Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to
him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you
at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house
in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he
confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and
her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which
card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may
find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for
us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today,
as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to
the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember
though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he
was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw
Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine
All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance
was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and
that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with
his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of
marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage
contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as
an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed
his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent
in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate
of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje
who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in
which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's
Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and
emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of
Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The
contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship
with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal
and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between
him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which
resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically
denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being
defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if
the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship,
he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene
Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father.
And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A
comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that
they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent
never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he
identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father
is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the
other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as
'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow
of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is
enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the
IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the
husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint
for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which
was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a
Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's
complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to
complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship
involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both
had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where
Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit
affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of
the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice
but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted
of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000,
dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as support for their two
(2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public document is a
prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal
and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133
despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license
number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to
protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification
states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held
that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S.
Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in
favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is
a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that
the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible
to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping
of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage
license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his
head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage
contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner’s
testimony as follows—

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don’t remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good enough for
the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which
Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously,
the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the
civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from
the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every intendment
of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It
is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is
not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year
before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of
their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore,
a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on
her right to freedom of religion.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT

Article 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)

Article 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personal before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
(72a)

Article 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that
there is no means of transportation to able such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the
officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of a legal
impediment to the marriage. (72a)
(articulo mortis or at the point of death)

Article 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage
contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (73a)

Article 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain
or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
(74a)

Article 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize
marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces
or civilians. (74a)

Military Commander

– he or she must be a commissioned officer;

– he or she can solemnized a marriage if it is in articulo mortis and in the absence of chaplain

– he or she must likewise be a commander of a unit/battalion.

Article 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly
without the necessity of a marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. (78a)

Muslims are governed by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines while members of the indigenous tribal
group are governed by R.A. No. 6766 Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomus Region (CAR), Article X, Section 2
“Marriages solemnized between or among members of the indigenous tribal group or cultural community in accordance
with the indigenous customary laws of the place shall be valid, and the dissolution thereof in accordance with these laws
shall be recognized.”

Article 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting partier and found no legal impediment to the
marriage. (76a)

Cohabitation for Five Years must meet two distinct conditions namely;

they must live as such for at least five years characterized by exclusivity and continuity that is unbroken;

they must be without any legal impediment to marry each other.

“legal impediment” – any possible ground or basis under the Family Code, including non-age and the status of being
already married among others, to make a marriage infirm.

These are the exemptions from getting a marriage license under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, comprising Articles 27 to 34. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages at the point of death, (2)
marriages in remote places or far areas, (3) solemnizing officer that will state in the affidavit that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis (4) submission of the affidavit within 30 days (5) Chief Pilot or Ship Captains can
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis (6) military commander can solemnized marriages in articulo mortis (7)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (8) ratification of marital cohabitation.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, v. ISAGANI D.

BOBIS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February
25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted
the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29,
1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent
should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a

civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense
must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7 cräläwvirtuali brä ry

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of

the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of
the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is
that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.9 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration

of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:10 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its

nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for
lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to
the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that
"every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds."12 Hence, parties should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same
must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No
matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40
of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be

successfully invoked as an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should
he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of
the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it
as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper
in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter
that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should
be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two
marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by
petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent
merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been
discussed above, this cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will
also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time
he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSEDand
SETASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELYproceed with Criminal
Case No. Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.November 29, 2005

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. [4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan
City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.\
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22,
1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. [5] It appeared
in their marriage contract that Eduardo was 'single.

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build
their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her. [6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped
giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract. [7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when
they exchanged their own vows. [8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer
(GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she
nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had
a 'love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was 'single in his marriage
contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to
go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless
he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months
and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he
had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as
maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus costs of suit. [9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling
of this Court in People v. Bitdu, [10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that
Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time
that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for
a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article
390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Pealosa [11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals. [12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good faith and reliance on the Court's ruling
in United States v. Enriquez [13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco, [14] the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should
not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State
and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of
the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the
appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaa's presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited
the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan [15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals [16] to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

SO ORDERED. [17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW. [18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under
the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been 'absent for 21 years since 1975; under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption
of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of
two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove
that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was
still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as
the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein
on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that
contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a 'GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit
relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner's conviction is in
accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco. [19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ' The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
 absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser
castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law. [20] The phrase 'or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings' was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of
the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a
number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy. [21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally
married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. [22] It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. [23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent intent ( intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo. [24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence
of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a
court of competent jurisdiction. [25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals [26] and Mercado v.
Tan, [27] under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3)
elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony
of the act. [28] He explained that:

' This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong
evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who
contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because
of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent
intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime. [29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary. [30] Although the words 'with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word 'voluntary. [31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury. [32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. [33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and
such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. [35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not
judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. [36] The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed
to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of
the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however,
failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase 'or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings' in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the 'State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law. [37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort
or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of
the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage,
the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well
take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse [38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is
the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, 'men
readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable,
not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals. [39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. [40] Thus,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief
of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, [41] namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide '

 Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration. [42] However, Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse . [43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code, [44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the
Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage,
he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse, [45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court
in Armas v. Calisterio: [46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of
death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition
is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments
of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela [47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. [48] In In Re Szatraw, [49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not
been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within
which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated
that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. [50] The Court also
took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion
with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, [51] the Court declared that the words 'proper proceedings' in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines, [52] the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized
to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that 'the provision of Article 349 or 'before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings' is erroneous and
should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been
legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the
subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true. [53] A second marriage is bigamous only
when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present. [54] Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits
that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy. [55] Former Justice Luis B.
Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage. [56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of
the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that
he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. [57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of
the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if
the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

' Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present
spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty
of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art.
 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already
established. [58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring
an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.\\

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause 'before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the
new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee,
otherwise, there is bigamy. [59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in
some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive
death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. [60] Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith. [61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of
the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code. [62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to
apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc, [63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the
petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove
the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is
not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No
existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados. [64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers
that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. [65] An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the
Civil Code. [66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been
any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 [67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.) [68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, 'every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. [70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that 'every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides
that 'any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy 'the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case. [71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was
single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance ' that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the
certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her,
the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man
she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was
not her lawful husband. [72]

The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab, [73] the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser,
supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the
wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24,
27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, 'Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant's
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and 'ashamed to go
out but 'couldnt sleep but 'couldnt eat, had terrific headaches' and 'lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis
appears for judicial interference with the jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the
first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div. [74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a
social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: [75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact
a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him,
 gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the
plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to
one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false
and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102
Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself but upon the defendant's misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for which damages
may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747;
Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent
recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her
illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's misrepresentation, and that she does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a
contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act
upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49
A. L. R. 958. [76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be
just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED .
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7)
months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying
Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February
17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the
bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and
One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was
null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s
defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could
not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it
is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola
v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to
be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by
a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio
S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of
the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law,
never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a
person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is
material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing
that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-
marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to
know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the
divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine
whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to
its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of
the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice:
first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest
in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we
also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25,
2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004.

Facts:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of one Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Bohol for four years. Their communication was broken after school year 1977-1978. In 1984, Lucio received a
letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters, the two became sweethearts. Lucia later
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a
constant communication. Lucia, later came back to the Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they
were married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for
divorce which was granted and took effect in February of 1992. On October that year Lucia married Maria
Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for nullity of marriage in
Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony actually took place. He was
later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial question. The civil case is a
prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the motion for reconsideration of
the prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of Appeals, the trial
court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

Held:

The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v. Bobis was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.

The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is moot and academic.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability
for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this
third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent
marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired
two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely
to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified
that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT
LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the
first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a
copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in
itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions
relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith
and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on
October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show
that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity,
apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’
letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to
Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7,
1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes
"any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes
the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of
the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses,
and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5
of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of
at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time,
while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage
is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a
deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on
bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:

Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes,
a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage
with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity,
he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.

The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding
were it not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being
void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties
to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the
affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the
Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of
nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had
the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal
statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a
defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment)4 the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can
outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy
although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is
contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong
reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:

"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous
marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It
may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs.
Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself
(the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage
which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to
conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the
settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon
law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church laws.9 The
"psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely
distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage,
such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a
marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to
have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed
to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void
marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It
is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage
is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for
the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a
valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of
the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy
demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It
would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if
it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.

Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in
that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior
to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of
marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years
following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems
to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be
inexistent.

Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological
incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared
otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent
marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be
a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid
until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court
has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has explained that for a
person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has
all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is
established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that
the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime
of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for
contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and
voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either
essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous
marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The
judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely
nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its
subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender
who had entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple when
quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On
May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a
period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity
on the part of Julia.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into
fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a
quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his
marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to
so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity,
why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the
reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added
that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there
are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not
refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it
as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent.
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he
stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid
consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of
consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as
long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after
the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
 Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because
it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
 The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot
be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a

grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-
considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
—

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the
family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to
every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.