357.

Caunca v Salazar; G.R. No. L-2690; 01 Jan 1949; 82 Phil 851

FACTS:

Estelita Flores was brought from the province to Manila and stayed in the house of respondent who is
running an employment agency. Estelita was prevented from going with her cousin, the petitioner,
unless the money advanced for her fare and other transportation expenses be paid first.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid until the latter has
returned the payment advanced to her.

RULING:

NO. An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee. The fact that power to
control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason
for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by
controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for
commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce
or any other business enterprise.

Petition is GRANTED.
358. “Who is Keyser Zosa?” –The Usual Suspects (1995)

People v Zosa; 38 O.G. 1676

FACTS:

Appellants were charged with violation of the National Defense Law for refusing to register in the
military service despite being required to do so. They were sentenced to imprisonment for a month and
a day.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the National Defense Law violates the constitutional right against involuntary servitude.

RULING:

NO. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

Assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

359.

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275

Facts:

1. This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California,
rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the petition of Robert
Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson.

2. The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of their liberty by
Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the county jail of Alameda County, by
virtue of an order of commitment, made by a United States commissioner, committing them for trial
upon a charge of disobedience of the lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine Arago.

3. Section 4598, which was taken from § 7 of the Act of July 20, 1790, reads as follows:

▬ SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall
at any port or place desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel without leave of the master
or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for any justice of the
peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the master, to issue his warrant to
apprehend such deserter x x x

4. Petitioners had shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton; that they had
each signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of the voyage, but,
becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they left the vessel at Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and
were subsequently arrested, under the provisions of Revised Statutes Sections 4596 to 4599

5. Section 4599, which was taken for § 53 of the Shipping Commissioners' Act of June 7, 1872, authorizes
the apprehension of deserting seamen, with or without the assistance of the local public officers or
constables and without a warrant, and their conveyance before any court of justice or magistrate of the
state, to be dealt with according to law. It also provides for punishment by imprisonment for desertion,
refusal to join the vessel, or absence without leave.

Issue: WON the Section 4596-4599 of the Shipping Commissioners’ act is valid.

Ruling: Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts contained in
their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment forbidding slavery and
involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the provision against involuntary servitude
was never intended to apply to such contracts. The Court is also of opinion that even if the contract of a
seaman could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a
case of involuntary servitude. From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor has been
treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the surrender of his personal liberty
during the life of the contract; that the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical moment or leave her at
some place. Such desertion might involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking another
crew, an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the ship itself. Hence, the laws of
nearly all maritime nations have made provision for securing the personal attendance of the crew on
board, and for their criminal punishment for desertion, or absence without leave, during the life of the
shipping articles.
360. “Pompeya-ngan na” by Parokya ni Edgar

U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil 245, August 6, 1915

FACTS:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally
and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal
ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do
not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law

W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights
therein guaranteed

HELD:

Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of
which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55,
as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace
and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of
the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may
be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise,
in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity
connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and
good government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system,
the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the
police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are
constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

Is there a cause of action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he
was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions
existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned
in the law.

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered."
361.

Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v Gotamco Sawmills; G.R. No. L-1573 ; 29 Mar 1948; 45 O.G. Supp
No. 9, p. 147

FACTS:

For failure of respondent company to accede to the request of petitioners for a wage increase, the
laborers declared a strike which suspended all the work in the respondent company. The parties
reached a temporary wage arrangement and the laborers were ordered to return to work. Months later
and while their main case was still pending in court, the court ordered petitioning union which again
picketed against respondent company to return to work.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the order violated the constitutional inhibition against involuntary servitude.

RULING:

NO. The very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the
power to issue the order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry.

[As a result of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of this
country urgently demands the reconstruction of industrial, commercial and residential buildings, which
in turn necessitates building materials, in which lumber figures prominently among the most vital, public
interest of a most real and positive character has attached to the lumber business. It is obvious that any
undue stoppage or diminution in the production of lumber or allied products so sorely needed in
reconstruction work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down the country’s program of
rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the government is striving to accelerate as much
as is humanly possible.]

Orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations are AFFIRMED.