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An Analysis of the Boeing 777 Fly-By-Wire System

Published on April 6, 2016

Jaime Beneyto Gómez de BarredaFollow

Ingeniero de diseño en Arrival

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Abstract

Airbus introduced full Fly-By-Wire (FBW) flight controls into their A320 in 1987 as the first civil
commercial airliner to incorporate such a system. Boeing followed in 1994 with their wide-body,
long-haul Boeing 777, albeit with a different philosophy. Today, some 20 years later, virtually every
new commercial jetliner project involves some form of FBW flight control system.
In this article I will analyze the FBW System of the Boeing 777 (Triple Seven) from a pilot's point of
view and with the help of a desktop flight simulation through a series of flight tests that will illustrate
how the system works, how it makes the job of the pilot easier, and how it protects the aircraft's
flight envelope.

This article was written as a read-along companion for my video-analysis below:

Table of Contents

Introduction

 Philosophy of the Boeing 777 FBW Flight Control System

FBW System Overview and Description

 Cockpit Controls

 System Architecture

 Operating Modes

Flight Tests

 Effect of Primary Flight Control Commands

 Effect of Trim Reference Airspeed (constant thrust)

 Effect of Thrust Changes (constant Trim Reference Airspeed)

 Turn Compensation and Bank Limit Protection

 Configuration Change Compensation

 Approach to Stall and Full Stall

Conclusion

Software

References

Introduction

Philosophy of the Boeing 777 FBW Flight Control System

Boeing intended their 777 to be flown just as a conventional jet aircraft. They wanted a 737 pilot (I
will often use the 737 as an example of a conventional non-FBW aircraft throughout this article)
capable of jumping into the flight deck of the 777 and still feel like "home". That's the reason why
the cockpit controls for all four Degrees of Freedom (roll, pitch, yaw and thrust) remain unchanged
from previous Boeing aircraft, that is: two sets of rudder pedals for governing the rudder (yaw axis),
two "yokes" consisting of control wheel for governing the ailerons, spoilers and flaperons (roll axis)
and control column for governing the pitch axis and finally one set of thrust levers to control the
engine's thrust output.

Boeing also designed its flight deck not only so it "looks" like one of a conventional aircraft, but also
so it "flies" like one, moreover like an extremely "well behaved" one. The key idea is that our FBW-
ignorant pilot coming from the 737 wouldn't have to learn to fly all over. In fact, the 777 flies just like
the trainer aircraft that Mr. Langewiesche had in mind when he wrote his beknown "Stick and
Rudder" (see reference 6). Our 737 pilot could fly the 777 without even knowing it's a FBW aircraft.

What is meant by "well behaved" is a set of superior handling qualities that make the pilot feel like
the aircraft is noble and easy to fly. The Boeing 777's FBW has an effect on these qualities as well
through the use of Stability Augmentation features and Compensations of different nature. Its rating
in the Cooper-Harper scale of handling qualities should be "1" or "excellent".

Finally and even more importantly, it's Boeing's philosophy that the FBW of the 777 lets the pilot be
always in command of the airplane and have full authority over it in all situations. There's no
computer the pilot can't override. The aircraft will warn the pilot should he be dangerously close to
the limit of the aircraft's flight envelope and will also impose "soft limits" to prevent the aircraft
from exceeding those limits inadvertently, but the pilot will be able to fly the aircraft out of its
envelope if he's determined enough to do so.

FBW System Overview and Description

Cockpit Controls

As mentioned before, cockpit controls consist of yokes, rudder pedals and thrust levers, just as in a
conventional 737.
Unlike modern Airbus aircraft, in the 777 both the rudder pedals and the yokes are mechanically
interconnected so that either pilot feels and sees what the other pilot is doing when he operates the
controls. In addition, all flight controls are "backdriven" by the Autopilot and/or Autothrottles when
they are engaged, so as to keep the pilots in the loop and give them visual clues of what the Auto-
Flight System is doing; the exception being the rudder pedals which will not be backdriven by the
Autopilot except during an Autoland approach below 1500 feet. No matter what the level of
automation is, any pilot can grab any control and manually override the Autopilot or Autothrottles.
The above image shows the First Officer's (F/O) primary flight controls with yoke in the foreground
and rudder pedals in the background below. On the right (outboard) horn of the yoke you can see
the Autopilot (AP) disengage button and the Pitch Trim Switch (or rather, switches, both must be
operated simultaneously) which I will discuss in more detail later on. For now it suffices to say that
pushing the trim switches on the 777 will not directly move the stabilizer but will instead set the
Trim Reference Airspeed (TRS). The concept of TRS is of capital importance to properly
understanding how the 777's FBW System works. On any conventional aircraft such as the 737,
operating the trim switch will move the pitch angle of the horizontal stabilizer (or horizontal tail-
plane); it won't do quite the same on the 777.

Even though the pitch trim system internally works in a different manner with respect to a
conventional airplane, it is used in the exact same way, that is, should the pilot find himself pushing
the control column forward to keep his desired flight condition, pushing the trim "up" (what is
usually known as a "nose down" command) will gradually reduce the required force on the control.
The opposite goes if the pilot is pulling back on the control. Just like in any aircraft, the ship will be
"in trim" once the required force on the control column is zero.

System Architecture

The FBW system consists of the following basic components:

 Primary Flight Computers (PFC). There are 3 triple-redundant PFCs labeled L, C and R. The
PFCs constitute the "heart" of the FBW system.

 Actuator Control Electronics (ACE). There are 4 identical ACEs labeled L1, L2, C and R
(roughly corresponding to the L, C and R hydraulic systems). The ACEs are basically analog to
digital and digital to analog converters.

 Power Control Units (PCU), at the heart of which lay the Control Surface
Actuators that physically move the control surfaces. The PCUs are electrically signaled but
hydraulically powered.

 ARINC 629 Data Buses. The Bus transmits information among the various components of the
system; essentially it's an information "highway".
The system works as follows (see figure above): The pilot generates an input signal by manipulation
of the primary flight controls. This analog signal is received by the ACEs which digitalizes it and
redirects it to the PFCs via the ARINC 629 Data Bus. The PFCs constantly gather and monitor
information from a number of aircraft sources and will then generate actual control laws by
"enhancing" the received signal. The PFC-generated control command will then be sent back to the
ACEs which will in turn convert it to an analog signal that the PCUs will use to move the control
surfaces. When the Autopilot is engaged it communicates directly with the PFCs.

The functions that the PFCs implement are, just to mention a few:

 Slip/skid compensation for coordinated turns

 Thrust Asymmetry Compensation (TAC)

 Turn compensation (prevents altitude loss during turns)

 Configuration change compensation (flaps, gear etc.)

 Thrust change compensation

 Dutch Roll dampening (also known as yaw dampening)

 Pitch control and stability augmentation

 Protections: Overspeed, stall, bank angle etc.

In the cockpit, pilots have control of the system via two overhead switches: A capped "PFCs
disconnect switch" and a "Thrust Asymmetry Compensation" push-button that disconnects it. These
controls are left untouched in their respective "auto" position during all normal operations. See top
left corner on the image below:
Regarding system redundancy, there's plenty of it. Four ACEs to control the three different hydraulic
systems. Three PFCs, any one of them being capable of flying the aircraft in its Normal Law. A Ram
Air Turbine (RAT) will automatically deploy in the event of hydraulic pressure loss to provide
sufficient hydraulic power to operate the basic flight controls. Should, in a highly unlikely event,
both the RAT and all three hydraulic systems fail, there is still a mechanical backup connection from
the cockpit control wheel to the number 4 and 11 spoiler panels, as well as an alternate mechanical
connection to the horizontal stabilizer through the "alternate pitch trim" control located left of the
spoiler/speedbrakes lever (see image below).

The alternate pitch trim control always moves the stabilizer directly and is generally not used in
normal operations. Should all four ACEs fail, then the alternate trim system will still be operational
to control pitch and together with that the aircraft will be governable through the use of engine
differential thrust. It has been shown that such a complete loss of hydraulic power, though highly
catastrophic, can result in successful control and safe landing of the aircraft. See the 2003 Airbus
A300 Baghdad incident.

Consult references 1 and 2 for more detailed descriptions of the system.

Operating Modes

Based on system status, there are three different operating modes or "laws":

 Normal Law: Full system functionality. This is the desired operating mode.

 Secondary Law: Degraded mode with limited functionality. PFCs still provide Control Laws
but Protection features are not available.

 Direct Law: PFC's are not available. System reverts to a direct "pilot to control surface" logic.
Direct Law can be reached by disconnecting the PFCs.

The airplane is flown most of the time in Normal Law. Should the PFCs detect inconsistent
information among various sources or a sufficient number of failures, they will revert to Secondary
Law which is a degraded operating mode. If the PFC's fail altogether, the system will revert to Direct
Law, the "lowest" operating mode. The aircraft handles very similarly in the Secondary and Direct
modes, the difference being that in Direct Law the PFCs are not generating the control laws for the
actuators. It's worth mentioning that the aircraft is perfectly flyable in both the Secondary and Direct
modes, although it's not dispatchable in such a state.

Interestingly enough, the Direct Law of the 777 is even more "direct" than in a conventional 737
because of the lack of Yaw Damping and other features that constitute separate systems in a 737 but
that are "built-in" into the PFCs of the 777. It's therefore an "everything or nothing" kind of logic.

In the cockpit, the pilot can overview the status of the system through the "Flight Controls" synoptic,
accessible via the Multi-Function Display.

Flight Tests

Throughout this series of "flight tests" performed in the simulator, I will analyze the different
handling qualities of the aircraft in both the Normal and the Direct law.

Effect of Primary Flight Control Commands

As earlier discussed, the pilot controls roll via the control wheel, pitch via the control column, yaw
via the rudder pedals and thrust via the thrust levers. All controls involve some sort of protection
that won't easily let the pilot push the plane out of its flight envelope. The system is generally
designed so as to require minimal pilot input during hand-flying operations; small and smooth
control inputs will be enough to command the aircraft through most normal maneuvers.

The wheel controls: a set of outboard ailerons (locked-out during high-speed flight), a set of inboard
flaperons (which function as a combination of flap and aileron), and two sets of outboard and
inboard spoiler panels. Rolling the wheel commands, not a given roll attitude, but a roll rate instead.
While the wheel is deflected a given roll rate will be obtained; once the wheel is released back to
neutral, the achieved roll attitude (or bank angle) will be held. To roll out of the turn back to straight
flight, the wheel must be rolled in the opposite direction to the turn, just to be released back to
neutral once the wings are level.

The column controls pitch attitude, or rather, angle of attack. It does so by deflecting the elevators
first in the desired direction, then moving the stabilizer so as to streamline the elevators. This is
done for several reasons: It allows for full elevator authority in either direction and reduces drag and
load on the elevator. For comparison, the column of a 737 controls the elevators exclusively; if the
aircraft is trimmed incorrectly, the pilot might "run out" of elevator authority.

The rudder pedals control the deflection of the rudder. Usually the pilots need not control the
rudder directly since this is automatically managed for them through the PFC's compensation
features. An exception would be handling during take-off, approach and landing; situations in which
flying at a crab angle might be required. The "yaw damper" and "rudder ratio" functionalities of
conventional aircraft are "built-in" into the PFC-generated Control Laws providing dutch roll
dampening and protection against excessive rudder deflection during high-speed flight. The Thrust
Asymmetry Compensation (TAC) system also operates the rudder in the event of a thrust asymmetry
(i.e., engine failure during take-off) via application of rudder trim.

Aileron and Rudder trim may be applied, if required, like in any conventional aircraft via the controls
located on the lower pedestal. These controls are usually not used during normal operations. The
same is not true for the Pitch trim, which is an important secondary flight control.

Effect of Trim Reference Airspeed (TRS)

The Flight Test performed in my video depicts the following considerations. TRS changes in Normal
Law at 12:50 to 15:49 and Pitch Trim operation in Direct Law at 15:50 to 17:53. All tests flown with
constant thrust and in clean configuration.

The first thing to mention here is that the Boeing 777 pitch trim operation is performed in exactly
the same manner as it's performed in any conventional aircraft. When the pilot wants to relieve a
"pushing force", he trims "nose down"; when he wants to relieve a "pulling force", he trims "nose
up". Note that trimming nose down actually means physically pushing the trim switches in the
"upward" direction.
As previously discussed, in Normal Law the trim switches on the yoke of the 777 don't directly
position the horizontal stabilizer like they do on the 737 but set a target Trim Reference Airspeed
(TRS) instead.

The Trim Reference Airspeed is defined as the target indicated airspeed that the aircraft will
eventually, after dampening of the Phugoid Mode, fly at in the absence of any other control input.
To achieve this, the PFCs will command both the stabilizer and the elevators in the way that's
necessary for the aircraft to fly at the TRS, all other parameters such as configuration, thrust setting
etc. considered.

The most important corollary deriving from this fact is that the aircraft need only be trimmed for
speed changes. Any kind of flight maneuver and/or configuration change that does not involve a
change in the target airspeed, does not require trimming by the pilot.

The trim switches hence work as a Trim Reference Airspeed control. Trimming nose down will
increase the TRS, trimming nose up will decrease the TRS.

The above consideration remains true only when in Normal Law and while in flight. On the ground,
or in Secondary or Direct mode, the pitch trim switches will move the horizontal stabilizer like in a
737.

Effect of Thrust (constant TRS)

See the Flight Test involving Thrust Changes at constant TRS at 17:54 to 21:44.

Since the Boeing 777 is a speed-stable aircraft (just like most conventional aircraft), for a given TRS
the thrust levers are basically the "up & down" control of the ship. Advance the levers and the
aircraft will climb. Close the throttles and it will descend, always keeping the airspeed constant at
the set TRS after the initial transition. For steady, unaccelerated 1-g flight, the angle of attack will
remain constant as well.

Fly straight and level, trim the aircraft for the desired airspeed and stabilize the engines at around
50-60% N1. Now advance the thrust levers slightly. Initially the aircraft will tend to accelerate but
the nose-up pitching moment generated by the excess thrust will raise the nose of the aircraft and
prevent the speed from increasing. Since the PFCs are going to work their magic to bring the
airspeed back to the unchanged TRS, all excess thrust is going to be employed into making the
aircraft climb at the same airspeed and same angle of attack as in level flight.

Turn Compensation and Bank Limit Protection

See the Flight Test performed at 23:25 to 25:36 on Turns in Normal Law, and at 21:45 to 23:24 on
Turns in Direct Law.

Starting from a straight and level flight condition, smoothly rolling the control wheel will command
the aircraft to bank in the same direction. Releasing the wheel will stop the rolling and settle the
attitude at the achieved bank angle. The aircraft will automatically compensate for slip by deflecting
the rudder in the appropriate direction and will also compensate for pitch by trimming in a way that
prevents the aircraft from losing or gaining altitude.
The Bank Angle Limit Protection prevents the aircraft from exceeding 35º of bank angle. For most
normal operations, 25 to 30 degrees of bank are usually more than enough to perform a turn. If the
pilot pretends to bank the aircraft past 35º, the sky pointer and slip indicator on the PFD (also known
as "sailboat") will turn solid amber, the control wheel will stiffen considerably and the PFCs will
cease to compensate for a level and coordinated turn. Once the control wheel is released, the
aircraft will roll back to 30º of bank.

Configuration Change Compensation

See the Flight Test regarding a lowering of the landing gear at 25:37 to 31:10.

In the pitch axis, the PFCs will automatically compensate for configuration changes in the usual
manner: Deflection of the elevators followed by movement of the horizontal stabilizer to streamline
the elevators.

In the event of a landing gear drop in straight and level flight, the Autothrottles will increase thrust
to compensate for the increased drag. This thrust increase will generate a nose-up pitching moment
which the PFCs will neutralize via nose-down commands to keep the aircraft in level flight.

A similar thing happens during flap deployment. Lowering the flaps will increase the lift and will tend
to make the aircraft "balloon" upwards. This will be prevented through nose-down corrections by
the PFCs.

Approach to Stall and Full Stall

In these Flight Tests a 1-g Approach to Stall maneuver at 31:11 to 37:57 is performed followed by a
Full Stall in Direct mode at 37:58 to 41:16.

The Boeing 777 incorporates an array of protections that make flying the aircraft into a stall very
difficult. One must consciously and actively try to stall the aircraft to achieve it. The only way to
"fully stall" the aircraft in 1-g flight is to disarm the Autothrottles and disconnect the PFCs; both
systems are supposed to stay armed/on during all normal operations.

As a first level of protection come the Autothrottles (ATs). When armed, the ATs won't let the
airspeed drop below Minimum Maneuvering Speed (top of the amber bar on the speed-tape, see
image above). If the ATs are disengaged and the speed drops below MMS, they will re-engage and
push the thrust levers forward to accelerate back to MMS in a function called "wake-up".

Disarming the Autothrottles through the AT disarm switches on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) will
prevent them from "waking-up" at low airspeeds. In such a case the Autopilot, if engaged, will give
up on maintaining level altitude and let the aircraft descend in an attempt not to exceed a given
angle of attack. An aural and visual warning will alert the pilots of this.

When hand-flying, the pilot won't be able to trim the aircraft for a speed slower than Minimum
Maneuvering Speed. The admissible range for the TRS is limited by the MMS on the lower end and
the maximum operating speed Vmo/Mmo on the upper end. Flying at a speed slower than MMS will
require the pilot to continuously pull on the control column. If he releases the control, the aircraft
will drop the nose to accelerate back up to MMS.

If the pilot continues to pull on the column while the airspeed drops trying to fly level, at some point
he will reach the red "barber pole" and the stick shaker will activate warning the crew from the
imminent stall. At maximum backwards control column deflection, the aircraft will not fully stall as
the PFCs will limit the deflection of the elevators to a value such as to not exceed the maximum
angle of attack and fully stall the aircraft. Stick shaker activation occurs when the angle of attack is
slightly below the maximum value.

Fully stalling the aircraft requires disconnection of the PFCs to retain enough elevator authority so as
to exceed the maximum angle of attack. Once in Direct Law with ATs disarmed and AP disengaged,
the aircraft can be stalled just like any conventional aircraft.

Conclusion

The Boeing 777 is a formidable flying machine. Its Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System greatly
enhances aircraft handling qualities, increases safety and reliability, reduces system weight and
maintenance costs and lets the pilots have ultimate full authority over the ship at all times. And it
achieves all that while still conserving the feel and handling principles of any conventional aircraft.

Relevant Software

 Microsoft Flight Simulator X - Windows-based Flight Simulation platform

 PMDG Boeing 777 - Complex and realistic simulation of the Boeing 777

References

1. Gregg F. Bartley - The Boeing 777 Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System, Ch. 11 The Avionics
Handbook (2001 CRC Press)

2. Y. C. Bob Yeh - Triple-Triple Redundant 777 Primary Flight Computers (1996 Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group)

3. Major J.P. Sutherland - Fly-By-Wire Flight Control Systems (1968 Air Force Flight Dynamics
Lab)

4. Cooper, Harper - The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities
(1969 AGARD Report 567)

5. Boeing 777 Flight Crew Operating Manual (The Boeing Company)

6. W. Langewiesche - Stick and Rudder. An Explanation of the Art of Flying (1944 McGraw-Hill)

7. Karl Sabbagh - 21st Century Jet. The Making and Marketing of the Boeing 777 (1996
Scribner)
Jaime Beneyto Gómez de Barreda

Ingeniero de diseño en Arrival

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LinkedIn User

A good article! In a few details regarding system description, I would like to disagree though, I'm
afraid. The operating modes are really called "modes" on the Boeings, "law" is an Airbus term for
essentially the same. Roll control is direct even in normal mode on the 777; only the 787 has
introduced a rate command roll control normal mode. And normal mode pitch control doesn't - in
control systems terms - control pitch attitude, but a mix of vertical load factor, pitch rate and thus
deviation from trim speed. Boeing dubs this the C*U function. All in all, I believe your conclusions
and experiments hold true though. Interesting read, thank you!

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Jaime Beneyto Gómez de Barreda

Ingeniero de diseño en Arrival

Matthias, thank you kindly for your corrections. I will ammend my text to eliminate the inaccuracies.
Thank you for reading and commenting.

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3y

3y

Sirio Mussa

Pilota di linea su aeromobili Boeing B777-200/300ER

nice writing, but you wrote "Should, in a highly unlikely event, both the RAT and all three hydraulic
systems fail, there is still a mechanical backup connection from the cockpit control wheel to the
number 4 and 11 spoiler panels", this is not correct, the "mechanical backup" comes in the unlikely
event of a complete "electrical" system shut down... cables from the flight deck to the stabilizer and
selected spoilers allow the pilots to fly straight and level until the electrical system is restarted. if you
loose all hydraulic systems the only way to fly is by the throttles, like in the event of DHL300.

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3y

Ash Gupta

Managing Partner at Gupta Smart Energy - Corporate Bridge Makers for Innovative Low-Carbon
Technologies & Funding

Yes Jaime Beneyto, what you say is correct. It's called "vested interest fade"

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4y

Ash Gupta

Managing Partner at Gupta Smart Energy - Corporate Bridge Makers for Innovative Low-Carbon
Technologies & Funding

I asked the head of Innovation & Technology at the UK Gov Technology Strategy Board if the Vehicle
C&U regs could be altered to permit DBW. He said of course, just ask us what you wish to change. So
why is this not happening. I see problems with CBW in F1 maybe relaibility is still an issue. The way I
see it is that if we had a world scale AutoOEM talk with say an Airbus Group or Lockheed Martin and
negotiate a licence for legacy aviation FBW they would be advanced versus the market. Am I barkin g
up the wrong tree or missing something?

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Jaime Beneyto Gómez de Barreda

Ingeniero de diseño en Arrival

Ash, again, I'm sorry that I'm not an expert in automotive DBW. General engineering "wisdom" is
that all "new" systems take a lot of time to be completely implemented. The "Technology Readiness
Level" is used to assess the maturity of a new technology. Also there's political/economical reasons
particularly in the Automotive industry. For instance, hybrid petrol/electric cars could have been the
standard many years ago but even today their use is still marginal. The question often is not "are we
able to?" but "are we willing to?".

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4y

4y

Ash Gupta

Managing Partner at Gupta Smart Energy - Corporate Bridge Makers for Innovative Low-Carbon
Technologies & Funding

For cats read cars for priestly read properly for apatt read apart Darn predictive text!

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4y
Ash Gupta

Managing Partner at Gupta Smart Energy - Corporate Bridge Makers for Innovative Low-Carbon
Technologies & Funding

For 10 years I have been seeking a DBW system foe cats linked to IWMotors on a DBW platform.
Why is this normal when flying but not when driving? Autonomous control and DBW priestly
configured and shielded to protect from hackers seem obvious. What am I missing apatt from the on
cost of triple redundancy!

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Jaime Beneyto Gómez de Barreda

Ingeniero de diseño en Arrival

Hello Ash. These systems are normal for aircrafts because of the reasons mentioned in the
conclusion: Increased safety, system reliability, reduced maintenance costs and less weight. In the
long run they save money and improve on safety. Would this apply to cars? I see their potential
application in commercial trucks at first. I have to admit that I don't know much about DBW systems
though

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4y

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