RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE RTC

SEC.1

NEYPES DOCTRINE

Sumaway vs. Urban Bank, G.R. No. 142534 (2006)

Doctrinal Pronouncements:

a) An order denying a motion for reconsideration, motion for new trial (whether full or partial)
finally disposes issues involved in a case and as such, it is a final order. However, in Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Diaz, 493 SCRA 248 (2006), the High Court ruled that all
orders issued after judgment are interlocutory and non-appealable

b) The Neypes rule which gives to an appelant a fresh 15 days from receipt of the order denying a
motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial applies not only in appeal from the RTC to
the CA under Rule 41 but also an appeal from the FLC to the RTC under Rule 40, petitions for
review under Rules 42 and 43 and petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

United Overseas Bank of the Philippines vs. Ching, 486 SCRA 1655 (2006)

The period to appeal a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President is 15 days from receipt of the order.

Testico vs. Baer, 490 SCRA 279 (2006)

The decision of the HLURB Arbiter is appealable to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
decision of the Board of Commissioners is appealable to the Office of the President and the action of the
latter is appealable to the CA under Rule 43.

SEC. 9

Perfection of Appeal

Ang vs. Grageda, 490 SCRA 424 (2006)

Doctrinal Pronouncements:

a) Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional

b) Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the notice to file is
a ground to dismiss the appeal.

c) Caspe vs. CA, 490 SCRA 588 (2000)

Payment of the appellate docket fee is not jurisdictional but mandatory.

SEC 13

Period to Appeal, Non-Extendible

Suarez vs. Villarama, 493 SCRA 74 (2006)

The reglementary period of 15 days to appeal is non-extendible except in the Supreme Court
under proper circumstances.

Appeal…

Remedy Against Order Dismissing a Complaint for Injunction

- Garayblas vs. Atienza, 492 SCRA 2002 (2006)

a) When there are questions of fact to be raised from the dismissal of a complaint for injunction,
the remedy is ordinary appeal under Rule 41 to the CA

b) When only question of law is to be raised, the remedy is petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45

Remedy Against Order denying a Third Party Claim

Salidum vs. CA, 492 SCRA 261 (2006)

The remedy against an order denying a third-complaint is not appeal nor certiorari but to file a separate
action against one who has an obligation in favor of a party to an action.

RULE 44

SEC. 7

Natonton vs. Magaway, 486 SCRA 199 (2006)

Failure of appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period is a ground to dismiss the
appeal. Dismissal however is directory – not mandatory.

RULE 47

SEC. 1

Sian vs. PNB, G.R. No. 66882, Jan. 31, 2007

Estate of Sian represented by an administrator filed a petition in the RTC against the PNB for
cancellation of mortgage lien. After the filing of this petition, PNB transferred all its interest to Maybank.
PNB filed a motion for substitution and dismissal of the case which was affirmed by Maybank. For failure
of PNB to submit the dacion en pago, the Court denied the motion. The court then without the answer
of the PNB or Maybank having been filed decided the petition on the merits canceling the mortgage lien.
After the motion for reconsideration of PNB was denied, it filed with the CA an action to annul judgment
on the ground of denial of due process. CA annulled the decision. After Sian’s MR was denied, it filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the SC.

Ruling:

1) Denial of due process is a recognized ground to annul final decisions (Arcelona vs. CA, 280 SCRA
20 (1971)

2) Citing Arcelona, the 3 remedies to void final judgment are:

a) petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 on the ground of FAME

b) direct action to annul judgment under Rule 47

c) direct action for certiorari under Rule 65

Thus, when mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of
want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law, the court can annul such judgment. The
action is called declaration of nullity of a patently void final judgment based on grounds other than
extrinsic fraud.

3) One need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled as long as he can prove that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and the resulting judgment prejudices him.

Thus, in National Housing Authority vs. Evangelista, 458 SCRA 469 (2005), the HC upheld the
annulment of the trial court’s judgment at the instance of a person not impleaded in the original case
but the judgment is shown to be prejudicial to him

RULE 51

SEC. 7-8

Extent of Power to Review

Camiling vs. Barcena,482 SCRA 342 (2006)

Doctrinal Pronouncements:
 a) The Supreme Court has the extraordinary power to resolve any issue, even if not raised before
it, if it is necessary to serve the cause of justice.

b) For good reason, other appellate courts may review matters which are not assigned as errors in
the appeal.

Note: Questions which were not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
(208 SCRA 887) except the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which can be raised even for
the first time on appeal (Gala vs. Cui & Rodriguez, 25 Phil. 522)

Arbitration Appeal

Gonzales vs. Climax Mining Limited., G.R. No. 167994, Jan. 22, 2007

Under the sec. 29 R.A. No. 876, Arbitration Law, a review of decisions or final orders of the
voluntary arbitration panel is by petition for review under Rule 43, not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45.

Under RA No. 876, the only matter that will be resolved is whether an arbitration agreement
between the parties is present.

The arbitration clause in a contract is a separate contract in itself and the nullity of the contract
does not affect the arbitration clause.

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (RULE 57 – 61)

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Provisional Remedies – ancillary or auxiliary remedies, writs or processes available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case.

Provisional because they are temporary measures;

Ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main
action

RULE 57

SEC. 1
 Attachment may be:

Preliminary – resorted to at the commencement of the action or at any

time before entry of judgment, for the temporary seizure of property of the adverse party; and

Final or Levy upon execution – available after the judgment in the main action has become executory,
and for the satisfaction of the said judgment

Procedure:

Regular – referring to corporeal property in the possession of the party

Garnishment – referring to money, stocks, credits and other incorporeal property which are in the
possession or under the control of a third person

Purposes of Preliminary Attachment:

a) To seize the property of the debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of
satisfying the said judgment, or

b) To enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the action by the actual or constructive seizure
of the property in those instances where personal service of summons on the creditor cannot be
effect (Mabunag vs. Gallimore, 81 Phil 354; Quasha, et.al. vs. Juan, et. al., L-49140, Nov. 19,
1982)

“IMPLIED CONTRACT” before is now changed to “quasi-contracts”

“fraud in contracting obligations” (dolo causante) as well as “fraud in the performance of

obligations” (dolo incidente) is now a ground for preliminary attachment

Hence, issuance of bouncing checks now a ground for preliminary attachment (Javellana vs. D.O. Plaza
Enterprises, Inc. L-28297 March 30, 1970)

Damages must be for specific amounts other than moral or exemplary

A defendant on his counterclaim, a co-party on his cross-claim and a third party plaintiff on his
third party claim may move for the issuance of the writ.

SEC. 4

Preliminary Attachment

Wee vs. Tankiansee, G.R. No. 171124, Feb. 11, 2000

 a) The rules on preliminary attachment should be strictly construed against the applicant.

b) It is not enough to state in the affidavit of merit that the defendant has defrauded the plaintiff-
applicant in his money placement.

The affidavit of applicant which is the foundation of the writ (Jardine-Manila Finance
Inc. vs. CA, 71 SCRA 636 (1988) merely states that the defendant connived with the other members of
the Board of Directors to defraud applicant of his money placement. This is a mere conclusion of fact.
The affidavit should show how defendant connived with the other directors in defrauding plaintiff.
Stated elsewise, there must be a showing in the affidavit what facts and circumstances constituted the
fraud and how it was perpetuated. (Tina vs. Villarreal, 176 SCRA 532 (1980).

Note: The merits of the main case are not to be tried in a motion to discharge an attachment for
otherwise, the movant can force a trial in the merits in a motion for dissolution (FCY Construction
Group, Inc. vs. CA, 382 SCRA 282 (2000).

RULE 58:PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

SEC 1

Manila International Airport Authority vs. Powergen, Inc., G.R. No. 1164299, Feb. 12, 2008

As a general rule, court should not issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because this
would practically resolve the issues in the main case without trial. (Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. CA,
162 SCRA 165 (1988).

SEC. 3

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRO

Meralco vs. Navarro-Domingo, 492 SCRA 363 (2006)

Doctrinal Rules

a) Preliminary injunction or TRO cannot be issued against a rural electric cooperative exercising
right to disconnect electric service as provided for under the law.

b) If a counterbond is filed, the court should deny the preliminary injunction on TRO, or if one has
already been issued, to dissolve the same.

Selegma Management and Development Corp. vs. UCPB, 489 SCRA 25 (2006)
 This ruling reiterates an old doctrine that in resolving an application for preliminary injunction
or TRO, it should not be in a manner as to practically resolve the merits of the case.

Duty to comply with an injunction or TRO

Lee vs. CA, G.R. No. 147191 (2006)

Doctrinal Rules:

a) An injunction or TRO, despite its ultimate nullity, should be obeyed until nullified.

b) A transfer of property in violation of an injunction or TRO does not affect its validity if the transferee
acted in good faith. Injunction being a remedy in personam affects only the person enjoined and all
those deriving title or right from him

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, ENTITLEMENT

Boncade vs. NAPOCOR, 503 SCRA 13 (

Sept. 27, 2006)

Even if there is evidence that unless the writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the movant
would suffer great and irreparable injury, he is not entitled to that provisional remedy if he cannot show
by convincing evidence that he has a clear legal right which needs to be protected pendente lite. A clear
legal right is one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforced as a matter of law. If movant’s right
is seriously disputed which necessarily requires the presentation of evidence to resolve the existence or
non-existence of such right, preliminary injunction should not be granted.

SEC.4

Order Denying Application for a TRO

LPBS Commercial Corp vs. Amila, G.R. No. 147443, Feb. 11, 2008

The remedy against an order denying an application for TRO is appeal on the merit of an
unfavorable judgment. Being an interlocutory order, the remedy generally is not certiorari but appeal of
the judgment. It is only when there are circumstances showing the inadequacy of appeal may certiorari
be resorted to. (Law Firm of Abrenica, et. al. vs. City Mayor of Manila, 420 SCRA 562 (2004)

RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP

SEC. 1
 Receivership, like injunction, may be the principal action itself

Or just an ancillary remedy if a principal action is indicated under the circumstances of the case
since, generally, the courts and quasi-judicial agencies may appoint receivers in cases pending
before them

Receiver is a person appointed by the court in behalf of all the parties to an action for the
purpose of preserving the property involved in the suit and to protect the rights of all the parties
under the direction of the court.

Where the action is merely to obtain a money judgment on unpaid credits and not to enforce a
lien upon a specific property or funds in the possession of the defendant, the appointment of a
receiver is improper (Bonaplata vs. Ambler, et. al., 2 Phil. 392; Arez, et. al. vs. Wislizenus, et. al.,
26 Phil. 625).

Also, in actions involving possession of or title to real property, the appointment of a receiver
may be made only if there is a clear necessity to protect the applicant from grave or
irremediable damages (Medel, et. al.vs. De Aquino, et. al., 92 Phil. 895; Camiling vs. De Aquino,
103 Phil. 128).

Unlike the other provisional remedies which can be availed of only before final judgment,
receivership may be resorted to even after the judgment has become final and executory. Thus
under sec. 1 (d), it can be availed of to aid execution or to carry the judgment into effect (sec. 41
Rule 39)

SEC. 5

A receivership may be denied or lifted (a) if the appointment sought or granted is without
sufficient cause, as where there is no necessity therefor or it is not a proper case for
receivership, (b) if the adverse party files a sufficient bond to answer for damages (c) where the
bond posted by the applicant for the grant of receivership is insufficient or (d) if the bond of the
receiver is insufficient.

RULE 60: REPLEVIN

Replevin vs. Preliminary Attachment

Replevin is available only where the principal relief sought is Recovery of Possession of Personal
Property, damages and other reliefs being merely incidental thereto; attachment is available
even if the recovery of personal property is only an incidental relief sought in the action;
 Replevin can be sought only where the defendant is in the actual or constructive possession of
the personalty involved; attachment may be resorted to even if the property is in the custody of
a third person;

Replevin extends only to personal property capable of manual delivery; attachment extends to
all kinds of property whether real, personal or incorporeal;

Replevin is available to recover personal property even if the same is not being concealed,
removed or disposed of; attachment is only to recover possession of personal property unjustly
detained presupposing that property is being concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent is
being found or taken by the applicant;

Replevin cannot be availed of if the property is in custodia legis, as where it is under attachment
or was seized under a search warrant; attachment can be resorted to even if the property is in
custodia legis

SEC. 3

Bonds

Replevin – double the value of the property sought to be recovered

Attachment – may be fixed by the court not exceeding applicant’s claim or equal to the value of
the property to be attached

Injunction – may be fixed by the court

Receivership – discretionary upon the court

RULE 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

SEC. 1

This provisional remedy is available only in an action for support (Coquia, et. al. vs. Baltazar, 83
Phil. 265) or where one of the reliefs sought is support for the applicant

While an order for support pendente lite is interlocutory, the same, however, is subject to
execution. Being an interlocutory order and one for support, the same may be modified at any
stage of the proceedings. The remedy, if the order is with grave abuse of discretion, is certiorari
with preliminary injunction.

SEC. 6-7
WRIT OF POSSESSION

Factor vs. Martel, Jr., G.R. No. 161037, Feb. 4, 2008

A writ of possession may be issued only for the following instances:

a) Land registration proceedings under Sec. 17, Act 496;

b) Judicial Foreclosure provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third
party to the foreclosure suit had intervened;

c) Extrajudicial Foreclosure of real estate under Sec. 7 Art. 3135 as amended by Art. 14118
(Mendoza vs. Salinas, 514 SCRA 414, 420 (2008); and

d) Execution sale (sec. 1 Rule 39)

e) Expropriation Proceeding

Remedy of Registered Owners – Accion Reivindicatoria. A writ of possession cannot be issued

against a possessor who claims to be the owner thereof. He cannot be ejected by writ of possession.
(Serra Serra vs. CA, 195 SCRA 482 (1991)

A person who took possession of a land after final adjudication in a registration proceedings
cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 62-71)

RULE 63-DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

SEC. 1

Requisites for Declaratory Relief

The subject matter of the controversy must be a DEED, WILL, CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT, STATUTE, EXECUTIVE ORDER, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE

The terms or validity of such documents are doubtful and require judicial construction

There must be no breach of the document in question otherwise an ordinary civil action is the
remedy
 There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons
whose interests are adverse

The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding

Other matters re: Rule 63

Action for Declaratory Relief must be brought in the proper RTC;

Not among actions within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are
involved

The court shall only make a declaration; no award or execution follows

RULE 65

SEC.2 Prohibition

Borres vs. Abela, 527 SCRA (2007)

Prohibition is not a proper remedy to question the constitutionality of a rule or regulation of the
administrative agency issued in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. The reason is that, in
prohibition only administrative agencies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions may be
a respondent.

The proper remedy is an ordinary action to nullify said order or regulation which falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULE 68: FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

SEC. 2

Extrajudicial vs. Judicial

In EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, the mortgagor has the right to redeem the property within
one year from the registration of the deed of sale (Reyes vs. Noblejas L-23691, Nov. 25, 1967).
The date of the sale mentioned in sec. 6 of Art. 3135 as amended, should be construed to mean
 the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the registry of deeds (Santos vs. Register of
Deeds of Manila, L-26752, March 19, 1971; Reyes vs. Tolentino, et. al., L-29142, Nov. 29, 1971).

In JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, there is no such right of redemption, except in the case of mortgages
with banking institutions … but the mortgagor has the “equity of redemption” which he can
exercise at any time after service of the judgment of foreclosure and within the period provided
herein, and even thereafter, provided he does so before the foreclosure is confirmed by the
court (Anderson vs. Reyes, 54 Phil. 944).

Foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions, whether judicially or extrajudicially is subject

to legal redemption, but the party redeeming must pay the amount fixed by the court in the
order of execution, not the amount for which the property was purchased at the public auction
(Ponce de Leon vs. RFC, L-24571, Dec. 18, 1970) sec. 78 R.A. 337). The same rule applies to
foreclosures effected by the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the
Philippines, as provided for in their respective charters (DBP vs. Mirang, L-29130, August 8,
1975). In other execution sales, redemption amount is the auction price with interest (Dulay vs.
Carriaga, et. al., G.R. No. 52831, July 29, 1983).

RULE 69

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

Philippine National Oil Co. vs. National College of Business and Arts, 481 SCRA 411 (2006)

Cases in which a writ of possession may be issued:

a) Land Registration Proceedings

b) Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

c) Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (sec. 7 Art. 3135 as amended by Art. 4118)

d) Expropriation Proceedings (Sec. 2 Rule 67)

The pendency of an action to annul the certificate of sale is no bar to the issuance of a writ of
possession.

RULE 70
SEC.2

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Forcible Entry

Cajayan vs. Batugong, 482 SCRA 461 (2006)

When the encroachment into the property of plaintiff was effected in an oppressive and
malevolent manner coupled with refusal to vacate the premises despite demand, the entry may be
characterized as “by force” and so, forcible entry is a proper action.

Unlawful Detainer

Valdez vs. CA, 489 SCRA 369 (2006)

For there to be unlawful detainers in tolerated possession, defendants’ possession of plaintiff’s property
should not have been effected by force. If effected by force but no forcible entry is filed within 1 year,
the plaintiff cannot make a demand to vacate and within 1 year from said demand, file an unlawful
detainer case.

RULE 71: CONTEMPT

Direct Contempt

Quezon vs. CA, G.R. No. 127819 (2006)

A direct contempt and an administrative case can both be based on the same act of the petitioner.
There is no double jeopardy in administrative case.

Indirect Contempt

Roxas vs. Zuguarregui, 527 SCRA 445 (2007)

A letter of a lawyer distributed to the members of the SC falsely denouncing the conduct of a member
thereof in a most insulting and disparaging way constituted indirect contempt of court. It cannot be
excused for being covered by the right of the lawyer to free speech as this is a clear abuse of such right.
That the lawyer did not distribute his letter to the media does not make his unethical act any less
contemptuous.

Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545- RTC (Jan. 31, 2008)
 There are only two ways of initiating indirect contempt: a) initiated by the court through an
order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or a formal
charge instituted by the court charging respondent of indirect contempt of court; and b) initiated by any
interested party by filing a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents and papers involved therein with full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. This petition is a special civil action and so docket and
other lawful fees shall be paid.

A mere motion cannot initiate an indirect contempt proceeding. (Sesbeño vs. Igoria, 480 SCRA
243, 251-252 (2006) citing LBP vs. Listana, Sr., 455 Phil. 750 (2003) which further cited Justice Regalado)

Note:

A lawyer’s remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contempt of court (Soriano vs. CA, 416 Phil. 226, 253 (2006).