1

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma.
Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free
of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed
of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de
nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad,
que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution.
En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo
de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de
Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio
Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus
Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened,
claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed
of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied
the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer,
but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a
liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed.,
p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o
intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are
by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to
practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
 2

approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had
not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the
"titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest
taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although
the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator
may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to
the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he
was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon
proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved
by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission
to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following
his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court
may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that
phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be
regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that
implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66
(formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the
office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo
warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui
came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48).
The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter
dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He
followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he
took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation
was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion
previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine
National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed
a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954
he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil
case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that
"as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the
case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R.
No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it
reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it"
(G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui
resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath
of office.
 3

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the
trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator
and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was
dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all these
circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of
the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's
illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in
September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right
arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38
Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of
the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in
the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de
mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older
than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer
the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since
the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to
whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint
in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, Respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination
of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which
made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me
and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated
said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be
void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
 4

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 --
to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."1 In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations
with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy
of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the
law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit
of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated
into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without **
(his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 5

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest."17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice
or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise
stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and
that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor"
does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 838 January 21, 1974

IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

RESOLUTION

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

This is an administrative case involving a member of the Bar, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman.

In Civil Case No. 71648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled: "Lagrimas Lapatha, et al. versus Vicente Floro, et al.", the Hon. Jesus
de Veyra rendered on July 23, 1968, a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:1

Judgment is, therefore, rendered setting aside the judgment of the City Court in Civil Case No. 165187 entitled Floro v. Lapatha as
well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and remanding this case to the City Court of Manila in order to give Petitioner
her day in Court. Defendant Floro shall pay the costs. Let copy of this decision be furnished the Supreme Court to take whatever
disciplinary action it may deem fit against Atty. Felizardo de Guzman for his manner of behavior in the proceedings before the City
Court of Manila. (Emphasis Ours)

Upon receipt of copy of the above-mentioned decision, this Court in its Resolution of August 16, 1968, required Atty. Felizardo de Guzman to
answer,2 and the latter complied on August 30, 1968.3 On September 10, 1968 the matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigate report and
recommendation.4 On November 20, 1973, We received the Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General. 5

At the hearing conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General during which none of the parties, with the exception of respondent, Atty. Felizardo de
Guzman, appeared despite due notice, the following incidents were brought out:

Sometime on October 12, 1967, a complaint for ejectment was filed with the City Court of Manila by Vicente Floro against Lagrimas Lapatha which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 165187 of said court.6 On November 2, 1967, a decision was rendered by the City Court, Branch VIII, presided by Judge
Roman Cansino, Jr., to this effect:7

BY CONFESSION, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant and all persons claiming under her to vacate premises
described in the complaint and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff; to pay unto the plaintiff the unpaid rentals in the sum
of P795.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 12, 1967 until fully paid; the sum of P150.00 as attorney's fees plus
the costs of the suit.

On December 29, 1967, Lagrimas Lapatha filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders & other
Proceedings in the Inferior Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", naming therein Vicente Floro and the Sheriff of Manila as party-respondents. 8 In
the Petition it was alleged by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha that at the initial hearing of Civil Case No. 165187 in the City Court of Manila held at 8:30
o'clock in the morning of November 2, 1967, she appeared without counsel; she approach Atty. Felizardo de Guzman, the lawyer of Vicente Floro, and
 6

begged for a five-day postponement of the trial to which Atty. de Guzman verbally agreed; Atty. de Guzman then asked her to affix her signature on the
court's "expediente" which she did, and after signing she left the courtroom; on November 16, 1967, she gave to Atty. Felizardo de Guzman a check for
P350.00 in partial payment of her arrears in the rentals; on November 20, 1967, she was surprised to receive copy of a decision from the City Court
dated November 2, 1967, wherein it appeared that she confessed judgment when in truth and in fact she asked for postponement of that initial hearing
with the conformity of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; upon verification of the "expediente" of the case, she discovered that below the signature which she
affixed at the request of Atty. de Guzman, the latter had written "CONFESS JUDGMENT", without her knowledge and consent; hence her petition for
relief from the judgment rendered by the City Court.

Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the decision of the City Court was based on an admission
made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the
case and underneath were affixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha
were made after the rendition of the decision to forestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of
petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed not to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she vacate the premises by
January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead filed the Petition for Relief. 9

10
On July 23, 1968, His Honor, Judge Jesus de Veyra, rendered his decision in the above-mentioned Petition for Relief favorable to petitioner Lapatha,
the dispositive portion of which We quoted in page two of this Resolution.

Judge de Veyra stated in his decision that due to the "machinations unworthy of an attorney" committed by respondent herein, Lagrimas Lapatha was
deprived of her day in court, said lawyer having agreed to a postponement of the hearing and even accepted partial payment so the case would not
proceed, but behind her back wrote the words "confessed judgment" over her signature and prevailed upon the City Court to render judgment. 11 Judge
de Veyra based his findings on the alleged testimonies of Lagrimas Lapatha and one Atty. Vargas given during the trial of the Petition for Relief.

We are constrained, however, to agree with the Solicitor General that the above-mentioned findings of Judge de Veyra were not only left unsubstantiated
at the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General's Office for failure of said witnesses to appear notwithstanding due notice that they were
satisfactorily controverted by the evidence submitted by respondent at said hearing.

Thus:

1. The records of Civil Case No. 71648 (Petition for Relief) show that the clerk of the City Court of Manila testified that when the ejectment case was
called for hearing on November 2, 1967, both Lagrimas Lapatha and Atty. de Guzman made their appearances, and when the trial Judge asked Lapatha
if she admitted the indebtedness alleged in the complaint, she answered in the affirmative and forthwith the words "confessed judgment" were written on
the "expediente" of the case after which Atty. de Guzman and Lapatha affixed their signatures. 12 As aptly observed in the Report of the Solicitor General,
the aforementioned testimony of the clerk of court deserves credit because the clerk was present at the hearing of November 2 and his testimony is
substantiated by the decision of the City Judge 13 who, We state, is presumed, sans evidence to the contrary, to have regularly performed his official
duty 14 and passed upon the matters before him in the manner stated in his decision. 15 On the other hand, Atty. Vargas on whom Judge de Veyra relied,
was not in Court on the date of the hearing so that his testimony was simply based on the supposed statement to him of his secretary that the latter
asked Atty. de Guzman for a postponement of the trial. 16.

2. The check for P350.00 was given by either Atty. Vargas or Lagrimas Lapatha to Atty. de Guzman not for the purpose of securing a postponement, for
said check was paid on November 16 several days after the hearing, but in partial payment of the arrears in the rentals to which Lapatha "confessed
judgment" and in order to forestall the immediate execution of the City Court's decision. 17 As a matter of fact, during the hearing of Lapatha's motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the City Court, Lapatha agreed to vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, and Atty. de Guzman in turn waived the
collection of the rentals for the months of November, 1967, up to January 15, 1968. 18

3. The only objective of Lagrimas Lapatha in filing her Petition for Relief before Judge de Veyra was to gain more time to stay in the leased premises
notwithstanding her commitment to vacate as of January 15, 1968, and in fact, she accomplished her purpose as shown by the "Compromise
Agreement" entered into between her and the lessor, Vicente Floro, before Judge de Veyra in Civil Case No. 71 which reads:

Plaintiff agrees to vacate the premises at 821 Second Floor, Isabel Street, Manila, on or before October 31, 1968 and in the Defendant V. Floro agrees
to condone all rentals past up to October 31, 1968 plus attorney's fees and costs.

Manila, Philippines, October 22, 1968

(Sgd.) LAGRIMAS LAPATHA

(Sgd.) VICENTE FLORO

(See Exh. "B" page 53 rollo)

We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed any deceit or
misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila.

In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made
the basis suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from
doubt a case which compels exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof
must be clearly demonstrated."

An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the
court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Thus, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against a respondent attorney. (Moran, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., vol. 6, p. 243, citing In
re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191)

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the charge.
 7

G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted
the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party defendant in
Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor
General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and
Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.

After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.

The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by respondent Enrile.

On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:

The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon
not appearing to be indubitable.

On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo,
Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires
leave of Court to determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor
may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)

Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this
alleged "harassment suit" against him.

The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:

In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties
to his counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the
counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim.

This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common, in their personal capacities or
otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)

In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive
portion of the resolution states:

WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando
Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss
counterclaim/answers, resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)

Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in
Civil Case No. 0033.

It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges
that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the
complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint
against Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.

He is sued in his personal and official capacities.

On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and
declared that "not one of the documents left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over
to the PCGG by the US State Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused to
yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to prosecute Defendant.
 8

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the illegal activities of former President
and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon
Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.

Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered,
authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant.

Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this harassment suit against Defendant.

In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and
in evident bad faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated,
violated, impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)

On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as
counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:

. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action.
The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award
that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons
who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service,
p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in
his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship does not make the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp.
924-925)

Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and
prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.

Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:

A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed
municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408
[1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the
dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
reinstate.

In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed
the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.

In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their
individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because
of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])

Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.

In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a
clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:

With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main
opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the
Commission's members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for
himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the
unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for
damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from
suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582)

Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:

It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended merely to restate the general
principle of the law of public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of
official duty, provided that such member had acted in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that
the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in damages to
a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this
Court. (at pp. 586- 587)

Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic. (id., at page 586)

Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es)
with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional
rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does
 9

not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations
may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the
right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from
the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator
Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.

In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed
against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private
respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party
plaintiff itself.

To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant
in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.

A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C.
T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49
SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same
case, he is kept busy defending himself.

The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1âwphi1 As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial
and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite
executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and
obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.

As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he
should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other
causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the
counterclaim filed against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31429 January 31, 1972

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSCOE DABAN y GANZON, defendant-appellant, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p

There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to
live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of
one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases.
Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled. If for any reason, he fails to do so — a matter which may be susceptible
of explanation but not of justification — he should know that he is to be held accountable. He is entitled to be heard in his defense, it goes without
saying. Where he is unable to do so, because what is alleged by him to ward off disciplinary action is bereft of support in law, he certainly cannot expect
to be let off lightly. That is the fate in store for respondent Sixto P. Demaisip, counsel de oficio of appellant Roscoe Daban.

The facts are undisputed. Respondent, Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip, started as counsel de parte of appellant. On October 24, 1970, he filed a motion for
extension of time of 30 days within which to file appellant's brief. It was granted. So were subsequent motions for extension respectively filed on
November 11, 1970 for 25 days, December 12, 1970 for 20 days, January 4, 1971 for 18 days, January 14, 1971 for 15 days, January 28, 1971 for 15
days, February 12, 1971 for 12 days, February 27, 1971 for 10 days, March 6, 1971 for 15 days, April 12, 1971 for 15 days, April 20, 1971 for 13 days,
May 3, 1971 for 10 days, and May 14, 1971 for 15 days. Then, on May 25, 1971, after having obtained 13 extensions in all, he filed a motion asking that
in view of the father of appellant being unable to raise money for printing expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel de parte and be appointed as
counsel de oficio instead to enable him to file a typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he had by then finished. This Court, in a resolution of
June 2, 1971, granted his prayer to be appointed counsel de oficio, but required him to file a mimeographed rather than a typewritten brief. In the light of
his own representation, there was reason to expect that such a brief would be duly forthcoming. It did not turn out to be the case at all, for respondent
Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio, kept on filing motions for postponement, four in number, likewise granted by this Tribunal in a spirit of
generosity. All in all, he had seventeen extensions. Still there was no appellant's brief.

It was only then that on October 11, 1971 this Court issued a resolution, reading as follows: "For failure to submit accused-appellant Roscoe Daban y
Ganzon's brief within the extended period which expired on August 24, 1971, Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby required to explain, within ten (10) days
from notice hereof, why disciplinary action should not be taken against him." What passed for an explanation for appellant's persistent failure to file
appellant's brief was submitted on November 25, 1971, worded thus: "[Comes now] the accused-appellant, by and thru the undersigned counsel de
oficio, unto this Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully manifests and explains that, in the opinion of the undersigned lawyer, grounded on settled
jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner automatically makes the appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered abandoned." It is his
prayer, therefore, that the above be considered a satisfactory explanation.

Respondent Demaisip ought to have known better. His explanation disregards the facts and betrays ignorance of the law. It is true there was a notice on
June 23, 1971 from the then Acting Director Vicente R. Raval of the Bureau of Prisons that on June 15 of that year appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon
 10

did escape. As far back as May 13, 1971, however, respondent Demaisip, according to his motion of that date filed on May 25, 1971, wherein he prayed
that he be appointed counsel de oficio and permitted to submit a mimeographed brief, had assured this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he
were not careless of the truth, then there was no excuse why prior to June 15, 1971 he was unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It is not to be
ignored either that as of that date he had already secured thirteen extensions, ordinarily many more than any counsel is entitled to but nonetheless
granted him, because the sentence imposed was one of death.

Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: "The records of all cases in which the death
penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within
twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41.
The transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the stenographer." The penalty
imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of death, the case was properly elevated to this Court.
Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision. As explained in former Chief Justice Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court:1 "In this connection, it must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty entered in the
trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en
consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence;
and that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and this automatic review by
the Supreme Court is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade."2 The mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could
not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent Demaisip, by such gross neglect of duty, notwithstanding the many extensions granted him, was
recreant to the trust reposed in him as counsel de oficio. The language of former, Justice Sanchez in a recent decision3 fits the situation: "It is true that
he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his
care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept
the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. ... For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to
have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the
indigent he defends." 4

Such a doctrine is of venerable vintage. As far back as 1905, this Court did have occasion to admonish counsel de oficio for failure to take the
appropriate steps in defense of an indigent client. Thus: "An examination of the record in the case of the United States vs. Julian Tulagan, et al. shows
that the appellants were sentenced in the trial court to long terms of imprisonment for the crime of robo en cuadrilla, from which sentence they appealed,
and it appearing that they were too poor to employ a lawyer, this court, in accordance with the law provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as
counsel de oficio, yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever in behalf of the defendants in said case, though more than a year
has elapsed since the date of said assignment. An examination of the record in the case of the United States vs. Julio Liuag shows that the defendant
was sentenced to seventeen years and four months' imprisonment for the crime of homicide, from which sentence he appealed, and it appearing that he
was too poor to employ a lawyer, this court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action
whatever on behalf of the defendant in that case, though more than six months have elapsed since the date of his assignment." 5

The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill his responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as counsel de
parte or a counsel de oficio, he was indeed truly remiss in the discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he cannot evade. It is by such
notorious conduct of neglect and indifference on the part of counsel that a court's docket becomes unnecessarily clogged. His transgression is
indisputable; what remains is the imposition of an appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court, respondent Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby suspended from the practice of the law in all courts of the
Philippines, except for the sole purpose of filing the brief for appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this Court within a period of twenty days from
receipt of this resolution. Let a copy of this resolution be spread upon his record. The Court of Appeals is furnished a copy of this resolution for its
information. The Department of Justice is likewise furnished a copy thereof for transmission to the courts of first instance and the inferior courts for their
information and guidance. This resolution is immediately executory.

A.C. No. 6246 November 15, 2011

(Formerly CBD No. 00-730)

MARITES E. FREEMAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes,
for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of
her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was
remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.

In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit1 dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British
national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but
their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the visas
and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go to London to facilitate the
processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the amount of
₱50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of ₱47,500.00 for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a
Cash/Check Voucher,2 issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in the amount of "₱50,000.00" and the date "12-5-
98" were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent the amount of ₱20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the
visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt3 bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she
went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional amount of ₱10,000.00 for travel expenses, per
Temporary Receipt4 bearing said date, issued by respondent’s law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa applications,
respondent told her, "Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa Embassy." (It is difficult to railroad the process of
securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that to lift the travel ban on
her, she should shell out ₱18,000.00 as "panlagay" or "grease money" to bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her
that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue resident visas instead of tourist
visas. Respondent told her that to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again give ₱20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth ₱5,000.00, as
"grease money" to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and
that another amount of ₱18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for ₱30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary
 11

Receipt,5 dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the former's flight to London, and ₱39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary Receipt 6 dated May
13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were issued by respondent’s law firm.

Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by
one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent
explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the
proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a letter 7 dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of
H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was covered by three insurance policies,
to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No.
PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512).8 Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations with the
insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds soon.

According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 9 dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA],
which would authorize the respondent to follow-up the insurance claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not notarized,
but another SPA,10 dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came across
a similar copy of the SPA,11 dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally bearing the signatures of two
witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with
the insurance companies in London.

Complainant discovered that in an undated letter,12 addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made
representations that her husband left no will and that she had no verified information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the existence of
any property in London that would be subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for probate
in the amount of £5231.35 and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added therein that "As to the matter of the installments due, as guaranteed
by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with
business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account name: Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her
temporary account until further notice."

Subsequently, in a letter13 dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring
that she is the "Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999]," replied that she had
appended the documents required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter,14 dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance
company; that pursuant to an SPA15 executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should be forwarded to her law firm; that she
sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount due and the requirements to be complied
with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left no will), she "enclosed an alternative document [referring to the
Extrajudicial Settlement16 dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole
child (Frank Lawrence Freeman)." In the same letter, respondent reiterated that complainant "requests that any amount of monies due or benefits
accruing, be directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under
Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice."

Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her passport and the total amount of ₱200,000.00
which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the
British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On
the supposed rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one
Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made her sign an
application for visa and demanded the amount of ₱3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law
firm, who advised her to ask respondent to return the total amount of ₱200,000.00.

In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer17 dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998, complainant, accompanied by former Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the
inheritance of her deceased husband, a British national.18 She told complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their
son, and other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before she accepted the case, she explained to
complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of ₱50,000.00, ₱20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount of
₱50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA, 19 dated April
6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance
companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received communications from said insurance companies, she stated that complainant
offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for
London in May 1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims.

As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked her why she had not left for London, and the latter replied
that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She explained to complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the
visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in
December 1999, to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous visa applications had been denied four
times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the travel consultant, who charged
her a "professional fee" of ₱50,000.00. She added that she had no participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the
said travel consultant.

With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the existence of the same, and declared that the SPA, 20 dated April
6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for communications with the insurance companies in London. She stated
that in her absence, complainant, through wily representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary, and never
returned the same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then had no immediate need of it.
She also said that her secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so as to attend to the
financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering ailment and consequent death.21 Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the
case folder and, thus, the law firm was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through complainant's own
criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively pursuing her claims. Between January to February 2000, she sent
complainant a billing statement which indicated the expenses incurred22 by the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of settling the amount, the
latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations.

On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments on Respondent's Answer,
alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter23 dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to
arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal
fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be
recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from abroad, respondent
never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's
personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not solely
for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the ₱50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the
amount of ₱47,500.00) and that she merely made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of ₱50,000.00; that with the use of an
SPA [referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of £10,546.7 [should be £10,960.63],24 or
 12

approximately equivalent to ₱700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor was
she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due
her, but that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court proceedings.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint25 for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, against complainant and one
Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for allegedly barging into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-off the
cords of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office
equipment in an estimated amount of ₱200,000.00. In the Resolution,26 dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended
that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure of respondent
to appear during the preliminary investigation of the case.27

Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, against respondent, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution28 dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be
withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information.29 Consequently, in the Order30 dated November 27, 2002, the trial court granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case.

In the Report and Recommendation31 dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and
appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the
approximate amount of ₱200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able
to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to
complainant the amounts she received from the London insurance companies.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166,32 adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred.

The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty
against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.33

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 34

Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability. This does not include
the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a
separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts.

In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa applications and claiming the
insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant.
A perusal of the [first] SPA,35 dated November 6, 1998, which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent
her and her son, in order to protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of any amicable settlement,
relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in the Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA, 36 dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on
April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear and
represent the complainant, in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks arising from said
claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA, 37 also dated April 6,
1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses,
was a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made
integral parts of the records of the case, were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their genuineness and authenticity.
Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her behalf with regard to the insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent
herself, as lawyer, that she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. 38

Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she
should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when
due or upon demand.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.39 In the present case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes
Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount of ₱167,000.00 40 from the complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's
case. Respondent admitted having received money from the complainant, but claimed that the total amount of ₱120,000.00 41 she received was in
accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual
expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an
agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a formal contract of legal services.

Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave ₱50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her in claiming the insurance proceeds;
however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry Clearance,42 dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to
London was to attend the International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gall to take advantage of the
benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she needed to go to London to assist in
recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the
nefarious culture of giving "grease money" or lagay, in the total amount of ₱43,000.00,43 to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary
occurrence in the normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictum in
 13

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank account, as shown by the monthly transaction report
(covering January to December for the years 2000-2001),44 respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory explanation,
as to why she failed to render an accounting, on the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis-á-vis the
correspondence by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following amounts to the respondent's personal bank
account, to wit: Per letter45 dated November 23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln Financial
Group, addressed to complainant, stating, among others, that "An amount of £10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th September
2000)," and per letter,46 dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company
Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among others, that "I can confirm that a death claim was
made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an amount of £471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal representative, ZP
Reyes Law Office of Quezon City, Philippines." Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of £10,489.57 and £471.06 were remitted to respondent
through other means of international transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no direct remittance from the insurance
companies in London could be traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per monthly transaction report, covering January to December for the
years 2000-2001.

A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case.47 Section 5, in relation to Sections 148 and 2,49 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal of a criminal
case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is
of no consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and
defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency
of evidence.

In Velez v. De Vera,50 the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith,
loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional
Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to
them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.51 Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.52

In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients'
moneys and properties. In Manzano v. Soriano,53 therein respondent, found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his
client) and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount of ₱50,000.00 as stipulated in their
agreement and, to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary public.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,54 therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's
insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed the same, and appropriated the proceeds.1âwphi1

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a
calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it
is subject to State regulation.55 Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to
the extent of milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to
complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the practice of law.
This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this
Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the respondent.

Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial
Group, in the amount of £10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, £471.06, or in the total amount of £10,960.63, which is
approximately equivalent to ₱700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:
 14

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent.
It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1
is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice
of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
 15

legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of
law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on
the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that
which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen
whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in
particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
 16

model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law
has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work
of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors
in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
 17

cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case
of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from
those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to
be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets
of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a
full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his
oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the
instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
 18

Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first
becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that
the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

 19

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes
"A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."chanrobles virtual law library

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.chanrobles virtual law
library

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 20

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services
for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited
for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive
of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where
the crime is committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity
of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 21

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of
the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting
itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article
of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged
in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows
that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:chanrobles virtual law library

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment
of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 22

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:chanrobles virtual law library

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it
also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:chanrobles virtual law library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law,
(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter
of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it
is not so, are highly reprehensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same
vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law - accurate or
inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 23

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the
like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise,
if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable
class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily
reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice
of law provided that:chanrobles virtual law library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:chanrobles virtual
law library

Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages,
like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject
and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem
of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . .
. . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes
the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
 24

attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation - in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all
the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to
state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11chanrobles virtual law library

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12chanrobles virtual law library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13chanrobles virtual law library

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty,
and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual law library

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18chanrobles virtual law library

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:chanrobles virtual law library

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
 25

instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with
the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."chanrobles virtual law library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20chanrobles virtual law library

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory
and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-
legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once
the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns.
We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and
you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21chanrobles virtual law library

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual law library

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23chanrobles virtual law library
 26

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24chanrobles virtual law library

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress
that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and
the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control. 27chanrobles virtual law library

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the
law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American
Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29chanrobles virtual law library

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA,
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33He is not supposed to use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34Nor
shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35Prior
to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36chanrobles virtual law library

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40chanrobles virtual law library

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or
solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41chanrobles virtual law library

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42chanrobles virtual law library

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43chanrobles virtual law library
 27

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44chanrobles virtual law library

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent,
is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority
in that state." 46This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when
the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of
the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of
law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133,
requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as
counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for
comment.3

In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He
reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to
get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public
since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the presiding
judge.1âwphi1.nêt
 28

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the
Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the
Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished
town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked
up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
"seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the
conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth
certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their
family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with
the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged
for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as
branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding
office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of
said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling.
That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared
that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he
agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to
him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance
as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the
Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the
knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition
of such act would be dealt with more severely.6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to
an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as
a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
 29

payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood
or in consideration of his said services."

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice,
to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. 8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No.
84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor
from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at
the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and
August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However,
he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head
of the Department contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such
act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of
the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would
be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of
the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this
time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City
Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was
not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by
a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as
already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the
civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
 30

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule
as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of
defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..