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
 On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the DENR and Secretary of the
DBM filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
 On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying
for the dismissal of the petition.
 On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State
has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are
at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
 On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition
and mandamus be dismissed.
 The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS:
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation
 of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
 Petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that
these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
 Petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.
 Thus, petitioners prayed that some parts of the law be declared unconstitutional
and a writ of prohibition from implementing its implementing rules be issued.

Held:
DISMISSED. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

OPINIONS:
Puno:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RA 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1977); RECOGNIZES
EXISTENCE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES OR INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.
2. ID.; ID.; ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LAND ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY AND DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. — Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private
property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain. The IPRA
grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The private
character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option
given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration
under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into
public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that
ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be Mrst converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the
beneMts of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the
land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over, from private to public agricultural land for proper
disposition. The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has
nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29,
1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
3. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP BY ICCs/IPs OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN LIMITED AND DOES NOT INCLUDE RIGHT
TO ALIENATE. — The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/lPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. Ownership of ancestral
domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a CertiMcate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs
over their ancestral domain. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not
part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in
common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and
conserve" them for future generations, "beneMt and share" the proMts from their allocation and
utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights
over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship.
4. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 7(a), 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF DO NOT VIOLATE REGALIAN DOCTRINE. — Sections 7
(a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral
domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly deMned and limited in Section 7 (a). The
ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and Mshing grounds, CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
2018 cdasiaonline.com and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains."

Case No. 4
Sec. of DENR v. Yap
GR No. 167707 Oct 8, 2008
FACTS:

 On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which
identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
 On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
 In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that the Proclamation raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
 Respondents-claimants posited that the proclamation did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone,
it was susceptible of private ownership. That under the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
 public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest,"
which was not available for disposition under the Revised Forestry Code.
 The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
 Issue: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment
to the titling of the lands in Boracay.
 On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants. The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied
lands titled in their name. It ruled that Proclamation No. 1801 did not mention
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. The
case was elevated in the CA, but the court sustained the ruling of RTC; hence
this instant petition.
 On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-
meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for
right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
 On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been
in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
 Claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
 Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to the revised forestry code, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not
the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in
order to release the lots for disposition.
 The cases were consolidated.
Held:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government.
 In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
 Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
 Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied
lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a
bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
 As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land.
The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land.
Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.
 Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified
as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since
June 12, 1945.