A.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
TITLE FACTS
1. MMDA v Viron GMA issued EO 179, which provided
for the ​establishment of a Mass
Transport System for Greater
Manila​. Pursuant to this EO, the
Metro Manila Council of the
MMDA cited the need to remove the
bus terminals​ located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Respondents, provincial bus operators
who had bus terminals that were
threatened to be removed, alleges that
EO should be declared
unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights
of owners and operators of public land
transportation units ​over their
respective terminals.
ISSUE HELD
W/O EO 179 IS A No.​ MMDA has n ​ o legislative power​;
VALID EXERCISE there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924
OF POLICE POWER that empowers the MMDA or its Council
to ​‘enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare’​ of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. ​MMDA is merely a
developmental authority, whose
powers are administrative in nature.
MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of the respondents’
terminals. Police power rests primarily
with the legislature, such power may
be delegated, a​s it is in fact increasingly
being delegated. ​By virtue of a valid
delegation,​ the power may be exercised
by the​ President and administrative
boards as well as ​by the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local
government under an express delegation
by the LGC of 1991 Measures calculated
to promote the safety and convenience of
the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a
proper subject for the exercise of police
power.
1
 B. POLICE POWER
TITLE FACTS
2. RA 7662 created the ​Legal Education Board (LEB)
PIMENTEL for the improvement of the system of legal
V LEB education​ in the Philippines. It is an e​xecutive
agency separate from the Department of Education,
Culture​ and Sports but attached solely for budgetary
and administrative purposes, consisting of presidential
appointees.
Section 2: The concept of continuing legal education
encompasses education not only of law students but
also of members of the legal profession. ​[This] implies
that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law
course and are already licensed to practice law,​ in
violation of the Supreme Court's power over the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Section 5: ​Supreme Court​ shall have the power to
promulgate rules on ​"legal assistance to the
“underprivileged", ​implementation might give rise to
infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
Section 7: giving the LEB the ​power to​ ​prescribe
minimum standards​ for law admission and giving the
LEB the p​ower to adopt a system of continuing legal
education and for this purpos​e, the LEB may provide
for the ​mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers
in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may
deem necessary encroach upon the Supreme Court's
powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of
ISSUE HELD
1. Whether or not the No.​ The Court has no primary and direct
Court has jurisdiction over legal education for the
jurisdiction over following reasons:
legal education
1. It had been ​historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. ​In
fact, it was recommended that legislation be
enacted to prohibit the opening of any school
without the permission of the Secretary of
Public Instruction. ​DECS shall be primarily
responsible for the formulation, planning,
implementation, and coordination ​of the
policies, plans, programs and projects in the
areas of​ formal and non-formal education.
2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 defined l​egal
education as an educational program
including a clinical program appropriate and
essential in the understanding and application
of law and the administration of justice. It is
professional education after completion of a
required pre-legal education​ at the college
level. For ​state colleges and universities, ​the
operation of their law schools was to depend
on their respective charters,​ and for ​private
colleges and universities​, by t​he rules and
regulations issued by the DECS. The
administration of a law school shall be
governed primarily by the law school's own
policies and the provisions thereof apply
only suppletorily.
2
the Constitution. Aside from its power over the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,​ the Supreme Court
is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law.
The PhilSAT is an aptitude test measuring the
examinee’s communication and language proficiency,
critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.
55% = fail.
3.​ ​Legal education is a mere composite of the
entire Philippine education system.​ Being a
specialized area of study, however, is ​not
reason in itself to demarcate legal education
and withdraw​ it from the regulatory and
supervisory​ powers of the political branches.
4. The Court's exclusive rule-making power
covers the practice of law and not the study
of law. ​Accordingly, the Court's exclusive
power of admission to the Bar has been
interpreted as ​vesting upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law,​ to
determine who​ will be admitted to the practice
of law, to ​hold in contempt ​any person found
to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,
and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority
over members of the Bar.
5. ​The Court exercises judicial power only
and should not assume any duty not connected
to its judicial functions, the basic postulate
being the separation of powers. ​Regulation
and supervision of legal education is
primarily exercised by the Legislative and
implemented by the Executive, ​thus, it cannot
be claimed by the judiciary.
6. ​The power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law
exists under the Constitution, ​the Court has
not promulgated any rule that directly and
actually regulates legal education. In
allowing the law student and in governing
the conduct of the law student practitioner
3
 under the Revised Law Student Practice
Rule, what the Court regulates and
supervises is ​not legal education,​ but the
appearance and conduct of a law student
b​efore any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal
clinic — an activity rightfully falling under the
definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the
law student is permitted to act for the legal
clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but
proper that the Court exercise regulation and
supervision over the law student practitioner.
Necessarily, the Court has the power to
allow their appearance and plead their case,
and thereafter, to regulate their actions.

2. Whether or not the Partially valid.

reasonable
supervision and A. REASONABLE SUPERVISION AND
regulation of legal REGULATION
education is a valid 1. SEC. 3(A) 7(2) - “increasing awareness
exercise of police among members of the legal profession of
power the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society” - INVALID

It is beyond the scope ​of R.A. No.7662, which

involves the improvement of the quality of
legal education, and, instead ​delves into the
training of those who are already members
of the bar. ​Likewise, this objective is​ a direct
encroachmen​t on the power of the Court to
promulgate rules ​concerning the practice of
law and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.

4
2. INVALID
(a). SEC 2. - mandates the State to legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal
education
(b). SEC. 7. - grants LEB the power to
establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar
examinations.

The jurisdiction to​ determine whether an

applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations ​belongs to the Court​. ​This
requirement unduly ​interferes with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Cour​t to
promulgate rules concerning the ​practice of
law and admissions thereto.

3. SEC. 2, 7 - "continuing legal education"

INVALID

Unduly gives the ​LEB the power to supervise

the legal education of those who are already
members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance
of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the LEB ​deems necessary
the same encroaches upon the Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar
which includes the education of
"lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is
practice of law.

4. SEC. 7. - rule-making power and the

power of the LEB to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission - VALID

5
In the exercise of this power through the
PhiLSAT, insofar as it ​functions as an
aptitude exam that measures the academic
potential​ of the examinee to pursue the study
of law to the end that the quality of legal
education is improved is ​not per se
unconstitutional.

6. Set standards for accreditation - VALID

B. Institutional Academic Freedom and the

Right to Education

1. PHILSAT
(a) Academic Freedom (invalid - ultra
vires)
In ​mandating the passing score of 55%​ in the
PhilSAT, it actually​ usurps the right of the
school to determine for itself the criteria for
the admission of the students.​ The law
schools are left with absolutely no discretion to
choose its students at the first instance and in
accordance with its own policies, but are
dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of
a State-determined pool of applicants, under
pain of administrative sanctions and/or
payment of fines. Mandating law schools to
reject applicants who failed to reach the
prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those
with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers
complete control over admission policies from
the law schools to the LEB.
(b) Right to Education (valid)
Cannot be voided on the ground that it
violates the right to education because the

6
PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard
that is rationally related to the interest of the
State to improve the quality of legal education
and, accordingly, to protect the general
community.

2. LEB Issuances INVALID

Relating to pre-requisites to admission t​o
law school, Ll. B or JD Program and Graduate
Programs of Law similarly ​encroach upon the
law school's freedom to determine for itself
its admission policies​. It affects a law school's
admission policies leaving the latter totally
without the full discretion to admit applicants
who do not comply with these requirements

3. Minimum qualification on faculty

members. VALID but INVALID by
practice
The masters degree required of law faculty
members and dean, and the doctoral degree
required of a dean of a graduate school of law
are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements.
However, it is ​the manner by which the LEB
had exercised this power through its various
issuances that prove to be unreasonable.​ In
this regard, the LEB is actually ​assessing the
teaching performance of faculty members
and when such is determined by the LEB as
constituting gross incompetence,​ the LEB
may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law
school's right to determine for itself the
competence of its faculty members.

7
 4. Legal apprenticeship and legal internship
INVALID ultra vires
The manner by which LEB exercised the power
to require apprenticeship through several of its
issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB
controls and dictates upon law schools on
how such apprenticeship and internship
programs should be undertaken.

ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS: 1. REASONABLE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

The ​enactment of education laws, implementing rules and
regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of
the State's police power​. Such exercise, however, is NOT ABSOLUTE.
When the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is
understood that what it enjoys is a ​supportive power, that is, the power
of oversight over all educational institutions​. It includes the ​authority
to check, but not to interfere. ​In this regard, the​ political departments
are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards​ to be met
by all educational institutions. To​ be valid,​ the supervision and
regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power must be
reasonable and not repugnant ​to the Constitution, which means that
when the ​Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it
does not in any way amount to control.

2. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, means
that the academic staff should have de facto control over:
(a) ​the ​admission​ and examination ​of students;
(b​) the​ curricular ​for courses of study​;
(c) the appointment and tenure of​ office of academic staff​; and
(d) the allocation of income ​among the different categories of
expenditure.

8

3. BELTRAN Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services
V Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994.
SEC OF The Act seeks to p​rovide an adequate supply of safe
HEALTH blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
by regulating blood banks​ in the country.
All commercial blood banks should have been phased
out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted
by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and
operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May
20, 1998, prior to the expiration, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, ​Our Lady of
Fatima Blood Bank."
Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition entitled
"Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health.”
Both cases were consolidated.
Respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood
from commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore
3. RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section
1, Article XIV, are:
(1) to protect and promote quality education;​ and
(2)​ to take appropriate steps toward​s making such quality education
accessible.
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both
the ​elimination of discrimination especially against disadvantaged
groups and to the financial duty of the Stat​e for, after all, the right to
education is part and parcel of social justice. The objective is to make
quality education accessible by appropriate means.
1. WHETHER OR No. No undue delegation of legislative power
NOT SECTION 7 OF if the statute was complete in all its terms
R.A. 7719 and provisions when it left the hands of the
CONSTITUTES Legislature ​so that ​nothing was left to the
UNDUE judgment of the administrative body or any
DELEGATION OF other appointee or delegate of the
LEGISLATIVE Legislature. ​As a general rule, is incomplete
POWER; and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it. ​Provisions are clear, and by its
provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority ​to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution​, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
2. WHETHER OR No. Class legislation or discriminating
NOT SECTION 7 OF against some and favoring others is
R.A. 7719 AND ITS prohibited ​bu​t classification on a reasonable
IMPLEMENTING basis ​and not made arbitrarily or capriciously​ is
RULES AND permitted. ​The classification is valid:
9
the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close
down commercial blood banks to protect the public.
ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS
1. ELEMENTS OF VALID
CLASSIFICATION (ISSUE 2)
(a) must be based on s​ubstantial distinctions which
make real differences;
(b) must be ​germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be​ limited to existing conditions​ only;
and,
(d) must a​pply equally to each member of the class​.
REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE 1. It was based on​ substantial distinctions​.
EQUAL The former operates for​ purely humanitarian
PROTECTION reasons​ and as a ​medical service​ while the
CLAUSE; latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the
former wholly​ encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats​ blood as a sale of
commodity.
2. The classification, and the consequent phase
out of commercial blood banks is ​germane to
the purpose of the law, ​that is, to provide the
nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and
treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or
medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase out of
commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood
donors who are considered unsafe compared to
voluntary blood donors as shown by the
USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system.
3. The Legislature ​intended for the general
application of the law.​ Its enactment was not
solely to address the peculiar circumstances of
the situation nor was it intended to apply only
to the existing conditions.
4. ​The law applies equally to all commercial
blood banks without exception.
3. WHETHER OR Refer to 5, public welfare outweighs right to
10
NOT SECTION 7 OF liberty and property.
R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is
RULES AND unconstitutional and void because it infringes
REGULATIONS on the​ freedom of choice of an individual in
VIOLATE THE connection to what he wants to do with his
NON-IMPAIRMENT blood.​ Additionally, under the Civil Code, the
CLAUSE; human body and its organs like the heart,
the kidney and the liver are outside the
commerce of man ​but this ​cannot be made to
apply to human blood​ because the latter can
be replenished by the body. ​To treat human
4. WHETHER OR blood equally as the human organs would
NOT SECTION 7 OF constitute invalid classification.
R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND
REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE
DEPRIVATION OF
PERSONAL
LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY;

5. WHETHER OR The promotion of public health is a

NOT R.A. 7719 IS A fundamental obligation of the State. The health
VALID EXERCISE of the people is a primordial governmental
OF POLICE concern. Basically, the National Blood Services
POWER; and, Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s
police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety. Police power of the
state is validly exercised if ​(a) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, requires the
interference of the State; and, (b) the means

11

4. MIRASOL Petitioners filed before the court a petition for
V declaratory judgment with application for temporary
DPWH restraining order and injunction. It seeks the
declaration of nullification of administrative issuances
for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was
enacted in 1957.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000,
DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215
declaring ​the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway as limited access facilities.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to ​prevent the enforcement of the
total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX,
Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway
under DO 215.
RTC​, after due hearing, ​granted the petitioner’s
application​ for preliminary injunction conditioned
employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the objective sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give
meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out
commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as
well as the employees, of commercial blood
banks but ​their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the
public.
1. WHETHER THE No. ​As the RTC correctly stated, the ​Order
RTC’S DECISION IS dated 28 June 2001 was not an adjudication
ALREADY BARRED on the merits of the case that would trigger res
BY RES JUDICATA; judicata. A P​RELIMINARY INJUNCTION
does not serve as a final determination of the
issues. It is a​ provisional remedy​, which
merely serves to preserve the status quo​ until
the court could hear the merits of the case. A
preliminary injunction is a mere adjunct, an
ancillary remedy which exists only as an
incident of the main proceeding.
2. WHETHER DO 74, Yes. DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the
DO 215 AND THE DPWH has no authority to declare certain
TRB REGULATIONS expressways as limited access facilities.
CONTRAVENE RA Under the EO No. 546, which was issued by
2000; then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is the
DOTC​ ​which is authorized to administer and
enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the
field of transportation and to regulate related
activities. ​Clearly, under EO 546, it is the
12
upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of
P100, 000 which petitioners complied.
DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing
motorcycles​ with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid
being violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to
limited access facilities. ​Since the DPWH has
no authority to regulate activities relative to
transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power
from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities.
3. WHETHER AO 1 (1) AO1 - CONSTITUTIONAL
AND DO 123 ARE The Court finds that AO 1 does not impose
UNCONSTITUTION unreasonable restrictions.​ It merely outlines
AL. several precautionary measures, to which
toll way users must adhere. ​These rules were
designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access
facilities. They cover several subjects, from
what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle,
to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of
certain types of vehicles is but one of these.
None of these rules violates reason. The
purpose of these rules and the logic behind
them are quite evident. A toll way is not an
ordinary road. The special purpose for which a
toll way is constructed necessitates the
imposition of guidelines in the manner of its
use and operation. Inevitably, such rules will
restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that
certain rights are restricted does not invalidate
the rules.
(2) DO123 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As previously discussed, the DPWH has no
authority to regulate limited access highways
since ​EO 546 has devolved this function to
the DOTC.
13
5. Social When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power
Justice clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the
Society former should prevail.
V allowing the
Lim Pandacan in the 1920s was an industrial area, now it is
a densely populated area.
During the incumbency of former Mayor Lito Atienza,
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted against the
continued stay of the oil depots​. Chevron Philippines,
Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron
Corporation (collectively “oil companies”) were then
o​rdered to stop the operation of their business​.
Meanwhile, Mayor Atienza also approved Ordinance
No. 8119. Article V, Sec. 23 thereof designated the
Pandacan oil depot area as a ​“Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone” (O-PUD).
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former
Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (​Mayor Lim​), who succeeded
Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187​. The new Ordinance ​repealed​,
amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance
No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all
other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith
thereby ​allowing​, once again, ​the operation ​of the oil
depots in the Pandacan area.
The SJS now seek the nullification of ​Ordinance No.
8187​, which contains provisions contrary to those
embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 8027 remains a valid exercise
enactment of of police power, but Ordinance No. 8187
Ordinance No. 8187 should be struck down.
As to the argument of the oil companies that
continued stay of the the​ threat of a terrorist attack is merely
oil companies in the conjectural​ (Twin Towers, NY basis was
depots is invalid and recent during the passing), the Court rules that
unconstitutional. the issue of whether or not the Pandacan
Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist
attacks has already been passed upon in G.R.
No. 156052. The very nature of the depots
where millions of liters o​f highly flammable
and highly volatile products​, regardless of
whether or not the composition may cause
explosions, has ​no place in a densely
populated area.​ Surely, any untoward incident
in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of
whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely
cause not only destruction to properties within
and among the neighboring communities but
certainly mass deaths and injuries.
It is the ​removal of the danger to life not the
mere subdual of risk of catastrophe​ that the
Court saw in and made the Court favor
Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected
by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the
affirmance of the Court’s Decision in G.R. No.
156052.
The objective adopted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to promote the constituents’
general welfare in terms of economic
benefits cannot override the very basic
14
 violation of the right to health and the right to a
healthful and balanced environment are also included.
6. CARLOS Petitioners are ​domestic corporations and
SUPERDRUG proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
V Public respondents, on the other hand, are specifically
DSWD tasked to m​onitor the drugstores' compliance​ with
the law; promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the law;
and ​prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments
R.A. No. 9257 (EXPANDED SENIOR CITIZENS
ACT), amending R.A. No. 7432,​ was signed into law
by President Gloria, which​ granted privileges for
Senior Citizens a 20% discount from all
establishments​ ​relative to the utilization of services
in hotels and similar​ lodging establishments​,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines​ in all establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens.
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it ​constitutes deprivation
of private property.​ Compelling drugstore owners
and establishments to grant the discount will result in a
loss of profit and capital because according to them
drugstores impose a ​mark-up of only 5% to 10%​ on
branded medicines, and the ​law failed to provide a
scheme whereby drugstores will be justly
compensated​ for the discount.
rights to life, security and safety of the
people.
W/O RA 9257 IS A YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of
VALID EXERCISE police power which, similar to the power of
OF POLICE POWER eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an
exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described
as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs. It is [t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to
15
insist that the grant of the senior citizen
discount is unduly oppressive to their
business, because petitioners have not taken
time to calculate correctly and come up with
a financial report, so that they have not been
able to show properly whether or not the tax
deduction scheme really works greatly to
their disadvantage.

In treating the discount as a tax deduction,

petitioners insist that they will incur losses.
However ,petitioner’s computation is clearly
flawed.

For purposes of reimbursement, the law

states that the cost of the discount shall be
deducted from gross income, the amount of
income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will
result in net income. Here, petitioners tried
to show a loss on a per transaction basis,
which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of
petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or
loss) for a given period could have
accurately reflected the effect of the discount
on their income. Absent any financial
statement, petitioners cannot substantiate
their claim that they will be operating at a
loss should they give the discount. In
addition, the computation was erroneously
based on the assumption that their
customers consisted wholly of senior citizens.
Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on
income, not on the amount of the discount.

16
 7. Republic Act 7277 also known as the Magna Carta for 1. W/O IT IS A
DRUGSTORES Disabled Persons was passed and was then amended by VALID POLICE
ASSOCIATION
V
Republic Act 9442​ which was known as the​ Magna POWER
NCDA Carta for Persons with Disability​. The said law
defined what covers Persons with Disability and the
20% discount to be provided on medicinal purpose
for the said people.
In relation to this the National Council on Disability
Affairs presented the following guidelines on how
PWDs would get the following identification to benefit
from the discount. ​Petitioners then filed a Petition
for Prohibition with Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
The Court of Appeals then rendered a decision 2. W/O IT
which upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 7277 a​s VIOLATED THE
amended by R.A. 9442, however, ​suspended the DUE PROCESS
effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1​ because of pending CLAUSE
proof with filing of the said administrative order with
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar
(ONAR) and its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. The respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration regarding the suspension of NCDA
A.O. No. 1 where the suspension was lifted by
attaching a proof of publication in the Philippine Star
and the Daily Tribune with certification from the
ONAR. ​After the lifting of the suspension, the
petitioners then filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was then turned down by the
Court of Appeals​.
YES. VALID R.A. No. 7277 was enacted
primarily to provide full support to the
improvement of the total
well-being of PWDs and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase
of medicine is ​supported by a valid objective
or purpose as aforementioned.​ It has a valid
subject considering that the concept of public
use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held
synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare, and public convenience
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by
R.A. No. 9442, must be read with its IRR
which stated that upon its effectivity,
N​CWDP (which is the government agency
tasked to ensure the implementation of RA
7277), would adopt the IDC issued by the local
government units for purposes of uniformity in
the implementation. Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1
provides the reasonable guidelines in the
issuance of IDCs to PWDs as proof of their
entitlement to the privileges and incentives
under the law and fills the details in the
implementation of the law.
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC
is issued by the city or municipal mayor or the
17
barangay captain, or the Chairman of the
NCDA, the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private
or government physician that will confirm his
medical or disability condition. If an applicant
is an employee with apparent disability, a
"certificate of disability" issued by the head of
the business establishment or the head of the
non-governmental organization is needed for
him to be issued a PWD-IDC. For a student
with apparent disability, the "school
assessment" issued by the teacher and signed
by the school principal should be presented to
avail of a PWD-ID. In line with this, the
petitioners then argued that non-competent
people such as teachers, head of establishments
and non-governmental organization heads to
confirm the medical condition is misplaced. It
must be stressed that only for apparent
disabilities can the teacher or head of a
business establishment validly issue the
mentioned required document because,
obviously, the disability is easily seen or
clearly visible.​ It is, therefore, not an
unqualified grant of authority for the said
non-medical persons as it is simply limited to
apparent disabilities. ​For a ​non-apparent
disability​ or a disability condition that is not
easily seen or clearly visible, ​the disability can
only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician,​ and a medical
certificate has to be presented in the
procurement of an IDC.

18
3. W/O it violates the No.​ Equality guaranteed under the equal
Equal Protection protection clause is​ equality under the same
Clause because of conditions and among persons similarly
singling out situated; it is equality among equals,​ not
drugstores to bear the similarity of treatment of persons who are
burden classified based on substantial differences in
relation to the object to be accomplished

The​ Constitution does not require that things

which are different in fact be treated in law
as though they were the same. ​The equal
protection clause​ does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different​.
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.

Same clause allows classification. All that is

required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on​ substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law​; that it
must ​not be limited to existing conditions
onl​y; and that it must a​pply equally to each
member of the class​. This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

19
8. ZABAL V President Duterte stated that Boracay has become a
DUTERTE cesspool and that he would later place the said island
under a state of calamity. Duterte ordered the shutting
down of the island and the said total closure of the
island was to officially begin on April 26, 2018. The
maximum duration of the said closure was for only a
total of six (6) months. According to the petitioners,
the closure was then followed by the deployment of
around 630 police and military personnel including
crowd dispersal management personnel.
Zabal, Jacosalem, and Bandiola filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
and/or Status Quo Ante Order against herein
respondents
Both Zabal and Jacosalem depend on tourist activities
as their source of income. ​Zabal builds sandcastles
for tourist while Jacosalem drives locals and
non-locals around the island. Bandiola was not a
resident of the island ​but would occasionally visit the
island for business and pleasure.
1. Whether or not No, this case does not actually involve the
Proclamation 475 right to travel in its essential sense contrary
poses an actual to what petitioners want to portray. ​There is
impairment on the certainly no showing that Proclamation No.
right to travel? 475​ deliberately meant to impair the right to
travel.​ The questioned proclamation is clearly
focused on its ​purpose of rehabilitating
Boracay​ and any intention to directly restrict
the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced
from its import.
The closure of Boracay was only limited for a
period of six (6) months and will no longer
extend after the prescription of the said months.
Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No.
475 on ​the right to travel is not direct but
merely consequential; and, the same is only
for a reasonably short period of time or
merely temporary.
With regards to the discussion on whether
President Duterte exercised a power legislative:
since ​Proclamation No. 475 does not actually
impose a restriction on the right to travel,​ its
issuance did ​not result to any substantial
alteration of the relationship between the
State and the people. ​The proclamation is
therefore not a law and conversely, the
President did not usurp the law-making power
of the legislature.
20
2. Whether or not The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation 475 be Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the
upheld for being in interest of the public in general. Being that, one
the nature of valid of the root causes of the problems that beset
police power? Boracay was tourist influ​x and, as early as
2007, DENR had already determined this as the
major cause of the catastrophic depletion of
the island's biodiversity. ​Certainly, the
closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily​, gave
the island its much-needed breather, and
likewise afforded the government the
necessary leeway in its rehabilitation
program.

Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid

police power measure. Police power constitutes
an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and
that even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater
number.

3. Whether or not When the conditions so demand as determined

petitioners have vested by the legislature, property rights must bow to
rights on their sources the primacy of police power because property
of income as to be rights, though sheltered by due process, must
entitled to due yield to general welfare.
process? ​Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem cannot be
said to have vested rights to their sources of
income in Boracay for they are included in the
informal sector of the economy where ​earnings
are not guaranteed. ​A right is not ​vested
unless it is more than a mere expectancy
based on the anticipated continuance​ of
present laws; it ​must be established interest

21

9. BATANGAS Police Power delegated to local government units must
V be exercised according to the will of their principal.
PHI. SHELL
PET. CO
To promote the discovery of indigenous petroleum
pursuant to P.D. 87, DOE (Department of Energy)
executed a service contract with SPEX (Shell
Philippines Exploration, B. V.)​ to authorize the latter
to explore North Western Palawan for possible
petroleum sources. When SPEX found an abundance
of natural gas in Malampaya field, the ​Malampaya
project was created,​ requiring the construction of an
offshore pipeline to transport natural gas from the
field to Batangas so that the gas may be treated in
PSPC’s (Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation)
in property, not open to ​doubt.​ x x x To be
vested in its accurate legal sense,​ a right must be
complete and consummated,​ and one o​f ​which the
person to​ ​whom it belongs cannot be divested
without his consent.
4. Whether or not No, there were no intrusions into the
there exists an autonomy of the concerned LGU’s. ​With RA
intrusion into the 10121,​ it gave LGU’s premium roles in the
autonomy of the disaster risk reduction and management ​and
concerned LGU’s? can be seen with the amount of legislative
policies that were aimed towards the
strengthening of the powers of the LGU’s.
The ​mere involvement of other
governmental agencies​ with regards to the
rehabilitation of the island ​does not constitute
to the encroachment​ of the powers and
functions of the LGU’s. All have their own
designated roles as defined and enumerated in
Executive Order No. 53.
Whether the CA erred Yes. Police power is the power to prescribe
in affirming the RTC regulations to promote the general welfare
Decision which of the people.​ As an inherent attribute of
declared the City sovereignty, police power primarily rests with
Ordinance No. 3 s. the State. In furtherance of the State's policy to
2001 invalid. foster local autonomy, the national legislature
delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units (LGUs) as agents of the
State. Since​ LGUs exercise delegated police
power​ as agents of the State, it is incumbent
upon them to ​act in conformity to the will of
their principal, the State.
The Water Code governs the ownership,
22
refinery.
In 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Batangas
enacted City Ordinance No. 3 s. 2001, which required
heavy industries operating along the portions of
Batangas Bay​ to construct ​desalination plants ​to
facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their
industrial facilities.
PSPC then filed a petition against Batangas and the
SP to the RTC,​ praying that the ordinance be made
null and void. Among PSPC’s contentions were that
the enactment of the ordinance constituted an invalid
exercise of police power as it failed to meet the
substantive requirements for validity. T​he ordinance
allegedly had no legal basis and encroached upon
the power of the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB)​ to regulate and control the Philippines' water
resources.
RTC & CA: invalid
ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS:
A. Valid Ordinance
The ordinance
(i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(ii) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(iii) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
(v) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and
(vi) must not be unreasonable.
appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and protection of
water resources. Under Article 3 thereof,​ water
resources are placed under the control and
regulation of the government through the
National Water Resources Council,​ now the
NWRB. The ordinance effectively contravened
the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates
unto Batangas City the power to control and
regulate the use of ground water.
Batangas City also failed to prove the existence
of factual basis to justify the enactment of City
Ordinance No. 3. ​The presumption of validity
ascribed to an ordinance prevails only in the
absence of some factual foundation​ of record
sufficient to overthrow the assailed issuance.
PSPC’s documentary and testimonial evidence
showing that ​no substantial diminution in the
ground water of Tabangao-Malitam
watershed had occurred in the​ last three (3)
decade​s, and that no threat of depletion of
ground water resources in said watershed
existed.
23
10. BASCO The​ Philippine Amusements and Gaming
V Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of
PAGCOR
P.D. 1067-A ​dated January 1, 1977 and was​ granted a
franchise under P.D. 1067-B ​also dated January 1,
1977 ​"to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines." ​Its operation was
originally conducted in the well known floating casino
"Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a
success for it proved to be a potential source of
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic
projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978
for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created
under P.D. 1869 to ​enable the Government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise ​or permitted by law.
PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over
the Philippines.
(1) WON it waived the (1) ​No. ​The City of Manila, being ​a mere
Manila City gov't's Municipal corporation has no inherent right
right to impose taxes
to impose taxes. ​Thus, "the Charter or statute
and license fees, must plainly show an intent to confer that
which is recognized
power or the municipality cannot assume it".
by law.
Its ​"power to tax" therefore must always
yield to a legislative act​ which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the "inherent power to tax".
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject
to control by Congress. ​It should be stressed
that ​"municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress" ​which has the power
to "create and abolish municipal corporations"
due to its "general legislative powers".
Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over Local governments​. And​ if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back
the power.
(2) WON it has (2) ​No. The City of Manila's power to
intruded into the impose license fees on gambling, has long
LGUs' right to impose been revoked. ​As early as 1975, the power of
local taxes and license
24
fees, and thus local governments to regulate gambling thru
contrary to the the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
principle of local withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
autonomy enshrined exclusively on the National Government.
in the Constitution.
Therefore, only the National Government
has the power to issue "licenses or permits"
for the operation of gambling. ​Necessarily,
the power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of
"licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the
City of Manila.

(3) WON it violates (3) ​No. The clause does not preclude
the equal protection classification of individuals who may be
clause as it allows accorded different treatment under the law
some gambling acts as long as the classification is not
but also prohibits
unreasonable or arbitrary​. A law does not
other gaming acts.
have to operate in equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution.

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit

the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate​. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling

conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities ​like

25
 cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as
amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and
races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) ​are
legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

(4) WON it violates (4) ​No. The judiciary does not settle policy
the government’s issues. The Court can only declare what the
policy of being away law is and not what the law should be. ​Under
from monopolistic our system of government, policy issues are
and crony economy,
within the domain of the political branches of
and toward free
government and of the people themselves as
enterprise and
privatization. the repository of all state power.

It should be noted that, as the provision is

worded, monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. ​The state
must still decide whether public interest
demands that monopolies be regulated or
prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for
the Legislature to decide.

26
C. EMINENT DOMAIN
TITLE FACTS
11. QUEZON Section 9 of ​Ordinance No. 6118,​ S-64, entitled
CITY "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
V ERICTA ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least​ six (6) percent ​of the total area
of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
XXX
7 years after the enactment ​of the aforequoted
Ordinance, Quezon City Council passed a
Resolution to request the city engineer to stop
further selling of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners​ failed to donate 6%
space intended for the paupers. ​City Engineer
ISSUE HELD:
W/O THERE IS A The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
VALID EXERCISE private cemeteries is not covered by Republic Act 537,
OF EMINENT the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers
DOMAIN the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within
the center of population of the city and to provide for
their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of
general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
The Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa
simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries.​ This has
been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the
present. ​Expropriation, however, requires payment
of just compensation​. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land
they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear
27
 then notified Himlayang Pilipino about the said
Resolution. Himlayang Pilipino in response filed
a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking
to annul sec 9 of the said Ordinance saying that
the said ordinance is contrary to the Constitution,
the Quezon City Charter, and the Local
Autonomy Act.
12. DOTC V Respondent spouses Abecina are the registered
ABECINA owners of ​five parcels​ of land in Sitio Paltik,
Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, ​Camarines
Norte.
The DOTC awarded Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a
contract for the management, operation,
maintenance, and development of a Regional
Telecommunications Development Project
(RTDP) under the National Telephone Program,
Phase I, Tranche 1.
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to
the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP
in the municipality. However, the​ municipality
erroneously included portions of the
respondents’ property in the donation.​ The
spouses discovered the occupation and they
required Digitel to vacate the properties and pay
damages, but the latter refused. Later on, the
spuses sent a final demand letter to both the
DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to
pay unpaid rent/damages
from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
Whether or not No.​ Although we have no doubt that when the DOTC
DOTC is immune constructed the encroaching structures and
from suit? subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their
maintenance, i​t was carrying out a sovereign
function​. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's
contention that these are ​acts jure imperii that fall
within the cloak of state immunity.
However,​ the doctrine of state immunity cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
to a citizen. I​f the DOTC had correctly​ followed the
regular procedure upon discovering that it had
encroached on the respondents' property, it would
have initiated expropriation proceedings ​instead of
insisting on its immunity from suit.
Whether or not The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine
there exists a necessity to take the property for public use​ and the
genuine necessity consequent payment of just compensation. The property
for the DOTC to is evidently being used for a public purpose. However,
actually take the
we also note that the respondent spouses willingly
property?
entered into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use
of the subject properties. If in the future the factual
28
circumstances should change and the respondents
refuse to continue the lease, then the DOTC may
initiate expropriation proceedings. But as matters now
stand, the r​espondents are clearly willing to lease the
property​. Therefore, we find ​no genuine necessity​ for
the DOTC to actually take the property at this point.

29
13. MANILA RA 7432​ was passed into law (amended by​ RA
MEMORIAL 9257​), granting senior citizens 20% discount on
PARK certain establishments. To implement the tax
V
provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance
SEC. OF
and the DSWD issued its own Rules and
DSWD
Regulations.
Petitioners are not questioning the 20%
discount granted to senior citizens ​but are only
assailing the​ constitutionality of the tax
deduction scheme​ prescribed under RA 9257
and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Petitioners
posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes
Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: ​"private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation.​" Under the tax deduction
scheme, the ​private sector shoulders 65% of
the discount because only 35% of it is actually
returned by the government.​ Petitioners posit
that the resolution of this case lies in the
determination of whether the legally mandated
20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain​. ​If it is police
power, no just compensation is warranted. But ​if
it is eminent domain, the tax deduction
scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a
peso for peso reimbursement of the 20%
discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it
constitutes taking of private property without
payment of just compensation.
Whether the tax No. The validity of the 20%​ senior citizen discount
deduction scheme and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an
prescribed under
exercise of police power of the State, has already been
RA 9257 and the settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.​ The
implementing rules
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a
and regulations are
forced subsidy​ corresponding to the taking of private
invalid and
unconstitutional. property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.​ A
tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of
the senior citizen discount.​ As such, ​it would not
meet the definition of just compensation.​ Having said
that, this raises the question of whether the State, in
promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, ​can impose upon private establishments the
burden​ of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction​. The law is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. For
this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature,​ property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, ​though sheltered by due process​, must
yield to general welfare.​ Police power as an attribute
to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
30
ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS: will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
A. Eminent domain. provision is invalidated
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the
inherent power of the State to take or appropriate
private property for public use. ​The
Constitution, however, requires that private
property shall not be taken without due
process of law and the payment of just
compensation.
Traditional distinctions exist between police
power and eminent domain.
In the exercise of police power,​ a property
right is impaired by regulation, or the use of
property is merely prohibited, regulated or
restricted to promote public welfare.​ In such
cases, there is no compensable taking, hence,
payment of just compensation is not required.
It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of
police power (as distinguished from eminent
domain), although the regulation affects the right
of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for use by
or for the benefit of the public.
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, p​roperty interests are
appropriated and applied to some public
purpose which necessitates the payment of
just compensation therefor.​ Normally, the ​title
to and possession​ of the property are transferred
to the ex​propriating authority​. In some cases,
although the private property owner is not
divested of ownership or possession, ​payment
of just compensation is warranted because of
the burden placed on the property for the use
or benefit of the public.

31
D. TAXATION
14. REYES Petitioners Jose B.L. Reyes and Milagros Reyes
V are owners of ​parcels of land situated in
ALMANZOR Tondo and Sta. Cruz, Manila​, which are leased
and occupied as dwelling units by tenants. The
tenants were paying monthly rentals not
exceeding ​Php 300​. In 1971, RA 6359 was
enacted prohibiting for one year from its
effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of
dwelling units or of lands on which another’s
dwelling is located, where such rentals do not
exceed Php 300 a month but allowing an
increase in rent by not more than 10% thereafter.
In 1973, the respondent City Assessor of Manila
r​e-classified and reassessed the value of the
subject properties based on the schedule of
market values. ​The r​evision entailed an
increase in the corresponding tax rates.​ The
petitioners filed a Memorandum of
Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment
Appeals. ​They averred that the reassessments
made were “excessive, unwarranted,
inequitable, confiscatory, and
unconstitutional”​ considering that the ​taxes
imposed upon them greatly​ exceeded the
annual income derived from their properties.
Whether or not the No. ​Under Article VII, Section 7 of the Constitution,
comparable sales then enforced, the rule of taxation must not only be
approach method uniform, but must also be equitable and progressive​.
used by respondents Uniformity​ has been defined as that principle by which
in fixing the
all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
assessed value of
class shall be taxed at the same rate​. Taxation is said
appellants’
properties is to be ​equitable​ ​when its burden falls on those better
reasonable. able to pay. ​It is​ progressive​ when its ​rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected​.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
and natural classification for purposes of taxation but
the government’s act must not be prompted by a spirit
of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds
no support in reason. It suffices that law operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different both in
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
32
 15. Philippine Philippine Health Care Provider is a
Health Care health-care organization that caters benefits
Provider vs.
Commission on
to its members through a prepaid system.​ The
Internal CIR found that the petitioner had a deficiency in
Revenue the payment of Documentary Stamp Tax under
Section of 185 of 1887 Tax Code:
“On all policies of insurance or bonds or
obligations of the nature of indemnity for loss,
damage, or liability made or renewed by any
person, association or company or corporation
transacting the business of accident, fidelity,
employer's liability, plate, glass, steam boiler,
burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other
branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland,
and fire insurance)”
The CIR sent a demand for the payment of
the said deficiency taxes​ including surcharges
and interest for the years ​1996-1997​ with the
total amount of P​224,702,641.18​. The petitioner
protested to the CIR, however, did not act on the
appeal. Hence, they proceeded to the Court of
Tax Appeals which declared a judgement against
them. CTA ordered them to pay 22 Million
Pesos for the 1997 and 31 Million Pesos for the
1996. ​The petitioner appealed to the CA
which also denied the appeal and even
increased the taxes to 55 and 68 Million pesos
respectively​.
WON a health care Yes. ​The DST is levied on the exercise by persons of
agreement in the certain privileges conferred by law for the creation,
nature of an revision, or termination of specific legal relationships
insurance contract through the execution of specific instruments. ​It is an
and therefore excise on the facilities used ​in the transaction of the
subject to the business,​ separate and apart from the business itself​.
documentary stamp
tax (DST) imposed The DST is an excise upon the privilege, opportunity,
under Section 185 or facility offered at exchanges for the transaction of
of Republic Act the business. In particular, the DST under Section 185
8424 (Tax Code of of the 1997 Tax Code is imposed on the privilege of
1997) making or renewing any policy of insurance (except
life, marine, inland and fire insurance), bond or
obligation in the nature of indemnity for loss, damage,
or liability.
Petitioner's health care agreement is primarily a
contract of indemnity​. And in the recent case of Blue
Cross Healthcare, Inc. v. Olivares, this Court ruled ​that
a health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life
insurance policy. ​Its health care agreement is not a
contract for the provision of medical services.
Petitioner does not actually provide medical or
hospital services but merely arranges for the same​.
It is also incorrect to say that the health care agreement
is not based on loss or damage because, under the said
agreement, petitioner assumes the liability and
indemnifies its member for hospital, medical and
related expenses (such as professional fees of
physicians). The term "loss or damage" is broad enough
to cover the monetary expense or liability a member
will incur in case of illness or injury.
33

16. CIR These consolidated cases c​onsider whether
V "San Mig Light" is a new brand or a variant
SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATIO
of one of San Miguel Corporation's existing
N beer brands​, and w​hether the Bureau of
Internal Revenue may issue notices of
discrepancy that effectively changes "San Mig
Light"'s classification from new brand to
variant​. The issues involve an ​application of
Section 143 of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code (Tax Code​), as amended, on the
definition of a variant, which is sub​ject to a
higher excise tax rate than a new brand.​ This
case also applies the requirement in Rep. Act
No. 9334 that reclassification of certain
fermented liquor products introduced between
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 can
only be done by an act of Congress.
Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA.- The health
care agreement was in the nature of non-life insurance,
which is primarily a contract of indemnity. Similarly,
the insurable interest of every member of
petitioner's health care program in obtaining the health
care agreement is his own health. Under the agreement,
petitioner is bound to indemnify any member who
incurs hospital, medical or any other expense arising
from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingency to
the extent agreed upon under the contract.
Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Can the BIR validly No, any reclassification of fermented liquor
reclassify brands? products should be by act of Congress. (Section 143
of the Tax Code)
The CIR's letters and Notices of Discrepancy, which
effectively changed San Mig Light's brand's
classification from "new brand to variant of existing
brand," n​ecessarily changes San Mig Light's tax
bracket. Based on the legislative intent behind the
classification freeze provision, petitioner has no
power to do this. A reclassification of a fermented
liquor brand introduced between January 1, 1997 and
December 31, 2003, such as "San Mig Light," must be
by act of Congress. ​There was none in this case.
Is "San Mig Light" Also, a 'variant of a brand' shall refer to a brand on
is a new brand and which a modifier is prefixed and/or suffixed to the
not a variant of root name of the brand. The word "Light" cannot he
"San Miguel Pale considered as a mere suffix to the word "San Miguel,"
Pilsen"? hut it is part and parcel of an entirely new brand name,
"San Mig Light.
34
Virgilio S. De Guzman (De Guzman), San
Miguel Corporation's Former Assistant Vice Though the ​"escudo" logo appears on both "Pale
President for Finance, wrote the Bureau of Pilsen" bottle and "San Mig Light" bottle and can, the
Internal Revenue Excise Tax Services Assistant same cannot be considered as an indication that
Commissioner Leonardo B. Albar (Assistant "San Mig Light" is merely a variant of the brand
Commissioner Albar) t​o request the "Pale Pilsen", since the said "escudo" i​nsignia is the
registration of and authority to manufacture corporate logo of petitioner. It ​merely identifies the
"San Mig​ Light," to be taxed at ₱12.15 per
products, as having been manufactured by
liter.9 The letter dated October 27, 1999 granted
petitioner, but does not form part of its brand​. In
this request.
fact, it appears not only in petitioner's beer products,
February 7, 2002, LTAD II Acting Chief but even in its non-beer products.
Conrado P. Item replied to Villacorte's letter. He
confirmed that based on the submitted
documents, ​San Miguel Corporation was
allowed to register, manufacture, and sell Is SMC entitled to a Yes, SMC is entitled to tax refund or tax credit
"San Mig Light"​ as a new brand, had been refund of excess certification. ​The Tax Code includes remedies for
paying its excise tax for a considerable length of payment of excise erroneous collection and overpayment of taxes​.
time, and that the tax classification and rate of taxes on "San Mig Under Sections 229 and 204(C) of the Tax Code, a
"San Mig Light" as a new brand were in order. Light"? taxpayer may seek recovery of erroneously paid taxes
within two (2) years from date of payment.
The CIR argues that "​San Mig Light,"
launched in November 1999, is not a new
brand but merely a low-calorie variant of
"San Miguel Pale Pilsen."​ Thus, the
application of the higher excise tax rate for
variant products is appropriate (₱19.91 per liter
instead of ₱9.15 per liter) and SMC should not
be entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate.​ The CTA sided with SMC; hence,
this petition by the CIR with the SC​.

35
E. PARTNERSHIP AMONG THE POWERS
17. ERMITA- Absence of any evidence to offset the presumption
MALATE of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
HOTEL AND ordinance, the presumption for validity prevails.
MOTEL
There being a presumption of validity, the
OPERATORS
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable.
ASSOCIATION
\
Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators, Hotel Del Mar, Inc. and Go Chiu, the
president and general manager of Hotel Del Mar,
assail the constitutionality of an ordinance passed
by the City Mayor of Manila.
Ordinance 4760 was approved by then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (VM Astorga),
who was the acting Mayor of the City of Manila at
the time.
The petitioners allege that the said​ ordinance was
beyond power of the Muncipal Board of the
City of Manil​a insofar as it would regulate motels
when there is ​no reference made to motels in the
revised charter of the City of Manil​a; that it was
unconstitutional and violative of due process
insofar as it imposes license fees per annum to
motels, by requiring the owners or managers of
such establishment to refrain from entertaining
customers who would refuse to provide their
personal information, such as name, address,
occupation, address, etc., in a document which
would be open to public view at all times; that it is
arbitrary and unreasonable insofar as it requires
motels to maintain certain minimum facilities;
W/N Ordinance 4760 NO. The SC held that Ordinance 4760 is valid
is unconstitutional. and in accordance with the constitution.
The SC’s primary reason for the reversal is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. There being a presumption of validity of
statutes and ordinances, the necessity for evidence
to rebut is unavoidable.
The Court cited the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. which stated
the following:
“The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of
due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, t​ he presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute.​ "
No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter
on the pl​eadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail ​and ​the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
36
that it is violative of due process insofar as the
penalty provided which causes the automatic
cancellation of the license of the owners of such
establishments.
Instead of presenting evidence, a stipulation of
facts was submitted. The ​lower court held the
assailed ordinance to be unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void.
With regards to the ​alleged violation of due
process​, the SC held that there was n​o violation
since the ordinance, being ​a manifestation of
police powe​r, was specifically aimed to ​safeguard
public morals by minimizing certain practices.
To satisfy the due process requirement, ​official
action must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness.
In the explanatory note of Councilor Astorga, there
was an alarming increase in the r​ate of
prostitution, adultery, and fornication in
Manila, ​traceable in great part to the existence of
motels. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted
Wherefore, the j​ udgment of the lower court is
reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith.
37
 18. Respondent is a domestic corporation primarily
COMMISSIONE engaged in retailing of medicines and other
R OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, pharmaceutical products​. In 1996, it operated six
Petitioners, v. (6) drugstores​ under the business name and style
CENTRAL 'Mercury Drug.​' From January to December
LUZON DRUG
CORPORATION 1996, respondent granted ​twenty (20%) percent
sales discount to qualified senior citizens​ on
their purchases of medicines pursuant to Republic
Act No. [R.A.] 7432 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. For the said period, the amount
allegedly representing the 20% sales discount
granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens
totaled P904,769.00. Respondent then filed its
Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1996
declaring therein that it i​ncurred net losses from
its operations​. Furthermore, respondent filed with
petitioner a claim for ​tax refund/credit in the
amount of P904,769.00 allegedly arising from
the 20% sales discount​ granted by respondent to
qualified senior citizens in compliance with R.A.
7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response from
petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the
Court of Tax Appeals via a Petition for Review.
The Tax Court rendered a Decision dismissing
respondent's Petition for lack of merit. In said
decision, the CTA justified its ruling with the
following ratiocination:
'x x x, if no tax has been paid to the government,
erroneously or illegally, or if no amount is due and
collectible from the taxpayer, tax refund or tax
credit is unavailing. x x x.
'Prescinding from the above, it could logically be
deduced that tax credit is premised on the
existence of tax liability on the part of taxpayer. In
WHETHER OR NOT Yes, Section 4a of RA 7432 ​grants to senior
RESPONDENT,
citizens the privilege of obtaining a 20 percent
DESPITE discount on their purchase of medicine from any
INCURRING A NET private establishment in the country. ​The latter
LOSS, MAY STILL
may then claim the c​ost of the discount as a tax
CLAIM THE 20%
credit. Such credit be claimed, even though an
SALES DISCOUNT
AS A TAX CREDIT. establishment operates at a loss.
Tax credit generally refers to an amount that is
"subtracted directly from one's total tax
liability." It is an ​"allowance against the tax
itself" or ​"a deduction from what is owed" by a
taxpayer to the government. Tax credit should be
understood in relation to other tax concepts. One of
these is tax deduction - - defined as a subtraction
"from income for tax purposes," ​or an amount
that is "allowed by law to reduce income prior to
the application of the tax rate to compute the
amount of tax which is due." An example of a tax
deduction is any of the allowable deductions
enumerated in Section 34 of the Tax Code. A tax
credit differs from a tax deduction. On the one
hand, a tax credit reduces the tax due, including - -
whenever applicable - - the income tax that is
determined after applying the corresponding tax
rates to taxable income. A tax deduction, on the
other, reduces the income that is subject to tax in
order to arrive at taxable income. To think of the
former as the latter is to avoid, if not entirely
confuse, the issue. A tax credit is used only after
the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before.
38
other words, if there is no tax liability, tax credit is
not available.'
Respondent lodged a Motion for Reconsideration.
The CTA, in its assailed resolution, granted
respondent's motion for reconsideration and
ordered herein petitioner to issue a Tax Credit
Certificate in favor of respondent citing the
decision, TO WIT:
'However, Sec. 229 clearly does not apply in the
instant case because the​ tax sought to be refunded
or credited by petitioner was not erroneously paid
or illegally collected.​ We take exception to the
CTA's sweeping but unfounded statement that
'both tax refund and tax credit are modes of
recovering taxes which are either erroneously or
illegally paid to the government. '​Tax refunds or
credits do not exclusively pertain to illegally
collected or erroneously paid taxes​ as they may be
other circumstances w ​ here a refund is warranted.
The tax refund provided under ​Section 229​ deals
exclusively with illegally collected or erroneously
paid taxes ​but there are other possible situations,
such as the ​refund of excess estimated corporate
quarterly income tax paid,​ or that of excess input
tax paid by a VAT-registered person, or that of
excise tax paid on goods locally produced or
manufactured but actually exported. The
standards and mechanics for the grant of a refund
or credit under these situations are different from
that under Sec. 229. Sec. 4a of R.A. 7432, is yet
another instance of a tax credit and it does not in
any way refer to illegally collected or erroneously
paid taxes, x x x.
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments
to ​claim as tax credit the amount of discounts
they grant. In turn, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the
procedures for its availment. To deny such credit,
despite the plain mandate of the law and the
regulations carrying out that mandate, is
indefensible.
First, the definition given by petitioner is
erroneous​. It refers to tax credit as the amount
representing the 20 percent discount that "shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their
gross income for income tax purposes and from
their gross sales for value-added tax or other
percentage tax purposes." In ordinary business
language, the ​tax credit represents the amount of
such discount. ​However, the manner by which the
discount shall be credited against taxes has not
been clarified by the revenue regulations. By
ordinary acceptation, a ​discount is an "abatement
or reduction made from the gross amount or
value of anything." ​To be more precise, it is in
business parlance ​"a deduction or lowering of an
amount of money;" or ​"a reduction from the full
amount or value of something, especially a
price." In business, there are many kinds of
discount, the most common of which is that
affecting the income statement or financial report
upon which the income tax is based.
39
 CA: Affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) ordering petitioner to issue
a tax credit certificate in favor of respondent in the
reduced amount of P903,038.39. It reasoned that
Republic Act No. 7432 ​required neither a tax
liability nor a payment of taxes by private
establishments prior to the availment of a tax
credit. ​Moreover, such credit is ​not tantamount
to an unintended benefit ​from the law, but rather
a just ​compensation for the taking of private
property for public use.

G. BILL OF RIGHTS AND PRIVATE PERSONS

19. PEOPLE V An act of a private individual, allegedly in
MARTI violation of appellant's constitutional rights, may
not be invoked against the State.
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to s​end
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. ​It was received
by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. ​Shirley refused and eventually
convinced Anita to seal the package making it
ready for shipment.​ Before being sent out for
delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, ​conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard
operating procedures​. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a ​suspicious odor ​which
made him took sample of the substance he found
inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the
presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the
Can the YES. The Supreme Court held based on the speech
Constitutional Right of Commissioner Bernas that the ​Bill of Rights
of Privacy be governs the relationship between the individual
enforced against and the state.
private individuals?
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
It is ​not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals​. It will be recalled that Mr
Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the
presence of the NBI agents in his place of business.
The ​mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr.
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
prescribed by the constitution​. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.

40
 suspicious package and found ​dried-marijuana
leaves inside​. A case was filed against Andre
Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in
the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy ​was violated and
that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
20. Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of
CAPIN-CADIZ V respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.
BRENT
HOSPITAL AND (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension
COLLEGES from employment in 2006. The cause of
suspension was Cadiz'​s Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed
Pregnancy. ​It appears that Cadiz ​became
pregnant out of wedlock​, and Brent imposed the
suspension until such time that​ she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
complaint for ​Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages
and Damages with prayer for Reinstatement
The Labor Arbitrator found that Cadiz's i​ndefinite
suspension amounted to a constructive
dismissal; ​nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz
was​ not illegally dismissed as there was just
cause for her dismissal, ​that is, she engaged in
premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend
resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged was AFFIRMED.
W/N technical defects NO. The technical failures were not enough to
were grounds to
dismiss the petition.
dismiss her case
The Court finds that the ends of substantial justice
would be better s​erved by relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure​. Time
and again, the Court has emphasized that rules of
procedure are d​esigned to secure substantial
justice. These are mere tools to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases and if their strict and
rigid ​application would frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, then it must be
avoided.
W/N NLRC NO, Immorality in this case was not a just cause
committed grave for termination.
abuse of discretion in
upholding her
Brent’s policy manual states immorality as grounds
dismissal from
for dismissal thus the question tha must be resolved
employment.
is whether Cadiz's premarital relations with her
boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of
wedlock constitute immorality.
41
Cadiz elevated her case to the CA but was
dismissed due to technical defects. Namely;​ (1)
incomplete statement of material dates; (2)
failure to attach registry receipts; and (3)
failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's
PTR and IBP official receipts.
The Court makes reference to the case of Cheryll
Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB.
The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of
whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral
involves a two-step process: first, a consideration
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers
moral and respectable.
B​rent erroneously relied on the standard
dictionary definition of fornication as a form of
illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz's acts fell under such classification, thus
constituting immorality. Jurisprudence has
already set the standard of morality with which an
act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious. ​Whether a conduct is considered
disgraceful or immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct​, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those
conducts which are proscribed because they are
detrimental to conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. More
importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful
or immoral.
42

G. BILL OF RIGHTS GUARANTEE DURING THE 1986 INTERROGATION
21. REPUBLIC V Immediately upon her assumption to office
SANDIGANBAY following the EDSA Revolution, President
AN
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
(EO No. 1) creating the ​Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG)​ to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, ​whether in
the active service or retired. Investigations include
the alleged unexplained wealth of ​respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas)​,
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Evidence showed that respondent is the owner of a
house and lot in Quezon City as well in Cebu City.
Moreover, equipment and communication
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried
mother by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene[s] any fundamental state
policy enshrined in the Constitution. “The fact that
Brent is a sectarian institution does not
automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard
of morality absent an express statement in its
manual of personnel policy and regulations,
prescribing such religious standard as gauge as
these regulations create the obligation on both the
employee and the employer to abide by the same.
1. Whether or not the NO. The SC held that the PCGG does not have
PCGG has the
jurisdiction because Ramas was not a
authority to “subordinate” of former President Marcos as
investigate Ramas contemplated under EO no. 1. Mere position held
and Dimaano
by a military officer does not automatically
make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that
he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos.
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive
orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term “subordinate”. The Whereas
Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, ​his immediate
43
facilities were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment, the
raiding team was also able to confiscate
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of ​Elizabeth Dimaano​. Affidavits of
members of the Military Security Unit disclosed
that ​Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent Ramas,​ that he stays and sleeps at the
house of Dimaano who kisses him whenever he
arrives, and that a person who rode in a car went to
her residence with 4 attache cases filled with
money owned by Ramas. ​Dimaano had no visible
means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary​, making her claim that she owns the
money improbable. ​With these, a prima facie
case exists against respondent Ramas for
ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. ​The PCGG
filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act
No. 1379, known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property (RA No. 1379)​,
against Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as
co-defendant, in favor of the State. However, ​the
Sandiganbayan​ subsequently D ​ ISMISSED​ the
complaint because there was an illegal search and
seizure of the items confiscated. The first
Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth
Dimaan​o, ​while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
family, relatives, and close associates both here
and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes `ll assets and properties in the
Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or
participation.'
Applying the rule in statutory construction known
as ​ejusdem generis​, the term ​"subordinate" as
used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to ​one who enjoys a
close association with former President Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative, and close associate in EO No.
1 and the close relative, business associate,...
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. There
must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife. This, the PCGG failed to
provide​. Ramas' position alone as Commanding
General of the Philippine Army with the rank of
Major General does not suffice to make him a
"subordinate" of former President Marcos for
purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments.
2. Whether or not the YES. While it is true that the Bill of Rights
property that were under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
confiscated were during an interregnum (any period during
illegally seized
44
which a state has no ruler or only a temporary
executive)​. However, the ​protection accorded to
individuals in International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect
during the interregnum. ​When n​o constitution
or Bill of Rights exists​, directives and orders
issued by government officers are ​valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority
granted on them. The raiding team ​seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other ​items not included in the search warran​t.
Dimaano was also not present during the raid
(only Dimaano's cousins witnessed the raid).Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to ensure that no one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that
no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated
under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.
Petition DISMISSED.

45