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Tbilisi Airfield Survey
Tbilisi Airfield Survey
Tbilisi Airfield Survey
AIRFIELD SURVEY
General 1
Runway, Taxiway, and Parking Area Data 2
Material Support 3
Navigational Aids 4
Section II – Transportation
Aerial Port Facilities 1
Vehicle Transportation 2
Airfield Throughput Capability 3
Section V – Summary
Section VI – Agency Directory
AIRFIELD SURVEY CHECKLIST
1. General:
a. The Airfield Survey Checklist is in two parts; Part I, Airfield Data and Part II, Airfield Support.
Part I is designed to provide information which will be used to determine if the airfield can
physically accept an airlift or tanker aircraft, eg., C-5, C-17, C-141, KC-10, and Commercial B-
747, DC-10, DC-8, etc. Part II is designed to provide information, which will be used to
determine if the airfield has the facilities to support an airlift or tanker operation.
b. Include representatives from LG, TR, CE, SE, etc., on the Airfield Survey Team, as required.
Personnel accomplishing the airfield survey should contact appropriate host airfield officials to
obtain required information.
c. The Airfield Survey Checklist should be completed in as much detail as possible. Attach
supporting information (digital photographs, maps, charts, and diagrams) to the survey checklist
whenever possible, to furnish required information.
a. Identify and complete data blocks on all runways, taxiways, and parking areas whether they are
active or inactive.
b. Include digital photographs (if possible) and an airfield diagram or sketch labeling each of the
above.
c. Identify specific taxi routes and parking areas on the airfield diagram/sketch.
d. List the published runway, taxiway, or apron strengths by at least on of the following designations:
ESWL – Equivalent Single Wheel Loading (Include associated tire pressure if available.)
When listing T, ST, TT, or TDT, include the other ratings, if available (e.g., if T is given, attempt
to obtain the ST, TT, and TDT rating). If data source is current FLIP, confirm with appropriate
airport official/civil engineers. If other ratings are not available, do not convert. Every effort
should be made to furnish a LCN at airports that will support civilian aircraft.
e. Identify and locate all obstructions adjacent to all runways, taxiways, and parking aprons. When
possible include photographs. (For example, runway distance markers 4 feet high every 1,000 feet
along RWY 04/22, 80 feet from centerline). If obstacle data is listed in current FLIPs, confirm its
accuracy. Measure distance to the obstruction from runway/taxiway centerline. If no taxi
centerline is on apron measure obstruction from edge of apron surface and so indicate.
NOTE: Use “feet” and “gallons” as the preferred method of measurement. If data collected is other
than “feet” or “gallons”, convert data and place side by side in appropriate block
f. Identify and include all obstructions in the approach and departure zones that violate the standards
listed in AFI 32-1026. Identify all obstructions and associated heights and locate them from a
known reference point adjacent or near to the obstruction.
g. Record distances between adjacent runways, taxiways, and parking areas. For example, 1,000 feet
between RWY 20 and parallel taxiway. Measure distance from marked edge lines or stressed
surface.
h. Record condition of area surfaces in regard to possible repair, FOD, and engine blast damage.
(Include photographs if possible.)
i. List and locate AGE equipment, buildings, barriers, etc., which are subject to possible blast
damage.
l. Review all airfield waivers. Obtain copies of any waivers not contained in FLIPs or NOTAMs.
(Include in Survey.)
3. Base Support:
a. When showing cost indicate type of acceptable payment (i.e. US $, or local currency).
b. Also indicate acceptable method of payment (i.e. Credit card, MIPR, cash, or Form 15).
c. Determine AGE and MHE available, cost compatibility, and condition. Determine base and
procurement resources.
d. Determine availability, cost, method of payment, capacity, and condition of warehouse and open
storage facilities.
4. Navigational Aids:
b. Determine if published SIDs can be used in lieu of radar vectors. Attach a copy of current SIDs to
survey.
5. Summaries:
a. In the summary area of each section, provide a brief synopsis of data collected.
d. The final summary should include an overall assessment to include showstoppers and/or known
deficiencies. (Keep in mind this is an assessment based on the information you have
gathered, not a suitability evaluation.)
AIRFIELD SURVEY CHECKLIST
Distribution:
PART I
AIRFIELD DATA
1. Runways:
a. Runway Data
b. Description, location, and height of obstructions along runways. Example: Radar reflector 72
inches high, 300 feet left of centerline RWY 04, 550 feet from the approach end. When possible
include photographs and lighting data.
NONE
c. Description, location, and height of obstructions in the approach and departure zones. Example:
Trees, 322 ft MSL, 1,000 ft prior to threshold RWY 22, 70 ft left of runway centerline. When
possible include photographs and lighting data.
NONE
NONE
e. Summary of runway data: RWY 31L/13R is main active runway. Continuous reconstruction of
airfield is present as well as minor improvements.
a. Taxiway Data
Designation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ength NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT
SPECIF SPECIF SPECIF SPECIF SPECIF SPECIF SPECIF SPECI
IED IED IED IED IED IED IED IED
Width 50’ 50’ CLSD 50’ 75’ 75’ CLSD CLSD
urface ASP ASP N/A ASP CON CON N/A N/A
*Condition GOOD GOOD N/A GOOD GOOD GOOD N/A N/A
ublished Strength LCN50 LCN50 N/A LCN50 LCN50 LCN50 N/A N/A
Imposed Weight Limits NONE NONE N/A NONE NONE NONE N/A N/A
Centerline Y Y N/A Y Y Y N/A N/A
dge Lights Y Y N/A Y Y Y N/A N/A
Runway Hold Lines Y Y N/A Y Y Y N/A N/A
houlders Stabilized Y Y N/A Y Y Y N/A N/A
tabilizing Surface ASP ASP N/A ASP ASP ASP N/A N/A
tabilized Width 70’ 70’ N/A 70’ 75’ 75’ N/A N/A
b. Description, location, and height of any obstructions along taxiways. When possible include
photographs and lighting data.
32” High runway designation lights located 125’ left of rwy center line R/W 13R and
20’right of twy’s 5 and 6. Two disabled helicopters approximately 15’ high located 115’
south/southwest of Twy 1 and 4 intersection.
a. Parking Data
Designation 1 2 3 4
Dimensions NOT 203’ X 520’ NOT NOT
SURVEYED SURVEYED SURVEYED
Surface CON/ASP ASP ASP CON
**Condition GOOD GOOD NOT GOOD
SURVEYED
Published Strength 24 F/B/X/T LCN 46 12 F/B/X/T 29 R/A/X/T
* Imposed Weight Limit NONE NONE NONE NONE
Taxi Lines Y Y NOT Y
SURVEYED
Tie-down Rings N N NOT N
SURVEYED
Grounding Points Y Y NOT Y
SURVEYED
Shoulders Stabilized Y Y NOT Y
SURVEYED
Stabilizing Surface ASP ASP NOT CON
SURVEYED
Stabilized Width 10’ N/A NOT 10’
SURVEYED
Flood Lighting Y N NOT N
SURVEYED
b. Description, location, and height of obstructions adjacent to parking areas that will restrict aircraft
operations while taxiing. When possible include photographs and lighting data.
Military ramp not accessible to acft larger than C141 due to narrow movement area and
potential damage to light aircraft parked on civil ramp. C5 acft must use R/W 13L/31R for
parking and download. Four engine acft must shut down outboard engines as soon as
possible after clearing active rwy due to narrow taxiways and multiple light aircraft parked
on civilian apron.
Yes: No: X
d. Designated number of remote spots and explosive limits for each. (Indicate locations on attached
airfield diagram.)
e. Is Explosive/HAZMAT storage available? If yes, is there a preferred route to the facility.
Yes: X No:
Preferred route: Did not receive precise data. Depends on Air Field manager, Port Services and
number of aircraft on the ground.
f. Are parking spots marked (C-5, C-141, C-17, KC-10, Commercial B-747, etc.)?
Yes: No: X
g. How much of the ramp parking space is available for AMC aircraft parking? (Indicate location on
attached airfield diagram.)
Yes: No: X
i. Does the slope of the parking ramp aggravate the breakaway and taxi power requirements?
Yes: No: X
j. Are there any other factors that may affect aircraft operations on the ground movement area?
NO
YES
l. Summary of aircraft parking data: New parking ramp (See attached photos) build within the last
three years.
A NEW RAMP HAS BEEN BUILT AND IS IN USE HOWEVER NO DIAGRAM EXIST.
SEE PHOTOS ATTACHED.
4. Engine Blast:
a. Can engines be run-up to max power in parking position without damage to ground surfaces or
structures?
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
Yes: No: X
d. Are other aircraft, structures, or surfaces likely to be damaged by engine blast from application of
breakaway power when moving from parking spot or from taxi power application as the aircraft
follows designated taxi routes to and from the parking areas?
Yes: No: X
If yes, explain.
e. Is any damage to structures, surfaces, or vehicular traffic likely to occur while the aircraft is in the
takeoff position when max engine power is applied?
Yes: No: X
If yes, explain.
f. Summary of engine blast information:
Director of Technical Services stated there was enough open space for engine run-up and
would be determined if the situation arose.
a. Identify any area not accessible to aircraft because of surface strength, obstacles, or probable jet
blast damage.
Military ramp accessable via twy 6 and 2 only(located at midfield). Twy 5 may be used for
entering rwy 13L/31R and for departures on 13R/31L only. Twy’s 1 and 4 should not be
used due to numerous disabled aircraft in close proximity to twy edges. Twy’s 3,7 and 8
are closed and may not be entered.
b. Identify any specific taxi route(s) that aircraft would have to follow from landing to the parking
areas and from parking areas to the runway for takeoff.
NONE SPECIFIED
c. Can aircraft taxi in and out of the following areas: (If no, explain.)
d. Attach to the completed survey checklist an airfield drawing (8” x 10”) showing designated
taxiways and proposed parking areas that aircraft will have to comply with while observing
limitations imposed by obstacles, weight bearing capacities, probable jet blast damage, etc.
e. Summary of aircraft movement on the ground. (Describe any condition or obstruction which
may/will impact air mobility operations.)
Aircraft are asked to taxi at least 100 ft down rwy 13R/31L prior to take off to prevent
blast damage to elevated threshold lighting. Aircraft using the military parking ramp must
use caution when entering or leaving parking area via twy 2 to prevent blast damage to
aircraft parked on civilian apron
PART II
AIRFIELD SUPPORT
SECTION I
OPERATIONS FACILITIES
1. TALCE Operation Center Facilities:
Yes: X No:
Building Number:
Rooms Available:
Dimensions:
Voltage: 220
Hertz: 50KHZ
1. Is flightline visible?
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
5. Summary of facilities: Most buildings available are abandoned and poorly constructed. The
use of antennas is not encouracged. The 1st Deputy Director General stated that we could
place personnel in their tower or Communications Section.
b. Is space available for mobile TALCE Operation Center Facilities? (MARC, tents, etc.)
Yes: X No:
Dimensions:
Voltage:
Hertz:
1. Is flightline visible?
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
5. Summary of facilities: Enough open space around airfield, however the antennas are still an
issue.
c. Sanitation accommodations:
Main Terminal
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Building Number:
Limitations:
Yes: No: X
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Building Number:
Limitations:
Yes: No: X
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Building Number:
Limitations:
2. Base Operations:
Yes: X No:
Building Number: TERMINAL BUILDING
Phone Number:
Fax Number:
Limitations:
b. NOTAMS:
c. Flight Publications:
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
If no, can TALCE personnel establish their own procedures?
Yes: No: X
SEP-NOV
(5) What birds or animals dwell within the perimeter of the airfield?
g. Radios:
(5) Type of communications support to be augmented and location where service is required:
NOT SPECIFIED
GOOD
NONE
BRITISH AIR
AEROFLAT
TURKISH AIR
GEORIGIAN AIR
UNITED NATIONS
3. Control Tower:
a. Does location of control tower afford the operators unrestricted vision of all approaches,
departures, runways, and taxiways?
Yes: X No:
c. What are equipment limitations for guarding and transmitting on A/G frequencies?
NONE
121.5
Yes: X No:
Type: GENERATOR
Delay time: 3 SECONDS
g. Are up-to-date charts and diagrams, including crash grid maps maintained in the tower?
Yes: X No:
h. IFR Tower:
Yes: X No:
i. VFR Tower:
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
NOT SPECIFIED
4. Air Route Traffic Control Center/Flight Service Station:
Nearest Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) or Flight Service Station (FSS)?
Type: ACC
Location: TIBILISI
Distance: N/A
Phone Number: NOT SPECIFIED
Fax Number: NOT SPECIFIED
5. Aids To Navigation:
6. Weather Facilities/Services:
a. Observations:
Agency Responsible For Observations: Tbilsi Meterological Service
Observing Hours: (Zulu) 24 HRS
Frequency Of Observations: 3 HRS
Location Of Observing Site: TIBILISI AIRPORT
Phone Number: (955 32) 96-94-78
Fax Number: (955 32) 99-73-61
Online service address:
c. Forecasts:
d. Weather Briefings:
e. Weather Communications:
(1) Facsimile:
Yes: No: X
(2) Where does the weather station transmit its weather data?
Yes: X No:
Local:
Long-line:
(4) Weather data received in the weather station comes from who/where?
f. Weather Equipment:
(1) Radar:
Yes: X No: Type: MRLS (Special Radar)
(2) Windsocks:
(3) Anemometer:
(4) Temperature/Humidity:
(5) RVR:
(6) Transmissometer:
(7) Ceiling:
(8) Other:
(1) Where is the physical location of the weather station (Bldg. and Rm.)?
BUILDING TWO
h. Weather Data:
Much of the weather equipment is of Russian design and is antiquated and often unreliable.
New equipment is being ordered and will replace the old equipment as money becomes
available.
7. Communications:
a. Telephones:
Yes: No: X
(2) Commercial:
Yes: X No:
TYPE QUANTITY
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) Incoming: UNLIMITED – AS REQUIRED
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) Outgoing: UNLIMITED – AS REQUIRED
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) 2-way lines:
Maximum Call Area: (World Wide, CONUS, Pacific, etc.) World Wide
Operator Assist: (Area Code and Telephone Number)
Yes: No: X
TYPE QUANTITY
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) Incoming:
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) Outgoing:
(2, 4, & 6 Wire) 2-way lines:
(a) To:
Yes: X No:
c. Record Communications:
Yes: No: X
(2) Distance and travel time between operating location and communications center?
NONE
8. Disaster Preparedness:
Yes: No: X
Building Number:
Distance From Flightline:
Protection Factor:
Communications Available:
Provisions Available:
Water:
Food:
Medical:
Remarks: Local city response available. Fire Department at airport.
Underground facilities (shelter) located at airport.
b. Decontamination Stations:
Yes: No: X
Building Number:
Location:
Facilities Available:
Communications Available:
Remarks: Water available for decontamination
Type Quantity
Yes: No: X
Communications:
Fall Out Shelters:
Provisions Available:
Water:
Food:
Medical:
Latrines:
Remarks:
PART II
AIRFIELD SUPPORT
SECTION II
TRANSPORTATION
a. Cargo Terminal:
Yes: X No:
Location:
Dimensions Available:
Type Surface: CONCRETE
Remarks: 3.5 ton capacity
Yes: X No:
CARGO TERMINAL
(4) What are the dimensions of the space available for the following?
Yes: No: X
Yes: X No:
e. Forklifts Available:
f. Wide-Body MHE:
Type Quantity
Pallet/Container Trailers:
Truck On/Off Loading Ramps: 5 TON LOADER TRUCKS
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Type: 200K Weight Capability: 1 TON LIMIT
Quantity: 2 Remarks:
Type: 600K Weight Capability: 1 TON LIMIT
Quantity: 1 Remarks:
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Usage Requirements: 24 HRS ADVANCE NOTICE
Cost: $41 FORKLIFT, $17 TRUCK LOAD, $40/DAY STORAGE – IF
LARGE AMOUNT OF CARGO, DISCOUNTS ARE GIVEN.
Method of Payment: CREDIT CARD / CASH
Yes: No: X
Location:
Dimensions Available:
Yes: No: X
Location:
i. Passenger Service:
Location:
Telephone Number:
Maximum Capacity:
What type of passenger and baggage screening procedures are conducted at terminal?
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Usage Requirements:
Cost:
Method of Payment:
j. Fleet Service:
Yes: X No:
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Usage Requirements:
Cost:
Method of Payment:
Yes: No: X
Distance to Facility:
Cost:
Method of Payment:
Yes: No: X
Location:
Distance from Flightline:
Operating Hours:
Required Lead Time:
2. Vehicle Transportation:
Yes: No: X
Yes: No: X
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Location:
Point of Contact:
Telephone Number:
Location:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
b. Considering the above factors, please specify below, the tonnage that could be removed
completely through the airfield during each 24-hour period.
c. If arriving personnel, vehicles, and cargo will be moved to their final destination by rail, road,
or a combination of both. The following information is required:
(1) Identify and indicate the distance to the nearest railhead(s) with the capability to load
wheeled and tracked vehicles. Also, include capabilities of loading ramps and
marshalling areas.
(2) Identify the number and type of major roads serving the airfield and any movement
restrictions that exist in the vicinity of the airfield and/or between the airport and
railhead(s) that could prevent movement of large wheeled or tracked vehicles.
PART II
AIRFIELD SUPPORT
SECTION III
LOGISTICS
1. Aircraft Support:
a. Deicing Equipment:
Yes: X No:
b. Transient Alert:
Operating Hours:
Building Number:
Phone Number:
2. Equipment:
d. Air Compressors:
e. Heaters:
g. Light Carts:
i. Jacks:
j. Maintenance Stands:
k. Cranes:
a. What repair capability exists on station that is compatible with the type of aircraft in this
operation?
(If complete field repair capability exists for an MDS state: C-141 – Complete – All.)
Type Amount
TS1 6500 TONS
3000 TONS
(3) How does the bulk storage facility receive the jet fuel? (TT – Tanker Truck, TC – Tanker Car,
PL – Pipeline, or TB – Tanker Barge)
TT
(5) Transfer rate from bulk storage to the hydrant storage tanks: (Gallons Per Minute “GPM”)
NA
NA
NA
(3) Total gallons per minute (GPM) that can be pumped through the hydrant systems:
NA
(4) Number of aircraft that can be refueled by hydrants simultaneously:
NA
Number Of Vehicles: 3
Fuel Capacity (Gallons): (1) 40 (2) 30
Pumping Rate (GPM): 2400 LITERS PER MIN / 1000 LITERS PER MIN
(6) Turnaround time from flightline to fill-stand, fill-up, and return to flightline:
30 MIN (MAX)
NA
c. Off-Base Facilities:
NA
NA
(3) Trace POL supply back to port or refinery. If the refinery is the source, determine production
capability for jet fuels:
(3) Oil:
(4) Tires/Wheels:
POL FACILITY WAS BUILT 3 YEARS AGO, VERY MODERN AND EXTREMELY
EFFICIENT. TS1 FUEL EQUIVELENT TO JET A-1.
PART II
AIRFIELD SUPPORT
SECTION IV
BASE SUPPORT
1. Base Facilities:
a. Billeting:
(1) On Base:
Yes: No: X
Name:
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Distance:
Number of Beds:
(2) Off-Base:
Yes: X No:
Name:
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Distance:
Number of Beds:
Name:
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Distance:
Number of Beds:
b. Messing:
(1) On Base:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Name:
Hours of Operation:
Personnel Capacity:
Distance from flightline:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
(1) On Base:
(1) On Base:
(2) Off Base:
e. During a contingency, how many medical personnel will remain at the base medical facility?
f. Number of Ambulances:
Military: 0
Civilian: Dial 901 or 009
Yes: No: X
i. During a contingency, how many ambulances will remain at the base medical facilities?
According to the Embassy NP, the quality and availability of medical care in the Republic
of Georgia is usually poor. Blood, oxygen, and medical supplies are not adequate.
Credentials of providers are not always trustworthy. Trauma patients usually require air
evacuation because there is little capability in country. Normally, a private company (SOS,
available 24 hrs/day) would be contacted for air evacuation. The last air evacuation
coordinated by the Embassy took 24 hrs from the time SOS was contacted. Ambulances
are available downtown; however, they are not always equipped with life support
equipment.
Embassy, Tbilisi: Susan Summers is a NP, ACLS-certified, and working toward ATLS
certification. The Primary Care Clinic (PCC) is currently located at the Embassy;
however, the PCC is expected to move Summer 2001 to Metechi Sheraton, 380003 20 Telavi
th
St Tbilisi, Georgia (5 Floor, diagram attached). The PCC provides general care and
stabilization, and serves as a liaison for referrals downtown. Medical personnel at the
Embassy are in the process of visiting and surveying 63 local clinics and hospitals in Tbilisi
to collect data on capabilities and evaluate which facilities are preferable. The Embassy
uses Frontline Medical Services (FMS) for medical referrals. Attached is a list of facilities,
points of contact, and phone numbers. Of all the facilities in Tbilisi, the following are
preferred choices:
(1) Frontline Medical Service, 2 Arakishvili St, phone 25-19-48/51, cell (899) 55-09-11, cell
(899) 55-19-11, open 24 hrs per day, 7 days per week; serves as liaison for authorized
hospitals and diagnostic centers in Tbilisi
(2) Curatio, 27B Vaja-Pshavela Ave, 2nd Floor, phone 94-15-94, serves as network for
specialists, Dr. David Gzirishivili, Dr. Baka Tavkhelidze
(3) Akad N. Kipshidze, named Central Clinic of Tbilisi State Medical Hospital, 29 Vaja-
Pshavela Ave, Tbilisi, phone number 392966, 395573, 394809, Medical Director Levan
Potskveria, phone (899) 551674, 1,500 beds, 15 kilometers from the airport,
(5) Central Military Clinical Hospital of Ministry of Defense, Navtlugi St #6, Tbilisi, phone
772656, 774485, 776379, 998963, Medical Director Anzor Gorbenadze, phone 772656, cell
(899) 152233, 100 beds, and
(6) Medi Club Georgia Medical Service Company, 5, Chavchavadze Ave, 380079, Tbilisi,
phone 995 32 25 1991, Medical Director Dimitri Makhatadze, phone (899) 50 1991, 24-hr
emergency service.
(1) What potentially transmissible diseases are prevalent in the surrounding area(s)?
(1) Diarrheal Diseases: Endemic at moderate to high levels; outbreaks are occurring with
increasing frequency; caused by several bacterial, protozoal, and viral agents.
(2) Other Food or Waterborne Diseases: Viral Hepatitis A and E, Typhoid and Paratyphoid
Fevers
(3) Vector-Borne Diseases: Arboviral Diseases: Including sandfly fever, West Nile virus fever,
tick-borne encephalitis, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Malaria (focally endemic, primarily
occurs April to October), Leishmaniasis (polymorphic protozoan disease of skin/mucous
membranes)
(3) Sanitation and Waste Management: Sanitary conditions in Georgia are well below
Western standards. Urban sanitation services have worsened in Georgia as a result of the internal
strife and supply shortages that have occurred since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Urban
sewage disposal systems are aging, poorly constructed, and inadequate to meet current needs.
Many rural dwellings/small communities still dispose of wastes directly into streams and rivers.
(4) Hazardous waste: In the past, waste sites were located near industrial sites/communal waste
areas. Very little management, control, or waste identification/monitoring were practiced.
Conditions have not improved; in fact indiscriminate dumping in large cities has increased.
Dump sites are usually open to air, near villages and other settlements and next to bodies of
water.
(2) Do the off-base eating facilities practice good standards of food preparation?
Yes: No:
Unknown.
(3) Are there any foods or drinks that should be avoided by U.S. Air Force personnel?
Groundwater
Yes: x No:
Yes, but not reliable. Vulnerability assessment not performed. Infrastructure poor.
Recommend bottled water (Borjomi, Gewa)
Yes: X No:
Yes: x No:
Yes: x No:
3. Personnel:
Yes: No: X
N/A
4. Security:
CIVILIAN
b. Are guards armed? SOME ARE ARMED – MAINLY THE VEHICAL PATROLS, BUT
CAN BE CHANGED AS NEEDED.
Yes: X No:
AK47’s
Foot: X Vehicle: X
Yes: No: X
Yes: No: X
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
m. Did they appear to use a restricted area badge or some other type of personal identification?
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
Yes: No: X
p. Summary of Security:
a. Manpower:
a. Facilities:
Yes: X No:
(2) Is a full suit of protective clothing available for each on-duty fire fighter (hood, coat,
trousers, boots, gloves, etc.)?
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
(4) Is a water supply available on the airfield for refilling crash trucks?
Yes: X No:
b. Operations:
Yes: X No:
Yes: X No:
b. Equipment:
(1) List the type and quantity of USAF fire protection Vehicles:
Type Quantity
42 TON 3
25 TON TANK 1
75 TON TANK 2
(2) Provide the following information on non-USAF fire protection vehicles:
Summarize the airfield’s capability to support C-130, C-141, C-17, C-5, KC-10, Commercial B-747, DC-
10, DC-8, etc., aircraft. Include whether the airfield is capable of supporting an on/off-load, en route stop
or emergency/alternate capability or SIOP mission. Include also any limiting factors not covered by this
checklist and measures necessary to correct all limiting factors.
Indicate working maximum on the ground (MOG) for normal operations and for contingencies by
aircraft type.
Name: COMMUNICATIONS
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Name: FUELS
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Name: HOSPITAL
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Name: SECURITY
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Name: TRANSPORTATION
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
Name: WEATHER
Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail Address:
Location:
st
621 Air Mobility Operations Group
Force Protection
Essential Elements of Information
1. Identifying Data:
2. OVERVIEW:
2.1. Geography:. Mountainous republic situated in the heart of the Caucasus range. Georgia has
borders with Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
2.2. People:
2.2.1. Nationality:
2.2.2. Ethnic Groups: Georgians 70.1%, Armenians 8.1%, Russians 6.3%, Azerbaijanis 5.7%,
Ossetians 3% and Abkhaz 1.8%.
2.2.3. Religion: Orthodox 65%, Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%, and Armenian Apostolic
8%.
2.2.4. Languages: The official language is Georgian, spoken by 71% of the population. Russian
spoken by 9%, Armenian spoken by 7%, and Azerbaijani spoken by 6% of the population.
2.2.5. Government: Republic
3.2. Perimeter Fencing/Wall: There is either a concrete wall or barbed wire fence encompassing
the entire perimeter of the airfield. The concrete wall is segregated into slabs, separated by steel
"I" beams. Each slab of concrete is reinforced with rebar rods. The concrete slabs are
approximately six and a half feet high and approximately six inches eight inch's thick. There are
some areas of the concrete wall, which is topped with barbed wire. The strain of barbed wire
varies from no wire at all to eight strains in other places. The overall condition of the wall should
be considered as in poor condition. There are numerous holes and areas of terrain erosion and
washout under the wall. There is no designated fencing or wall around the aircraft parking area
within the perimeter of the airfield.
3.2.1. Clear zones: There are no defined clear zones. There are no obstructions on the interior of
the perimeter.
3.3. Perimeter Roads: There is one perimeter road, which extends around the entire inner
perimeter of the airfield. The dirt road is approximately twenty feet wide and should be
considered as rough terrain.
3.4. Restricted Area/No Admittance Signs: There are no restricted area or no admittance signs
posted on the perimeter of the airfield.
3.5. Other Physical Barriers: With the exception of the entry control points, there are no other
physical barriers on or around the airfield.
3.6. Security Forces (SF): The security force element is comprised of civilian personnel
employed by the airport to perform security functions. The official terminology used for these
personnel is "Aviation Security."
3.6.1. Security Force Composition: The SF members are assigned to the authority of civil
aviation, under the director of security. There are a total number of SF member's is approximately
120 personnel. The force can be augmented indefinitely with or without advance notification, and
they are capable of providing additional manning for increased security. The SF member's are on
duty for twenty-four hours, on post for twelve and then they receive a post break for twelve. Each
member works four days and receives two days off. All post are manned twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week. There are no local holidays or customs which decrease security manning.
3.6.2. Security Force Training: The SF members receive basic infantry training, during their
indoctrination (basic training). After completion of this training, selected members receive
specialized training equivalent to airborne, Special Forces, explosives and security. These few
members receiving this training are then distributed throughout the military units to apply and
share the training they received. At this airfield there were approximately 6 personnel assigned to
the SF with specialized training. All other members of the SF receive OJT by the specialized
trained members.
3.6.3. Security Force Equipment: Per conversation with the director of security, only SF
members on patrols are armed with AK 47's (No weapons were observed on any of the patrols).
Each patrol has a portable radio. The radios are manufactured by Motorola, and are multiple
frequency capable. The SF contingents uniform consist of forest green sport coat and slacks with
a white shirt and black tie; Color of slacks vary. Some member's were wearing gray slacks and
black slacks.
3.6.4. Security Force Vehicles: The SF patrol vehicles consist of small "FIAT" type sedans.
Some of the vehicles are yellow and some are white. There are no radios in the vehicles. Some
vehicles have removable "kojack" type emergency lights mounted on the roof of the vehicle.
There are approximately ten vehicles available to the SF contingent.
3.7. Patrols: The only patrols conducted are within the interior of the airfield boundary. There
are no exterior patrols conducted by the SF contingent. Two person perimeter patrols are
conducted ten times per day (five times during daylight hours and five times during darkness).
Patrols on and around the flight line/ramp area are conducted by one-person foot patrols. The
patrol is conducted on a random basis and the individual is not armed. The only equipment
provided to this patrol is a radio.
3.8. Military Working Dogs/K-9: There are no military working dogs assigned to the airfield.
3.9. Watch Towers/Fixed Guard Positions: There are no watchtowers on or around the
perimeter. The only fixed guard position are at the entry control points.
3.10. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Counter Terrorism Units (CTU): There are two QRF or
CTU located in the inner city of Tbilisi. One unit is assigned to the president (Presidential
Security), and the other is assigned to the local police (Anti-Terrorist Unit). Both units are
capable of responding to the airport within thirty minutes. Both units receive training from
international sources (Exact source was not disclosed), and receive continuation training on a
weekly basis from within their assigned units. Neither unit has ever conducted any real world
operations. Morale of the forces is higher for these member's due to their professional status, and
pay. The size and weapon capabilities were not disclosed. Based on local customs and level of
difficulty extracting this information; decision making during contingencies would be at the
highest level.
3.11. Entry Control Points(ECP): There is at least six ECP's, accessing the perimeter of the
airfield and/or the flight line/ramp area. There was only two ECP's, which were manned. The
main ECP to the airfield is located adjacent the passenger terminal, and it is manned with three
unarmed SF members. The only other manned ECP is on the perimeter of the airfield, which is
manned by one unarmed SF member. Two of the other ECP's accessing the perimeter of the
airfield were either locked or welded, making them inaccessible. One of the two remaining ECP's
was insecure. Although construction was being conducted on the exterior of the perimeter, the
gate accessing the airfield remained open and no guards were posted. There is a distinguished
visitor ECP located adjacent the passenger terminal. This ECP was not manned; however, it was
locked. There are no force multipliers available such as X-Ray machines, trans friskers, or
mirrors at any of the ECP's.
3.11.1. Entry Control Point Communications: There is one landline at the main ECP. The
telephone line did not have the capability to call outside of the airfield. One Motorola portable
radio with multiple frequency capability is positioned on this post for the three SF members. The
only other manned entry controller on the perimeter ECP was equipped with one Motorola radio
with multiple frequency capability.
3.11.2. Entry Control Point Lighting: There is no ECP lighting or special purpose lighting
located at any of the entry control points. .
3.11.3. Entry Control Point Signs: There are no "Authorized Entry Only" or "No Trespassing"
signs posted at any of the ECP's.
3.11.4. Circulation Control: The SF contingent utilize a single badge and personal recognition,
entry control system. The badges are white laminate and the dimensions are approximately three
by five inches. Information included on the badge is the individuals picture, name of the airport
(in Georgian and English), badge number, and the area which the individual works. Each area is
identified by a color code such as blue, yellow, green, red or purple. All colors are placed on the
far right side of the badge vertically. The area in which the individual is authorized is displayed at
the bottom center of the badge in the correlating color. Visitors entering the airfield are given a
visitor badge with "VISTOR" stamped on it. The visitor badge is white in color and is laminated.
Privately owned vehicles are not authorized on the airfield without permission of the director of
security and the airfield manager; a visitor pass for the vehicle will then be issued. Each person
entering the area is required to show identification. This procedure does vary, depending on who
you are and whom you are traveling with (i.e. If travel through the entry control point with the
director of security, you will not be required to show identification). Vehicles or personnel or
their possessions are not searched prior to entering the airfield. These procedures do not vary
during daylight and darkness.
3.12. Lighting:
3.12.1. Portable Lighting Unit: There are a total of three portable lighting units available at the
airfield.
3.12.2. Aircraft Parking (AC) Area Lighting: There are approximately six ballpark type lighting
units positioned adjacent the passenger terminal. Each lighting unit houses six lights. There is
additional halogen type lighting units positioned on the passenger terminal building. The
operational status of the units is unknown.
3.12.3. Perimeter Lighting: There is no lighting on the interior or the exterior of the perimeter.
There is streetlights on approximately five percent of the perimeter, which borders the passenger
terminal and support facilities.
3.13. Close Circuit Television (CCTV): There is a CCTV system and associated equipment,
which monitors the parking area and passenger terminal activities. The number of cameras was
not disclosed, but there are six monitors. All images from the camera are recorded onto a VCR
tape and archived for three months.
3.14. Alarm System: There is no type of alarm system.
3.15. Control/Dispatch Center: There is one room located within the passenger terminal, which
is dedicated as a control center for security. One SF member is on duty at all times. Associated
equipment include a base station radio system (manufactured by Motorola) with multiple
frequency capability, six CCTV monitors, one VCR (manufactured by Panasonic), one
commercial telephone with dialing capability to call outside the airport complex. The SF member
working within the control center is not armed. Access to the control center is not controlled.
Imagery was not permitted in this area.
3.16. Aircraft Parking: The airfield manager designated a parking area for US government,
which is segregated from commercial aircraft. Additional guards are not posted but can be
requested with advance notice. The area is not marked as a restricted area and no signs are posted.
US personnel may be armed with proper coordination (written request from Am Embassy, to the
Minister of Transportation). All requests should include pertinent data such as individuals name,
passport number, purpose for arming, and type of weapon, serial number, and address while in
Tbilisi, length of stay, and any other data, which could be pertinent to the mission. There are
weapons storage facilities available; however, they do not meet US resource protection standards
and the airfield will not be responsible for their security.
4. Billeting: The Am Embassy does not provide billeting at the compound but there are two
approved hotels and numerous guesthouses within the city of Tbilisi.
4.1. Sheraton Palace Hotel: The only western standard hotel within the city of Tbilisi. The hotel
meets minimum western security requirements. There are unarmed security guards on duty
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Guards are assigned to fixed post on the interior of
the hotel and the exterior, to include the parking garage. The security guard composition includes
personnel employed by the Sheraton hotel for security, and the presidential security detail. The
majority of all security personnel have radio communications. There are a total of nine floors,
four stairways and three elevators within the hotel, and only one main entrance. All other
entrances or exits are for emergency purposes or hotel staff. US personnel are billeted together
and sometimes separately. Metal detectors are used at the main entrance to the hotel. The hotel
does provide transportation if coordinated with the concierge. Personnel assigned to the hotel for
security are not available for escort, under normal conditions. In the event that a unique
circumstance did arise, requesting escort service through the Am Embassy, DAO and RSO could
provide security escort.
4.2. Additional Guest Houses (Detailed Information was not obtained for these billeting
facilities):
4.2.1. Betsy's; 55/21 Belinski Street, Phone number (995) 88-32-98, or 98-29-37
4.2.2.Sharmi Guesthouse: 11 Chakhrudhadze Street (10 minute walk from Am Embassy),
4.2.3. BeauMonde: 11 Chavchavadz Street, (995) 99-62-46
4.2.4. Vere Palace Hotel: 24/8 Kuchishvili Street, Phone number (995) 25-33-40 or 41/42
4.2.5. Bonton: 36 Brothers Zubalashvili Street, Phone number (995) 91-18-80
4.2.6. Argo: 3 1st Kobuleti, Phone number (995) 23-06-73
4.2.7. Metro Guesthouse: 16 Kobuleti, Phone number (995) 29-46-47
4.2.8. Iberia Inn: 10A Bakhtrioni, Phone number (995) 96-75-48
4.2.9. Demi: 10 Ananuri Street, Phone number (995) 22-06-19
5. Route Security: The city of Tbilisi were the majority of the billeting locations are is
approximately twenty five to thirty five minutes away. There are at least three routes that can be
taken to the main thoroughfare allowing access to the airport road. There is at least two choke
points; one being a overpass just prior to exiting the main thoroughfare to enter the main road to
the airport. The second choke point is on the main access road to the airport. The road travels past
a hill, providing an optimum view of the entire access road. Host nation law enforcement does not
regularly patrol the road in Tbilisi. There were no recommended safe houses (for short or long
term) observed on the route to the airport. On the main route to the airport, there is an excess of
three overpasses and an excess of four bridges. All of the bridges transited were across roads.
6. Personnel Threat: Petty thefts and pick pocketing are prevalent. Foreigners are becoming
targets on a more frequent basis. The law enforcement community in Tbilisi calls it "the hunting
of foreigners." A total of forty-three crimes against foreigners have been committed to date. Of
those forty-three, only ten of the cases have been solved. According to Tbilisi police, four
hundred and fifty seven organized gangs were operating in Tbilisi in the past year. Although
protest against the lack of electricity occur on a regular basis and the protest have the capability to
become violent. Additional information on potential threats is contained in paragraph 8.2. Crime.
7. Physical Location: The airfield is located within the city limits of Tbilisi, sitting in a valley of
hills on all sides. The airport borders farmland and one major road that access the airport. There
are no vacant tall buildings in the immediate vicinity of the airport. The tall buildings that are
situated on or around the airfield is either occupied or in the process of being occupied by airport
support agencies. Although these facilities are not abandoned, they are not continuously occupied
and the potential for them to be used for surveillance activities is highly achievable. There is only
one facility that meets the aforementioned criteria adjacent the designated US aircraft parking
area. There are no power lines in the immediate vicinity of the airport. The airport complex
saturates the northern side of the airfield. The east, south, and west boundaries of the airfield is
heavy brush, ravines, hills, trenches, creeks and constructions sites. The vegetation is thick
around the entire exterior of the airfield, which could easily conceal a potential adversary.
Although vegetation is seasonal, the warmer months will increase the vegetation growth. There is
no agency on or around the airport responsible to maintain vegetation length. Generally, the
airport is ideal for any type of covert operation or standoff attack.
8.1. Safety and Security: A passport and visa are required. US citizens may receive a visa upon
arrival at Tbilisi Airport, the Port of Pot, and the Red Bridge crossing on Georgia's border with
Azerbaijan. The Am Embassy advises American citizens to avoid travel to the separatist-
controlled region of Abkhazia. There are reports of continued fighting and terrorist activity,
including attacks and kidnappings of international observers. These incidents have included
bombings and the mining of roads, which pose a serious threat to vehicular traffic. American
citizens are also advised to avoid travel to other areas of continuing security concern; specifically
the Pankisi Gorge north of Akhmeta and the northern mountainous areas of Georgia bordering
Chechnya, Dagestan and Svaneti. There have been instances of kidnappings for ransom purposes
in these regions. As a result of a threat posed by banditry and other criminal activities, American
citizens should carefully evaluate the implications for their security before considering travel to
South Ossetia and along the Georgian Military Highway north of the Gudauri ski resort.
8.2. Crime: Petty thefts and pick pocketing were previously the most common crimes, recently
foreigners in Georgia have also been victimized by muggings, home break ins and other violent
crimes. Most muggings have occurred on side streets near Tbilisi's city center. In all instances,
the mugging victims have first been knocked unconscious by blows to the head. Petty theft is
particularly a problem on the Tbilisi metro system and in mini-vans used for public transit. While
the security of overland travel in Georgia has improved, vehicular and rail traffic remains
vulnerable to robbery. Americans visiting or residing in Tbilisi should take the same precautions
they would in any major city where crime can be a problem. American citizens in Tbilisi are
advised to remain aware of their surroundings at all times, day or night; and to stay off dark or
unlit streets even when traveling in a group; to avoid carrying large sums of cash; and to be
particularly cautious of being singled out for victimization at establishments frequented by
foreigners.
8.3. Medical: Medical care in Georgia is limited. There is a severe shortage of basic medical
supplies, including disposable needles, anesthetics, and antibiotics. Georgian doctors and
hospitals often expect immediate cash payment before rendering medical services.
8.4. Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: Vehicle traffic in Georgia moves along the right side of
the roadway. Speed limits range from 80 to 100 km/hr. on highways, and from 60 to 90km/hr. on
urban thoroughfares. Drivers are not permitted to make right turns on red at traffic lights. While
legislation mandating seat belt use has not been enacted, drivers and passengers are advised to
"Buckle Up" on Georgian roadways. Inter city travel in Georgia by bus and public minivan is
readily available, and improved train service links the capital to most large cities and towns. It is
also possible to hire private taxis for inter city travel. The state road police are responsible for
maintaining road safety in Georgia. Many local drivers do not operate their vehicles in
accordance with established driving regulations, motorists should exercise extreme caution when
driving, and pedestrians should be careful when crossing streets. The roads are generally in poor
condition and lack shoulder markings and centerlines. Traffic lights may not work due to power
outages and burned out bulbs. Undivided two lane roads connect most major cities, and motorists
attempting to pass other vehicles may encounter on coming high-speed traffic. Driving at night
can be especially dangerous. Travel on mountainous roads is treacherous in both rain and snow,
and heavy snowfalls may make some roads impassable. The following considerations should be
taken into account when planning to travel in Georgia: Safety of public transportation is fair;
urban road conditions and maintenance is poor; rural road conditions and maintenance is poor;
Availability of roadside assistance is poor.
9. Question concerning the contents of this survey should be directed to MSgt King at (609) 754-
5824 or 5754; DSN: 640-XXXX.
SUMMARY
3. Pavement conditions for all new surfaces (RWY 31L/13R, TWYs 5, 6, 7, & APN 4)
are very good. Joint seal in these areas is very good. All other areas are overlaid by
asphalt and vary in condition from good to fair. Reflective cracking is prevalent on
the main apron. However, no areas indicated stress from overloading. TWY 7
remains under construction and is expected to be complete by summer of 2001.
ANALYSIS
4. Detailed engineering drawings were unavailable for most of the airfield. Drawings of
the new areas mentioned above were unclear, but suggested that massive excavation
and backfill was part of the project to increase the strength rating of the subgrade.
Over this backfill, the profile of the new areas was 30 cm of PCC over 24 cm of
stabilized base over 19 cm of crushed stone. As mentioned before, these numbers,
combined with a subgrade strength rating of “A,” can be used to calculated a much
higher PCN based upon the USAF standard of a fully loaded C-17, weighing 580,000
lbs, and passing over 50,000 times.
5. This discrepancy can be explained by the method of PCN calculations. The Russian
government uses a mixture of Russian aircraft and an unknown number of passes to
generate PCNs for airfields throughout the area. This mixture of traffic represents a
greater stress on the pavement than the USAF standard and thus generates a PCN that
restricts the number of passes allowed for heavier traffic. This should be considered
when assessing the airfield for use by AMC traffic.