H. Termination Proceedings
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 573
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004. *
JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS,
INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.
Labor Law; Administrative Law; If the factual findings of the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are conflicting, the reviewing court may
delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned
findings.—It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even
finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. This
is especially so when such findings were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. However, if the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter are con-
_______________
* EN BANC.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
flicting, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the
records and examine for itself the questioned findings. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of the facts, ruled that
petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned
their employment and were already working for another employer.
Same; Dismissal of Employees; To dismiss an employee, the law
requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself.—To dismiss an employee, the law requires
not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.
causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or the latter’s representative in connection with the
employee’s work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Words and
Phrases; Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment—it is a form of neglect of duty,
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.—
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty,
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be
present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The
intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof
that it was deliberate and unjustified.
Same; Same; Same; Moonlighting; Subcontracting for another
company clearly shows the intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship; The record of an employee is a relevant consideration
in
575
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 575
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
determining the penalty that should be meted out to him.—In
February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having
subcontracted for an installation work for another company.
Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship with private respondent.
This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they did
not report for work because they were working for another company.
Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would
be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the
warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-
employee relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out
to him.
Same; Same; The employer may not be compelled to continue to
employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently
be inimical to his interests.—The law imposes many obligations on
the employer such as providing just compensation to workers,
observance of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in
the termination of employment. On the other hand, the law also
recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not
only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good
conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue
to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will
patently be inimical to his interests.
Same; Same; Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts
or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on
authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which
allow the employer to terminate employees.—Dismissals based on
just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the
employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve
grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to
terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause
requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of
employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages
are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer
possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be
granted.
Same; Same; Due Process; Notice Requirement; Procedurally,
(1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, the employer must give the employee two written notices
and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee
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576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
before terminating the employment, and (2) if the dismissal is
based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation; Failure to observe due process in a dismissal for just or
authorized cause does not invalidate the dismissal but makes the
employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.—Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is
based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be
heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is
sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or
opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2)
if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283
and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department
of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the
effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible
situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article
283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was
observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but
due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the
dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not
observed. In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid
and the employer will not suffer any liability. In the second and
third situations where the dismissals are illegal, Article 279
mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid
up to the time of actual reinstatement. In the fourth situation, the
dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot
be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the
employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the employee may not
be residing in the address indicated in the employer’s records does
not excuse the employer from sending the notices to the employee’s
last known address.—The present case squarely falls under the
fourth
577
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 577
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for
another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the
last known addresses would have been useless because they did not
reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent,
this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice
requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should
be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements
of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court believes that the ruling in
Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445
(2000), did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor
Code which provision means that the termination is illegal only if it
is not for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law
and that payment of backwages and other benefits, including
reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was unjustly
dismissed; The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and
injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted the Court to
revisit the doctrine.—The rationale for the re-examination of
the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the significant number of
cases involving dismissals without requisite notices. We concluded
that the imposition of penalty by way of damages for violation of the
notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent. Hence, we now
required payment of full backwages from the time of dismissal until
the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause. Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to
“dismiss now and pay later” by imposing full backwages. We believe,
however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full
meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code which states: ART. 279.
Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. This means
that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified
or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and
other benefits, including reinstate-
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ment, is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed.
The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice
which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to revisit the doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The Due Process
Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system
of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to
a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.—To be sure, the
Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just. It is a constitutional restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the
government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory due process should be
differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due
process—constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings while statutory due process found in the
Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being
unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.—
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized
causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and
procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process
requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of
P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department
Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements
violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be
differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due
process. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory due processfound in the
Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being
unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
579
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Same; Same; The better rule is to abandon the Serrano
doctrine and to follow Wenphil v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 170 SCRA 69 (1989), by holding that the dismissal was
for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer, which
sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.—
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent
doctrines in the law on employment termination, we believe that in
cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the
twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to
abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that
the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the
employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that
imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve
a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees, but to
employers as well.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional policy to provide full
protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers—
the commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent
it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.—The
unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid or
authorized causes but not complying with statutory due process
may have far-reaching consequences. This would encourage
frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of company
policy are rewarded by invoking due process. This also creates
absurd situations where there is a just or authorized cause for
dismissal but a procedural infirmity invalidates the termination.
Let us take for example a case where the employee is caught
stealing or threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a
criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or where serious
business losses demand that operations be ceased in less than a
month. Invalidating the dismissal would not serve public interest.
It could also discourage investments that can generate employment
in the local economy. The constitutional policy to provide full
protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers.
The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent
us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this
case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay
employees for work not actually performed and in fact abandoned.
The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a
person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and
whose continued employment is patently inimical to the employer.
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The law protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
Same; Same; Social Justice; An employee who is clearly guilty
of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the
Social Justice Clause of the Constitution—social justice must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life; Social justice is not based on rigid formulas set in
stone—it has to allow for changing times and circumstances.—An
employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282
should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the
Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used
only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel
observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” This is
not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled the way it did in
Wenphil, Serrano and related cases. Social justice is not based on
rigid formulas set in stone. It has to allow for changing times and
circumstances.
Same; Same; Due Process; The violation of an employee’s right
to statutory due process by the employer warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account
the relevant circumstances.—The violation of the petitioners’ right
to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount
of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix
it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to
deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process
rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
581
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Same; Evidence; Payment; Burden of Proof; As a general rule,
one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it—even where
the employee must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the
employee to prove non-payment.—We affirm the ruling of the
appellate court on petitioners’ money claims. Private respondent is
liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and
13th month pay without deductions. As a general rule, one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
employee must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the
employee to prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the
pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other
similar documents—which will show that overtime, differentials,
service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid—
are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and
absolute control of the employer.
Same; Wages; Thirteenth Month Pay; The 13th month pay is
included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor
Code from which the employer is prohibited under Article 113 from
making any deductions without the employee’s knowledge and
consent.—Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the value of the
shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay, we find the
same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of Presidential
Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the
13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as
“to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-
wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay
is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor
Code, to wit: (f) “Wage” paid to any employee shall mean the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being
expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time,
task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a
written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be
done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of
board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employee . . .” from which an employer is prohibited
under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions
without the em-
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ployee’s knowledge and consent. In the instant case, private
respondent failed to show that the deduction of the SSS loan and
the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month
pay was authorized by the latter. The lack of authority to deduct is
further bolstered by the fact that petitioner Virgilio Agabon
included the same as one of his money claims against private
respondent.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; I respectfully
dissent and maintain my view that the workingman’s right to job
security and due process of law cannot be measured with a reduced
price tag.—While I appreciate the view of Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago that “[t]he indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer in
order to discourage the abhorrent practice of ‘dismiss now, pay
later,’ ” the majority, however, simply retained, if not diminished,
the indemnity granted to the dismissed employees. Consequently, I
respectfully dissent and maintain my view that the workingman’s
right to job security and due process of law cannot be measured with
a reduced price tag. The majority opinion treats an employee’s right
to due process as no more than an abstract declaration. I am
unwilling to diminish petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural
due process which is necessary to protect their security of tenure.
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; Words and
Phrases; Constitution is an ode to social justice; Social justice is that
virtue by which individuals and groups fulfill their obligations to
human society by contributing positively to the complete well-being
of their fellowmen considered as members of society, and hence
regulate all their actions accordingly.—Our Constitution is an ode to
social justice. The Court should give due obeisance to this ode for
social justice is not a mere euphony of words. In other countries,
political debates over the last two centuries continue to rage on
whether social rights should be given constitutional protection. In
our jurisdiction, however, constitutional social rights have long been
embedded in all our Constitutions, and thus at the very least should
be respected and protected by our courts. Social justice is that virtue
by which individuals and groups fulfill their obligations to human
society by contributing positively to the complete well-being of their
fellowmen considered as members of that society, and hence
regulate all their actions accordingly. Social justice as a creed in the
1935 Constitution was crafted by Delegate Jose C. Locsin. He
persistently pounced on the necessity
583
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
of including social justice in the Constitution to protect those
who have little in life.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Substantive rights are not to be
weakened by a diminished procedural right, for in weakening the
procedure, we weaken the substantive right.—Courts at all times
should give meaning and substance to constitutional postulates in
favor of the workingman. The 1987 Constitution is fraught with
provisions protecting the workingman, e.g.,Secs. 9, 10 and 18, Art.
II, and Sec. 3, Art. XIII, a legacy of the evolution of rights. These
constitutional creeds should not be dwarfed by deeds. A contrary
posture would convert these creeds as “meaningless constitutional
patter.” The principle of social justice was not embedded in the
fundamental law for demogoguery. It was meant to be a vital,
articulate, compelling principle of public policy. Social justice should
be a living reality and not a mere high level abstraction. Thus, while
the Constitution must be read as a whole, even if we do not invoke
its Due Process Clause, the coherent application of the separate
constitutional creeds on social justice and labor is enough to uphold
the workers’ constitutional right to work and their consequent right
to job security. These substantive rights are not to be weakened by a
diminished procedural right. For in weakening the procedure, we
weaken the substantive right. The importance of the procedure to
protect the exercise of the right to work Cannot be overemphasized.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection.—The constitution puts the employee on equal
footing with his employer. As between an employee, usually poor
and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able
legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter
compliance. For, social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection. As Mr. Chief Justice Fernando stressed in Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission—To
repeat, courts should ever be on the alert lest through inadvertence
or faulty analysis the expected opposition from management be
appraised much more favorably than warranted. The unfortunate
result would be that both the social justice concept and the
complementary constitutional command of protection to labor would
be disregarded and set at naught. There is no higher duty cast on
the judiciary than to guard against such an undesirable possibility,
fraught as it is with consequences truly to be deplored.
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has long extended
constitutional due process in labor cases involving private action.—
This Court has long extended constitutional due process in labor
cases involving private action. Prior to Wenphil, the rule etched in
stone is that an employer can validly dismiss an erring employee
only after giving him notice and hearing. Thus, decades ago, this
Court in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of
Appeals ruled that “the failure of petitioner to give the private
respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed
constitutes an infringement on his constitutional right to due process
of law.” In De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission where
an employee was dismissed without notice, it was held that “[t]here
is in this case a clear denial of due process, a constitutional right
which must be safeguarded at all timesespecially when what is at
stake is petitioner’s position as his only means of livelihood.”
In Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., where petitioner Reyes was
dismissed from the service in 1977 without any investigation or
hearing, this Court found that the dismissal was arbitrary as Reyes
was denied due process. Hence, even the non-compliance with
Sections 2 and 3, Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code pursuant to the amendments of P.D.
No. 850 which was issued in 1975, requiring a prior clearance from
the Department of Labor to terminate the services of an employee,
rendered the termination illegal and nullified the dismissal of the
employee.
Same; Same; Same; The posture that the constitutional due
process requirement limits government action alone and does not
apply to private action is already passé—modern notions of
violations of due process which may fairly be attributed to the State
have expanded considerably in recent decades.—The posture that
the constitutional due process requirement limits government
action alone and does not apply to private action is
already passé. Thus, even in the United States, the application of
due process to private conduct has gained approval and has become
a settled norm. For, as expressed by Professor Laurence H. Tribe, a
noted constitutionalist—But particularly where ostensibly “private”
power is the primary source of the coercion and violence that
oppressed individuals and groups experience, it is hard to accept
with equanimity a rigid legal distinction between state and
society. The pervasive system of racial apartheid which existed in
the South for a century after the Civil War, for example, thrived
only because of the resonance of society and politics
585
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 585
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
. . . the close fit between private terror, public discrimination,
and political exclusion. So too, where it is the state’s persistent
inaction in the face of patterns of deprivation for which the state
and society seem to many to bear collective responsibility, the
premise that only identifiable state “action” may be called
constitutional account is deeply troubling. Accordingly, modern
notions of violations of due process which may fairly be attributed to
the State have expanded considerably in recent decades. Seemingly
private conducts have arguably been treated as adequate state
actions. Individual invasions of individual rights in certain
instances have become proper subjects of constitutional restraints.
In fine, as Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, “ ‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances x x x. Due process is not a
mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a delicate process
of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process.” Beyond argument, the Constitution was designed to
embody and celebrate values and to inculcate proper acceptance of
them, as much as to compel governments to abide by them.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who is denied procedural due
process is entitled to reinstatement, nothing less.—An employee who
is denied procedural due process is entitled to reinstatement.
Nothing less. This Court, in carrying out the constitutional directive
of the 1973 Constitution requiring the State to “assure the rights of
workers to x x x security of tenure x x x” has quite consistently
nullified, simply on constitutional grounds, dismissals in violation
of procedural due process, notwithstanding the absence of an
express provision of any statute. The Court has done the same under
the 1987 Constitution which admittedly has given more protection
to labor than any of our previous charters—through a four-
paragraph section in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights which details the protective mantle accorded to labor alone.
Thus, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution decrees that “[t]he
State shall afford full protection to labor x x x and promote full
employment x x x (All workers) shall be entitled to security of tenure x
x x” Art. XII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[t]he
State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.” All told, this
Court for almost three
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
decades has set aside, on constitutional grounds, dismissals in
violation of procedural due process—until Wenphil came along, with
the interests of the employer tailing and suddenly enjoying
preference. To uphold Wenphil, Serrano, and now Agabon, is to
dilute the protection to those who need it most despite the
constitutional mandate which in the language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo speaks with “a reverberating clang that drowns all weaker
sounds.” With due respect, the grant of indemnity to the dismissed
employee “as both penalty and disincentive” as the majority
provides in the instant case does not square with the protection
accorded by the Constitution to labor. There is only one main relief
in cases of dismissal without notice and hearing—reinstatement.
Same; Same; Same; Compliance with procedural due process is
not a burden on employers.—Compliance with procedural due
process is not a burden on employers. There is no valid reason why
employers should have any difficulty according procedural due
process to their employees. The rules are fairly simple.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal without due process debases
human dignity.—Verily, dismissal without due process debases
human dignity. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the employer to
conduct a formal investigation and inform the employee of the
specific charges against him. Most certainly, the resolution of
extreme cases, e.g., where the employee threatens the life of the
employer, are the exceptions rather than the ordinary and usual
cases. As such, rules governing them should not be used as the
general rule. Rather, employers should be reminded that under our
system of government, even the most hardened criminals are given
their day in court. Employees are not entitled to anything less.
Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; In the hierarchy of
rights of an employee, the right to security of tenure is high, if not the
highest.—In the hierarchy of rights of an employee, the right to
security of tenure is high, if not the highest. Its paramount value is
recognized and guaranteed under our new Constitution.
Consequently, the first paragraph of Article XIII, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution, extends the protective mantle of the Constitution
to all of labor including the promotion of full employment. The
second paragraph specifies the guaranteed right to security of
tenure. All other rights, e.g., the right to collective bargaining and
negotiations,
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the right to peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike and
form unions, and the right to due process, merely complement the
right to job security. All these complementary rights are meaningless
to an unemployed Juan De la Cruz.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Workers need work more than
anything else—work is a defining feature of human existence.—
Workers need work more than anything else. For a wageworker, a
job is important. While there is work, there is food on the table. Take
away work, replace it with a meager lump sum, and the food will
disappear. Through work, the breadwinner satisfies his basic needs
and those of his family. He also provides himself with a means to
express himself, transform, develop and perfect his skills and
talents. Through work, he interacts and establishes relations with
others. Work is a defining feature of human existence. It is the
means of sustaining life and meeting essential needs. It is also an
activity through which individuals affirm their own identity, both to
themselves and to those around them. It is crucial to individual
choice, to the welfare of families and to the stability of societies.
Every man has the right to work, to a chance to develop his qualities
and his personality in the exercise of his profession, to equitable
remuneration which will enable him and his family to lead a worthy
life on material, social, cultural and spiritual level. Shylock said it
well: “You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; To simply allow payment of
nominal damages for violation of employee’s right to due process is
to give undue advantage to employers—the right to security of tenure
and due process is beyond monetary valuation.—To simply allow
payment of nominal damages for violation of employee’s right to due
process is to give undue advantage to employers. One does not need
to have a stratospheric mind to know that the Constitution gave
greater rights to employees over their employers. The intent is to
equalize the fight of the underprivileged against the overprivileged.
We cannot allow the employers to marginalize the right of the
workingman to due process for a few pesos without mocking the
protection accorded by the Constitution to the powerless. The
deprivation of the right to security of tenure and due process is
beyond monetary valuation.In fine, to lengthen the longevity
of Serrano is to sharpen the dangerous divide between the haves
and have-nots in our society. But Agabon is not merely
extending Serrano. Agabon is far worse than Serrano.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; In these times when our lowly
workers can hardly maintain body and soul together due to their
meager means, I find it hard to believe that the majority in Wenphil,
in Serrano, and now in the instant case Agabon, persists in
weakening our employee’s right to job security.—In these times when
our lowly workers can hardly maintain body and soul together due
to their meager means, I find it hard to believe that the majority
in Wenphil, in Serrano, and now in the instant case Agabon,
persists in weakening our employee’s right to job security. The
stance simply offends a basic principle of justice so entrenched in
our tradition and etched in our conscience. An employee may not
have a Torrens title to his job but it is not too much to require that
before he is dismissed by his employer, he should be given a simple
notice of the cause of his dismissal and a summary hearing to
present his side. All our constitutional and statutory precepts on
social justice and the protection of labor will go to naught if we
perpetuate our ruling that a dismissal without the required prior
notice is valid and if we just penalize with the payment of
pennies violations of the employee’s right to due process. Without
doubt, Wenphil and Serranohave lengthened the queue of the
unemployed. Agabon will stretch it out even more.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court should protect
labor and it should walk the talk.—In the case at bar, where
petitioners Jenny Agabon and Virgilio Agabon were dismissed from
the service for abandonment of work without the due process
requirements of two (2) notices and hearing, I submit that the
dismissals should be nullified and set aside, and petitioners
immediately reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges. This Court should protect labor and it should walk the
talk.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; I respectfully
submit that nothing has transpired in the past four and half years
since Serrano was issued, that justifies further diminution of
whatever constitutional rights to due process and security of tenure
our workers still enjoy.—With due respect, I strongly oppose the
Court’s inexplicable turnaround. This ruling is a setback on labor’s
rights. Thus, I reiterate my Dissent in Serrano, in that case, I was
grateful enough that the Court had decided to reexamine and
modify the ten-year Wenphil doctrine. In the process, it had at least
increased the monetary award that should go to the dismissed
employee—from a
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nominal sum in the concept of “indemnity or damages” to “full
back wages.” I respectfully submit that nothing has transpired in
the past four and a half years since Serrano was issued, that
justifies further diminution of whatever constitutional rights to due
process and security of tenure our workers still enjoy. On the
contrary, nothing is more evident than the inescapable fact that
their empowerment makes them better partners in the country’s
development and global competence. Any further trampling of their
rights is undeserved.
Same; Same; Same; When an employee is dismissed without
due process, the legal effect is an illegal dismissal, and the
appropriate sanction is full back wages plus reinstatement, not
merely full back wages (or separation pay), much less merely
“indemnity of one month salary for every year of service.”—As
explained in my Dissenting Opinion in Serrano, the notice
requirement finds basis not only in the Labor Code but, more
important, in the due process clause of the Constitution.
Consequently, when an employee is dismissed without due process,
the legal effect is an illegaldismissal; and the appropriate sanction
is full back wages plus reinstatement,not merely full back wages (or
separation pay), much less merely “indemnity of one month salary
for every year of service.” It is jurisprudential settled that when
procedural due process is violated, the proceedings—in this case, the
dismissal—shall be voided, and the parties returned to their status
quo ante; that is, the employees should be given back their old jobs
and paid all benefits as if they have never been dismissed. In ruling
that the dismissal should be deemed legal, the majority has
virtually rendered nugatory the employees’ right to due process as
mandated by law and the Constitution. It has implicitly allowed the
employer simply to ignore such right and just pay the employee. I
respectfully submit that illegal dismissal results not only from the
absence of a legal cause, in accordance with Articles 282 to 284 of
the Labor Code, but likewise from the failure to observe due process.
There are many labor and other cases in which acts violative of due
process have unequivocally been declared illegal by the Court. They
range from similar cases of employment termination to criminal
prosecutions to administrative cases and election cases as well. I
made a summary of these Decisions in my
aforesaid Serrano Opinion, which I shall no longer repeat here.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The traditional
doctrine that constitutional rights may be invoked only against the
State
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should be modified to enable the judiciary to cope with new
paradigms and to continue protecting the people from new forms of
abuses.—True, traditional doctrine holds that constitutional rights
may be invoked only against the State, which in the past was the
only entity in a position to violate these rights, including the due
process clause. However, with the advent of liberalization,
deregulation and privatization, the State tended to cede some of its
powers to the “market forces.” Hence, corporate behemoths and even
individuals may now be sources of abuses and threats to human
rights and liberties. I believe, therefore, that this traditional
doctrine should be modified to enable the judiciary to cope with new
paradigms and to continue protecting the people from new forms of
abuses.
TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; The
importance of sending the notice of termination should not be
trivialized—the termination letter serves as indubitable proof of loss
of employment, and its receipt compels the employee to evaluate his
or next options.—The importance of sending the notice of
termination should not be trivialized. The termination letter serves
as indubitable proof of loss of employment, and its receipt compels
the employee to evaluate his or her next options. Without such
notice, the employee may be left uncertain of his fate; thus, its
service is mandated by the Implementing Rules. Non-compliance
with the notice rule, as evident in this case, contravenes the
Implementing Rules. But does the violation serve to invalidate the
Agabons’ dismissal for just cause?
Same; Same; Same; The Court, prior to the enactment of the
Labor Code, was ill-receptive to the notion that termination for just
cause without notice or hearing violated the constitutional right to
due process.—Clearly, the Court, prior to the enactment of the Labor
Code, was ill-receptive to the notion that termination for just cause
without notice or hearing violated the constitutional right to due
process. Nonetheless, the Court recognized an award of damages as
the appropriate remedy. In Galsim v. PNB, the Court held: Of
course, the employer’s prerogative to dismiss employees hired
without a definite period may be with or without cause. But if the
manner in which such right is exercised is abusive, the employer
stands to answer to the dismissed employee for damages.
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 Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code, in its inception, did not
require notice or hearing before an employer could terminate an
employee for just cause.—The Termination Pay Law was among the
repealed laws with the enactment of the Labor Code in 1974.
Significantly, the Labor Code, in its inception, did not require notice
or hearing before an employer could terminate an employee for just
cause. As Justice Mendoza explained: Where the termination of
employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to be given
to the employee. It was only on September 4, 1981 that notice was
required to be given even where the dismissal or termination of an
employee was for cause. This was made in the rules issued by the
then Minister of Labor and Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130
which amended the Labor Code. And it was still much later when
the notice requirement was embodied in the law with the
amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989.
Same; Same; Same; It cannot be denied though that the
thinking that absence of notice or hearing prior to termination
constituted a constitutional violation has gained a jurisprudential
foothold with the Court.—It cannot be denied though that the
thinking that absence of notice or hearing prior to termination
constituted a constitutional violation has gained a jurisprudential
foothold with the Court. Justice Puno, in his Dissenting Opinion,
cites several cases in support of this theory, beginning
with Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that “the failure of petitioner to give the
private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed
constitutes an infringement on his constitutional right to due
process of law.” Still, this theory has been refuted, pellucidly and
effectively to my mind, by Justice Mendoza’s disquisition
in Serrano.
Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Judicial
Legislation; Theories, no matter how entrancing, remain theoretical
unless adopted by legislation, or more controversially, by judicial
opinion.—Justice Puno characterizes the notion that constitutional
due process limits government action alone as “passé,” and adverts
to nouvelle vague theories which assert that private conduct may be
restrained by constitutional due process. His dissent alludes to the
American experience making references to the post-Civil War/pre-
World War II era when the US Supreme Court seemed overly
solicitous to the rights of big business over those of the workers.
Theories, no matter
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how entrancing, remain theoretical unless adopted by
legislation, or more controversially, by judicial opinion. There were
a few decisions of the US Supreme Court that, ostensibly, imposed
on private persons the values of the constitutional guarantees.
However, in deciding the cases, the American High Court found it
necessary to link the actors to adequate elements of the “State” since
the Fourteenth Amendment plainly begins with the words “No State
shall . . .” More crucially to the American experience, it had become
necessary to pass legislation in order to compel private persons to
observe constitutional values. While the equal protection clause was
deemed sufficient by the Warren Court to bar racial segregation in
public facilities, it necessitated enactment of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 to prohibit segregation as enforced by private persons within
their property. In this jurisdiction, I have trust in the statutory
regime that governs the correction of private wrongs. There are
thousands of statutes, some penal or regulatory in nature, that are
the source of actionable claims against private persons. There is
even no stopping the State, through the legislative cauldron, from
compelling private individuals, under pain of legal sanction, into
observing the norms ordained in the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; The strained analogy between the State
and a private employer does not square since the attributes of an
employer are starkly incongruous with those of the State—employers
plainly do not possess the awesome powers and the tremendous
resources which the State has at its command.—Justice
Panganiban’s Separate Opinion asserts that corporate behemoths
and even individuals may now be sources of abuses and threats to
human rights and liberties. The concern is not unfounded, but
appropriate remedies exist within our statutes, and so resort to the
constitutional trump card is not necessary. Even if we were to
engage the premise, the proper juristic exercise should be to
examine whether an employer has taken the attributes of the State
so that it could be compelled by the Constitution to observe the
proscriptions of the Bill of Rights. But the strained analogy simply
does not square since the attributes of an employer are starkly
incongruous with those of the State. Employers plainly do not
possess the awesome powers and the tremendous resources which
the State has at its command. The differences between the State
and employers are not merely literal, but extend to their very
essences. Unlike the State, the raison d’etre of employers in
business is to accumulate profits. Perhaps the State
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and the employer are similarly capacitated to inflict injury or
discomfort on persons under their control, but the same power is
also possessed by a school principal, hospital administrator, or a
religious leader, among many others. Indeed, the scope and reach of
authority of an employer pales in comparison with that of the State.
There is no basis to conclude that an employer, or even the employer
class, may be deemed a de facto state and on that premise,
compelled to observe the Bill of Rights. There is simply no nexus in
their functions, distaff as they are, that renders it necessary to
accord the same jurisprudential treatment.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy to rightward judicial bias is
not leftward judicial bias—the more proper judicial attitude is to
give due respect to legislative prerogatives, regardless of the
ideological sauce they are dipped in.—It may be so, as alluded in the
dissent of Justice Puno, that a conservative court system overly
solicitous to the concerns of business may consciously gut away at
rights or privileges owing to the labor sector. This certainly
happened before in the United States in the early part of the
twentieth century, when the progressive labor legislation such as
that enacted during President Roosevelt’s New Deal regime—most
of them addressing problems of labor—were struck down by an arch-
conservative Court. The preferred rationale then was to enshrine
within the constitutional order business prerogatives, rendering
them superior to the express legislative intent. Curiously, following
its judicial philosophy at the time the U.S. Supreme Court made due
process guarantee towards employers prevail over the police power
to defeat the cause of labor. Of course, this Court should not be
insensate to the means and methods by which the entrenched
powerful class may maneuver the sociopolitical system to ensure
self-preservation. However, the remedy to rightward judicial bias is
not leftward judicial bias. The more proper judicial attitude is to
give due respect to legislative prerogatives, regardless of the
ideological sauce they are dipped in.
Same; Same; Same; While the Bill of Rights maintains a
position of primacy in the constitutional hierarchy, it has scope and
limitations that must be respected and asserted by the Court, even
though they may at times serve somewhat bitter ends.—While the
Bill of Rights maintains a position of primacy in the constitutional
hierarchy, it has scope and limitations that must be respected and
asserted by the Court, even though they may at times serve
somewhat
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bitter ends. The dissenting opinions are palpably distressed at
the effect of the Decision, which will undoubtedly provoke those
reflexively sympathetic to the labor class. But haphazard legal
theory cannot be used to justify the obverse result. The adoption of
the dissenting views would give rise to all sorts of absurd
constitutional claims. An excommunicated Catholic might demand
his/her reinstatement into the good graces of the Church and into
communion on the ground that excommunication was violative of
the constitutional right to due process. A celebrity contracted to
endorse Pepsi Cola might sue in court to void a stipulation that
prevents him/her from singing the praises of Coca Cola once in a
while, on the ground that such stipulation violates the
constitutional right to free speech. An employee might sue to
prevent the employer from reading outgoing e-mail sent through the
company server using the company e-mail address, on the ground
that the constitutional right to privacy of communication would be
breached.
Same; Same; Same; We must avoid overarching declarations in
order to justify an end result beneficial to labor.—The above
concerns do not in anyway serve to trivialize the interests of labor.
But we must avoid overarching declarations in order to justify an
end result beneficial to labor. I dread the doctrinal acceptance of the
notion that the Bill of Rights, on its own, affords protection and
sanctuary not just from the acts of State but also from the conduct
of private persons. Natural and juridical persons would hesitate to
interact for fear that a misstep could lead to their being charged in
court as a constitutional violator. Private institutions that thrive on
their exclusivity, such as churches or cliquish groups, could be
forced to renege on their traditional tenets, including vows of
secrecy and the like, if deemed by the Court as inconsistent with the
Bill of Rights. Indeed, that fundamental right of all private persons
to be let alone would be forever diminished because of a questionable
notion that contravenes with centuries of political thought.
Same; Same; Same; It is not difficult to be enraptured by novel
legal ideas—their characterization is susceptible to the same
marketing traps that hook consumers to new products; Before we join
the mad rush in order to proclaim a theory as “brilliant,” a rigorous
test must first be employed to determine whether it complements or
contradicts our own system of laws and juristic thought; Just as
patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels, the broad constitutional
claim
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that the Bill of Rights may be invoked to invalidate actions by
private entities against private individuals is the final resort of the
desperate litigant.—It is not difficult to be enraptured by novel legal
ideas. Their characterization is susceptible to the same marketing
traps that hook consumers to new products. With the help of unique
wrapping, a catchy label, and testimonials from professed experts
from exotic lands, a malodorous idea may gain wide acceptance,
even among those self-possessed with their own heightened senses
of perception. Yet before we join the mad rush in order to proclaim
a theory as “brilliant,” a rigorous test must first be employed to
determine whether it complements or contradicts our own system of
laws and juristic thought. Without such analysis, we run the risk of
abnegating the doctrines we have fostered for decades and the
protections they may have implanted into our way of life. Should the
Court adopt the view that the Bill of Rights may be invoked to
invalidate actions by private entities against private individuals,
the Court would open the floodgates to, and the docket would be
swamped with, litigations of the scurrilous sort. Just as patriotism
is the last refuge of scoundrels, the broad constitutional claim is the
final resort of the desperate litigant.
Same; Labor Law; Due Process; It was only after the enactment
of the Labor Code that the doctrine relied upon by the dissenting
opinions became en vogue.—It is quite apparent that the
constitutional protection of labor was entrenched more than eight
decades ago, yet such did not prevent this Court in the past from
affirming dismissals for just cause without valid notice. Nor was
there any pretense made that this constitutional maxim afforded a
laborer a positive right against dismissal for just cause on the
ground of lack of valid prior notice. As demonstrated earlier, it was
only after the enactment of the Labor Code that the doctrine relied
upon by the dissenting opinions became en vogue. This point
highlights my position that the violation of the notice requirement
has statutory moorings, not constitutional.
 Same; Same; Same; Without specific and pertinent legislation,
judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to
approximate at least the aims of the Constitution—ultimately,
therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of
a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee
for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing.—
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Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and
security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that
these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need
for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the
constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise
of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of
such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. The guarantees of “full protection to labor” and
“security of tenure,” when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a
blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an
unimpeachable right to continued employment—a utopian notion,
doubtless—but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of
these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not
only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers’ as well.
Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at
a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the
aims of the Constitution. Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article
XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to
stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the
failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several
framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice
require legislative enactments for their enforceability.
Same; Same; Same; The Court’s reference to laws other than the
Constitution in resolving the issue of dismissal is an implicit
acknowledgment that the right to security of tenure, while recognized
in the Constitution, cannot be implemented uniformly absent a law
prescribing concrete standards for its enforcement.—The necessity
for laws concretizing the constitutional principles on the protection
of labor is evident in the reliance placed upon such laws by the Court
in resolving the issue of the validity of a worker’s dismissal. In cases
where that was the issue confronting the Court, it consistently
recognized the constitutional right to security of tenure and
employed the standards laid down by prevailing laws in
determining whether such right was violated. The Court’s reference
to laws other than the Constitution in resolving the issue of
dismissal is an implicit acknowledgment that the right to security
of tenure, while recognized
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in the Constitution, cannot be implemented uniformly absent a
law prescribing concrete standards for its enforcement. As discussed
earlier, the validity of an employee’s dismissal in previous cases was
examined by the Court in accordance with the standards laid down
by Congress in the Termination Pay Law, and subsequently, the
Labor Code and the amendments thereto. At present, the validity of
an employee’s dismissal is weighed against the standards laid down
in Article 279, as well as Article 282 in relation to Article 277(b) of
the Labor Code, for a dismissal for just cause, and Article 283 for a
dismissal for an authorized cause.
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; The
circumstances distinguishing just and authorized causes are too
markedly different to be subjected to the same rules and reasoning in
interpretation.—Before I proceed with my discussion on dismissals
for just causes, a brief comment regarding dismissals for authorized
cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code. While the justiciable
question in Serrano pertained to a dismissal for unauthorized
cause, the ruling therein was crafted as definitive to dismissals for
just cause. Happily, the Decision today does not adopt the same
unwise tack. It should be recognized that dismissals for just cause
and dismissals for authorized cause are governed by different
provisions, entail divergent requisites, and animated by distinct
rationales. The language of Article 283 expressly effects the
termination for authorized cause to the service of written notice on
the workers and the Ministry of Labor at least one (1) month before
the intended date of termination. This constitutes an eminent
difference than dismissals for just cause, wherein the causal
relation between the notice and the dismissal is not expressly
stipulated. The circumstances distinguishing just and authorized
causes are too markedly different to be subjected to the same rules
and reasoning in interpretation.
Same; Same; Same; There is no express provision in the Labor
Code that voids a dismissal for just cause on the ground that there
was no notice or hearing—based on reading Section 279 alone, the
existence of just cause by itself is sufficient to validate the
termination.—There is no express provision in the Labor Code that
voids a dismissal for just cause on the ground that there was no
notice or hearing. Under Section 279, the employer is precluded
from dismissing an employee except for a just cause as provided in
Section 282, or an authorized cause under Sections 283 and 284.
Based on reading
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Section 279 alone, the existence of just cause by itself is
sufficient to validate the termination.
Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; The remedy of
reinstatement despite termination for just cause is simply not
authorized by the Labor Code.—The failure to substantially comply
with the standards of due process, including the notice and hearing
requirement, may give rise to an actionable claim against the
employer. Under Article 288, penalties may arise from violations of
any provision of the Labor Code. The Secretary of Labor likewise
enjoys broad powers to inquire into existing relations between
employers and employees. Systematic violations by management of
the statutory right to due process would fall under the broad grant
of power to the Secretary of Labor to investigate under Article 273.
However, the remedy of reinstatement despite termination for just
cause is simply not authorized by the Labor Code. Neither the Labor
Code nor its implementing rules states that a termination for just
cause is voided because the requirement of notice and hearing was
not observed. This is not simply an inadvertent semantic failure, but
a conscious effort to protect the prerogatives of the employer to
dismiss an employee for just cause. Notably, despite the several
pronouncements by this Court in the past equating the notice-
hearing requirement in labor cases to a constitutional maxim,
neither the legislature nor the executive has adopted the same tack,
even gutting the protection to provide that substantial compliance
with due process suffices. The Labor Code significantly eroded
management prerogatives in the hiring and firing of employees.
Whereas employees could be dismissed even without just cause
under the Termination Pay Law, the Labor Code affords workers
broad security of tenure. Still, the law recognizes the right of the
employer to terminate for just cause. The just causes enumerated
under the Labor Code—serious misconduct or willful disobedience,
gross and habitual neglect, fraud or willful breach of trust,
commission of a crime by the employee against the employer, and
other analogous causes—are characterized by the harmful behavior
of an employee against the business or the person of the employer.
These just causes for termination are not negated by the absence of
notice or hearing. An employee who tries to kill the employer cannot
be magically absolved of trespasses just because the employer forgot
to serve due notice. Or a less extreme example, the gross and
habitual neglect of an employee will not be improved upon
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 just because the employer failed to conduct a hearing prior to
termination.
Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code presents no textually
demonstrable commitment to invalidate a dismissal for just cause
due to the absence of notice or hearing.—The Labor Code presents
no textually demonstrable commitment to invalidate a dismissal for
just cause due to the absence of notice or hearing. This is not
surprising, as such remedy will not restore the employer or
employee into equity. Absent a showing of integral causation, the
mutual infliction of wrongs does not negate either injury, but
instead enforces two independent rights of relief.
Same; Same; Separation Pay; Supreme Court; Equity
Jurisdiction; The award of separation pay as a measure of social
justice has no statutory basis, but clearly emanates from the Court’s
so-called “equity jurisdiction.”—The award of separation pay as a
measure of social justice has no statutory basis, but clearly
emanates from the Court’s so-called “equity jurisdiction.” The
Court’s equity jurisdiction as a basis for award, no matter what form
it may take, is likewise unwarranted in this case. Easy resort to
equity should be avoided, as it should yield to positive rules which
pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Abstract as the concept
is, it does not admit to definite and objective standards.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Social justice should be the
aspiration of all that we do, yet I think it the more mature attitude
to consider that it ebbs and flows within our statutes, rather than
view it as an independent source of funding.—I consider the
pronouncement regarding the proper monetary awards in such
cases as Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, Reta, and to a degree,
even Serrano as premised in part on equity. This decision is
premised in part due to the absence of cited statutory basis for these
awards. In these cases, the Court deemed an indemnity award
proper without exactly saying where in statute could such award be
derived at. Perhaps, equity or social justice can be invoked as basis
for the award. However, this sort of arbitrariness, indeterminacy
and judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives is precisely the
source of my discontent. Social justice should be the aspiration of all
that we do, yet I think it the more mature attitude to consider that
it ebbs and flows within our statutes, rather than view it as an
independent source of funding.
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600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Criminal Law; Under Art. 288 of the Labor Code, which
is a penal provision, the penalty should be paid to the State, and not
to the person or persons who may have suffered injury as a result of
the violation; Art. 288 clearly serves as a punitive fine, rather than a
compensatory measure—nothing in its language indicates an
intention to compensate or remunerate a private person for injury he
may have sustained.—It is apparent that Article 288 is a penal
provision; hence, the prescription for penalties such as fine and
imprisonment. The Article is also explicit that the imposition of fine
or imprisonment is at the “discretion of the court.” Thus, the
proceedings under the provision is penal in character. The criminal
case has to be instituted before the proper courts, and the Labor
Code violation subject thereof duly proven in an adversarial
proceeding. Hence, Article 288 cannot apply in this case and serve
as basis to impose a penalty on Riviera Homes. I also maintain that
under Article 288 the penalty should be paid to the State, and not
to the person or persons who may have suffered injury as a result of
the violation. A penalty is a sum of money which the law requires to
be paid by way of punishment for doing some act which is prohibited
or for not doing some act which is required to be done. A penalty
should be distinguished from damages which is the pecuniary
compensation or indemnity to a person who has suffered loss,
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, on
account of the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another.
Article 288 clearly serves as a punitive fine, rather than a
compensatory measure, since the provision penalizes an act that
violates the Labor Code even if such act does not cause actual injury
to any private person. Independent of the employee’s interests
protected by the Labor Code is the interest of the State in seeing to
it that its regulatory laws are complied with. Article 288 is intended
to satiate the latter interest. Nothing in the language of Article 288
indicates an intention to compensate or remunerate a private
person for injury he may have sustained.
Same; Damages; The proper legal basis for holding the
employer liable for monetary damages to the employee dismissed for
just cause is the Civil Code.—As earlier stated, Wenphil allowed the
payment of indemnity to the employee dismissed for just cause is
dependent on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
committed by the employer. However, I considered Wenphil flawed
insofar as it is silent as to the statutory basis for the indemnity
award. This failure, to my mind, renders it unwise for to reinstate
601
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
the Wenphil rule, and foster the impression that it is the
judicial business to invent awards for damages without clear
statutory basis. The proper legal basis for holding the employer
liable for monetary damages to the employee dismissed for just cause
is the Civil Code. The award of damages should be measured against
the loss or injury suffered by the employee by reason of the employer’s
violation or, in case of nominal damages, the right vindicated by the
award. This is the proper paradigm authorized by our law, and
designed to obtain the fairest possible relief.
Same; Same; The damages referred under Section 217(4) of the
Labor Code are those available under the Civil Code, it being the law
that regulates the private relations of the members of civil society,
determining their respective rights and obligations with reference to
persons, things, and civil acts.—The damages referred under
Section 217(4) of the Labor Code are those available under the Civil
Code. It is but proper that the Civil Code serve as the basis for the
indemnity, it being the law that regulates the private relations of
the members of civil society, determining their respective rights and
obligations with reference to persons, things, and civil acts. No
matter how impressed with the public interest the relationship
between a private employer and employee is, it still is ultimately a
relationship between private individuals. Notably, even though the
Labor Code could very well have provided set rules for damages
arising from the employer-employee relationship, referral was
instead made to the concept of damages as enumerated and defined
under the Civil Code.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioners.
Nestor P. Ricolcol for private respondents.
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the decision of the
1
Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
63017, modifying the decision of National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 023442-00.
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is
engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio
Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when
2
they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the
3
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals
illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary
claims. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the termination of
the complainants illegal. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered
to pay them their backwages up to November 29, 1999 in the sum
of:
1. 1.Jenny M. Agabon—P56, 231.93
2. 2.Virgilio C. Agabon—56, 231.93
and, in lieu of reinstatement to pay them their separation pay of
one (1) month for every year of service from date of hiring up to
November 29, 1999.
Respondent is further ordered to pay the complainants their
holiday pay and service incentive leave pay for the years 1996, 1997
and 1998 as well as their premium pay for holidays and rest days
and Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay differential amounting to
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate
Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Danilo B. Pine.
2 Rollo, p. 41.
3 Id., pp. 13-14.
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (P2,150.00) Pesos, or
the aggregate amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT & 93/100
(P121,678.93) Pesos for Jenny Agabon, and ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
EIGHT & 93/100 (P123,828.93) Pesos for Virgilio Agabon, as per
attached computation of Julieta C. Nicolas, OIC, Research and
Computation Unit, NCR.
SO ORDERED.’ ” 4
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it
found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and
were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other
money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied
for lack of evidence. 5
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the
petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their
employment but ordered the payment of money claims. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is REVERSED only insofar as it dismissed petitioner’s
money claims. Private respondents are ordered to pay petitioners
holiday pay for four (4) regular holidays in 1996, 1997, and 1998, as
well as their service incentive leave pay for said years, and to pay
the balance of petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay for 1998
in the amount of P2,150.00.
“SO ORDERED.” 6
Hence, this petition for review on the sole issue of whether
petitioners were illegally dismissed. 7
_______________
4 Id., p. 92.
603 5 Id., p. 131.
6 Id., p. 173.
7 Id., p. 20.
604
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the
private respondent refused to give them assignments unless
they agreed to work on a “pakyaw” basis when they reported
for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not agree on this
arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social
Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners also claim that
private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements
of notice and hearing. 8
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that
petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their
work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last
9
known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for
work. Private respondent’s manager even talked to petitioner
Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to tell
him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers
involving 40,000 square meters of cornice installation work.
However, petitioners did not report for work because they had
subcontracted to perform installation work for another
company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their
wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted,
petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal
dismissal case. 10
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even
finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence.
This is especially so when such findings were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. However, if the factual findings of the NLRC
11
and the Labor Arbiter are conflicting, as in this case,
_______________
8 Id., pp. 21-23.
9 Id., p. 45.
10 Id., pp. 42-43.
11 Rosario v. Victory Ricemill, G.R. No. 147572, 19 February 2003, 397
SCRA 760, 767.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 605
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine
for itself the questioned findings. 12
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of
the facts, ruled that petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause.
They had abandoned their employment and were already
working for another employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates
13
the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s representative in
connection with the employee’s work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or his duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of
14
duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the
employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two
15
factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship,
_______________
12 Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, 27 February 2003, 398
SCRA 288, 298.
13 Santos v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 149416, 14 March 2003, 399
SCRA 172, 182.
14 Columbus Philippine Bus Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 417 Phil. 81, 100; 364 SCRA 606, 622 (2001).
15 De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 364 Phil. 91, 102; 304 SCRA 448, 458 (1999).
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606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
with the second as the more determinative factor which is
manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that
the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that
it was deliberate and unjustified. 16
In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent
having subcontracted for an installation work for another
company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed
the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
with private respondent. This was not the first time they did
this. In January 1996, they did not report for work because
they were working for another company. Private respondent
at that time warned petitioners that they would be dismissed
if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning
and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-
employee relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted
out to him. 17
In Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave, we held that an employee
18
who deliberately absented from work without leave or
permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a
job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job. We
should apply that rule with more reason here where
petitioners were absent because they were already working in
another company.
The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as
providing just compensation to workers, observance of the
procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the
termination of employment. On the other hand, the law also
recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers
not
_______________
16 Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
144483, 19 November 2003, 416 SCRA 233.
17Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 111155, 23 October 1997, 281 SCRA 146, 153-154.
18 G.R. No. L-49875, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 472, 478.
607
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 607
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also
good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled
19
to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the
service will patently be inimical to his interests. 20
After establishing that the terminations were for a just and
valid cause, we now determine if the procedures for dismissal
were observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in
Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice.—In all cases of
termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
1. I.For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:
1. (a)A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side;
2. (b)A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
3. (c)A written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
 In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on
the employee’s last known address.
_______________
19 Judy Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 352 Phil.
593, 606; 289 SCRA 755, 766 (1998).
20 Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 343 Phil. 284, 291; 277 SCRA 506, 512 (1997).
608
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions
attributable to the employee while dismissals based on
authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code
which allow the employer to terminate employees. A
termination for an authorized cause requires payment of
separation pay. When the termination of employment is
declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages are
mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer
possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may
be granted.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of
his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be
derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282
of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283,
or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was
observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause
but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just
or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the
dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was
not observed.
In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid
and the employer will not suffer any liability.
In the second and third situations where the dismissals are
illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 609
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld.
While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not
invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be
held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation.
The dismissal should be upheld because it was established
that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices
to the last known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the
private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law
mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last
known address. Thus, it should be held liable for
21
noncompliance with the procedural requirements of due
process.
A review and re-examination of the relevant legal
principles is appropriate and timely to clarify the various
rulings on employment termination in the light of Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission. 22
Prior to 1989, the rule was that a dismissal or termination
is illegal if the employee was not given any notice. In the 1989
case of Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commis-
sion, we reversed this long-standing rule and held that the
23
dismissed employee, although not given any notice and
hearing, was not entitled to reinstatement and backwages
because the dismissal was for grave misconduct and
insubordination, a just ground for termination under Article
282. The employee
_______________
21 See Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 128395, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 713, 720.
22 G.R. No. 117040, 27 January 2000, 323 SCRA 445.
23 G.R. No. 80587, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 69.
610
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
had a violent temper and caused trouble during office hours,
defying superiors who tried to pacify him. We concluded that
reinstating the employee and awarding backwages “may
encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of
the rules of discipline that employees are required to
observe.” We further held that:
24
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent
for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his
former employment.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for
failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation
before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed.
The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause
and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the
second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its
failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as
required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment.
Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must
indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The
measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the
gravity of the omission committed by the employer. 25
The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason
to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer
will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This
became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.
On January 27, 2000, in Serrano, the rule on the extent of
the sanction was changed. We held that the violation by the
employer of the notice requirement in termination for just or
authorized causes was not a denial of due process that will
nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is ineffectual
and the employer must pay full backwages from the time of
_______________
24 Id., at p. 76.
25 Id.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 611
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal
was for a just or authorized cause.
The rationale for the re-examination of
the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the significant number
of cases involving dismissals without requisite notices. We
concluded that the imposition of penalty by way of damages
for violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a
deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full backwages
from the time of dismissal until the time the Court finds the
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to
“dismiss now and pay later” by imposing full backwages.
We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did not
consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code
which states:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for
any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law.
Payment of backwages and other benefits, including
reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was unjustly
dismissed.
The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and
injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to
revisit the doctrine.
To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of
our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civi-
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
lized society as conceived by our entire history. Due process is
that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair
and right and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the
26
legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of
the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor
Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.
Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found
in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule
I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and
10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the
27
Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be
differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due
process.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found
in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees
from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice
and hearing.
In Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the dismissal was for a just and valid cause but
28
the employee was not accorded due process. The dismissal was
upheld by the Court but the employer was sanctioned. The
sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty,
and
_______________
26 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Due process is violated if a practice or rule “offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental;” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
27 Department Order No. 9 took effect on 21 June 1997. Department Order
No. 10 took effect on 22 June 1997.
28 G.R. No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 535.
613
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 613
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the
omission committed by the employer.
In Nath v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was 29
ruled that even if the employee was not given due process, the
failure did not operate to eradicate the just causes for
dismissal. The dismissal being for just cause, albeit without
due process, did not entitle the employee to reinstatement,
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate opinion in MGG
Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, which opinion he reiterated in Serrano, stated:
30
C. Where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not
been properly observed by an employer, it would not be right to
order either the reinstatement of the dismissed employee or the
payment of backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with
the procedure prescribed by law in terminating the services of the
employee, the employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any
case, should be made liable, for the payment of separation pay. It
might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the hearing to
be conducted generally constitute the two-part due process
requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the employer.
Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain
situations where to undertake the above steps would be no more
than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be
imprudent to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of
separation pay, nominal damages to the employee. x x x. 31
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent
doctrines in the law on employment termination, we believe
that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without
observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the
better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow
_______________
29 G.R. No. 122666, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 386.
30 G.R. No. 114313, 29 July 1996, 259 SCRA 699, 700.
31 Serrano, supra, Vitug, J., Separate (Concurring and Dissenting)
Opinion, 323 SCRA 524, 529-530 (2000).
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614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but
imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however,
must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this
Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing
justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals
for valid or authorized causes but not complying with
statutory due process may have far-reaching consequences.
This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most
notorious violators of company policy are rewarded by
invoking due process. This also creates absurd situations
where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal but a
procedural infirmity invalidates the termination. Let us take
for example a case where the employee is caught stealing or
threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a
criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or where serious
business losses demand that operations be ceased in less than
a month. Invalidating the dismissal would not serve public
interest. It could also discourage investments that can
generate employment in the local economy.
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor
is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not
prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the
right, as in this case. Certainly, an employer should not be
32
compelled to pay employees for work not actually performed
and in fact abandoned.
The employer should not be compelled to continue
employing a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently
inimical to the employer. The law protecting the rights of the
la-
_______________
32 Capili v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117378, 26
March 1997, 270 SCRA 488, 495.
615
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 615
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
borer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. 33
It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners
committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the
requirements of due process were complied with, would
undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of
Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice
Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term
suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must
be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.” 34
This is not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled
the way it did in Wenphil, Serrano and related cases. Social
justice is not based on rigid formulas set in stone. It has to
allow for changing times and circumstances.
Justice Isagani Cruz strongly asserts the need to apply a
balanced approach to labor-management relations and
dispense justice with an even hand in every case:
We have repeatedly stressed that social justice—or any justice for
that matter—is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his
mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of
reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for
_______________
33 Filipro, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-70546,
16 October 1986, 145 SCRA 123.
34 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 735 (1940).
616
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law. 35
Justice in every case should only be for the deserving party. It
should not be presumed that every case of illegal dismissal
would automatically be decided in favor of labor, as
management has rights that should be fully respected and
enforced by this Court. As interdependent and indispensable
partners in nation-building, labor and management need each
other to foster productivity and economic growth; hence, the
need to weigh and balance the rights and welfare of both the
employee and employer.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor
Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should
36
be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now,
pay later,” which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The
sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty
and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the
employer.
Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him. 37
_______________
35 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 608,
616.
36 G.R. No. 112100, 27 May 1994, 232 SCRA 613, 618.
37 Art. 2221, Civil Code.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor
Relations Commission, an employer is liable to pay indemnity
38
in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been
dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to
comply with the requirements of due process. The Court, after
considering the circumstances therein, fixed the indemnity at
P2,590.50, which was equivalent to the employee’s one month
salary. This indemnity is intended not to penalize the
employer but to vindicate or recognize the employee’s right to
statutory due process which was violated by the employer. 39
The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due
process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering 40
the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it
proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages
would serve to deter employers from future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it
provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
_______________
38 G.R. No. 108405, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 557 citing Kwikway
Engineering Works v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 85014,
22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 526, 532; Aurelio v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 99034, 12 April 1993, 221 SCRA 432, 443;
and Sampaguita Garments Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 102406, 17 June 1994, 233 SCRA 260, 265.
39 Id., citing Better Buildings, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 109714, 15 December 1997, 283 SCRA 242, 251; Iran v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121927, 22 April 1998, 289
617 SCRA 433, 442.
40 Savellano v. Northwest Airlines, G.R. No. 151783, 8 July 2003, 405 SCRA
416.
618
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Private respondent claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it failed to pay petitioners’ holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
We are not persuaded.
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court on petitioners’
money claims. Private respondent is liable for petitioners’
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay
without deductions.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden
of proving it. Even where the employee must allege non-
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the
employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to
prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the
pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents—which will show that overtime,
differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of
workers have been paid—are not in the possession of the
worker but in the custody and absolute control of the
employer. 41
In the case at bar, if private respondent indeed paid
petitioners’ holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, it
could have easily presented documentary proofs of such
monetary benefits to disprove the claims of the petitioners.
But it did not, except with respect to the 13th month pay
wherein it presented cash vouchers showing payments of the
benefit in the years disputed. Allegations by private
42
respondent that it does not operate during holidays and that
it allows its employees 10 days leave with pay, other than
being self-serving, do not constitute proof of payment.
Consequently, it failed to discharge the onus probandi thereby
making it liable for such claims to the petitioners.
Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the value of the shoes
from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay, we find the
_______________
41 Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 130935, 11 May
2000, 331 SCRA 686.
42 Rollo, pp. 60-71.
619
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 619
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of Presidential
Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of
the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the
same so as “to further protect the level of real wages from the
43
ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional
44
income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of
wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code, to wit:
(f) “Wage” paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or
earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms
of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or
other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the
employee . . .”
from which an employer is prohibited under Article 113 of 45
the same Code from making any deductions without the
employee’s knowledge and consent. In the instant case,
private
_______________
43 UST Faculty Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
90445, 2 October 1990, 190 SCRA 215.
44 “Whereas” clauses, P.D. No. 851.
 45“Art. 113. Wage deduction.—No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf
of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees
except:
1. (a)In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the
employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the
amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
2. (b)For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union
to check off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in
writing by the individual worker concerned; and
3. (c)In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
respondent failed to show that the deduction of the SSS
loanand the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio
Agabon’s13th month pay was authorized by the latter. The
lack ofauthority to deduct is further bolstered by the fact that
petitioner Virgilio Agabon included the same as one of his
moneyclaims against private respondent.
The Court of Appeals properly reinstated the monetary claims
awarded by the Labor Arbiter ordering the private respondent
to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular
holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00,
service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount
of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio Agabon’s thirteenth
month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that petitioners
Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their work, and
ordering private respondent to pay each of the petitioners
holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the
amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same
period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio
Agabon’s thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of
P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is
further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount
of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with
statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), I join Mr. Justice Puno in his
dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 621
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Panganiban, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I join Justice Puno in
his Dissent.
Austria-Martinez, J., I join in the separate opinion of
Justice Tinga.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Tinga, J., In the result, per separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., I concur in J. Puno’s dissenting
opinion.
Garcia, J., I join J. Puno’s dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
“Strike if you will, but hear me first!” was adjuration of
Themistocles, c. 528-462 B.C., Athenian General and
Statesman, to Eurybiades, Admiral of the Spartan fleet, who,
in an argument, raised his staff as though to strike him. It
1
was the same plea, centuries later, of petitioner-employees
Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilio C. Agabon to their employer
who fired them from their jobs without hearing them first.
In the last two decades, this Court has wrestled with due
process issues in dismissal cases. In February 1989, Wenphil
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission put an 2
abrupt end to the longstanding doctrine nullifying the
dismissal of an employee even if based on a just or authorized
cause, if done without prior notice to the
employee. Wenphil upheld the dismissal of a crew of a fast food
chain for just cause even if it was effected without the
requisite notice. And in compensation for the deprivation of
his prior right to notice and investigation before dismissal, he
was given a measly sum
_______________
1 Plutarch, Lives: Themistocles, Ch. 3, Sec. 11.
2 G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69.
622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
of P1,000.00. Since then, lowly employees have been cut-off
from their bloodline—their jobs—without due process of law.
A decade later, we re-examined Wenphil in Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission but the struggle of our
3
employees for job security turned from bad to worse.
In Serrano, the majority held that “the employer’s failure to
comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a
denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure
for the termination of employment which makes the
termination of employment merely ineffectual.” Thus, the
4
dismissal without prior notice was further legalized and the
dismissed employee was simply awarded some crumbs—
backwages from the time his employment was terminated
until it was determined that the termination was for an
authorized cause. I dissented and voted for the return of
the pre-Wenphil rule to stop the pernicious practice of
dismissals without prior notice.
After four years of the Serrano rule, I see no reason to
relent from my Dissenting Opinion as the situation has even
turned from worse to worst. Agabon is doing away with the
crumbs and is leaving the employee with no more than a tiny
bit of grain. As such, I feel the strong urgency to right away
revert to the pre-Wenphil era to rectify a grave error and atone
for the wanton, albeit now licensed, violation of the pre-
dismissal notice requirement committed by employers with
twisted ethos.
There are enduring reasons for resisting Wenphil, its
clone Serrano, and now their offspring Agabon. As I said
in Serrano—
Our ten (10) years experience with Wenphil is not a happy one.
Unscrupulous employers have abused the Wenphil ruling. They
have dismissed without notice employees including those who are
not as eminently undesirable as the Wenphil employee. They
dismissed
_______________
3 G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000, 323 SCRA 445.
4 Id., p. 472.
623
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 623
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
employees without notice as a general rule when it should be the
exception. The purpose of the pre-dismissal notice requirement was
entirely defeated by employers who were just too willing to pay an
indemnity for its violation. The result, as the majority concedes, is
that the indemnity we imposed has not been effective to prevent
unjust dismissals of employees. To be sure, this is even a supreme
understatement. The ugly truth is that Wenphil is the mother of
many unjust and unauthorized dismissals of employees who are too
weak to challenge their powerful employers.
As the Wenphil indemnity doctrine has proved to be highly
inimical to the interest of our employees, I humbly submit a return
to the pre-Wenphil rule where a reasonless violation of the pre-
dismissal notice requirement makes the dismissal of an employee
illegal and results in his reinstatement. In fine, we should strike
down as illegal the dismissal of an employee even if it is for a
justified end if it is done thru unjustified means for we cannot be
disciples of the Machiavellian doctrine of the end justifies the
means. With due respect, the majority decision comes too near this
mischievous doctrine by giving emphasis on the end and not on the
means of dismissal of employees. What grates is that the majority
today espouses a doctrine more pernicious than Wenphil for now it
announces that a violation of the pre-dismissal notice requirement
does not even concern due process. The reasons relied upon by the
majority for this new ruling against the job security of employees
cannot inspire assent.
xxx xxx xxx
The new ruling of the majority erodes the sanctity of the most
important right of an employee, his constitutional right to security
of tenure. This right will never be respected by the employer if we
merely honor the right with a price tag. The policy of “dismiss now
and pay later” favors [moneyed] employers and is a mockery of the
right of employees to social justice. There is no way to justify this
pro-employer stance when the 1987 Constitution is undeniably more
pro-employee than our previous fundamental laws. Section 18 of
Article 11 (State Policies) provides that “the State affirms labor as
a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare.” Section 1, Article XIII (Social Justice
and Human Rights), calls for the reduction of economic inequalities.
Section 3, Article XIII (Labor) directs the State to accord full
protection to labor and to guaranty security of tenure. These are
constitu-
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
tional polestars and not mere works of cosmetology. Our odes to the
poor will be meaningless mouthfuls if we cannot protect the
employee’s right to due process against the power of the peso of the
employers.
To an employee, a job is everything. Its loss involves terrible
repercussions—stoppage of the schooling of children, ejectment
from leased premises, hunger to the family, a life without any safety
net. Indeed, to many employees, dismissal is their lethal injection.
Mere payment of money by way of separation pay and backwages
will not secure food on the mouths of employees who do not even
have the right to choose what they will chew. 5
The instant case is a perfect portrait of this reversal of fortune.
On January 2, 1992, petitioners Jenny Agabon and Virgilio
Agabon were hired as gypsum board and cornice installers by
respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. Seven (7) years later, on February
23, 1999, their services were terminated on the ground of
abandonment of work. Apparently, petitioners were
subcontracting installation jobs for another company and were
frequently absent from work. Thus, when petitioners reported
for work on February 23, 1999, respondent company simply
refused to reemploy them unless they agree to work on a
“pakyaw” basis. Petitioners demurred since this would mean
losing their benefits. They were given their walking papers
without according them the twin requirements of notice and
hearing. Respondent company stated that they abandoned
their jobs. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of money claims against respondent
company.
 On December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter held that the
dismissal of petitioners was illegal and ordered respondent
company to pay them backwages, holiday and service
incentive leave pay, and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbi-
_______________
5 Id., pp. 499-500; 523-524.
625
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 625
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ter and ruled that the latter erred in awarding backwages and
separation pay to petitioners who deliberately abandoned
their work. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the NLRC but ordered respondent company to pay
petitioners their money claims. Hence, this petition for review
on the lone issue of whether petitioners were illegally
dismissed from the service.
While I appreciate the view of Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago that “[t]he indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
in order to discourage the abhorrent practice of ‘dismiss now,
pay later,’ ” the majority, however, simply retained, if not
6
diminished, the indemnity granted to the dismissed
employees. Consequently, I respectfully dissent and maintain
my view that the workingman’s right to job security and due
process of law cannot be measured with a reduced price tag.
The majority opinion treats an employee’s right to due process
as no more than an abstract declaration. I am unwilling to
diminish petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due
process which is necessary to protect their security of tenure.
I proffer the following precepts:
One. Our Constitution is an ode to social justice. The Court
should give due obeisance to this ode for social justice is not a
mere euphony of words. In other countries, political debates
over the last two centuries continue to rage on whether social
rights should be given constitutional protection. In our 7
jurisdiction, however, constitutional social rights have long
been embedded in all our Constitutions, and thus at the very
least should be respected and protected by our courts.
Social justice is that virtue by which individuals and groups
fulfill their obligations to human society by contributing
positively to the complete well-being of their fellowmen
considered as members of that society, and hence regulate all
_______________
6 Ponencia, 15.
7 See Fabre, C., Social Rights Under the Constitution. Government and the
Decent Life. Oxford University Press, 2000.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
their actions accordingly. Social justice as a creed in the 1935
8
Constitution was crafted by Delegate Jose C. Locsin. He
persistently pounced on the necessity of including social
justice in the Constitution to protect those who have little in
life. In the course of the debates, the core concept of social
justice was developed to mean—
x x x justice to the common tao, the “little man” so-called. It means
justice to him, his wife, and children in relation to their employers
in the factories, in the farms, in the mines, and in other
employments. It means justice to him in the education of his
children in the schools, in his dealings with the different offices of
the government, including the courts of justice. 9
1935 Constitution
Thus, Article II (Declaration of Principles), Section 5 of the
1935 Constitution, provides that “[t]he promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State.” Mr. Justice Jose
Laurel, in his concurring opinion in the main case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, explained the 10
constitutional milestone—
Our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and
dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress which
was threatening the stability of governments the world over. Alive
to the social and economic forces at work, the framers of our
Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties which faced
them and endeavored to crystallize, with more or less fidelity, the
political, social and economic propositions of their age x x x (by
inserting) general provisions in the Constitution which are intended
to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between
compo-
_______________
8 Rerum Novarum (On the Condition of the Working Classes). Encyclical of His
Holiness Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor issued on May 15, 1891.
9 I J. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 147 (1936).
10 L-46496, May 29, 1939, 7 Lawyer’s Journal 487.
627
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
nent elements of society through the application of what may be
termed as the justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibinitz
many years ago to be secured through the counterbalancing of
economic and social forces and opportunities which should be
regulated, if not controlled by the State or placed, as it were, in
custodia societatis. “The promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people” was thus inserted
as a vital principle in our Constitution. 11
And, as quoted in the 1940 case of Antamok Goldfields Mining
Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court held
12
that in order that the declaration of the principle of social
justice “may not just be an empty medley of words, the
Constitution in various sections thereof has provided the
means towards its realization.” Thus, the promotion of the
13
welfare of the working classes was concretized in Article XIII
(General Provisions), Section 6, which mandates that “[t]he
State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and shall regulate the relations x x x
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”
Delegate Locsin even exerted a last-ditch effort to amend
the draft of the constitutional provision on labor to read in
part, “[t]he State recognizes the right of all workers to work and
shall enact laws protecting labor.” In defense of his substitute
amendment, Delegate Locsin in a stirring speech dwelt on the
necessity of paying more attention to the needs of the working
class and of including in the Constitution a provision
guaranteeing to all workers the right to work. His substitute
amendment was however defeated, but only because his ideas
were already said to be within the scope of the constitutional
_______________
11 Id., p. 494.
627
12 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
13 Id., p. 357.
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
provisions on social justice and on labor which was then being
considered. 14
As early as Calalang v. Williams, the Court already threw
15
in some wind of caution—
The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to [e]nsure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. 16
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of
a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.” 17
Indeed, in light of the accelerated pace of Philippine
industrialization then, the Filipinos who used to be more or
less anchored to the soil and living comparatively simple lives
were fast becoming full-fledged members of the complex and
impersonal industrial society. They and their families were
entirely at the mercy of the severities of the labor system.
_______________
14 II J. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 656-657 (1937).
15 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
16 The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
17 70 Phil. 726, 734-735 (1940).
629
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
They were wholly dependent for their subsistence,
sustenance and sheer survival on a job and regular wage.
In time, Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando drew the
arches of social justice as follows:
What is thus stressed is that a fundamental principle as social
justice, identified as it is with the broad scope of police power, has
an even more basic role to play in aiding those whose lives are spent
in toil, with destitution an ever-present threat, to attain a certain
degree of economic well-being. Precisely, through the social justice
coupled with the protection to labor provisions, the government is
enabled to pursue an active and militant policy to give reality and
substance to the proclaimed aspiration of a better life and more
decent living conditions for all. It is in that spirit that in 1969, in Del
Rosario vs. Delos Santos (L-20586, March 21, 1969, 22 SCRA 1196),
reference was made to what the social justice concept signifies in the
realistic language of the late President Magsaysay: “He who has less
in life should have more in law.” After tracing the course of decisions
which spoke uniformly to the effect that the tenancy legislation, now
on the statute books, is not vitiated by constitutional infirmity, the
Del Rosario opinion made clear why it is easily understandable
“from the enactment of the Constitution with its avowed concern for
those who have less in life, [that] the constitutionality of such
legislation has been repeatedly upheld.” What is sought to be
accomplished by the above fundamental principle is to assure the
effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the economically
underprivileged. For under existing conditions, without succor and
support, they might not, unaided, be able to secure justice for
themselves. 18
1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution carried over the concept of social justice
under the 1935 Constitution. Article II (Declaration of
19
Principles and State Policies), Section 6 of the 1973
629
Constitution, provides that “[t]he State shall promote social
justice to
_______________
18 Fernando, Enrique M., Constitution of the Philippines, 80-81 (1974).
19 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. A Commentary, 81 (2003).
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people.
Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private
property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits.” Its counterpart provision on labor was specific and
categorical. Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies), Section 9 of the 1973 Constitution, commands that
“[t]he State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State
may provide for compulsory arbitration.” The elevation of this
provision in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
the 1973 Constitution underscored its sublime significance.
Hence, in Philippine Apparel Workers Union v. National
Labor Relations Commission, this Court explained that this
20
obligation of the State to the workingman has repercussions
on the stability, if not survival, of the nation itself—
More than elusive justice, survival is the daily problem of the
worker and his family. The employer is not faced with such a
problem. More often than not, the employer dissipates part of his
income or profit in pleasures of the flesh and gambling aside from
luxuries, fabulous parties and conspicuous consumption.
The stability of the economy does not depend on the employer
alone, but on government economic policies concerning productivity
in all areas and not only in the clothing or textile industries. There
is not even an intimation that the company is losing. It is the living
wage of the workers which is the basis of a stable economy. If the
company cannot pay a living wage, it has no business operating at
the expense of the lives of its workers from the very start.
The preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty, of the
State, more vital than the preservation of the profits of the
corporation. When the State is engaged in a life-and-death struggle,
like
_______________
20 G.R. No. 50320, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 444.
631
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 631
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
war or rebellion, it is the citizen worker who fights in defense of the
State and for the preservation of the existence of corporations and
businesses within its territorial confines. When the life of the State
is threatened from within and without, it is the citizen, not the
corporation or business enterprise, that mans the weapons of war
and march into battle.
To invoke the nebulous term “stable economy” to justify rejection
of the claims of the workers as against the assets of the employer, is
to regard human life as more expendable than corporate capital.
There is nothing in the Constitution that expressly guarantees the
viability of business enterprises much less assuring them of profits. 21
Thus, in affirming the reinstatement of an employee, this
Court in Philippine Air Lines v. Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association held that—
22
[t]he futility of this appeal becomes even more apparent considering
the express provision in the Constitution already noted, requiring
the State to assure workers “security of tenure.” It was not that
specific in the 1935 Charter. The mandate was limited to the State
affording “protection to labor, especially to working women and
minors x x x.” If by virtue of the above, it would not be legally
justifiable to reverse the order of reinstatement, it becomes even
more readily apparent that such a conclusion is even more
unwarranted now. To reach it would be to show lack of fealty to a
constitutional command. 23
1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution has deepened the roots of social justice
and expanded its branches to include “all phases of national
development.” An entire article was devoted to Social
24
_______________
21 Id., p. 462.
22 L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489.
23 Id., pp. 495-496.
24 Section 10, Article II (Declaration of State Policies and Principles, State
Policies), 1987 Constitution provides: “The State shall promote social justice in
all phases of development.”
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Justice and Human Rights which properly includes a full
25
section on labor—
LABOR
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
Then, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies),
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, provides that “[t]he State
affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.”
Under Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies),
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, “[t]he State shall promote
a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all.” These provisions protecting
labor are not mere beliefs but should be reinforced by everyone’s
behavior.
_______________
25 Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), 1987 Constitution.
633
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 633
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The Labor Code of the Philippines and its
Implementing Rules
In 1974, P.D. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, was enacted. There was power
in its purpose which was trumpeted in its title—to afford
protection to labor, promote employment and human resources
development and insure industrial peace based on social
justice. Article 3 of its Preliminary Title under General
Provisions provides—
ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
Under Labor Relations (Book Five), Article 211 states—
ART. 211. Declaration of Policy.—A. It is the policy of the State:
1. (a)To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling
labor or industrial disputes;
2. (b)To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the
enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social
justice and development;
3. (c)To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong
and united labor movement;
4. (d)To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their
rights and obligations as union members and as employees;
5. (e)To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the
expeditious settlement of labor or industrial peace;
6. (f)To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace;
and
634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
1. (g)To ensure the participation of workers in decision and
policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare.
In May 1980 and then again in March 1989, B.P. Blg. 70 and
R.A. No. 6715 were approved, respectively, “to strengthen the
constitutional right of workers” and “to extend protection to
labor.” Accordingly, Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, decreed that “[i]n the implementation and
26
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should
be the primordial and paramount consideration.” 27
Two. Courts at all times should give meaning and substance
to constitutional postulates in favor of the workingman. The
1987 Constitution is fraught with provisions protecting the
workingman, e.g., Secs. 9, 10 and 18, Art. II, and Sec. 3, Art.
XIII, a legacy of the evolution of rights. These constitutional
creeds should not be dwarfed by deeds. A contrary posture
would convert these creeds as “meaningless constitutional
patter.” The principle of social justice was not embedded in
28
the fundamental law for demogoguery. It was meant to be a
vital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy. Social 29
justice should be a living reality and not a mere high level
abstraction. Thus, while the Constitution must be read as a
30
whole, even if we do not invoke its Due Process Clause,
_______________
26 L-45824, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 42.
27 Id., p. 48.
28 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., L-31195, June 5, 1973, 51 SCRA 189, 210.
29 Bocobo, Jorge., Cult of Legalism, cited by Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto in
his Concurring Opinion in Ocampo Vda. De Gomez v. The Government
Insurance Board, 78 Phil. 216, 225 (1947); and by Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla
some 40 years later in National Service Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 69870, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 122,
138.
30 Magnolia Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
116813, November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA 332, 340.
635
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 635
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
the coherent application of the separate constitutional creeds
on social justice and labor is enough to uphold the workers’
constitutional right to work and their consequent right to job
security. These substantive rights are not to be weakened by a
diminished procedural right. For in weakening the procedure,
we weaken the substantive right. The importance of the
procedure to protect the exercise of the right to work cannot
be overemphasized.
I have always, as I do now, adhered to the constitutional
precepts of social justice and protection to labor. Some years
back, in Pepito v. Secretary of Labor, I, as an Assistant
31
Solicitor General, invoked the argument of constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure as the rationale for the
reinstatement of an employee. The argument was sustained
by this Court speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando no
less—
x x x As set forth in the Comment, considered as the answer,
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz “are of the opinion that
petitioner’s reinstatement is in order.” Their view follows from
pronouncements of this Tribunal “handed down in consonance with
the social justice and protection to labor provisions of the
Constitution.”
x x x That point is well-taken. In the latest case in point, Meracap
v. International Ceramics Mfg. Co., Inc., this Court left no doubt that
it is committed to the principle of vitalizing “the constitutional
mandate of security of tenure as an aspect of the protection accorded
labor.” There should be no reason why there should be a deviation
in this litigation especially so when again, as noted in the Comment,
respect for such a mandate has been accorded in previous opinions. 32
With due respect, we should not now deviate from this
doctrine.
_______________
31 L-49418, February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 454.
32 Id., pp. 457; 459-460.
636
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Three. The constitution puts the employee on equal footing with
his employer. As between an employee, usually poor and
33
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able
legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter
stricter compliance. For, social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection. As Mr. Chief Justice Fernando
34
stressed in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission — 35
To repeat, courts should ever be on the alert lest through
inadvertence or faulty analysis the expected opposition from
management be appraised much more favorably than warranted.
The unfortunate result would be that both the social justice concept
and the complementary constitutional command of protection to
labor would be disregarded and set at naught. There is no higher
duty cast on the judiciary than to guard against such an undesirable
possibility, fraught as it is with consequences truly to be deplored. 36
In a similar vein, Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his
Concurring Opinion in Allied Investigation Bureau v. Hon.
Inciong, opined that “social justice in the case of the laborers
37
means compassionate justice or an implementation of the
policy that those who have less in life should have more in
law.” The Constitution helps labor for a simple reason.
38
Employees are overmatched in their struggle against their
employers. Their playing field is not level.
Four. This Court has long extended constitutional due
process in labor cases involving private action. Prior
to Wenphil, the rule etched in stone is that an employer can
validly
_______________
33 Philippine Airlines v. Santos, G.R. No. 77875, February 4, 1993, 218
SCRA 415.
34 Agustin v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-19957, September
29, 1964, 12 SCRA 55, 59.
35 L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.
36 Id., p. 298.
37 L-49678, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 265.
38 Id., p. 274.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
dismiss an erring employee only after giving him notice and
hearing. Thus, decades ago, this Court in Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals ruled that “the failure of
39
petitioner to give the private respondent the benefit of a
hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement
on his constitutional right to due process of law.” In De Leon
40
v. National Labor Relations Commission where an employee
41
was dismissed without notice, it was held that “[t]here is in
this case a clear denial of due process, a constitutional right
which must be safeguarded at all times especially when what
is at stake is petitioner’s position as his only means of
livelihood.” In Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., where
42
petitioner Reyes was dismissed from the service in 1977
without any investigation or hearing, this Court found that the
dismissal was arbitrary as Reyes was denied due
process. Hence, even the non-compliance with Sections 2 and
3, Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code pursuant to the amendments of
P.D. No. 850 which was issued in 1975, requiring a prior
clearance from the Department of Labor to terminate the
services of an employee, rendered the termination illegal and
nullified the dismissal of the employee. 44
In August 1981, B.P. Blg. 130 did away with, the clearance
to terminate employment. Prior notice and formal
investigation were however instead imposed as conditions sine
qua non
_______________
39 L-38482, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 470.
40 Id., p. 480.
41 G.R. No. 52056, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 691.
42 Id., p. 698.
637 43 G.R. No. 54996, November 27, 1981, 109 SCRA 489.
44 Egyptair v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 63185,
February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 125; Oliva v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 57865. April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 827; Visperas
v. Inciong, G.R. No. 51299, December 29, 1982, 119 SCRA 476; Bachiller v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 51484, June 25, 1980, 98
SCRA 393.
638
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
before termination may be effected. Thus, the inviolability of
45
prior notice and hearing before an employee could be
dismissed was iterated and reiterated. In Miguel v. National
Labor Relations Commission, where the employee was simply
46
handed his walking papers without any explanation, this
43
Court held that the dismissal was unwarranted and ruled that
“[t]he due process requirement is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of
serious concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest
order in response to man’s innate sense of justice.” Kwikway 47
Engineering Works v. National Labor Relations
Commission, explained that “[t]he twin requirements of notice
48
and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in
cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is
intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer’s
intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal;
upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employer’s charges
against him accordingly to defend himself therefrom before
dismissal is effected. Neither of these two requirements can be
dispensed with without running afoul of the due process
requirement of the 1987 Constitution.” In a stream of
49
ceaseless cases, we adhered to the doctrine that failure to
comply with the two-notice rule makes the dismissal illegal
and rein-
_______________
45 Metro Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
Nos. 71632-33, March 9, 1989, 171 SCRA 190.
46 G.R. No. 78993, June 22, 1988, 162 SCRA 441.
47 Id., p. 445, citing Natividad v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-
42340, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 115, 119-120; and Luzon Surety Co. v.
Beson, L-26865-66, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 313, 318. See also De Leon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 52056, October 30, 1980, 100
SCRA 691.
48 G.R. No. 85014, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 526.
49 Id., p. 531; citing Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 528, 535.
639
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 639
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
statement or payment of separation pay in order. In fine, 50
“fire the employee, and let him explain later” violates this
hallowed rule. It has always been this way—until Wenphil.
51
This is not to hold that a trial-type proceeding is required to
be conducted by employers. Hearings before the employers
52
prior to the dismissal are in the nature of and akin to
administrative due process which is free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements. Mr. Justice Laurel way back
in 1940 enumerated the cardinal rights of parties in
administrative proceedings in the landmark case of Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations —
53
1. 1.the right to a hearing which includes the right to
present one’s case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
2. 2.the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. 3.the decision must have something to support itself;
4. 4.the evidence must be substantial which means such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion;
_______________
50 Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
114337, September 29, 1995, 248 SCRA 654; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101900, June 23, 1992, 210
SCRA 277; De Vera v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 93070,
August 9, 1991, 200 SCRA 439; Tingson v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 84702, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 498; Ruffy v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 84193, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA
365; and National Service Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 69870, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 122.
51 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 94429, May 29, 1992, 209 SCRA 430, 439.
52 Sajonas v. National Labor Relations Commission, L-49286, March 15,
1990, 183 SCRA 182.
53 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
640
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
1. 5.the decision must be based on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
2. 6.the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate;
3. 7.the board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the issues involved
and the reasons for the decision rendered. 54
The posture that the constitutional due process requirement
limits government action alone and does not apply to private
action is already passé. Thus, even in the United States, the
application of due process to private conduct has gained
approval and has become a settled norm. For, as expressed by
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, a noted constitutionalist—
But particularly where ostensibly “private” power is the primary
source of the coercion and violence that oppressed individuals and
groups experience, it is hard to accept with equanimity a rigid legal
distinction between state and society. The pervasive system of racial
apartheid which existed in the South for a century after the Civil
War, for example, thrived only because of the resonance of society
and politics . . . the close fit between private terror, public
discrimination, and political exclusion. So too, where it is the state’s
persistent inaction in the face of patterns of deprivation for which
the state and society seem to many to bear collective responsibility,
the premise that only identifiable state “action” may be called
constitutional account is deeply troubling. 55
_______________
54 Id., pp. 642-644; cited by Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization
v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 108625, March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 565, 573-574;
and Doruelo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 67746, November 21,
1984, 133 SCRA 376, 381-382.
55 Tribe, L., Constitutional Choices (Chapter 16. Refocusing the “State
Action” Inquiry: Separating State Acts from State Actors). Harvard University
Press, 1985.
641
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 641
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Accordingly, modern notions of violations of due process which
may fairly be attributed to the State have expanded
considerably in recent decades. Seemingly private conducts
have arguably been treated as adequate state
actions. Individual invasions of individual rights in certain
56
instances have become proper subjects of constitutional
restraints. In fine, as Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it
57
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, “ ‘[d]ue 58
process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
circumstances x x x. Due process is not a mechanical
instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a delicate process of
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of
the process.” Beyond argument, the Constitution was
59
designed to embody and celebrate values and to inculcate
proper acceptance of them, as much as to compel governments
to abide by them. 60
This is as it ought to be for as well observed by Dr. David
C. Korten, Founder and President of the People-Centered
Development Forum, “x x x [corporations have emerged as the
_______________
56 See Gunther, G. and Sullivan, K., Constitutional Law, 13th Ed. (Chapter
10. The Post Civil War Amendments and Civil Rights Legislation:
Constitutional Restraints on Private Conduct; Congressional Power to
Implement Amendments). The Foundation Press, Westbury, New York, 1997.
57 See Cohen, W. and Varat, J., Constitutional Law. Cases and Materials.
9th Ed. (Chapter 12. Application of the Post Civil War Amendments to Private
Conduct: Congressional Power to Enforce the Amendments). The Foundation
Press, Westbury, New York, 1993.
58 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
59 Cited by Altschuler, B. and Sgroi, C, Understanding Law in a Changing
Society. (Chapter 3. Due Process of Law, 94). Prentice Hall, Inc., 1996.
60 Chemerinsky. E., Rethinking Sate Action., 80 Nw.U.L. Rev. 503, 535-546,
550-553 (1985), citing Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d. 582, 594 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.
1983).
642
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
dominant governance institutions on the planet, with the
largest among them reaching into virtually every country of the
world and exceeding most governments in size and
power. Increasingly, it is the corporate interest more than the
human interest that defines the policy agendas of states and
international bodies x x x.” Assailing the threat to liberty
61
coming from these new economic rulers, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt said: “The royalists of the economic order
have conceded that political freedom was the business of
government but they have maintained that economic slavery
was nobody’s business. They granted that the government
could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that
the government could do anything to protect the citizen in his
right to work and his right to live.” To be sure, some of the
62
unlamented decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States were those which allowed private corporations to run
roughshod over the rights of workers. Observed Korten again:
A conservative court system that was consistently responsive to the
appeals and arguments of corporate lawyers steadily chipped away
at the restraints a wary citizenry had carefully placed on corporate
powers. Step-by-step, the court system put in place new precedents
that made the protection of corporations and corporate property a
centerpiece of constitutional law.These precedents eliminated the
use of juries to decide fault and assess damages in cases involving
corporate-caused harm and took away the right of states to oversee
corporate rates of return and prices. Judges sympathetic to
corporate interests ruled that workers were responsible for causing
their own injuries on the job, limited the liability of corporations for
damages they might cause, and declared wage and hours laws
unconstitutional. They interpreted the common good to mean
maximum production—no matter what was produced or who it
harmed.
_______________
61 Korten, When Corporations Rule the World, 54 (2002 ed.).
62 Acceptance Speech for the Democratic Nomination for President,
Philadelphia, June 27, 1936.
63 Korten, op. cit., 59.
643
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 643
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The choice that confronts us is which right to uphold: the
right to work of an underprivileged natural person or the
right to property of an overprivileged artificial person. In
truth, there is but one choice to make for it is highly
anomalous to bestow better rights to an artificial person than
a natural person.64
Certainly, these are neither “novel legal ideas” nor “nouvelle
vaguetheories” but careful directions brought about by the
evolution of laws and the due process clause which saw the
need to rightfully protect the underprivileged as a result of
63
ominous occurrences over the years. These, on the contrary,
are persuasive axioms which prevail in other countries and
should find application in our jurisdiction.
Indeed, it strains my imagination to see how the application
of the constitutional due process clause to cases of illegal
dismissal can “open the floodgates to, and the docket x x x
swamped with, litigations of the scurrilous sort” and “give rise
to all absurd constitutional claims.” Suffice it to say that
equating an excommunicated Catholic demanding
reinstatement, or a celebrity endorser suing to be able to sing
for another brand, or even an employee preventing his
employer to read his out going e-mail with a dismissed
employee exerting his constitutional right to security of tenure
and due process of clause is too off-line. Withal, as adverted
to, we have long extended constitutional due process and
security of tenure in labor cases involving private action and I
have yet to see “litigations of the scurrilous sort” being
entertained by the courts.
Five. An employee who is denied procedural due process is
entitled to reinstatement. Nothing less. This Court, in carrying
out the constitutional directive of the 1973 Constitution
requiring the State to “assure the rights of workers to x x
x security of tenure x x x” has quite consistently nullified,
65
simply
_______________
64 See Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance
and the Theft of Human Rights.
65 Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), Section 9 of the
1973 Constitution.
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
on constitutional grounds, dismissals in violation of
procedural due process, notwithstanding the absence of an
express provision of any statute. The Court has done the same
under the 1987 Constitution which admittedly has given more
protection to labor than any of our previous charters—through
a four-paragraph section in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights which details the protective mantle accorded to
labor alone. Thus, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution
66
decrees that “[t]he State shall afford full protection to labor x
x x and promote full employment x x x (All workers) shall be
entitled to security of tenure x x x” Art. XII, Sec. 18 of the 1987
Constitution mandates that “[t]he State affirms labor as a
primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.” All told, this Court for
almost three decades has set aside, on constitutional grounds,
dismissals in violation of procedural due process—until
Wenphil came along, with the interests of the employer tailing
and suddenly enjoying preference. To uphold Wenphil,
Serrano, and now Agabon, is to dilute the protection to those
who need it most despite the constitutional mandate which in
the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo speaks with “a
reverberating clang that drowns all weaker sounds.” With due
respect, the grant of indemnity to the dismissed employee “as
both penalty and disincentive” as the majority provides in the
instant case does not square with the protection accorded by
the Constitution to labor. There is only one main relief in cases
of dismissal without notice and hearing—reinstatement.
Six. Compliance with procedural due process is not a burden
on employers. There is no valid reason why employers should
have any difficulty according procedural due process to their
employees. The rules are fairly simple. Section 2, Rule XXIII
(Termination of Employment), Book V (Labor Relations),
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides—
_______________
66 Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution.
645
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 645
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.—In all
cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due
process shall be substantially observed:
1. I.For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:
1. (a)A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side;
2. (b)A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
3. (c)A written notice [of] termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the
 circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the
employee’s last known address.
1. II.For termination of employment as based on authorized
causes defined in Article 283 of the Code, the requirements
of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service
of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate
Regional Office of the Department at least thirty (30) days
before the effectivity of the termination, specifying the
ground or grounds for termination.
2. III.If the termination is brought about by the completion of
the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required. If
the termination is brought about by the failure of an
employee to meet the standards of the employer in the case
of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a
written notice is served the employee within a reasonable
time from the effective date of termination.
Similarly, Section 2, Rule I (Termination of Employment and
Retirement), Book VI (Post-Employment) of the same
Omnibus Rules, which covers all establishments and
undertakings, whether for profit or not, except the
Government, requires the same notice and hearing.
In sum, in cases of dismissal based on just causes (Article
282, Labor Code), the employer must give two
(2) simple notices: (1) notice before dismissal to apprise the
employee being
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
dismissed of the particular acts or omissions for which the
dismissal is sought, and (2) subsequent notice to inform him
of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. In cases of dismissal
for authorized causes (Article 283, Labor Code), the employer
must serve an uncomplicated written notice on the worker and
on the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended closure of the establishment or
reduction of personnel. The law requires nothing more.
It is distressing to say the least why employers should be
exempted from observing this simple duty. In fine, to give to
labor what is due them is far from authorizing oppression, nor
destruction of the employer as some views would have. The
employer cannot simply abuse the conduct of his business to the
prejudice of an employee. The persistence in violating the
rights of the workers is the employer’s own doing and self-
destruction which may be let alone.
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee differs
from and should not be confused with the manner in which
such right is exercised. While the management has certain
privileges, the exercise of such privileges must be made
without abuse of discretion. Thus, Dole Philippines v.
National Labor Relations Commission, recognized as a67
management prerogative the determination of the need for the
phasing out of a department as a labor and cost saving device.
In the same manner, Remereco Garments Manufacturing v.
Minister of Labor and Employment conceded that it is the sole
68
prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee.
But in these two cases, and in so many other cases, this Court
cautioned that the exercise of such prerogatives must be made
without abuse of discretion for what is at stake is not only the
employee’s position but also their means of livelihood. It must 69
_______________
67 G.R. No, 120009, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 124.
68 G.R. Nos. 56176-77, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167, 175.
69 International Harvester Macleod v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 73287, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 641 citing D.M.
647
 VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 647
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
not be oppressive and abusive since it affects one’s person and
property. It is the right of every workingman to assure himself
and his family a life worthy of human dignity. Consequently,
in dismissing an employee based on authorized cause or for
just cause, as the case may be, the employer must, at the very
minimum, comply with procedural due process. Failure to
observe due process, particularly the prior notice requirement,
rightly deserves stiff sanctions, if not condemnation, and not
a mere slap on the wrist, as the majority now propounds. As I
said in Serrano—
It is equally puzzling why the majority believes that restoring the
employee’s right to pre-dismissal notice will negate the right of an
employer to dismiss for cause. The pre-Wenphil rule simply requires
that before the right of the employer to dismiss can be exercised, he
must give prior notice to the employee of its cause. There is nothing
strange nor difficult about this requirement. It is no burden to an
employer. He is bereft of reason not to give the simple notice. If he
fails to give notice, he can only curse himself. He forfeits his right to
dismiss by failing to follow the procedure for the exercise of his right.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, if the employer’s right to dismiss an employee is forfeited
for his was failure to comply with this simple, reasonable duty to
pre-notify his employee, he has nothing to blame but himself. 70
Verily, dismissal without due process debases human
dignity. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the employer to
conduct a formal investigation and inform the employee of the
specific charges against him. Most certainly, the resolution of
extreme cases, e.g.,where the employee threatens the life of
the employer, are the exceptions rather than the ordinary and
usual
_______________
Consunji, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 71459,
July 30, 1986, 143 SCRA 204; Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes v.
Camara Shoes, G.R. No. 50985, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 477.
70 323 SCRA 445, 504-505, 523.
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648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
cases. As such, rules governing them should not be used as the
general rule. Rather, employers should be reminded that
under our system of government, even the most hardened
criminals are given their day in court. Employees are not
71
entitled to anything less.
Seven. In the hierarchy of rights of an employee, the right to
security of tenure is high, if not the highest. Its paramount
value is recognized and guaranteed under our new
Constitution. Consequently, the first paragraph of Article
72
XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, extends the protective
mantle of the Constitution to all of labor including the
promotion of full employment. The second paragraph specifies
the guaranteed right to security of tenure. All other
rights, e.g., the right to collective bargaining and negotiations,
the right to peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike
and form unions, and the right to due process, merely
complement the right to job security. All these complementary
rights are meaningless to an unemployed Juan De la
Cruz. Thus, we held in Rance v. National Labor Relations
Commission, “[i]t is the policy, of the State to assure the right
73
of workers to ‘security of tenure.’ The guarantee is an act of
social justice. When a person has no property, his job may
possibly be his only possession or means of
livelihood. Therefore he should be protected against any
arbitrary deprivation of his job.” Almira v. B.F. Goodrich
74
Philippines, Inc. is worth quoting—
75
It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought
not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only
_______________
71 De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 52056, October
30, 1980, 100 SCRA 691, 698.
72 Tolentino v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75380, July 31,
1987, 152 SCRA 724.
73 G.R. No. 68147, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 279.
74 Id., pp. 284-285. See also Bondoc v. People’s Bank and Trust Company, L-
43835, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 599, 605.
75 L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 120.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 649
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
because of the law’s concern for the workingman. There is, in
addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold
hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The
misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided
if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances
of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of
livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For
all this while, since private respondent considered them separated
from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical
standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his
masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be
made to rest [on] an informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all
the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally,
labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not
only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem. 76
Eight. Workers need work more than anything else. For a
wageworker, a job is important. While there is work, there is
food on the table. Take away work, replace it with a meager
lump sum, and the food will disappear. Through work, the
breadwinner satisfies his basic needs and those of his family.
He also provides himself with a means to express himself,
transform, develop and perfect his skills and talents. Through
work, he interacts and establishes relations with others. Work
is a defining feature of human existence. It is the means of
sustaining life and meeting essential needs. It is also an
activity through which individuals affirm their own identity,
both to themselves and to those around them. It is crucial to
individual choice, to the welfare of families and to the stability
of societies. Every man has the right to work, to a chance to
77
develop his qualities and his personality in the exercise of his
profession, to equitable remuneration which will enable him
and his family to lead a worthy life on material, social, cul-
_______________
76 Id., p. 131.
77 Juan Somavia, ILO Director-General, June 2001.
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
tural and spiritual level. Shylock said it well: “You take my
78
life when you do take the means whereby I live.” 79
Nine. To simply allow payment of nominal damages for
violation of employee’s right to due process is to give undue
advantage to employers. One does not need to have a
stratospheric mind to know that the Constitution gave greater
rights to employees over their employers. The intent is to
equalize the fight of the underprivileged against the
overprivileged. We cannot allow the employers to marginalize
the right of the workingman to due process for a few pesos
without mocking the protection accorded by the Constitution
to the powerless. The deprivation of the right to security of
tenure and due process is beyond monetary valuation. In fine,
to lengthen the longevity of Serrano is to sharpen the
dangerous divide between the haves and have-nots in our
society. But Agabon is not merely extending Serrano. Agabon
is far worse than Serrano.
In Serrano, the dismissed employee was awarded
backwages from the time his employment was terminated
until it was determined that the termination was for an
authorized cause. Using the facts of the instant case as an
illustration, petitioner-employees who were dismissed in
February 1999 stand to get roughly 63 months of
backwages under Serrano, i.e., the number of months from the
time they were dismissed in February 1999 until November
2004 when it was determined that the termination was for just
cause. In Agabon, however, the dismissed employee is merely
being granted an indemnity equivalent to Thirty Thousand
Pesos. This is exactly Wenphil more than a decade later, with
the cost of money and inflation factored in. Indeed, the sorry
plight of the workers has just been worsened, if not preserved,
by the new majority ruling.
_______________
78 Octagesima Adveniens. An Apostolic Letter of His Holiness Pope Paul VI.,
citing Gaudium et Spes, 25: AAS 67 (1966), p. 1089.
79 The Merchant of Venice.
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Just a word more. In Serrano, I pointed out:
x x x The dilution of the rule has been abused by unscrupulous
employers who then followed the “dismiss now, pay later” strategy.
This evil practice of employers was what I expected the majority to
address in re-examining, the Wenphil doctrine. At the very least, I
thought that the majority would restore the balance of rights
between an employee and an employer by giving back the
employee’s mandatory right to notice before dismissal. It is
disquieting, however, that the majority re-arranged this balance of
right by tilting it more in favor of the employer’s right to dismiss.
Thus, instead of weakening a bit the right to dismiss of employers,
the majority further strengthens it by insisting that a dismissal
without prior notice is merely “ineffectual” and not illegal.
The stubborn refusal of the majority to appreciate the
importance of pre-dismissal notice is difficult to understand. It is
the linchpin of an employees’ right against an illegal dismissal. The
notice tells him the cause of [the] dismissal. It gives him a better
chance to contest his dismissal in an appropriate proceeding as laid
down in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement or the rules of
employment established by the employer, as the case may be. In
addition, it gives to both the employee and employer more cooling
time to settle their differences amicably. In fine, the prior notice
requirement and the hearing before the employer gives an employee
a distinct, different and effective first level of remedy to protect his
job.
xxx xxx xxx
I respectfully submit that the majority cannot revise our laws nor
shun the social justice thrust of our Constitution in the guise of
interpretation especially when its result is to favor employers and
disfavor employees. The majority talks of high nobility but the
highest nobility is to stoop down to reach the poor. 80
In these times when our lowly workers can hardly maintain
body and soul together due to their meager means, I find it hard
651 to believe that the majority in Wenphil,in Serrano,and now in
the instant case Agabon, persists in weakening our
_______________
80 Id., pp. 503-504; 521.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
employee’s right to job security. The stance simply offends a
basic principle of justice so entrenched in our tradition and
etched in our conscience. An employee may not have a torrens
title to his job but it is not too much to require that before he
is dismissed by his employer, he should be given a simple
notice of the cause of his dismissal and a summary hearing to
present his side. All our constitutional and statutory precepts
on social justice and the protection of labor will go to naught if
we perpetuate our ruling that a dismissal without the required
prior notice is valid and if we just penalize with the payment
of pennies violations of the employee’s right to due process.
Without doubt, Wenphil and Serrano have lengthened the
queue of the unemployed. Agabon will stretch it out even
more.
In the case at bar, where petitioners Jenny Agabon and
Virgilio Agabon were dismissed from the service for
abandonment of work without the due process requirements
of two (2) notices and hearing, I submit that the dismissals
should be nullified and set aside, and petitioners immediately
reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges. This Court should protect labor and it should walk
the talk.
Accordingly, I vote for the immediate REINSTATEMENT
of petitioners Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilio C. Agabon,
without loss of their seniority rights and other privileges and
with full backwages, and the REVERSION to the pre-Wenphil
Doctrine in resolving future labor cases.
SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The core issue of the present case concerns the legal effect of
and the corresponding sanction for the failure of an employer
to give an employee the pre-dismissal written notice of
termination and opportunity to be heard required under the
Labor Code and its implementing Rules.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 653
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
In Serrano v. NLRC, the Court held that such termination of
1
employment should be considered “ineffectual” and, as such,
sanctioned with payment of full back wages plus—in case the
dismissal was for an authorized cause—separation pay in
accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code. In
2
addition, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded,
if warranted by the evidence.
In the case before us now, the employment of petitioners
was terminated on the ground of abandonment of their work.
However, the employer failed to accord them their right to
prior notice and hearing, required under Article 277 of the 3
_______________
1 380 Phil. 416; 323 SCRA 445, January 27, 2000.
2 “Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.—The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation or operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
[Department] of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to
a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one
(1) month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishments or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or to as least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.”
3 “Art. 277. . . .
1. (b)Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure
and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
 containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule XXIII of the 1999
4
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The majority holds that
for violation of the employee’s right to statutory due process,
an indemnity in the amount of P30,000 should be awarded to
the
_______________
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker
to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the
termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by
the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such
dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in
implementation of a mass lay-off.”
4 “Sec. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of notice.—In all cases of
termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
1. I.For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
of the Code:
1. (a)A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds
for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side;
2. (b)A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
3. (c)A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last
known address.”
655
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 655
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
petitioners as nominal damages under the Civil Code.
According to the majority, this award should serve to
discourage employers from violating the statutory due
process rights of their employees.
With due respect, I disagree with this ruling, because it
aggravates the rights of our work force, and diminishes
respect for due process.
Jurisprudence on Right to Notice and Hearing
Prior to the promulgation in 1989 of Wenphil v. NLRC, the
5
Court held that—whether for a valid cause or not—dismissing
employees without giving them prior notice and the
opportunity to be heard was illegal; and that, as a
consequence, they were entitled to reinstatement plus full
back wages. Wenphil abandoned this policy and ruled that if
the dismissal was for a just or an authorized cause, but
without due process, the termination was valid; but that the
employer should be sanctioned, for violating the employee’s
right to notice and hearing, through the payment of indemnity
to each dismissed employee in an amount ranging from P1,000
to P10,000.
In 2000, Serrano held that such dismissals for just or
6
authorized causes but without due process were
merely ineffectual (not illegal). Nevertheless, the employee
was entitled to full back wages plus nominal and moral
damages, if warranted by the evidence; and, in case the
dismissal was for an authorized cause, separation pay in
accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code.
This time, in the present case, the majority is incredibly
reverting to Wenphil in upholding the validity of employment
terminations without due process.
_______________
5 170 SCRA 69, February 8, 1989.
6 Supra.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
A Setback on Labor’s Rights
With due respect, I strongly oppose the Court’s inexplicable
turnaround. This ruling is a setback on labor’s rights. Thus, I
reiterate my Dissent in Serrano. In that case, I was grateful
7
enough that the Court had decided to reexamine and modify
the ten-year Wenphil doctrine. In the process, it had at least
increased the monetary award that should go to the dismissed
employee—from a nominal sum in the concept of “indemnity
or damages” to “full back wages.”
I respectfully submit that nothing has transpired in the
past four and a half years since Serrano was issued, that
justifies further diminution of whatever constitutional rights
to due process and security of tenure our workers still enjoy.
On the contrary, nothing is more evident than the inescapable
fact that their empowerment makes them better partners in
the country’s development and global competence. Any further
trampling of their rights is undeserved.
As explained in my Dissenting Opinion in Serrano, the
notice requirement finds basis not only in the Labor Code but,
more important, in the due process clause of the Constitution.
Consequently, when an employee is dismissed without due
process, the legal effect is an illegal dismissal; and the
appropriate sanction is full back wages plus reinstatement, not
merely full back wages (or separation pay), much less merely
“indemnity of one month salary for every year of service.” It is
jurisprudential settled that when procedural due process is
violated, the proceedings—in this case, the dismissal—shall be
voided, and the parties returned to their status quo ante; that
is, the employees should be given back their old jobs and paid
all benefits as if they have never been dismissed.
_______________
7 Pp. 531-547; pp. 251-258. See also my Separate Opinions in Better
Buildings, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 347 Phil. 521,
535; 283 SCRA 242, December 15, 1997; and Del Val v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 357 Phil. 286, 294; 296 SCRA 283, 291, September 25,
1998.
657
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 657
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
In ruling that the dismissal should be deemed legal, the
majority has virtually rendered nugatory the employees’ right
to due process as mandated by law and the Constitution. It
has implicitly allowed the employer simply to ignore such
right and just pay the employee.
I respectfully submit that illegal dismissal results not only
from the absence of a legal cause, in accordance with Articles
282 to 284 of the Labor Code, but likewise from the failure to
8 9
observe due process. There are many labor and other cases in
which acts violative of due process have unequivocally been
declared illegal by the Court. They range from similar cases of
employment termination to criminal
10
_______________
8 “Art. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
1. (a)Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
2. (b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
3. (c)Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
4. (d)Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
 5. (e)Other causes analogous to the foregoing.”
9 “Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination.—An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from
any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one
(1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service,
whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as
one (1) whole year.”
10 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 210
SCRA 277, June 23, 1992; Bacus v. Ople, 217 Phil. 670; 132
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
prosecutions to administrative cases and election cases as
11 12
well. I made a summary of these Decisions in my
aforesaid SerranoOpinion, which I shall no longer repeat here.
Violation of Due Process Amounts to Illegality of Proceedings
In all these cases, the Court has uniformly ruled that the
denial of the fundamental right to due process resulted in the
illegality of the proceedings. Thus, the deprived individuals
should be brought back to their status quo ante, not merely
awarded nominal damages or indemnity.
Our labor force deserves no less. Indeed, the State
recognizes it as its primary social economic force, to which it
14
is constitutionally mandated to afford full protection. Yet, the
15
Court refuses to declare the illegality of dismissals made
without due process. I insist that we should denounce such
dismissals as null and void and grant our workers these proper
reliefs: (1) a declaration that the termination or dismissal is
illegal and unconstitutional; and (2) the reinstatement of the
employee, without loss of seniority rights and accruing
benefits plus full back wages.
_______________
SCRA 690, October 23, 1984; Philippine National Bank v. Apalisok, 199
SCRA 92, July 12, 1991.
11 People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 170-171, August 16, 1985; People v. San
Diego, 135 Phil. 514; 26 SCRA 522, December 24, 1968; People v. Sola, 191
Phil. 21; 103 SCRA 393, March 17, 1981; People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489,
February 21, 1989; People v. Calo, Jr., 186 SCRA 620, June 18, 1990; People v.
Burgos, 200 SCRA 67, August 2, 1991; People v. Parazo, 369 Phil. 398; 310
SCRA 146, July 8, 1999 (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration).
12 Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940; 282 SCRA 256, November 28,
1997.
13 Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 497; 319 SCRA 470,
November 29, 1999.
14 §18, Art. II, 1987 Constitution.
15 §3, Art. XIII, Ibid.
659
13
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 659
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Exception to Due Process Sanctions
The only exception to the above sanctions would be a case
analogous to Wenphil, one clearly showing the impracticality
and the futility of observing the procedure laid down by law in
terminating employment. To recall, the employee involved
in Wenphil had exhibited a violent temper and caused trouble
even in the presence of the restaurant’s customers. In an
altercation with a co-employee, he “slapped [the latter’s] cap,
stepped on his foot and picked up the ice scooper and
brandished it against [him].” When summoned by the
assistant manager, the employee “shouted and uttered
profane words” instead of giving an explanation. Under the
circumstances, instant action was necessary to preserve order
and discipline, as well as to safeguard the customers’
confidence in the employer’s business—a fastfood chain
catering to the general public, towards whom courtesy was a
prized virtue.
 In most of the succeeding cases, though—including the
present one before us in which petitioners had been dismissed
without prior notice and hearing—there were ample
opportunities for the employers to observe the requisites of
due process. There were no exigencies that called for
immediate response.
For the infringement of the fundamental right to due
process, I believe that the price the Court once again sets is
too insignificant and too niggardly at such a late hour. I iterate
that imposing a stiffer sanction is the only way to emphasize
to employers the extreme importance of the right to due
process. Such right is too sacred to be taken for granted or
glossed over in a cavalier fashion. To hold otherwise, as by
simply imposing an indemnity (or even “full back wages” as
was done in Serrano), is to allow the rich and powerful to
virtually purchase and thereby stifle a constitutional right
granted to the poor and marginalized.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Respect for Due Process Should Be Maintained
The ponencia concedes that the worker’s right to due process
is both statutory and constitutional in nature. Yet, it still gives
it little regard and value.
May I just recall that in Wallem Maritime Services v.
NLRC, the Court said that “[o]ne’s employment, profession,
16
trade or calling is a property right within the protection of the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law.” An objective
reading of the Bill of Rights clearly shows that the due process
protection is not limited to government action alone. The
Constitution does not say that the right cannot be claimed
against private individuals and entities. Indeed, the employee
is entitled to due process, not because of the Labor Code, but
because of the Constitution. Elementary is the doctrine that
constitutional provisions are deemed written into every
statute, contract or undertaking.
True, traditional doctrine holds that constitutional rights
may be invoked only against the State, which in the past was
the only entity in a position to violate these rights, including
the due process clause. However, with the advent of
liberalization, deregulation and privatization, the State
tended to cede some of its powers to the “market forces.”
Hence, corporate behemoths and even individuals may now be
sources of abuses and threats to human rights and liberties. I
believe, therefore, that this traditional doctrine should be
modified to enable the judiciary to cope with new paradigms
and to continue protecting the people from new forms of
abuses.
In the final analysis, what is involved here is not simply the
amount of monetary award—whether insignificant or
substantial; whether termed as indemnity, penalty,
separation pay or full back wages. Neither is the subject here
merely
_______________
16 331 Phil. 476, 485; 263 SCRA 174, 182, October 15, 1996, per Romero, J.
661
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 661
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
a matter of respect for workers’ rights or adequate protection
of labor. The bottom line is the constitutionally granted right
to due process, which is the very essence of justice itself.
Where the rule of law is the bedrock of our free society, justice
is its very lifeblood. A denial of due process is thus no less than
a denial of justice itself.
Summary
In conclusion, I believe that even if there was just or
authorized cause for termination of employment, but due
process was not afforded the employee, the dismissal
proceedings must be declared null and void. Consequently, the
employee must be reinstated and given full back wages and
accruing benefits. Depending on the facts of each case,
damages as provided under applicable articles of the Civil
Code may additionally be awarded.
An exception may be entertained if the employer could
adequately prove that under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, there was no opportunity to comply with due process
requirements; or doing so would have been impractical or
gravely adverse to the employer, as when the employee was
caught in flagrante delicto.Under such circumstances,
dismissal would not be illegal, and no award may properly be
granted. Nevertheless, as a measure of compassion in this
specific instance, the employee may be given a nominal sum
depending on the circumstances, pursuant to Article 2221 of
the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Petition and ORDER
the petitioners’ REINSTATEMENT without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, plus FULL BACK WAGES from
the date of termination until actual reinstatement.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
SEPARATE OPINION:
TINGA, J.:
I concur in the result, the final disposition of the petition being
correct. There is no denying the importance of the Court’s
ruling today, which should be considered as definitive as to the
effect of the failure to render the notice and hearing required
under the Labor Code when an employee is being dismissed
for just causes, as defined under the same law. The Court
emphatically reaffirms the rule that dismissals for just cause
are not invalidated due to the failure of the employer to
observe the proper notice and hearing requirements under the
Labor Code. At the same time, The Decisionlikewise
establishes that the Civil Code provisions on damages serve as
the proper framework for the appropriate relief to the
employee dismissed for just cause if the notice-hearing
requirement is not met. Serrano v. NLRC, insofar as it is
1
controlling in dismissals for unauthorized causes, is no longer
the controlling precedent. Any and all previous rulings and
statements of the Court inconsistent with these
determinations are now deemed inoperative.
My views on the questions raised in this petition are
comprehensive, if I may so in all modesty. I offer this opinion
to discuss the reasoning behind my conclusions, pertaining as
they do to questions of fundamental importance.
Prologue
The factual backdrop of the present Petition for Review is not
novel. Petitioners claim that they were illegally dismissed by
the respondents, who allege in turn that petitioners had
actually abandoned their employment. There is little difficulty
in upholding the findings of the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners are guilty of abandonment, one of the
_______________
1 380 Phil. 416; 323 SCRA 445.
663
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 663
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
just causes for termination under the Labor Code. Yet, the
records also show that the employer was remiss in not giving
the notice required by the Labor Code; hence, the resultant
controversy as to the legal effect of such failure vis-à-vis the
warranted dismissal.
Ostensibly, the matter has been settled by our decision
in Serrano , wherein the Court ruled that the failure to
2
properly observe the notice requirement did not render the
dismissal, whether for just or authorized causes, null and void,
for such violation was not a denial of the constitutional right
to due process, and that the measure of appropriate damages
in such cases ought to be the amount of wages the employee
should have received were it not for the termination of his
employment without prior notice. Still, the Court has, for good
3
reason, opted to reexamine the so-called Serranodoctrine
through the present petition
Antecedent Facts
Respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. (Riviera Home)
is engaged in the manufacture and installation of gypsum
board and cornice. In January of 1992, the Agabons were hired
in January of 1992 as cornice installers by Riviera Home.
According to their personnel file with Riviera Home, the
Agabons given address was 3RDS Tailoring, E. Rodriguez
Ave., Moonwalk Subdivision, P-II Parañaque City, Metro
Manila. 4
It is not disputed that sometime around February 1999, the
Agabons stopped rendering services for Riviera Home. The
Agabons allege that beginning on 23 February 1999, they
stopped receiving assignments from Riviera Home. When 5
they demanded an explanation, the manager of Riviera
_______________
2 Id.
3 Id., at pp. 443, 445, 448; pp. 472, 474, 476.
4 Rollo, p. 42.
5 Id., at p. 32.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Homes, Marivic Ventura, informed them that they would be
hired again, but on a “pakyaw” (piece-work) basis. When the
Agabons spurned this proposal, Riviera Homes refused to
continue their employment under the original terms and
agreement. Taking affront, the Agabons filed a complaint for
6
illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (“NLRC”).
Riviera Homes adverts to a different version of events
leading to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. It
alleged that in the early quarter of 1999, the Agabons stopped
reporting for work with Riviera. Two separate letters dated 10
March 1999, were sent to the Agabons at the address indicated
in their personnel file. In these notices, the Agabons were
directed to report for work immediately. However, these
7
notices were returned unserved with the notation “RTS
Moved.” Then, in June of 1999, Virgilio Agabon informed
Riviera Homes by telephone that he and Jenny Agabon were
ready to return to work for Riviera Homes, on the condition
that their wages be first adjusted. On 18 June 1999, the
Agabons went to Riviera Homes, and in a meeting with
management, requested a wage increase of up to Two Hundred
Eighty Pesos (P280.00) a day. When no affirmative response
was offered by Riviera Homes, the Agabons initiated the
complaint before the NLRC. 8
In their Position Paper, the Agabons likewise alleged that
they were required to work even on holidays and rest days, but
were never paid the legal holiday pay or the premium pay for
holiday or rest day. They also asserted that they were denied
Service Incentive Leave pay, and that Virgilio Agabon was not
given his thirteenth (13th) month pay for the year 1998. 9
_______________
6 Ibid.
7 Id., at pp. 59-60.
8 Id., at p. 15.
9 Id., at p. 34.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 665
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
After due deliberation, Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-
Barcelona rendered a Decision dated 28 December 1999,
finding the termination of the Agabons illegal, and ordering
Riviera Homes to pay backwages in the sum of Fifty Six
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty One Pesos and Ninety Three
Centavos (P56,231.93) each. The Labor Arbiter likewise
ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of separation
pay of one (1) month pay for every year of service from date of
hiring up to 29 November 1999, as well as the payment of
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and premium pay for
holiday and restday, plus thirteenth (13th) month differential
to Virgilio Agabon. 10
In so ruling, the Labor Arbiter declared that Riviera Homes
was unable to satisfactorily refute the Agabons’ claim that
they were no longer given work to do after 23 February 1999
and that their rehiring was only on “pakyaw” basis. The Labor
Arbiter also held that Riviera Homes failed to comply with the
notice requirement, noting that Riviera Homes well knew of
the change of address of the Agabons, considering that the
identification cards it issued stated a different address from
that on the personnel file. The Labor Arbiter asserted the
11
principle that in all termination cases, strict compliance by the
employer with the demands of procedural and substantive due
process is a condition sine qua non for the same to be declared
valid. 12
On appeal, the NLRC Second Division set aside the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit. The NLRC held that the Agabons were not
13
_______________
10 Id., at p. 92.
11 Id., at p. 91. The address indicated in the identification cards was “V 6
Cruz Iron Works, E. Rodriguez Parañaque City.”
12 Ibid., citing Philippine Air Lines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 279 SCRA 533 (1997).
13 In a Decision dated 21 August 2000, penned by Commissioner V.R.
Calaycay, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner R. Aquino and
Commissioner A. Gacutan.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
able to refute the assertion that for the payroll period ending
on 15 February 1999, Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for
only two and one-half (2 1/2) and three (3) days, respectively.
It disputed the earlier finding that Riviera Homes had known
of the change in address, noting that the address indicated in
the identification cards was not the Agabons, but that of the
persons who should be notified in case of emergency
concerning the employee. Thus, proper service of the notice
14
was deemed to have been accomplished. Further, the notices
evinced good reason to believe that the Agabons had not been
dismissed, but had instead abandoned their jobs by refusing
to report for work.
In support of its conclusion that the Agabons had
abandoned their work, the NLRC also observed that the
Agabons did not seek reinstatement, but only separation pay.
While the choice of relief was premised by the Agabons on
their purported strained relations with Riviera Homes, the
NLRC pointed out that such claim was amply belied by the
fact that the Agabons had actually sought a conference with
Riviera Homes in June of 1999. The NLRC likewise found that
the failure of the Labor Arbiter to justify the award of
extraneous money claims, such as holiday and service
incentive leave pay, confirmed that there was no proof to
justify such claims.
A Petition for Certiorari was promptly filed with the Court
of Appeals by the Agabons, imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in dismissing their complaint for
illegal dismissal. In a Decision dated 23 January 2003, the
15
Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the Agabons had
abandoned their employment. It noted that the two elements
constituting abandonment had been established, to wit: the
failure to report for work or absence without valid justifiable
reason, and; a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship. The intent to sever the employer-employee rela-
_______________
14 Rollo, p. 127.
15 Penned by Associate Justice M. Buzon, concurred in by Associate Justices
J. Guevara-Salonga and D. Pine.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
tionship was buttressed by the Agabon’s choice to seek not
reinstatement, but separation pay. The Court of Appeals
likewise found that the service of the notices were valid, as the
Agabons did not notify Riviera Homes of their change of
address, and thus the failure to return to work despite notice
amounted to abandonment of work.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC as
regards the denial of the claims for holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, and the balance of Virgilio Agabon’s
thirteenth (13th) month pay. It ruled that the failure to adduce
proof in support thereof was not fatal and that the burden of
proving that such benefits had already been paid rested on
Riviera Homes. Given that Riviera Homes failed to present
16
proof of payment to the Agabons of their holiday pay and
service incentive leave pay for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998,
the Court of Appeals chose to believe that such benefits had
not actually been received by the employees. It also ruled that
the apparent deductions made by Riviera Homes on the
thirteenth (13th) month pay of Virgilio Agabon violated
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree No. 851. Accordingly, Riviera Homes was
17
ordered to pay the Agabons holiday for four (4) regular
holidays in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as their service
incentive leave pay for said years, and the balance of Virgilio
Agabon’s thirteenth (13th) month pay for 1998 in the amount
of Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P2,150.00). 18
In their Petition for Review, the Agabons claim that they
had been illegally dismissed, reasserting their version of
events, thus: (1) that they had not been given new assign-
_______________
16 In their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the Agabons
667
particularly claimed that they were required to work on four holidays, namely,
Araw Ng Kagitingan, National Heroes Day, Bonifacio Day, and Rizal Day. See
Rollo, p. 154.
17 Deducted from Virgilio Agabon’s thirteenth (13th) month pay were his
SSS loan and expenses for shoes. Rollo, pp. 171-172.
18 Rollo, p. 173.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ments since 23 February 1999; (2) that they were told that
they would only be re-hired on a “pakyaw” basis, and; (3) that
Riviera Homes had knowingly sent the notices to their old
address despite its knowledge of their change of address as
indicated in the identification cards. Further, the Agabons
19
note that only one notice was sent to each of them, in violation
of the rule that the employer must furnish two written notices
before termination—the first to apprise the employee of the
cause for which dismissal is sought, and the second to notify
the employee of the decision of dismissal. The Agabons 20
likewise maintain that they did not seek reinstatement owing
to the strained relations between them and Riviera Homes.
The Agabons present to this Court only one issue, i.e.:
whether or not they were illegally dismissed from their
employment. There are several dimensions though to this
21
issue which warrant full consideration.
The Abandonment Dimension
Review of Factual Finding of Abandonment
As the Decision points out, abandonment is characterized by
the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship. The question of whether or not an
employee has abandoned employment is essentially a factual
issue. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals, both appropriate
22
triers of fact, concluded that the Agabons had actually
abandoned their employment, thus there is little need for deep
_______________
19 Id., at p. 22.
20 Id., at p. 23 citing Kingsize Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 238 SCRA 349 (1994).
21 Rollo, p. 20.
22 Palencia v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-75763, 21
August 1987, 153 SCRA 247; Pure Blue Industries v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 115879, 16 April 1997, 271 SCRA 259.
669
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 669
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
inquiry into the correctness of this factual finding. There is no
doubt that the Agabons stopped reporting for work sometime
in February of 1999. And there is no evidence to support their
assertion that such absence was due to the deliberate failure
of Riviera Homes to give them work. There is also the fact, as
noted by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, that the Agabons
did not pray for reinstatement, but only for separation pay and
money claims. This failure indicates their disinterest in
23
maintaining the employer-employee relationship and their
unabated avowed intent to sever it. Their excuse that strained
relations between them and Riviera Homes rendered
reinstatement no longer feasible was hardly given credence by
the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. 24
The contrary conclusion arrived at by the Labor Arbiter as
regards abandonment is of little bearing to the case. All that
the Labor Arbiter said on that point was that Riviera Homes
was not able to refute the Agabons’ claim that they were
terminated on 23 February 1999. The Labor Arbiter did not
25
explain why or how such finding was reached or how such
finding was more credible than that of Riviera Homes’. Being
bereft of reasoning, the conclusion deserves scant
consideration.
Compliance with Notice Requirement
At the same time, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the apparent fact that the rules governing
notice of termination were not complied with by Riviera
Homes. Section 2, Book V, Rule XXIII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Implementing Rules) specifi-
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 129, 170.
24 Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals noted that the 10 June 1999
conference between the Agabons and Riviera Homes was at the behest of the
Agabons, thus countering the claim of strained relations. Rollo, pp. 130, 170-
171.
25 Rollo, p. 91.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
cally provides that for termination of employment based on
just causes as defined in Article 282, there must be: (1) written
notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for
termination and giving employee reasonable opportunity to
explain his/her side; (2) a hearing or conference wherein the
employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or
rebut evidence presented against him/her; and (3) written
notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify termination.
At the same time, Section 2, Book V, Rule XXIII of the
Implementing Rules does not require strict compliance with
the above procedure, but only that the same be “substantially
observed.”
Riviera Homes maintains that the letters it sent on 10
March 1999 to the Agabons sufficiently complied with the
notice rule. These identically worded letters noted that the
Agabons had stopped working without permission that they
failed to return for work despite having been repeatedly told
to report to the office and resume their employment. The 26
letters ended with an invitation to the Agabons to report back
to the office and return to work.27
The apparent purpose of these letters was to advise the
Agabons that they were welcome to return back to work, and
not to notify them of the grounds of termination. Still,
considering that only substantial compliance with the notice
requirement is required, I am prepared to say that the letters
sufficiently conform to the first notice required under the
Implementing Rules. The purpose of the first notice is to duly
inform the employee that a particular transgression is being
considered against him or her, and that an opportunity is
being offered for him or her to respond to the charges. The
_______________
26 Supra note 6.
27 Id.
671
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 671
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
letters served the purpose of informing the Agabons of the
pending matters beclouding their employment, and extending
them the opportunity to clear the air.
Contrary to the Agabons’ claim, the letter-notice was
correctly sent to the employee’s last known address, in
compliance with the Implementing Rules. There is no dispute
that these letters were not actually received by the Agabons,
as they had apparently moved out of the address indicated
therein. Still, the letters were sent to what Riviera Homes
knew to be the Agabons’ last known address, as indicated in
their personnel file. The Agabons insist that Riviera Homes
had known of the change of address, offering as proof their
company IDs which purportedly print out their correct new
address. Yet, as pointed out by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, the addresses indicated in the IDs are not the
Agabons, but that of the person who is to be notified in case on
emergency involve either or both of the Agabons.
The actual violation of the notice requirement by Riviera
Homes lies in its failure to serve on the Agabons the second
notice which should inform them of termination. As
the Decision notes, Riviera Homes’ argument that sending the
second notice was useless due to the change of address is
inutile, since the Implementing Rules plainly require that the
notice of termination should be served at the employee’s last
known address.
The importance of sending the notice of termination should
not be trivialized. The termination letter serves as indubitable
proof of loss of employment, and its receipt compels the
employee to evaluate his or her next options. Without such
notice, the employee may be left uncertain of his fate; thus, its
service is mandated by the Implementing Rules.
Noncompliance with the notice rule, as evident in this case,
contravenes the Implementing Rules. But does the violation
serve to invalidate the Agabons’ dismissal for just cause?
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The So-Called Constitutional Law Dimension
Justices Puno and Panganiban opine that the Agabons should
be reinstated as a consequence of the violation of the notice
requirement. I respectfully disagree, for the reasons
expounded below.
Constitutional Considerations
Of Due Process and the Notice-Hearing
Requirement in Labor Termination Cases
Justice Puno proposes that the failure to render due notice and
hearing prior to dismissal for just cause constitutes a violation
of the constitutional right to due process. This view, as
acknowledged by Justice Puno himself, runs contrary to the
Court’s pronouncement in Serrano v. NLRC that the absence
28
of due notice and hearing prior to dismissal, if for just cause,
violates statutory due process.
The ponencia of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in Serrano provides this cogent overview of the history of the
doctrine:
Indeed, to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor Code is
an aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that Art. 283 had its
origin in Art. 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 which
gave either party to the employer-employee relationship the right to
terminate their relationship by giving notice to the other one month
in advance. In lieu of notice, an employee could be laid off by paying
him a mesada equivalent to his salary for one month. This provision
was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, which took effect on
August 30, 1950. But on June 12, 1954, R.A. No. 1052, otherwise
known as the Termination Pay Law, was enacted reviving
the mesada. On June 21, 1957, the law was amended by R.A. No.
1787 providing for the giving of advance notice for every year of
service. 29
_______________
28 Supra note 1.
29 Supra note 1 at p. 446; p. 469.
673
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 673
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Under Section 1 of the Termination Pay Law, an employer
could dismiss an employee without just cause by serving
written notice on the employee at least one month in advance
or one-half month for every year of service of the employee,
whichever was longer. Failure to serve such written notice
30
entitled the employee to compensation equivalent to his
salaries or wages corresponding to the required period of
notice from the date of termination of his employment.
However, there was no similar written notice requirement
under the Termination Pay Law if the dismissal of the
employee was for just cause. The Court, speaking through
Justice JBL Reyes, ruled in Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia: 31
[Republic] Act 1052, as amended by Republic Act 1787, impliedly
recognizes the right of the employer to dismiss his employees (hired
without definite period) whether for just case, as therein defined or
enumerated, or without it. If there be just cause, the employer is not
required to serve any notice of discharge nor to disburse termination
pay to the employee. x x x 32
_______________
30 See Section 1, Republic Act No. 1052, which states:
Sec. 1. In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or
agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate
at any time the employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an
employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one month in advance, or
in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least one month in
advance or one-half month for every year of service of the employee, whichever is longer,
a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year.
The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause shall be entitled to compensation from the date of
termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of notice.
124 Phil. 698; 18 SCRA 107 (1966).
31
Id., at p. 703; p. 111.
32
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Clearly, the Court, prior to the enactment of the Labor Code,
was ill-receptive to the notion that termination for just cause
without notice or hearing violated the constitutional right to
due process. Nonetheless, the Court recognized an award of
damages as the appropriate remedy. In Galsim v. PNB, the 33
Court held:
Of course, the employer’s prerogative to dismiss employees hired
without a definite period may be with or without cause. But if the
manner in which such right is exercised is abusive, the employer
stands to answer to the dismissed employee for damages. 34
The Termination Pay Law was among the repealed laws with
the enactment of the Labor Code in 1974. Significantly, the
Labor Code, in its inception, did not require notice or hearing
before an employer could terminate an employee for just
cause. As Justice Mendoza explained:
Where the termination of employment was for a just cause, no notice
was required to be given to the employee. It was only on September
4, 1981 that notice was required to be given even where the
dismissal or termination of an employee was for cause. This was
made in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor and
Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor
Code. And it was still much later when the notice requirement was
embodied in the law with the amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No.
6715 on March 2, 1989. 35
It cannot be denied though that the thinking that absence of
notice or hearing prior to termination constituted a
constitutional violation has gained a jurisprudential foothold
with the Court. Justice Puno, in his Dissenting Opinion, cites
several cases in support of this theory, beginning
with Batangas
_______________
33 139 Phil. 747; 29 SCRA 293 (1969).
34 Id., at p. 754; p. 298.
35 Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 1 at p. 447;
p. 470.
675
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 675
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals wherein we held
36
that “the failure of petitioner to give the private respondent
the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an
infringement on his constitutional right to due process of
law.” 37
Still, this theory has been refuted, pellucidly and effectively
to my mind, by Justice Mendoza’s disquisition in Serrano,
thus:
x x x There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by
the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a
denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee’s
dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a
limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise
of private power, such as the termination of employment under the
Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the
Constitution, viz.: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. . . .” The reason is simple: Only
the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the
individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that
the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under
the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are
brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case
of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is
not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for
requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is
not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against
him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to
prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity
to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment.
xxx
_______________
36 G.R. No. L-38482, 18 June 1976, 71 SCRA 470.
37 Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 1 at p. 480;
p. 514.
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676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not
be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the
employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge
of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment
for a just cause under Art. 282 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer,
gross and habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust
of the employer, commission of crime against the employer or the
latter’s immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or
other analogous cases) 38
The Court in the landmark case of People v. Marti clarified 39
the proper dimensions of the Bill of Rights.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to
be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be
subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
“First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in
the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom?
Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the
private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.” (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
674; July 17, 1986; Italics supplied)40
I do not doubt that requiring notice and hearing prior to
termination for just cause is an admirable sentiment borne out
of basic equity and fairness. Still, it is not a constitutional
requirement that can impose itself on the relations of private
_______________
38 Serrano, supra note 1 at pp. 445-446; pp. 468-470.
39 G.R. No. 81561, 18 January 1991, 193 SCRA 57.
40 Id., at p. 67.
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persons and entities. Simply put, the Bill of Rights affords
protection against possible State oppression against its
citizens, but not against an unjust or repressive conduct by a
private party towards another.
Justice Puno characterizes the notion that constitutional
due process limits government action alone as “passé,” and
adverts to nouvelle vague theories which assert that private
conduct may be restrained by constitutional due process. His
dissent alludes to the American experience making references
to the post-Civil War/pre-World War II era when the US
Supreme Court seemed overly solicitous to the rights of big
persons. There is even no stopping the State, through the
legislative cauldron, from
_______________
41 See G. Gunther and K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law (14th ed.) at p. 867.
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678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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compelling private individuals, under pain of legal sanction,
into observing the norms ordained in the Bill of Rights.
Justice Panganiban’s Separate Opinion asserts that
corporate behemoths and even individuals may now be sources
of abuses and threats to human rights and liberties. The 42

business over those of the workers.

concern is not unfounded, but appropriate remedies exist
Theories, no matter how entrancing, remain theoretical
within our statutes, and so resort to the constitutional trump
unless adopted by legislation, or more controversially, by
card is not necessary. Even if we were to engage the premise,
judicial opinion. There were a few decisions of the US Supreme
the proper juristic exercise should be to examine whether an
Court that, ostensibly, imposed on private persons the values
employer has taken the attributes of the State so that it could
of the constitutional guarantees. However, in deciding the
be compelled by the Constitution to observe the proscriptions
cases, the American High Court found it necessary to link the
of the Bill of Rights. But the strained analogy simply does not
actors to adequate elements of the “State” since the
square since the attributes of an employer are starkly
Fourteenth Amendment plainly begins with the words “No
incongruous with those of the State. Employers plainly do not
State shall . . .”
41

possess the awesome powers and the tremendous resources

More crucially to the American experience, it had become
which the State has at its command.
necessary to pass legislation in order to compel private
The differences between the State and employers are not
persons to observe constitutional values. While the equal
merely literal, but extend to their very essences. Unlike the
protection clause was deemed sufficient by the Warren Court
State, the raison d’etre of employers in business is to
to bar racial segregation in public facilities, it necessitated
accumulate profits. Perhaps the State and the employer are
enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 to prohibit
similarly capacitated to inflict injury or discomfort on persons
segregation as enforced by private persons within their
under their control, but the same power is also possessed by a
property. In this jurisdiction, I have trust in the statutory
school principal, hospital administrator, or a religious leader,
regime that governs the correction of private wrongs. There
among many others. Indeed, the scope and reach of authority
are thousands of statutes, some penal or regulatory in nature,
of an employer pales in comparison with that of the State.
that are the source of actionable claims against private
There is no basis to conclude that an employer, or even the
employer class, may be deemed a de facto state and on that
premise, compelled to observe the Bill of Rights. There is
simply no nexus in their functions, distaff as they are, that
renders it necessary to accord the same jurisprudential
treatment.
It may be so, as alluded in the dissent of Justice Puno, that
a conservative court system overly solicitous to the concerns of
business may consciously gut away at rights or privileges
owing to the labor sector. This certainly happened before in
_______________
42 Separate Opinion of Justice Panganiban, p. 12.
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the United States in the early part of the twentieth century,
when the progressive labor legislation such as that enacted
during President Roosevelt’s New Deal regime—most of them
addressing problems of labor—were struck down by an
archconservative Court. The preferred rationale then was to
43
enshrine within the constitutional order business
prerogatives, rendering them superior to the express
legislative intent. Curiously, following its judicial philosophy
at the time the U.S. Supreme Court made due process
guarantee towards employers prevail over the police power to
defeat the cause of labor. 44
Of course, this Court should not be insensate to the means
and methods by which the entrenched powerful class may
maneuver the socio-political system to ensure self-
preservation. However, the remedy to rightward judicial bias
is not leftward judicial bias. The more proper judicial attitude
is to give due respect to legislative prerogatives, regardless of
the ideological sauce they are dipped in.
While the Bill of Rights maintains a position of primacy in
the constitutional hierarchy, it has scope and limitations that
45
must be respected and asserted by the Court, even though they
may at times serve somewhat bitter ends. The
_______________
43 See e.g., Morehead v. State of New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), which
affirmed the invalidity of minimum wage laws as previously declared
in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
44 Famously justified by the Supreme Court as an assertion of the “liberty
of contract”, or “the right to contract about one’s affairs”, as contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545.
(1923). But as Justice Holmes famously critiqued: “Contract is not specially
mentioned in the text (of the Fourteenth Amendment) that we have to
construe. It is merely an example of doing what you want to do, embodied in
the word liberty. But pretty much all law consists in forbidding men to do some
things that they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from law than
other acts.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, Id., at p. 568.
45 See People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA
142.
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680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
dissenting opinions are palpably distressed at the effect of the
Decision, which will undoubtedly provoke those reflexively
sympathetic to the labor class. But haphazard legal theory
cannot be used to justify the obverse result. The adoption of
the dissenting views would give rise to all sorts of absurd
constitutional claims. An excommunicated Catholic might
demand his/her reinstatement into the good graces of the
Church and into communion on the ground that
excommunication was violative of the constitutional right to
due process. A celebrity contracted to endorse Pepsi Cola
might sue in court to void a stipulation that prevents him/her
from singing the praises of Coca Cola once in a while, on the
ground that such stipulation violates the constitutional right
to free speech. An employee might sue to prevent the employer
from reading outgoing e-mail sent through the company server
using the company e-mail address, on the ground that the
constitutional right to privacy of communication would be
breached.
The above concerns do not in anyway serve to trivialize the
interests of labor. But we must avoid overarching declarations
in order to justify an end result beneficial to labor. I dread the
doctrinal acceptance of the notion that the Bill of Rights, on
its own, affords protection and sanctuary not just from the acts
of State but also from the conduct of private persons. Natural
and juridical persons would hesitate to interact for fear that a
misstep could lead to their being charged in court as a
constitutional violator. Private institutions that thrive on
their exclusivity, such as churches or cliquish groups, could be
forced to renege on their traditional tenets, including vows of
secrecy and the like, if deemed by the Court as inconsistent
with the Bill of Rights. Indeed, that fundamental right of all
private persons to be let alone would be forever diminished
because of a questionable notion that contravenes with
centuries of political thought.
It is not difficult to be enraptured by novel legal ideas. Their
characterization is susceptible to the same marketing traps
that hook consumers to new products. With the help of
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unique wrapping, a catchy label, and testimonials from
professed experts from exotic lands, a malodorous idea may
gain wide acceptance, even among those self-possessed with
their own heightened senses of perception. Yet before we join
the mad rush in order to proclaim a theory as “brilliant,” a
rigorous test must first be employed to determine whether it
complements or contradicts our own system of laws and
juristic thought. Without such analysis, we run the risk of
abnegating the doctrines we have fostered for decades and the
protections they may have implanted into our way of life.
Should the Court adopt the view that the Bill of Rights may
be invoked to invalidate actions by private entities against
private individuals, the Court would open the floodgates to,
and the docket would be swamped with, litigations of the
scurrilous sort. Just as patriotism is the last refuge of
scoundrels, the broad constitutional claim is the final resort of
the desperate litigant.
Constitutional Protection of Labor
The provisions of the 1987 Constitution affirm the primacy of
labor and advocate a multi-faceted state policy that affords,
among others, full protection to labor. Section 18, Article II
thereof provides:
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Further, Section 3, Article XIII states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equal
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security to tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
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682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
 The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
The constitutional enshrinement of the guarantee of full
protection of labor is not novel to the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working
women, and minors, and shall regulate the relations between the
landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry
and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.
Similarly, among the principles and state policies declared in
the 1973 Constitution, is that provided in Section 9, Article II
thereof:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.
On the other hand, prior to the 1973 Constitution, the right to
security of tenure could only be found in legislative
enactments and their respective implementing rules and
regulations. It was only in the 1973 Constitution that security
of tenure was elevated as a constitutional right. The
development of the concept of security of tenure as a
constitutionally
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recognized right was discussed by this Court in BPI Credit
Corporation v. NLRC, to wit:
46
The enthronement of the worker’s right to security of tenure in our
fundamental law was not achieved overnight. For all its liberality
towards labor, our 1935 Constitution did not elevate the right as a
constitutional right. For a long time, the worker’s security of tenure
had only the protective mantle of statutes and their interpretative
rules and regulations. It was as uncertain protection that sometimes
yielded to the political permutations of the times. It took labor
nearly four decades of sweat and tears to persuade our people thru
their leaders, to exalt the worker’s right to security of tenure as a
sacrosanct constitutional right. It was Article II, section 2 [9] of our
1973 Constitution that declared as a policy that the State shall
assure the right of worker’s to security of tenure. The 1987
Constitution is even more solicitous of the welfare of labor. Section
3 of its Article XIII mandates that the State shall afford full
protection to labor and declares that all workers shall be entitled to
security of tenure. Among the enunciated State policies are the
promotion of social justice and a just and dynamic social order. In
contrast, the prerogative of management to dismiss a worker, as an
aspect of property right, has never been endowed with a
constitutional status.
The unequivocal constitutional declaration that all workers shall
be entitled to security of tenure spurred our lawmakers to
strengthen the protective walls around this hard earned right. The
right was protected from undue infringement both by our
substantive and procedural laws. Thus, the causes for dismissing
employees were more defined and restricted; on the other hand, the
procedure of termination was also more clearly delineated. These
substantive and procedural laws must be strictly complied with
before a worker can be dismissed from his employment. 47
It is quite apparent that the constitutional protection of labor
was entrenched more than eight decades ago, yet such did not
prevent this Court in the past from affirming dismissals for
just cause without valid notice. Nor was there any pretense
made that this constitutional maxim afforded a laborer
_______________
46 G.R. No. 106027, 234 SCRA 441, 25 July 1994.
47 Id., at pp. 451-452.
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684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
a positive right against dismissal for just cause on the ground
of lack of valid prior notice. As demonstrated earlier, it was
only after the enactment of the Labor Code that the doctrine
relied upon by the dissenting opinions became en vogue. This
point highlights my position that the violation of the notice
requirement has statutory moorings, not constitutional.
It should be also noted that the 1987 Constitution also
recognizes the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers, and the right of enterprise to
reasonable returns, expansion, and growth. Whatever
perceived imbalance there might have been under previous
incarnations of the provision have been obviated by Section 3,
Article XIII.
In the case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, we affirmed
48
the presumption that all constitutional provisions are self-
executing. We reasoned that to declare otherwise would result
in the pernicious situation wherein by mere inaction and
disregard by the legislature, constitutional mandates would be
rendered ineffectual. Thus, we held:
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become
in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon
the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitu-
_______________
48 335 Phil. 82; 267 SCRA 408 (1997). The Court therein was divided, with
twelve voting for, and three against the decision. Interestingly, both Justices Puno
and Panganiban adopted the dissenting position that the provisions of Article XII
of the Constitution alone were insufficient to accord the Filipino bidder a
preferential right to obtain the winning bid for Manila Hotel. Their concession as
to the enforceability of paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution
without enabling legislation was in a situation wherein if the bids of the Filipino
and the foreign entity were tied. Id., at p. 154 (J. Puno, dissenting) and 154 (J.
Panganiban, dissenting).
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tion are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that—
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 49
In further discussing self-executing provisions, this Court
stated that:
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. 50
_______________
49 Id., at p. 102 citing 16 Am Jur. 2d 281.
50 Id., at pp. 103-104 citing 16 Am. Jur. 2d 283-284.
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and
security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the
sense that these are automatically acknowledged and
observed without need for any enabling legislation. However,
to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and
the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view
presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. The guarantees of “full protection to labor” and
“security of tenure”, when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests
a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an
unimpeachable right to continued employment—a utopian
notion, doubtless—but still hardly within the contemplation of
the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define
the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the
protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor
sector, but of the employers’ as well. Without specific and
pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,
formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the
aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on
its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off
the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure
to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several
framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social
justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.
This is reflected in the record of debates on the social justice
provisions of the Constitution:
MS. [FELICITAS S.] AQUINO: We appreciate the concern of
the Commissioner. But this Committee [on Social Justice]
has actually become the forum already of a lot of specific
grievances and specific demands, such that
understandably, we may have been, at one time or another,
dangerously treading into the functions of legislation. Our
only plea to the Commission is to focus our perspective
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
on the matter of social justice and its rightful place in the
Constitution. What we envision here is a mandate specific
enough that would give impetus for statutory
implementation. We would caution ourselves in terms of the
 judicious exercise of self-censorship against treading into
the functions of legislation. (italics supplied) 51
xxx
[FLORENZ D.] REGALADO: I notice that the 1935
Constitution had only one section on social justice; the same
is true with the 1973 Constitution. But they seem to have
stood us in good stead; and I am a little surprised why,
despite that attempt at self-censorship, there are certain
provisions here which are properly for legislation. 52
xxx
BISHOP [TEODORO S.] BACANI: [I] think the distinction
that was given during the presentation of the provisions on
the Bill of Rights by Commissioner Bernas is very apropos
here. He spoke of self-executing rights which belong properly
to the Bill of Rights, and then he spoke of a new body of
rights which are more of claims and that these have come
about largely through the works of social philosophers and
then the teaching of the Popes. They focus on the common
good and hence, it is not as easy to pinpoint precisely these
rights nor the situs of the rights. And yet, they exist in
relation to the common good. 53
xxx
MS. [MINDA LUZ M.] QUESADA: I think the nitty-gritty of
this kind of collaboration will be left to legislation but the
important thing now is the conservation, utilization or
maximization of the very limited resources. x x x
[RICARDO J.] ROMULO: The other problem is that, by and
large, government services are inefficient. So, this is a
problem all by itself. On Section 19, where the report
_______________
51 II Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates
613.
52 Id., at p. 617.
Id., at p. 626.
53
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
says that people’s organizations as a principal means of
empowering the people to pursue and protect through
peaceful means . . ., I do not suppose that the Committee
would like to either preempt or exclude the legislature,
because the concept of a representative and democratic
system really is that the legislature is normally the principal
means.
[EDMUNDO G.] GARCIA: That is correct. In fact, people
cannot even dream of influencing the composition or the
membership of the legislature, if they do not get organized.
It is, in fact, a recognition of the principle that unless a
citizenry is organized and mobilized to pursue its ends
peacefully, then it cannot really participate effectively. 54
There is no pretense on the part of the framers that the
provisions on Social Justice, particularly Section 3 of Article
XIII, are self-executory. Still, considering the rule that
provisions should be deemed self-executing if enforceable
without further legislative action, an examination of Section 3
of Article XIII is warranted to determine whether it is
complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future
legislation for completion and enforcement. Particularly, we
55
should inquire whether or not the provision voids the
dismissal of a laborer for just cause if no valid notice or hearing
is attendant.
Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas makes
a significant comment on Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution:
_______________
54 Id., at p. 644.
 The test suggested by Justice Puno in the Manila Hotel case, supra note
55
47, is as definitive as any proposed method of analysis could ever be. “A
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a
present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future
legislation for completion and enforcement. The inquiry demands a micro-
analysis and the context of the provision in question.” J. Puno, dissenting, Id.,
at pp. 141-142. See also Rev. Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
161872, 13 April 2004, 427 SCRA 96.
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The [cluster] of rights guaranteed in the second paragraph are the
right “to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage.” Again, although these have been set apart by a period (.) from
the next sentence and are therefore not modified by the final phrase
“as may be provided by law,” it is not the intention to place these
beyond the reach of valid laws. x x x (emphasis supplied) 56
At present, the Labor Code is the primary mechanism to carry
out the Constitution’s directives. This is clear from Article
3 under Chapter 1 thereof which essentially restates the
57
policy on the protection of labor as worded in the 1973
Constitution, which was in force at the time of enactment of
the Labor Code. It crystallizes the fundamental law’s policies
on labor, defines the parameters of the rights granted to labor
such as the right to security of tenure, and prescribes the
standards for the enforcement of such rights in concrete terms.
While not infallible, the measures provided therein tend to
ensure the achievement of the constitutional aims.
The necessity for laws concretizing the constitutional
principles on the protection of labor is evident in the reliance
placed upon such laws by the Court in resolving the issue of
the validity of a worker’s dismissal. In cases where that was
the issue confronting the Court, it consistently recognized the
constitutional right to security of tenure and employed the
standards laid down by prevailing laws in determining
_______________
56 J. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (1996), at p. 1064.
57 Article 3, Chapter I of the Labor Code declares:
Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford full protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and
humane conditions of work.
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690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
whether such right was violated. The Court’s reference to
58
laws other than the Constitution in resolving the issue of
dismissal is an implicit acknowledgment that the right to
security of tenure, while recognized in the Constitution,
cannot be implemented uniformly absent a law prescribing
concrete standards for its enforcement.
As discussed earlier, the validity of an employee’s dismissal
in previous cases was examined by the Court in accordance
with the standards laid down by Congress in the Termination
Pay Law, and subsequently, the Labor Code and the
amendments thereto. At present, the validity of an employee’s
dismissal is weighed against the standards laid down in
Article 279, as well as Article 282 in relation to Article 277(b)
of the Labor Code, for a dismissal for just cause, and Article
283 for a dismissal for an authorized cause.
The Effect of Statutory Violation Of Notice and Hearing
There is no doubt that the dismissal of an employee even for
just cause, without prior notice or hearing, violates the
_______________
58 See Phil. Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 387 Phil. 250; 331 SCRA 232 (2000); Gonzales v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 372 Phil. 39; 313 SCRA 139 (1999); Jardine Davies v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 370 Phil. 310; 311 SCRA
289 (1999); Pearl S. Buck Foundation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 80728, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 446; Bagong
Bayan Corporation, Realty Investors & Developers v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 61272, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 107; Labajo v.
Alejandro, et al., G.R. No. L-80383, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 747; D.M.
Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan, et al., G.R. No. L-71413, March 21, 1988; 159 SCRA
107; Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-76271,
September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166; People’s Bank & Trust Co. v. People’s Bank
& Trust Co. Employees Union, 161 Phil. 15; 69 SCRA 10 (1976); Philippine
Movie Pictures Association v. Premiere Productions, 92 Phil. 843 (1953); Phil.
Refining Co. v. Garcia, supra.
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Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Labor Code. However, does such violation necessarily void the
dismissal?
Before I proceed with my discussion on dismissals for just
causes, a brief comment regarding dismissals for authorized
cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code. While the
justiciable question in Serrano pertained to a dismissal for
unauthorized cause, the ruling therein was crafted as
definitive to dismissals for just cause. Happily,
the Decision today does not adopt the same unwise tack. It
should be recognized that dismissals for just cause and
dismissals for authorized cause are governed by different
provisions, entail divergent requisites, and animated by
distinct rationales. The language of Article 283 expressly
effects the termination for authorized cause to the service of
written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor at
least one (1) month before the intended date of termination.
This constitutes an eminent difference than dismissals for just
cause, wherein the causal relation between the notice and the
dismissal is not expressly stipulated. The circumstances
distinguishing just and authorized causes are too markedly
different to be subjected to the same rules and reasoning in
interpretation.
Since the present petition is limited to a question arising
from a dismissal for just cause, there is no reason for making
any pronouncement regarding authorized causes. Such
declaration would be merely obiter, since they are neither the
law of the case nor dispositive of the present petition. When
the question becomes justiciable before this Court, we will be
confronted with an appropriate factual milieu on which we can
render a more judicious disposition of this admittedly
important question.
1. B.Dismissal for Just Cause
There is no express provision in the Labor Code that voids a
dismissal for just cause on the ground that there was no notice
or hearing. Under Section 279, the employer is precluded from
dismissing an employee except for a just cause as
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
provided in Section 282, or an authorized cause under Sections
283 and 284. Based on reading Section 279 alone, the existence
of just cause by itself is sufficient to validate the termination.
Just cause is defined by Article 282, which unlike Article
283, does not condition the termination on the service of
written notices. Still, the dissenting opinions propound that
even if there is just cause, a termination may be invalidated
due to the absence of notice or hearing. This view is anchored
mainly on constitutional moorings, the basis of which I had
argued against earlier. For determination now is whether
there is statutory basis under the Labor Code to void a
dismissal for just cause due to the absence of notice or hearing.
 As pointed out by Justice Mendoza in Serrano, it was only
in 1989 that the Labor Code was amended to enshrine into
statute the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Such
requirements are found in Article 277 of the Labor Code,
under the heading “Miscellaneous Provisions.” Prior to the
amendment, the notice-hearing requirement was found under
the implementing rules issued by the then Minister of Labor
in 1981. The present-day implementing rules likewise
mandate that the standards of due process, including the
requirement of written notice and hearing, “be substantially
observed.” 60
Indubitably, the failure to substantially comply with the
standards of due process, including the notice and hearing
requirement, may give rise to an actionable claim against the
employer. Under Article 288, penalties may arise from
violations of any provision of the Labor Code. The Secretary of
Labor likewise enjoys broad powers to inquire into existing
relations between employers and employees. Systematic
violations by management of the statutory right to due process
_______________
59 Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 1.
60 Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
693
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
would fall under the broad grant of power to the Secretary of
Labor to investigate under Article 273.
However, the remedy of reinstatement despite termination
for just cause is simply not authorized by the Labor Code.
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules states that
a termination for just cause is voided because the requirement
of notice and hearing was not observed. This is not simply an
inadvertent semantic failure, but a conscious effort to protect
the prerogatives of the employer to dismiss an employee for
59 just cause. Notably, despite the several pronouncements by
this Court in the past equating the notice-hearing
requirement in labor cases to a constitutional maxim, neither
the legislature nor the executive has adopted the same tack,
even gutting the protection to provide that substantial
compliance with due process suffices.
The Labor Code significantly eroded management
prerogatives in the hiring and firing of employees. Whereas
employees could be dismissed even without just cause under
the Termination Pay Law , the Labor Code affords workers
61
broad security of tenure. Still, the law recognizes the right of
the employer to terminate for just cause. The just causes
enumerated under the Labor Code—serious misconduct or
willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect, fraud or
willful breach of trust, commission of a crime by the employee
against the employer, and other analogous causes—are
characterized by the harmful behavior of an employee against
the business or the person of the employer.
These just causes for termination are not negated by the
absence of notice or hearing. An employee who tries to kill the
employer cannot be magically absolved of trespasses just
693 because the employer forgot to serve due notice. Or a less
extreme example, the gross and habitual neglect of an
employee will not be improved upon just because the employer
failed to conduct a hearing prior to termination.
_______________
61 Supra note 2.
694
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
In fact, the practical purpose of requiring notice and hearing
is to afford the employee the opportunity to dispute the
contention that there was just cause in the dismissal. Yet it
must be understood—if a dismissed employee is deprived of the
right to notice and hearing, and thus denied the opportunity to
present countervailing evidence that disputes the finding of
just cause, reinstatement will be valid not because the notice
and hearing requirement was not observed, but because there
was no just cause in the dismissal. The opportunity to dispute
the finding of the just cause is readily available before the
Labor Arbiter, and the subsequent levels of appellate review.
Again, as held in Serrano:
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing
is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and
hearing as the essence of procedural due process. Thus, compliance
by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an
employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the
legality of his dismissal. As Art. 277(b) provides, “Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission.” 62
The Labor Code presents no textually demonstrable
commitment to invalidate a dismissal for just cause due to the
absence of notice or hearing. This is not surprising, as such
remedy will not restore the employer or employee into equity.
Absent a showing of integral causation, the mutual infliction
of wrongs does not negate either injury, but instead enforces
two independent rights of relief.
_______________
62 Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 1 at p. 445;
p. 468.
695
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 695
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The Damages’ Dimensions
Award for Damages Must Have Statutory Basis
The Court has grappled with the problem of what should be
the proper remedial relief of an employee dismissed with just
cause, but not afforded either notice or hearing. In a long line
of cases, beginning with Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC and up 63
until Serrano in 2000, the Court had deemed an
indemnification award as sufficient to answer for the violation
by the employer against the employee. However, the doctrine
was modified in Serrano.
I disagree with Serrano insofar as it held that employees
terminated for just cause are to be paid backwages from the
time employment was terminated “until it is determined that
the termination is for just cause because the failure to hear
him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.” Article 279 of the Labor
64
Code clearly authorizes the payment of backwages only if an
employee is unjustly dismissed. A dismissal for just cause is
obviously antithetical to an unjust dismissal. An award for
backwages is not clearly warranted by the law.
The Impropriety of Award for Separation Pay
The formula of one month’s pay for every year served does
have statutory basis. It is found though in the Labor Code
though, not the Civil Code. Even then, such computation is
made for separation pay under the Labor Code. But separation
pay is not an appropriate as a remedy in this case, or in any
case wherein an employee is terminated for just cause. As
Justice Vitug noted in his separate opinion in Serrano, an
employee whose employment is terminated for a just cause is
_______________
63 G.R. No. 80587, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 69.
64 Serrano, supra note 1 at pp. 453; p. 476.
696
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
not entitled to the payment of separation benefits. Separation 65
pay is traditionally a monetary award paid as an alternative
to reinstatement which can no longer be effected in view of the
long passage of time or because of the realities of the
situation. However, under Section 7, Rule 1, Book VI of the
66
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, “[t]he
separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not
entitle him to the termination pay provided in the
Code.” Neither does the Labor Code itself provide instances
67
wherein separation pay is warranted for dismissals with just
cause. Separation pay is warranted only for dismissals for
authorized causes, as enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of
the Labor Code.
The Impropriety of Equity Awards
Admittedly, the Court has in the past authorized the award of
separation pay for duly terminated employees as a measure of
social justice, provided that the employee is not guilty of
serious misconduct reflecting on moral character. This
doctrine is inapplicable in this case, as the Agabons are guilty
of abandonment, which is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
Abandonment is tantamount to serious misconduct, as it
constitutes a willful breach of the employer-employee
relationship without cause.
_______________
65 Serrano, supra note 1 at p. 485; p. 525; J. Vitug, separate concurring and
dissenting.
66 Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. L-46766-7, 1 April 1980, 97
SCRA 5, 8.
67 “x x x without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits, and
privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining
agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.” Section
7, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
68 See Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 98137, 15 September 1997, 279 SCRA 106, 115, citing
cases.
697
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 697
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The award of separation pay as a measure of social justice has
no statutory basis, but clearly emanates from the Court’s so-
called “equity jurisdiction.” The Court’s equity jurisdiction as
a basis for award, no matter what form it may take, is likewise
unwarranted in this case. Easy resort to equity should be
avoided, as it should yield to positive rules which pre-empt and
prevail over such persuasions. Abstract as the concept is, it
69
does not admit to definite and objective standards.
I consider the pronouncement regarding the proper
monetary awards in such cases as Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC, Reta, and to a degree, even Serrano as premised in
70 71
part on equity. This decision is premised in part due to the
68
absence of cited statutory basis for these awards. In these
cases, the Court deemed an indemnity award proper without
exactly saying where in statute could such award be derived
at. Perhaps, equity or social justice can be invoked as basis for
the award. However, this sort of arbitrariness, indeterminacy
and judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives is precisely
the source of my discontent. Social justice should be the
aspiration of all that we do, yet I think it the more mature
attitude to consider that it ebbs and flows within our statutes,
rather than view it as an independent source of funding.
Article 288 of the Labor Code as a Source of Liability
Another putative source of liability for failure to render the
notice requirement is Article 288 of the Labor Code, which
states:
_______________
69 Aguila v. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-48335, 15 April 1988, 160
SCRA 352, 360. “For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the
absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside
legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often
happens, supplement the law.” Id.
70 170 SCRA 69 (1989).
71 G.R. No. 112100, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 613.
698
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Article 288 states:
Penalties.—Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the
acts complained of hinges on a question of interpretation or
implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective
bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code
declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a
fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than
three months nor more than three years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
It is apparent from the provision that the penalty arises due
to contraventions of the provisions of the Labor Code. It is also
clear that the provision comes into play regardless of who the
violator may be. Either the employer or the employee may be
penalized, or perhaps even officials tasked with implementing
the Labor Code.
However, it is apparent that Article 288 is a penal
provision; hence, the prescription for penalties such as fine
and imprisonment. The Article is also explicit that the
imposition of fine or imprisonment is at the “discretion of the
court.” Thus, the proceedings under the provision is penal in
character. The criminal case has to be instituted before the
proper courts, and the Labor Code violation subject thereof
duly proven in an adversarial proceeding. Hence, Article 288
cannot apply in this case and serve as basis to impose a
penalty on Riviera Homes.
I also maintain that under Article 288 the penalty should
be paid to the State, and not to the person or persons who may
have suffered injury as a result of the violation. A penalty is a
sum of money which the law requires to be paid by way of
punishment for doing some act which is prohibited or for not
doing some act which is required to be done. A penalty should
72
be distinguished from damages which is the pecu-
_______________
72 Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990 ed., p. 1133; citing Hidden Hollow Ranch v.
Collins, 146 Mont. 321, 406 P.2d 365, 368.
699
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 699
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
niary compensation or indemnity to a person who has suffered
loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or
rights, on account of the unlawful act or omission or negligence
of another. Article 288 clearly serves as a punitive fine, rather
than a compensatory measure, since the provision penalizes
an act that violates the Labor Code even if such act does not
cause actual injury to any private person.
Independent of the employee’s interests protected by the
Labor Code is the interest of the State in seeing to it that its
regulatory laws are complied with. Article 288 is intended to
satiate the latter interest. Nothing in the language of Article
288 indicates an intention to compensate or remunerate a
private person for injury he may have sustained.
 It should be noted though that in Serrano, the Court
observed that since the promulgation of Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC in 1989, “fines imposed for violations of the notice
73
requirement have varied from P1,000.00 to P2,000.00 to
P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.” Interestingly, this range is the
74
same range of the penalties imposed by Article 288. These
“fines” adverted to in Serrano were paid to the dismissed
employee. The use of the term “fines,” as well as the
terminology employed a few other cases, may have left an
75
erroneous impression that the award implemented beginning
with Wen-phil was based on Article 288 of the Labor Code.
Yet, an examination of Wenphilreveals that what the Court
actually awarded to the employee was an “indemnity,”
dependent on the facts of each case and the gravity of the
omission committed by the employer. There is no mention
in Wenphil of Article
_______________
73 170 SCRA 69 (1989).
74 Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 1 at pp. 442;
p. 465.
75 See e.g., Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112100,
27 May 1994, 232 SCRA 613, wherein the Court held that “private respondents
should pay petitioner P10,000.00 as penalty for failure to comply with the due
process requirement.” Id., at p. 618.
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
288 of the Labor Code, or indeed, of any statutory basis for the
award.
The Proper Basis: Employer’s Liability under the Civil Code
As earlier stated, Wenphil allowed the payment of indemnity
to the employee dismissed for just cause is dependent on the
facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed
by the employer. However, I considered Wenphil flawed
insofar as it is silent as to the statutory basis for the indemnity
award. This failure, to my mind, renders it unwise for to
reinstate the Wenphil rule, and foster the impression that it is
the judicial business to invent awards for damages without
clear statutory basis.
The proper legal basis for holding the employer liable for
monetary damages to the employee dismissed for just cause is
the Civil Code. The award of damages should be measured
against the loss or injury suffered by the employee by reason of
the employer’s violation or, in case of nominal damages, the
right vindicated by the award. This is the proper paradigm
authorized by our law, and designed to obtain the fairest
possible relief.
Under Section 217(4) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter
has jurisdiction over claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations. It is thus the duty of Labor Arbiters to adjudicate
claims for damages, and they should disabuse themselves of
any inhibitions if it does appear that an award for damages is
warranted. As triers of facts in a specialized field, they should
attune themselves to the particular conditions or problems
attendant to employer-employee relationships, and thus be in
the best possible position as to the nature and amount of
damages that may be warranted in this case.
The damages referred under Section 217(4) of the Labor
Code are those available under the Civil Code. It is but proper
that the Civil Code serve as the basis for the indemnity, it
701
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 701
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
being the law that regulates the private relations of the
members of civil society, determining their respective rights
and obligations with reference to persons, things, and civil
acts. No matter how impressed with the public interest the
76
relationship between a private employer and employee is, it
still is ultimately a relationship between private individuals.
Notably, even though the Labor Code could very well have
provided set rules for damages arising from the employer-
employee relationship, referral was instead made to the
concept of damages as enumerated and defined under the Civil
Code.
Given the long controversy that has dogged this present
issue regarding dismissals for just cause, it is wise to lay down
standards that would guide the proper award of damages
under the Civil Code in cases wherein the employer failed to
comply with statutory due process in dismissals for just cause.
First. I believe that it can be maintained as a general rule,
that failure to comply with the statutory requirement of notice
automatically gives rise to nominal damages, at the very least,
even if the dismissal was sustained for just cause.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a
plaintiff which has been violated or invaded by another may
be vindicated or recognized without having to indemnify the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Nominal damages may
77
likewise be awarded in every obligation arising from law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law,
and quasi-delicts, or where any property right has been
invaded.
Clearly, the bare act of failing to observe the notice
requirement gives rise to nominal damages assessable against
the employer and due the employee. The Labor Code indubi-
_______________
76 A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (1990 ed.), at p. 11; citing 9
Fabres 10.
77 Article 2221, Civil Code.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
tably entitles the employee to notice even if dismissal is for
just cause, even if there is no apparent intent to void such
dismissals deficiently implemented. It has also been held that
one’s employment, profession, trade, or calling is a “property
right” and the wrongful interference therewith gives rise to an
actionable wrong. 78
In Better Buildings, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the
79
while the termination therein was for just and valid cause, the
manner of termination was done in complete disregard of the
necessary procedural safeguards. The Court found nominal
80
damages as the proper form of award, as it was purposed to
vindicate the right to procedural due process violated by the
employer. A similar holding was maintained in Iran v.
81
NLRC and Malaya Shipping v. NLRC. The doctrine has
82 83
express statutory basis, duly recognizes the existence of the
right to notice, and vindicates the violation of such right. It is
sound, logical, and should be adopted as a general rule.
The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion
of the court, or in labor cases, of the Labor Arbiter and the
84
successive appellate levels. The authority to nominate
standards governing the award of nominal damages has
clearly been delegated to the judicial branch, and it will serve
good purpose for this Court to provide such guidelines.
Considering that the affected right is a property right, there is
justification
_______________
78 Ferrer v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 100898, 5 July
1993, 224 SCRA 410; citing Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145
SCRA 268(1986).
79 347 Phil. 521, 531; 283 SCRA 242, 250 (1997).
 80 Id., at p. 531; p. 250.
Id.
81
82 G.R. No. 121927, 22 April 1998, 289 SCRA 433.
83 G.R. No. 121698, 26 March 1998, 288 SCRA 181. The ponente in all three
cases was Justice Flerida Ruth Romero.
84 See Article 2216, Civil Code. See also Saludo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
95536, 23 March 1992, 207 SCRA 498.
703
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
in basing the amount of nominal damages on the particular
characteristics attaching to the claimant’s employment.
Factors such as length of service, positions held, and received
salary may be considered to obtain the proper measure of
nominal damages. After all, the degree by which a property
right should be vindicated is affected by the estimable value of
such right.
At the same time, it should be recognized that nominal
damages are not meant to be compensatory, and should not be
computed through a formula based on actual losses.
Consequently, nominal damages usually limited in pecuniary
value. This fact should be impressed upon the prospective
85
claimant, especially one who is contemplating seeking
actual/compensatory damages.
Second. Actual or compensatory damages are not available
as a matter of right to an employee dismissed for just cause
but denied statutory due process. They must be based on clear
factual and legal bases, and correspond to such pecuniary loss
86
suffered by the employee as duly proven. Evidently, there is
87
less degree of discretion to award actual or compensatory
damages.
I recognize some inherent difficulties in establishing actual
damages in cases for terminations validated for just cause.
The dismissed employee retains no right to continued
employment from the moment just cause for termination
exists, and such time most likely would have arrived even
before the employer is liable to send the first notice. As a
result, an award of backwages disguised as actual damages
would almost never be justified if the employee was dismissed
for just cause. The possible exception would be if it can be
703 proven the
_______________
85 In relation to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are less
than temperate/moderate damages or compensatory damages.
86 See De la Paz, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA
65 [1987]; Chavez v. Gonzales, 32 SCRA 547 [1970].
87 See Art. 2199, Civil Code.
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ground for just cause came into being only after the dismissed
employee had stopped receiving wages from the employer.
Yet it is not impossible to establish a case for actual
damages if dismissal was for just cause. Particularly
actionable, for example, is if the notices are not served on the
employee, thus hampering his/her opportunities to obtain new
employment. For as long as it can be demonstrated that the
failure of the employer to observe procedural due process
mandated by the Labor Code is the proximate cause of
pecuniary loss or injury to the dismissed employee, then actual
or compensatory damages may be awarded.
Third. If there is a finding of pecuniary loss arising from
the employer violation, but the amount cannot be proved with
certainty, then temperate or moderate damages are available
under Article 2224 of the Civil Code. Again, sufficient
discretion is afforded to the adjudicator as regards the proper
award, and the award must be reasonable under the
circumstances. Temperate or nominal damages may yet
88
prove to be a plausible remedy, especially when common sense
dictates that pecuniary loss was suffered, but incapable of
precise definition.
Fourth. Moral and exemplary damages may also be
awarded in the appropriate circumstances. As pointed out by
the Decision,moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith, fraud, or
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, or the employer committed an act oppressive to
labor. Exemplary damages may avail if the dismissal was
89
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Appropriate Award of Damages to the Agabons
The records indicate no proof exists to justify the award of
actual or compensatory damages, as it has not been estab-
_______________
88 Art. 2225, Civil Code.
89 Page 16, Decision, citing jurisprudence.
705
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 705
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
lished that the failure to serve the second notice on the
Agabons was the proximate cause to any loss or injury. In fact,
there is not even any showing that such violation caused any
sort of injury or discomfort to the Agabons. Nor do they assert
such causal relation. Thus, the only appropriate award of
damages is nominal damages. Considering the circumstances,
I agree that an award of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
each for the Agabons is sufficient.
All premises considered, I VOTE to:
1. (1)DENY the PETITION for lack of merit, and AFFIRM
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January
2003, with the MODIFICATION that in addition,
Riviera Homes be ORDERED to pay the petitioners
the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) each,
as nominal damages.
2. (2)HOLD that henceforth, dismissals for just cause may
not be invalidated due to the failure to observe the due
process requirements under the Labor Code, and that
the only indemnity award available to the employee
dismissed for just cause are damages under the Civil
Code as duly proven. Any and all previous rulings and
statements of the Court inconsistent with this holding
are now deemed INOPERATIVE.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Separation pay is allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. (Salavarria vs. Letran
College, 296 SCRA 184 [1998])
While the right of an employer to terminate the services of
an employee for a just or authorized cause is recognized,
nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within
the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa
and fair play. (Colegio de San Juan de Letran vs. Association
of Employees and Faculty of Letran, 340 SCRA 587 [2000])
The offer to re-employ an employee could not have the effect
of validating an otherwise arbitrary dismissal. (Hantex
Trading Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 390 SCRA 181 [2002])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Substantive Due Process
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and Go
CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR
ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as
to constitutionality of ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show
invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors who
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities
of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action,
must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless
there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on
its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is
unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for
overthrowing an ordinance which is not void on its face, the
presumption of constitution-ality must prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—
A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and
lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation
of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything
of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the
legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal
license fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction
of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police
power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power
to license and regulate, but in fixing the amount of license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of
cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the
number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of
license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise
of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal
infirmity.—There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental
action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates
of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of
an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels,
etc.— The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which
cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest. If the liberty invoked were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What
makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its face for
alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and diff er as to its
application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for
intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the
lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons
to be more specifically set forth, such
852
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the
requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
being unreasonable and violative of due procfess insofar as it
would impose ?6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels
and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
_______________
1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel,
was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court,
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar,
Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the
853
president and general manager of the second petitioner"
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853
against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power
vs. City Mayor of Manila,
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
that the provision in the same section which would require the
give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that
a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other
promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
livelihood, to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of
investment of more than P3 million." (par. 2). It was then
1

companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship,

alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City
age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14,
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the
coupled with a certification that a person signing such form
time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
representative, with such registration forms and records kept
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
and bound together, it also being provided that the premises
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief
any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1
of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not
only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in f irst class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the
ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any
room or portion
854
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the
due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that
insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause
the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its
investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null
and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963
issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from
and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed
to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila,
of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a
cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a
reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and
that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against selfincrimination, with the assertion that
the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was
contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed f or its dissolution
and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and
855
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855
 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all
having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent
City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with
the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June
14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio
Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now
Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January
22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the
validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its
lack of conf ormity to the Constitution resting on the party who
assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum
likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later,
on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was
filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what they considered to be applicable
American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring
the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable"
and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued.
856
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of
the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed
to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that
without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of
the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came
to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction
issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''" Hence this
appeal.
 As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance.
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what
has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption
is all in favor of validity. x x x The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the wellbeing of the people. x x x The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not
a clear invasion
857
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation."2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its f
ace, which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where 3
the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on
the ground that the specif ic method of regulation prescribed
is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process
of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present
case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of f acts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face
the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the
_______________
2 US. v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation
of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the
leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
858
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. given for the play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not
regulate, laissez faire—not the individual—must be the regulator. (Hamilton,
vs. City Mayor of Manila
Pre view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great
4 5 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.

public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading

5 6 U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.

7 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.

decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
859
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
general welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent
6

vs, City Mayor of Manila

and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to
that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 7

check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
these establishments by requiring these transients and guests
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a
public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
operating for purpose other -than legal" and at the same time,
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
________________ to increase "the income of the city government." It would
4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
Frankfurter the police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
policy. It def ies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of society,
argues eloquently for it,
it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to
life; in resolving cases. it must not fall back upon sterile claims; its judgments It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
are not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the police power. stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must meet vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is more
than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in
vagrant; providing a license tax for and regulating the
8

vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a maintenance or operation of public dance halls; prohibiting 9

progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social gambling; prohibiting
10 jueteng; and 11monte, prohibiting
12

consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its
bottomless well and how f ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of
holidays; prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; and,
13 14

any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a process of trial prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or
and error; in the making of policy the f ullest possible opportunity must be
maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is,
smoked or otherwise used, all of which are intended ,to
15
protect public morals. ,
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
________________
8 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-
15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10 U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11 U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26
Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65 Phil. 625
12 U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
13 U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14 Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of
Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15 U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
860
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In
view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry.
Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial
of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill
tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due
16
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate. case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of
_______________
16 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the
right of privacy or the prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners
obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect
be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken
advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and
accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing
business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate
cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.
861
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those
17
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions
of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical
18
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a
19
"close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of
our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated
20
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would
seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what
would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It
provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A
strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set
forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of
such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
________________
17 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32-
33.
18 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
862
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
21
the latter, f irst-class motels being required to pay a P6,000
annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been
the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal
license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the
regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only. As was explained
22
more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for
non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees
the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint
upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in
non-usef ul enterprises is, of course, generally an important
factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in
cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable." 23
________________
22 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
23 Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120
111. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 111.
19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal.
46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v.
Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash,
41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans,
31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel.,Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc.
Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex
parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck
v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-
830.
863
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta this 24
Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to
implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for
public purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much
discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining
the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure. The discussion of this particular matter may fitly
26
close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees
that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they
can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that
plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat,
the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted. x x x And surely, the mere fact, that
some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in
a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in
the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in these occupations
________________
24 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S.
412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed
in Republic v. BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
25 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21,
1967.
26 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil.
1142.
864
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal
exercise of that power." 27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar
as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for
the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could
be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted.
How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of
an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty
which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.
Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different
conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty'
as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. x x
x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of
the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
_______________
27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City
of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-
Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914),
189 Ala. 66.
865
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila,
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights
of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for
all."29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom
to contract, People v. Pomar, no longer "retains its virtuality
30
as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest." What may be stressed sufficiently is
31
that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory
________________
29 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734
30 46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American
sovereignty, American Supreme Court decisions hav-ing thus an obligatory
effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the then controlling
decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which
subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300 U.S.
379
 31Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360,
quoting a concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No.
46496.
866
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
measure is wider. How justify then the allegation of a denial
32
of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principle of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the
alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for
determining whether the companion or companions referred
to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of
the registry or entering the room with him at about the same
time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a
proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether
the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon
the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to
whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such
lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It
may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
_______________
32 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those
cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which
collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the
principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its standard. The
right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so
far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of
speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well be infringed on such
slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." (West
Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
867
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867
Acuña vs. Yatco
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction Co. to Adderley v. 33
Florida, the principle has been consistently upheld that what
34
makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment
either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us?
A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit, but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with
all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
and determination, the attack against the validity of the
challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from
it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held
and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
 Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and
the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave.
Judgment reversed.
___________
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 110027. November 16, 1994. *
MARANAW HOTEL RESORT CORPORATION (CENTURY
PARK SHERATON MANILA), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GINA G. CASTRO,
respondents.
Labor Law; Reinstatement; Labor Code; Article 223; The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided therein.—The resolution of the issue is found
in the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads:
“In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
191
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 16, 1994 191
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
either be admitted back to work under the terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by
the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court sustained its
constitutional-ity as an exercise of the police power of the state.—This
paragraph was inserted by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, which took
effect on 21 March 1989. In Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we sustained its constitutionality as an
exercise of the police power of the state and further ruled that since
appeal is a privilege of statutory origin, the law may validly
prescribe limitations or qualifications thereto or provide relief to the
prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing
party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If execution pending appeal is
granted, the employee concerned shall be admitted back to work
under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation.—It is clear from Article 223 that if execution pending
appeal is granted, the employee concerned shall be admitted back to
work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation. However, instead of doing so, the employer
is granted the option to merely reinstate the employee in the payroll.
This would simply mean that although not admitted back to work,
the employee would nevertheless be included in the payroll and
entitled to receive her salary and other benefits as if she were in fact
working.
Same; Same; Same; Article 224; Writ of Execution; Although
thereinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately executory, it
does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a writ of
execution.—It must be stressed, however, that although the
reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately executory, it
does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a writ of
execution which may be issued motu proprio or on motion of an
interested party. Article 224 of the Labor Code provides: “ART.
224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards.—(a) The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission
or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator
may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ
of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory. . . .” (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Labor Arbiter neither
issued motu proprio a writ of execution to enforce the reinstatement
aspect nor acted on the private respondent’s motion for execution.—
In
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
 the instant case, the Labor Arbiter neither issued motu
proprio a writ of execution to enforce the reinstatement aspect of his
decision nor acted on the private respondent’s motion for execution
filed on 13 March 1992. The NLRC did not also resolve it prior to
the promulgation of its decision more than a year later or on 23
March 1993. The pleadings before us do not show that the private
respondent had filed a motion to resolve the motion for execution or
that she had, by any other means, called the attention of the NLRC
to such motion for execution. The private respondent may therefore
be deemed to have abandoned her motion for execution pending
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of an order for the
issuance of the writ of execution on the reinstatement aspect,
petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to work the
private respondent.—In the absence then of an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution on the reinstatement aspect of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal
obligation to admit back to work the private respondent under the
terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at the
petitioner’s option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll. An option
is a right of election to exercise a privilege, and the option in Article
223 of the Labor Code is exclusively granted to the employer. The
event that gives rise for its exercise is not the reinstatement decree
of a Labor Arbiter, but the writ for its execution commanding the
employer to reinstate the employee, while the final act which
compels the employer to exercise the option is the service upon it of
the writ of execution when, instead of admitting the employee back
to his work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the
payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it must
forthwith admit the employee back to work, otherwise it may be
punished for contempt.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cabochan, Reyes & Capones for petitioner.
Malang and Duka Law Offices for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This special civil action of certiorari raises the issue of
whether the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payroll
reinstatement of an employee despite its resolution reversing
the decision of the
193
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 16, 1994 193
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
Labor Arbiter and declaring that there was no illegal
dismissal. The factual and procedural antecedents in this case
are in the main not disputed.
On 16 June 1990, private respondent Gina G. Castro was
hired on a probationary basis for six months as a guest
relations officer of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, a five-
star hotel located at Malate, Manila, owned by the
petitioner. On 10 November 1990, she was dismissed on the
1
ground of failure to meet the standards set forth in her
probationary employment contract. She then filed on 13
2
November 1990 with the Arbitration Branch of the National
Capital Region of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal
with reinstatement, back wages, and damages against the
hotel and its former general manager, Peter Grieder. The case
3
was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-06059-90.
On 23 December 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of the private respondent. The dispositive
4
portion thereof reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. 1.Declaring the dismissal of complainant Gina G. Castro by
respondents to have been illegally effected;
2. 2.Ordering respondents to immediately reinstate com-
plainant to her former position or substantially equivalent
 position without loss of seniority rights including the
payment of backwages in the amount of Eighty-Eight
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Pesos (P88,620.00);
3. 3.Respondents are further ordered to pay the amount of Two
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P2,800.00) for unpaid 13th
month pay and Nine Thousand One Hundred Forty Two
Pesos (P9,142.00) as ten (10%) per cent attorney’s fees,
which is equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the awards
herein;
4. 4.As to the claims for damages, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.” 5 based on the erroneous computation by the Labor Arbiter.
_______________
1 Rollo, 53-54.
2 Rollo, 22-24; 37-39.
3 Annex “C” of Petition; Id., 50.
4 Annex “D” of Petition; Id., 53-62.
5 Id., 61-62.
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
The petitioner received a copy of the decision on 28 January
1992. On 7 February 1992, within the 10-day reglementary
period, it filed an appeal to the NLRC alleging therein that
6
the Labor Arbiter committed abuse of discretion and serious
error in his findings of fact and conclusions of law. It also
claimed that the Labor Arbiter erred in ruling that the
monthly salary of the private respondent is P7,000.00 when it
should have been P3,403.00. Also, on 7 February 1992, it filed
an Omnibus Motion For Extension Of Time To File Surety
Bond And To Reduce Amount Of Bond since by reason of the
7
above error as to the monthly salary, the back salaries should
only have been P40,836.00 and not P88,620.00 and the 13th-
month pay should only have been P1,134.00 and not
P2,800.00. Thus, the total amount due the private respondent
should only be P41,970 and not P91,420.00. This motion was
not resolved by the Labor Arbiter.
On 17 February 1992, the private respondent filed a motion
for the execution of the decision on the ground that the
8
petitioner did not file the memorandum of appeal and appeal
bond and that the order of reinstatement was immediately
executory. This motion was likewise not resolved.
On 14 July 1992, the petitioner filed a surety bond in the
amount of P100,562.00 to answer for the monetary award
9
10
In its resolution of 25 March 1993, the NLRC (Second
11
Division) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that there
was no illegal dismissal but rather a failure of the private
respondent to comply with the petitioner’s standards for
permanent employment. It then made the following
observations:
_______________
6 Annex “E” of Petition; Rollo, 64. The appeal contains the Memorandum on
Appeal.
7 Annex “B” of Reply; Id., 126.
8 Annex “F” of Petition; Id., 82-83.
9 Annexes “C” and “C-1” of Reply; Id., 129-131.
10 Id., 122.
11 Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 34-48.
195
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 16, 1994 195
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
“It appears however that on March 13, 1992, complainant filed a
Motion For Execution Pending Appeal which motion was
inadvertently not acted upon.
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides among others, as follows:
‘In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal or separationor, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not
stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.’ (Italics supplied)
In view of the aforequoted provision, complainant should be
considered on payroll reinstatement, as of the date of the filing of
the Motion For Execution up to the date of the promulgation of this
Resolution and thus pay [sic] her salaries corresponding to that
period based on P4,800.00 a month which was her salary at the time
of her dismissal.”
and ultimately decreed thus:
“WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
However, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant Gina
C. Castro her salaries corresponding to the period March 13, 1992
up to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution computed at
P4,800.00 per month.
SO ORDERED.” 12
Its motion for partial reconsideration seeking to delete the
13
portion of the decision ordering it to pay the private
respondent the sum of P4,800.00 per month from 13 March
1992 up to 25 March 1993 having been denied by the NLRC
for lack of merit, the petitioner filed the instant case raising
14
the sole issue of whether the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in decreeing the
_______________
12 Id., 46-48.
13 Annex “G” of Petition; Rollo, 85-88.
14 Annex “B” of Petition; Id., 49.
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
payroll reinstatement of the private respondent and ordering
the petitioner to pay the private respondent.
It maintains that the filing of the motion for execution
pending appeal did not entitle the private respondent to
payroll reinstatement because this is an option granted to the
employer by Article 223 of the Labor Code and the operative
act therefor is the exercise by the employer of such option upon
the service upon it of the writ of execution for the
reinstatement of the private respondent. In the instant case,
the motion for execution was not acted upon and no writ of
execution was issued. Hence, there was no occasion for the
petitioner to exercise its option and the NLRC’s order was, in
effect, an order for the payment of salary to a party for the
period during which she did not work, which is violative of the
rule of “no work, no pay.” Moreover, the order is inconsistent
with the ruling that the private respondent was validly
dismissed.
We required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In her comment filed on 14 September 1993, the private
15
respondent side-steps the merits of the issue raised in the
petition; instead, she assails the validity of the NLRC
resolution and prays that the same be declared null and void
because the petitioner’s appeal to the NLRC was not perfected
on time due to the petitioner’s failure to put up the required
surety bond within the 10-day reglementary period. She
further asks that the case be remanded to the NLRC for the
execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The petitioner
controverts these claims in its reply.
16
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment filed on 12
17
October 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that the assailed resolution of the NLRC is not in accordance
with law. It prays that the NLRC be given a new period within We agree with the petitioner that the NLRC acted with
which to file its comment, which we granted. grave abuse of discretion. The petition should thus be granted.
In its comment filed on 14 March 1994, the NLRC
18 The resolution of the issue is found in the third paragraph
contends that its challenged resolution is correct. of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads:
_______________ “In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
15 Id., 101-107.
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
16 Rollo, 117-124.
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
17 Id., 140-150.

18 Id., 161-166.
197
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 16, 1994 197
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
It must be stressed that the private respondent did not
challenge the resolution of the NLRC reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and dismissing her complaint for illegal
dismissal and it is only in this action that she questioned the
timeliness of the petitioner’s appeal to the NLRC. We have
ruled that the issue of the timeliness of an appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC may not be raised
for the first time before this Court. The proper step that the
19
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.” (emphasis supplied)
This paragraph was inserted by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715,
which took effect on 21 March 1989. In Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs.
_______________
19 Arrastre Security Association-TUPAS vs. Ople, 127 SCRA
580 [1984]; Rada vs. NLRC, 205 SCRA 69 [1992].
20 Diaz vs. Nora, 190 SCRA 404 [1990].
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC

private respondent should have taken was to file with the
National Labor Relations Commission, we sustained its
21

NLRC a motion to dismiss the appeal and to remand the

constitutionality as an exercise of the police power of the state
records on the ground that the decision had become final and
and further ruled that since appeal is a privilege of statutory
executory. 20

origin, the law may validly prescribe limitations or

The sole issue thus presented for our determination is
qualifications thereto or provide relief to the prevailing party
whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.
in holding that the private respondent should be considered as
It is clear from Article 223 that if execution pending appeal
reinstated in the payroll from the filing of the motion for
is granted, the employee concerned shall be admitted back to
execution on 13 March 1992 until the promulgation of its
work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
resolution and, as a necessary consequence, ordering the
dismissal or separation. However, instead of doing so, the
petitioner to pay the private respondent her salaries
employer is granted the option to merely reinstate the
corresponding to the period from 13 March 1992 up to 25
employee in the payroll. This would simply mean that
March 1993 when its resolution was promulgated.
although not admitted back to work, the employee would
nevertheless be included in the payroll and entitled to receive
her salary and other benefits as if she were in fact working.
It must be stressed, however, that although the
reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately
executory, it does not follow that it is self-executory. There
must be a writ of execution which may be issued motu
proprio or on motion of an interested party. Article 224 of the
Labor Code provides:
“ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards.—(a) The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary
arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested
party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years
from the date it becomes final and executory. . . .” (emphasis
supplied)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule VIII of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC also provides:
“The Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator, or the Regional Director,
or his duly authorized hearing officer of origin shall, motu proprio
or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on
a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it becomes final
and executory . . . . No motion for execution shall be entertained nor
a writ be issued unless the Labor Arbiter is in possession of the
records of the case which shall include an entry of judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
_______________
21 200 SCRA 246 {1991}.
199
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 16, 1994 199
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter neither issued motu
proprio a writ of execution to enforce the reinstatement aspect
of his decision nor acted on the private respondent’s motion for
execution filed on 13 March 1992. The NLRC did not also
resolve it prior to the promulgation of its decision more than a
year later or on 23 March 1993. The pleadings before us do not
show that the private respondent had filed a motion to resolve
the motion for execution or that she had, by any other means,
called the attention of the NLRC to such motion for execution.
The private respondent may therefore be deemed to have
abandoned her motion for execution pending appeal.
In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the
22
Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to
admit back to work the private respondent under the terms
and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at the
petitioner’s option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll. An
option is a right of election to exercise a privilege, and the
23
option in Article 223 of the Labor Code is exclusively granted
to the employer. The event that gives rise for its exercise is not
the reinstatement decree of a Labor Arbiter, but the writ for
its execution commanding the employer to reinstate the
employee, while the final act which compels the employer to
exercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of
execution when, instead of admitting the employee back to his
work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the
payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it
must forthwith admit the employee back to work, otherwise it
may be punished for contempt. 24
This option is based on practical considerations. The
employer may insist that the dismissal of the employee was
for a just and valid cause and the latter’s presence within its
premises is intolerable by any standard; or such presence
would be inimical
______________
 22 Under Section 2, Rule III of the Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs of the for illegal dismissal, the rationale for the order of payroll
NLRC, the writ of execution must issue in the name of the Republic of the
reinstatement is beyond us.
Philippines.
23 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 986.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
24 Section 2, Rule III, Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs of the NLRC; challenged resolution of the National Labor Relations
Section 9, Rule 39, Rules of Court, which may be applied suppletorily pursuant Commission of 25 March 1993 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-
to Section 3, Rule I of the Manual.
06059-90 is modified by deleting the portion thereof ordering
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the petitioner to pay the private respondent her salaries
corresponding to the period from 13 March 1992 up to the date
Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation vs. NLRC
of the promulgation of the resolution. The rest shall stand.
to its interest or would demoralize the co-employees. Thus,
No pronouncement as to costs.
while payroll reinstatement would in fact be unacceptable
SO ORDERED.
because it sanctions the payment of salaries to one not
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan
rendering service, it may still be the lesser evil compared to
, JJ.,concur.
the intolerable presence in the workplace of an unwanted
Petition granted. Resolution modified.
employee. _______________
Since in the instant case no occasion arose for the petitioner 25 Rollo, 146.

to exercise its option under Article 223 of the Labor Code with 201
respect to the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 17, 1994 201
Arbiter, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when People vs. Sumaya
it ordered that the private respondent should be considered Note.—A motion for writ of execution should be sought
reinstated in the payroll from the filing of her motion for before the arbiter, not with the NLRC. (Callanta vs. National
execution until the promulgation of its resolution on 25 March Labor Relations Commission, 225 SCRA 526 [1993])
1993. As correctly contended by the Office of the Solicitor ——o0o——
General, the NLRC “arrogated unto itself the right to choose © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
whether to admit the dismissed employee back to work or to
reinstate her in the payroll, which right properly pertains to
the employer.” Worse, the NLRC resolution granted the
25

unresolved motion for execution which had been effectively

abandoned through the private respondent’s inaction and
which, for obvious reasons, could no longer be properly
resolved in a resolution finally disposing the appeal. And since
the resolution reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed for lack of merit the private respondent’s complaint
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
G.R. No. 166494. June 29, 2007. *
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the
name and style “Carlos Superdrug,” ELSIE M. CANO, doing
business under the name and style “Advance Drug,” Dr.
SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing business under the name and
style “City Pharmacy,” MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing
business under the name and style “Botica dela Serna,” and
LEYTE SERV-WELL CORP., doing business under the name
and style “Leyte Serv-Well
Drugstore,”petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF),
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG),
respondents.
Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 (R.A. No.
9257); Taxation; Being a tax deduction, the discount given by
drugstores in favor of senior citizens does not reduce taxes owed on a
peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes
owed.—Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction
scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount
privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is
treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted
from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated
otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the
income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the
amount of tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does
not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of
the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered
the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; The
permanent reduction in the drugstores’ total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use
or benefit, which constitutes compensable taking for which the
owners would
_______________
* EN BANC.
131
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 131
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD)
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation; Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator; A tax deduction
does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount—as
such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.—The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does
not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such,
it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Police Power; The State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon
private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program.—This raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object; When the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare; Police power
as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of property owners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, a questioned provision is
invalidated.—The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has
been purposely veiled in general
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD)
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as
it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” For this reason,
when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of
the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is unfair for drugstore owners to
criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their
medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry.—
It is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot
raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the
players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of
petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below
acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this
decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot
reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot
afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to
competition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and
the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.—The Court is not oblivious of the
retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive
pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and
the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business
133
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 133
 Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD)
which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension.
While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly
on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public
utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property
can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the
promotion of public good.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Without sufficient proof that Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.—
The success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the
support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed
in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to
achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the
same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court
will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roque and Roque Law Firm for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary
1
Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Ex-
2
panded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
_______________
1Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2An Act Granting Additional Benefits and Privileges to Senior Citizens
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7432, otherwise known as “An Act
to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance
(DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been
specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with
the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations
for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and
revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No.
7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
3
Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a)
of the Act states:
“SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens.—The senior citizens shall
be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial
services for the death of senior citizens;
...
 The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a),
(f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That
the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax
if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes
_______________
Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for other
Purposes.”
3 Otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act.
135
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 135
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.” 4
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257, Rule
VI, Article 8 of which states:
“Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments.—The establishment
may claim the discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4—
Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental
5
Services in Private Facilities[,] and Sections 10 and 11 —Air, Sea
6 7 8
and
_______________
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Section 4. Discounts from Establishments.—The grant of twenty percent
(20%) discount on all prices of goods and services offered to the general public
regardless of the amount purchased from all establishments, irrespective of
classification, relative to the utilization of services for the exclusive use of
senior citizen in the following:
...
d) DRUG STORES, HOSPITAL PHARMACIES, MEDICAL AND
OPTICAL CLINICS AND SIMILAR ESTABLISHMENTS DISPENSING
MEDICINES.—The discount for purchases of drugs/medicines shall be subject
to the Guidelines to be issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs, Department
of Health (BFAD-DOH), in coordination with the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHILHEALTH).
6 Section 9. Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities.—The senior
citizen shall be granted twenty percent (20%) discount on medical and dental
services and diagnostic and laboratory fees such as but not limited to x-ray,
computerized tomography scans and blood tests, including professional fees of
attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be issued by the Department of Health, in
coordination with the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation.
7 Section 10. Air and Transportation Privileges.—At least twenty percent
(20%) discount in fare for domestic air, and sea travel based on the actual fare,
including the promotional fare, advance booking and similar discounted fare
shall be granted for the exclusive use and enjoyment of senior citizens.
8 Section 11. Public Land Transportation Privileges.—Twenty percent
(20%) discount in public railways, including LRT, MRT,
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the
goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further,
That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts
for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and
to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended; Provided, finally, That the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the
Department of Finance (DOF).” 9
On July 10, 2004, in reference to the query of the Drug Stores
Association of the Philippines (DSAP) concerning the meaning
of a tax deduction under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act,
the DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B. Recente,
clarified as follows:
“1) The difference between the Tax Credit (under the Old Senior granted. The establishment shoulders the remaining portion of the granted
Citizens Act) and Tax Deduction (under the Expanded Senior discounts.
Citizens Act). It may be necessary to note that while the burden on [the] government
1.1. The provision of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 (the old Senior Citizens Act) is slightly diminished in terms of its percentage share on the discounts
grants twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to granted to senior citizens, the number of potential establishments that
the utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging may claim tax deductions, have however, been broadened. Aside from the
establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of establishments that may claim tax creditsunder the old law, more
medicines anywhere in the country, the costs of which may be claimed by establishments were added under the new law such as: establishments
the private establishments concerned as tax credit. providing medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory services,
Effectively, a tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayer’s including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and
tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such medical facilities, operators of domestic air and sea transport services,
establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers public railways and skyways and bus transport services.
the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the A simple illustration might help amplify the points discussed above, as
government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. follows:
_______________ 138
PNR, Skyways and fares in buses (PUB), jeepneys (PUJ), taxi and shuttle 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
services (AUV) shall be granted for the exclusive use and enjoyment of senior ANNOTATED
citizens.
9 Rollo, p. 57.
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
137 and Development (DSWD)
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 137 Tax Deduction Tax Credit
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare Gross Sales xxxxxx xxxxxx
and Development (DSWD) Less : Cost of goods xxxxx xxxxx
It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax credit scheme under sold
the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior payments of taxes have Net Sales xxxxxx xxxxxx
been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from
his/her income tax due. The tax credit scheme under R.A. No. 7432 is,
Less: Operating
therefore, inapplicable since no tax payments have previously occurred. Expenses:
1.2. The provision under R.A. No. 9257, on the other hand, provides that Tax Deduction x x x x --
the establishment concerned may claim the discounts under Section 4(a), on Discounts
(f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction from gross income, based on the net cost
Other deductions: xxxx xxxx
of goods sold or services rendered.
Under this scheme, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct Net Taxable Income xxxxx xxxxx
from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount of Tax Due xxx xxx
discounts granted to senior citizens. Effectively, the government loses in Less: Tax Credit -- xx
terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate
Net Tax Due – xx
the said establishment is liable to pay the government. This will be an
amount equivalent to 32% of the twenty percent (20%) discounts so
As shown above, under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together
with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income.
On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of
discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from
the tax due amount.” 10
Meanwhile, on October 1, 2004, Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the
Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as
the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” was issued by the
11
DOH, providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in
the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all
establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of
the senior citizens.
On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative
Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177,
12
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 67-69; emphasis supplied.
11 The A.O. became effective on October 9, 2004, after its publication in two
national newspapers of general circulation.
12 “Amendment to Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2004 on the Policies and
Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions of
139
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 139
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the
purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall
extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines
whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that “[t]he grant
of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the
purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.”
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the
Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the following
grounds: 13
1. “1)The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9
of the Constitution which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
2. 2)It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1)
enshrined in our Constitution which states that “no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal
protection of the laws;” and
3. 3)The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional
guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes “essential
goods, health and other social services available to all
people at affordable cost.”
14
_______________
Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act
of 2003.”
13 Rollo, pp. 17-24.
14 According to petitioners, of the five (5) million Filipinos who are 60 years
old and above, only 500,000 are in Metro Manila and thus, have access to
Mercury Drug which, because of the bulk discounts it gets from pharmaceutical
companies and suppliers, can afford to give the 20% discount . Unlike Mercury
Drug, small- to medium-scale drugstores similar to those of petitioners’,
however, can only impose minimal mark-ups for competitive pricing but are
constrained to raise the prices of their medicines so that they would be able to
recoup the 20% discount that they extend to senior citizens. In the end, roughly
4.5 million senior citizens in the provinces or in the areas where Mercury Drug
is not present will not be able to benefit fully from the discount that the law
provides.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to
grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the
discount.
Examining petitioners’ arguments, it is apparent that what
petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax
deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the
twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior
citizens.
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction
scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount
privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the
discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense
that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower
taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is
allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application
15
of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is
due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes
16
owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional
reduction in taxes owed.
_______________
15 Under Section 34 of the Tax Code, the itemized deductions considered as
allowable deductions from gross income include ordinary and necessary
expenses, interest, taxes, losses, bad debts, depreciation, depletion of oil and
gas wells and mines, charitable and other contributions, research and
development expenditures, and pension trust contributions.
16 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, G.R. No. 159647, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 414, 428-429 citing
Smith, West’s Tax Law Dictionary (1993), pp. 177-178, 196.
141
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 141
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction
reduces the net income of the private establishments
concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers
and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for
public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for
17
which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the
word compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample. 18
_______________
17 The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion
of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit,
public welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to which senior
citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which
these citizens belong (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, supranote 14, at p. 444; Land Bank of the Philippines v. De
Leon, 437 Phil. 347, 359; 388 SCRA 537, 546 [2002] citing Estate of Salud
Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, January 16,
2001, 349 SCRA 240, 264).
18 National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, 437 SCRA 60, 68
citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of
just compensation. 19
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group
of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the
burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize
the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to
grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement
and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of
our society. 20
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the
Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act
provides:
“SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.—Pursuant
to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of
_______________
19 In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, supra note 14, the Court held that just compensation confers the
right to receive an equivalent amount for the discount given and the prompt
payment of such amount. The advantage of a tax deduction is that the cost of
the discount can immediately be refunded, though not fully, by declaring it as
a deductible expense in computing for taxable income. In a tax credit, one has
to await the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct amount
of the discounts given before the latter can be refunded. Thus, the availment
of a tax credit necessitates prior payment of income tax.
20 Article XV of the Constitution states: “Section 1. The State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.”
143
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Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may
design programs of social security for them. In addition to this,
Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
provides: “The State shall provide social justice in all phases of
national development.” Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides:
“The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children.”
Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the
declared policies of this Act:
...
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in
the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to
actively seek their partnership.” 21
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty
percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees
charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and
other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares
for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition,
but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to condi-
_______________
21 Emphasis supplied.
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
tions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
22
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he
23
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.” 24
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. 25
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners
that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor. 26
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the
grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
_______________
22 Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71169, August 25,
1989, 176 SCRA 719.
23 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849 citing Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 412 (1911).
24 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910) citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush.,
53 (Mass. 1851); U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 253-254 (1915).
25 Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172 (1968).
26 Id.
145
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 145
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that
they have not been able to show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage. 27
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners
insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF
Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that
petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as
only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax
deduction.
To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited
the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an
example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the
distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at
a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens
or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to
sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital
of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax
deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the
full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32%
of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores. 28
Petitioners’ computation is flawed. For purposes of
reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount
shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income
29
de-
_______________
27 The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have personal
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
28 Rollo, p. 11.
29 Section 27(E)(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provides
that for purposes of applying the minimum corporate income tax on domestic
corporations, the term ‘gross income’ shall mean gross sales less sales returns,
discounts and allowances and cost of goods sold. For a trading or
merchandising concern, ‘cost of goods sold’ shall include the invoice cost of the
goods sold, plus import duties, freight in transporting the goods to the place
where
146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
rived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses,
which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show
a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case.
An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners’
sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could
have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their
income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot
substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss
should they give the discount. In addition, the computation
was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers
consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is
to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law
because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given
the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a
business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the markup
at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged
by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as
pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law
for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to
raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to
competition.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which may result in
an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension.
While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for
the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
_______________
the goods are actually sold including insurance while the goods are in
transit.
147
VOL. 526, JUNE 29, 2007 147
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts
and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the
State for the promotion of public good. 30
 Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests Puno (C.J.), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other Martinez,Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-
private establishments concerned. This being the case, the Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.and Nachura, JJ., concur.
means employed in invoking the active participation of the Quisumbing, J., On Official Leave.
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Leave.
the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient Petition dismissed.
proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that Notes.—Without discrediting the accomplishments of
the continued implementation of the same would be nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons
refrain from quashing a legislative act. 31 of the alleged seller’s age—93 years—are typically sedentary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant
merit. distances alone. (Tigno vs. Aquino, 444 SCRA 61 [2004])
No costs. The term “cost” in Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 refers to the
_______________ amount of the 20% discount extended by a private
30 By the “general police power of the State, persons and property are
establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the medicines. (Bicolandia Drug Corporation vs. Commissioner of
legislature to do which, no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged and Internal Revenue, 492 SCRA 159[2006])
general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.” ——o0o——
(U.S. v. Toribio, supra note 24, at pp. 98-99, citing Thorpe v. Rutland & 149
Burlington R.R. Co. (27 Vt., 140, 149).
31 Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
of police power using the due process clause and the equal protection clause as
yardsticks, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it,
and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature
to determine, not only what interests of the public require, but what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests (U.S. v. Toribio, supra note 24,
at p. 98, citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133,136; Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S.
27; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1).
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD)
SO ORDERED.
Equal Protection of Law
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 801
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
G.R. No. 106724. February 9, 1994. *
THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM),
represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C.
Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen.
Virgilio H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez,
Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano, Director
for Personnel, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., CHIEF SUPT. NORBERTO
M. LINA, CHIEF SUPT. RICARDO TRINIDAD, JR., SR.
SUPT. MANUEL SUAREZ, SUPT. JUSTITO B. TAGUM, SR.
SUPT. TRANQUILINO ASPIRAS, SR., SUPT. RAMON I.
NAVARRO, SR. SUPT. JOSE P. SURIA, SR. SUPT. AGATON
ABIERA, CHIEF INSP. BIENVENIDO TORRES, AND THE
NATIONAL (ROTC) ALUMNI ASSOCIATION INC.
(NARRA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT COL.
BENJAMIN GUNDRAN, AND DIRECTOR HERMO-GENES
PERALTA, JR., respondents.
Police Officers; Statutory Construction; RA. No. 6975 itself
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP”
as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.—From a careful
perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of
the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise,
the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the
members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP) for
retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that
“INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
Same; Same; In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted.—Having defined the meaning of INP,
the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious
meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a
situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the
construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case
of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put
to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted.
_______________
* EN BANC.
802
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; Courts should not give a literal
interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the
legislative intent.—Courts should not give a literal interpretation to
the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
PETITION for certiorari to reverse a judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142. De Guzman, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.
BIDIN, J.:
The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the
compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39,
RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department
of the Interior and Local Government”, which took effect on
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a
uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39
thereof reads:
“SEC. 39. Compulsory Retirement.—Compulsory retirement, for
officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six
(56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief
superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission
may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of
one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of
retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of
fifty-six (56).
In response, private respondents filed a complaint on
December 19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction
(docketed as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their complaint, respondents
aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section
39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also
covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
803
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 803
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
“Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within
the transition period of four (4) years following the effectivity of this
Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered
compulsorily retired:
1. “a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first
year of the effectivity of this Act.
2. “b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the
second year of the effectivity of this Act.
3. “c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the
third year of the effectivity of this Act.
4. “d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the
fourth year of the effectivity of this Act.”
It is the submission of respondents that the term “INP”
includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier
constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue
of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-
year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to
the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at
age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant
or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the
PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a
restraining order followed by a writ of injunction on January
8, 1992 upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private
respondents.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings,
the case was submitted for resolution and on August 14, 1992,
the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term “INP” in
Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original status of the
present members of the Philippine National Police before its
creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall
become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period.
“The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992
seeking the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12,
1993, the
804
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
Court resolved to treat the respondents’ Comment as Answer
and gave due course to the petition.
 In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge
observed, among others, that:
“It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police
forces as the “INP”, but the PNP Law failed to define who or what
constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the
source of the “INP” as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved. There
is nothing extant in the statute books except that which was created
and established under PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article
XV of the 1973 Constitution providing that the ‘State shall establish
and maintain an integrated national police force whose
organization, administration and operation shall be provided by
law.’ Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law categorically
declared the PC ‘as the principal component of the Integrated
National Police’ (Sec. 5, PD 765).”
“The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with
excerpts taken from the discussion amongst the members of Congress
concerning the particular provision of Section 89. The court is not
persuaded by said discussion; it was a simple matter for the
members of the legislature to state precisely in clear and
unequivocal terms their meaning, such as ‘integrated police forces’
as used in PD 765. Instead, they employed ‘INP’, a generic term that
includes the PC as the principal component of the INP, supra. In
failing to categorically restrict the application of Section 89 as the
members of legislature are said to have intended, it gave rise to the
presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit the
meaning of the word when the bill was finally passed into law. It is
not difficult for the court to also presume that in drafting the
wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the historical
legislative origin of the ‘INP’.
xxx
“The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is
found in the Transitory Provisions of the law which do not provide
for any distinction between the former PC officers and those
belonging to the civilian police forces. These provisions are
specifically enacted to regulate the period covering the dissolution
of the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period that necessarily
would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by the
wholesale and mass integration. In fact, the retirement payment
scheme of the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the impression
that nothing is really settled until after the transition of four years
has lapsed. Section 89 therefore prevails over Section 39 up to the
year 1995 when the retirement age for
805
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 805
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995,
Section 39 shall be the applicable law on retirement of PNP
members.” (Rollo, pp. 27-28; italics supplied)
Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in
Sec. 89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated under
PD 765 wherein it is provided:
“Section 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police.—There is
hereby established and constituted the Integrated National Police
(INP) which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as
the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as
components, under the Department of National Defense.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the
nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD 765,
former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should
not be discriminated against from the coverage of the term
“INP” in Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term “INP”
found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in PD 765.
Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish.
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC?
Petitioners submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to
stress the point, viz.:
“SEC. 23. Composition.—Subject to the limitations provided for in
this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter referred to as
the PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of the members
of the police forces who were integrated into the Integrated National
Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the
officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
xxx
xxx
“The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP,
Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical command of the AFP
assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing officers
holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the Department
as employees thereof, subject to existing laws and regulations.
xxx
“SEC. 85. Phases of Implementation.—The implementation of
this Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:
Phase I—Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the
806
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned with the
Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the technical
services of the AFP assigned with the PC to include the regular CIS
investigating agents and the operatives and agents of the
NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch,
and the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on
Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to
be completed within six (6) months from the date of the effectivity
of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC,
Technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection,
Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by
official orders assigning them to the PNP x x x.
xxx
“x x x. Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the
twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act, retire x x x.
“Phase III.—x x x. To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the
Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of the
following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one (1)
representative each from the PC, INP, Civil Service Commission
and the Department of Budget and Management.”
Section 86 of the same law further provides:
“SEC. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions.—The PNP
shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and the Narcotics
Command upon the effectivity of this Act.”
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears
therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with
the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just
made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and
not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC
and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89
includes the members of the PC.
And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge
that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90
of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
“SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP.—Upon the
effectivity of this Act, the present National Police Commission and
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease
to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nuclues of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to
be a major
807
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 807
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated
National Police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine
ConstabularyIntegrated National Police, shall cease to be the
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be
established and constituted pursuant to this Act.” (italics supplied)
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the
legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are.
In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in
Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would
be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not
have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term.
Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not
without recourse in determining the construction of the
statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves
of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of
doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning
put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may
be adopted (De Villa v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 [1991]
citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v.
City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318[1978]).
Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter
of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow
Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers’ Assn. v. Manila
Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, we find that the legislature did intend to exclude
the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as
the retirement age is concerned, thus:
“THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people
really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty-six; of course,
the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is not acceptable to
us in the sense that we tied this up really to the question of: If you
are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry into the PNP, then tighten
up the retirement. If we will be strict in, like requiring examinations
and other conditions for their original entry, then since we have
sifted out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a
longer retirement
808
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
age. That was the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are
relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . .
“THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GUTANG), Exit.
“THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA) . . . . the retirement, the
exit.
“THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear,
Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let’s say, that will not make any
adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at age)
fifty-six.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang
masasabi.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police,
since they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it will be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total period
of four years transition.” (Bicameral Conference Committee on
National Defense, March 12, 1990)
“REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will
retire at 60 years.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.
“REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.
“REP. GUTANG. On the third year. 58.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So ‘yung 55,
on the third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.
“REP. GUTANG. Oo.
“SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes effective
...
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon
siya aabot.
“REP. UNICO. Pwede.
 “SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil ‘yon, may time to . . .
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa
transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa
kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw ko
ngang dagdagan ‘yung 56 nila at ‘yon din ang Armed Forces, 56.
(Ibid., May 22, 1990)
In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police
force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in any
manner, give any undue preferential treatment in favor of the
other group. On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to
the real intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of
the
809
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 809
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the
enactment of RA 6975.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner
that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local
police force is clear. The question now is whether the
classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such
that it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must
be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members
of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions.
The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were
already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were
retirable at 60, and governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec.
33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for the purpose of
the statute, which is to enable the local police force to plan for
their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of
the new law. Section 89 is merely transitory, remedial in
nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year
transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies not only to
some but to all local police officers.
It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems
absurb that a law will grant an extension to PC officers’
retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to
56 without any cogent reason at all. Why should the
retirement age of PC officers be increased during the
transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who
would retire at age 56 after such period? Such absurdity was
never contemplated by the law and would defeat its purpose of
providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and
the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, D
avide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapu
nan, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., On leave.
810
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Zaballero vs. Court of Appeals
Petition granted; Assailed decision reversed and set aside.
Note.—Construction placed upon a law by the officials in
charge of enforcing the same deserves great weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166).
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 703
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993. *
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its
President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for
Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and
Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 85, QUEZON CITY and Branches 160, 167 and 166,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President, REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President,
TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the
Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country,
petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress.—Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading
of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
where we explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and indepen-
_______________
* EN BANC.
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
dent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.—The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection
clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes
result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
ORIGINAL PETITION to declare the unconstitutionally of
Republic Act No. 7354.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
705
VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 705
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of
the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself
affected by these measures and is thus an interested party
that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time.
Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office
has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this
matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
abovenamed measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its
own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it
has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354
on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass
the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory
and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in
mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitution-
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
ally flawed, that attack against its validity must be rejected
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I of postal matters between nations;
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1),
of the Constitution providing that “Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.”
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or
“log-rolling” legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation
that is being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise,
if they shall so desire.
1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3,
which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide
postal system:
1. a)to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and
other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full
recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
2. b)to promote international interchange, cooperation and
understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange
_______________
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 295-296; State v. Dolan,
14 L.R.A. 1259; State v. Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
707
VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 707
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
1. c)to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to
cater to different users and changing needs, including
but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
2. d)to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by
and within the industry to finance the overall cost of
providing the varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of services standards by the
same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the
petition reads as follows:
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause.—All acts, decrees, orders, executive
orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed,
except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265,
Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No.
35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-President, under
such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that
the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body
of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly
indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible. As has been correctly
3
explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its
title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title,
and
_______________
2 Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 8 A.L.R. 466.
3 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297.
708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act
the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its
execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have
special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which
Cooley writes: “The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on
the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new
statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more
germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby
than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith.” 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law,
such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and
it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title. As observed in one case, if the
5 6
title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters
by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act.
Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal
service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35
covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners
_______________
4 Ibid, p. 302.
5 Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 737.
6 City of Winona v. School District, 41 N.W. 539.
709
 VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 709
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of
House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Articles
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate
and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter
or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the
two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report
on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the
bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses
of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled
7
bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that
have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on
the final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also
8
binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason
9
thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
_______________
7 7 SCRA 347.
8 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
9 34 Phil. 729.
711
VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 711
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is
based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because
while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary,
it retains the same for the President of the Philippines; the
Vice-President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former
Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices or officers.
10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance
with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege
has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the
Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language;
the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission;
the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and
Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the
Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
11 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
12
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in
the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections
or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen
pell-mell, as it were without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt
that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon by
the political departments before it was finally enacted. There
is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care (or
attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the
unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification
was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments of
the government. The same observations are made if the
importance or status of
_______________
12 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA
654; Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 375.
13 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
713
VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 713
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the
franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census
and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not
the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for
the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providing for a smoother flow of communication between the
government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the
departments of the government, it is the Judiciary that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that
if there is any major branch of the government that needs the
privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify
the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this
basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available
data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted
to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the
service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00 and those coming from
the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00.
The respondents’ conclusion is that because of this
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking
privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in
effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended
only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the
widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it
badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a
person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not
really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
it altogether from all agencies of the government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between
those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved
by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which
the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary
for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand
why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that
Committee.And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking
privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is
not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any
justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which,
like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does
not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting
the public service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in
exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter, like
exemption from taxes, customs and tariff duties. Among the
14
services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of
mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public
functions.
_______________
14 Sec. 14 of RA No. 7354.
715
 VOL. 227, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 715
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation
is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by
the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from
the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the tax
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege by the Judiciary will cripple the
Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the
delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it
of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious
problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the
respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the
courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with
lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget
compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of
the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%,
is allotted to the Judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine
the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge
of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we
find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we
annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall “be deprived
of the equal protection of the laws.”
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of
similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial
conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political
system that we are prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot
even debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases
before us as the law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our
own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE
insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority
and its Registers of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining
order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, D
avide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition partially granted; Sec. 35 of RA No. 7354 declared
unconstitutional.
Note.—The “equal protection” clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable arbitrary (Basco vs. Philippine Amusements &
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52).
——o0o——
717
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 VOL. 301, JANUARY 297
20, 1999
Ituralde vs. Falcasantos
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999. *
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,
petitioners-intervenors.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.—The established rule is that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The
burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.
Courts; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Requisites for a Case to
Fall Within the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.--A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A.
8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-
gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e)
is a public official or employee holding any of the posi-
_______________
* EN BANC.
299
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 299
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
tions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the
offense committed is in relation to the office.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act 8249; Under Section
4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting
Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of Presidential Decree 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.—Considering that herein
petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is
a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a
but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains
to “other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.”
The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the
crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the
accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan’sjurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender—that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section
4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same
Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of
the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention
the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection
Clause; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Every classification made
by law is presumed reasonable—the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness.—Petitioner and intervenors’
posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law because its enactment was particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan,
is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration
of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional.
Every classification made
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification.—It is an established precept in constitutional law
that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class, all of which are present in this case.
Same; Same; The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under Republic Act
8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.—The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed
to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of
the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending
cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted
their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7
placed them under a different category from those similarly situated
as them.
301
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 301
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
Same; Statutes; Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.—On the perceived bias
that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute
sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee
involves the graft court of which one is the head of
the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it
decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words and Phrases; “Ex Post
Facto Laws,” Explained.—This contention is erroneous. There is
nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post
facto law is one—(a) which makes an act done criminal before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed; (d) which alters the legal rules
of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant; (e) every law which, in relation to the offense
or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8249 is not a penal law—it is
a substantive law on jurisdiction, and not being a penal law, its
retroactive application cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.—
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
R.A. 8249 is not a penallaw. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606
as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes
rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.—Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their
right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975
has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved
at the time of their passage.
Same; Statutes; Bills; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of
the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments; The requirement that every bill must only have one
subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve.—The challenged law does not violate the
one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis
is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines”
the Sandiganbayanjurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
“expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to
be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is
satisfied if the title is compre-
303
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 303
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
hensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to
the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is
liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the
law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in
employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its
powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.”
Courts; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction
of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute, and the elements
of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as
to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.—The
jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is
essential that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed
to him as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.”—The noble object of written
accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S.
v. Karelsen: “The object of this written accusations was—First. To
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense; and second to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must
be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
necessary to constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts
that are imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient—that phrase is
merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
the accused’s official duties.—The stringent requirement that the
charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation
to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s
official duties.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific
factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and
the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime
as having been committed in relation to public office.—In the
aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the
phrase “committed in relation to public office” does not appear in
the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not
what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What
is controllingis the specific factual allegations in the information
that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged,
in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation
to public office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine
National Police officers, the offense charged is plain murder and,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.—Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the
305
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 305
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fotun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
Chavez, Laureta & Associates for petitioners-
intervenors.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8249—an act which further defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan—is being challenged in this petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined
by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia,
Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for
multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel
Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG
was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commis-
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
sion—Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner
Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police
District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not
a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members
and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability
all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the
May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel’s
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein
petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations
for murder before the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division,
2
while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as accessories
after-the-fact.
___________________
1 Rollo, p. 43
2 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex “B,” Petition;
Rollo, pp. 32-34, 44.
307
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 307
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
3
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before 5
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia,
Jr. and others. One of the accused was dropped from the case.
6
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend 7
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
“principal accused” are government officials with Salary
Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of
Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended
informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 19968
(promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou,
with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Bala-
________________
3 Their motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file their
respective motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s final resolution.
4 Annex “C,” Petition—Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995;
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
 6 Inspector Alvarez.
7 Entitled “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural
Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose
Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended.”
8 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, p. 42.
308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
jadia and Garchitorena
dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted
9 the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused
has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending
resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up
with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996,
House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by
10 11
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by
12
Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law
as R.A. No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on
13
February 5, 1997.
___________________
9 Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as
special members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-
96 dated March 26, 1996.
10 Annex “F,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 113-123.
11 Annex “F-1,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 124-134.
12 Annex “G,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 135-145.
13 Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 28, 31. The law is entitled,
“AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25,
1997.
309
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 309
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the 14
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling
that it “stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.”
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an
15
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
“After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his
concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic
Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on
February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting,
as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor’s motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
“Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are
PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M.
Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all
these cases—in fact, no order of arrest has been issued—this court
has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
“To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the
vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these
cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases.” [Emphasis supplied]
16
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that
the said law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.” Petitioner
argues that:
_________________
14 Rollo, pp. 162-171.
15 March 5, 1997.
16 Rollo, pp. 214, 216-219.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
“a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the
situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way
the Sandiganbayan has footdragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases
to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been
timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot,
and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that
it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which
petitioner’s cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet
commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it
an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as
an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due
process.
“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
aforesaid “innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually
expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975),
thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the
passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.” 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
intervention, add that “while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in
said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case
pending before the Sandiganbayan.” They further argued
18
that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right
to procedural due process would be violated as they could no
longer avail of the
_________________
17 Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 10-11.
18 Petition-In-Intervention, p. 9; Rollo, p. 236.
311
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 311
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired
under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor
General filed separate pleadings in support of the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in
question and praying that both the petition and the petition-
in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties
19
to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10)
days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the
commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within
the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The
burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not
convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides:
“SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be
known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction
_________________
19 Dated December 15, 1998.
20 Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People, 269
SCRA 402, citing Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.”
The said special court is retained in the new (1987)
Constitution under the following provision in Article XI,
Section 4:
“Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree
No. 1486 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
21
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order,
were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
22
Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and
23 24 25 26
R.A. No. 8249. Under the latest amendments introduced
27
by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
20
_________________
21 Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA
229 [1994].
22 Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
23 “Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. (See
also Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 685-686 [1994]).
24 Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
25 Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
26 Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v.
Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 [1995]; Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA
757[1997].
27 Approved on February 5, 1995.
313
 VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 313
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
“SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended]
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
1. (1)Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
1. (a)Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
2. (b)City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
3. (c)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
4. (d)Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
5. (e)Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
6. (f)City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
7. (g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
1. (2)Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as
Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
1. (3)Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
2. (4)Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
3. (5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade
‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction
or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
 “The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
315
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 315
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
“SEC. 7. Transitory provision.—This act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A.
7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
“SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
1. (1)Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
1. (a)Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
1. (b)City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
2. (c)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
3. (d)Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
4. (e)PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
5. (f)City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
6. (g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
 1. (2)Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as
Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
2. (3)Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
3. (4)Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
4. (5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade
‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
“In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
317
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 317
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than grade ‘27,’ or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts.”
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
“principal” before the word “accused” appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word “principal”
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not
the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal
cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent or 28
higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain
cases, contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
29
pursuant to R.A. 8249.
________________
28 This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.), Section 2 of R.A.
7975, while in paragraph a(1) (e) of said Section 2, the rank is “chief
superintendent” or higher.
29 Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals
that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A.
1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
30
in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies
31
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is
a public official or employee holding any of the positions
32
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under
Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision
on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph
b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation
to their office.” The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus,
under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender—that is, whether he is one of
those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a
of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c
of the same Section
_________________
30 Items (a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
31 Paragraph c, Section 4, R.A. 8249.
32The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the
complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction.
319
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 319
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of
the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a
principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606
which does not mention the criminal participation of the
public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Balelengcases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into
law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department
as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
1. (1)it must rest on substantial distinction;
2. (2)it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. (3)must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
 4. (4)must apply equally to all members of the same class;
________________
33 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”
(Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution).
34 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
35 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA
703; Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA
386 (1988).
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
1. all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut
the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those
pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against
those cases where trial had already started as of the approval
of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were
36
not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had
already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses
and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated
37
that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
35 them under a different category from those similarly situated
as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it
shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and,
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases
pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does
not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayanbut also
in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong
Balelengcases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by
the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A.
8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
______________
36 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
37 See Fabian v. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129742, Sept.
16, 1998.
321
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 321
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for 38
their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter
by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other
Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word “principal” in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the
transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A. 8249, while still a bill,
39
was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and
by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by
the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committee
hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification
to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary
by Congress since the matter before the committee involves
the graft court of which one is the head of
the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 40
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases
__________________
38 Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia.
39 Petition, p. 17.
40 Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.”
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their
41
right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under
R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is
42
one—
1. (a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing
of the law and which was innocent when committed,
and punishes such action; or
2. (b)which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
when it was committed; or
3. (c)which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed;
4. (d)which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict
the defendant; 43
5. (e)Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
1. (f)that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
___________________
41 “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted” (Section 22,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution).
42 Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall. 386, 390); Black, Constitutional
Law, 595, cited in Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 ed., p. 247.
43 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766,
770, cited in Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991
ed., p. 513.
 This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So.
44 46 Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Juarez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v.
2d 1, 5 (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor
Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241. General, 180 SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1059; Republic
323 v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274.
47 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937).
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 323
48 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102.

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary 49 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346.

1. (g)deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful 50 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v.
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63; Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433; De
Guzman v. People, December 15, 1982.
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
324
proclamation of amnesty. 45
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
46

The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of

jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure,
51

establish penalties for their violations; or those that define

47

and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake

crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
the nature of an ex post factolaw. It does not mete out a penalty
punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
48

and, therefore, does not come within the

the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
52

other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as

evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
53

not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
unresolved at the time of their passage. 54

all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal

49

In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to

law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On 55

challenged as unconstitutional.
the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to
Court still has the power of review to determine if the
a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome. 56

been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-
same contention has already been rejected by the court several
title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis
times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural
50

is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines”

right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.
_________________
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is
45 En banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v. to “expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction
Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not
Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241.
have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such
is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have one subject
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
57
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
_________________
51 Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
52 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186.
53 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680.
54 Oñas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261.
55 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 cited in Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
56 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar
Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.
57 Section 26(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution reads “Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.”
325
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 325
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given
58
a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of
R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D.
1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are
germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing
59
the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its powers
since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe,
and apportionthe jurisdiction of various courts.” 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the
subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of
R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple
murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented
61
by the parties at the trial. 62
v. _______________
58 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.
59 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291.
60 Sec. 2, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.”
61 People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222 [1995], citing Republic vs.
Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211 [1994].
62 People vs. Magallanes, ibid., citing U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil.
366 [1913]; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 [1935]; People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA
218 [1978].
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b]
of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must
be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order
for the Sandiganbayanto have jurisdiction over it. This 63
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases
committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, “in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.” This constitutional
mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when
it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan “shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.”
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, we held that an offense is said to
64
have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense)
is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged
65
and the discharge of official duties “must be alleged in the
information.” 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
“SEC. 9. Cause of accusation—The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and
_________________
63 Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, pp. 232-233; People vs. Magallanes, supra, p.
220.
64 108 Phil. 613 [1960].
65 See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs.
Magallanes, 249 SCRA 221 [1995].
66 See Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra.
327
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 327
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of
the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that “the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts.” “The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
67
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information.” 68
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
“The object of this written accusations was—First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must
be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.”
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the
facts that are imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have
_________________
67 People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 657, 660 [1954].
68 People vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743.
69 3 Phil. 223, 226 [1904]. See also Matilde v. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456,
[December 29, 1975]; People v. Labado, 98 SCRA 730, 747 [July 24, 1980], cited
in Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines—A Commentary, Vol. 1, 1987
Edition, p. 386.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the ________________
70 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Criminal Procedure, p. 77, cited

offense.”
70
in Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982].
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present 71 The eleven (11) amended informations were couched uniformly except for the

case, we find the amended informations for murder against names of the victims.
329
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 329
factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense chargedand the discharge of official
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P.
function of the offenders.
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
informations for murder reads:
71

CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG and SPO1

“AMENDED INFORMATION
OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of their public and
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG,
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
“That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP.
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD,
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3
PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2
WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
members of the Philippine National Police, are charged herein as
follows:
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
“That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about the
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
early dawn of May 18, 1995.
JOSELITO
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder “in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation
of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories
after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
alleged therein that the said accessories concealed “the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing
that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque,
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.”
The sudden mention of the arrestsmade during
the raid conducted by the accused” surprises the reader. There
is no indication in the amended information that the victim
was one of those arrested by the accused during the
“raid.” Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted
“at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila” but, as
alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the
amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling.
Again, while there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed the offense
“in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),” we,
however, do not see the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the accused’s official functions, which, as
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the
mere allegation in the amended information that the offense
was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his
office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused’s official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between
72
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:
_________________
72 249 SCRA 212, 222-223 [1995].
331
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 331
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
“It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
evidence after trial.
“In People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), where the amended
information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups
of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen
and x x x special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and
high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is
under his command x x x supervision and control where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not 73

the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official
functions and would not have been committed had they not held
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused
arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that
the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of
P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial.”
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy
that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the
the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal
Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,Kapunan, Me
ndoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena an
d Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Constitutionality sustained.
Notes.—Continued incarceration after the twelve year
period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
_______________
73 Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides: “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
332
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.” See also People v.
Magallanes, 249 SCRA 223 [1995].
333
VOL. 301, JANUARY 21, 1999 333
Mallorca vs. Panopio
accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others
similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
implications at war with equal protection. (Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971])
The non-prosecution of another suspect provides no ground
for the accused to fault the decision of the trial court convict-
ing him. (People vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 [1995])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 G.R. No. 158359. March 23, 2004. * Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escoli
ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ABDULLAH S. MANGOTARA, respondents.
Election Law; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply
means that all persons and things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.—We
are not prepared to conclude that the assailed Resolutions of the
HRET offend the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
means that all persons and things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid and substantial
distinction justifies divergent treatment.
Same; Election Contests; Electoral Tribunals; The grant of a
motion for technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of
the Electoral Tribunal; The Constitution confers full authority on the
electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate as
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.—It should be emphasized
that the grant of a motion for technical examination is subject to the
sound discretion of the HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it
useful in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant
Mangotara’s motion for technical examination. Conversely, it found
Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and accordingly denied the same.
In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds of its
Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution
confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and/or Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for petitioner.
n,Martinez & Vivero Law Office for private respondent.
_______________
* EN BANC.
227
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004 227
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition brought by Congressman
Abdullah D. Dimaporo (Dimaporo), as petitioner, seeking to
nullify the twin Resolutions of the House of Representatives
1
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which denied his Motion for
Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures
Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and Voting
Records and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 03-
2
408 Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting
Records. 3
A brief factual background is in order.
On July 20, 2001, Dimaporo was proclaimed a Member of
the House of Representatives, representing the 2nd
Legislative District of Lanao del Norte.
Pursuant to the 1998 Rules of the HRET (HRET
Rules), congressional candidate Abdullah S. Mangotara
4
(Mangotara) filed on July 30, 2001 a Petition of Protest (Ad
Cautelam), seeking, among others, the technical examination
5
of the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the Voters
Registration Records (VRRs)/Book of Voters and the List of
Voters with Voting Records in all the protested precincts of the
municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara
alleged that the massive substitution of voters and other
electoral irregularities perpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters
will be uncovered and proven by the revision of ballots and the
comparison between the signatures and thumbmarks
appearing in the VRRs/Book of Voters and those appearing in
the List of Voters with Voting Records used on election day or
those affixed at the back of the VRRs. From this and other
premises, he concluded that he is the duly-elected
representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del Norte.
On October 10, 2001, Dimaporo filed an Answer with
Counter-Protest impugning all the ballots and votes counted
6 (Comelec) had started retrieving the election records needed
in favor of
_______________
1 Resolution No. 03-408 dated March 20, 2003, Rollo, pp. 26-30;
and Resolution No. 03-166 dated May 29, 2003, Id., at pp. 31-32.
2 Id., at pp. 33-38, excluding annexes.
3 Id., at pp. 67-72.
4 Rule 16, HRET Rules.
5 Supra, note 2 at pp. 73-87.
6 Id., at pp. 89-96.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Mangotara in all precincts of all the 15 municipalities of Lanao
del Norte, except SND. He alleged that irregularities and
electoral frauds, consisting of massive substitute voting, i.e.,
persons other than the registered voters voted in favor of
Mangotara, were committed in the counter-protested
precincts. Moreover, pairs or groups of ballots written by only
one person were counted in favor of Mangotara. Accordingly,
Dimaporo prayed for, among others, the technical examination
of the signatures and thumbmarks of the voters who allegedly
voted in the questioned precincts.
Before revision proceedings were conducted, Mangotara
filed an Urgent Motion for Technical Examination dated May
7 VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
3, 2002, praying for the technical examination of the
signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the Registration
Records/Book of Voters and List of Voters with Voting Records
in all the precincts of SND. According to him, the fire that
gutted all the ballot boxes used in SND made the revision of
ballots in the said municipality physically impossible. Hence,
technical examination was the only means by which the HRET
can determine Mangotara’s claim of massive substitute voting.
Mangotara also argued that the Commission on Elections
for the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections.
There was no assurance that the integrity of these records will
be preserved. Thus, there was an urgent need for technical
examination of the election records. Moreover, Mangotara
averred that the results of the technical examination are
determinative of the final resolution of the election protest in
view of the fact that Dimaporo’s presumptive lead over him
was only 5,487 votes.
Dimaporo filed an Opposition to the Motion for Technical
Examination on May 24, 2002.
Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned
ballots because there are no ballots but only election
documents to consider,” the HRET granted Mangotara’s
motion and permitted the latter “to engage an expert to assist
him in the prosecution of his case.” Accordingly, the National
8
Bureau of Investigation conducted the technical examination
of the signatures and thumbmarks of the voters of SND affixed
in their VRRs and other voting records.
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 101-106.
8 Id., at pp. 116-122, Resolution No. 02-173, June 6, 2002.
229
229
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
After the completion of the revision of ballots, Dimaporo filed
on November 11, 2002 a Motion for Technical Examination of
the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Hence, Dimaporo filed the instant Petition for Certiorari
Registration Records and Voting Records of: (a) 198 revised
9 and/or Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
pilot counter-protested precincts; (b) 47 pilot counter- Preliminary Injunction on June 8, 2003. 14

protested precincts; and (c) 36 precincts of the municipality of _______________

9 Supra, note 2.
Tangcal (Tangcal). The motion was filed allegedly in order to 10 Supra, note 1.

substantiate Dimaporo’s claims that pairs or groups of ballots 11 Id., at p. 28.

were written by only one person and that there was massive 12 Ibid.

13 Supra, note 3.
substitute voting in the counter-protested precincts. Dimaporo
14 Supra, note 2 at pp. 3-24.

further alleged that, upon opening 47 ballot boxes of the 47

230
counter-protested precincts, it was discovered that the boxes 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
did not contain any ballot. Hence, no revision could be made.
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Likewise, the ballots for 36 precincts of Tangcal could no
Dimaporo claims that the HRET deprived him of equal
longer be revised because the ballot boxes had been burned.
protection when the latter denied his motion for technical
Citing these circumstances as akin to those mentioned by
examination even as it had previously granted Mangotara’s
Mangotara in his motion, Dimaporo moved that his request for
similar motion. According to him, his motion should have been
technical examination be granted.
granted because there is no valid distinction between the
The HRET denied Dimaporo’s motion in its
counter-protested precincts and the precincts in SND subject
assailed Resolution No. 03-408. The Tribunal declared that
10

of Mangotara’s motion since, in both instances, the ballots

Dimaporo’s allegations that pairs or groups of ballots were
were no longer available for revision. He also asserts that the
written by only one person and that substitute voting took
denial of his motion deprived him of procedural due process or
place in the first and second groups of precincts are matters
the right to present scientific evidence to show the massive
which are “well within the judicial determination of the
substitute voting committed in the counter-protested
Tribunal and which may be determined without resort to
precincts.
technical examination.” As regards the 36 precincts of
11

On July 21, 2003, Mangotara filed his Comment averring

15

Tangcal, the HRET found it physically impossible to conduct

that the petition is an obvious dilatory tactic to render the
a technical examination of the signatures and thumbmarks of
election protest moot and academic by the expiration of the
voters as found in the VRRs and Book of Voters due to the
term involved. He points out that there are substantial
destruction of the pertinent election documents. In its
differences between his own motion for technical examination
questioned Resolution No. 03-166, the Tribunal denied
12

and that of petitioner. For instance, in SND, all the ballot

Dimaporo’s Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 03-
boxes were destroyed by fire, whereas those of the 47 counter-
408 Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting
protested precincts were not. In fact, except for the ballots
Records.13

themselves, the election documents and other paraphernalia

remained intact. Another difference is that Mangotara
specifically contested the election results in SND on the
16
ground of substitution of voters, whereas massive substitute
voting was allegedly a mere general averment in Dimaporo’s
counter-protest. Moreover, Mangotara moved for technical
examination even before the revision proceedings, whereas
Dimaporo’s motion was anchored on Rule 42 of the HRET 17
Rules and was filed only after the revi-
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 128-147.
16 In his election protest, Mangotara alleged that in at least 35 precincts of
SND, the voter turn out was 100%. In some instances, the votes recorded even
exceeded the voters who actually voted. Moreover, in 73 out of 130 precincts of
SND, Dimaporo obtained 100% of the votes cast, while the rest of the
congressional candidates, including Mangotara, got zero (0) vote; Id., at p. 138.
17 “Rule 42. Motion for Technical Examination; Contents.—Within five (5)
days after completion of revision, either party may move for a technical
examination, specifying:
1. (1)The nature of the technical examination requested (fingerprint
examination, etc.);
2. (2)The documents to be subjected to technical examination;
231
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004 231
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
sion of ballots. As regards the counter-protested precincts of
Tangcal, Mangotara avers that destruction of the ballot boxes
is not among the grounds for technical examination under
Rule 42 of the HRET Rules, the provision cited by Dimaporo.
Mangotara further claims that the former cannot ask for
technical examination under Rule 42 of the HRET Rules in
order to substantiate allegations of substitute voting because
this was not cited as a ground for objection in the course of the
revision of ballots. Rule 42 of the HRET Rules provides that
the party moving for technical examination must specify the
objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which
the movant intends to substantiate with the results of the
technical examination. Furthermore, Dimaporo was not
deprived of his right to present evidence because the
questioned Resolution No. 03-408 itself states that all election
documents “are still subject to the scrutiny of the Tribunal
during the appreciation of evidence.” Hence, at the
appropriate time and in accordance with HRET Rules,
Dimaporo will be given an opportunity to present his evidence.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on July 29, 2003
18
arguing that there is a distinction between the motions filed
by Mangotara and Dimaporo. Whereas Mangotara’s motion
was filed before the completion of the revision proceedings,
that of Dimaporo was filed after the revision of ballots. The
HRET acted within the confines of its discretion. Hence, there
is no need for this Court to exercise its extraordinary power of
certiorari.
Dimaporo filed a Consolidated Reply to the Comments of the
Public and Private Respondent on August 12, 2003.
19
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Memoranda as 20
required by the Court.
_______________
1. (3)The objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which
the movant intends to substantiate with the results of the technical
examination; and
2. (4)The ballots covered by such objections.”
18 Supra, note 2 at pp. 158-163.
19 Id., at pp. 166-176.
20 Memorandum of the Petitioner dated October 16, 2003, Rollo, pp. 194-
207; Memorandum for Private Respondent Mangotara dated November 6,
2003; Manifestation Adopting the Comment of House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) as its Memorandum dated October 27, 2003 filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
We are not prepared to conclude that the
assailed Resolutions of the HRET offend the equal protection
clause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that
21
the existence of a valid and substantial distinction justifies
divergent treatment.
It should be mentioned that Dimaporo does not question the
HRET Rules but only the Tribunal’s exercise or
implementation thereof as manifested in the
questioned Resolutions. According to him, since the ballot
boxes subject of his petition and that of Mangotara were both
unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotara’s, should
be granted.
This argument is rather simplistic. Purposely or not, it fails
to take into account the distinctions extant in Mangotara’s
protest vis-à-vis Dimaporo’s counter-protest which validate
the grant of Mangotara’s motion and the denial of Dimaporo’s.
First. The election results in SND were the sole subjects of
Mangotara’s protest. The opposite is true with regard to
Dimaporo’s counter-protest as he contested the election
results in all municipalities but SND.
Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the
election records of SND are determinative of the final outcome
of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be
said of the precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
The election results show that Mangotara won over
Dimaporo in 10 out of 15 municipalities of Lanao del Norte.
Dimaporo prevailed only in five (5) municipalities, including
SND. His winning margin in four (4) of these municipalities
was small, but in SND, Dimaporo obtained 22,358 votes as
opposed to Mangotara’s 477 votes. This means that Dimaporo
won by a margin of 21,881 votes over Mangotara in SND.
Further, the election results show that Mangotara was
credited with zero (0) vote in 73 out of 130 precincts of the said
municipality. That Dimaporo won the elections by a margin of
_______________
21 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, July 14, 1989, 175
SCRA 343, 375 (1989), citing Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155. See
also Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 330 Phil. 678; 262 SCRA 122 (1996); Basco v.
PAGCOR, 274 Phil. 323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991).
233
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004 233
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
5,487 votes establishes the fact that the results of the election
in SND handed the victory to him. 22
The technical examination of the election records of SND
and the consequent determination of the true will of the
electorate therein, therefore, serves the interest not only of the
parties but also of the constituency of the 2nd District of Lanao
del Norte.
Second. Mangotara filed a motion for technical
examination before the start of the revision proceedings on the
ground that the destruction of the ballot boxes of all precincts
of SND rendered revision physically impossible. The urgency
of technical examination was due to the impending SK
elections and the resultant need for the Comelec to retrieve
the election records of the municipality.
On the other hand, Dimaporo filed a motion for technical
examination after the revision of ballots. No circumstance of
necessity or urgency was averred in the motion.
Third. The HRET was informed—and it is not disputed—
that the ballot boxes and other election documents pertaining
to Tangcal were totally gutted by fire, making technical
examination an impossibility. 23
On the other hand, although the ballot boxes of the
precincts of SND were also destroyed by fire, the other election
records, e.g., Lists of Voters with Voting Records and Voters’
Affidavits contained in the Book of Voters, were not. Thus,
technical examination of the available election records could
still be had.
Fourth. With regard to the other counter-protested
precincts, the HRET correctly pointed out that Dimaporo’s
claims that pairs or groups of ballots were written by only one
person and that massive substitute voting took place may be
resolved by the Tribunal without need for technical
examination. Although no ballots were found inside the ballot
boxes of 47 counter-protested precincts, the election returns
and tally boards were still intact. These documents may yet be
considered by the Tribunal in its resolution of the election
protest. Thus, technical examination was uncalled for, as it
was not absolutely necessary.
_______________
22 Preliminary Conference Resolution No. 01-361, HRET Records, vol. 1, p.
181.
23 Supra, note 2 at p. 29, re: Letter from Atty. Rey Sumalipao, PES of Lanao
del Norte and 14 other election officers of the 2nd District of Lanao del Norte
received by the HRET on March 5, 2003.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for
technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the
HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the
24
conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotara’s
motion for technical examination. Conversely, it found
Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and accordingly denied the
same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds
of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the 25
Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals
of the House of Representatives and the Senate as the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is
original and exclusive. 26
Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the
assailed Resolutionsdenied him the right to procedural due
process and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of
massive substitute voting committed in the counter-protested
precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself may ascertain
the validity of Dimaporo’s allega-
_______________
24 “Rule 43. Technical Examination; Time Limits.—The motion for technical
examination may be granted by the Tribunal in its discretion and under such
conditions as it may impose. If granted, the movant shall schedule the
technical examination, to start within ten (10) calendar days from the time he
was notified of the resolution or order granting his motion, notifying the other
party and the Secretary of the Tribunal at least five (5) days in advance thereof.
The technical examination shall be completed within the period allowed by the
Tribunal, but in no case to exceed twenty (20) working days, unless an
extension is granted pursuant to Rule 46. The other party may attend the
technical examination, either personally or through a representative, but the
technical examination shall proceed with or without his attendance, provided
due notice has been given him.
Where more than one party would request for technical examinations, the examinations
shall, as far as practicable, be conducted simultaneously.
The technical examination shall be conducted at the expense of the movant, in the
offices of the Tribunal or such other place as the Tribunal may designate and under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Tribunal or his duly authorized representative.”
25 Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.
26 Santiago v. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276; 298 SCRA 756 (1998), citing Co v.
HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
citing Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, G.R. No. L-84297, December 8, 1988.
235
 VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004 235
Dimaporo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
tions without resort to technical examination. To this end, the
Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and
other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny in
the appreciation of evidence. 27
Moreover, it should be noted that the records are replete
abuse of discretion. (Garcia v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353 [1999])
The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code
underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal’s
jurisdiction over election
_______________
27 Supra, note 2 at p. 28, citing Resolution No. 02-128 dated May 14, 2002,

with evidence, documentary and testimonial, presented by HRET Case No. 01-015, Cariño v. Lanot.
Dimaporo. He has, in fact, already filed a Formal Offer of 28 HRET Records, vol. 4, p. 1772.

Evidence on January 29, 2004 to which Mangotara filed

28
29 Id., at pp. 1775-1794.

236
a Comment on February 4, 2004. Hence, Dimaporo’s
29

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

allegation of denial of due process is an indefensible pretense.
For the reasons above-mentioned, we are not convinced Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification
that the Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion, much contests relating to its members. (Rasul vs. Commission on
less exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Elections, 313 SCRA 18 [1999])
questioned Resolutions. ——o0o——
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr. (C.J.), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ.,concur.
Puno, Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., No
part.
Vitug, J., On Official Leave.
Panganiban, J., On Leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The fact that the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualification of
its members does not bar the Supreme Court from
entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave
III. Arrests, Search, and Seizure
A. When is a search a “search”?
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990
Guazon vs. De Villa
G.R. No. 80508. January 30, 1990.
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA
DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES,
ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG,
LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE,
ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA
CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS
GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO,
PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,
ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO,
ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA
LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.
RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO,
_______________
* EN BANC.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW
GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA
MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN.
RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO
LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Nothing in the Constitution
denies the authority of the Chief Executive to order police actions to
stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming
communist activities.—There is, of course, nothing in the
Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive,
invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop
623
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek
*
and cripple subversive movements which would bring down
constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual
liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security
of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the
limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the
same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the
right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence
it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still
be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through
violations of the constitutional protections which are their
distinguishing features.
Same; Same; Illegal Searches and Seizures; Right to be left
alone in the privacy of his own house guaranteed under Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution.—“That right is guaranteed in the following
provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: “SEC. 3. The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be siezed.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Importance of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure explained.—“It is deference to
one’s personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily
 625
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 625
Guazon vs. De Villa
one’s home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is
a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence.
In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only
in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful,
does not as such have access except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion
by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber
v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court
[1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right as the
embodiment of a ‘spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards.’
Same; Same; Police actions should not be characterized by
methods that offend a sense of justice.—The decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L.
Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The court
ruled: “Applying these general considerations to the circumstances
of the present case, we are compelled to conclude that the
proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was
there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course
of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound
to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to
the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”
Same; Same; Same; It is not the police action per se which is
impermissible and which should be prohibited but the procedure
used or methods which offend even hardened sensibilities.—It is
significant that it is not the police action per se which is
impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it is the
procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which “offend
even hardened sensibilities.”
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
Same; Same; Zonings intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements.—The areal target zonings in this petition were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers
and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the “drives” were conducted.
Same; Same; Where a violation of human rights is involved, it
is the duty of the court to stop the transgression.—Where a violation
of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is
involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and
state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach
upon the rights of the individual.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy is not to stop all police actions
including the essential and legitimate ones.—The Court believes it
highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This
is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the
thousands of residents “to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification.” We cannot imagine police
actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by
the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined
soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However, the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots
or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers.
A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people
are protected and not violated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem is not initially for the
Supreme Court but basically one for the executive departments and
for trial courts.—The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a taxpayers’ suit. Where not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially
for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive
departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only
second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and
the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all
remedies for all evils.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem is appropriate
for the Commission on Human Rights.—The problem is appropriate
for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference
should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice,
Department of
627
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 627
Guazon vs. De Villa
National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies
and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Saturation drives not
among accepted instances where search or arrest may be made
without a warrant.—Saturation drives are not among the accepted
instances when a search or an arrest may be made without warrant.
They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions stigmatized
by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really introducing
the “zona” as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate.
It must state that intention in forthright language and not in vague
generalizations that concede the wrong but deny the right.
Same; Same; Evidence; Mere waging of saturation drives
unconstitutional even without proof of personal indignities.—I urge
my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per
se unconstitutional. I urge them to accept that even without proof of
the hooded figure and the personal indignities and the loss and
destruction of properties and the other excesses allegedly
committed, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is
enough to make this Court react with outraged concern. Confronted
with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up
our hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court
should instead declare categorically and emphatically that these
saturation drives are violative of human rights and individual
liberty and so should be stopped immediately. While they may be
allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the
insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila
is not such a battleground.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; The stakes are too
high for this Court to avoid judicial confrontation.—Respondents,
fortunately, have branded petitioners’ allegations of such brutality,
as total lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such
methods reminiscent of a “police state” can exist in a society built
on a republican and constitutional system. Respondents must be
given a chance to face their accusers and prove that they are indeed
fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes, I submit, are too high for this
Court, as the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial
confrontation with the issue. I vote, therefore, to refer this case
(dispensing with normal venue requirements) to the Executive
Judge, RTC of Manila, for
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
 him—to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and
in reputation of the petitioners’ allegations; to decide the case
expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review by this
Court; to report to this Court on action taken.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; In saturation drives
police officers are fishing for evidence of offenses, hence, a warrant is
necessary.—I find allusions to the last aborted coup d’etat inapt. In
that case, our men in uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes
being committed in flagrante.The instant case is quite different.
There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officers
fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed. As I
said, in that event, a court warrant is indispensable.
Same; Same; Same.—Worse, it is passing the buck. The
petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses
they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which
presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem,
so I hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts,
and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or
“Satu-ration Drives” in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal
age, bonafide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that
they have a common or general interest in the preservation of
the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign
of peace and order in their communities. They claim to
represent “the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar
interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before this Court.”
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor
General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they
are not the proper parties to institute the action.
629
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 629
Guazon vs. De Villa
According to the petitioners, the following “saturation drives”
were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan,
and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June 19, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday
Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street,
Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to 13, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in
six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay
Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension,
Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at 10:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-
dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz
Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo,
Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive,
Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila.
 12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban,
Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the “areal target zonings” or
“saturation drives” are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.
The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20
saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five
hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during
the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of
human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the
following were committed:
“1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night
or early morning hours, police and military units without any
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in
Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and without
name-plates or identification cards.
“2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking
their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering
the residents within to come out of their respective residences.
“3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded
like cows, the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
“4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being
conducted by the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team
force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off
area and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without
civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
“5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the
raiders ransack their homes, tossing about the residents’ belongings
without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are
destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders’ illegal effort to ‘fish’
for incriminating evidence.
“6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their money and valuables have
disappeared after the said operations.
“7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to
waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and ‘verified.’ These arrests are all conducted without
any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the
conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men
are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
“8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the
expiration of the period wherein they can be legally detained
without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons
are released without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
“9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point
them at the residents during these illegal operations.
“10. Many have also reported incidents of ‘on-the-spot beatings’,
maulings and maltreatment.
“11. Those who are detained for further ‘verification’ by the raid-
ers are subjected to mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical information.” (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
631
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 631
Guazon vs. De Villa
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment
which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives. And second, they allege that the accusations
of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human
rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned,
the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution
which provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied by the respondents.)
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. x x x.”
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances,
the police action of the nature described by the petitioners
would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police
must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch
criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the
constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by
such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which
denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power
to seek and cripple subversive movements which would bring
down constituted authority and substitute a regime where
individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the
name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of
authoritarian systems both
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632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres
of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic
institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit
strengthened through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the
Court stated:
“One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the
right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has
ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty
English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly
subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed.
This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign
lord and all the forces of the Crown.
“That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to
dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among
the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of
the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now
because it is like a prodigal son returning.
“That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution:
“SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA
655; 660-661 [1988]):
“This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person,
papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People vs.
Burgos
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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 633
Guazon vs. De Villa
(144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the
right is so important:
“ ‘It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man’s prerogative to
choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge,
his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall
be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US
757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]).
In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize
constitutional right as the embodiment of a ‘spiritual concept: the
belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only
under stringent procedural safeguards.’ (ibid, p. 74.)”
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v.
California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes
clearly that police actions should not be characterized by
methods that offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
“Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of proceeding by
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and
the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”
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634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
It is significant that it is not the police action per se which is
impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it is
the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which
“offend even hardened sensibilities.” In Breithaupt v.
Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court
validated the use of evidence, in this case blood samples
involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was
nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
“Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing
‘brutal’ or ‘offensive’ in the taking of a sample of blood when done,
as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure,
the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the
absence of conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily
render the taking a violation of a constitutional right; and certainly
the rest was administered here would not be considered offensive by
even the most delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured
by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the
most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of
‘decency and fairness’ that has been woven by common experience
into the fabric of acceptable conduct. x x x.”
The individual’s right to immunity from such invasion of his
body was considered as “far outweighed by the value of its
deterrent effect” on the evil sought to be avoided by the police
action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief
hinges closely on the determination of the exact facts
surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners
are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth, not
only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would
immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern
of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the
petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the
statements made by the petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
“This is a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to
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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 635
Guazon vs. De Villa
human rights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead of the actual operation. They were executed
in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their
constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had
joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5,
1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987,
Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged
victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
“In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at
Camp Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of
deliberate disregard for human rights as ‘total lies’. Here are
excerpts from her strongest speech yet in support of the military:
“‘All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been
shown up to be total lies.
“ ‘x x x To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every
assurance that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the
blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the final
victory that I am certain will be ours.
“ ‘You and I will see this through together.
“ ‘I’ve sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
“ ‘We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a
long way to lasting peace. x x x. The dangers and hardships to our men in
the field are great enough as it is without having them distracted by this
worthless carping at their backs.
“‘Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic
development to pull out the roots—and military operations to slash the
growth—of the insurgency.
“ ‘The answer to terror is force—now.
“ ‘Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic
and social initiatives bear fruit. x x x. Now that the extreme Right has been
defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against the
communist insurgency,even as we continue to watch our backs against
attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15;
italics ours.)’
“Viewed in the light of President Aquino’s observation on the
matter, it can be said that petitioners misrepresent as human rights
violations the military and police’s zealous vigilance over the
people’s right to live in peace and safety.” (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
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636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the
truth. Everything before us consists of allegations. According
to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in
the saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates are
given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas;
Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the
Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several
thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner
described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has
come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence
admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have
been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were
inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly
arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged
and none of those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General’s
comments is the statement that local and foreign
correspondents actually joined the saturation drives and
witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the
activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view
of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being used to
fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good
television copy. If true, this was probably effected away from
the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor
General contends, the allegation is a “complete lie.”
The latest attempt to stage a coup d’etat where several
thousand members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
sought to overthrow the present Government introduces
another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly why
those directly affected by human rights violations should be
the ones to institute court actions and why evidence of what
actually transpired should first be developed before petitions
are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the
police or military may go in force to the combat areas, enter
affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels
and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to
secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of
Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White Plains
Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the
first week of
637
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Guazon vs. De Villa
December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to
flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and
police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the “drives” were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and
respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal
activity similar to that of the attempted coup d’ etats. There
appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested.
There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the “areal zoning” could not be achieved even as
the rights of squatter and low income families are fully
protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed
by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to
stop the transgression and state where even the awesome
power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the
individual.
 It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in
cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do not
complain that they were victims of the police actions, where
no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given,
and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police
“saturation drives,” as long as the Court is convinced that the
event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations
were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas
of barangay officials for the thousands of residents “to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification.” We cannot imagine police actions of the
magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the
respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined
soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However,
the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police
making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police
cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not
move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that
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638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one
on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of
arrests against specific individuals are easily procured.
Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit
down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show
of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought
through a taxpayers’ suit. Where not one victim complains and
not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not
initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot
keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive,
the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are
the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of
constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly
procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed.
If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and
the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to
maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and
policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be
enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human
Rights. A high level conference should bring together the
heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National
Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and
institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers’ suit, there is no
erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In
the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time.
Further investigation of the petitioners’ charges and a hard
look by administration officials at the policy implications of
the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing
that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking
in of doors, the herd-
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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 639
Guazon vs. De Villa
ing of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of
tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are
humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which
are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the
Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General
PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear
guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and
civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue
terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights
alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police
actions are ENJOINEDuntil such time as permanent rules to
govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés, Medialde
a and Regalado, JJ.,concur.
Cruz, J., See dissent.
Padilla, J., See separate opinion.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion.
Griño-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and
Sarmiento’s dissents.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually
find ourselves together on the side of liberty. It saddens me
that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are
irreconcilable enemies. The two must in fact co-exist, for only
in a well-ordered society can rights be properly enjoyed.
Implicit in that theory, however, is the other imperative: that
the highest function of authority is to insure liberty.
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the
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640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
saturation drives, the majority practically blinks them away
on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.
Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not
choose to see the woods for the trees. The brutal fact is staring
us in the face but we look the other way in search of excuses.
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because
no one directly affected has complained. Such silence, if I
understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged the
drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are
conducted not in the enclaves of the rich but in the deprived
communities, where the residents have no power or influence.
The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little
people. They cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for
their temerity. Their only hope is in this Court, and we should
not deny them that hope.)
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a
specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical
objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many
decisions applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil.
603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA
702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA
835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria
v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a
proper party even if he may not be directly injured. Each of us
has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a
proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who
has the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right
and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he
lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor
General’s assertion that the claimed abuses are “complete lies”
and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is not enough. The
evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio and
television. That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly
dismissed as “complete lies.”
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Guazon vs. De Villa
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the
“zona” of the Japanese Occupation. An area was surrounded
by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of their houses
and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his
head. This man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were
immediately arrested and eventually if not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most
important difference is that it is no longer 1943 and the
belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now
1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)
The provision is intended to protect the individual from official
(and officious) intrusions, no matter how humble his abode
and however lowly his station in life. Against the mighty forces
of the government, the person’s house is his castle, his
inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he is the
monarch of all he surveys.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one’s
door and command him at gunpoint to come out so he and his
neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can all be placed
on public examination, as in a slave market. This is followed
by the arrest and detention of those suspected of villainy,
usually on the basis only of the tattoos on their bodies or the
informer’s accusing finger.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest
required by the Bill of Rights? Where is the probable cause
that must be determined personally by the judge, and by no
other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce to establish the probable cause? Where is the
particular
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642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
description that must be stated in the warrant, of the places
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized? And
where, assuming all these may be dispensed with, is the
admissible exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances
when a search or an arrest may be made without warrant.
They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions
stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is
really introducing the “zona” as another exception to the rule,
it must not equivocate. It must state that intention in
forthright language and not in vague generalizations that
concede the wrong but deny the right.
To justify the “zona” on the basis of the recent coup attempt
is, in my view, to becloud the issue. The “zonas” complained of
happened before the failed coup and had nothing whatsoever
to do with that disturbance. There was no “large scale mutiny
or actual rebellion” when the saturation drives were conducted
and there were no “combat areas” either in the places where
the violations were committed. The failed coup cannot validate
the invalid “zonas” retroactively.
The ponencia says that “we cannot take judicial notice of
the facts and figures given by the petitioners regarding these
saturation drives conducted by the military and police
authorities.” Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial
notice of the saturation drives themselves which are not and
cannot be denied by the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives
are per seunconstitutional. I urge them to accept that even
without proof of the hooded figure and the personal indignities
and the loss and destruction of properties and the other
excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging of the
saturation drives alone is enough to make this Court react
with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not
simply throw up our hands and proclaim our helplessness. I
submit that this Court should instead declare categorically
and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of
human rights and individual liberty and so should be
stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the
Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such
a battleground.
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Guazon vs. De Villa
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who
openly defy the authority of the government and violate its
laws. The greater menace is in those who, in the name of
democracy, destroy the very things it stands for—as in this
case—and so undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are
degraded and diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to
every one. We should realize that when the bell tolls the death
of liberty for one of us, “it tolls for thee” and for all of us.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
This case is another classic instance of state power colliding
with individual rights. That the State, acting through the
government and its forces, has the authority to suppress
lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise
of that authority is justified when viewed from the standpoint
of the general welfare, because the State has the elementary
and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful life and existence
for its citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure
peace and order for its citizens loses the very right to remain
in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of
the means and methods to suppress lawless violence, the right
of the individual citizen to the dignity of his person and the
sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless
there is, in a particular case, a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a compelling duty to
suppress or abate.
Petitioners’ vivid description of the “areal target zoning” or
“saturation drives” allegedly conducted by police and military
units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret out
criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned areas,
while vigorously denied by respondents, deserves an effective
and immediate response from this Court.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts—and
this case involves certainty of facts alleged by petitioners and
denied by respondents—this case should be referred to a
proper trial court where the petitioners can
present evidence to support and prove the allegations they
make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of
military and police units.
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644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by
this Court as a general proposition during abnormal
times, and which involve the right of military and police
**
forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through
certain fixed points for the purpose of apprehending criminals
and/or confiscating prohibited articles like unlicensed
firearms, the “areal target zoning” and “saturation drives”, as
described in petitioners’ allegations, are actual raids on
private homes in selected areas, and are thus positive
assaultsagainst the individual person and his dignity. The
individual is, as described, yanked out of his home, without
any arrest warrant, to face investigation as to his connections
with lawless elements. In short, the sanctity of the home is
pulverized by military and police action. Thus, while the
checkpoint is a defensive device, on the part of government,
the “areal target zoning” or “satura-tion drive” is a direct
assault against, an intrusion into individual rights and
liberties.
Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners’
allegations of such brutality, as total lies. It is indeed difficult
to even contemplate that such methods reminiscent of a “police
state” can exist in a society built on a republican and
constitutional system. Respondents must be given a chance to
face their accusers and prove that they are indeed fabricating
falsehoods. But the stakes, I submit, are too high for this
Court, as the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a
judicial confrontation with the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal
venue requirements) to the Executive Judge, RTC of Manila,
for him—
1. 1.to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support
and in refutation of the petitioners’ allegations;
2. 2.to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the
evidence, subject to review by this Court;
 3. 3.to report to this Court on action taken.
_______________
** Valmonte vs. Gen. de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989.
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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990
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SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police
actions (saturation drives) complained of constitute a valid
exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and
November, 1987 the military conducted the saturation drives
in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor General
admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except
that they had been done “with due regard to human rights.”
“Not only that,” so he states:
x x x they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead
of the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with
barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification.
Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations,
witnessed, and reported the events that transpired relative
thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12;
November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).
That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims
who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation
drives in question lawful and legitimate? It is also a question
that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests were not
accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1 offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned,
executed in coordination with Tondo’s barangay officials, and
undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I doubt),
will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per
se, illegal.
According to the majority, “the remedy is not to stop all
police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones . . .
645
[w]e see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly
felt in troubled areas . . .” But the petitioners have not come
2
to court to “stop all police actions” but rather, the saturation
drives,
_______________
1 CONST., art III, sec. 21; People v. Burgos, No. 68955, September 4,
1986, 144 SCRA 1.
2 Decision, 15; emphasis in the original.
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guazon vs. De Villa
which are, undoubtedly, beyond police power.
That “[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as
the rights of people are protected and not violated” is a 3
contradiction in terms. A “show of force” (by way of saturation
drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered
by a judicial warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete
exaggeration of the issues:
x x x A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of
people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as
that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one
on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of
arrests against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
are totally prohibited.4
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is
possessed of the proper arrest or search warrant. The
exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him,
in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority
would have the exception to be simply, the general rule.
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by
police officers on the beat or prowl cars on patrol. What we
have—and I suppose that everybody is agreed on it—are
lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and
summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed by the
Constitution. If this is a “show of force”, it certainly has no
place in a constitutional democracy.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d’etat inapt. In that
case, our men in uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes
being committed in flagrante. The instant case is quite
different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather,
police officers fishing for evidence of offenses that may have
been committed. As I said, in that event, a court warrant is
indispensable.
_______________
3 Supra; emphasis in the original.
4 Supra.
647
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 647
Guazon vs. De Villa
That “the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court” is to
5 6 Supra.
me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the
controversy is purely one of law—the facts being undisputed.
Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not
the Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely,
have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint to
the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has its
imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to
make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly,
a neutral arbiter.
I am also taken aback by references to “[w]ell meaning
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events . . .
keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems of the
Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court
as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils.” First,
6
the facts are not “second-hand”, they are undisputed: There
had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have
trooped to the highest court with a legitimate grievance
against the Executive (and military).
The fact that the majority would “remand” the case to the
lower courts and the various echelons of the Executive for
investigation is to admit that walls have indeed been banged,
doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see
therefore why we can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed
for, in the midst of these facts.
Note.—The requirement of “searching questions” is
satisfied when a judge examines under oath the witnesses by
asking questions that were adopted from a previous
investigation. (Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423.)
——o0o——
_______________
5 Supra; emphasis in the original.
648
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
E. Conditions for a valid warrant not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void—this
Existence of Probable Cause would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by
the police.—The fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 683
the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
People vs. Salanguit
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police.
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001. *
The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as
appellee, vs.ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused- it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to
appellant. the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; In issuing a search evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Same; Same; It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant,
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure—no presumption which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the
of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto
undertakes to justify its issuance.—Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not
on Criminal Procedure provides supported by the evidence.—It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a
_______________ warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
* SECOND DIVISION.
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
684
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED for other items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold
People vs. Salanguit that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of
that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable accused-appellant’s house for an undetermined quantity of shabu,is
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation drug paraphernalia, is not.
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Since the Dangerous Drugs
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs
search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No related or which belong to the same class or species, one (1) search
presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the Act.—Indeed, in People v. Dichoso the search
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are 685
fulfilled. VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 685
Same; Same; The fact that there was no probable cause to People vs. Salanguit
support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does
 warrant was also for “Violation of R.A. 6425,” without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it
authorized the search and seizure of “dried marijuana leaves and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic).” This Court, however, upheld the validity of
the warrant: Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in
question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and
sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is
clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this
theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession
of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia.
This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Same; Same; Where the location of the accused’s house was
made determinate by reference to the affidavit supporting the
warrant, and made part of the record, there can be no doubt that the
warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.—The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground
and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each
floor. However, the description was made determinate by a
reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused “Morris Ferrante of 83
Pleasant Street, Malboro, Mass.” In this case, the location of
accused-appellant’s house being indicated by the evidence on record,
there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Requisites; Under the “plain
view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented in evidence.—Under the “plain view
doctrine,” unlawful ob-
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
jects within the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be:
(a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
(c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the
authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Once the valid portion of the search
warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found—
the doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.—Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the
warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to
assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain
view doctrine” can no longer provide any basis for admitting the
other items subsequently found. As has been explained: What the
‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each
of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search incident to a
lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control.—The only other possible
justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellant’s lawful arrest for possession
of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to
the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit
violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
687
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 687
People vs. Salanguit
Same; Plain View Doctrine; Where the marijuana bricks were
wrapped in newsprint, there is no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure.—The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There
was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is
similar to People v. Musa in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs
were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its
contents.
Same; No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an
officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.—No
presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights
secured by the Constitution. In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two
bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container,
the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the “plain view doctrine,”
we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be
upheld.
Same; The circumstances that the occupants of the house
refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party
knocked on the door several times fancy and the agents saw
suspicious movements of the people inside the house, justified the
searching party’s forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated
unless they do so.—In contrast, Aguilar and Duano’s claim that they
had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The
occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to
open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on
the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances
justified the searching party’s forcible entry into the house, founded
as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Br. 96.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Salanguit
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated January 27, 1998,
1
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
§16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of
§S8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A.
No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case
No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug,
without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess
or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty, whereupon he was tried.
4
_______________
1 Per Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.
2 Rollo, p. 13.
3 Id., p. 14.
4 RTC Records (Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358), p. 50.
689
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 689
People vs. Salanguit
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp.
Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical
Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics
Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando
Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a
warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
5
Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellant’s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was
taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room.
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about
10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. 6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door,
but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the
door open and entered the house. 7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the
house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the
house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
8 firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box opening in the roof. 15

also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search
of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of
newsprint having a total weight of ap-
9 him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however,
_______________ the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. 16

5 RTC Records for Search Warrant No. 160, “A,” p. 4.

6 TSN, p. 4, Oct. 29, 1996.

Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in
7 Id., pp. 5-6.
one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search,
8 Id., p. 6. forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing
9 TSN, p. 22, June 9, 1997.
money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned
690
goods. 17

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

People vs. Salanguit 10 Id., p. 7.

11 RTC Records (Crim. Case No. Q-95-64358), p. 10.

proximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
10

12 TSN, June 9, 1997, p. 8.

prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11

13 Id., p. 9.

After the search, the police operatives took accused- 14 Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 24.

appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon 15 TSN, pp. 1-4, Nov. 24, 1997.

16 Id., pp. 5-6.

City, along with the items they had seized. 12
17 Id., p. 9.

PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the 691

confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a
13
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 691
total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box People vs. Salanguit
with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995,
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two
and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him
bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other
with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where
850 grams, were found to be marijuana.
accused-appellant was detained.
14
18

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own

Accused-appellant’s mother-in law, Soledad Arcano,
behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law,
corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the
Soledad Arcano.
policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December
away canned goods and other valuables. 19

26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard
a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house.
Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
 1. 1.In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,
2. 2.In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the
1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and
condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian
of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the
National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED. 20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that—
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
SEARCH WARRANT VALID
_______________
18 Id.
19 TSN, Oct. 6, 1997.
20 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE
SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three
grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the “plain
view” doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by
the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not issue
21
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly
with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the
22
search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-
appellant reads:
_______________
21 Formerly Rule 126, §3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
22 Nolasco v. Paño, 139 SCRA 152 (1985) citing Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA
388(1984).
693
 VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 693 The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined
People vs. Salanguit quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160 presented showing probable cause of the existence of
For: Violation of RA 6425 methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-
SEARCH WARRANT appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: is void because no evidence was presented
694
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, People vs. Salanguit
PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same
there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court. 23

has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex “A,” the properties
to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described and
forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995
at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three
grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for
drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be
searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund
Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer,
did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search
warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section,
NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were
assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned
for monitoring or surveillance?
A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house
without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City, sir.
Q Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q Are you familiar with that place?
A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate
inside the area and established contract with ROBERT
SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.
Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
- SALANGUIT alias Robert? Q- How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought
A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine
- drug pusher of shabu, sir. shabu?
Q Were you able to buy at that time? A- After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT
- @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
A Yes, sir. reported the progress of my mission to our Chief
- and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved? bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our
- Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical
- in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a
(P2,750.00) pesos, sir. regulated drug as shown in the attached
Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95
- @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were dated 19 Dec. 95.
being kept? Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room. your statement?
- A- Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT
_______________ SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to
23 Rollo, p. 29.

buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to

695
VOL. 695 transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
356, Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos
APRIL per gram.
19, 2001 Q- Are you willing to sign your statement freely and
People vs. Salanguit voluntarily?
A- Yes, sir.
24

Q How were you able to know the place where he

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support
kept the stuff?
the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not
A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from
warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This
him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the
fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. “Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court the warrant properly
25
_______________
24 RTC Records for Proceedings of Search Warrant No. 160, p. 5.
25 55 Cal. 2d 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 362 P. 2d 47 (1961) cited in WAYNE R.
LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 258 (2nd ed. 1987).
696
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
described two obscene books but improperly described other
articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does
not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would
mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant
was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of
the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the
named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of
obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise
valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles . . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid
portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be
obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor
items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale
seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified.
Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be
tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was
issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items
to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other
items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold
26
that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the
search of accused-appellant’s house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense because possession or use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of
R.A. No. 6425. It27
_______________
26 LA FAVE, supra at 28.
27 SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
697
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 697
People vs. Salanguit
will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to
dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it
is in connection with “Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes
alias ‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and custody
of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is
the subject of the offense stated above.” Although the specific section
of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question
at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a
basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also
satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of
the description to be made of the “place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso the search warrant was also for
29
“Violation of R.A. 6425,” without specifying what provisions of
the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure
of “dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic).” This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in question was
issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic
juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are
covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, the search war-
_______________
authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.—The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated
drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof. (As amended by Sec. 16, RA No. 7659.)
28 Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486, 490-491 (1987).
29 223 SCRA 174 (1993).
698
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
rant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short,
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate
search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for
illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession
of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly,
one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case, the search warrant was captioned:
31
“For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,
etc.).” The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular
provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses.
We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under §1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a
codification of the various laws on illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so
related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only
one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the
various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to
indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General
states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely “Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City,” the trial court took note of the fact that
the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1)
the application for search warrant which stated that the premises
to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan
Street, San Jose, Quezon City, 2) the
_______________
 30 Id., pp. 184-185.
31 Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989).
699
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 699
People vs. Salanguit
deposition of witness which described the premises as “a house
without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City;
and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be
searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant’s house
under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar
could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the
same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact
Aguilar’s place is at the end of appellant’s place in Binhagan.
Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar’s team is undeniably
appellant’s house and it was really appellant who was the target.
The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant
that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started
their operation. 32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. For example, a search warrant authorized a search
33
of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment
Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the
warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused
“Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro, Mass.” In 34
this case, the location of accused-appellant’s house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure
of shabu from accused-appellant’s residence, Search Warrant
No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath
or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana.
However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the
ground that the
_______________
32 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 140-141.
33 Prudente v. Dayrit, supra.
34 Commonwealth v. Todisco, Mass., 294 N.E. 2d 860 (1973).
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
drug was seized within the “plain view” of the searching party.
This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within
the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must
35
be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence
before the police. The question is whether these requisites
36
were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana
in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the
warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant
has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently
found. As has been explained:
What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. 37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the
police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-
appellant’s law-
_______________
35 People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993) citing Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1968).
36 People v. Musa, supra citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,
29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
37 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
701
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 701
People vs. Salanguit
ful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident
to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested
and the premises within his immediate control. The rationale
38
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested
from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for
incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant’s person or in
an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had
been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was
no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is
similar to People v. Musa in which we declared inadmissible
39
the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said
drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication
of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging
in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They
had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was
visible to the police officer’s eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of
the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that
the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their “plain view,” what may be said to be the
object in their “plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic
bag was not immediately apparent from the “plain view” of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinc-
_______________
38 People v. Musa, supra, citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed.
2d 744 (1981).
39 Supra.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salanguit
tive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer.40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in
aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this 41
case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of
accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in
newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible
as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner
these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without
a warrant was conducted in accordance with the “plain view
doctrine,” we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation
of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and
unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in
effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
42
Right to break door or window to effect search.—The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein
to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant’s claim that the policemen had clambered up
the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and
windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent
proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like
the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-
appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
_______________
40 Id., p. 612.
41 Nolasco v. Paño, supra.
42 Formerly Rule 126, §6 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
703
VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 703
People vs. Salanguit
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano’s claim that they had to use
some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The
occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused
to open the door despite the fact that the searching party
knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents
saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house.
These circumstances justified the searching party’s forcible
entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that
the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they
do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs under §16 of RA. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same
court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation
of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as
ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357 affirmed; but
reversed and set aside in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358,
accused-appellant acquitted therein.
Notes.—Objects could not be considered to have been
seized in plain view where there was no valid intrusion and
the evidence
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De la Cruz
was not inadvertently discovered. (People vs. Bolasa, 321
SCRA 459 [1999])
Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personalty despite
absence of warrant under the “plain view doctrine,” so long as
the area of search is within the immediate control of the
arrested person and that the object of the search was open to
the eye. (People vs. De Guzman, 351 SCRA 573 [2001)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Partially Valid Warrant
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MAXICORP, INC.,
a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites
a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
*
If
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.

respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court; Questions of Law vs. Questions of Fact; A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.—A petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions
of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this
Court will not review them on appeal, subject to exceptions as when
the findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the
trial court.
Same; Same; A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.—The distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt
or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple,
determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is
sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that
all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve
purely questions of law.
Same; Same; There is a question of law if the issue raised is
capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review
of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.—There is
225
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 225
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual.
Civil Procedure; Legal Personality to File Petition for Review
under Rule 45; Proper Party; The general rule is that the proper
party in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as
representative of the People of the Philippines. However, a petitioner-
complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its
case before the Supreme Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there
is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due
process.— Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal
personality to file this petition since the proper party to do so in a
criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative
of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule
but the exception governs this case. We ruled in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the petitioner-
complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its
case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave
error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This
avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in
the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to
pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The
circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently
similar to the present case to warrant the application of this
doctrine.
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause means
“such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper.”—Probable cause means
“such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper.” Thus, probable cause for
a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense
are in the place to be searched.
Same; Determination of Probable Cause; The judge
determining probable cause must do so only after personally
examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath
required must refer
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses.”—The judge determining probable cause
must do so only after personally examining under oath the
complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.” The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances. “Reliable information” is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses.
Same; Same; The determination of probable cause does not call
for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment
of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause” is concerned with probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty.—The determination of
probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial
on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause”
is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.
The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.
Law on Intellectual Property; Copyright Infringement and
Unfair Competition; What Constitutes; Copyright infringement and
unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling,
packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the
counterfeit goods.—Copyright infringement and unfair competition
are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a
whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to
marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit
goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses on
such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules
of Court only require that the judge examine personally and
thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to
determine probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the
requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
227
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 227
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; A
search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and
the objects to be seized. It shall be issued "in connection with one
specific offense.” The articles described must bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is issued.—A search warrant must
state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be
seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the
articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the
search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is
necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no
unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.
Same; Partially Defective Search Warrant; There is no existing
provision of law which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect
to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective
warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant.—No provision of law exists which requires that a warrant,
partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet
particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a
whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items
specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable,
the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant.
Constitutional Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; Section 3(2)
of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any
proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and
seizure.—The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of
the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure.
Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants,
not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to
Maxicorp.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Torres for petitioner.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
Michael Elbinias for respondent Maxicorp, Inc.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
1
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 23 December 1998 and its
2
Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Order of the Regional Trial
3
Court, Branch 23, Manila (“RTC”), denying respondent
Maxicorp, Inc.’s (“Maxicorp”) motion to quash the search
warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners
are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49
(“Section 29 of PD 49”) and for unfair competition under
4
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”). 5
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”)
Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. (“NBI Agent Samiano”) filed
several applications for search warrants in the RTC against
Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and
Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary
examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William
M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-
453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices
Jorge S. Imperial and Omar U. Amin concurring.
3 Penned by Judge William M. Bayhon.
4 Presidential Decree on Intellectual Property. Section 29 punishes
copyright infringement.
5 Article 189 punishes unfair competition.
229
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 229
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for
July 1996 a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property resolution:
fitting the description stated in the search warrants. 230
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of 1. 1.WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS
“general warrants.” The RTC denied Maxicorp’s motion on 22 OF LAW;
January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorp’s motion for 2. 2.WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL
reconsideration. PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants 3. 3.WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;
(“Sacriz”), and computer technician Felixberto Pante 4. 4.WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE
(“Pante”). The three testified on what they discovered during “GENERAL WARRANTS.”
their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also The Ruling of the Court
presented certifications from petitioners that they have not The petition has merit.
authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
petitioners’ products. Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari raise questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments
with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. petitioners presented are questions of fact, which this Court
On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the should not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review.
RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in this
warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out that the
Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999. facts are not in dispute.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to present during the preliminary examination conclusive should cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not
6

evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of
products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review
receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he them on appeal, subject to exceptions as when the findings of
7

bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court.
8

certain “Joel Diaz.” The distinction between questions of law and questions of
Hence, this petition. fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or
The Issues difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
_______________
6 Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
7 Amigo v. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).
8 Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., 125 Phil. 701; 19 SCRA
289(1967).
231
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 231
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems
simple, determining the true nature and extent of the
distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is
incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of
being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value
of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
9
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query
10
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Our 11
ruling in Paterno v. Paterno is illustrative on this point:
12
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious,
or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are
without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs
presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary
evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one
side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests
as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as
to justify refusing to give said proofs weight—all these are issues of
fact.
_______________
9 Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario De Molo, 132 Phil. 9; 23
SCRA 525 (1968).
10 Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, 21 January
1991, 193 SCRA 93.
11 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, 7 December 1992, 216
SCRA 224.
12 G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by
petitioners. But this situation does not automatically
transform allissues raised in the petition into questions of
law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition—the legal
personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants
issued and the presence of probable cause—only the first two
qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there
was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question
of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question
of law since it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity
of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require
this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence
presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by
raising arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and
the documentary evidence presented during the search
warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us
substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence.
This is exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only
questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the
function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. When we 14
give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of
exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of
extremely meritorious circumstances. 15
_______________
13 Manila Bay Club Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 805; 245 SCRA
715(1995).
14 Nicolas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37631, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 635.
15 As laid out in Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., supra:
233
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the
findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of
the RTC. Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting
16
findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to
resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this
Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to
file this petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal
case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of
the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule
but the exception governs this case. We ruled in Columbia
17
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the 18
petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45
could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor
General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or
lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a
complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a
case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy
due to circumstances beyond its control. The cir-
_______________
1. (a)when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures;
2. (b)when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
3. (c)where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. (d)when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. (e)when the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are conflicting;
6. (f)where the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence of record.
16 Ibid.
17 People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155.
18 G.R. No. 111267, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA 219.
233
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
cumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are
sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the
application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search
Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the RTC based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the
name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the
Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that
the RTC considered in determining the existence of probable
cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err
in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire
preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was
defective.
 The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual
findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt
presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought
counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain
“Joel Diaz.” Second, the fact that petitioners’ other witness,
John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit
goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
RTC’s findings.
Probable cause means “such reasons, supported by facts
and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief
that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper.” Thus, probable cause for a search
19
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched. 20
_______________
19 United States v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914).
20 Burgos,
Sr. v. The Chief of Staff, AFP, 218 Phil. 754; 133 SCRA
800 (1984).
235
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 235
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his
witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.” The applicant must have
21
personal knowledge of the circumstances. “Reliable
information” is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough,
22
and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses. 23
The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the findings of the RTC
centers on the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners
during the preliminary examination failed to prove
conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from
Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a
failure to prove the existence of a connection between the
offense charged and the place searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright
infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair
competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these
charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent
Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian.
The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate
several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one
of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to
the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of
infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected
the testimonies of the witnesses to the requisite examination.
NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display
_______________
21 Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
22 Ibid.
23 Roan v. Hon. Gonzales, 230 Phil. 90; 145 SCRA 687 (1986).
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also
saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged
within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically
stated that he was certain the products were counterfeit
because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving
the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements
and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he
witnessed several instances when Maxicorp installed
petitioners’ software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz
also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners’ software
within Maxicorp’s premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the
object and documentary evidence they presented, are
sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and
in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
24
judge after a fullblown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific
kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determi-
_______________
24 People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937).
237
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 237
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
nation exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of
25
conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was
26
improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s
findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his
name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales
receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners’
software occurred. During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the
computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which
computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’
software. Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
27
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent
Samiano purchased the computer unit. Pante, the computer
28
technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of
petitioners’ software on the same computer unit. There was a
29
comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and
Maxicorp’s software preinstalled in the computer unit that
NBI Agent Samiano purchased. Even if we disregard the
30
sales receipt issued in the name of “Joel Diaz,” which
petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used
in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Sacriz’s
testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase
counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the
existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and un-
_______________
25 La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332; 129 SCRA
373(1984).
26 Central Bank of the Phils. v. Morfe, 126 Phil. 885; 20 SCRA 507 (1967).
27 TSN of proceedings on application for search warrants, Rollo, p. 50.
28 Ibid., p. 59.
29 Ibid., p. 52.
30 Ibid., p. 61.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
fair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying,
assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere
offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm
testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses on such other acts stand
untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only
require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the
applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine
probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the
requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and
findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who
had the opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses. For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve
31
great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts
before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. Nothing in
32
the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal
any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one
can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly the
applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of
proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be
placed in a compromising situation if it were required to
present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General
Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be
searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for
this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to
those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the
_______________
31 Luna v. Hon. Plaza, 135 Phil. 329; 26 SCRA 310 (1968).
32 Supra note 25.
239
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 239
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and
seizures be committed. 33
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue “in
connection with one specific offense.” The articles described
must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is issued. Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state
34
that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or
intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too
broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to
the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the
warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Maxicorp and reversed the RTC’s Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner’s
store can be seized on the ground that it is “used or intended to be
used” in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the
private respondents’ software and their manuals. 35
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived
infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC
issued. The appellate court found that similarly worded
warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase “used or
intended to be used,” were previously held void by this
Court. The disputed text of the search warrants in this case
36
states:
_______________
33 Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920).
34 BACHE & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 147 Phil. 794; 37 SCRA
823 (1971).
35 Rollo, p. 38.
36 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, 29 June 1993, 223
SCRA 761; 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-76649-51,
19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 655; BACHE & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 147
Phil. 794; 37 SCRA 823 (1971).
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
1. a)Complete or partially complete reproductions or
copies of Microsoft software bearing the Microsoft
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes
and hard disks;
2. b)Complete or partially complete reproductions or
copies of Microsoft instruction manuals and/or
literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
3. c)Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
4. d)Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts,
ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books
of accounts and documents used in the recording of the
reproduction and/or assembly, distribution and sales,
and other transactions in connection with fake or
counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights
and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
5. e)Computer hardware, including central processing
units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives,
keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying
machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used
or intended to be used in the illegal and unauthorized
copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their
manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise
exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks
and copyrights; and
6. f)Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in
order to access all computer hard drives, data bases
and other information storage devices containing
unauthorized Microsoft software. (Emphasis
37
supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The description of the
38
property to be seized need not be technically accurate or
precise. The nature of the description should vary according to
whether the identity of the property or its character is a
_______________
37 Rollo, p. 64.
38 People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
241
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 241
 Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc. 39 Kho v. Hon. Makalintal, 365 Phil. 511; 306 SCRA 70 (1999).
40 Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18.
matter of concern. Measured against this standard we find
39
41 Supra note 36.

that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be 42 Supra note 34.

seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they 43 Supra note 36.

were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the 242

offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those 242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
articles used or intended for use in the illegal and Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This language c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,
meets the test of specificity.
40
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In
CORPORATION;
those cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers
of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the
property used for personal or other purposes not related to
phrase “used or intended to be used.” In Columbia Pictures,
copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the
Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of “television
description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought
sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x
legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors.
x” were found too broad since the defendant there was a
Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing
licensed distributor of video tapes. The mere presence of
41

the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not.

counterfeit video tapes in the defendant’s store does not mean
Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright
that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes.
infringement or unfair competition.
The situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a
licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co.
warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to
(Phil.),Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the
be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should
warrants because they authorized the seizure of records
be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains
pertaining to “all business transactions” of the
valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A 44

defendant. And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court

42

search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently

of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely
described may be cut off without destroying the whole
gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that
warrant. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of
45

such appliances are “generally connected with the legitimate

Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any
business of renting out betamax tapes.” 43

proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable

However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants
searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph
lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states:
_______________
(c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b,
d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
 WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant (Kenneth Roy Savage/K Angelin Export Trading vs. Judge
petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 Taypin, 331 SCRA 697 [2000])
December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in ——o0o——
CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE 244
except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Search War-
_______________
44 People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, 19 April 2001, 356 SCRA 683.

45 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, 20 October 2000, 344

SCRA 36.
243
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 243
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
rants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles
seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling
under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to
Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-
Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., No part. Close relation to counsel.
Petition partially granted, assailed decision and resolution
reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A reevaluation of the factual issues by the
Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is
justified only when the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the records or are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. (Marquez vs. Court
of Appeals, 329 SCRA 567[2000])
If there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant is null
and void and all property seized by virtue hereof shall be
returned in accordance with established jurisprudence.
Personal Determination by Judge
G.R. No. 197293. April 21, 2014.*
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary
Investigation; The conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable
cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.—
The conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause
lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon
evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis
to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
648the information with the court. Once the information
has been filed, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence” to
determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; Warrants of Arrest; The
Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or
warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause.—The Constitution
prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest
where the judge has not personally determined the existence
of probable cause. The phrase “upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce” allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge ex parte.
Same; Same; Once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or
the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court.—Once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused,
rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A judge must always
proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of
probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it.—Although jurisprudence and procedural
rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the
preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he
or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to
support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss
the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause,
he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and
trial in order that justice may be served.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
649
Escobido & Pulgar Law Offices for petitioner.
Kalalo, Cacho & Associates Law Firm for private
respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a
person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor, the trial
court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental right to
liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the
evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable
cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Court of Appeals’ decision[2] dated January 14, 2011, which
reversed the Regional Trial Court’s dismissal of the complaint
against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft
and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno
Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on
January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against
Alfredo.[3]
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June
2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On
November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia,
conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that
five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without
Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.[4]
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars
made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-31.
[2] Id., at pp. 33-44.
[3] Id., at p. 80.
[4] Id.
650were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were
accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo
failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a
Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into
account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of
the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount
of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.[5]
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno
Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership over the five (5) cars
or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted
payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.[6]
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado
issued a resolution[7] finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for
qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied.[8]He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.[9]
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two
informations for qualified theft[10] and estafa[11] were filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong
City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for
determination of probable cause[12] before the trial court. On
April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
_______________
[5] Id., at pp. 81-82.
[6] Id., at p. 82.
[7] Id., at pp. 60-64.
[8] Id., at p. 35.
[9] Id.
[10] Id., at pp. 65-67.
[11] Id., at pp. 68-69.
[12] Id., at pp. 70-79.
651
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not
conducted.[13] On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to
submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory
hearing, for resolution.[14]
 On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge
Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order[15] dismissing the
complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on
record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008,
the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding
of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.
x x x.[16]
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial
court denied on July 3, 2009.[17]
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that “the
determination of probable cause and the decision whether or
not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the
public prosecutor.”[18]
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision,[19] reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case.
In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction “in supplanting
_______________
[13] Id., at p. 35.
[14] Id., at pp. 35-36.
[15] Id., at pp. 80-85.
[16] Id., at p. 84.
[17] Id., at p. 87.
[18] Id., at p. 36.
[19] Id., at pp. 33-44, Court of Appeals’ decision, per Tenth Division, penned
by J. Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by J. Ricardo R. Rosario and J.
Samuel H. Gaerlan.
652the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her
own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable
cause.”[20]
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45
before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was
correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown
by the evidence on record. He argued that “judicial
determination of probable cause is broader than [the]
executive determination of probable cause”[21] and that “[i]t is
not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is
exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x.”[22]
In its comment,[23] Juno Cars argued that Alfredo
presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere
rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the
appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public
respondent, stated in its comment[24] that the appellate court
correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of
probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of
probable cause.
In his reply,[25] Alfredo reiterated that “judicial
determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior
faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the
disposition of the issue on the existence of probable
cause.”[26] He argued that the findings of the trial court should
be accorded greater weight
_______________
[20] Id., at p. 44.
[21] Id., at p. 15.
[22] Id.
[23] Id., at pp. 130-136.
[24] Id., at pp. 146-161.
[25] Id., at pp. 163-166.
[26] Id., at p. 163.
653than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings
of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss
an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own
independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the
issue of the difference between the determination of probable
cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of
probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these
two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified
theft[27]and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no.
3(c)[28] of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation
must first be conducted “to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty
_______________
[27] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 310. Qualified Theft.—The crime of theft
shall be punished by the penalties next higher in degree than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is large
cattle or consists of coconuts, or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
[28] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 315. Swindling (Estafa).—Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall
be punished by:
xxxx
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such
amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned,
the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxxx
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
xxxx
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in
part, any court record, office files, document or any other papers.
654thereof, and should be held for trial,” in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable
cause lie solely within the discretion of the public
prosecutor.[29] If upon evaluation of the evidence, the
prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or
she shall then cause the filing of the information with the
court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
“personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence”[30] to determine whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage,
a judicialdetermination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,[31] this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function
has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether
or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
_______________
[29] See Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575,
598 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].
[30] RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 112, Sec. 6.
[31] 607 Phil. 754; 590 SCRA 95 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
655
 The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.[32]
The difference is clear: The executive determination of
probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough
evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
In People v. Inting:[33]
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for
the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embar-
_______________
[32] Id., at pp. 764-765; p. 106, citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 273 Phil. 290, 296;
196 SCRA 86, 90 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 620-621; 254 SCRA 307, 350 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc]; Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, 611; 280 SCRA 365, 380 (1997) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
[33] G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En
Banc].
656rassment of trial — is the function of the
Prosecutor.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for
the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the
prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan
Cerbo[35] discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan
Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his
father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed
against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as
private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging
Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a
motion to amend the information, which was granted by the
court. The information was then amended to include Billy
Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued
against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing
that it was issued without probable cause. The trial court
granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the
case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals
and ordered the reinstatement of the amended information
against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case
or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are
simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid
on its face and
_______________
[34] Id., at pp. 792-793.
[35] 361 Phil. 401; 301 SCRA 475 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
657there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor,
courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during
the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the
public prosecutor in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal
justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
“oppressive” exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to
be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we
recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no
showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the
performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain
from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the
accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move
for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal
is resolved.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of
Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and evidence
were “sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner]
x x x.”[37] There was nothing in his resolution which showed
that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law
and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was
valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her
own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the
arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
_______________
[36] Id., at pp. 420-421; pp. 493-494.
[37] Rollo, p. 62.
658
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant
of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the
accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants
or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce” allows a determination of
probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
“immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to
establish probable cause.” Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112
reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the
Regional Trial Court.—Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue
a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
659by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7
of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:[38]
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court
three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the
above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents.[39](Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that “once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused,
rests in the sound discretion of the court.”[40]
_______________
[38] G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264 [Per J.
Abad, En Banc].
[39] Id., at pp. 287-288.
[40] Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598
[Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division], citing Galvez
660
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent
assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that “the
evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause
for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.”[41] Specifically,
she found that Juno Cars “failed to prove by competent
evidence”[42] that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by
Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that
these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to
substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that
the complaint “[did] not state with particularity the exact
value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly
have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the
accused,”[43]which she found crucial to the prosecution of the
crime of estafaunder Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of
the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this
case be set for clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters
pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private
complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as
well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying
itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case
which private complainant failed to do.[44]
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on
the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case
against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a
judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases
due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary
_______________
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, 237 SCRA 685
[Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
[41] Rollo, p. 84.
[42] Id.
 [43] Id.
[44] Id., at pp. 84-85.
661nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she
finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a
finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case.
On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she
must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in
order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza
are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law
is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day without regard to the fine. (Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA
13 [2012])
Under Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same.
(Arroyo vs. Department of Justice, 681 SCRA181 [2012])
——o0o——

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Examination of Witness
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mata vs. Bayona
No. L-50720. March 26, 1984. * 389
SORIANO MATA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSEPHINE K.
BAYONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court
of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO MAYOTE,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrant; Illegality
of issuance of search warrant for judge’s failure to conform with
essential requisites for taking depositions of complainant and his
witnesses to determine existence or non-existence of probable cause,
and to attach the depositions in the record.—Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Term “depositions”, meaning and nature
of; Searching questions to applicants for search warrant, nature of.—
The term “depositions” is sometimes used in a broad sense to
describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more
technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited
to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial
proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination.
A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other
judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory,
and usually subscribed by the witnesses. The searching questions
propounded to
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
VOL. 128, MARCH 26, 1984 389
Mata vs. Bayona
the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must
depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long
as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with
certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath
may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and
elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and
must be in writing.
Same; Same; Same; Strict compliance by judge with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions in
issuance of search warrant enjoined; Liberal construction in favor of
individual; Presumption of regularity, not invocable by officer who
undertakes to justify issuance of search warrant.—Thus, in issuing
a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A
liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the
rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it.
Same; Same; Same; Illegality of search warrant does not call
for return of things seized which are prohibited.—While We hold
that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro vs. Pabalan, it was held that the
illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the
things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the City Court
of Ormoc. Bayona, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Valeriano R. Ocubillo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
(not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mata vs. Bayona
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant
issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the
application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private
respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed,
and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge.
Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of
respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to
the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal
Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD
810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him
alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on
the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned.” 1
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case
could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry
respondent Judge replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to
the records.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing
and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent
Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of
Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP;
that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and
that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify
_______________
1 Annex “A”, of the petition, p. 7, Rollo.
391
VOL. 128, MARCH 26, 1984 391
Mata vs. Bayona
when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
2
aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court,
with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
 We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality
for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is
the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section
4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before
issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it
if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.
The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants
under oath has become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at
the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers
_______________
2 Annex “H” of the petition, p. 20, id.
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mata vs. Bayona
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant,
after he demanded the same from the lower court since they
were not attached to the records, he did not find any
certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to
quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true
copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which
certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back.
Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint
affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also
the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more
confirmed by respondent Judge’s own admission, while
insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that
“she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because
to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which
will be open and public”, such that, according to her, the
3
persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and
move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure
the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no
“deposition in writing” attached to the records of the case in
palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore
quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to
stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and
child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make
both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to
abate the proliferation of this illegal “masiao” lottery, she
thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of
deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court
room.
Two points must be made clear. The term “depositions” is
sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written
statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to
written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial
_______________
3 Comment, p. 31, id.
393
VOL. 128, MARCH 26, 1984 393
Mata vs. Bayona
proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or
4
taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a
commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to
interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed
by the witnesses. The searching questions propounded to the
5 6 54 SCRA 312.
applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must
depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just
as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to
believe the commission of a specific offense and that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public.
It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more
important is that the examination or investigation is not
merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the
required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and
must be in writing.
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites.
It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
“It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of
others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.” 6
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon,
_______________
4 16 Am Jur, 699.
5 Words & Phrases “Demand”, p. 258.
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mata vs. Bayona
or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked
7
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return
of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro vs.
Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant
9
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession
of which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search
warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the
motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search
warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding
such illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as
stock of “masiao” tickets; “masiao” issue tickets; bet money;
control pad or “masiao” numbers; stamping pad with rubber
stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai,” cannot be returned as
sought by petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Actg. C.J., (Chairman), Concepcion,
Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., in the result.
Abad Santos, J., no part.
Petition granted and order reversed.
Notes.—The constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not require judicial intervention in
the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law.
General search warrants are outlawed because they place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383.)
_______________
7 Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 42.

8 People vs. Veloso, 40 Phil. 169.

9 70 SCRA 478.

395
VOL. 128, MARCH 26, 1984 395
Salgado vs. Court of Appeals
The Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Particularity of Description
G.R. No. 199032. November 19, 2014.*
RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Reprimand; Section 5, Chapter III
of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that “[t]he imposition upon
an Executive Judge or Vice Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest
him of his position as such.”—Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that “[t]he imposition upon an
Executive Judge or Vice Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest
him of his position as such,” Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge and accordingly issue
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s Resolution
in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta, 585 SCRA 93 (2009),
wherein he was administratively penalized with fines of P15,000.00
and P5,000.00. While the Court does agree that the imposition of
said administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified that
the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result
in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de
facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
Same; De Facto Officers; Words and Phrases; A de facto officer
is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face.—Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196
(2013), defines who a de factoofficer is and explains that his acts are
just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned, viz.: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment
from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging
[his] duties
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.
Same; Same; The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is
premised on the reality that third persons cannot always investigate
the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such,
have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in
office are legally such.—The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is
premised on the reality that third persons cannot always investigate
the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such,
have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in
office are legally such. Public interest demands that acts of persons
holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be,
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from
the officer in question — is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not
for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for
the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the
official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants;
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements
for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City.—Section
12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal cases
pertain to those “involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual
Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff
and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.” Search warrant applications for such cases may be
filed by “the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Philippine National Police(PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task
Force (ACTAF),” and
241
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 241
Laud vs. People
“personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies.” As in
ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly
describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or
things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The
Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official
leave of absence or are not physically present in the station,
the Vice Executive Judges” are authorized to act on such
applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may
be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
said courts.”
Same; Same; Same; In order to protect the people’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that no search warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.—In order to
protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) provides that no search warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Same; Same; Same; Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable
cause in connection with one (1) specific offense.—Section 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense: SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of probable
cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition
of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal
case.—In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of
proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That
a “considerable length of time” attended the search warrant’s
application from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself,
negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the
witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be
accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance
to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the
existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities
attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay
in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable
cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement
has been sufficiently met.
Same; Same; Same; Any designation or description known to
the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.—“[A] description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation
or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is
forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another.—There is forum shopping when
a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending
243
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 243
Laud vs. People
in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase
his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then
in another. Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed
in this case considering the various points of divergence attending
the search warrant application before the Manila-RTC and that
before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila
was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not
specify any crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be
searched were different — that in Manila sought the search of the
Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular
area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of
facts and circumstances between the two applications, the rule
against forum shopping was therefore not violated.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aguirre & Aguirre Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated
October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-
14407.4
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-53.
2 Id., at pp. 57-70. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Agnes Reyes-Carpio,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 72-74.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 207-208.
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
 The Facts
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP),
through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo,
applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves
located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-
a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims
summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad”
may be found.5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto
Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there
testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6)
persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group
that buried the victims.6
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as
Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued
Search Warrant No. 09-144077 which was later enforced by the
elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the
Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud
Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of
human remains.8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4
Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and
to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence9 premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act
on the application for a search warrant since he had been
automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge
when several administrative penalties were imposed against
him by
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 58.
6 Id., at p. 66.
7 CA Rollo, pp. 207-208.
8 Rollo, p. 59.
9 Id., at pp. 93-127.
245
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 245
Laud vs. People
the Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in
Davao City;11 (c) the human remains sought to be seized are
not a proper subject of a search warrant;12 (d) the police officers
are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for
exhumation of human remains;13(e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause;14(f) the rule against
forum shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of
the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be
seized.16
The Manila-RTC’s Ruling
In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted
the motion of Laud “after a careful consideration [of] the
grounds alleged [therein].” Aside from this general statement,
the said Order contained no discussion on the particular
reasons from which the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed
a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in
an Order19 dated December 8, 2009, wherein the Manila-RTC,
this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant’s quashal,
namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 95-98. Referring to the administrative case entitled “Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Peralta” (see 603 Phil. 94; 585 SCRA 93 [2009]), wherein
the Court administratively penalized Judge Peralta with fines of P15,000.00 Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
and P5,000.00.
abuse of discretion.
11 Id., at pp. 98-106.
12 Id., at pp. 106-108. It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search
13 Id., at pp. 108-112. warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application
14 Id., at pp. 113-118. therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
15 Id., at pp. 118-121.
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under
16 Id., at pp. 121-124.
17 Id., at p. 139. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as explicitly
18 Id., at pp. 140-187. recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in A.M.
19 Id., at pp. 188-192. No. 03-8-02-SC,26 pro-
246 _______________
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 20 Id., at p. 190.
Laud vs. People 21 Id.
22 Id., at pp. 79-80.
reason to justify the issuance of a search warrant by the 23 Id., at p. 191. See Davao-RTC Order dated July 7, 2009 penned by
Manila-RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City Presiding Judge Ridgway M. Tanjili.
where the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of 24 Id., at pp. 57-70.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;20 (b) the fact that the 25 Entitled “Resolution Clarifying Guidelines on the Application for and
Enforceability of Search Warrants” (January 25, 2000).
alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the 247
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 247
existence of probable cause;21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the Laud vs. People
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject
vided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National
matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-
same as the one contained in a previous application22before the
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction
RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-RTC) which had been
Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF),27 with the
denied.23
endorsement of its head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition
City, and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive
for certiorari before the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
Judge or Vice Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as
113017.
in this case.28
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established
The CA’s Ruling
since, among others, witness Avasola deposed and testified
that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in
In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the
December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried
People’s petition and thereby annulled and set aside the
the victims — two bodies in each of the three (3)
caves.29 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to
consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a
witness to get involved in a criminal case, stating that these
are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the
application of a search warrant.30 Accordingly, it deemed that
the physical evidence of a protruding human bone in plain
view in one of the caves, and Avasola’s firsthand eye witness
account both concur and point to the only reasonable
conclusion that the crime of Murder had been committed and
that the human remains of the victims were located in the
Laud Compound.31
Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping,
finding that the prior application for a search warrant filed
before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and circumstances
_______________
26 Entitled “Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties” (January 27,
2004).
27 Chapter V, Section 12, of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC omits the PAOC-TF and
the REACT-TF, and mentions, instead, the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF).
28 Rollo, pp. 62-64.
29 Id., at pp. 66-67.
30 Id., at pp. 64-65.
31 Id., at p. 67.
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
different from those in the application filed before the
Manila-RTC.32
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied in a Resolution33 dated October 17, 2011,
hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues for the Court’s resolution are as follows: (a)
whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge
Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b) whether
the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant
despite noncompliance with the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;
(c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular
description were complied with and the one-specific-offense
rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search
warrant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum
shopping.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A. Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.
Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which
provides that “[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or
Vice Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least
a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his
position as such,” Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge and accordingly issue
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s
_______________
32 Id., at p. 69.
33 Id., at pp. 72-74.
249
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 249
Laud vs. People
 Resolution in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge
Peralta34wherein he was administratively penalized with fines
of P15,000.00 and P5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified
that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of
itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407
considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have
made the issuance as a de factoofficer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de facto officer is and explains
that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one
having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive
office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be
one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from
an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.37
The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the
reality that third persons cannot always investigate the right
of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have
a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in
_______________
34 603 Phil. 94; 585 SCRA 93 (2009).
35 Id., at p. 103; p. 102.
36 G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196.
37 Id., at p. 224; citations omitted.
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
office are legally such.38 Public interest demands that acts
of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
— as distinguished from the officer in question — is
concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that
the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the
protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office
without being lawful officers.40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the
following elements must concur: (a) there must be a de
jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual
physical possession of the office in good faith.41
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in
this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice
Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to
the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and
was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal
technicality — that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III
of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above explained; also, it may be said
that there was general acquiescence by the public since the
search warrant application was regularly endorsed to
the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice
Execu-
_______________
 38 See Re: Nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as
Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Dennis B. Habawel, A.M.
No. 13-04-03-SC, December 10, 2013, 711 SCRA 715.
39 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7, 29; 21 SCRA 774, 792-793 (1967).
40 See Monroy v. Court of Appeals, 127 Phil. 1, 7; 20 SCRA 620, 626-627
(1967).
41 Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460, 472; 249 SCRA 342, 353
(1995).
251
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 251
Laud vs. People
tive Judge.42 Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical
possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as
the contrary was not established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta
can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid
as if it was issued by a de jureofficer suffering no
administrative impediment.
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search
Warrant No. 09-14407; Exception to the Compelling
Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those
“involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001, the Tariff and Cus-
_______________
42 Rollo, pp. 61-64.
43 “Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the
Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia,
to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience.
Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the
performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. ‘Bad faith’ does not simply connote
bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.” (Collantes v.
Marcelo, 556 Phil. 794, 806; 530 SCRA 142, 155 [2007])
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
toms Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.” Search warrant applications for such cases
may be filed by “the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads
of such agencies.” As in ordinary search warrant applications,
they “shall particularly describe therein the places to be
searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges [of
these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice
Executive Judges” are authorized to act on such
applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.”
 The Court observes that all the above stated requirements
were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application
was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed
by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,44 particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
(as will be elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous
crime of Murder.45 Finding probable cause therefor,
_______________
44 Rollo, p. 63. See also CA Rollo, p. 22.
45 Republic Act No. 7659, entitled “An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code,
as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes,” states:
xxxx
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason
of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
253
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 253
Laud vs. People
Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice Executive Judge,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state,
may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves
a “special criminal case” excludes it from the compel-
_______________
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;
xxxx
Sec. 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding
of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means
of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.” (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
ling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
filed.—An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action
is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on search warrant applications before
the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above mentioned
special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Section 2 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact that a
search warrant is being applied for in connection with a
special criminal case as above classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this
effect would be superfluous and therefore should be dispensed
with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on
these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the
preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.
255
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 255
Laud vs. People
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements
for the Issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 and the
One-Specific-Offense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the firsthand
account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he
personally witnessed the commission of the aforestated crime
and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims:
Q9: Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and
buried in the caves in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.?
A9: I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims
when they were still alive as Pedro and Mario. I don’t know the
names of the other four victims.
 Q10: What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four
victims were killed?
A10: Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and
bury equally the bodies in the three caves. We buried Pedro and
Mario altogether in the first cave, located more or less 13 meters
from the makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in
the second cave and the remaining two in the third cave.
Q11: How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of
December 2005?
A11: I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran
errands [for] him.46
Avasola’s statements in his deposition were confirmed
during the hearing on July 10, 2009, where Judge Peralta
conducted the following examination:
Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong
naghukay, nakatago o kasama ka?
_______________
46 Rollo, pp. 66-67.
257
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 257
Laud vs. People
Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.
Court: Mga ilang katao?
Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.
Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?
Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki.
x x x47
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the
testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge
Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the crime
of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the
human remains in connection with the same are in the place
sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc.,48 the
Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. However, the findings of the judge should not
disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates
of reason.49
_______________
47 Id., at p. 67.
48 563 Phil. 781; 538 SCRA 474 (2007).
49 Id., at p. 793; pp. 484-485.
258
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum
of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been
met. That a “considerable length of time” attended the search
warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not,
by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or
the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly
observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of
reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal
case.50 Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable
cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally
examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and
sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind,
the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does
not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the
probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance
with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular
description of “the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
“[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description
known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion
of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement.”51
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the
foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to
be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside the
Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City:
_______________
50 Rollo, p. 65.
51 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 907-908; 344 SCRA 36,
53 (2000); citations omitted.
259
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014
Laud vs. People
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any
time [of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the
three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the said Laud
Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao City and forthwith
seize and take possession of the remains of six (6) victims who
were killed and buried in the just said premises.
x x x x 52 (Emphases supplied)
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant
even made explicit reference to the sketch53 contained in the
application. These, in the Court’s view, are sufficient enough
for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described,
namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and
buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that
human remains are not “personal property” and, hence, could
not be the subject of a search warrant deserves scant
consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. (Emphases supplied)
“Personal property” in the foregoing context actually refers
to the thing’s mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or
alienated by a particular person. Article 416 of the Civil Code,54
_______________
52 CA Rollo, p. 207.
53 Rollo, p. 81.
54 Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
259
260
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
which Laud himself cites,55 states that in general, all things
which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be
personal property. Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place, and considering
further that they qualify under the phrase “subject of the
offense” given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti,56 it
follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant
under the above cited criminal procedure provision.
Neither does the Court agree with Laud’s contention that
the term “human remains” is too all-embracing so as to
subvert the particular description requirement. As the Court
sees it, the description points to no other than the things that
bear a direct relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder.
It is also perceived that the description is already specific as
the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the
buried bodies would have naturally decomposed over time.
These observations on the description’s sufficient particularity
square with the Court’s pronouncement in Bache and Co.
(Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,57 wherein it was held:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]) or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may
be guided
_______________
xxxx
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place
without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed.
55 Rollo, p. 46.
56 “Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man. It refers
to the fact that a crime has been actually committed.” (People v. Quimzon, 471
Phil. 182, 192; 427 SCRA 261, 270 [2004])
57 147 Phil. 794; 37 SCRA 823 (1971).
261
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 261
Laud vs. People
in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.);
or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence,
other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. (Emphases supplied)58
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular
description requirement — both as to the place to be searched
and the things to be seized — had been complied with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-
offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as
above cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the
issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for
more than one specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-
shot warrants was discussed in the case of People v. CA59 as
follows:
There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a
specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill
v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as
follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.
_______________
58 Id., at p. 811; p. 835.
59 G.R. No. 94396, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 101.
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laud vs. People
 Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause,
omitting to continue that it was in connection with one specific
offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot
warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, “to robbery,
theft, qualified theft or estafa.” On this score alone, the search
warrant was totally null and void and was correctly declared to be
so by the very judge who had issued it.60
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,61 the Court, however,
settled that a search warrant that covers several counts of a
certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense
rule, viz.:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband
items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with
the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein
issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. (Emphasis
supplied)62
Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued
only for one specific offense — that is, of Murder, albeit for six
(6) counts — it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court had been violated.
That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on
forum shopping.
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 104-105; citations omitted.
61 329 Phil. 875; 261 SCRA 144 (1996).
62 Id., at p. 928; pp. 185-186.
263
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 263
Laud vs. People
D. Forum Shopping.
There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously
or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase
his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another.63
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in
this case considering the various points of divergence
attending the search warrant application before the Manila-
RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses
presented in each application were different. Likewise, the
application filed in Manila was in connection with Murder,
while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and
more importantly, the places to be searched were different —
that in Manila sought the search of the Laud Compound caves,
while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold
Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and
circumstances between the two applications, the rule against
forum shopping was therefore not violated.
Thus, for all the above discussed reasons, the Court affirms
the CA Ruling which upheld the validity of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 113017 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
_______________
63 Briones v. Henson-Cruz, 585 Phil. 63, 80; 563 SCRA 69, 84 (2008).
264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Laud vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,** Leonardo-De
Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—While it is not necessary that the property to be
searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under appellant’s control or
possession. (Del Castillo vs. People,664 SCRA 430 [2012])
Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, “[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.” (People vs. Collado, 698 SCRA 628 [2013])
——o0o——
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1870 dated November
4, 2014.

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Objects of Seizure
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005.
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO
ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS,
process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by
the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of
a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A
search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A
search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the
*
People of the Philippines.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.

Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, respondents.
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; A search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of
a prosecution—it is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature,
and made necessary because of public necessity, resembling in some
respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.—
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention that a
search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the
commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against
any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of
personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in
nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John
Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
Same; Same; A search warrant is a legal process which has been
likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure
relevant evidence of crime—it is in the nature of a criminal process,
restricted to cases of public prosecutions and not a process for
adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights; A
private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI
or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special
penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file
pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia,
to validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the
admissibility of the properties seized.—A search warrant is a legal
575
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 575
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a
process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private
rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the
ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may
only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining
to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement
of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate
and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to
maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the
court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation
of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in
collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party
may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant
issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court
order granting such motion to quash.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG); While the general rule is that the proper
party to file a petition in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court to
assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People, a private corporation may file the petition
for certiorari which may be considered as the petition filed by the
OSG.—The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in
the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in
the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the
complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the
said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case
in lieu of the OSG: From the records, it is clear that, as
complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case
is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears
to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process,
the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein
as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling,
the Court gives this petition due course and will
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned
order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
Same; Same; Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The Court, in
exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issued raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.—The general rule is that a party is mandated to
follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the
Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the
petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
Same; Same; A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime.—A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of
the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the
search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating
to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or
exploratory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Essential Elements; The
plain view doctrine is not an exception to the warrant—it merely
serves to supplement the prior justification, whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful
arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected
with a search directed against the accused.—Objects, articles or
papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the
executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the
officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot
be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadver-
577
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 577
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
tently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure. The doctrine is not an exception to
the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification—
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an
incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being
present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused.
The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police
officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not
covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their
eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are
investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless
to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the doctrine,
there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there
is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The immediate
requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine
probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence—to be
immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s
instantaneous sensory perception of the object.—The immediate
requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him,
determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence. In
other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct
result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object.
The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to
connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of
the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without
the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent
at the moment of seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of inadvertence
means that the officer must not have known in advance of the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it.—The requirement of
inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not
have known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to
seize it. Discovery is not anticipated.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immediately apparent test does
not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating
character of evidence—incriminating means the furnishing of
evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a
person.—The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly
high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of
evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a
viewed object and criminal activity. Incriminating means the
furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the
guilt of a person.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probable cause is a flexible, common
sense standard, merely requiring that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that
certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime—a practical, non-traditio nal probability that
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.—Probable
cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable
caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof
that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-
traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all
that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and
verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.
Same; Same; Same; The immediately apparent aspect is central
to the plain view exception; It is not enough to prove that the sealed
boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents—evidence should be
adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for
the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the motion to
quash.—In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the
search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the properties to
be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the
officers only to seize “counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or
unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture
and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale,
sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins.” The implementing
officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and
579
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 579
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place
where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove
their claim that the items were seized based on the plain view
doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the
plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to
prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the
application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents’
motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI
and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004.
The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain
view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is
no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to
adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to
present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of
the petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the
enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers
discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and
their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It
must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the
warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their
contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI
agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were
opened.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 24.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Michael G. Ureta for petitioner.
Saguisag & Associates for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a
search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (for-
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
merly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied
and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by
Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation
of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8203:
1. a.Finished or unfinished products of UNITED
LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
multivitamins;
2. b.Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
3. c.Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts,
ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books
of accounts and documents used in recording the
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or
sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins. 1
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al.,
Respondents, Search Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled to
Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the following:
(1) a sketch showing the location of the building to be
2 particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was
searched; (2) the affidavit of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo
3 already patented by UNILAB since 1985;
Protection and Security Agency hired by United Laboratories,
Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture,
production and/or distribution of fake drug products such as
Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of
UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or
distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the
unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and,
if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint of4
UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and
Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit of NBI Agents
5 that the area of counterfeiting operations are the first
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 95.
2 Id., at p. 108.
3 Id., at p. 99.
4 Id., at pp. 103-104.
5 Id., at pp. 106-107.
581
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 581
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the
following allegations:
1. 2.When learned that an Asset was already placed by
ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY
AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a
room since November 2003, at the said premises
located at No. 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR.
RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a
certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP and that the said
premises which is known as SHALIMAR
PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to
manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products,
2. 3.Upon verification of the report, we found out that the
said premises is a six-story structure, with an
additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown.
It has a tight security arrangement wherein non-
residents are not allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the
premises;
3. 4.We also learned that its old address is No. 1524
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has a new
address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and
and second floors of Shalimar Building;
4. 5.Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the
Asset to take pictures of the area especially the places
wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations
were being held. At a peril to his well-being and
security, the Asset was able to take photographs
herein incorporated into this Search Warrant
Application. 6
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified
during the hearing on the application for the search warrant.
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court
granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-
4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the
law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the
following items:
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 106.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
1. a.Finished or unfinished products of UNITED
LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
multivitamins;
2. b.Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
3. c.Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts,
ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books
of accounts and documents used in recording the
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or
sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins. 7
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before
it, together with a true inventory thereof executed under oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on
January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in
coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon
multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at
the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which,
when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent
Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION
792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.
30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg. 8
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory
of the things seized in which he declared that the search of the
first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in
the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He
also filed a Return of Search Warrant, alleging that no other
9 averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search
articles/items other than those mentioned in the
_______________
7 Id., at p. 112.
8 Rollo, p. 114.
9 Id., at p. 116.
583
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 583
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed
that of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at
least one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court
10
issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the
turn over be made before the court, in the presence of a
representative from the respondents and the court. 11
The respondents filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence.” They contended
12
that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their
search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the
building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where items in “open display” were allegedly found. They
pointed out, however, that such premises was different from
the address described in the search warrant, the first and
second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise,
asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox
products which were not included in the list of properties to be
seized in the search warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the
motion, insisting that the search was limited to the first and
second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of
Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
warrant application, Rabe’s affidavit, as well as the joint
affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the
search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street
corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out
that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old
address, and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street,
_______________
10 Id.
respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by
the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the
appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the
latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The
respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of
UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of

11 Rollo, p. 115.
UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained
12 Id., at pp. 117-124.
in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Ave-
584 _______________
13 Rollo, pp. 125-128.
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 14 Id., at pp. 129-136.

United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip 15 G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.

Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was not 16 Rollo, p. 138.

17 Id., at pp. 153-155.

implemented in any other place. 13

18 Id., at p. 157.

In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized 585

were different from those listed in the search warrant. They VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 585
also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the
nue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not
premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court. In
apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized
14

accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of

items were not those described and itemized in the search
Appeals, the respondents served a copy of their pleading on
warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court
15

UNILAB.
itself. The respondents emphasized that the Shalimar
16

On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an

Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical
Order granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground
preparations of the following products:
17

that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not
Products:
those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the
- Povidone Iodine
trial court issued an advisory that the seized articles could no
18

- Chamomile Oil
longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in
- Aceite de Alcamforado
collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of
- Aceite de Manzanilla 19

the order, contending that the ground used by the court in

quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed likewise, declared that the examined Disudrin syrup failed the
the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, and insisted that it test. The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:
23

was not authorized to appear before the court under the Rules PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS
of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the BFAD 1. Unilab 21021552 3-06 - Registered,
was the authorized government agency to file an application Phenylpropanolamine however, label/
for a search warrant. (Disudrin) 12.5 physical
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had mg./5mL Syrup appearance
the personality to file the motion for reconsideration because does not
it was the one which sought the filing of the application for a conform with
search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of the BFAD
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in approved
the proceedings and filing pleadings. The only parties to the
label/registered
case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or public
specifications.
prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or
2. Ofloxacin Unilab 99017407 3-05 - Registered,
the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through
(Inoflox) 200 mg. however,
counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section
tablet. label/physical
7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
_______________ appearance
19 Rollo, p. 195. does not
586 conform with
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the BFAD
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip approved
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the label/registered
place searched by the NBI officers. In their rejoinder, the
20
specifications. 24

respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the _______________

option to look forward to. However, no such ocular inspection
21 20 Rollo, p. 207.

21 Id., at p. 214.
of the said premises was conducted.
22 Id., at p. 175.

In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the 23 Id., at p. 177.

result of its examination of the Disudrin and Inoflox samples 24 Id., at p. 182.

which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On 587
its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 587
declared that the substance failed the test. The BFAD,
22 United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order denying the
25
motion for reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court
declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only
authorized to take possession of “finished or unfinished products of
United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature of
said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to
the warrant does not, however, include REVICON but other
products. And whether or not these seized products are imitations
of UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor
any was given during the proceedings on the application for search
warrant relative to the seized products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity
and, hence, cannot be sustained.26
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where the
following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30
boxes of Inoflox 200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against
the respondents because they constitute the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same
counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the “plain view”
doctrine and, hence, the same are legally admissible as evidence
against the respondents in any and all actions?27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day
in court when the trial court quashed the search warrant for a
ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in
their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that the
trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The
petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of
_______________
25 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
26 Id., at p. 19.
27 Id., at p. 46.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
its right to due process. The petitioner asserts that the
description in the search warrant of the products to be
seized—“finished or unfinished products of UNILAB”—is
sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the premises of
the respondents not covered by any license to operate from the
BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or
repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, the petitioner asserts that the products seized were
28
in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The
petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted
that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said
articles were in plain view of the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that
the petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert
that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition
involving the validity and the implementation of the search
warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely assisted the
NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it
should have impleaded the said government agencies as
parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI
and/or the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the
government and its officers charged in their official capacity
in cases before the Supreme Court. The respondents further
assert that the trial court may consider issues not raised by
the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the just one building on the two parcels of land described in two titles
determination of the case. where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team the NBI officers. It also asserts that the building is located at
31

slashed the sealed boxes so fast even before respondent Isip the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No. Manila. 32

1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Trans- The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is
_______________ applicable in this case because the boxes were found outside
28 G.R. No. 121917, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 402.
the door of the respondents’ laboratory on the garage floor. The
589
boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 589
team—precisely because these were marked with the distinc-
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip _______________
fer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, 29 G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.

Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 30 Rollo, pp. 229-244.

31 Annexes “A” and “A-1,” Rollo, p. 285.

as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of
32 Annex “G,” Id., at p. 125.

the Court in People v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this

29
590
case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine. 30
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is,
tive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items were
in fact, the real party-in-interest to defend the validity of the
contained were themselves so designated to replicate true and
search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its
original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the
instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by
left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes the letters
33

the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not

“ABR” under the words “60 ml,” appeared to describe the
proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal
condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine
complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to
UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The
file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner points
petitioner pointed out that “ABR” is the acronym for “amber
out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically
bottle round” describing the bottles in which the true and
prohibit a private complainant from defending the validity of
original Disudrin (for children) is contained.
a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a state
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their
prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all,
own “license plates” which were instituted as among its
the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the application and
internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate
issuance of a search warrant is not a criminal action. The
that the items within are, supposedly, “Disudrin.” The NBI
petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched was
officers had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes
sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only
have one and the same data appearing on their supposedly
distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that although
some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo
were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the
original because these, too, were marked with the distinctive
UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading
pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched
showing respondent Isip; the boxes seized by the police
34
officers containing Disudrin syrup; and the boxes containing
35
Inoflox and its contents. 36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the
petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench; (2)
whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present
petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and
(3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the
first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the sei-
_______________
33 Annexes “C-2” and “C-4,” Id., at pp. 288-289.
34 Annexes “A” to “A-1” and “B-2,” Rollo, pp. 286-287.
35 Annexes “C-2” and “C-4,” Id., at pp. 288-289.
36 Annexes “C-5,” “C-6” and “C-7,” Id., at pp. 290-291.
591
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 591
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
zure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained
Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention
that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal
action or the commencement of a prosecution. The
37 38
proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made
necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some
respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is
39
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an
action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened
to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure
relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal
40
process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search 41
warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A
search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely,
the People of the Philippines. 42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not
a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere
private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished
43
from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of
_______________
37 State v. Kieffer, 187 NW 164 (1922).
38 Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584 (1929).
39 State v. Kieffer, supra.
40 Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 542 (1932).
41 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 63, p. 825, citing State v. Derry, 85 N.E.
765; Brooks v. Wyner, 46 So.2d 97; and Philipps v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354.
42 Section 1, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
43 State v. Derry, 86 NE 482 (1908).
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance
44
of public prosecution. 45
However, a private individual or a private corporation
complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged
with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD,
may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search
warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the
search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the
properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed;
such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or
such government agency. The party may file an opposition to
a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a
motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such
motion to quash. 46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI,
opposed the respondents’ motion to quash the search warrant.
The respondents served copies of their reply and
opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro,
Jr. The court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and
47
accepted the pleadings filed by it and its counsel.
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition
in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the
RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the
Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a
48
private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a
petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed
by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
_______________
44 Lodyga v. State, supra.
45 State v. Derry, supra.
46 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-
76649-51, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 655.
47 Rollo, p. 145.
48 G.R. No. 111267, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA 219.
593
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 593
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were
involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while
the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error
committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be
deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed
by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this
petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case
against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General. 49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the
hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court,
for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance
50
of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by
the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioner’s contention
that the issue of whether the Disudrin and Inoflox products
were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the
respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed
to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant;
in their reply, however, they averred that the seized items
were not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were
not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also averred that
the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives
and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful
search. In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15,
51
2004, the respondents even alleged the following:
_______________
49 Id., at p. 224.
50 Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, 29 August
2003, 410 SCRA 148.
51 Rollo, pp. 131-132.
 594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the
determination of whether there is a legal basis to quash the search
warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the
articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search
warrant—Disudrin and Inoflux products—were not included in the
search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the
raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms
cache, subversive materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in
the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some such.
No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell
without proper examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox
samples allegedly seized from respondent’s place were counterfeit.
All the relevant presumptions are in favor of legality.
52
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention
of the petitioner that the respondents never raised in the
court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin
and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the March 11, 2004 Order of the court a
quo on the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue
or the issue as to the alleged failure to particularly
describe in the search warrant the items to be seized
butupon which NO challenge was then existing and/or
NO controversy is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that “finished
or unfinished products of UNILAB” cannot stand the
test of a particular description for which it then reasons
that the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the
evidence seized is lawfully inadmissible against
respondents. 53
_______________
52 Rollo, pp. 140-141.
53 Id., at p. 23.
595
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 595
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and
the issue raised by it before finally resolving to deny the same.
It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was denied its
right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its
contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects
the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake
a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds
of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited
in scope so as not to be general or exploratory. Nothing is left
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 54
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but
on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him.
However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers
not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for
an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from
which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. 55
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely
serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a
_______________
54 People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, 12 September 2003, 411 SCRA 81.
55 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971).
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident
to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being
present, unconnected with a search directed against the
accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact
that when executing police officers comes across immediately
incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they
should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of
whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or
evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require
the police to obtain another warrant. Under the doctrine,
56
there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and
there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing
officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts
therein available to him, determine probable cause of the
object’s incriminating evidence. In other words, to be
57
immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the
officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object. The 58
object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause
to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating
nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the
search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure.
It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. 59
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means
that the officer must not have known in advance of the location
of the evidence and intend to seize it. Discovery is not
60
anticipated. 61
_______________
56 United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (1973).
57 United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574 (1987).
58 Ibid.
59 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
60 Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).
61 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
597
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 597
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly
high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of
evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate
the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists
between a viewed object and criminal activity. 62
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of
circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person. 63
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense
standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief
that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that
such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-
traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved
is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen
and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of
law enforcement. 64
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the
search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the
properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant
specifically authorized the officers only to seize “counterfeit
Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the
documents used in recording, manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale,
sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins.” The
implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when
opened at the place where they were found, turned out to
contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner
to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the
plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the
_______________
62 United States v. Beal, supra.
63 United States v. Truitt, Jr., 521 F.2d 1174 (1975).
64 Texas v. Brown, supra.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip
sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence
should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the
essential requirements for the application of the doctrine
during the hearing of the respondents’ motion to quash, or at
the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The
immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain
view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI.
There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even
attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and
the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed
the warrant, or any of the petitioner’s representative who was
present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove
that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed
that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had
personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their
contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent.65 There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they
were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner
and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the
application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the Regional
Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed orders affirmed.
_______________
65 People v. Go, supra.
599
VOL. 461, JUNE 28, 2005 599
Torres, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo
Notes.—Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA 668 [1999])
The seizure of evidence in “plain view” applies only where
the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. (People vs. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25 [2000])
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